MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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GATHERING OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY WARFARE: THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE DURING THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS (JANUARY – OCTOBER 1957)

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Executive Summary

Title: Gathering of Human Intelligence in Counter-insurgency Warfare: The French Experience during the Battle of Algiers (January – October 1957).

Author: Major Hervé Pierre, French “Troupes de Marine”.

Thesis: If in a short-term perspective the battle of Algiers was an operational success since the terrorist attacks ended by the of fall 1957, the different methods used to gather intelligence proved to be strategically counterproductive and left an open wound on the French Society.

Discussion: In 1956, both internal and international political situations favored the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). In August, during a clandestine meeting in the Soummam valley (Kabylie), the FLN decided to direct the fighting against the European population in urban areas. Such an intensification of the conflict was aimed at winning a decisive battle: bringing the terror to Algiers was perceived as the last step before the independence.

Facing a paralysis of regular courses of action, the French reacted to the terrorist wave by giving the military extraordinary police powers. Jacques Massu’s 10th Para Division implemented radical methods. From 20 January to 31 March 1957, it succeeded in disorganizing the whole insurgency (first battle). However, the tactical victory against terrorism was as blatant as it proved to be short-lived. Facing a resuming tactical threat, General Massu entrusted Colonel Yves Godard with the AOR of Algiers (second battle). If the first battle was fought using bloody swords, the second one, based on infiltration and disinformation operations, proved to be a surgical operation using scalpels. On 8 October 1957, the battle of Algiers ended.

In a blurred conflict that belonged neither to police operations nor to conventional war, the legal black hole ineluctably led to the temptation of committing illegal acts. Paul Aussarresses and Yves Godard embodied the two opposite approaches that are distinguishable during the battle. Pushing the justification of illegal violence to the limit, Aussarresses represents the dark face of COIN operations while Godard repeatedly stated that there was no need to use torture.

Facing an invisible enemy who could be everywhere and did not hesitate to resort to asymmetrical resources to terrorize the population, the French regular forces felt a feeling of frustration. Being unable to find and fix the opponents naturally led to the temptation of extracting the pertinent information from prisoners. In such a context, the "ticking-time bomb" paradigm became easy justification for all the excesses committed.

Many lessons have to be drawn from the French experience in Algeria and the hexagonal volunteer amnesia is a societal cancer that still prevents France from developing a consistent COIN theory. The major take-away from the Battle of Algiers is certainly at the essence of the subsequent paradox: winning the battle of Algiers precipitated the loss of Algeria.

Conclusion: The excesses of force are strategically counterproductive: gathering intelligence through brutal methods eventually increases the enemy’s source of power. It resulted in an increase of enemy local and international legitimacy and weakened French determination.
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Preface

“Un passé qui ne passe pas.”¹ The French-Algerian war has remained an open wound in French society, kept alive by the continued requests for consideration from the veterans of this “non war,” the Harkis’ unsolved issue, and the cyclic controversies in the national press about the behavior of the French conscripts in Algeria. In this painful context, the “Battle of Algiers” crystallized the resentment around the question of the use of torture and eventually appeared as a new “Dreyfus’ affair”: it divided French society between those who invoke the highest “raison d’Etat” and those who consider that personal ethical considerations must always remain above any other consideration. In 2004, the French historian Jean-Charles Jauffret called for the end of the collective “amnesia.”² However, the “policing operations” in Algeria between 1954 and 1962 are still not part of the curriculum in French military academies, and, until very recently, David Galula and Roger Trinquier’s books were unobtainable in France. Conversely, these two French theorists have been studied for a long time across the Atlantic and their books have been regularly republished in English.

The French experience in colonial warfare is officially at the core of the new US COIN doctrine and in 2001, the famous Gillio Pontoverco’s movie “The Battle of Algiers” was screened by top civilian and military officials in Washington.³ While some try to forget this topic altogether and other want to use it as a model, the purpose of this paper is to try to assess the methods used by the French military to gather intelligence during the battle of Algiers and demonstrate that the resort to torture proves to be strategically counterproductive. Paradoxically, winning the battle of Algiers using brutal methods such as illegal arrests, torture, and summary executions precipitated the loss of Algeria.
Before entering into the core of the analysis, it seems highly necessary to define the limits of the topic and the terms that will be used throughout the work. The so-called phrase “Battle of Algiers” currently refers to the confrontation that occurred in the capital of French colonial Algeria between the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the French forces from January to October 1957. The term “battle” actually is incorrect, as Jacques Fremeaux has argued, since no conventional or guerilla fighting occurred but rather police operations did, in reaction to terrorist actions.4 According to Yacef Saadi, the phrase was forged in 1957 by Jacques Le Prévost, a pro-French journalist, to support the recent excesses of the COIN repression. However, it was subsequently sanctioned by usage and used by both parties, e.g Yacef Saadi in 1962 in his “memories of the Battle of Algiers” and, ten years later, General Jacques Massu in his “True Battle of Algiers.”5

Additionally, the term “torture” refers to “the infliction of extreme pain and suffering by a victimizer who dominates and controls. The pain may have either physical or psychological elements or a combination of both.”6 “Interrogatories” or “interrogatories in depth” are synonyms usually preferred by the loyalist forces because of a less charged phraseology and content but correspond to the same reality within the context of the Battle of Algiers.7 The specifics of torture, both extent and methods, will not be discussed in this paper since the focus is really on the slide to their use and the ensuing results.

Furthermore, intelligence is “a dynamic process used to assess the current situation and confirm or deny the adoption of specific courses of action by the enemy. It helps refine the commander’s understanding of the battle space and reduces uncertainty and risk.”8 Such a definition insists on the close relationship existing between time and intelligence. The “ticking-time bomb” paradigm drives this relation to an extreme when obtaining a relevant small piece of
information may save many human lives. Finally, a matter of semantics has to be clarified before proceeding further. The FLN will be called “insurgency” and its agents “insurgents”; the French regular forces will be the “loyalists” or the “counterinsurgency.”

Available sources are numerous. Nonetheless, with no possible access to the still classified French archives, protagonists’ memoirs remain precious, albeit biased, primary sources. Understandably, these sources often present the risk of being driven by the desire of their authors to justify their own actions and discredit their enemy’s achievements.

Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the patient and benevolent guidance provided by Doctor Donald F. Bittner, who mentored me throughout this work with critical instructions. I am also indebted to Mrs. Andréa L. Hamlen and to Lieutenant-Colonel Anne Barrett who corrected my English. I must not forget Doctor Jacques Frémeaux, a specialist of French colonial history in Northern Africa, who has been my French mentor at La Sorbonne University since 1995. My wife, Marylène, and my daughters, Marie-Alix, Clémence and Sibylle, require a special acknowledgment for letting me encroach on limited family time to write this paper. To conclude, I would like to dedicate this work to my grand-uncle, Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Kervahut, who had the courage in these trouble times to be one of these few “drops of good conscience in a tide of horror.”
1 “The past is still alive,” sentence from Henry Rousso.


4 Jacques Fremeaux, telephone conversation with author.


9 Patrick Rotman, L’Ennemi intime (Paris: Le Seuil, 2002), 64.
BATTLE OF ALGIERS OR BATTLE FOR ALGERIA

1956: The Progresses of the Rebellion. At the beginning of this third year of war, general attention mainly focused on the military operations in the so-called “bled.”¹ Since 1954, the French army had proven to be incapable of preventing the National Liberation Army (ALN) from spreading its influence over the open country. The number of rebels’ actions steeply increased from 5,537 in 1955 to 26,515 in 1956, and bloody ambushes against the conscripted soldiers had a tremendous impact on the metropolitan public opinion.²

At the same time, both internal and international political situations favored the National Liberation Front (FLN). Using both conviction and terror, it suppressed its domestic main political rivals, especially from the Algerian Communist Party and the Algerian Nationalist Movement (MNA). It also tried to consolidate the unions in purely Muslim associations and won the support of an increasing number of moderate nationalists, as well as the moral backing of the Ulema³ religious association. Within the FLN, emerging leaders like Ramdane Abbane tried to structure the movement in order to increase both its efficiency and its credibility. In August 1956, a FLN clandestine meeting in the Soummam valley (Kabylie) gathered 16 military commanders under Abbane’s leadership: the National Council of the Algerian Revolution and its subordinate “Executive and Coordinating Committee” (CCE) were created.⁴ Also reorganizing the ALN in depth, Abbane claimed the predominance of the political arm over the Military, and of the combatants fighting in Algeria over those who had taken refuge abroad. Setting up Algiers as an “autonomous zone,” the rebellion historical chiefs decided to direct the fighting against the European population in urban areas.
The rebellion also benefited from the international situation: both Moroccan and Tunisian independence in May 1956, offered stimulating examples and, more pragmatically, provided sanctuaries and outside support for the Algerian insurgents. The failure of the Anglo-French Suez expedition also enhanced the prestige of Egyptian president Gamal Nasser, who reaffirmed a strong support for the rebellion. Finally, for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, the United Nations General Assembly decided on 1 October 1956 to place the Algerian question on the agenda for the 1957 session.

“A person killed in Algiers will cause a more important scandal…” In this national and international context, the FLN leaders decided to take the war to the very heart of the colonial apparatus. While “Algiers-the-white” had been the center of a permanent nationalist activity since the starting of the uprising, it had been mainly used as a rear base in charge of providing funds, weapons, supplies, and drugs for the ALN combatants fighting in Kabylie and in the Blida mountains. If a few bombings had nevertheless steadily increased the feeling of insecurity in the European community, the majority of the inhabitants were far from the reality of war: what was going on in the djebel seemed to belong to the “other Algeria.” Large-scale operations in the city were probably first triggered by the will to demonstrate the strength of the insurgency and gain the support of both the Algerian population and the global public opinion. As the head offices of the national and international press were in Algiers, Ramdane Abbane declared that “a cracker in the city could have the same impact as five ambushes in the djebel.” For some of the FLN leaders, such intensification of the conflict was aimed at winning a conventional decisive battle against the French as the Viet-Minh had done at Dien Bien Phu less than three years ago. From this perspective, the battle of Algiers was considered as the last step before the independence. It thus became the battle for Algeria.
As the capital of Algeria, Algiers was a symbol of the French colonization. The central boroughs, a mixture of Second-Empire architecture and modern buildings, were criss-crossed with main thoroughfares teeming with European-style department stores, movie theaters, brasseries, and Catholic churches. Wealthy villas and individual houses dominated the city from the Birmandeis, El-Biar, Hydra, and Bouzéra hills that were still not affected in 1956 by the successive waves of rapid urbanization. Two European working-class districts flanked these “beaux quartiers”: Bab-el-Oued to the North and Belcourt to the South. Most of Algiers resembled Southern French metropolitan cities such as Marseille, Toulon, or Nice. However, there was one exception…. the “Casbah,” that reminded everyone of the Arab, Turk, and Muslim origins of the city. The triangle-size district concentrated more than 60,000 Muslims inhabiting one square kilometer. Dwellings were cubes with only one massive wooden door opening to the narrow lane, but connected to each other by their roof-top, a network of stairs, and a maze of tortuous back streets. A foreigner definitively lost his way in such a labyrinth when a Casbah native, jumping from one roof to another, was able to quickly disappear without a trace.

If segregation had never been part of the French colonial doctrine, it had actually occurred in downtown Algiers where relatively wealthy European areas were separated from exclusively Muslim districts where destitution was blatant. The only areas shared by both communities were the peripheral shantytowns resulting from increasing rural depopulation. Despite Mayor Jacques Chevallier’s great efforts to improve sanitation and provide social aid, poverty seemed to be spreading as the Muslim population grew much faster than the European one (see table).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>31 Oct 1954 Census</th>
<th>Non-Muslims</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Algiers</td>
<td>192,890</td>
<td>162,150</td>
<td>355,040</td>
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When Ramdane Abbane arrived in Algiers in March 1955, after five years in jail for active militancy against French authority, he undertook to reorganize the rebellion since coordination was non-existent and rivalries divided the various spontaneously-generated armed groups. He gave a 29-old son of a Casbah baker the responsibility to discipline, reorganize, and purge the rebellion from its doubtful elements. Saadi Yacef began the “cleansing,” which entailed turning the Muslim district into a fortress from which a terror campaign could be launched.

**First Attacks, First Fears: the Spiral of Violence.** From spring 1955 to that of 1956, armed actions intensified as the FLN imposed its unique clandestine warfare organization in the city and to control the Muslim population in the Casbah. This included the underworld gangs and political opponents from the MNA and the PCA. Hence, the “Battle of Algiers” commenced, the FLN was the predominant rebel organization in Algiers.

According to Colonel Roger Trinquier, such an organization provided a perfect example of an efficient clandestine architecture by balancing the centralization required to unite the efforts and the decentralization indispensable to provide force protection and adaptation to a constantly evolving situation. The “Autonomous Zone of Algiers” (ZAA) consisted of three regions – Central Algiers, Algiers West, and Algiers East – subdivided into sectors, which were themselves divided into districts. Each of the thirty-four districts was ruled by two coordinated but structurally separate organizations working side by side: an ALN 35-men military unit and a FLN 127-men political cell. Spreading its double cobweb both horizontally in a geographical perspective and vertically from the grass-roots to the Muslim upper classes, the organization could eventually rely on a total network of an estimated 1,200 combatants and 4,500 political activists. Existing parallel to the regular French administration, this comprehensive shadow political structure was in charge of controlling the population, transmitting orders, and collecting
the “revolutionary” tax. As a result of such an influence, passers-by turned into lookouts watching over the movements, shopkeepers acted as mail boxes, and sympathizers fueled a constant and updated flow of intelligence to the head of the organization. At the top, a council of four members – Ramdane Abbane, Larbi Ben M’hidi, Benyoucef Benkhedda, and Saddi Yacef – collectively made the decisions, even if the comparative importance of each of the members was actually proved to be different and changing during the battle.

In charge of the armed operations, Saddi Yacef shrewdly organized his operational networks by trying to minimize his vulnerabilities and striving to increase the value of his specific assets. First, as a Casbah native, he knew how to take advantage of the terrain. Enhancing the natural benefits of the old-tortuous-street Muslim city, he created, with the help of skillful masons, arms caches, bomb factories, and multiple secret passages to connect adjacent houses. Moreover, quickly understanding that the Muslim district would certainly be the focus point of the counter-insurgency reaction, he also made use of active sympathies in wealthy European boroughs to set a series of less open-to-suspicion caches and installed himself right in front of the office of the French commandant of the Algiers sector.\(^\text{17}\)

Second, carefully kept apart from the political organization, the military branch was broken down into numerous distinct, compartmented, and hermetic cells. Every basic cell of three men, headed by a leader and a deputy, had no contact with the other adjacent units. The cell only communicated with its direct chief through a system of letter boxes, hence each had a very limited knowledge about the organization as a whole. For example, the so-called “bomb network” thus actually consisted of different separate cells like “body-maker,” “explosive experts,” “delivery team,” or “bomb placers.”\(^\text{18}\)

Third, Saddi Yacef chose young attractive women to carry and place the bombs. Among the most famous, Hassiba Ben Bouali, Zohra Drif, Djamila Bouhired and Samia Lakdahri were
all from bourgeois background and fiercely faithful to the rebellion. Easily morphing from a traditional Muslim woman, hiding the bomb under her *jellabah*, into an attractive European dressed female frequenting the bars in vogue, they often evaded the security forces’ attention.\(^\text{19}\)

On 19 June, Ahmed Zabane and Abd el-Kader, two NLF activists, were guillotined at Barberousse jail.\(^\text{20}\) Believing that these two “combatants” should have been treated as soldiers coming under the laws of war, Abbane ordered that every European “between the ages of 18 and 44. But no women, no old people…” was a potential target.\(^\text{21}\) In a 72-hours period of time, from 21 to 24 June, Saadi Yacef’s terror squads randomly shot down 49 civilians in Algiers. On 10 August, overreacting to this wave of attacks, police cordoned the Casbah and blew up a dwelling that reputedly housed terrorists involved in the June reprisals. Three neighboring dwellings were also destroyed, leading to the death of 70 persons, including women and children.\(^\text{22}\) Escalating security measures eventually resulted in fueling the ineluctable vicious circle of violence.

Consequently, blaming the French government for the bombings directed at human beings, the *Soumman* conference decided one month later to adopt a policy of indiscriminate terrorism against the European population. From April to December 1956, the ALN conducted an estimated 600 armed operations, from throwing grenades to planted bomb explosions. Some devices did not work,\(^\text{23}\) others were found before the explosion but some caused carnage.\(^\text{24}\) On 30 September, two bombs detonated in two brasseries, the *Milk Bar* and *La Cafétéria*, resulting in three deaths and 50 injured, including a dozen amputations. The assassination attempts increased and on the 28 December, Amédée Frogier, mayor of Boufarik and an open supporter of an Algeria under French rule, was killed by Ali la Pointe, Saddi Yacef’s most loyal lieutenant.\(^\text{25}\) Facing an increasing day-to-day insecurity, the European population repeatedly and increasingly pressured the government to act firmly.
Calling For the Centurions. The capital of French Algeria descended into ungovernable anarchy. Radicalization of the situation was not only the direct consequence of the FLN decision to bring the fight into Algiers but also the product of the European counterterrorist reaction fomented by extremists of the Resistant Organization for French Algeria (ORAF). As a result, the reciprocal demonization process progressively led to silencing the moderates on both sides and to suppress any hope of peaceful negotiated solution. In such a stalemate situation, the French civilian authorities’ ordinary efforts seemed to be insufficient to regain the initiative.

Facing a desperate paralysis of regular courses of action, Robert Lacoste – Algeria’s senior civilian executive – decided to stop the terror by temporarily giving the military extraordinary police powers. On 7 January 1957, prefect Serge Baret entrusted General Jacques Massu, commander of the elite 10th Para Division, with the responsibility to enforce law and order in Algiers. “In the territory of the department of Algiers, the law and order responsibilities are transferred […] to the military authority which will exercise, under the high control of the prefect of Algiers, the police powers which are normally within the hands of the civilian authorities.”

The decree not only included meetings or movements regulations, but also the right to carry out night searches and to place every “potentially dangerous person” under house arrest. Most of these measures, inconceivable on the metropolitan territory, i.e Mainland France, were backed by a series of laws progressively voted by the National Assembly, especially the State of Emergency Act (3 April 1955) and the Special Powers Act (16 March 1956).

Nevertheless, such a transfer of powers proved to have dramatic long-term consequences. First, France fell into the trap of provocation by taking up the FLN’s challenge and fighting on its terms, i.e using unlimited force to try and achieve a decisive victory. Second, the civilian
authority abdication of responsibility meant that political decisions were driven by the military results in the field. Third, officers, unprepared for such duties, found themselves in charge of enforcing civilian authority in French “départments d’Algérie” that were not officially at war.

Massu himself felt very uncomfortable with the decision that gave him such powers. He commented to his chief of staff, Colonel Yves Godard: “I can tell you right away, we’re going to have some heaps of emmerdements!” However, albeit reluctant as “he abhorred all kinds of political involvement,” he was naturally not disposed to argue about orders. As the stereotype of the loyal and stern disciplined soldier ready to accept the mission, he vigorously brought all his forces into the battle. The 10th Para division had been raised in 1956 for the Suez Canal expedition and had just returned frustrated from this operation where it had exhibited proof of real tactical offensive capabilities without achieving a strategic success because of political hesitancy and civilian leadership indecisiveness. Composed of four parachutist regiments, the division numbered 3,200 paratroopers, all well-equipped, skillfully trained, and strongly led. Gendarmerie and police units (3,000) as well as Army units (5,800) already deployed in Algiers were added to the 10th Para. Taking the area of Algiers under his unique command, Jacques Massu could eventually rely on a total strength close to 12,000 men, half of whom were not stuck to static missions but could be used as a quick reaction force. This was not the first time that the paratroopers had intervened in the Casbah as a year previously they had been called to reinforce the police there. However, in January 1957 the conditions were completely different.

The “centurions” – easily recognizable from their “leopard-camouflaged” battle dress uniform they disseminated to all the forces under Massu’s command because of the psychological effect on the population – were this time fully in charge of implementing law and order in the city. If theoretically and supposedly Jacques Massu acted under the authority of
prefect Serge Baret, in reality he actually had freedom of action and he did not hesitate to delegate to the lower hierarchical levels of command so they could also act accordingly.

**The Sword: The First Battle of Algiers.** Paratroopers entered Algiers less than a week after Massu had received his orders. However, albeit impressive, their presence was not anything new: paras had been called one year before to restore order after tough demonstrations. Nonetheless, what was new was the situation. Bolstered both by the police powers and the extended freedom to act it had received from the civilian authority, the 10th Para Division firmly implemented several radical methods, particularly well-described in the J2 order issued in January 1957 and called “Directive to root the rebel organization out of Algiers.”

The first action consisted in organizing a “quadrillage” system to conduct surface warfare in Algiers.\(^3\) To do so, the city was divided into four districts and each of them became the area of operations of a dedicated regiment. More than 200 sensitive points were thus constantly monitored, 180 patrols moved daily throughout the city, and 30 patrols each night were in the streets while many permanent as well as hasty built barricades deeply impeded the FLN movements. Colonel Trinquier, in charge of police operations, pushed the system further by developing a community policing system called the “Urban Protection System” (DPU).\(^3\)\(^3\) Every 18-man-police-station jurisdiction was divided into blocks or “îlots,” themselves subdivided into groups of houses. Every “îlot” was characterized by a letter and every group by a number. Local leaders, generally French Army veterans, had to give every inhabitant a special ID whose purpose was to link a physical individual to a precise residency location.\(^3\)\(^4\) Understanding that a pro-FLN population was the enemy Center of Gravity, Jacques Trinquier tried to disconnect the Casbah inhabitants from the insurgents, slowing down the movement of the “fish in the water,” facilitating denunciations, and replacing the FLN propaganda with pro-French endeavors.
Second, four Administrative Urban Sections (SAU) were created to compete with FLN political structure. While these sections obviously participated in the global process of intelligence collection, they mainly tried to win the “hearts and minds” battle among the population using billboards, leaflets, radios, movie theaters, street loud-speakers, and public meetings. A new Muslim elite, based on veterans and DPU members, progressively took the control of the Casbah. Hundreds of young Muslims were sent to France to receive a professional education and women were merged into “female associations.”

Third, collecting intelligence proved to be a crucial, if not the vital, issue to foil the random bombings. Another aspect of the COIN operations was the penetration into the Muslim society to find, break, and destroy the enemy cells. If the traditional sources of information, such as the population and the administrative files, were still relevant and widely used to shape the battlefield human terrain, the common feeling of racing against the clock made the interrogation of suspects much more attractive in obtaining immediate useful information. Facilitated by the extensive powers given to the lower hierarchical commands, the extraction of high-value information progressively appeared to be the only way to combat and neutralize terrorist actions. With the civilian authorities' political abdication of responsibilities, the paras resorted to large-scale interrogations outside of French law, which led to various human right violations such as illegal detentions, tortures, and summary executions. If General Aussaresses clearly recognized in 2001 his responsibility as the leader of the “death squadron” in charge of discreetly doing the “dirty work,” recent studies argue that cases of torture were widespread. Brutalities, such as the passage à tabac, the water-pipe, or the use of electrodes, were common methods that were justified – even sometimes too easily when the suspect had no direct link with the insurgency – by the imperative necessity to save the lives of innocent people.
These radical methods proved to be tactically and operationally efficient to end what Yacef Saadi himself designated as a “murderous madness.” In January, Algiers seemed to be under the control of the insurgency: a general strike threatened to paralyze the whole economic life and the inhabitants were terrorized by an increasing number of bombings such as the attacks that simultaneously struck the brasseries the Cafeteria, the Otomatic and the Coq Hardi. By early April, the bomb network had been completely dismantled and the remaining FLN leaders were unable to coordinate actions. From 20 January to 31 March, the 10th Para Division killed 200 fellaghas and arrested 1,827 people. Such losses represent an estimated 20% of the FLN forces. They were sufficient to temporarily disorganize the insurgency but not to suppress it. Massu had lost two paratroopers killed and five wounded. As the bombings stopped, one could think that the “Battle of Algiers” was won and the division – apart from one regiment regularly relieved in place – returned to its natural area of operations: the djebel.

### The Scalpel: The Second Battle of Algiers

However, the victory against terrorism was as blatant as it unfortunately proved to be short-lived. On 3 June, three bombs hidden in public lampposts exploded, killing three and wounding 88. The day after, new explosions resulted in the death of 10 innocent passer-bys. On 9 June, the “Casino de la Corniche” bombing caused eight deaths and 81 injured, including ten leg amputations. European reactions to such a resumption of random violence were equally murderous, for instance a “punitive retaliation” after the death of two young paratroopers caused ten of Muslim victims.

In the face of such a new threat, General Massu entrusted his deputy, Colonel Yves Godard, with the command of the Algiers area of responsibility. If the so-called “first battle of Algiers” was fought using bloody swords, the second one proved to be a surgical operation using scalpels. Locating his headquarter close to the Casbah, Godard shrewdly conducted his action
without troop reinforcements and within a strict legal framework. In close coordination with the
civilian authority, he transferred the responsibility of interrogations of suspects as well as
clearing centers administration to police officers legally able to investigate criminal cases.
Relying on the different structures already created during the first battle, Godard added a
masterful innovation: the so-called “bleus de chauffe” or “blue coveralls.”

Understanding that the horror at the FLN atrocities, intended to induce a French military
overreaction, could conversely dissociate the Muslim population from the insurgency, Captain
Paul-Alain Léger created a special pro-French “urban fellagah” unit: the Intelligence Collection
and Exploitation Group (GRE).42 These men – “boiler suits” dressed – were mostly recruited
among relatives of people killed or tortured by the insurgency. Disseminated in the Casbah to bait
those in charge of implementing the strict FLN life rules, they were latter hidden in strategic
locations to report any suspect behavior or movement inside the Muslim district.43 Finally, they
participated in various infiltration and disinformation operations that resulted in dismantling the
terrorist network in Algiers. After identifying and putting under arrest most of the FLN leaders in
the city, Léger succeeded in maintaining the illusion of a FLN staff in Algiers constantly asking
the djebel units for reinforcements. Captured as soon as they entered in the Casbah, these “fells”44
provided information that allowed the French military to go back along several networks. When
the illusion became hard to maintain, the ultimate step consisted in publically admitting the
infiltrations that provoked paranoiac reactions.

The bomb network was completely dismantled and Yacef Saadi himself was captured on
24 September 1957. The last act occurred on the 8 October 1957 when Ali-la-Pointe, Saadi’s
henchman, was killed. The Battle of Algiers thus ended. Based on turnarounds, infiltrations and
surveillances, the “bleuite”45 proved to be extremely efficient with a light military footprint and
without violating legality.
**Aussaresses versus Godard.** In a blurred conflict that is neither a police operation nor a conventional war, the legal uncertainty created by the abdication of responsibility by civilian authority ineluctably led to the temptation of committing illegal acts. Adhering neither to the legality of peace nor of war, the “counter-revolutionary war” theories of Roger Trinquier\(^{46}\) or Charles Lacheroy\(^{47}\) have to be understood as an attempt to respond to a unique situation without any theoretical references. The proposed concepts, which share a strong emphasis on the absolute need for intelligence, differ drastically on the way to quickly obtain the vital information. Paul Aussaresses and Yves Godard were both close to Massu but personally disliked each other. \(^{48}\) They also embodied two opposite approaches that are clearly distinguishable during the Battle of Algiers. A fair comparison between the phases of the fight seems to be distorted, as the second one clearly benefited from some of the first’s achievements. An analysis of the two phases eventually brings out two different perspectives on how to overwhelm an asymmetrical adversary within a context of irregular warfare. Putting aside any consideration of morality, were these methods effective to win the battle in a short-term perspective?

Paul Aussaresses, – a major in the French special services attached to Massu’s headquarters between 1955 and 1957 – in 2001 published a book explaining that he routinely tortured suspects and killed them afterwards. \(^{49}\) Pushing the justification of illegal violence to the limit, he embodies the dark face of COIN operations. Although acting much more extremely than Roger Trinquier’s theoretical prescriptions, he shares with the author of “Modern Warfare”\(^{50}\) the widespread “ticking-bomb test”\(^{51}\) argument that put human rights and best intentions under pressure. This comes when authorities have credible information that a bomb is going to detonate and that they have apprehended the suspects who may be able to say when and where it will
explode. If these prisoners refuse to talk, should they be tortured? According to Aussaresses, the real issue is not the moral scruple about inflicting pain on perpetrators but telling the parents of the victims that it is better to let innocent people be killed or wounded rather than make a single terrorist suffer. As the British journalist Edward Behr, who cannot be regarded as a supporter of torture, said: “The Battle of Algiers could not have been won by General Massu without the use of torture.”

Nonetheless, the resort to torture was not a guarantee of obtaining the precious intelligence. A large majority of the detainees had actually no clue about what was going to happen and most of the tortured victims, desperate to stop the agony, eventually gave plenty of false information. Moreover, torture led to radicalization and polarization of the population as it drove into the insurgent camp undecided and moderate Muslims. As the French writer and Algiers native Albert Camus concluded: “torture has perhaps saved some at the expense of honor, by uncovering thirty bombs, but at the same time it has created fifty new terrorists who, operating in some other way and in another place would cause the death of even more innocent people.”

After the war, Yves Godard – Massu’s éminence grise – explained that from his perspective, “there was no need to torture.” Recalling to a certain extent the French traditional doctrine of association, he mainly tried to transform insurgents into associates. As a former chief of the SDECE – the French secret service, he was inclined to share Colonel Lacheroy’s focus on psychological warfare. If admittedly a pro-FLN population proves to be the insurgency “dynamic” source of power, the overuse of strength by loyalist forces consolidates the links between insurgents and population. Using torture eventually reinforced the enemy Center of Gravity by increasing the rebellion’s popular support. Conversely sowing discord in the “Enemy’s house” and discrediting it with the population were two modus operandi that directly
attacked the insurgency’s critical vulnerability. Emptying the water from the bowl will not allow the fish to live.

**Trivialization of Ordinary Violence or Institutionalization of Torture?** Today, almost nobody denies the reality of the use of torture during the Battle of Algiers. The current debate focuses more on the scale of the methods and on the French senior officials’ degree of involvement. Both alleged extensions – horizontally as well as vertically – reveal the vicious circle that led an increasing number of soldiers to commit illegal acts and to lose their honor, while most of the political leaders, in Algiers as well as in Paris, hypocritically gave the military a free hand while abdicating their own responsibility.

The “ticking-time bomb” paradigm opened the Pandora’s Box. Those refusing the *a priori* condemnation of any resort to torture heavily rely on this paradigm, based on recognized exceptional circumstances. It became a morally comfortable way to justify various kinds of excesses. What was initially identified by the fresh French soldier newly arriving in Algeria as an isolated act of cruelty, only potentially conceivable to ultimately protect his loved relatives from certain death, turned rapidly into the banal routine of everyday horror. Initial justifications of the exception ended up justifying the routine. Those who overcame their scruples ultimately found themselves unable to escape from the process. In a context of disgust at the atrocities of the FLN and of determination not to lose Algeria, the dehumanization of the enemy led to an irretrievable process of trivialization of ordinary violence. Atrocities were not only committed, as General Raoul Salan wrote, “by maverick soldiers who were already crazy before entering the military or who act under the influence of alcohol” but also by average French conscripts with no criminal background. Officers felt very uncomfortable with “non codified missions far from conventional warfare (…) that put consciences in a painful dilemma in a total lack of precise
directives.”  

If today’s researchers admit that there was a real process of acceptability of illegal acts especially during the Battle of Algiers, they also recognize that most of the officers – when not clearly denouncing torture – strove hard trying to stay within the republican legal boundaries.  

By giving the military extraordinary police powers, the French highest officials in Paris and Algiers encouraged the Army to fight the battle with total energy. Meeting General Massu and his colonels on 10 February 1957, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, the Defense Secretary, did not raise any objection to Lieutenant-Colonel Bigeard’s remark, “we’re not going to go back along terrorist networks with altar boys.” In a similar way, General Salan wrote the same year a secret and personal directive that provided the commanders with some practical advice far from the canons of Republican legality: “the temporary abduction by heliborne operation of randomly-chosen inhabitants to question them about the rebel organization in the douar” must be prioritized and “in-depth and as tight as possible interrogatories must be immediately exploited.”  

However, abdication of the civilian political control at the top and trivialization of violence from the bottom does not mean that there was a volunteer political process of institutionalizing torture. On the contrary, although senior officials then currently denied the resort to prohibited methods, today’s evidence proves that torture was not part of a conscious system but rather the by-product of a total lack of leadership. Each time the problem was clearly identified and the taboo word pronounced, the politicians did not hesitate to firmly condemn the practice. In March 1955, Jacques Soustelle – Governor General of Algeria – thus categorically refused a senior-civil-servant report clearly arguing for legalization of torture. After demonstrating that torture had become so prevalent in Algeria and had provided effective results in neutralizing the terrorists, Inspector-General Wuillaume had explained:
The water and electricity methods, provided they are used carefully, are said to produce a shock which is more psychological than physical and therefore do not constitute excessive cruelty… According to certain medical opinion which I was given, the water-pipe method, if used as outlined above, involves no risk to the health of the victim…(…). I am inclined to think that these procedures can be accepted and that, if used in the controlled manner described to me, they are no more brutal than deprivation of food, drink, and tobacco…

Winning the Battle, Losing the War: the Counter-productive Effects. In 1972, the famous ethnologist Germaine Tillon, reacting to general Massu’s book, wrote in Le Monde: “From now on, States know that to be sure to lose a country, they just have to win “a true battle of Algiers.” Playing with the title of the book, the Maghreb specialist deeply figured out a paradox that still remains at the heart of every asymmetrical conflict. The more-powerful-protagonist’s overuse of strength – either indiscriminate or disproportionate – proves to be strategically counterproductive. More specifically, gathering intelligence primarily through brutal methods eventually increases the enemy’s source of power.

First and foremost, it resulted in an increase of enemy legitimacy within the local population which Mao had already identified as the source of insurgents’ movements, protection, and, logistical support. As already explained above, if torture could sometimes be tactically and operationally profitable in a short-term perspective, it also always had immediate dramatic strategic consequences. The use of torture led to a radicalization of the situation for which the insurgents were looking. Such a demonization of French behavior backed the insurgents’ raison d’être with the population. In a vicious circle, random terrorism became the justification for torture and vice versa. The rifts created by excesses led to the eradication of any possible Muslim “third” force with which a compromise peace should have been reached. As Albert Camus said, any resort to torture saved thirty lives but generated fifty new terrorists.
Second, it resulted in an increase of enemy international legitimacy. The “illegitimacy of French Presence in Algeria” began to be denounced at the United Nations. With the help of pictures and testimonies, FLN unofficial delegates described in New York the “horrible, inhuman and immoral” French method of pacification in Algeria. As a result, Syrian, Moroccan, Tunisian and Egyptian representatives regularly asked the UN General Assembly to condemn France. In 1956, facing international critics after the Suez political fiasco, French officials could no longer prevent the Algerian issue being placed on the agenda. At the beginning of 1957, they temporarily succeeded in delaying the discussion but the echoes from the Battle of Algiers made the French international position much more uncomfortable after each day of fighting.

Third, it weakened the French determination to keep Algeria. The Battle of Algiers left behind a poison that lingered in French society long after the war. This appeared even before the French left Algeria, as early as March 1957, condemnations of the methods used by the military in Algeria increased in Paris. The writer Pierre-Henri Simon published “Against the Torture” when another famous writer and World War II resistance, Vercors, returned in protestation to the President of the French Republic his “légion d’honneur”. A manifesto against torture was initiated by a 357-member Spiritual Resistance Committee structured around the jurist René Capitant and Henri Alleg’s book, “The Question.” It provoked in 1958 a tidal wave of revulsion in the French society. The author described with many details the tortures he endured during his two months of illegal incarceration. Nonetheless, critics not only came from supposedly pro-FLN left-wing intellectuals but also from “regular” civilian and military officials. In March 1957, Paul Teitgen, Secretary General at the Algiers Prefecture, submitted a letter of resignation to the Governor General explaining that “for the past three months we have been engaged… in irresponsibility which can only lead to war crimes.” At the same time, General Jacques de la Bollardière, a famous wartime veteran in charge of the Blida sector, requested to be posted back
to France. Considering that his protests were just ignored by his superiors, he subsequently wrote in *The Express* “the terrible danger there would be for us to lose sight, under the fallacious pretext of immediate expediency, of the moral values which alone have, up until now, created the grandeur of our civilization and of our Army.” Both men fought the Nazi less then fifteen years before and Teitgen had been tortured by the Gestapo nine times.

The “new Dreyfus Affair” – as the writer François Mauriac named the debate about torture – reveals the painful paradox in the core of the Algerian war. Torture appeared in France, a democratic country that presents itself as the home of liberal conscience and free humanity, and a recognized member of the international community which had signed in 1948 the “Universal declaration of Human Rights.” It was a country whose population endured German occupation and was still proud to have helped defeat Nazi barbarity. In the early 21st century, the deep injury is still present in the French society, regularly opened according to the circumstances. For example, in 2001 with the publication of General Aussarresses’ frightening memoirs, in 2004 with the revelation of Abu Graib’s abuses, or in 2006 when an Ivorian rebel was suffocated to death by a French soldier. French archives about Algeria are still classified in contrast to those of the US about Vietnam which are now available. The French-Algerian war definitively remains “un passé qui ne passe pas.”
Conclusion

Facing an invisible enemy who could be everywhere and did not hesitate to resort to asymmetrical resources to terrorize the population, the French regular forces felt an increasing feeling of frustration. Being unable to find and fix the opponents naturally led to the temptation of extracting the precious information from prisoners. The temptation seemed to be all the more important as time was against the security forces. Preventing the bombings became a political leitmotiv and a primary military objective. Consequently, in such a context, the “ticking-time bomb” paradigm became the easy and common justification for all the excesses and progressively led to a trivialization of brutal methods.

Many lessons have been drawn from the French experience in Algeria and the hexagonal volunteer amnesia is a societal cancer that still prevents France from developing today a consistent COIN theory. Nonetheless, as Michael Kaufman notes, “the conditions that the French faced in Algeria are similar to those the United States is finding in Iraq.”\(^76\) This proves to be a dangerous assumption. First, argued Jacques Fremeaux, one must not be blinded by the similarities but must also consider the differences: apart from religion, the Middle East has nothing to do with North Africa, Algeria was a French department where both communities knew each other very well, and the means the insurgents can employ today are much more enhanced than the ones FLN could rely on in 1957. However, the major take-away from the Battle of Algiers is certainly at the core of the subsequent paradox: winning the battle of Algiers precipitated the loss of Algeria. If the French Army succeeded in “destroying the political and military structure of the enemy,” it failed to achieve two other COIN lines of operation: “maintaining the political will to support the conflict” and “maintaining control of the population” mainly because of resorting to brutal methods.
1 The word “Bled”, “countryside” in colloquial French, comes from the Arabic word “balad” (بلد) which means “village”.

2 Jacques Fremeaux, telephone conversation with author.

3 The word “Ulema” (علماء, “scholars”) refers to the educated class of Muslims in legal Islamic studies.

4 Jacques Fremeaux, telephone conversation with author.


6 The word “Djebel” (“jabal”, جبل) means « mountain » in Arabic.


10 See appendix A.


12 Jacques Fremeaux, telephone conversation with author.

13 Ramdane Abbane was a famous Kabyle leader and one of the few FLN undergraduates.


16 Trinquier, *La guerre moderne*.

17 Jacques Fremeaux, telephone conversation with author.

18 See appendix B.


20 Ahmed Zabane had been charged for the assassination of a rural policeman and Abd el-Kader for his participation to a bloody ambush that had caused the death of six persons. For more details, refer to Saadi Yacef, *La bataille d’Alger*, 231-234.


23 Air France in the Maurétania building.

24 EGA (Electricité et Gaz d’Algérie)


26 In a book that became one of France’s greatest best sellers since World War II, Jean Lartéguy gave the name of “centurion” to the hard-bitten French regular who had survived the Indochina war and later had sought to apply his lessons in Algeria.

27 Algerian colonists formed a subversive organization pledged to fight for French Algeria.


32 See appendix C
33 DPU : Dispositif de Protection Urbaine.
35 Jacques Fremeaux, telephone conversation with author.
40 The word *fellagha* (فلاقة), highwaymen in Arabic, was used by the French in Algeria and in Tunisia to call the insurgents. Literally, it means “heads breaker.”
41 Jacques Fremeaux, telephone conversation with author.
42 GRE : Groupe de Renseignement et d’Exploitation.
43 Michel Goya, email message to author, September 5, 2008.
44 “Fells” is the commonly used abbreviation for the word “fellagha.”
46 Trinquier, *La guerre moderne*.
48 Delmas, *La bataille d’Alger*, 163. Aussaresses wrote: “It was when the Battle of Algiers was already won that Godard appeared.”
50 Trinquier, *La guerre moderne*.
52 Edward Samuel Behr (May 7, 1926, Paris - May 27, 2007, Paris) was a foreign correspondent and war journalist.
57 The phrase is from General Catroux describing Lyautey’s methods in Morocco.
59 Ignatieff, “The Torture Wars.”
60 Letter from General Salan to Army Corps Commanders, April 27, 1957, Vincennes, SHA 1 H 2579/2.
62 Branche, “L’armée et la torture pendant la guerre d’Algérie.”
63 “*Douar*” (دل) means a camp or village of tents.
64 General Salan, March 11, 1957, 1 H 3087.
66 Branche, “L’armée et la torture pendant la guerre d’Algérie.”
68 Massu, *La vraie bataille d’Alger*.
70 Marcel Champeix’s testimony audition in the French National Assembly, March 14, 1957, French National Assembly Archives.
75 “The past is still alive,” sentence from Henry Rousso.
Bibliography

Note: some French sources have been translated into English, and therefore are listed in both categories.

With no possible access to the still classified French archives, the protagonists’ memoirs remain precious primary sources. Understandably, these sources often present the risk of being driven by the desire of their authors to justify their own actions and discredit their enemy’s achievements.

English sources

Books:


Student Theses


Articles


French sources

**Books:**


**Student Theses**

Articles


Military publications


Films

1 – Algiers in Algeria

Source: Lieutenant-Colonel François, CDEF (French Tradoc), Paris.
2 - The Casbah in Algiers (1956)

Source: Lieutenant-Colonel François, CDEF (French Tradoc), Paris.
1 – FLN Administrative and Political Organization.

Sources:
2 – ALN Military Organization.

3 – ALN Bomb Network.
APPENDIX C : THE FRENCH QUADRILLAGE

APPENDIX D: BIOGRAPHIES

General Jacques MASSU (1908 - 2002)

“Everything about the stocky, vital figure that was to become one of the best known on the World’s screens and in Press over the next years bespoke toughness: growling voice, the vigorous hair *en brosse* and the down-turned eyes that reminded one a little of his fierce First World War predecessor, General Charles Mangin (“The butcher”), the square, set jaw and the aggressive, all-dominant nose, and the rugged features that altogether looked as if they had been hewn, like a Swiss bear, from a block of wood. On meeting Massu for the first time one was a little surprised to find that he was not eight feet tall – in fact, rather than medium height. His presence commanded, and he was, as he looked, every inch a fighting soldier – and a superb fighting soldier at that, of the ilk of the campaign-hardened veterans of the Grande Armée”.


Jacques Massu was born in 1908. He graduated from Saint-Cyr in 1930. Between October 1930 and August 1931, he served in the 16th Senegalese Tirailleur Regiment (16th RTS). He was sent to Morocco with the 5th RTS and took part in the fighting around Tafilalt where he earned his first citation. He was promoted to lieutenant in October 1932 and took part in the operations in the High Atlas mountains, earning a second citation. He served in Togo from January 1935 to February 1937, performing military and civilian duties in Komkombas. Then he was stationed in Lorraine with the 41st RMIC until June 1938, when he was sent to Chad to command the subdivision of Tibesti. He was serving in Africa when World War II broke out, and joined the Free French Forces. He served as a lieutenant-colonel in the 2nd Armored Division (2e DB) until the end of the war. In September 1945, he landed in Saigon and took part in the retaking of the city and of the South of Indochina.

Brigadier General in June 1955, Massu commanded 10e Division parachutiste that was sent in Egypt to take back the Suez Canal and to Algeria in response to a wave of armed attacks. In July 1958, he was promoted to Lieutenant-General and took the head of the army corps of Algiers, as well as functions of prefect for the region of Algiers.

In March 1966, he became a five-star general and chief of the French forces in Germany. On the 29 May 1968, Charles de Gaulle came to visit him during the events of May 68. Massu assured de Gaulle of his support, but according to some sources, conditioned it upon an amnesty for French military officers implicated in coup attempts during the Algerian War.

Massu retired from military duty in July 1969 and spent the rest of his life in his home at Conflans-sur-Loing. He died there on 26 October 2002.

Colonel Yves Godard (1911 – 1975)

Yves Godard was a French Army officer who fought in World War II, First Indochina War, and Algerian War. A graduate of Saint-Cyr and Chasseur Alpin, he served as a ski instructor in Poland during 1939. He became a prisoner in 1940 and made two unsuccessful escape attempts, finally succeeding on his third. He made his way to France and joined the French Resistance maquis in Savoy.

He was part of the occupation force in Austria, then a general staff officer of the French Army before taking command of the 11e Bataillon Parachutiste de Choc. He led the battalion during the First Indochina War, taking part in a failed attempt from Laos to relieve the French Union garrison at Dien Bien Phu. In 1955 Godard become chief of staff of the Parachute Intervention Group, soon to become the 10th Parachute Division, in Algeria commanded by General Jacques Massu. He took part in the Anglo-French operation during the Suez Crisis in 1956. Godard become one of the primary figures of the Battle of Algiers, especially during the later part when he commanded the Algiers sector.

After the barricade week in 1960, Godard was transferred to France, but he returned to take part in the unsuccessful Algiers putsch of 1961. When this failed, he joined the OAS but left Algeria in the summer of 1962 and stayed underground until 1967. Godard was sentenced to death for his part in the putsch and OAS. He settled in Belgium and, unlike his OAS colleagues, he didn't return to France after the 1968 amnesty. Godard died in 1975 at Lessines, Belgium, aged 64 years old.

General Paul Aussaresses (born in 1918).

In 1941, Aussaresses served a year as an officer cadet in Algeria. The next year, he volunteered for the special services unit in France. He wound up in the Jedburghs and member of Team CHRYSLER which parachuted into France behind the German lines in August 1944. The Jedburghs worked clandestinely behind enemy lines. On 1 September 1946, he founded 11th Choc Battalion and commanded the battalion until 1948, when he was replaced by Yves Godard. Later, he served in the First Indochina War with the 1st Parachute Chasseur Regiment.

In 1955 he was transferred to Philippeville, Algeria, to be part of the 41st Parachute Demi-Brigade as an intelligence officer. On 20 August 1955; the FLN staged an attack against the people of Philippeville. Aussaresses states that he had information about this attack well beforehand and therefore he was able to prevent much of the possible bloodshed. The members of the FLN had also convinced many of the men, women, and children of the countryside to march in with them without weapons. Aussaresses reports that his battalion killed 134 of these men, women, and children.

General Jacques Massu, who had noted Aussaresses' repressive work against the insurrections in Philippeville, ordered Aussaresses to work under him in Algiers in the effort to control the FLN. Aussaresses reported for duty in Algiers on 8 January 1957. He was the main executioner and intelligence collector under Jacques Massu during the Battle of Algiers. On 28 January, he broke a city-wide strike organized by the FLN using repressive measures. Later, in 1957, he ordered his men to hang Larbi Ben M'Hidi, an important member of the FLN, as if he had committed suicide. In a separate incident he ordered that an officer throw Ali Boumendjel, an influential Algerian attorney, from the 6th floor, claiming that Boumendjel had committed suicide. Aussaresses contends, in his book, that the French government insisted that the military in Algeria "liquidate the FLN as quickly as possible".

Aussaresses did not fight till the end for French Algeria, unlike the officers who joined the OAS militant group. He had a successful career after the war, being named in 1961 military attaché of the French embassy in Washington DC, along with ten veterans of the Algerian War under his orders. He then joined Fort Bragg, North Carolina, seat of the 10th Special Forces Group. There, he taught the "lessons" of the Battle of Algiers, including torture. The Americans started by reading Colonel Trinquier's book on "subversive warfare. The inspiration for the Phoenix Program during the Vietnam War came from students of Aussaresses, who sent Trinquier's book to the CIA agent Robert Komer.

Aussaresses went to Brazil in 1973 during the military dictatorship, where he maintained very close links with the military. There, he advised the South American juntas on counter-insurrection warfare, also on the use of torture.

Colonel Roger Trinquier (1908 - 1986)

Trinquier was posted to China in the 1930s where he learned Chinese and served in the French Shanghai concession between 1940 and 1946. When the Japanese occupied China during World War II, the Vichy French forces were left armed and unmolested until March 1945 and then imprisoned. Unlike many Vichy officers, Trinquier was kept in service after the war due to the attention of General Raoul Salan. Trinquier was posted alternately to Indochina and to the Commando Training Center. In 1951 he became commander of all anti-communist guerrillas (GCMA) in north Indochina (Tonkin) and his teams were successful until the Battle of Dien Bien Phu caused the withdrawal of the French army from Indochina.

He was posted in 1957 to Algiers during the Algerian War. In Algiers he was at the origin of the Dispositif de Protection Urbain. Trinquier retired in 1961 and went to the Congo to support the Katanga rebellion.

Trinquier is a major theorist in the style of warfare he called Modern Warfare, an "interlocking system of actions - political, economic, psychological, military - that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country.

Perhaps his most original contribution was his study and application of terrorism and torture as it related to this Modern Warfare. He argued that it was immoral to treat terrorists as criminals, and to hold them criminally liable for their acts. In his view, terrorists should be treated as soldiers, albeit with the qualification that while they may attack civilian targets and wear no uniform, they also must be tortured for the very specific purpose of betraying their organization. Trinquier's criteria for torture was that the terrorist was to be asked only questions that related to the organization of his movement, that the interrogators must know what to ask, and that once the information is obtained the torture must stop and the terrorist is then treated as any other prisoner of war.

The French army applied Trinquier's tactics during the Algerian War. In the short run these tactics resulted in a decisive victory in the Battle of Algiers. These tactics were exposed by the press, which had little or no effect at the time, as they were generally regarded as a necessary evil. In the longer term the debate on the tactics used, particularly torture, would re-emerge in the French press for decades.

Saadi Yacef (born January 20, 1928)

Saadi Yacef was one of the leaders of Algeria's National Liberation Front during his country's war of independence. He is currently a Senator in Algeria's People's National Assembly.

Yacef was born in Algiers. He started his working life as an apprentice baker. In 1945 he joined the Parti du Peuple Algerien, a nationalist party which the French authorities soon outlawed, after which it was reconstituted as the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Democratiques (MTLD). From 1947 to 1949 Yacef served in the MTLD's paramilitary wing, the Organisation Secrète. After the OS was broken up Yacef moved to France and lived there until 1952, when he returned to Algeria to work again as a baker.

Yacef joined the FLN at the start of the Algerian War in 1954. By May 1956 he was the FLN's military chief of the Zone Autonome d'Alger (Autonomous Zone of Algiers), making him one of the leaders on the Algerian side in the Battle of Algiers. He was captured by French troops on September 24, 1957 and eventually sentenced to death. General Paul Aussaresses claims that while in custody, he provided the French army with the location of Ali la Pointe, another leading FLN commander.

He was ultimately pardoned by the French government after Charles de Gaulle's 1958 return to power.

While in prison, Yacef wrote his memoir of the battle, which was published in 1962 as Souvenirs de la Bataille d'Alger. After the Algerian War, Yacef helped produce Gillo Pontecorvo's film The Battle of Algiers (1966), based on Souvenirs de la Bataille d'Alger. Yacef played a character modeled on his own experiences in the battle.


Charles Lacheroy (1906 - 2005)

Charles Lacheroy was a French Army officer, theorist of Counter-insurgency warfare, and member of the Organisation de l'armée secrète.

Lacheroy was born to a military family. His father was a decorated infantry second lieutenant killed on 2 August 1916 at Fleury, next to Fort Douaumont at Verdun. Lacheroy was raised by his grandfather, and graduated from Saint-Cyr in 1927 ranking among the 20 top students.

Lacheroy chose the Colonial infantry and obtained a commission as second lieutenant in the 3rd Méhariste company in Levant at Latakia, where he remained until 1935. Promoted to captain, Lacheroy served as instructor for the air group in Rabat from 1936. From 1941, Lacheroy served in the staff of General de Lattre de Tassigny in Tunisia (Free French Forces).

In 1951, he was sent to French Indochina, where he was tasked to protect a railroad to Saigon and secure the sector of Bien Hoa. Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, Lacheroy was transferred to Paris and made director of the Centre d'études asiatiques et africaines (CEAA). There, he developed a theory of Counter-insurgency warfare, by then known as "psychological action". In 1954, he
served as adviser to Defence minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, and Defence minister André Morice in 1956.

In 1958, Lacheroy was dismissed by Jacques Chaban-Delmas and sent to the Constantine Province. On 13 May, he was made director of information and psychological action services in Algiers. In December, he gave conferences at the École supérieure de guerre.

In the early 1960s, Lacheroy resigned his commission to organise a coup d'État against President Charles de Gaulle. For seven years, he lived underground and directed the OAS. He was sentenced to death on abstancia in April 1961. Lacheroy granted amnesty in 1968. He returned to Paris, where he retired.

APPENDIX E: CHRONOLOGY

1954
31 October – 1 November: “Bloody All Saints’ Day.” Beginning of the war in Algeria.

1956
19 June: Ahmed Zabane and Abd el-Kader are guillotined at Barberousse jail.
21-24 June: FLN random attacks in Algiers.
20 August: Soummam meeting.
30 September – 12 November: bloody bombings in Algiers, among them the Milk Bar and La Cafétéria.
16 October: boarding of the “Athos” and seizure of FLN weapons.
22 October: hijacking of the plane transporting the FLN negotiators.
5-7 November: Anglo-French operation “Muskeeter” in the Suez Canal area.
14 December: General Lorrillot is replaced by General Salan, a devotee of the “revolutionary war” concept he experienced in Indochina.
28 December: assassination of Amédée Frogier.

1957
January – May: First battle of Algiers.
7 January: Governor Robert Lacoste gives Massu the responsibility to enforce law and order in Algiers.
16 January: “Ototmatic” and “Coq hardi” bombings.
15 February: Témoignage Chrétien publishes “The Muller’s File”, a first testimony denouncing the use of torture.
21 February: General Jacques Pâris de la Bollardière asks to be posted back to France.
March: Abbane Ramdane and the “Executive and Coordinating Committee” (CCE) have to leave Algiers.
5 April: creation of the “Safeguard Committee.”
**June – October: Second battle of Algiers.**

9 June: “Casino de la Corniche” bombing.

2 July: US Senator Kennedy calls for a negotiated solution.

8 October: Death of Ali la Pointe. End of the “Battle of Algiers.”

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**1962**

18 March: Evian Agreement. Independence of Algeria.