MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE: THE 13TH REGIMENT, TENNESSEE VOLUNTEER CAVALRY: TRANSITION FROM IRREGULAR TO CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

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Executive Summary

Title: The 13th Regiment, Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry: Transition From Irregular to Conventional Warfare

Author: Major Richard J. Righter, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The protracted violence and involvement in irregular warfare had significant impact on troop performance in the conventional, nearly total warfare actions in which the 13th Tennessee was employed late in the war. Irregular experience and unique awareness of their environment was beneficial in many cases, but in others, particularly when strong leadership was lacking, the partisan war experience manifested itself in poor discipline and retaliatory atrocities.

Discussion: During the Civil War, Tennessee was a state of sharply divided loyalties. Although the state seceded in 1861, Union sentiment was particularly strong in East Tennessee. Divisions of loyalty in the region quickly escalated to violence, marked by partisan uprising, guerilla warfare, and frequent atrocities. The majority of 13th Tennessee volunteers came from Carter and Johnson Counties in the mountainous northeast corner of the state, and were the frequent victims of those atrocities under Confederate rule. The regiment was officially mustered in October 1863 after a large band of Unionist refugees fled to Knoxville, Tennessee with General Ambrose Burnside’s invading forces. For the better part of a year the 13th Tennessee was involved mainly in irregular actions and limited combat against guerilla forces. Their experience with the same served them well in many of those situations. The troops and junior officers of the regiment proved a leadership challenge as they took slowly to military discipline and training. In August 1864 the regiment returned to east Tennessee under the 3rd Brigade command of General Alvin Gillem. They experienced some success against regular Confederate Forces, most notably the killing of General John Morgan at Greeneville. In December 1864 the 13th Tennessee participated in Major General George Stoneman’s raid into southwest Virginia, and in 1865 were a part of his second raid across North Carolina. The regiment’s performance received mixed reviews. Officially cited for a number of tactical achievements, they fought passionately to drive Rebel forces from their home region. The dark side of that passion was reflected in breeches of discipline and reported atrocities of retaliation against civilians they encountered. Leadership casualties took a toll on overall discipline, and the “total war” objectives of Stoneman and Gillem encouraged ruthless destruction. The 13th Tennessee participated in the pursuit of Confederate President Jefferson Davis, and successfully captured the vice president and secretary of war. They were mustered out of service 5 September 1865.

Conclusion: The leaders and troops of the 13th Tennessee were well served by their unique perspective and personal passion to redeem their homeland, but the dark side of their passion could be devastating. Violence endured early in the war was a significant factor in their thinking and battlefield actions as uniformed soldiers. Men with admirable qualities sometimes resorted to rebellion and even murder. Their experiences are significant for United States troops currently engaged in protracted irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. The historical study of the 13th Tennessee suggests that troops can make the transition to fight more conventional actions, but not without consequences. Strong leadership is critical to mitigate reprisals. Sustainment training and equipment readiness must never neglect conventional capabilities.
Preface

Like the mist shrouded Appalachians, East Tennessee’s past is veiled in a hazy blend of history and myth. The real truth is often more intriguing than legend. Plowing our farm by the ruined chimneys of a 300 year old cabin was as likely to unearth Cherokee arrowheads as a piece of iron train rail. The various people who hunted in the forests or scraped out farms learned that the ancient mountains were more than a beautiful backdrop to their sordid lives. Like a living force of nature, the mountains imposed their will on the lives and thinking of men who battled isolation, violent storms, wild animals, and at times, each other.

Learning my own Tennessee ancestry has always involved reconciliation of contradictions and paradox. The average East Tennessean accepts the coexistence of Sunday morning church and Sunday afternoon football. The Bible and guns are carried together – indeed some would not dream of having one without the other. The Volunteer State is as much characterized by patriotic devotion as hostile rebellion to authority. Flabbergasted by his own statesmen, General Andrew Jackson was said to remark, “these volunteers... when they volunteer to fight, they fight. When they volunteer to go home, they go home.” Jokes and country songs are written along these lines, but the uneasy balance of politics and ideas turned deadly during the Civil War. Though not documented or studied as extensively as the major battles of the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia, the mountain war in East Tennessee was no less brutal for intensity of personal violence.

Many East Tennesseans are not even aware that the majority of the region fought on the side of the “damn Yankees.” My great, great, great, great grandfather, Captain Frederick Slimp, was commander of Company F, 13th Regiment, Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry, United States Army. It was not the least bit strange in our home to speak the name Stonewall Jackson with
only the greatest reverence, yet brag of the exploits of Captain Slimp fighting renegade rebels. My great grandfather clearly remembered family who fought on either side, and he honored the convictions of both. Growing up we often broke out the old 13th Tennessee history book to see the ominous photos of bearded ridgerunners, but the verbal sketches that accompanied such sessions have not survived like the menacing glares in silver bromide.

Stories of mountain raids and guerrilla warfare became more vague and confused with each passing decade. Research for this paper was inspired by my desire to recover the memories and learn more about Captain Slimp and the men he fought with. In that sense it is an incomplete work, limited by my own imperfect research and deterioration of the historical record. Slimp’s hometown of Butler is buried by the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Watauga Lake. The older relatives who knew the most have died.

The significance of the research extends beyond genealogical discovery. It was not difficult to see potential application in my own deployments to the war in Iraq. The aspects of the Civil War in East Tennessee - partisan uprising, bushwhackers, counter-guerilla action, retaliatory killings, even mutilation and public display of corpses - all demand comparison to the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Drastic and confusing transitions between conventional and irregular warfare were as much a problem for the 13th Tennessee as for United States Marines and soldiers in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. The nature of war is unchanging.

Gratitude and appreciation are owed to many at Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University. Faculty representatives of North and South coordinated efforts to make completion of this project possible. As my Ph.D. faculty mentor, Doctor Richard DiNardo provided the initial direction to formulate a working thesis and guided the project throughout. His Yankee ingenuity and exceptional knowledge of the Civil War (not to mention photographic
memory of all historical readings) drove me far beyond initial aspirations. The operational art instruction of The Distinguished Gentleman from South Carolina, Doctor John Gordon, provided great insight to the topic of irregular warfare, particularly through his expertise on the Revolutionary War and "The Late Unpleasantness." Doctor Frank Marlo, Lieutenant Colonel Paige Chandler, Doctor Mark Jacobsen, and other staff members also provided important instruction on warfare and counter insurgency.

Rachel Kingcade at the Gray Research Center, Marine Corps University, provided outstanding research support. Her professional knowledge and resourcefulness at locating sources were invaluable. At the university’s Leadership Communication Skills Center, Andrea Hamlen and Doctor Patrice Scanlon, helped refine my thesis and kept my writing on track.

I must especially thank Allen W. Ellis, Professor of Library Services, Northern Kentucky University, who shared tirelessly from his 30 years of research on Captain Daniel Ellis and the Civil War in East Tennessee and surrounding regions.

I owe the deepest gratitude to my parents, Richard and Jessica Righter. Another North and South combined effort, both served as Marines during the Vietnam War. By example they taught my brothers and me to honor those who served. They also drug us to Civil War battlefields all over the country and gave us no choice but to love our past. They have kept the memory of our family’s American military service history alive and well. Most importantly, they taught us to love our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom all things are possible. He is the Beginning and End of all history.
During the Civil War, Tennessee was a state of sharply divided loyalties. Although the state seceded, Union sentiment was particularly strong in East Tennessee. While citizens of the Deep South were generally united to face what they saw as an outside enemy, the schism in East Tennessee broke through citizens' own communities. Split allegiances, family grudges, bushwhacking, and reprisals brought an especially brutal, personal violence to the mountain region. Most members of the 13th Regiment, Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry, United States Army, had endured two years of irregular warfare before mustering into official service in October 1863. The protracted violence and involvement in irregular warfare had significant impact on troop performance in the conventional, nearly total warfare actions in which the 13th Tennessee was employed late in the war. Irregular experience and unique awareness of their environment was beneficial in many cases, but in others, particularly when strong leadership was lacking, the partisan war experience manifested itself in poor discipline and retaliatory atrocities.

The majority of 13th Tennessee Regiment volunteers came from Carter and Johnson Counties in the mountainous northeast corner of the state. If the average East Tennessean was not fiercely pro-Union, chances were he just wanted to be left alone. Most had no interest in defending slavery, and the only government trying to force its will on them was that of the Confederate States of America. They found themselves in the ironic status of rebellion against the Confederate rebellion. Of course not all East Tennesseans felt the same. The primary question for mountain people was which side they saw as the invasive, oppressive government (See Appendix A). Violence in Carter and Johnson Counties grew ever hotter over the summer months of 1861, eventually leading to bloodshed. Confederate authorities were provoked to demand harsher crackdowns and appeal to Richmond for more troops.

Pro-Union leaders like Congressman Horace Maynard and future Vice President Andrew
Johnson fled north and became active lobbyists for Union liberation of East Tennessee. Another prominent fugitive, Reverend William B. Carter, from Elizabethton, Tennessee in Carter County, went a step further. Adopting an idea originally conceived by Unionist leader William G. "Parson" Brownlow, Carter initiated and planned the infamous Bridge Burnings. The plan was ambitious. Carter would organize partisan actions to simultaneously burn nine bridges on the East Tennessee rail lines to Virginia, Georgia, and Middle Tennessee. With reinforcements cut off from the region, the Unionist population would rise up and support a Northern invasion to secure East Tennessee. President Abraham Lincoln enthusiastically approved the plan and Carter returned to Tennessee to carry out his end of the bargain (See Appendix B). Many future members of the 13th Regiment Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry were among the band that burned the Holston River bridge, an experience that served them well throughout the war.

On 8 November the chosen men gathered and set off toward Carter's Depot. Local leaders decided the Confederate garrison there was too strong and redirected all efforts on the bridge at Zollicoffer, just south of Bristol. When about 23 men reached the bridge, two guards were startled out from under either end. The guard on the far side fled immediately into the darkness. The near guard quickly surrendered his rifle, and the raiders made quick work of igniting the bridge.

The prisoner, Confederate soldier Stanford Jenkins, recognized his captors and pled for his life. While many favored shooting Jenkins on the spot, Dan Keene prevailed upon the rest to spare the life of his friend. Jenkins profusely swore to secrecy, and the raiders rode hard back to Elizabethton. Jenkins wasted no time reporting his benefactor, Keen, and all others he recognized to the Confederate authorities - another lesson men of the 13th surely carried throughout the war.
As the bridge burners scattered, all believed the supporting Union invasion was imminent. Indeed General George H. Thomas was poised to sweep across the border. But for good or ill, military bureaucracy did not rumble on with the fierce efficiency of the fired up mountain men. General William Tecumseh Sherman, in charge of all federal troops in Kentucky, had expressed initial reservations, and on 5 November, he characteristically followed his own inclinations over those of the president and called off the attack. Numerous dispatches and letters document disagreement between the leaders involved, but in the end, Sherman won out and Thomas stayed put in Kentucky. The bridge burners were left high and dry on the wrong side of the river.4

Blissfully unaware of the political drama in the north, the bridge burners of Carter and Johnson Counties prepared for a blue-coated flood of redemption. News of the night’s activities and the approach of Sherman’s army spread faster than the flames that engulfed the bridge. True to Carter’s word, Unionist mobilization was instantaneous. By the end of the day, over 1,000 men had gathered at Elizabethton, where Unionist militia units were drilling in the open.

Men brought along squirrel guns, shotguns, pistols, and knives, but some were still unarmed, so the town was scavenged for butcher knives, pitchforks and any other tool resembling a weapon. The impassioned mob determined to preempt Confederate retaliation and attack the garrison of about 125 Confederate soldiers at Carter’s Depot (present day Watauga). Confederate Captain McClellan led his company out to attack the would-be army. Many of the scared farmers fled into the night, but a large number rolled over and returned fire. The two groups exchanged fire for some time until McClellan withdrew, unable to cross the river against so many guns, however inferior in caliber and training.

The Unionists wisely did not pursue, and in the morning fell back to Elizabethton to
wait for the Union troops. Instead of Sherman’s army, news came that Colonel Danville Leadbetter was bringing a Confederate force of 10,000 men to repair the bridges and break up the rebellion. Subsistence of the large gathering of irregulars became more difficult with each passing day, and they slowly withdrew toward the mountains to regroup and find food. By 14 November they had fallen back all the way to Doe River Cove in Hampton, about 10 miles outside Elizabethton on the road to Mountain City, then called Taylorsville. Two nights later, Leadbetter’s force arrived with mountain howitzers and brought a harsh end to “The Carter County Rebellion.”

Already loosely organized at this point, the Unionist men were quickly scattered in the dark. The foolish ones went home to be rounded up later by Confederate forces. Others ran into the hills and forests. One of the bridge burners, soon to be most famous of the group, Daniel Ellis, fell back deeper in Doe River Cove with a small group that included at least three other future officers of the 13th Tennessee. As the situation degenerated, Ellis and the others broke up their separate ways. Ellis was briefly captured, but soon escaped into the mountains and successfully evaded pursuing cavalry. It was the first of many escapes for the most elusive and successful of all Union pilots and scouts in the war.

Confederate retribution was swift and extreme. Many Unionists were captured and sent to Southern prisons. Fear of arrest, murder by Rebel bushwhackers, and conscription drove many to leave Tennessee for the Union lines in Kentucky. Confederate Home Guard and blockade forces arrested or killed many in the attempt. Making the trip blindly alone became nearly impossible, but an “underground railroad” developed from the mountains of western North Carolina and East Tennessee to Union territory in Kentucky. Skilled navigators who knew the terrain, reliable citizens and danger spots along the route, would “pilot” those seeking
refuge through the mountains, usually to Camp Dick Robinson, Kentucky, where they would enlist in the Union Army.

Daniel Ellis, the Old Red Fox, had served in the Mexican War and worked as a farmer and wagon maker. Following the Carter County Rebellion, he withdrew deep in the mountains where Rebel troops were unable to locate him. Fleeing vindictive Confederate forces and bushwhackers, others made their way to his hideout and he began to lead refugees across the mountains to Kentucky. He successfully piloted over 4,000 loyalists through Confederate lines. Ellis later gathered the first group of recruits that became the corps of the 13th Tennessee. He continued piloting and led occasional raids to enforce his own sense of justice on Confederate raiders and home guard. Ellis was eventually commissioned a captain in the regiment and led a company back to clear Confederate forces from his home mountains and exact vengeance upon his hated oppressors.

East Tennessee saw a flicker of hope just after Christmas of 1862 when Major General William Rosecrans drove Confederate troops from Murfreesboro to Chattanooga, and Major General Ambrose Burnside took the Army of the Ohio through the Cumberland Gap to Knoxville. The Army of the Ohio was hailed in the streets of Knoxville as liberating heroes. The celebration was to be short lived, and ultimately the push into upper East Tennessee became yet another fiasco for the blundering Burnside. After failing to reinforce Rosecrans in his desperate stand at Chickamauga, Burnside continued the march east. In October he defeated outnumbered Confederate forces at Bulls Gap, and pressed as far as Carter Station. But Confederate General William E. Jones and his forces escaped into southwest Virginia, and Lieutenant General James Longstreet, attacking to retake Knoxville, forced Burnside to race back to the city. Retaking the city would restore Confederate rail connections to the Shenandoah
Valley, and effectively negate all Union gains in East Tennessee.

East Tennessee Union men had turned out in force to support the Yankee troops. With the Union withdrawal underway, the harshest Confederate retaliation was certain to follow, and these men were left with little option but to flee. Colonel John K. Miller had been authorized to raise a 12th Tennessee Cavalry Regiment (later the 13th), and with the assistance of Daniel Ellis, had gathered several hundred men to join the Union forces. Most of these men literally ran out the door with the barest essentials, following the federal forces as they withdrew from Carter and Johnson Stations.

Burnside managed to win the race to Knoxville, but at the cost of three regiments lost in delaying actions. Longstreet laid siege to the city. As Burnside's supply situation grew desperate, a group of future 13th Tennessee soldiers provided vital relief until the siege was broken. Native East Tennessean, Captain George W. Doughty, had recruited his own company for the 17th Tennessee, which was soon incorporated into the 13th when sufficient numbers were not attained for a stand-alone regiment. Captain Doughty reported to General Burnside at Knoxville, where part of the company was detached for mail security, while Captain Doughty and the rest were sent to reconnoiter the Holston River to the east. A Michigan unit with 40 flat boats had been previously tasked to forage in that area. The Michiganites apparently had very little success in the countryside already scoured by both armies, and at the enemy's approach they retreated to the city. Intimately acquainted with the area and citizens, Doughty sent out supply requests through the local grapevine. Despite supposed depletion from previous foraging, locals responded with a surprising quantity of all manner of subsistence, which Doughty and his men were able to float down river on the flat boats under cover of darkness and fog. Burnside credited Doughty's efforts and claimed his force could have held out another month.
Meanwhile the men who fled Carter and Johnson Counties were assembled just east of Knoxville at Strawberry Plains. The Field and Staff were officially mustered on 3 November 1863, to date from 28 October 1863. By their own admission, they were a pathetically organized lot, nearly devoid of modern military training, equipment, or even a change of clothes. In their present state they could be of little use in the defense of Knoxville. On 21 November 1863 they were ordered to Camp Nelson, Kentucky. The regiment reached Camp Nelson on 4 December, where they were organized, equipped, and additional troops were mustered, to include 150 men brought through Cumberland Gap by Captain Doughty. Doughty was immediately promoted to major and made the 1st Battalion commander.

On 25 January the 13th Tennessee received orders back to Tennessee, as well as their first mission, to disperse guerilla bands along the Kentucky, Tennessee border. The regiment located and skirmished with guerilla forces. They experienced moderate success and captured at least seven guerillas. The regiment then proceeded to Nashville without further incident and went into camp on 18 February 1864.

As the men of the 13th found a new identity in the uniformed service, the winter became all the more unbearable for those left at home. Wives and children were the frequent victims of marauders and thieves. The Johnson County home guard was led by the notorious William "Old Bill" Parker, who was said to have killed three elderly men in one day. Ellis tells how Parker and his men drug 80-year-old John Hawkins from his own home. Parker put the old man on his knees and shot him three times in the back. According to Ellis, the only charge against Hawkins was "that he was a Union man. He did not even have a son in the Federal army." Parker was reported to continue his killing spree, shooting or hanging his victims in front of wife and children. Such were the atrocities Ellis determined to avenge when he and his band
lay in ambush five days to shoot down Old Bill as he traveled down a Johnson County road.

Shot several times, Parker managed to disappear into the woods and crawl three miles through thick brush, only to die a slow death in the brush near a fellow rebel’s house. “That he died a most miserable death no person has ever presumed to doubt, which was a just reward for his monstrous crimes,” Ellis fairly crowed.¹²

Ellis carried news of these events along with letters from home and new recruits to his friends in the camp of the 13th Tennessee. It is doubtful a man in the regiment was untouched by the violence. At least 100 houses were burned through the summer and fall of 1864,¹³ and these men knew their families at home faced a brutal winter without even a roof over their heads.

Bad news and past experiences festered in the souls of the 13th soldiers drilling in middle Tennessee. Scott and Angel wrote of the time:

> Knowing that this condition of things existed at home our men were much depressed, and were eager for orders to go to the relief of their families. It was said that many, brooding over the condition of their families, died of home-sickness, with no symptoms of any malady or disease.¹⁴

Meanwhile they took to drill slowly. It was observed that most of the men would have been more graceful with a pitchfork than a sword, the former being their only weapon during the Carter County Rebellion.¹⁵ More difficult than cavalry tactics was general discipline of military life. On 13 April 1864 the regiment was organized under the “Third Brigade, Governor’s Guards,” composed of the 8th, 9th and 13th Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry Regiments with Batteries E and G of the 1st Tennessee Light Artillery. Colonel John Miller of the 13th was named brigade commander. When a new regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Ingerton, was appointed to the battalion from outside the regiment, the mountain men exhibited the same aversion to outside authority that had caused many of them to stand against the Confederacy. Ingerton had served as a lieutenant in the 4th Regular U. S. Cavalry, was a veteran of fighting in Mississippi, and was exactly the disciplinarian needed to help lead the
inexperienced 13th Tennessee. Yet the stubborn Tennesseans were leery of regular officers and felt it their right to elect their own leaders. Many threatened violent mutiny if Ingerton was not removed.16

Fortunately for them, Lieutenant Colonel Ingerton displayed incredibly calm and cool leadership to avert an explosion. He complimented the other officers on the regiment’s potential, recommended his experience to help them realize that potential, and offered to resign after a month if they were unhappy with his progress. Some of the officers already realized the folly of mutiny, among them the senior Major Doughty, who helped persuade the others of the need for an experienced officer to prepare them for field duty. Ingerton took firm charge of drilling the battalion. His ability was obvious to all, and even his harsh disciplinary ways served to win over the confidence of the regiment.17

Conflict with regular Army authority and aversion to outside command was not new in the American experience. This incident supports the theory that these East Tennesseans had much in common with early American colonists. American Revolution historian Don Higginbotham observes similar characteristics in the Colonial militia. He writes that, like many soldiers of the 13th who resisted involvement in the Civil War until it struck home, Colonial militia were reluctant to serve with the regular army except in response to a state of emergency in their own region or state, and “when the militia turned out, they preferred to fight under their own leadership..... And they chose to give battle in their own way; their proficiency with firearms and their familiarity with the terrain not infrequently counterbalancing their lack of formal training – King’s Mountain and Cowpens are classic examples.”18 Not coincidentally, East Tennesseans still celebrate their ancestors, The Over Mountain Men, who marched from Carter County to join in those very battles.
George Washington wrote in 1777 of the peculiar discipline issues with such a true people’s army: “...a people unused to restraint must be led, they will not be drove, even those who are engaged for the War, must be disciplined by degrees....”19 Six years earlier the French military theorist Comte de Guibert prophesied of the citizen soldier,

...terrible when angered, he will carry flame and fire to the enemy. He will terrify, with his vengeance, any people who may be tempted to trouble his repose. And let no one call barbarous these reprisals based on the laws of nature, [though] they may be violations of so-called laws of war....he will perish, in the end, if necessary; but he will obtain satisfaction, he will avenge himself, he will assure himself, by the magnificence of this vengeance, of his future tranquillity.20

Magnificent or barbarous, vengeance was certainly the watchword when the 13th Volunteer Cavalry got their chance to take the fight back home.

The attitude of leadership was key in the character of the unit’s performance. The anxiously awaited move east began slowly with a shift of camp to Gallatin. It was here that Major Doughty would have another opportunity to prove his leadership abilities. Gallatin was plagued by Confederate guerilla activity. Soldiers could not leave camp in small groups for fear of ambush, and a large gang routinely wrecked trains on the Louisville and Nashville (L&N) Railroad. Previous commanders had failed to stop the guerillas, both miserably and embarrassingly. Governor Andrew Johnson was fed up and sent General Alvin C. Gillem, Adjutant-General of Tennessee, to put an end to the trouble at Gallatin. Gillem passed the order on to Lieutenant Colonel Ingerton, who in turn tasked Major Doughty. Gillem and Ingerton met together with Doughty and made their commander’s intent perfectly clear. He was to stop at nothing and “’never come back until the country was cleared and some assurance of safety that could be relied upon’” was achieved.21

Doughty’s approach was a sophisticated blend of diplomacy and stark violence. His detachment of about 80 men did not have to wait long for the guerilla gang to wreck a train and kill 16 Union soldiers. Doughty rode out and located a small town nearby that served as the
gang's main rendezvous and distribution point for plunder. Despite the prolific, local warning network, Doughty managed to confirm this intelligence and capture a member of the gang nearby. In order to make a clear example, Doughty promptly and publicly hung the hapless guerilla. This less than subtle task out of the way, Doughty then gathered the community’s older citizens, preachers, doctors and anyone of prominence. He plainly explained his orders and the extreme lengths that he and the federal army were willing to go to in the event of any further incidents. He expressed his utmost confidence in “their influence, and their direct intimacy with these men, they could stop it if they would.” As for the executed guerilla, Doughty saw to his proper burial, had his widow paid $500.00, and ensured her proper care for the remainder of the war. The town’s populace was apparently impressed with Doughty’s sincerity and capability to do exactly what he promised. They privately assured Doughty on their word of honor that there would never be another train wreck. They were apparently good to their word, and Doughty considered it his greatest achievement of the war at the cost of only one enemy life. The incident testified further to Doughty’s regional insight, understanding of who was influential in the town, and what combination of force and reason would achieve the desired results.

Finally in August 1864 the 13th regiment got their chance to march back into East Tennessee and be tested in more conventional military operations. On the first of the month Andrew Johnson issued an order placing General Gillem directly in command of the 3rd Brigade. His mission was to proceed to East Tennessee and “kill or drive out all hands of unlawful persons or bands which now infest that portion of the State.” They said farewell to Gallatin on the fourth, and saw their first action against regular Confederate forces on the 19th.

Colonel Ingerton led a detachment of the 13th against a smaller Confederate unit reported to be in Rogersville, Tennessee. Just before daylight he captured the pickets, and surprised the
force in town. Several enemy were reported killed and 35 prisoners taken, to include
Confederate Congressman Joseph B. Heiskell.\(^{25}\) Fighting in the area continued until 26 August,
after which General Gillem officially recognized Colonel Miller and Lieutenant Colonel
Ingerton, and wrote of the 9th and 13th Regiments, “These Regiments are improving rapidly and
require little more experience to make them excellent soldiers.”\(^{26}\)

One of the regiment’s most famous achievements soon followed on the morning of 4
September 1864 when Confederate General John Morgan was killed in Greeneville, Tennessee.
On 3 September Morgan had marched about 2500 men an incredible 56 miles from Bristol to
Greeneville with hopes of trapping General Gillem’s brigade. Meanwhile, Gillem and Colonel
Miller had the 3rd Brigade at Bulls Gap. That night they received word from a young boy that
about 200 to 300 enemy troops were camped near Greeneville at Blue Springs. Miller sent
Ingerton and the 13th to get behind the enemy by way of a little used, back woods trail, while
Gillem would bring the rest of the brigade up the main road in order to hammer the Confederate
force between himself and the anvil of Ingerton.

Ingerton and the better-mounted men of the 13th moved out in a tremendous lightening
storm that began just after 10:00 pm. Darkness, rain and mud made the trail extremely difficult,
but Ingerton and his forces covered over 40 miles and were in place before 6:00 AM when
Gillem kicked off his attack on what proved to be General John C. Vaughn’s command. As the
battle intensified, Ingerton got frantic word that Morgan and at least 5,000 men were right behind
his position. Though actually half that many, Morgan’s 2,500 greatly exceeded Ingerton’s
present force of only 500. But Ingerton also learned that Morgan and his staff were basically
alone at the Williams’ residence in downtown Greeneville.

Rather than retreat, Ingerton boldly sent two companies to surround and capture Morgan.
The story’s details have been victim of countless myths and lies over the years, but without question the companies were successful in catching Morgan by surprise. A melee broke out in the streets and Morgan decided to make a run for it. He tried to fight his way out with two pistols, but he was shot and killed by Private Andrew Campbell. Morgan’s death was a moral blow to the Confederacy far exceeding any surrounding events on the battlefield for those few days at Greeneville.

For the rest of September and October the 13th Tennessee fought well in a number of skirmishes and battles, mainly against Confederate troops under the command of Brigadier Generals John C. Vaughn and John S. Williams. They were now close to home and pushed the rebels all the way past Carter Station, where Elizabethton families celebrated the reunion. On the 13th Regiment’s one-year anniversary date of 28 October 1864, General Gillem attacked General Vaughn’s forces at Morristown. Here the 13th Tennessee was victorious in the most conventional action of a head to head cavalry charge across 1,000 yards of open ground. The 13th broke the first line alone while the other two regiments were in reserve, then reformed, and with the 8th Tennessee broke the enemy’s second line and forced them to retreat. The fight resulted in a total rout of Vaughn’s forces: 309 enemy casualties, 26 friendly. Gillem wrote high praise for Ingerton in his report:

Allow me to call your particular attention to Lt.-Colonel Ingerton, commanding the Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, who led the first charge and broke the enemy’s first line without firing a shot. I earnestly recommend that he be appointed to the command of the first regiment of Tennessee troops that becomes vacant.

It was not long before the 13th suffered their first major defeat. After Vaughn’s defeat at Morristown, Confederate theater commander, Major General John C. Breckinridge, determined to reinforce a concerted effort to save control of upper East Tennessee. Breckinridge led a veteran force of 5,000 troops against the 3rd Brigade. Realizing reinforcements were not
coming, Gillem fell back to Bull's Gap, where on 12 November, his forces successfully repelled Confederate assaults. On 13 November Gillem withdrew and left Colonel Miller and the 13th Regiment as a rear guard. The 13th was able to repel one major assault, but after fierce fighting against overwhelming numbers, the 13th collapsed in general retreat. Likewise Gillem's main body was crushed at Russellville. Some men took weeks to straggle back to Strawberry Plains, and the 3rd Brigade was sent back to Knoxville. While local histories sometimes gloss over the dismal affair, Scott and Angel themselves were chagrined at the "demoralization of the stampede." About 150 men were captured, as well as six artillery pieces, wagon and pack trains, ambulance with horses, and even colors.

The dramatically chaotic retreat certainly says something of unit discipline and their relative inexperience against seasoned troops on the conventional battlefield. Still the unit did regroup at Strawberry Plains to stop the enemy's advance near Flat Creek railroad bridge. Far more can be said of the failure of two senior officers, Brigadier General Jacob Ammen and Gillem, for allowing personal differences to imperil the brigade and even the federal position at Knoxville. Gillem, for his part, officially recognized the personal gallantry of five officers of the 13th in repelling the initial assaults: Colonel John K. Miller, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Ingerton, Major J. J. Wagner, Captain C. C. Wilcox, and Lieutenant B. A. Miller.

Perhaps the 13th's single, costliest casualty of the war was inflicted not in combat but during their early winter layover at Knoxville. General Gillem had established his headquarters at the Franklin House hotel, where some of the officers' families were able to join them during the lull in fighting. On the evening of 25 November, Lieutenant Colonel Ingerton was socializing with a large group in the hotel lobby. J. H. Walker, a former subordinate lieutenant whom Ingerton had allegedly charged with cowardice in the presence of the enemy at the battle
of Okalona, Mississippi, entered the lobby and pulled a pistol on him. Ingerton lunged at Walker, but was mortally wounded in the stomach. Ingerton’s capable, disciplined leadership was irreplaceable for the 13th Tennessee Regiment.

Outraged troops clamored to lynch Walker, but were held off by General Gillem, who promised the murderer would be dealt with. Ingerton’s discipline was missed immediately. The officers returned to their old tricks of disputing Ingerton’s replacement. When Captain B. P. Stacy was promoted over the majors and senior captains, it was Major Doughty who called on his friends and supporters to openly resist. General Gillem and Colonel Miller favored and promoted Stacy due to his greater experience in the regular army. Doughty was arrested but soon released. Doughty resigned his battalion on principal, but Gillem surprisingly retained him as Chief of Staff.

Eager to atone for their failure at Bulls Gap, the men of the 13th would have to wait for another general looking for his own redemption. On 10 December 1864, General Gillem and the 3rd Brigade would be attached to Major General George Stoneman for his raid into Southwest Virginia. Stoneman had been a favorite target of “Fighting Joe Hooker” to cast blame for his failure at Chancellorsville. Then while campaigning with Sherman in Georgia, Stoneman achieved the dubious honor of being the highest ranked Union prisoner of war. After Sherman arranged a prisoner exchange, Stoneman was left languishing at a desk job until his last big chance came with a tactical cavalry command.

The partisan war that bred the 13th Tennessee Regiment had also led many generals to accept “total war” as the only option for bringing the war to a close. Stoneman’s personal application of Sherman’s scorched earth policy was well suited to the 13th Tennessee’s appetite for vengeance. They performed exceptionally well in the destruction of the Wytheville Salt
Works, with Lieutenant Colonel Stacy leading the charge to capture the breastworks and break the Confederate defense. Stoneman reported, “To Lieutenant Colonel Stacy, and the 13th Tennessee Cavalry, is due the credit of having acted the most conspicuous part.”

But all was not glory for the 13th Regiment on Stoneman’s Raid. As they passed through Abingdon, Virginia, vengeance overcame discipline with tragic results. Captain James B. Wyatt was from Abingdon and had suffered particularly bad treatment from neighbors during the early years of the war. Recognizing the potential trouble, Wyatt’s superior specifically ordered him to remain with the unit. Wyatt feigned compliance, but soon doubled back and stayed behind until the regiment had passed through. Retaliating for past grievances, Wyatt began to set fire to some buildings. He was discovered; the town’s people ran him down and shot him to death.

Rather than progressing, it seemed discipline may have stepped backward as the war went on. Mounting fury at the deaths of comrades at arms also boiled over when Captain William M. Gourley, one of the original Bridge Burners, was killed. Scott and Angel wrote without remorse that the men’s reaction was to set fire to the nearest house.

Stoneman’s Raid was a great success in crushing Confederate resistance and destroying materials of war. That success inspired a much larger, second raid. Stoneman’s mission from Major General George Thomas, was to “dismantle the country to obstruct Lee’s retreat” by destroying parts of the East Tennessee & Virginia Railroad, the North Carolina Railroad, and the Danville-Greensboro line. The Confederate prison and supply depot at Salisbury, North Carolina was Stoneman’s prize objective. Combined with Sherman’s March to the Sea, General Ulysses S. Grant’s intent was to “leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon.”

It was in fact guerilla warfare and the sort of atrocities endured by East Tennesseans that led generals like Grant and Sherman to adopt this destructive, all consuming approach to the war.
Historians McPherson and Cooling credit Tennessee guerilla activity with creating one of total war's ultimate practitioners, William Tecumseh Sherman. Small wonder that those soldiers who endured the worst of Tennessee's brutality would help their commander, General Alvin Gillem, seriously contend for Sherman's title.

Gillem would be Stoneman's second-in-command as commanding general of the 4th Division's three brigades, including Colonel John Miller's 3rd Tennessee Brigade. Gillem's "Cossacks," as he affectionately referred to the 13th Tennessee, would finally have the dominant power to return home and inflict their will upon their enemies. Not all historians would agree with the Comte de Guibert's "magnificent" appraisal of their vengeance. William Trotter writes of the 3rd Brigade, "There were mountaineers from both Tennessee and North Carolina in all of these units, but the 13th, especially, was comprised almost wholly of hard-bitten men from the disputed mountain counties.... In the weeks to come, Gillem's Tennessee regiments would acquire a reputation for brutality and brigandage fully equal to that of Sherman's 'bummers' in the eastern part of the state."

A Michigan officer expressed much the same thoughts:

These Tennesseans in their present condition do not add any strength to the Union forces. In the beginning and during most of the war they had suffered terrible cruelties at the hands of the rebels. They had been hunted and shot down as unworthy of any humanity being shown them. Their homes were burned and their families driven away, and all because they were loyal to the flag, but now that the tables were turned and disloyal families were at their mercy, they repaid what they had suffered by an indiscriminate pillage. The result was a demoralized command, out of which little military duty could be had, and their General knew they were in no condition to fight an organized force, no matter how small.

But the Tennesseans had in fact faced many organized forces. For good or bad, they would contribute to the legacy of Stoneman's second raid. Stoneman began his march through the Tennessee mountains to Boone, North Carolina. He crisscrossed and feinted into Virginia, confusing the Confederates as to his objective. Colonel Miller and the 13th Tennessee paid
another visit to Wytheville, where they destroyed two bridges and a supply cache that included five tons of gunpowder. They lost 35 men in a serious fight with Confederate cavalry.

Stoneman achieved operational deception, and the Confederate garrison at Salisbury was depleted to reinforce Greensboro. Only a patchwork force remained under the command of General William M. Gardner. His artillery was focused on the Mocksville road bridge across Grant’s Creek, and planks were torn out of the bridge to slow advancing cavalry. Usually called upon to destroy bridges, the men of the 13th and 8th Tennessee Regiments were sent crawling out on the bridge to replace the missing boards. The bridge was sufficiently repaired and cavalry flooded across to overwhelm the defenders and seize the town. Stoneman’s men destroyed vast stockpiles of weapons and supplies, as well as Salisbury prison.44

Deciding his raid was complete, Stoneman splintered his forces for final operations and the return to Tennessee. To the great misfortune of North Carolinians in his way, General Gillem was left with the majority of forces and directed to Asheville, NC. Gillem overwhelmed minor opposition along the way, and upon reaching Asheville he heard that Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had surrendered his Army of Tennessee to Sherman. Believing their war had ended, Gillem and his forces agreed to a cease fire, left Asheville and started for home. But Lincoln rejected Johnston’s terms of surrender and General George Thomas ordered Stoneman and his cavalry “to ‘do all in its power to bring Johnston to better terms.’”45

Gillem and his troops complied with enthusiasm. General James G. Martin, commander of the District of Western North Carolina, said that he “had heard of no worse plundering anywhere.”46 Historian Trotter makes quite obvious his disdain for Gillem, and the 13th Tennessee in particular. Ample space in his book is devoted to lambasting Gillem and his marauding hordes. Trotter’s case is often supported by the 3rd Brigade’s antics: shooting wildly
in all directions, breaking into houses and stealing anything of value, smashing what they
couldn't carry, and beating on the citizenry. In the mind of Gillem, there were no innocent
civilians. Total war meant destroying the enemy and all that could support him. Food in an
Asheville pantry meant food for the Confederate cause. There was no doubt that the pillage was
condoned and encouraged from the top. One disapproving officer wrote,

Much depended on the personal character and disposition of the commanding officer of these
detachments. If he happened to be a gentleman, the people were spared as much as possible; if he
were simply a brute dressed in a little brief authority, every needless injury was inflicted,
accompanied with true underbred malice and insolence. The privates always followed the lead of
their commander.

Gillem returned to Tennessee, but the 13th Tennessee was not quite finished with the
war. Trotter credits General Palmer of the 1st Brigade with pursuing President Jefferson Davis
into South Carolina. He fails to mention that at least a significant portion of the 13th Tennessee
Regiment was also in on the chase. They narrowly missed catching Davis, but Scott and Angel
give a detailed account of a gentlemanly dinner at the home of Confederate Vice President
Alexander H. Stephens, who surrendered to them at Crawfordsville, Georgia on 7 May 1865.
They proceeded on to Athens and captured the Confederate Secretary of War, General Robert
Toombs. Thus truly ended the 13th Tennessee’s role in Stoneman’s second raid and their
significant conventional operations in the Civil War. Stoneman’s raiding force of 6,000 men had
covered more than 600 miles of enemy territory, destroying vital infrastructure and countless
supplies all along the way. Sherman approvingly said that Stoneman’s raid was “fatal to the
hostile armies of Lee and Johnston.”

The 13th Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry Regiment was mustered out of service at
Strawberry Plains on 5 September 1865. Throughout the war these men had witnessed the full
spectrum of war, from partisan uprising and bushwhackings, to full-scale conventional, total war
in the raiding force of General Stoneman. Individually and in groups they endured and
participated in the personal savagery of the irregular war that in a very real way birthed the devastating tactics of their ultimate role in bringing the war to its bitter end. At each level along the way they fulfilled the Comte de Guibert’s prophecy to assure vengeance, or perish trying.

Military discipline of such men was never a constant. It was slow in coming and quick to relapse. Too much can be made of this. Serious discipline issues occurred in all variety of Civil War units from both sides of the Mason Dixon. The American Civil War was, after all, a people’s war of unprecedented proportion, both in numbers of combatants and destruction of the same. The armies were not made up of long-standing, professional elite. Still the East Tennesseans of the 13th were among those who experienced the most severe, ultimate fulfillment of a people’s war. The evidence is clear that the violence endured early was a significant factor in the thinking and battlefield actions of these men when they later donned the uniform of Union soldiers.

The trials of life in the Appalachians and the hardening of early war persecution were the perfect forge for scouts and pilots like Daniel Ellis. His accomplishments robbed the Confederacy of incredible numbers in manpower, and the ferocity of he and his men in combat were a terror to the Confederate guerillas that were otherwise such a menace to the regular Union forces operating in the region. Men like Ellis and Major Doughty had insight and appreciation of the region they fought in, which gave them success in ways unattainable by regular units from outside. The leaders and troops of the 13th Tennessee were well served by their unique perspective and personal passion to redeem their homeland.

The dark side of their passion could be devastating to themselves and innocent people they encountered. Men like Captain Wyatt, who died needlessly in the snow at Abingdon, were testament to the brutal consequences of unchecked vengeance. Wyatt, who had served his
regiment well in other battles, was consumed by the resentment of past persecutions. He directly disobeyed orders and set fire to property of no military value. He paid for it with his life. No mental leap is required to appreciate how such actions can negatively impact the strategic goals of an army.

Ellis and Doughty had problems of their own. Doughty, who had led so brilliantly on many occasions, was also a mutinous fool in the post Ingerton promotion controversy. Such conduct was a problem throughout the unit. Ellis wrote of his men taking matters into their own hands to kill unarmed adversaries and those who might have been safely captured. Whether Ellis actually tried to stop them or directly ordered such acts, or some of both, the results are the same and show the harsh, corrosive environment of the partisan war they were immersed in. Men with admirable qualities resorted to rebellion and extreme violence, if not murder. It is difficult to conceive of a separation of these actions from the extreme circumstances in which they had experienced the same directed toward them.

Leadership emerges as a strong factor in the performance of the 13th Tennessee. The virtues and vices of partisan warriors can be greatly guided, controlled and turned to benefit by strong, effective leaders. This is true for all military units, but is especially critical for the volatile, high-risk cases. Incomparable leaders like Washington and Nathaniel Green achieved incredible results with their much maligned, underdog American revolutionaries. Lieutenant Colonel Ingerton displayed similar traits of subtlety and firmness, and he achieved remarkable results of his own.

Leaders like Gillem encouraged what most modern observers consider atrocities, and the men of the 13th delivered the same with interest. Note that Gillem expressed great pleasure and approval for those results. Any general who saw total war as the only means to a successful end
would view many “atrocities” as absolutely necessary. Gillem made his commander’s intent very clear to his subordinates. In the case of Doughty outside of Gallatin, Gillem and Miller gave a clear, concise ultimatum. They enabled Doughty to execute boldly and decisively. As previously discussed, Doughty’s own local experience was also an enabler.

The experiences of the 13th Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry are especially important for United States troops currently engaged in protracted irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. Leaders study the effects and debate the impact this type of conflict will have on our ability to fight more conventional actions. The historical study of the 13th Tennessee suggests that troops can make the transition, but not without consequences. The potential for reprisals must be monitored closely and kept in check by strong leaders. Leaders brought from outside the unit and who have not been recently immersed in the corruptive trials of irregular warfare may at times be more objective and effective leaders during the transition. At the same time the outside leaders must understand the unit’s situation. They can learn much from subordinate leaders who have inside experience. Sustainment training and equipment readiness must never neglect conventional capabilities.

Clausewitz eloquently stated that war is a human experience, and the execution of warfare can be captured neatly neither as science nor art. The effects of sustained irregular warfare on troops transitioning to conventional operations cannot be stated precisely in all their varied manifestations. Actions and inaction by government and leaders throughout wars have profound impact on the direction of partisan conflict and the lives of those involved. Dramatic mistakes at every level and stage of the Civil War still provide lessons today. The men of the 13th Tennessee persevered and overcame some of the worst.
Notes

1 Noel C. Fisher, War at Every Door: Partisan Politics and Guerrilla Violence in East Tennessee, 1860-1869 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 42. In August 1861, at least two secessionists were killed and several wounded. The Confederate court clerk in Johnson County was forced to resign, while many other secessionists fled the state.


4 Piston, 17. Scott and Angel, 62-64.


7 Scott and Angel, 111, 115.

8 Fisher, 128.


10 Scott and Angel, 114.


12 Daniel Ellis, 304.

13 Ellis, 299.

14 Scott and Angel, 141-142.

15 Scott and Angel, 138.

16 Scott and Angel, 142.

17 Scott and Angel, 142-143.


19 Higginbotham, 19.

20 Higginbotham, 13.

21 Scott and Angel, 145.

22 Scott and Angel, 146.
Walker actually escaped from jail and was never prosecuted. Scott and Angel record that in 1892 Walker was intoxicated while driving a mule-drawn vehicle in Sevier County, Tenn. When he fell from the vehicle, “His clothing was caught and he was dragged to death.” Scott and Angel, 217.

35 Scott and Angel, 217-218.
38 Scott and Angel, 222.
39 Scott and Angel, 223.
40 http://www.historynet.com “Major General George Stoneman Led the Last American Civil War Cavalry Raid” Posted by HistoryNet Staff, 12 June 2006, 8:08 pm in America’s Civil War.
41 McPherson, 76-81. Sutherland, 116.
42 Trotter, 251.
43 Trotter, 251.
44 Trotter, 275-276. HistoryNet Staff.
45 HistoryNet Staff.
46 HistoryNet Staff.
47 Trotter, 287.
48 Trotter, 281.
49 Scott and Angel, 243-245.
50 HistoryNet Staff.
51 Scott and Angel, 222.
52 McPherson, 76, 81-82. McPherson discusses the evolution of Grant’s and Sherman’s attitude toward what constituted atrocity and what was a necessary act of war.
Bibliography


History Net Staff, http://www.historynet.com "Major General George Stoneman Led the Last American Civil War Cavalry Raid” 12 June 2006, 8:08 pm in America's Civil War


APPENDIX A

EAST TENNESSEANS CHOOSE SIDES

East Tennessee did not fit neatly with either North or South, and there was more to divisions of loyalty than border state status. Antebellum Tennessee, particularly Johnson and Carter Counties, bore more resemblance to the early American colonial frontier than to the stratified social structure of Virginia and the Deep South. Settlers in the mountain region became isolated from eastern civilization and the typical development of the American Republic. Appalachian communities had chosen a wilderness existence, and the mountains were effective roadblocks to outside interference. The climate did not support expansive cotton plantations, and the economy, or lack thereof, depended very little on slave labor. As the 19th century wore on, many East Tennesseans had little reason to resent oppression of Northern politics against slavery, or states’ rights, or much of anything else. Like the early colonists across the ocean from Mother England, the average man was a world away from the political arguments of Washington and Richmond. To be sure, Tennessee politics were a fierce business, but parties had aligned on family tradition and local issues. Anti-secessionists vastly outnumbered secessionists in 1861.

If the average East Tennessean was not fiercely pro-Union, chances were he just wanted to be left alone. The Confederate government forced involvement in a cause they did not want a part in. Most had no interest in defending slavery, and the only government trying to force its will on them was that of the Confederate States of America. They found themselves in the ironic status of rebellion against the Confederate rebellion.

Of course not all East Tennesseans felt the same. It would seem that the primary question for mountain people was which side they saw as the invasive, oppressive government. Benjamin Cooling refers to difficulty explaining allegiances in the South’s “tribal culture,” and says that the recurrent theme “of both popular resistance and irregular warfare in Kentucky and
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Tennessee overtly related to the intrusion of central authority, whether Union or Confederate, via military-political-economic activity from 1861-1865.ii Railroad construction had begun to connect the region to markets in the South. In his book, Mountain Rebels, W. Todd Groce examines the motivations of “a large, vocal, and determined Confederate minority” in East Tennessee.iii Generational trends, occupation, political parties, and socioeconomic bonds are among the complex reasons he explores.

It is sufficient for this study of the 13th Tennessee to acknowledge the presence of violently fervent secessionists in the predominantly Unionist region. This minority had the support of the new government. The influential among them found positions of authority, and backed by Confederate troops, used that new power to settle old grudges, many of which had nothing to do with Civil War politics.iv

Thus partisan conflict broke out even before Confederate troops arrived.v The populace was not united against a common enemy. The outcome of the war would determine the well-being and way of life for both sides.vi A longstanding grudge or personal affront could result in political arrest or murder by guerilla bands. As citizens joined either army, “brother against brother” was no poetic slogan for the war. Fighting through Blountville, Tennessee, 13th Tennessee troops found the body of Confederate soldier Christly Crow. His brother, John Crow of the 13th Tennessee’s ambulance corps, paused just long enough to employ a local citizen “to see that his brother was properly buried.”vii

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i John W. Gordon, South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 97-98. Dr. Gordon’s description of South Carolina’s backcountry before and during the American Revolution could well be applied to antebellum East Tennessee. His account of the backcountry’s partisan/guerilla-war begs further comparison to the East Tennessee mountain war discussed in this paper.

ii Daniel E. Sutherland, ed, Guerrillas, Unionists, and Violence on the Confederate Home Front (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1999), 115.

iii W. Todd Groce, Mountain Rebels (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1999), 46-47.

iv Sutherland, 124.
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vi Fisher, 63.

CARTER'S BRIDGE BURNING PLAN

With the help of Maynard and Johnson, Reverend William E. Carter took his plan to the top, getting the favorable endorsement of Major General George B. McClellan and President Abraham Lincoln himself. Intrigued with the prospect of partisan support in enemy territory, as well as the moral obligation to liberate loyalist citizens, Lincoln ordered the Army of the Cumberland to support the plan and attack to seize a strategic point on the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad.¹

Reverend Carter’s plan execution was a model of efficient success for the modern insurgent. The centralized plan was secretly disseminated through a select cadre of trustworthy men for decentralized execution. Critical details were withheld until absolutely necessary, and five of the nine bridges along 270 miles of track were successfully destroyed. Many future members of the 13th Regiment Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry were among the band that burned the Holston River bridge, an experience that served them well throughout the war.

Carter dispatched a messenger to share the plan with four men in his hometown of Elizabethton. They were to burn two of the nine bridges: the Holston River bridge at Zollicoffer and Watauga River bridge at Carter’s Depot. In late October, Captain Thomas Tipton delivered the plan to the chosen four, and commissioned Andrew Johnson’s son-in-law, Daniel Stover, as leader of the party. According to 13th Tennessee historians Captain Samuel W. Scott and Captain Samuel P. Angel, the plan was shared with no one else until 24 hours before the bridge was to be burned. Carter’s own wife, Elizabeth, traveled to Roan County, Tennessee to meet her husband and brought back
APPENDIX B

final coordinating instructions to Stover. 8 November was the date set, and Stover began notifying his chosen men the day prior.ii

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APPENDIX C

Bridges Burned by Unionists, 8 November, 1861

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APPENDIX D

STONEMAN'S SECOND RAID, 1865

Inset: Major General George Stoneman
http://www.nndb.com/people/134/000097840/

The Civil War at a Glance brochure, National Park Service
http://www-atlas.usgs.gov/articles/history/a_civilwar.html
APPENDIX E

SCOUT DANIEL ELLIS (left) armed with Navy Colt revolvers and Spencer repeater carbine.

MAJOR G. W. DOUGHTY

Photos from Scott and Angel, 65, 144.