NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH

BY

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The State Partnership Program (SPP), a National Guard (NG) supported initiative, is one of the many successful Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs available that the six Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) use to meet their objectives. However, has it reached its full potential as a “Whole-of-Government” tool for establishing enduring civil-military relationships while building partnership capacity across all levels of society to promote international stability and security? If not, what recommendations could be made for areas requiring improvements? Before the research questions can be adequately explored and answered, it is essential to present the foundations of the SPP to include exploring its history, goals and objectives, and the benefits achieved by using the program.
The National Guard’s State Partnership Program is about helping other nations, building friends and security.

—GEN Craig McKinley

The State Partnership Program (SPP), a National Guard (NG) supported initiative, is one of the many successful Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs available that the six Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) use to meet their objectives. However, has it reached its full potential as a “Whole-of-Government” tool for establishing enduring civil-military relationships while building partnership capacity across all levels of society to promote international stability and security? If not, what recommendations could be made for areas requiring improvements? Before the research questions can be adequately explored and answered, it is essential to present the foundations of the SPP to include exploring its history, goals and objectives, and the benefits achieved by using the program.

History of the SPP

The State Partnership Program evolved in 1993 from the United States European Command’s (USEUCOM) Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP). The JCTP, devised in 1992 by Generals Colin Powell and John Shalikashvili, was initially launched in Europe as a political and military outreach initiative to the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The JCTP presents the hosting nation with the U.S. example of how a civilian controlled military works in a democratic free market society. Soon after this program was established, DoD made the decision to send a thirty-member Military Liaison Team (MLT) led by Lieutenant General John B.
Conaway, former Chief of National Guard Bureau (NGB), to Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. DoD believed that the NG-led delegation would appear to the Russians as non-threatening and helpful to the emerging democracies and their defense forces. Creation of the SPP took place following the successful MLT when Lieutenant General Conaway, working with General Shalikashvili, proposed his visionary idea to pair State NGs with the countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Since then, the program has grown far beyond JCTP and is now a key United States security cooperation tool, facilitating mutual cooperation across all aspects of international civil-military affairs.

Soon after the establishment of the first state partnerships in USEUCOM the program evolved from a regional program into a global initiative. Today there are 62 countries partnered with 47 states, 2 territories (Puerto Rico and Guam), and the District of Columbia. Sixty percent of the growth took place in the past five years. United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) established its first SPP pairing (Arizona and Kazakhstan) in 1995 and now has six partnerships. United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) embraced the program in 1996, approving the partnership between Missouri and Panama, and currently has 20 flourishing partnerships. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) joined the program in 2000 by partnering Guam and Hawaii with the Philippines and today has six active partnerships. United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) has eight state partnerships, and its first program (New York and South Africa) was established in 2003 when most of Africa was part of USEUCOM. The partnership of Rhode Island and the Bahamas is the only one in United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).
The original SPP mission dating back to 1993 was “to link NG states and territories with partner countries for the purposes of fostering mutual interests and establishing long-term relationships across all levels of society.” This initiative supported the 1993 National Security Strategy (NSS) that directed the DoD to take an active role in shaping the international security environment by strengthening emerging nations, promoting democracy, fostering prosperity, and enhancing security. The early stage of the SPP focused on bilateral military to military engagements primarily to promote democratic ideals, especially subordination of military affairs to civilian authorities. In addition, the program provided much needed relief to the active duty forces that were already stretched thin due to force structure reductions and increased operational requirements.

By 1997 the now flourishing SPP, with its number of partners increasing to 24, located in three GCC areas of operation, broadened its mission significantly as follows:

Build genuine state partnerships which mobilize the entire social fabric of American support to democracy abroad. Capitalizing on the unique role of the NG citizen-soldiers, we will aggressively engage at home and abroad to promote stability by strengthening democracy and free market economies. We will assist in the construction of democratic institutions and the social infrastructures necessary to sustain a democratic tradition. Partnerships will create long-term personal relationships based on openness, confidence, and trust.

At this point the program grew well beyond its initial scope under the JCTP and was now a key shaping tool for the GCCs. The first SPP informal doctrine, published in 1998, identified five broad National Security Cooperation Objectives for the program leaders to focus their attention. The objectives were: to demonstrate military subordination to civilian authority, to demonstrate military support to civilian authorities, to assist in the development of democratic institutions, to foster open market economies
to help bring stability, and to project and represent United States' humanitarian values.\textsuperscript{11}

A sixth objective, to improve military interoperability between the United States and partner nations, was added later. The doctrine also stated that, in order to meet these objectives, NG members must focus (from a military perspective) on military justice codes, national security strategy, disaster response planning, military medical preparedness, search and rescue techniques, military leadership principles, and include the civic role which the program also supports.\textsuperscript{12}

Although the SPP endures as a program that supports the GCCs' achievement of their security cooperation objectives, it has evolved significantly. Continued emphasis is placed on civil-military cooperation, but now a whole-of-government approach for building partnership capacity and to achieve the security cooperation objectives nested in Country Campaign Plans (CCP) as well as the goals set in the U.S. Ambassadors' Mission Strategic Plans (MSP) is emphasized.

The Current Mission Statement developed in 2006 by Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, the former Chief of NGB, now reads, "Enhance combatant commanders' ability to establish enduring civil-military relationships that improve long-term international security while building partnership capacity across all levels of society."\textsuperscript{13} The mission spans military, political, economic and social realms; is characterized by personal and enduring relationships; features scalable cooperation activities via local, state and national conduits; and opens doors and the breadth of U.S. defense and interagency capabilities.\textsuperscript{14} Lieutenant General Blum was confident that this program would help to achieve the desired end states of security and stability in partner
countries. This mission statement remains relevant and supports statements written by Secretary of Defense, Robert N. Gates, in a *Foreign Affairs* article:

> Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches -- primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces -- to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States' allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.

Building partnership capacity is about assisting a partner nation in developing the required capabilities to ensure their stability and security. Done correctly partner countries will be better able to take ownership of and solve crisis situations within their borders, provide necessities to their people through sound governance, and hopefully become true enduring partners with the U.S. and not just customers of U.S. support. Building partnership capacity can be thought of as an umbrella objective that draws on the elements of security cooperation. If the NG is able to execute the SPP’s defined mission then the program will certainly provide value to the GCCs and their ability to achieve the Secretary of Defense’s strategy to prevent conflicts.

Although the SPP has been in existence since 1993 it was not until May of 2008 that it became a validated and recognized DoD program. The program received its first funding in FY 2009 DoD President’s Budget, and is now funded through FY 2015 as a result of the Program Objective Memoranda (POM) process. The program became reality because of the hard work of NGB-J5-IA, starting in 2006, working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense (ASD-HD), and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (AS-GSA). The program clearly supported the desired ends articulated in the DoD’s 2006 QDR *Execution Roadmap Building Partnership Capacity*. In this Roadmap, the
shift in emphasis / strategic direction is manifested by changing the Department’s approaches, for example: … from static alliances to dynamic partnerships; from the U.S. military performing tasks to a focus on building partner capabilities; … ¹⁹ Prior to DoD recognition, the SPP relied on Congressional earmarks and contributions from other DoD programs to finance its activities. ²⁰

The SPP, depicted in figure 1, starts with a foundation of individual bilateral partnerships between U.S. states and allied or friendly countries, and concludes with a roof illustrating the capacity of partnership governments and security forces. Partnerships start with a request from a country usually as the result of U.S. and foreign country security cooperation policy discussions and goal assessments. ²¹ The requests are submitted to the U.S. Ambassador who endorses the partnership concept and sends it to the appropriate GCC who then endorses the request and coordinates actions with NGB. NGB performs a selection analysis and nominates a state partner. The nomination goes through the GCC back to the Ambassador who presents it to the requesting nation. The requesting nation then approves the partnership and activities can begin.
Figure 1, Pillars of the State Partnership Program

Soon after a partnership is established the state will hire and train a State Partnership Program Director (SPPD) who will then meet with NGB representatives and the appropriate GCC desk officer to better understand U.S. involvement in the partner country. The state Adjutant General (TAG) and the SPPD will start the formal relationship process by first visiting with their partner country’s Embassy in the U.S. followed by the first country visit to meet with their senior leadership and the U.S. Ambassador. Based on these initial meetings and security cooperation guidance found in the GCC’s CCP and the security assistance guidance found in the Ambassador’s MSP, the state develops a five-year engagement plan. Outlined in this plan are the event planning and implementation goals and objectives. The plan must parallel NGB’s spectrum of engagement for military, political and social, and economic engagements.22

The SPP plan must follow the operational construct Lead – Support – Enable23

Through the SPP the NG will become a lead Department of Defense instrument by advancing civil-military cooperation. They will continue their steadfast support of military-to-military activities that reinforce the GCCs’ plans, and will leverage the close ties between the State/Territory NGs and their communities to enable and facilitate development of broad civil relationships that foster cooperation across all levels of society.24

Lead – Support – Enable become the basis for the program’s three engagement pillars which are comprised of Military to Military (mil-to-mil), Military to Civilian (mil-to-civ), and Civil Security Cooperation events. Events are planned and executed across a broad spectrum of cooperation as shown in figure 2. A well planned and executed program should culminate with enduring relationships and improved capacity of partnership governments and security forces prepared to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
SPP Goals and Objectives

To meet these challenges, along with the new operational construct, NGB J5’s International Affairs Division (NGB-J5-IA) developed new SPP goals and objectives. In 2007, NGB-J5-IA completed a detailed analysis of the then current National and DoD strategy and guidance documents to include: the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS), 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS), 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 2006 Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), 2005 DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense & Civil Support, and the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). From their analysis they determined common DoD themes and priorities and, from those, came up with four broad SPP goals that provide the strategic framework from which specific security objectives could be created. NGB-J5-IA identified supporting objectives for each of these goals to provide more specific guides for the program’s
execution and measuring the program’s effectiveness. The goals are broad, allowing for future expansion, and many of the SPP individual events support multiple goals.

The first goal, Build Partnership Capacity to Deter, Prevent, and Prepare, focuses on activities designed to build nation’s or region’s preventative capabilities to dissuade/avert attack or prepare for natural/man-made disasters emphasizing civil-military and interagency cooperation. Key supporting objectives include building capacity to exercise national sovereignty in the physical domain; plan and prepare for natural and man-made disasters, including attacks; protect critical infrastructure; deter and prevent the establishment of transnational and non-state networks that threaten freedom, stability, or peace; and plan and prepare for health contingencies and human related crises.

The second goal, Build Partnership Capacity to Respond & Recover, focuses on activities designed to build a nation’s or region’s responsive capabilities to respond and recover from attacks or natural/man-made disasters emphasizing civil-military and interagency cooperation. The two main supporting objects include building capacity to respond and recover from natural and man-made disasters, including attacks; and respond to sustained transnational threats.

The third goal, Support Partner’s Defense Reform & Professional Development, focuses on activities to assist nations in transforming defense structures and personnel to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The goal has two primary objectives and includes supporting institutional defense reform and transformation of military and security forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century; and development of
capabilities to plan and conduct operations within multi-service, interagency, and multinational environments.  

The last goal is to Enable and Facilitate Enduring Broad-Spectrum Security Relationships and focuses on activities designed to build a nation’s capabilities to cooperate and collaborate regionally and globally on a wide range of security and socio-political issues in support of DoS and other lead agencies. The four significant supporting objectives are to facilitate finding peaceful solutions to regional and global challenges, encourage good governance by sharing public and private sector management best practices founded on democratic principles, protect human rights and the rule of law, support economic security and growth initiatives to improve opportunities and prosperity for all citizens, and to enable the broadening and deepening of societal and cultural understanding through public diplomacy. The goal is achieved primarily through Civil Security Cooperation SPP engagements.

SPP Events

The states accomplish these SPP goals and objectives by planning and executing three types of engagements, mil-to-mil, mil-to-civ, and civil security cooperation (formerly Civ to Civ)-- the program’s three pillars. The engagements support: partner countries’ requirements, the GCC’s theater security objectives contained in their CCPs, the U.S. Ambassadors’ MSP and, in the case of Mil to Civ events, the NGB Annual SPP plan as well.

Mil-to-mil focuses on contacts and activities designed to promote cooperation, understanding and to support the GCCs' theater security cooperation missions between the U.S. and SPP military partners from the Chief of Defense level to unit level. Events can range from very small traveling contact teams (TCTs), subject matter
experts (SMEs), state hosted familiarization events (FAM) and individual exchanges (EXCH) up to small unit events (SUE) and unit and personnel exchanges (UEP). The smaller events are more common and are designed to share specific information relating to U.S. military operations. The larger more complicated and expensive events are found in mature partnerships. SUEs are bilateral activities that are designed to meet GCC goals that require increased capabilities and U.S. involvement, and the most common application is to help allies prepare to support current coalition operations.

UEPs are events that are common in mature partnerships and are conducted in annual training status to achieve more significant security cooperation objectives. The majority of military to military events are funded by the GCCs using their traditional commander activities (TCA) funds. NGB can also fund some of these activities. All events must support the GCC’s Country CCP and the U.S. Ambassador’s MSP.

Mil-to-Civ focuses on contacts and activities designed to build and promote defense security related cooperation in areas including but not limited to emergency management, disaster response and homeland defense/homeland security, and critical infrastructure protection. This is the main effort for the SPP, and most of the events that support achievement of the first two program goals fall under this category. The GCCs, country U.S. Ambassadors and NGB-J5-IA provide event approval. Guidance is found in CCPs and MSPs. The events are funded primarily with NGB funds and sometimes with GCC TCA funds. Many of the events highlight the NG’s ability to provide military support to civil authorities (MSCA) preparing for and responding to natural and man-made disasters. Activities also include law enforcement, counterdrug operations, port security, and border security operations. These events emphasize the
principal of civilian control over the military-- a principal that is not well understood in many countries.

Civil Security Cooperation events focus on contacts and activities facilitated by the broad-spectrum civil cooperation (education, legal, medical, science, economy) between partner nations. The role of the NG is to facilitate and enable the execution of these events, and it is able to do so because its access to the entire social fabric of the U.S. Guidance for these events comes from the Ambassadors’ MSPs and do not require GCC approval. Unlike mil-to-mil and mil-to-civ events, which are authorized by Title 10 USC, these events are executed under Title 22 USC authority. Resources needed to run this pillar of the program come from a variety of sources to include, but not limited to, government agencies, federal and state grants, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, private sector organizations, and other initiatives. Civil Security Cooperation events are the means to achieving the fourth goal of the program and are the most difficult to resource.

There are thousands of SPP events each year, close to 500 mil-to-mil events in USEUCOM alone. Each one is unique and tailored to a particular country and objective. Each GCC has a different regional focus. For instance USEUCOM prefers activities that increase civil military capabilities, promote NCO development, or lead to coalition support in current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM promote events that will build capacity to instill democratic values, promote economic development, address counter-narcotics issues and help to curb human trafficking. USAFRICOM encourages events that will sustain enduring efforts that contribute to African unity, reduce conflict and improve security, support crisis
response and humanitarian assistance, improve cooperative efforts to stem transnational terrorism and support peacekeeping training. USCENTCOM supports more mil-to-mil events and USPACOM wants emphasis placed on disaster planning and response, humanitarian assistance, maritime security, reserve component capabilities and peace support operations.

The Benefits of the SPP

The NG is well suited for the SPP mission for many reasons, the most significant being its ability to maintain long-term relationships, its ability to help partner countries build a cost effective professional reserve force, and its additional niche capabilities and their capacity to successfully execute the program. These abilities are the reasons why the SPP is a critical engagement tool for the GCCs. By linking American states with designated partner countries, the GCCs promote access, enhance military capabilities, improve interoperability, and enhance the principles of responsible governance.

Building long-term relationships is one of the most significant contributions of the SPP. Secretary Gates has argued, “much of our national security strategy depends upon securing the cooperation of other nations, which will depend heavily on the extent to which our efforts abroad are viewed as legitimate by their publics.” The key, he says, is “the steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time.” It is hard for the active Army to develop the trust and credibility that Secretary Gates indicates is critical because personnel move relatively quickly from assignment to assignment making long-term personal relationships near impossible to maintain. The NG partnerships do not have this problem and thus long-lasting and strong relationships are able to develop over many years of interactions. There are numerous Adjutant Generals who started interacting with their state partnership countries when they were
junior field grade officers. One example, Major General William Enyart, the Adjutant General in Illinois, first participated with his partner, Poland, when he was a junior Lieutenant Colonel. Many of the Polish contacts that he maintained relationships with are now senior leaders in their nation's military.\textsuperscript{43} Because of this long-standing relationship and the trust forged over many years between Illinois and Poland, Polish armed forces deployed to Iraq, commanding a multi-national division, and the Illinois Guard went with them providing critical enabling capabilities.\textsuperscript{44} This clearly demonstrates the power of relationships established in the SPP.

There are many nations that do not have the financial resources to build the large active military forces they require to ensure local and regional security, but are interested in building professional reserve forces to meet their needs. The U.S. NG, one of the best, most experienced, and well tested reserve forces in the world, is eminently qualified to help partner countries build or improve their reserve components and is the focus of many partnership events. For example, South Africa, a country with a stressed active duty force as a result of their involvement in numerous peacekeeping operations, wants the New York NG to assist them in transforming their marginally trained and ill equipped strategic reserve force into a professional operational reserve capable of mobilizing to fill some of their peacekeeping mission requirements.\textsuperscript{45} This significant objective will provide much needed relief for their active forces and increase their military capabilities at a greatly reduced cost. The New York NG planned and executed a number of mil to mil events designed to meet the objective and even taught them how to run an effective family program which is an imperative when sustaining a reserve force. This is a common objective for many of the partner countries across the entire
SPP and the NG is probably the best equipped DoD agency to help them achieve their goals.

In addition to the NG’s proficiency in fostering long-term relationships and skillfulness in assisting partner countries developing strong reserve components, they possess many niche capabilities to achieve SPP goals and objectives. NGB-J5-IA identified many of these NG capabilities to include providing a lower level concentrated focus on a partner country (State vs. U.S. Government); executing mission spanning military, political, economic and social realms; sharing their expertise with interagency coordination and cooperation; employing their skills and experience with disaster first preparedness, response, and mitigation; plus providing partners with insights on homeland security and defense. These additional capabilities allow the NG to go well beyond the traditional mil-to-mil engagements and provide their expertise in military to civilian activities and also enable civil security cooperation endeavors. As a result of these capabilities the NG's State Partnership Program (SPP) continues to be one of the GCCs’ most effective Security Cooperation Programs.

Every NG state or territory has the capacity to fully partner with at least one country and probably more. The operational tempo for both the active components and the reserves is very high, but the NG, at least on the Army side, may have more flexibility as a result of having more dwell time between deployments. According to the 2009 U.S. Army Posture Statement and the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Rotation Planning Goals, the active component will move towards a cycle of one to three (9 months deployed and 27 months training in a 3-year cycle) during steady-state conditions and a cycle of one to two (1 year deployed and 2 years training in a 3-year
cycle) during surge conditions. In the same document the stated ARFORGEN goals for the reserve component is a cycle of one to five (one year mobilized and five years demobilized in a 6-year cycle) during steady state conditions and a cycle of one to four during surge conditions. Neither of the components has achieved this goal and their mobilization cycles are significantly faster today, leaving very little time for active component units to participate in security cooperation activities. Even with the current deployment timelines in the NG, there is ample time between deployments to participate in short duration security cooperation and assistance events. When the ARFORGEN rotation goals are achieved, the NG will have additional capacity available to support the SPP.

There are numerous second and third order effects that can result from the SPP. Service members, state entities, and civilians all receive tertiary benefit from the program. Almost every individual participating in a SPP event will benefit from the experience. Due to the significance and high visibility of working with another nation, trainers will normally prepare classes, exercises, and presentations in more detail than normal and as a result will most likely become more proficient in their own positions and jobs. SPP events can be used to prepare NG members for mobilization. This is common with Air NG civil engineers who seek opportunities that mimic conditions close to those expected on a wartime deployment and match their mission training needs. They use these opportunities to enhance state partnerships, advance the combatant commander’s theater engagement objectives, and use the opportunity to prepare for their deployments. Lessons learned during partnership engagements are shared and American service members will learn new tactics, techniques, and practices from their
interactions with partner service members. This also applies to civilians and entities participating in Military to Civilian and Civil Security Cooperation events. Participants will most likely gain as much from the experience as their partners do.

Another outcome of the SPP, although hard to quantify, is that it helps to better position America by engaging States in a globalized world. Individual states participating internationally will gain from strong or improved international relationships, instead of focusing inwardly and relying on federal entities and large corporations to operate externally to the nation. The SPP offers opportunities for state governors, state agency leaders, additional state entities, civic organizations, business leaders, and educators to connect internationally. As individual state partnership programs mature and increase their participation over the broad spectrum of cooperation, the greater the benefit will be.

**Assessment**

It is clear that the NG is well suited for the SPP mission, but is the program achieving the goals and objectives required to establish enduring civil-military relationships, build partnership capacity across all levels of society and improve and promote international stability and security? This is a very difficult question to answer because security cooperation programs, of all types, are both dispersed and long-term, and a comprehensive framework for assessing them is still lacking. Empirical measures that determine if the outcomes of the security cooperation programs have achieved their effect or determine which ones achieve the greatest cost-benefit are not easy to define and currently do not exist. Today program officials often assert that the relationship with the partner country is simply “better” than it was prior to the execution of the activity. In the absence of empirical measures the best way to assess the
effectiveness of the program may be to look at how the GCCs rate the program and to look at what the events accomplish.

USEUCOM has the most experience with the SPP and worked hard to improve the program since its inception there in 1993. Today the SPP is viewed as a critical engagement tool essential for building theater security cooperation and shaping security and stability on the USEUCOM area of responsibility. USEUCOM states the SPP’s return on investment is monumental and cites the following program contributions:

1. The SPP is considered the pinnacle for success for building partnership capacity.

2. SPP countries support 90% or more of U.S. initiatives in NATO and other collective security bodies.

3. SPP countries favorably respond to 90% or more of U.S. requests for capabilities to support security initiatives.

4. All 20 state Adjutant Generals visit their SPP partner country yearly to discuss future combat, combat support, and combat service support missions. These strategic engagements foster partnering and relationship building.

5. On average, SPP engagements account for over 40% of all USEUCOM mil-to-mil events.

6. USEUCOM SPP’s co-deployment Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams are essential for taking the burden off U.S. centric embedded training teams supporting ISAF in Afghanistan.

USEUCOM believes that, with the appropriate resources and authorities, the SPP will be the benchmark for military partnering, building partnership capacity,
enhancing USEUCOM’s regional security, supporting ISAF, and reducing the “hard” DoD footprint by leveraging mil-to-civ engagements.

USAFRICOM presents another example of a GCC that recognizes the value of the SPP. GEN William Ward, Commander, USAFRICOM, in his March 2009 written testimony to the U.S. Congress, stated “the NG SPP remains a superb, effective theater security cooperation program which helps to build long-term relationships, promotes access, enhances African military professionalism and capabilities, interoperability, and promotes healthy civil-military relationships. He also articulated that the unique civil-military nature of the NG’s enables it to interact consistently, over time, with all security forces and, when appropriate, African civilian officials. In many African countries like South Africa leaders are leery of U.S. military interests and do not like to engage with AFRICOM. States, because of the personal relationships built under the SPP, are able to engage. GEN Ward told New York NG leaders that they had access to Africa that they wish they had. This certainly demonstrates the contribution of the SPP as a tool for the GCCs to accomplish their requirements.

To properly gage the effectiveness of the SPP it is important to assess the benefit of each individual event, the outcome of a series of events designed to meet a specific objective or objectives, and to determine broader outcomes from multiple partnerships.

As part of the Louisiana partnership with Belize, two Belize Defense Force (BDF) Soldiers graduated from the accelerated Officer Candidate School at Fort McClellan. Prior to attending the OCS program the BDF Soldiers completed the Louisiana NG’s Warrior Leader Course and Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course. This event
supported the goal by providing professional development, sharing leadership best practices, and when the two soldiers apply what they learned in Belize the results will most likely improve operability between the two countries.

The Rhode Island NG, through their partnership with the Bahamas, provides a great example of a more complex successful Civil Security Cooperation SPP event. In January 2006, shortly after the partnership solidified, the Rhode Island NG along with a delegation put together by the Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation met with their counterparts from the different Bahamian ministries and agencies to lay the groundwork for a mutually beneficial relationship between the two entities. The event was very successful and according to a report from the U.S. Embassy in Nassau there were numerous positive outcomes. Some of the outcomes include 19 serious business leads generated, expectations of significant sales revenues resulting from company interactions during the Business Trade Mission to the Bahamas' meetings, the possibility of several joint ventures with U.S. engineering and architectural firms and Bahamian local contractors and design firms, and a request to connect the University of Rhode Island Coastal Resources Center with the Bahamas Nature Conservancy and National Trusts to develop training partnerships in coastal planning and land use management. The intent of the event was to help maintain the Bahamas' political stability which is valued by the U.S. and needed to ensure cooperation efforts to mitigate the persistent flow of illegal narcotics and migrants through the archipelago.

An example that NGB-J5-IA often presents to demonstrate how a series of events can culminate with the accomplishment of a specific objective involves the Washington State NG and their partner country, Thailand. Over a three-year period the
Washington State NG, along with the port authorities of Seattle and Tacoma, assisted the Kingdom of Thailand in developing a comprehensive maritime security strategy for the Port of Laem Chabang, a major departure point for cargo bound for the U.S. market. The plan included multiple events that built on each other leading to the accomplishment of meeting Thailand’s requirement to be in compliance with International Shipping and Port Security (ISPS) Code and the Maritime Security Act for the United States. The events included numerous subject matter expert visits from multiple agencies and culminated with a full-scale port exercise. This joint interagency project supported USPACOM goals for developing maritime counter-narcoterrorism capabilities and builds Thailand’s capacity to respond to multiple security threats.

The partnership of South Dakota and the South American country Suriname provides an example of a program that is designed to meet multiple objectives that support a larger goal. Suriname is a country that supports strong bilateral relations with the U.S., but does not want a significant U.S. military presence in their borders. Suriname fully endorses the SPP and the majority of their aspirations for the program focus on goal four objectives. With staunch support of the U.S. Embassy and USSOUTHCOM, South Dakota, working with their partner, designed a model program that highlights economic and non-governmental engagement to achieve desired results. Their strategy for partnership/capacity building in the economic sector is through engagements in the following areas: tourism, mining, agriculture, import and export of consumer goods, natural resources and tribal arts/crafts, timber, environmental initiatives, indigenous Amerindian tribe economic development, American business organization exchanges, water and hydroelectric development, foreign investment
reform and development, franchise opportunities, bio-fuels development, and public and rural healthcare initiatives.\textsuperscript{65} Although there is limited military involvement in the majority of the South Dakota partnership events with Suriname, they provide a great example of the ability of NG states to build partnership capacity with non-military instruments of power to achieve results.

A measure of success for the SPP is its connection and contribution to the growth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On April 4, 1949, 12 nations from Western Europe and North America signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C. A key feature of this treaty is Article 5, in which the signatory members agreed that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”\textsuperscript{66} NATO accepted four additional countries as members prior to the end of the Cold War and the conception of the SPP.

Since the end of the Cold War NATO added 12 countries to its ranks and all of them are active and valued participants in the NG’s SPP. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were admitted in 1999. In 2004 NATO added the original three “test” countries to participate in the SPP, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia also attained membership that year. In April 2009, celebrating NATO’s 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary, Albania and Croatia became the last two countries to complete the accession process. The SPP is not the main reason for NATO growth, but the program is an excellent tool used by partner countries to achieve the NATO requirements for membership.
Albania and Croatia both acknowledge the benefits they received from the program in helping them achieve their NATO objectives. Croatia partnered with Minnesota in 1996 and after 12 years of successful engagements, the Croatian military leaders credited their partnership with helping the country win its invitation to full NATO membership. New Jersey and Albania started their partnership in 2002. Six years later, during a visit to New Jersey, Albanian Minister of Defense, Gazmend Oketa, said that New Jersey provided critical assistance to help Albania reach its longstanding goal of NATO membership.

It is expected that NATO’s rapid recent growth will continue, and the alliance has many new prospect countries seeking membership. All of the prospect countries are currently engaged in flourishing SPP NG partnerships. Macedonia and Montenegro are the closest to achieving their membership goals. They were selected and are participating in NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP), a program of advice, assistance, and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. Georgia and the Ukraine are currently engaged in intense dialogue with NATO and are on their way to achieving membership.

Many of the individual European Country SPP program objectives have been and continue to be focused on helping countries meet their MAP requirements. For example, as part of the SPP, Maryland helped Estonia meet the requirements by focusing their training to meet four specific needs and capabilities: demonstrate military support to civilian authorities, develop security systems and procedures, assist the development of an open market economy, and establish an education exchange program.
Another testament to the evolution and success of the SPP is that, as of June 2009, 11 states deployed soldiers jointly with soldiers from partner countries to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. GEN McKinley, Chief of NG Bureau, stated, “What a wonderful maturation of this program to show how we started by building relationships and how now we are fighting side-by-side with other soldiers on-the-ground in a major contingency.”

A significant example of this type of cooperation is the experiences shared by Illinois and Poland, a significant contributor to the Global War on Terror. The first event took place in 2003 when Illinois sent 11 soldiers to Iraq supporting the Polish army who commanded Multi-National Division-South and one of their officers served as the logistics commander for the Poles. The co-deployments in Iraq continued through the Poles’ 6th rotation. In addition, Illinois supported co-deployments in Afghanistan and currently have 11 soldiers serving on a Bilateral Embedded Staff Team working alongside Polish Land Forces assisting the Afghan government and national army.

There are many examples of SPP successes that directly and indirectly support combat operations in current operations. In 2007, NG soldiers from the state of Georgia, as a result of their strong SPP relationship with the country of Georgia dating back to 1994, upon request of their partner country sent 30 Soldiers and Airmen to assist a Georgian brigade prepare for their deployment to Iraq. The event was well beyond the scope of an average SPP event and consisted of a 12-week schedule that included training on individual soldier skills, small unit tactics, plus company and battalion operations. This was possible only because of the trust and confidence that developed during the long partnership.
Michigan, Tennessee, Ohio, and Minnesota have all participated with their partner countries Latvia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Croatia, in co-deployment Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT), and there are several waiting approval. The OMLT program is an important part of NATO-International Security Force’s (ISAF) contribution towards the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA). OMLTs vary in size and purpose and are complementary to the U.S.-led embedded training teams (ETT). As of October 2009, 27 nations have contributed or have pledged support to the program. Without the NG's assistance, many NATO partners would be unable to participate in the International Security Assistance Force mission. OMLTs alleviate the need for an increase in Embedded Training Teams. When U.S. forces participate in OMLTs they are subordinate to the country that accepted the mission.

Soldiers from the Minnesota NG, partnered with Croatia since 1993, just completed their first of five nine-month co-deployment OMLTs in Afghanistan. When NATO asked Croatia to participate in OEF, they accepted, but wanted assistance from their State partners and Minnesota gladly agreed. Michigan and Latvia became the first multi-lateral OMLT in the Regional Command-East in Afghanistan, charged with mentoring and advising an ANA Battalion-sized unit operating in a remote area close to the Pakistan Border. Prior to deploying to theater in 2009, they spent three months training with their Latvian counterparts to ensure they were synchronized. After the training one U.S. officer was quoted as saying, “That way we will be on the same page, not just the American way or the Latvian way, but an OMLT way.” Twenty-eight Ohio NG soldiers along with twenty-nine soldiers from their partner country, Hungary, returned from their first successful joint OMLT in August 2009. During their six-month
deployment, they conducted more than 100 combat patrols, participated in 3 major operations, were credited with numerous enemy casualties, and captured 12 enemy combatants. All of these deployments were real success stories and demonstrate that the long standing relationships forged in the SPP can go far beyond the shaping phase goals and objectives.

**Issues and Recommendations**

The SPP is, in the author’s opinion, a superb, cost effective, value-added tool available to help GCCs and Ambassadors meet security cooperation objectives. However, like any program, there are areas, some significant and others minor, needing improvement in order to maximize its benefit. Seven issues are identified, that if addressed may enhance the program, and include:

1. Stabilizing and funding for Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAO)
2. Growing the SPP to meet demands
3. Enhancing SPP funding and addressing funds management
4. Enhancing SPP culture and language training
5. SPP awareness training
6. Improving incomplete Country Campaign Plans
7. Expanding efforts in the area of Civil Security Cooperation

One of the most pressing issues in the SPP is stabilizing and dedicated funding for the BAOs who are considered critical for the program’s success. BAOs are NG officers who work for the GCCs and under the direction of the Embassy Office of Defense Coordinator (ODC) in the partner country. They are considered critical because they are the ones on the ground serving in their State’s partner country, developing personal relationships, identifying program opportunities, assessing the partner’s
requirements and capabilities, plus helping with the execution of events. The BAOs also
serve as the security cooperation officers and are liaison officers representing the
interests of the NG. Currently funding is ad-hoc out of the GCCs accounts and the
majority of BAOs serve one-year unaccompanied tours. In order to maximize the
effectiveness of the BAOs they need to serve, accompanied whenever possible, in the
positions for at least two, preferably three, years. A recommendation is to properly
document and fund the positions. Another issue with funding is that either Army NG
officers or Air NG officers can fill BAO positions, but every GCC is experiencing a
problem with the color of money and sometime they hire based on the type of funding
they have and not the qualifications of the applicant. The BAOs can determine success
or failure of a program. Short tours do not allow for proper knowledge levels and
relationships to develop needed to ensure success.

The most significant means that can limit the growth of the SPP is the number of
States and Territories and their capacity to execute and sustain multiple programs. In
August, 2007 NGB compiled a list identifying 24 countries as potential candidates for
future partnerships and as of December, 2009 7 of these countries found state
partners. Most of the anticipated near term partnership expansion opportunities are
located in the USPACOM and USAFRICOM areas of operation. GEN William Ward,
commander of USAFRICOM, is aggressively seeking to grow the program in his AOR
and stated at the 2007 USEUCOM SPP workshop, “The work that you all do is an
absolutely critical element to our engagement strategy.” Clearly there is a need to
expand the program and the challenge is how to do it.
In order to grow the program the few states that do not have partnerships should get on board and participate in the program and at the same time states with partnerships need to determine if they have the capacity to take on additional partnerships. Initiating partnerships is time consuming and demanding on both the state accepting the requirement and the NGB-J5-IA staff. This is especially true for the state senior level officers and officials, who must spend time learning about their partner countries and their needs, plus expend human capital developing relationships and the trust between senior leaders. Relationship building is not easy, but is the cornerstone of the program. New partnerships normally require intensive interaction between the partners which equates to numerous events, all requiring significant effort to ensure they are beneficial. When relationships deepen and the partnerships mature, the level of effort and number of number of events required to sustain the relationships normally reduces. States with mature partnerships are clearly in a better position to tackle new partnerships than states with new programs.

Additional possibilities, desirable and undesirable, are available as ways and means to grow the program or address the need to establish critical partnerships. Some ideas include: conducting a top-down review of the program’s processes to determine where efficiencies are possible; dissolving partnerships that are not meeting the program goals and objectives; amicably end mature partnerships; establish regional or joint state partnerships; add force structure, increase funding and support with the established Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities (DOTML-PF) process. Some of the possibilities are worth exploring and some are actions of last resort.
Ending a partnership for any reason is the least preferred action, especially mature partnerships. Mature partnerships represent success and, even if the program goals and objectives are achieved, the relationships must be sustained. States with these partnerships may want to consider minimizing the number of events thus providing capacity to engage in new partnerships, but should never sever the relationships they worked so hard to develop.

The procedures for completing the numerous actions required to ensure events are successful are not always clear and can be complicated. The complications result from the complexity of a program that involves, NGB, the six GCCs, 62 countries and country teams, 47 participating states and territories, multiple funding streams many of which have slightly different views of what and how things must be done. NGB-J5-IA and many of the GCCs have worked hard to articulate processes and simplify actions. NGB’s SPP guides published in 2008 and USEUCOM SPP Standard Operating Procedure document published in 2009 are examples of well written documents that clearly help program coordinators to execute their programs. Even with these documents efforts need to continue to streamline process and look for efficiencies.

Adding force structure to the NG may assist States in their ability to increase their capacity to execute partnership programs. Currently personnel needed to execute events are drawn from units with potentially competing requirements. Allocating force structure would allow the States to dedicate and focus personnel resources on their partnerships. These additional personnel dedicated to the partnership will provide a backup capability, and should ensure that the relationships with their partner country remain strong as personnel move to new assignments. Additional personnel will also
ensure that programs will be vibrant by providing new and creative ideas to improve their programs. The downside to a force structure increase is that, unless the authorized strength of the NG is increased, capabilities will decrease in other areas. An additional concern is that widespread involvement in the program is important and additional force structure may decrease opportunities for soldiers in unit formations. Funding for the additional resources will compete with other programs. This is an area that would require significant analysis before implementing.

Increasing the SPP funding is an effective way to increase the capacity of the States to execute their programs. Many of the current initiatives are reduced in scope or are rejected because of available funds. GCCs take funds out of their limited TCA accounts and are not able to support to the level they would like. The NG’s limited program funding must be prioritized and are not able to support many justifiable requests. GEN McKinley indicated at an SPP conference in January 2009 that the Joint Staff envisions the NGs building partnership capacity as a fifty million dollar program. This represents a huge increase and will require program adjustments. Prior to 2008 dedicated SPP funding was for the civil-military contacts and activities and it was dependent on Congressional line items which varied from $1.0 to $2.2 million per year. In 2008 $4.1 million and then in 2009 $8.0 million was dedicated to the program in the President’s budget as “bridge” financing to sustain the civil-military partnerships. The SPP is currently funded in the 2010 POM (FY 2010-15) at $12.3 million to $14.5 million annually. If for some reason the growth does not occur as envisioned by the Joint Staff then funding must increase to support new partnerships and sustain existing ones.
Fund management is very challenging because of the numerous funding sources, time constraints, and the joint funding issues. One state articulated, in a query from NGB to identify program issues, that the event approval processes are not timely resulting in numerous last minute cancellations, wasted effort, and a decrease in program trust and interest. The state indicated they are required to submit events and budgets two years prior to execution, NGB approves events one quarter at a time during the year of the event, and the GCC approves events 30 days out from the event execution. Ideally events require approval with a funding source identified at least one year prior to execution. It is also understood that final funding approval will come when the Defense budget is signed by the President. This can be accomplished if all of the program stake holders attend the annual event scheduling conferences and agree on the events list and funding source. There will always be circumstances requiring cancellation of events or the need to seize opportunities and add events later than desired, but those should be minimized. Currently each GCC has their own planning cycle and some of the issues may lessen if cycles are standardized across the GCCs.

At the present time NG Bureau does not fund language or culture training for SPP participants. While the author understands that SPP funding is limited and the execution of events is the main effort, he also believes that it is imperative to support, at a minimum, culture training for BAOs and SPPDs. Language is also important for the individuals. FM 6-22 states that Army leaders must consider and evaluate the possible implications of partners’ customs, traditions, doctrinal principles, and operational methods when working with forces from another nation. Richard Lewis wrote, “By focusing on cultural roots of national behavior, both in society and business (can be
applied to the military), we can foresee and calculate with a surprising degree of accuracy how others will react to our plans for them, and we can make certain assumptions as to how they will approach us.”90 Developing relationships is a core component of the SPP and relationships are built on trust. Building trust is not easy, but understanding a partner’s culture will simplify and quicken the process. BAOs and SPPDs are on the front line of the SPP. In order to effectively execute their position requirements and produce program recommendations for senior leaders they need to understand as much as they can about the country they are supporting. Culture training can be accomplished in programs similar to those the Special Operations Forces use or through University programs.

Several SPP coordinators implied that there is a lack of knowledge about the SPP in the active duty community to include senior leaders.91 Many senior active duty leaders do not clearly understand the NG’s dual status mission, connections to civilian entities, ability to develop strong long term relationships with partner countries, or the NGs role in civil-military cooperation. Leaders who understand the SPP and respect the NG’s unique and powerful abilities to build partnership capacity will most likely recognize the value of the program and will support it. In 2006, GEN James Jones, Commander USEUCOM stated, “We based our strategies on the principle that it is much more cost-effective to prevent conflicts than it is to stop one once it’s started. I cannot overstate the importance of our theater security cooperation programs as the centerpiece to securing our Homeland from the irregular and catastrophic threats of the 21st Century.”92 GEN Jones recognized the importance of security cooperation programs and the SPP, yet there is very little instruction or discussion about these
programs in the senior service colleges. At the U.S. Army War College only one day is
spent on TSC and the SPP is not addressed. This topic should be considered for
inclusion into the curriculum, especially considering that very few active duty senior
leaders understand the NG.

One state reported a concern with the lack of availability of a complete CCP. The CCP included in the GCC’s Phase Zero plan establishes tailored country objectives
derived from security cooperation guidance from Secretary of Defense and include
measures of effectiveness to guide engagement activities. The CCP, along with the
US Embassy MSP, are the critical documents needed to develop and execute SPP plans. All Mil to Mil events need to support the security cooperation objectives in the
CCP. If the plans are outdated or incomplete then there is significant risk that the SSP plan for the country is flawed. SPP planers may miss opportunities because of a lack of
clear objectives and they may propose ideas for events that are not approved, because there are no associated CCP objectives. It is unclear how extensive this problem is, but it is quite possible that with the current operational pace, shortages of officers to fill
planning positions, and the number of plans that require completion that there are
numerous CCPs that require attention. There is a real need for GCCs to assess the
extent of this issue. If the analysis demonstrates that the problem is widespread then
the problem needs to be addressed as soon as possible.

The last item indentified for improvement is the need to seize opportunities and expand efforts in the area of Civil Security Cooperation. This area, the third in the
spectrum of cooperation, is the key component needed to tackle the SPP’s fourth goal:
to enable and facilitate enduring broad spectrum security relationships. Achieving this
important goal is possible only through a broad-spectrum of civil cooperation activities that help build partner capacity. The list of activities and opportunities that support this goal and help build capacity is near limitless and are constrained primarily by the initiative, imagination, and creativity of the program leadership and the amount of resources available to execute. Some examples include activities in the areas of education, medical, economic, science, public administration, public finance sector, legal frameworks, public services, open markets, and international cooperation. The role of the SPP program is to enable and facilitate engagements that support this goal, but to date efforts have only scratched the surface of this third component in the spectrum of cooperation.

Civil Security Cooperation activities are complicated because the authority to execute these events is Title 22 USC, and the guidance and approval rests primarily with the US Ambassador’s MSPs as well as the NGB/NG Annual SPP plan. Resources to execute events come from a variety of sources to include government agencies, NGOs, international agencies, federal and state grants, private sector organizations, and state sponsored initiatives. This is significantly different than the Mil to Mil and Mil to Civ activities which are authorized under Title 10 USC, receive their guidance and approval primarily from the GCC CCPs, US Ambassador’s MSPs, and NGB\NG Annual SPP Plan, and are resourced by the GCCs TCA or NGB-J5-IA funding.

In order to realize the true power and potential of the SPP and its impact on building partnership capacity, steps must be taken to improve this area. The most significant issue is available funding to support Civil Security Cooperation undertakings. These types of engagements between civilian entities were funded using Minute Man
Fellows funds, but they are no longer available. NGB is not in a position to fund the events and expects states to find private or public resources to fund them. The vast majority of states cannot afford to pay for these activities and with current economic conditions private support is difficult to find. This program pillar is too important to neglect and should be resourced at a level required to meet established goals and objectives. The fix for this problem is not easy and requires senior level interagency coordination and negotiation between the Department of Defense and Department of State to determine a funding solution. One ground breaking solution is the establishment of a dedicated Title 22 USC appropriation to support the program. The Department of State would retain oversight of the execution of the funds. States, during their normal SPP planning cycle, would prepare a prioritized list, endorsed by the appropriate US Ambassador, of Civil Security Cooperation events they would like to execute. The prioritized list, along with event concept sheets, would then be sent to NGB for consolidation and then presented to the Department of State or as delegated for funding approval.

Conclusion

The SPP, like any program, is not perfect. It is far from reaching its full potential as a “Whole-of-Government” tool for establishing enduring civil-military relationships while building partnership capacity across all levels of society to promote international stability and security. This is not bad news, considering that the program’s achievements far exceed what was envisioned by its founders, is endorsed and viewed as a critical strategic engagement tool by all of the GCCs, and is enhancing U.S. relations in 62 countries. This is good news because NGB and the individual states are executing the program so well that there is a recognized need to broaden the program,
both in size and capabilities, to help the GCCs and Ambassadors meet their continually expanding requirements.

The SPP’s four goals and supporting objects are sound. This author believes that, with continued effort and cooperation by all responsible parties, appropriate funding, and resolution of seven key issues, they are attainable. First, BAOs are critical to the program’s success as they are the NG’s representation on ground-- developing relationships, identifying opportunities, and working directly with the responsible GCCs to ensure that the program supports their objectives. Second, there is room for the program to grow currently, but there is a need to streamline procedures and explore new initiatives so the program’s capacity can meet the demands of additional countries requesting state partners. Third, enhancing program funding and management of the funds are critical in ensuring the SPP is sustained and opportunities to meet objectives are seized and exploited. Fourth, culture and language training needs to be funded for key individuals in state programs. Establishment of relationships is a core program component and, when program coordinators understand the culture and the language of the country they are partnered with, the chances of success are greatly enhanced. The fifth issue is the need to educate senior active duty officers about the SPP and the NG’s civil-military capabilities. Having a better appreciation of the program may help to improve accomplishment of TSC objectives. The sixth item is the need to ensure CCPs are up to date. These plans are critical when states develop their supporting SPP plans. If they are not up to date and accessible to the planners, the program will be less effective. The last issue, the one I believe is the most important one, is the need to expand Civil Security Cooperation efforts. This is one of the three pillars in the SPP and
represents a relatively untapped area that requires significant improvement. This program component has tremendous potential and, if improved, will not only help to achieve SPP goals, but will most likely improve interagency cooperation.

The SPP is one of many tools in the GCCs’ arsenal to achieve TSC objectives. With some improvement the SPP will truly be a “Whole-of-Government” tool to promote international stability and security.

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