COAXING THE PEACE: REASSURANCE STRATEGY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

by

Dave A. Lopez

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Thesis Co-Advisors: Jeffrey Knopf Zachary Shore

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Coaxing the Peace: Reassurance Strategy in the Twenty-first Century

Dave A. Lopez

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

The international system of the twenty-first century calls for new ways to resolve conflicts. Traditional influence strategies, such as deterrence and compellence, have undergone new revisions to conform to new challenges. A third strategy, reassurance, has demonstrated its potential in recent interstate conflicts after rarely being used during the Cold War. A strategy of reassurance involves one state’s actions to increase the security of an adversary by helping the adversary in an issue that the adversary deems important. If the actions convince the adversary that the reassurer seeks peace, and the adversary also seeks peace, then the adversary reciprocates by sending an equally reassuring signal, completing an exchange that may lead to cooperation. This thesis analyzes the process of reassurance, using four modern case studies. In two of these case studies, one state’s signal of reassurance was reciprocated, leading to a reduction in tensions. In the other two, the signal of reassurance was not reciprocated, leading to further tensions. This thesis seeks to find which conditions surrounded the successful cases. It will reveal that when benign intentions are made transparent through rhetoric, and when signals are perceived as costly, an adversary is more likely to reciprocate signals of reassurance.

International relations, reassurance, deterrence, compellence, Colombia, Cyprus, Italy, Libya, Morocco, Nicaragua, Spain.
ABSTRACT

The international system of the twenty-first century calls for new ways to resolve conflicts. Traditional influence strategies, such as deterrence and compellence, have undergone new revisions to conform to new challenges. A third strategy, reassurance, has demonstrated its potential in recent interstate conflicts after rarely being used during the Cold War. A strategy of reassurance involves one state’s actions to increase the security of an adversary by helping the adversary in an issue that the adversary deems important. If the actions convince the adversary that the reassurer seeks peace, and the adversary also seeks peace, then the adversary reciprocates by sending an equally reassuring signal, completing an exchange that may lead to cooperation. This thesis analyzes the process of reassurance, using four modern case studies. In two of these case studies, one state’s signal of reassurance was reciprocated, leading to a reduction in tensions. In the other two, the signal of reassurance was not reciprocated, leading to further tensions. This thesis seeks to find which conditions surrounded the successful cases. It will reveal that when benign intentions are made transparent through rhetoric, and when signals are perceived as costly, an adversary is more likely to reciprocate signals of reassurance.
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I would like to thank the American taxpayer for giving me the opportunity to do this research at such a fantastic institution. Not only has this experience enriched my knowledge of international relations, but it has also motivated me to seek new ways to resolve conflicts in a world where anything is possible. This experience would not have been possible without the unwavering support of the American public, which finances our armed forces, and this wonderful institution.
I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: REASSURANCE AS AN INFLUENCE STRATEGY

A. PURPOSE

Reassurance is an influence strategy in international relations whereby a state attempts to reduce tensions by undertaking an action that improves its adversary’s security. If the strategy is successful, the adversary sends a reciprocal signal, completing a reassurance exchange that may lead to cooperation. In addition to a reciprocal signal, other types of responses may also follow an attempt to provide reassurance. History has demonstrated that measures intended to provide reassurance have at times been reciprocated, other times ignored, and sometimes even exploited. This thesis seeks to find the causes for the diverse outcomes of reassurance. The main question it seeks to address is: Under what conditions are signals of reassurance reciprocated?

B. IMPORTANCE

The unexpected end of the Cold War sparked a new debate over influence strategies like reassurance. Specifically, international relations (IR) scholars offered new and competing explanations for the unexpected de-escalation of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States in the late 1980s. Gorbachev’s pledge to destroy a great part of the USSR’s nuclear arsenal, his massive troop reductions in 1988, and his moratorium on nuclear tests, brought about rapprochement and reciprocal gestures from the West. Post-revisionist scholars have depicted this rapprochement as a successful example of reassurance. They argue that these exchanges of reassurance built trust by convincing each state that reciprocated cooperation was preferable to nuclear war.

Trust is the desired outcome of reassurance. However, in an anarchical international system where stakes are high, states are reluctant to begin a reassurance exchange from a position of mistrust. IR scholars have proposed several conditions that

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enhance the possibility of building trust, both before and after the employment of reassurance strategy. This thesis seeks to compile these conditions and test them. It will do this by completing a case study analysis that will seek to determine which of the proposed conditions (independent variables) are present in cases where signals of reassurance are reciprocated (dependent variable) and which are not.

One of the most important contributions of this thesis involves addressing the potential of reassurance by redefining it to conform to a more modern, post-Cold War definition. The evolution of security studies has caused all influence strategies to get a twenty-first century update. Reassurance is no exception. The case studies in this thesis may uncover non-traditional examples of reassurance that are appropriate today because of the evolution of the international security environment. Once the concept is defined, the case studies will highlight which conditions increase the chances that a state will reciprocate a signal of reassurance. Policymakers can look for evidence of any of these conditions as they interact with their counterparts in other nations. Understanding the conditions that increase the likelihood of reciprocation can help a policymaker in his or her decision to use reassurance alone, or in conjunction with other influence strategies such as deterrence, compellence, or positive incentives. If the conditions indicate that a reassurance signal is not likely to be reciprocated, then the choice of a different influence strategy may be more appropriate. If the conditions indicate that a reassurance signal is likely to be reciprocated, then a signal of reassurance may avoid a future war.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

Reassurance has not been explored as fully as other IR strategies like deterrence or compellence. IR scholar Andrew Kydd writes “reassurance has been accorded only sporadic attention in the field of international relations.” The limited literature on reassurance offers wide-ranging arguments regarding its importance in IR. On one extreme, Janice G. Stein (an advocate of reassurance) defines “reassurance strategies” as “a set of strategies that adversaries can use to reduce the likelihood of resorting to the

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threat of force.”⁴ On the other extreme, Evan B. Montgomery (a skeptic of reassurance) defines it as “an unexplained effect of reduced uncertainty, as well as a cause of it.”⁵

The debate regarding the effectiveness of reassurance centers on the security dilemma and a state’s willingness to cooperate in an environment of uncertainty.⁶ Considering the literature on the subject (summarized in the next section), one initial hypothesis is that reassurance signals are most likely reciprocated when the initiating state is the weaker adversary. Stronger states are more apt to cooperate but less apt to initiate a process of cooperation. The stronger state that receives the weaker state’s signal is more likely to deem the weaker reassurer as trustworthy and worthy of a reciprocating signal. A second hypothesis from the literature is that transparency, though desirable, does not always cause a reciprocation of reassurance signals. Robert Jervis points out that misperceptions of an adversary’s intentions may include a misunderstanding that a signal of reassurance is actually a “result of fear and weakness.”⁷

A third hypothesis is that, although determining whether a signal is costly enough to merit a reciprocation falls on the receiver, it is the sender that carries the burden of designing a signal that is meaningful to the receiver. This is a modification to the traditional concept of reassurance, which will be explained in Chapter II. Finally, internal domestic issues, such as an insurrection, or the unpopularity of a government, can force a state to reassure its international adversaries for fear of isolation or attack. A

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⁶ Ken Booth, and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 1. The security dilemma is a well-studied IR term that is well explained in this book. Essentially, security-seeking states are faced with the daunting task of correctly interpreting other states’ intentions (dilemma of perception), and deciding on how to react to those perceptions (dilemma of response).

⁷ Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 85. His example of this problem is Hitler’s misperception that “Chamberlain was conciliatory [by signing the Munich Agreement] not because he felt Germany would be sated, but because he lacked the resolve to wage a war to oppose German domination of the continent.” Chamberlain felt he was being transparent in his intentions to give Hitler one last concession. Hitler misunderstood the signal and the result was war.
problem with this fourth hypothesis is that sometimes the opposite happens. Leaders sometimes use a dispute as a rallying cry of nationalism, and escalate tensions just to unify the citizenry.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The first modern IR scholar to argue the merits of reassurance was Charles Osgood in the 1960s. The expert on Cold War issues posed two questions while the nuclear race was at its peak: “would it be possible for this country to take the initiative in reducing mistrust? Could we transform the spiral of fear into a spiral of hope?” Osgood’s Gradual Reciprocation in Tension Reduction (GRIT) strategy consisted of using the same IR logic behind a tense arms race to propose a tension-decreasing possibility. If an arms race is a “tension-increasing” system where adversaries are in a “spiral of fear,” then a state that reverses “one of the characteristics of an arms race….may be able to transform it into a spiral of trust.” The challenge is that “it is necessary to indicate the characteristics the unilateral initiatives in such a program must have in order to maintain adequate felt security while at the same time inducing reciprocative behavior from an opponent.” This psychological approach to reassurance will be explained in detail in Chapter II.

Robert Jervis has argued the merits of reassurance from a more rational and less psychological angle. His “spiral theory” argues that states that feel insecure seek greater relative military strength only to feel more confident. Thus, when a state does something that increases the adversary’s security, it thereby decreases the adversary’s desire to seek a greater military arsenal. Jervis writes,

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9 Ibid., 87.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 89.
12 Ibid., 80.
one state must take an initiative that increases the other side’s security. Reciprocation is invited and is likely to be forthcoming because the initiative not only reduces the state’s capability to harm the other but also provides evidence of its friendly intentions.13

This summary provides the rational approach to reassurance. It is in line with Osgood’s argument that a signal of reassurance “breaks” a negative spiral or reverses one of the characteristics fueling the tensions. But Jervis argues that because most policies are based on rational assessments, it is hard and at times impossible to break a spiral.

While an understanding of the security dilemma and psychological dynamics will dampen some arms-hostility spirals, it will not change the fact that some policies aimed at security will threaten others. To call the incompatibility that results from such policies ‘illusory’ is to misunderstand the nature of the problem and to encourage the illusion that if the states only saw themselves and others more objectively they could attain their common interest.14

Jervis’ argument goes to the heart of the never-ending debate between realists, idealists, and constructivists. If two states seek security, and one sends a signal to another to demonstrate that it only seeks security and not aggression, the reassuree has to determine if the signal is an authentic attempt to reduce tensions, or if the signal is bait from which a reciprocal signal would be exploited. Constructivists “maintain that it is possible to initiate interactions that transform state identities; one possible result of this is that fear can be allowed to evaporate as states grow in confidence about the peaceful intentions of others.”15 But because of the risks, mistrust has traditionally been the prudent posture.16 Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler write, “given the stakes involved, the existence of weapons in the hands of one state can provoke at least uncertainty and possibly of real fear in others even when those weapons are not intended to be used except for self protection. . .”17 Offensive realists like John J. Mearsheimer use this

13 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations, 82.
14 Ibid., 76.
16 Ibid., 14.
17 Ibid., 1.
inevitability to downplay the role of reassurance because they assume that every state is greedy, aggressive, and seeks power out of fear that others will attack them if they don’t.

...in a world where great powers have the capability to attack each other and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and be reluctant to trust them... Because it is sometimes difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason not to trust other states and to be prepared for war with them.18

Mearsheimer concludes that there would be little room for reassurance because trust is hard to garner in an international system. A state that reassures is likely to be exploited. In contrast, defensive realists such as Kenneth Waltz argue that states prefer balances of power over offensive actions to maximize their own security.

In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power... The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.19

Waltz leaves a small window for reassurance by emphasizing that survival and security—not power—are a state’s highest priorities. If states increase each others’ perceived probability of survival by reassuring each other, then reassurance is beneficial.

Andrew Kydd defines reassurance as the “process of building trust.”20 He writes that “trust is established and fostered by small, unilateral cooperative gestures that initiate chains of mutually rewarding behavior.”21 He focuses on a “rational choice approach” that considers “costly signals” the main component of reassurance. In fact, Kydd calls the entire subject, “the costly signal theory of reassurance” because it focuses “on the sending and interpretation of costly signals.”22 According to Kydd, costly signaling is the condition for reassurance to work. He defines costly signals as “signals designed to

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22 Ibid., 326.
persuade the other side that one is trustworthy by virtue of the fact that they are so costly that one would hesitate to send them if one were untrustworthy.”23 These signals should demonstrate that a state “. . . is moderate, not out to get the other side, willing to live and let live, preferring to reciprocate cooperation.”24 Costly signaling is one of the independent variables to be tested in this thesis.

The dilemma that states face when considering costly signals is the resulting increase in their vulnerability. Evan Montgomery, a skeptic of reassurance, argues that while a costly signal may convince an adversary to reciprocate, the reassurer may not be able to defend against “greedy states that might choose to attack—a heightened possibility if the signaling state appears less willing or able to defend itself.”25 With this dilemma in mind, Kydd writes,

The signals cannot be too cheap, or untrustworthy types will send them too in an effort to lull the other side. They cannot be made too costly, or the trustworthy types will be afraid to send them lest the other side turn out to be untrustworthy.26

Kydd proposes that reassurance strategy will only work on security seekers:

Security-seeking states tend to be liberal democracies and non-democracies with limited aims or capabilities. No one thinks that France might decide to launch a renewed bid for control of Southeast Asia after the next election, or that Britain will attempt to retake South Africa if the Conservatives defeat the Labor party. . . Other states are more volatile, especially dictatorships run by mercurial leaders such as Libya.27

Interestingly, even Libya has been involved in a period of reassurance and cooperation with the West (Italy in particular) because of the impact of domestic politics. Charles Glaser focuses on the impact of domestic politics on reassurance. Glaser argues that a state’s moderates will point to a reassurance signal as a sign of a state’s “benign

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23 Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation, 326.
24 Ibid.
26 Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, 188.
27 Ibid., 203–204.
motivations.” Meanwhile, the same state’s hard-liners may cite the same signal as evidence of a state’s “lack of resolve.” The prevailing perception will depend on who is in charge. In the case of Libya, Mu‘amar Qadhafi decided in 1999 to side with the so-called Libyan pragmatists, who favored Libya’s reintegration in the international community. He agreed that Libya would demonstrate its “benign motivations” by handing over the two alleged masterminds of the 1988 Lockerbie terrorist attack.

Deborah Larson argues that by human nature, “mistrust is not easily overcome. States may build trust by negotiating small agreements that enable them to test each other’s sincerity at lowered risk.” This logic goes against Kydd’s costly signal argument, because lower risk signals that may begin a reassurance exchange are by nature, not costly. Larson also argues that to build trust, “a state should also maintain a consistent policy, because people tend to believe that a state's actions in different areas, no matter how desperate the circumstances, reveal its underlying motives.”

On the willingness to cooperate, Jervis states that “the costs of exploitation decrease as states’ vulnerabilities decrease. If states are strong enough so that a few defections cannot cripple them, they can better afford to take chances on cooperation.” In other words, a strong state is more likely to cooperate. There is a subtle difference between reassurance and cooperation. Cooperation can take place once a process of reassurance begins. In other words, states may choose to cooperate after an initial reassurance exchange. Using Jervis’ argument, the stronger of two adversaries is more willing to reciprocate a signal from the weaker state because even an exploitation of a reciprocal signal will not make the stronger state vulnerable. Therefore, the burden falls on the weaker state to reassure first. If the stronger state communicates its willingness to

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31 Ibid.
cooperate, but requires a sign of reassurance, then it is up to the weaker state to begin the process. Relative strength as the initiator will be an independent variable examined in this thesis.

Transparency of intentions is another independent variable tested in this thesis. One way that transparency can be demonstrated is through participation in confidence building measures (CBMs). CBMs are “often described as the fastest growing business of the post Cold War Era.” They are bilateral or multilateral activities that allow states to demonstrate their intentions and expose their capabilities. Such activities reduce uncertainty and build trust, which increases the likelihood of reciprocation. Desjardins explains that although CBMs are seen as “harmless and risk-free,” they are not “cost free or necessarily easy.”

CBMs, it is argued, can reduce the risk of miscalculation or communication failure escalating into war, and can inhibit the use, or the threat of use, of force for political coercion. They can increase predictability, strengthen stability, and enhance security. .

Another variable to consider is multilateralism. Jervis argues that concerts, or multilateral regimes, may reduce the possibility of defection because “the state will have to expect that its defection will meet opposition not only from the particular state it is harming, but also from others in the old coalition.” Furthermore, multilateral regimes allow for the establishment of norms for cooperation that its members can rely on. As Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane point out, “international regimes do not substitute for reciprocity; rather, they reinforce and institutionalize it. Regimes incorporating the norm of reciprocity delegitimize defection and thereby make it more costly.” Finally, multilateralism leads to a higher level of communication among the actors.

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34 Desjardins, *Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures*, 63
36 Ibid., 70.
declarations of common goals, cultural and military exchanges, and transparency—all factors that increase the likelihood for cooperation.38

On the issue of trust, Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler describe four pairs of attributes (called properties of trust) that are integral to reciprocity and cooperation.39 The first property is “leap in the dark/uncertainty.” Under this property, one state initiates the trust-building process by sending a signal of reassurance towards the other state without knowing the outcome.40 A second pair is “empathy/bonding.” Social scientist L.G. Wispe defines empathy as the “self-conscious effort to share and accurately comprehend the presumed consciousness of another person, including his thoughts, feelings…[and] perceptions…as well as their causes.”41 Under this pair, states that seek to build trust must understand each other’s interests. Although they may disagree on the motivations for the interests, both states should understand the other’s motivations and seek to accommodate these interests as best as possible.

The third property of the trust-building model is “dependence/vulnerability.” Under this pair, “actors must be willing to accept their vulnerability to betrayal if their positive expectations about the motives and intentions of others prove misplaced.”42 Both trust and vulnerability increase when a state gives up something of value.43 In other words, “the acceptance of vulnerability is an essential property of trust.”44 Booth and Wheeler’s final property of trust is integrity/reliability. This pair centers on the implication that “partners have confidence that the other will do what is right.”45 Proving one state’s reliability takes time.

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40 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 241.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
Trust does not develop overnight but rather is accomplished after a lifetime of common experiences and through sustained interactions and reciprocal exchanges, leaps of faith that are braced by the verification offered by organizations, trial and error, and a historical legacy of actions and encounters that deposit an environment of certitude notwithstanding the uncertainty that accompanies social life.46

This resembles Axelrod’s “shadow of the future” argument:

If one side takes the initiative and adopts a ‘nice’ strategy and both sides follow a rule of reciprocity, cooperation can evolve through a tit-for-tat mechanism. The main condition is that the two sides anticipate interacting many more times, so that the ‘shadow of the future’ is cast over present actions.47

Janice Stein’s work on reassurance focuses on the benefits of reassurance over deterrence. She offers five reassurance strategies “that differ in the scope of their objectives and in their combinations of the elements of reassurance.”48 Her first strategy is restraint. Stein argues that a state’s restraint inspires trust that can usher in a period of reassurance signals. The problem with restraint is that an adversary may misperceive restraint as a demonstration of weakness, and exploit the situation. Stein’s second strategy is “reassurance through norms of competition.”49 Adversaries can agree to compete under certain rules. An adherence to rules deescalates tensions because it increases the predictability of state behavior. Stein’s third strategy is “reassurance through irrevocable commitment.”50 In this strategy, a state can reassure by taking a significant gesture or action that it cannot undo. Her fourth strategy is “reassurance through limited security regimes.”51 These regimes increase transparency, establish norms, and allow for confidence building. The fifth strategy is “reassurance through


48 Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” 32.

49 Ibid., 38.

50 Ibid., 42.

51 Ibid., 45.
reciprocity.” Stein writes “when the issue is one of security, reciprocal behavior is most usefully conceived as a pattern of contingent, sequential, and diffuse exchange among independent adversaries.”

The limited literature on reassurance suggests several conditions that tend to improve the odds of cooperation when a state offers a signal of reassurance. Osgood’s “spiral of hope” theory is about states that decide to embark on a trust-building process that involves signals of reassurance, reciprocation, and cooperation. History has included cases where these processes have succeeded and others where they have not. With the stakes in the international system so high, it behooves all actors to consider these conditions and pursue them as frequently as possible.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

Based on the literature review, this thesis consolidates the different factors that improve the chances of a successful reassurance exchange. In particular, four conditions (independent variables) will be tested to see if they played any part on a reassuree’s decision to reciprocate an initial signal of reassurance (dependent variable).

1. A signal of reassurance is likely to be reciprocated if the weaker state reassures first. If the weaker state is defensive because it feels less secure, and the stronger state is also defensive and has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate, then the burden is on the weaker state to “break” the “arms-hostility cycle.”

2. Reassurance signals applied within a multilateral framework increase the chances for reciprocity. Other members of an international regime may encourage reciprocation.

3. If the reassurer shows a transparency of its defensive intentions through political rhetoric, diplomacy, and defensive postures, then a signal of reassurance is more likely to be reciprocated.


53Term “arms-hostility cycle” is from Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 82. This term will be used throughout this thesis.
4. A reassurance signal is most likely to be reciprocated when the signal is perceived as costly. In other words, if the reassuree considers the reassurer’s signal costly, then it is likely to reciprocate.

The methodology for this project will employ the comparative case study approach, focusing on four case studies from recent history where a signal of reassurance by one of the two adversaries sought to break a spiral of tensions and replace it with a “spiral of hope.” In two of these, the initial signal of reassurance was reciprocated, leading to rapprochement; in the other two, the initial signal was not reciprocated and tensions continued. This thesis seeks to identify which of the four conditions identified above were evident in the cases where reassurance led to rapprochement, and if any of these conditions were evident in the cases where reassurance failed to improve relations. Since there could be other explanations for the two cases of rapprochement, each case study will consider the most plausible competing explanation for the rapprochement, and will compare the competing explanation with the reassurance explanation.

The first case involves the rapprochement between Spain and Morocco. Both nations almost went to war in 2002 when Moroccan troops occupied a small island off its coast in the Strait of Gibraltar, claimed by Spain. Today, relations between the two neighbors are arguably at their best level ever. This case study highlights evidence of a reassurance exchange that may have led to rapprochement, and seeks to find if any of the above conditions were present.

The second case involves the rapprochement between Italy and Libya. Both nations almost went to war in 1986 when Libya launched two Scud missiles at a U.S. base in Italy in retaliation for an American air strike on Libya several hours earlier. Italy chose not to retaliate. Today, as in the first case, relations between the two neighbors are arguably at their best level ever. This case study also highlights evidence of a reassurance exchange that ushered in a new “spiral of hope.”

The third case study focuses on the dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua over an archipelago in the Western Caribbean. This dispute has led to military shows of force and almost war. Although the International Court of Justice (ICJ) arbitrated the dispute, tensions have remained high. The tensions have spilled over into the war
between Colombia and domestic armed guerrilla groups that seek to overthrow the Colombian Government. Nicaragua has openly supported these groups, causing more mistrust among Colombian policymakers. Nicaragua attempted to break the spiral of fear by sending a signal of reassurance to Colombia; however, Colombia did not reciprocate, essentially ending a first attempt at a reassurance exchange.

The fourth case study has to do with the ongoing tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. After several conflicts that included Greek and Turkish forces, a tense but stable situation has existed for over thirty years. In two particular occasions, the Greek Cypriot Government sent signals of reassurance to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The TRNC did not perceive these signals as reassurance and did not reciprocate. This case study focuses on the causes of the failure of reassurance.

This thesis will employ the “controlled comparison” format. All four cases will point out and explain the pertinent signals of reassurance. The four conditions constitute the independent variables. The reciprocation or not of the reassurance signals constitutes the dependent variable. The presence or absence of the conditions will be demonstrated through logical arguments based on empirical data (events and facts).

The primary sources for this thesis include press releases, political speeches, and treaties. Secondary sources include academic research regarding reassurance from scholarly journals, books, and dissertations, as well as newspaper articles, magazines, etc., that provide information about events.

F. CHAPTER OUTLINE

Under what conditions is a signal of reassurance reciprocated? The first step in answering this question is defining the term “reassurance.” Chapter II will bring the concept out of the traditional Cold War scope explained in the literature review, and into the twenty-first century. Then, the next four chapters will be the four case studies that will test the proposed conditions. Before summarizing the findings of the case studies, Chapter VII will bring the concept back into perspective, using two historical cases, and two from present times where these findings can help a policymaker decide whether or not reassurance may be a good influence strategy to pursue.
Each case study will have five sections. First, a historical overview of each case study will explain the evolution of the tensions. Second, the securitized issues of both states will be outlined. Next, in the cases where relations improved, a competing explanation—not having to do with reassurance—will offer an alternate explanation for the reduced tensions. Next, an explanation of the signals of reassurance and their effects will point to the eventual outcome of the relationship. Next, the presence or absence of the four proposed conditions will be explained with regard to each case. It is important to note that in the case of reduced tensions, alternative explanations may complement—rather than compete with—the progress that can be attributed to reassurance.

The findings of this thesis will reveal that reassurance can succeed in reducing tensions. This thesis will conclude that out of the four conditions that increase the possibility of reciprocation, a transparency of intentions is consistently present in the two successful cases, and not present in two unsuccessful cases. The next finding most consistent with the cases is that a signal perceived as costly by the reassuree has a high potential of being reciprocated. Similarly consistent is the condition that, when the weaker state reassures first, the stronger state is most likely to reciprocate. Finally, the thesis will conclude that multilateralism has a meaningless effect on the potential of reassurance.
II. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY REASSURANCE: ADAPTING AN INFLUENCE STRATEGY TO THE NEW CONCEPT OF SECURITY

A. INTRODUCTION

The unexpected end of the Cold War taught international relations (IR) scholars that influence strategies do not always have to involve hostile military postures. The world was able to step back from the brink of nuclear war on a number of occasions and defuse nuclear tensions through generally peaceful means. World leaders learned that understanding an adversary’s most important interests can reduce tensions. In this new post-Cold War era, a modernization of security studies requires an equal modernization of influence strategies. No longer should these be limited to diplomatic and military actions. Influence strategies should involve issues that states prioritize, or securitize.

The evolution of security studies has required all influence strategies to be reexamined through a post-Cold War lens.\(^{54}\) Considering the literature review in Chapter I, most scholarship regards reassurance as involving means such as arms reduction pledges, troop redeployments, and diplomatic gestures. These actions are designed to convince the other side that a state does not intend to threaten the other side’s security. This chapter proposes that successful reassurance strategies should not be restricted to the “military sector” of international relations. As security studies expand to include the political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors, so too should reassurance strategies.\(^{55}\) States can successfully reassure their adversaries by sending signals that improve the condition of any issue that an adversary has securitized—or made vitally important to its existence.

This chapter first groups the literature on the subject reviewed in Chapter I into two main “schools of thought” prevalent in the traditional concept of reassurance. Then

\(^{54}\) The definition that reassurance is the process of building trust comes from Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, 184.

\(^{55}\) These sectors are defined and explained in Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers inc., 1998).
it will explain the recent evolution of security studies, and propose that reassurance adapt to this evolution. Next, it will distinguish this updated concept of reassurance (in this thesis referred to as “twenty-first century reassurance”) from other more established IR influence strategies. Finally, an overview of securitized issues in four case studies will ground the broad conceptualization of reassurance being proposed here.

**B. REASSURANCE: FROM THE CONVENTIONAL TO THE POST-MODERN**

There are two main “schools of thought” with regard to reassurance. The first, originally proposed by Charles Osgood, explains the merits of reassurance from a psychological angle. The second school, proposed by Robert Jervis, explains the merits of reassurance from a rational angle. Recent advocates of reassurance include Andrew Kydd and Janice G. Stein. Kydd supports Jervis’ “rational choice approach” by proposing that the effectiveness of a reassurance signal depends on how costly it is. Stein supports Osgood’s psychological approach by arguing that reassurance is an alternative to deterrence that can achieve “less conflictual relationships” through conventional and non-conventional methods. Stein’s work brings the concept of reassurance out of the dusty annals of Cold War history and into the twenty-first century. This project seeks to continue in this direction.

Charles Osgood begins his argument by critiquing man’s “Neanderthal mentality.” “Since the Neanderthal in us naively assumes that everyone shares his norms, it must follow that if someone else sees as ‘straight’ what to him is obviously crooked, calls ‘tasty’ what to him is obviously distasteful, then this other person must be dishonest, evil, or at least abnormal in some way.” He argues that the Neanderthal mentality forces one state to identify with everything it likes (in the case of the United States, freedom and democracy), while identifying an enemy with everything it dislikes (in the case of the USSR, communism, tyranny, autocracy). Considering this mentality,

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56 Both “schools of thought” are explained in Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” 328, 329.
58 Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender*, 25.
two adversaries will start from a position of mistrust, and will assume that any signal received is aggressive and threatening, while any signal sent is defensive and correct. Osgood offers the 1960 shoot down of an American U2 overflying the Soviet Union as an illustration of the Neanderthal mentality.

Witness the debate in the United Nations over the U2 incident: Americans, knowing themselves to be peaceful in intent but being afraid of treacherous surprise attack, viewed this as a legitimate defense operation; Russians, knowing themselves to be peace-loving, not treacherous, but suspecting treacherous espionage from us, viewed this as a confirmation of their fears.59

Mistrust forces a state to reciprocate an aggressive signal with another aggressive signal, and so on. A “spiral of terror” develops whereby a state assumes that its adversary’s signals are evil and deserving of equal, tension-increasing “defensive” signals that the adversary then also interprets as evil. Osgood proposes that this spiral can be broken if one of the adversaries sends a “peace offensive.” The signal has to be positive enough to overcome the adversary’s Neanderthal mentality. If the adversary is convinced that the signal is positive, it will reciprocate, initiating a “spiral of hope” that can lead to a reduction in tensions. As a way to initiate this spiral of hope, Osgood proposed the Gradual Reduction In Tensions (GRIT) strategy. It involves a “self-regulating procedure in which the participants carefully monitor their own initiatives on the basis of their own evaluation of the reciprocating actions taken by the other side.”60

As early as 1962, Osgood suggested that “[GRIT] is broader than disarmament, or even disengagement, as this is usually conceived, since it would include programs of graded initiatives of a tension-reducing nature in areas of science and secrecy, of economic, social, and cultural exchanges, of Communist China and the United Nations, of controls and inspections, of diplomatic adjustments, and so forth—as well as actual military and disarmament steps.”61 Today, Stein argues that “insofar as leaders can modify their [reassurance] strategies to accommodate the political, strategic, cultural, and

60 Ibid., 88.
61 Ibid.
psychological context of their adversary, reciprocal strategies of tension reduction may be useful in changing the context of an adversarial relationship.”

In contrast to the psychological emphasis of Osgood and Stein, Robert Jervis explains reassurance through a rational model of behavior. State behavior is oftentimes influenced by uncertainty about an adversary’s intentions. Jervis agrees that psychology creates unnecessary spirals of fear, but he departs from Osgood by arguing that “some [rational] policies aimed at security will [inevitably] threaten others.” One of his examples is the fact that Canada’s only war plan in 1920 envisioned the defense of the homeland against an American invasion. Although the notion of an American invasion in Canada seems far-fetched today, a Canadian policymaker in 1920 could have cited the historical fact that the United States invaded lands held by Mexico and Spain between 1848 and 1898, and come to a rational conclusion that Canada’s greatest threat in 1920 was from its Southern neighbor.

Jervis also explains that powerful states routinely require a high sense of security and manifest that requirement through postures that are misperceived as threatening by other states. This describes the environment throughout the Cold War. Both the Soviet Union and the United States crafted their security policies assuming an ever-present existential threat from each other. Jervis argues that these perceptions of threat force two counterparts into a spiral where fear fuels unnecessary armaments and hostility.

Unless the requirements for offense and defense differ in kind or amount, a status quo power will desire a military posture that resembles that of an aggressor. For this reason, others cannot infer from its military forces and preparations whether the state is aggressive. States therefore tend to assume the worst…To be safe, the state should buy as many weapons as it

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63 Jervis makes the assertion that “spiral theorists… have given a psychological explanation for perceptions of threat without adequate discussion of whether these perceptions are warranted.” – Robert Jervis, “Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary,” Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 76.

64 These examples, as well as Jervis’ description of the Spiral Model, can be found in Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 62–67.
can afford. But since both sides obey the same imperatives, an attempt to increase one’s security by standing firm and accumulating more arms is self-defeating. 65

The enormous expenditures on nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War are an example of how this spiral model can lead adversaries to a self-defeating position, since the excessive production of nuclear weapons did not make either side more secure. Jervis argues that states can break this spiral if they can determine each other’s defensive posture through reassurance.

When two countries are locked in a spiral of arms and hostility, such bonds [of shared values and interests] are obviously hard to establish. The first step must be a realization, by at least one side but preferably by both, that they are, or at least may be, caught in a dilemma that neither desires. On the basis of this understanding, one must take the initiative that increases the other side’s security… The end result is not that the state has given something up, or even that it has proposed a trade, but that a step is taken towards a mutually beneficial relationship. 66

According to Jervis, one state can correct a misperception (rather than a impression based on the Neanderthal Mentality) by convincing its adversary that it is not an aggressor. A signal of reassurance may be appropriate when “the adversary’s motivation for possibly taking a hostile action is defensive and stems from a sense of weakness, vulnerability, or mistaken concern that hostile actions are about to be directed towards it.”67 But misperceptions can go the other way. “Aggressors often think that their intentions are obvious to others and therefore conclude that any concessions made to them must be the result of fear and weakness.”68 The key to reassurance depends on a state’s accurate understanding of an adversary’s intentions. A defensive posture deserves reassurance; an offensive posture deserves deterrence.

65 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 64–65.
66 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 82.
68 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 85.
The application of these schools of thought to today’s “broadening and deepening” of security issues reveals that reassurance can be applied in disputes that are not primarily military in nature, but that involve issues that a state has securitized, or made vital to its existence. Recent research in security studies suggests that states may value some of their securitized issues as much as their military issues, and may hence be “reassurable” in a dimension other than military. But what is the new concept of security? A careful explanation will uncover the potential of twenty-first century reassurance.

C. THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITY STUDIES

Given the level of anarchy in the international system, security has always been one of the highest priorities for governments. However, what is international security? According to Amitav Acharya, security has traditionally meant “protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states from external military threats.”69 If an adversary’s military posture presents an existential threat to the survival of a state, government, territory, or society, then that adversary’s actions have been interpreted as threats to security.70 A leader or government that perceives a threat to any of these “referent objects” can justify extreme actions to defend against that threat. Buzan et al. label this “securitization,” a situation that can arise whenever “…a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development.”71 These actions can include curtailing civil rights, mobilizing the military, and spending large amounts of money.

Since the end of World War II, many states have successfully used this mechanism for dealing with threats in issue areas that are not traditionally associated with security. For example, the United States successfully securitized its accessibility to the world’s supply of oil in the 1970s, and used this issue as a justification for military and economic actions against Iraq in 1991–1992. Iraq threatened this securitized issue because there was a perceived threat that it would negatively impact U.S. accessibility to oil if it

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71 Ibid.
invaded its oil-rich neighbors. Hyperinflation was successfully securitized in Latin America in the 1970s, as military regimes overthrew civilian governments, claiming the right to intervene to stabilize inflation. In addition to cases involving action by the military to defeat non-military threats, security studies has brought attention to the strategies using non-military responses to non-military threats in the name of security.

The key to securitization is that a state “takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics... [in other words] securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politization.” A state that politicizes an issue usually subjects it to lengthy public debates. In a democracy, a majority—but not all—of the political players have to agree on a politicized decision. In contrast, a state securitizes when all players, including those of the opposition, agree that the issue poses an existential threat to the state and essentially relinquish power to the executive so that he or she can use emergency measures to deal with the issue. The feeling becomes, “[if] the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist [or be able] to remedy our failure.” In autocracies, it is easier to securitize an issue because the opposition’s agreement is not required and the executive can deal with the issue though extraordinary means.

Considering how states can effectively securitize any current issue, security is no longer restricted to the physical survival of the state from the military threat of an adversary. It has broadened to include threats to human survival and can include non-military solutions that safeguard society on a transnational level. For example, what good is the survival of The Maldives as a state if climate change will potentially cause the Indian Ocean to wipe the islands off the map? What good is the state survival of Argentina if it has no credible currency or economy? If a state’s main role is the security of its citizens, then it must securitize issues that threaten human survival. If an adversary threatens a securitized issue, then tensions can arise that can lead to military action, but can also be resolved with non-military alternatives.

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73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., 24, 26.
Considering the dynamic of “broadening and deepening” of security, Buzan et al. grouped “securitizable” issues into five types, or “sectors”: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. The concept of associating economic, societal, and environmental issues to security is new, and indeed necessary in today’s international system characterized by interdependence, supranationalism, and globalization. It is only fitting that IR influence strategies adapt to this expansion of the concept of security.

D. SECURITY STUDIES AND REASSURANCE CONVERGE

Twenty-first century reassurance originates from the application of the traditional concept of reassurance strategy to a broader and deeper concept of security. Helga Haftendorn explains that while the traditional concept of security continues to apply to the “highly industrialized democracies of the west… other countries have very different concepts of security. Most developing countries emphasize the economic, social, and domestic dimensions of security.”75 With this in mind, Buzan proposes that security involve “a much more open spectrum of possibilities” than the traditional survival of the state concept.76 Likewise, reassurance should involve a wide spectrum of possibilities. If an adversary understands why a state has securitized an issue, and desires to reduce tensions, then it can send a signal of reassurance by using its power to improve the situation with respect to that securitized issue. Unfortunately, the nature of international anarchy and the lack of credibility among adversaries have typically allowed the “Neanderthal mentality” to prevail. It has been more likely for a state to distrust its adversary’s reasons for securitizing an issue, and miss an opportunity for reassurance.

Twenty-first century reassurance seeks to remedy this tendency by examining an adversary’s strategic culture, rational interests, psychological motivations, domestic


politics, and credibility. Each of these elements influences an adversary’s decision to securitize an issue. Determining credibility presents the greatest obstacle to reassurance. Unlike deterrence, where the burden of determining credibility falls solely on the threatened state (assuming the deterrer intends to deter), reassurance involves a determination of credibility by the reassurer (is it worth sending a signal of reassurance in the first place?) and the reassuree (does the reassurer have defensive intentions that merit reciprocation?). This is why understanding predictive mentalities can help both the reassurer and reassuree in this rather daunting “dual burden” of credibility in reassurance.

This thesis seeks to open a debate on whether reassurance signals towards securitized (or highly politicized) issues can reduce tensions. The uncertainty remains: will the reassuree react positively to the reassurer’s empathy? Or, will the reassuree dismiss the signal as not costly enough, given that the signal may pertain to an issue that is not as vital to the reassurer? Those who advocate a psychological approach to reassurance would argue that psychological factors determine a state’s reaction to a signal of reassurance. Those who advocate a “rational choice approach” to reassurance would argue that since it is difficult to determine if a non-military signal is costly enough to reciprocate, reassurance is most effective in military and diplomatic issues. This may explain why reassurance’s strongest advocates—Osgood and Stein—stand in the psychological strand, while those who try to confine reassurance to military issues—Jervis and Kydd—stand in the rational choice approach strand.

In a paper titled “The Psychology of Assurance,” Stein mentions that “scholars in international relations are now beginning to look carefully at the neuroscience of emotion and how it affects cooperation, war termination, the credibility of threats, financial decision making, and the solution of collective action problems.” These elements are

77 Janice G. Stein, “The Psychology of Assurance: An Emotional Tale,” Paper prepared for Conference on Security Assurances in the Summer of 2009, 12–13. Stein argues that the potential of assurances may depend on these factors. This thesis goes further, suggesting that understanding these factors in an adversary can also help a reassurer understand what its adversary has securitized, allowing the reassurer to target its signal. A state is best served when it reassures “smartly,” and not “blindly.”


useful in understanding the potential of twenty-first century reassurance. If a state empathizes with an adversary by promoting an adversary’s securitized issue, then there is a psychological expectation that empathy will invoke positive reactions. However, empathy can also invoke suspicion. This is why a policymaker needs to consider the psychological clues behind state behavior. Richard Ned Lebow writes, “While it is difficult to penetrate the cultural and political barriers that impede empathy, it is nevertheless essential for policymakers to attempt to understand the goals and schemas of their adversaries before using strategies of either coercion or reward.”

E. DISTINGUISHING MODERN REASSURANCE FROM OTHER CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND INFLUENCE STRATEGIES

Twenty-first century reassurance is not deterrence, though one strategy may complement the other. Deterrence has received much more attention than reassurance; so much so, that the “assurance” dimension of deterrence has been confused with reassurance. Nevertheless, most post-Cold War scholars of deterrence distinguish it from reassurance:

Strategies of reassurance begin with a different set of assumptions. Unlike deterrence, they root the source of overt, aggressive behaviour in the acute vulnerability of adversaries. Reassurance encourages self-defined defenders to search for effective ways of communicating their benign and defensive intentions to would-be challengers. They do so to reduce the fear, misunderstanding and insecurity that are so often responsible for conflict escalation. The combination of carrots and sticks is often more successful than either alone.

Twenty-first century reassurance can be used in conjunction with deterrence. But deterrence need not include reassurance, and reassurance need not include deterrence. A policymaker that decides to employ the “team” of reassurance and deterrence should consider that reassurance requires two defenders; deterrence requires at least one aggressor. If a perceived aggressor is actually a defender, then it can reveal its defensive intentions by sending a signal of reassurance. If a defensive state is transparent in its

81 Ibid., 128.
intentions, then reassurance is also preferred. If an offensive state is transparent in its intentions (and does not hide its aggressive intentions), then deterrence is the better choice. If a defensive state is not transparent, then initial deterrence can bring about transparency and improve the conditions for reassurance. This logic assumes that the deterring (or reassuring) state is also demonstrating a transparent posture. Because of the “dual burden” of reassurance, transparency becomes a key variable when assessing the potential of a successful reassurance exchange.82

Another important difference between deterrence and reassurance involves the status quo. While deterrence strategy assumes that one state wants its adversary to refrain from altering the status quo, reassurance assumes that both states are willing to live in a status quo, but tensions remain that preclude cooperation and relations.83

Deterrence has been recently updated to reflect a “fourth wave” that reflects the realities of a post-9/11 world. This “twenty-first century deterrence” also emphasizes the need to understand adversaries’ securitized issues. The fact that deterrence is getting an update only strengthens the call for a similar “second wave” update for reassurance.84

Twenty-first century reassurance is not compellence, though many classify reassurance as one of the tenets of a broader concept of compellence. As in the case of deterrence, some who study compellence have included “positive inducements” into the strategy. In his book *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, Robert F. Art mentions that “coercive diplomacy can include, but need not include, positive inducements, and these inducements can involve either a transfer of resources to the

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82 This logic is similar to Stein’s logic: “if an adversary is driven by domestic political needs or strategic weakness, then reassurance may be more appropriate as a substitute for deterrence. If adversarial motives are mixed, reassurance may be more effective as a complement to deterrence. When an adversary is motivated primarily by opportunity, reassurance is likely to misfire and encourage the challenge it is designed to prevent.” The main difference between Stein’s logic and the logic offered here is that this logic focuses on transparency; Stein’s focuses on needs and opportunity. All three variables are important considerations. Stein’s logic is found in Janice G. Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear war*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 59.

83 An empirical example for the first scenario is the tension between the United States and Iran, where the U.S. is trying to deter Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. An empirical example of the second scenario is the tension between the United States and Venezuela, where cooperation is unlikely but neither state is actively trying to deter the other from doing something.

target or the offer of things...[that] are nonetheless of tangible benefits to the target.”

But in the foreword of this same book, George suggests the distinct nature of what he calls “positive incentives.”

Earlier research on coercive diplomacy had already focused on the importance of adding meaningful positive incentives in a combined ‘carrot and stick’ variant of the strategy. . .in general, positive inducements should not be offered before undertaking coercive threats or limited military action.86

The main difference between positive inducements included in a strategy of compellence and reassurance is the degree of urgency in each strategy. Compellence involves alternating positive inducements with force to change someone’s behavior rapidly. Twenty-first century reassurance does not involve force. Rather, the strategy seeks a gradual change of behavior over a long period of time, as adversaries develop trust towards each other. The change in behavior is more an aspiration than a time-urgent necessity, and there are no guarantees or expectations of a timely reciprocation. When reassurance is applied, the reassurer is not comfortable with the status quo, but is willing to live with it. When compellence is applied, the status quo is being altered, and the coercer is trying to force the coercee to return to it urgently. Positive incentives in both strategies can be useful, but serve different purposes and involve different environments and timelines.

Twenty-first century reassurance differs from positive incentives in that positive incentives mirror compellence strategy by attaching strings to those incentives. There is usually a linkage, or condition, that the receiver will give something back or do something in return for a positive incentive. Although peace is a general goal, positive incentives seek a specific “quid pro quo.” They do not necessarily require a warming of relations, but rather a specific change of behavior in a specific place in time.87 On the other hand, reassurance signals do not have “strings attached.” There is an undertone of

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86 Alexander George, “Foreword” in Art, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy,” x.

hope that the adversary reciprocates with a similar signal of reassurance that applies to a securitized issue (thus, the term “spiral of hope” coined by Osgood). This hope includes a broader rapprochement through trust. It is more open-ended, and without an immediate expectation of a change in behavior. Deborah Larson uses an example from the Cold War to explain how post-Stalin Soviet leaders sent signals of reassurance in an open-ended attempt at rapprochement with the United States. Initially, the signals did not change the status quo, and there is even evidence that the lack of an American reciprocation antagonized the Soviets.88 But over time, Larson argues that reassurance led to the crafting of the Austrian State Treaty. Positive incentives in this case would have probably failed at the first lack of reciprocation.

Twenty-first century reassurance does fall into a unique “blurry line” between conflict resolution and influence strategy. Conflict resolution strategies seek to build confidence between adversaries undergoing a conflict. This confidence can be attained through “formal and informal arrangements to which they can agree to hand over their conflict, whose solution they can accept and which can define the termination of a conflict.”89 The ultimate goal is “a social situation where the armed conflicting parties in a (voluntary) agreement resolve to peacefully live with—and/or dissolve—their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against one another.”90 Although reassurance also seeks to build trust, it assumes that hostilities have not begun, or ended some time before. Conflict resolution is employed when there is a sense of urgency to terminate hostilities. Reassurance seeks to keep tensions from escalating any further. Reassurance can follow conflict resolution if hostilities end and tensions remain high.

F. A PREVIEW OF THE FOUR CASE STUDIES

Each of the four case studies in this thesis involves pairs of adversaries that recently underwent tensions. All eight states in the case studies have one or more issues that are securitized, and the reassuring states have sent signals pertaining to these issues.

90 Ibid., 47.
Each case study will explain the signals and whether or not they were reciprocated. It is worth reemphasizing that some issues that are highly politicized can function similarly to those that are securitized, and can be used as targets for signals of reassurance. The state interests identified in each case study are gathered from the literature used to explain the evolution of tensions. The determination of whether or not these interests are securitized or politicized is made by the author, in accordance with the definitions outlined above. To reemphasize, the main difference between securitized and politicized interests (or issues) is that securitized interests command a nearly unanimous sentiment of being a national priority by those in power, while politicized interests do not. In other words, when almost all power actors in a state perceive that an interest involves an existential threat to the state, that interest is securitized. On the other hand, the priority of politicized issues is subject to further debate. Highly politicized issues, while not commanding a near unanimous sentiment of national priority, may still be perceived as critical by a majority of the power actors.

In the case of Spain and Morocco, one of Spain’s securitized issues is illegal immigration from North Africa. Most Spaniards are concerned that the massive influx of immigrants from Morocco will bankrupt its welfare funds, and will undermine the Spanish cultural identity. Spain has also securitized the issue of sovereignty over the North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Spain also securitized terrorism in the aftermath of the 2004 Madrid train bombings. Finally, Spain has highly politicized its fishing industry, making access to waters near Morocco a key part of Spain’s economic policy. Morocco has securitized the issue of Western Sahara. It considers this territory as part of Morocco, and considers any opposition to Western Sahara’s annexation a threat to its territorial integrity. In addition, due to the massive poverty facing Morocco, the kingdom has securitized the access of its exports to European markets.

In the case of Italy and Libya, Italy has also securitized immigration, declaring a state of emergency in 2008 in response to the massive influx of immigrants from Libya. In addition, international terrorism was securitized in 1986, when Libyan terrorists attacked Rome’s Airport. The attacks terrorized the Italian people, causing the issue to be perceived as an existential threat. Libya, an autocracy led by one individual, has
securitized its ability to sell its natural resources. Any international economic sanction undermines Muammar Qaddafi’s grip on power, especially as Islamist opposition groups seek to capitalize on the country’s social conditions to topple the Libyan ruler. Libya has also securitized the legacy of colonial atrocities. Qaddafi insists that as long as these atrocities are not compensated, Libya’s survival as a state is threatened because the effects of colonialism impede Libyan cohesion and progress.

In the case of Nicaragua and Colombia, Nicaragua has securitized the issue of sovereignty over the resource-rich waters on its Atlantic coast. This fuels its claim to the San Andres archipelago, which has been a politicized interest (subject to significant political opposition). Colombia has securitized the existence of guerrilla organizations that actively seek to take over the Colombian Government. It has also securitized the San Andres archipelago, claiming that the island as an integral part of its territory.

In the case of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots have securitized the Turkish occupation and consider it an existential threat to the Republic of Cyprus. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots consider the lack of an internationally recognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a threat to the Turkish Cypriot community’s existence. Both sides see the other’s influence as a threat to its own identity, well-being, and security. While treaties and external powers may have averted an all-out war, neither side is satisfied with the current status quo.

G. CONCLUSION

This chapter has re-conceptualized the strategy of reassurance in a world where security no longer pertains exclusively to military threats. As other conflict resolution and influence strategies are updated, so too should the concept of reassurance strategy. Signals to demonstrate a state’s benign intentions should be economic, political, environmental, or military in nature. A reassurer must have the power in regard to its adversary’s securitized issue to send a meaningful signal that will successfully reassure the adversary. A reassurer should understand its adversary’s securitized issues, so it can target its signal more accurately. A signal that is “off target” may not be regarded as costly or empathetic, rendering it meaningless and unlikely to be reciprocated.
This chapter also pointed to the merits of using psychology to determine whether an adversary’s non-military securitized issues are worth reassuring in order to reduce tensions. Much more study is needed in this field, as there is little conclusive evidence that a state’s empathy towards another’s securitized issues can lead to a reduction in tensions. There is more study needed on how to effectively combine reassurance with other influence strategies, such as compellence and deterrence, and how the variable of time affects the option to combine these strategies. Finally, more study is needed to find the limit of security. What is the limit to “securitizable” issues? Any conclusions reached in the field of security studies need to be applied to reassurance.

Finally, the suggestion, that “American policymakers need to worry less about communicating resolve and more about understanding the needs, goals, and subjective understandings of the leaders they want to deter, compel, or reward,”91 adds to the value of twenty-first century reassurance. If our adversaries understand what we want, then they may be willing to reassure us in an issue that we have securitized. The case studies in this thesis do not include the United States. Nevertheless, they can aid a U.S. policymaker in understanding the potential of reassurance strategies, given the right conditions.

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91 Richard Lebow, “Deterrence and Reassurance: Lessons from the Cold War.”
III. CASE STUDY #1: EXPLAINING THE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN SPAIN AND MOROCCO

A. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Spain and Morocco showcases the ongoing challenges in the relationship between Europe and its Southern neighbors in North Africa. The contrasts in culture, language, religion, and politics have created friction between the two regions. Massive immigration from North Africa to Europe, European security concerns, and issues regarding energy have provided Europe a strong incentive to seek better relations with North Africa (commonly known as the Maghreb). In 2002, Morocco and Spain experienced a dramatic spike in tensions, culminating in a confrontation over the small island of Perejil that put the two countries at the brink of war. The EU reacted by

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92 This map, relevant to the case study, is obtained from http://www.eudimensions.eu/content/pstudy/spanish_moroccan.htm on 20 January 2010.
supporting Spain, though there was internal disagreement on the degree of support.93 By the end of 2002, relations between the two neighbors were virtually nonexistent.

Since 2002, Spain-Morocco relations have been repaired and are arguably at their best since Morocco’s decolonization in 1956. What events caused Spain and Morocco—two nations at the brink of war in 2002—to have such close relations today? What event broke the “spiral of fear” and forged a “spiral of hope?”94 A signal of reassurance by Morocco, combined with Spain’s willingness to cooperate, halted the escalating tensions and beginning a period of rapprochement. This case hence represents a success of reassurance. This chapter argues that two of this thesis’ four conditions were present during the reassurance exchange. A potential alternative explanation is that Spain sought rapprochement out of concern that continued tensions would benefit France at Spain’s expense, given the many economic and political incentives to cultivate influence in the Maghreb. This chapter will conclude that this competing explanation accounts for part of the case outcome but not all of it. Part of the trajectory from near conflict to friendly relations must be attributed to Morocco’s use of reassurance.

B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Spain’s relationship with Morocco is rooted in a history of colonialism and is affected by a rivalry between Spain and France over influence in North Africa. The drive for European colonization in the 1800s brought France, Spain, the UK and Germany to Moroccan shores. Morocco’s natural resources, strategic coastlines, and potential market for European goods made it a grand prize during the “scramble for Africa.” The coastal city of Melilla had been a Spanish possession since 1497, five years after the end of the Reconquest. Ceuta, another city on Morocco’s coast, had been a Portuguese port and remained under Spanish rule after the Iberian Union dissolved in 1640.95

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94 Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, 6.
The 1884 Berlin Conference gave France the right to conquer North Africa while guaranteeing Spain the region of Western Sahara. France went on to claim most of Morocco in the 1890s. Between 1899 and 1904, European powers wrestled over their interests in Africa. A final settlement was concluded in the Spanish city of Algeciras in 1906. Limited Moroccan sovereignty was overseen by a Spanish protectorate along Morocco’s North coast, and a French protectorate in Morocco’s interior. Although Moroccan nationalists challenged this arrangement, it withstood both World Wars and the Spanish Civil War. In 1956, both protectorates (with the exception of Ceuta and Melilla) merged to form the Kingdom of Morocco.

Soon after independence, Morocco protested the Spanish presence in Ceuta, Melilla, and Western Sahara. In 1975, as Spanish Ruler Francisco Franco lay on his death bed, King Hassan II of Morocco sent 350,000 unarmed Moroccans into Western Sahara and dared the Spanish troops to shoot at them. Spain’s leaders, cognizant of failed French campaigns in Algeria and Portugal’s failure to keep its colonies in Angola and Mozambique, ceded half of Western Sahara to Mauritania, and half to Morocco as a revolt became imminent. The ensuing war involved Moroccan troops in Western Sahara, in a conflict against the Saharan nationalist movement, the POLISARIO Front.

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98 Mohamed Bouarfa, *Marruecos y Espana: El Eterno Problema* [Morocco and Spain: The Eternal Problem]. (Malaga: Editorial Algazara, 2002), 49. France signed an accord with Italy vowing noninterference with Italian ventures in Libya. Furthermore, it guaranteed Spain’s claim to Ceuta and Melilla, and ceded to Britain’s demands that Tangier be an international city and guaranteed the safe passage of British vessels in the Strait of Gibraltar.

99 Ibid., 56–57.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid., 272.


103 Ibid.

104 The POLISARIO ([Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro] is the pro-independence movement for Western Sahara.
The Western Sahara issue has since fueled Moroccan nationalism. It has provided a means for reconciliation between Hassan and national movements that had threatened his power with protests, two military coups, and the costly Sand War with Algeria. It also rallied Moroccans during the 2002 Crisis with Spain. After a promising start in 1997, Morocco’s democratic reforms initiated by Hassan and continued by his son Mohammed seemed to stall. The optimism that came from Prime Minister Abdul Rahman al-Yussufi’s election in 1997 eventually gave way to an impression of ineffectiveness in improving Morocco’s social problems, which helped the recruitment campaigns of illegal Islamic movements. As the 2002 parliamentary elections approached, Mohammed wanted to demonstrate to the world that Morocco was a showcase of free, democratic, and highly participatory elections. In order to do this, he needed a nationalist issue to rally Moroccans to the ballot box. He borrowed a page from his father’s playbook and used the dispute over a small island in the Strait of Gibraltar to unite the Moroccan people.

C. RECENT TENSIONS

The crisis that led to the standoff over the island of Perejil began when both Spain and Morocco became fixated on their national interests and ceased to cooperate to achieve them. In April 2001, to Spain’s disappointment, Morocco suspended talks on fishery rights for Spanish ships, a politicized issue for Spain. Interestingly, French President Jacques Chirac had said the previous year that he did not support Spanish fishery rights in Morocco. Many think that Mohammed suspended the talks due to

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106 Paloma Gonzalez Del Miño, *Las Relaciones entre España y Marruecos* [The Relations Between Spain and Morocco] (Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata, 2005), 46–47.


108 Paloma Gonzalez Del Miño, *Las Relaciones entre España y Marruecos*, 49.

109 Perejil is a small, uninhabited island on the Strait of Gibraltar off the coast of Morocco, near Ceuta. The name means “parsley” in Spanish. Moroccans call the island by its Arabic name Leila.

pressure from the Moroccan military, which was profiting from the fisheries.\textsuperscript{111} In retaliation, the Spanish foreign minister summoned the Moroccan ambassador in August to convey Spain’s concern at the increasing tide of illegal Moroccan immigration by way of makeshift boats (referring to one of Spain’s securitized issues). Twelve days later, Mohammed blamed the Spanish Mafia for providing the boats for the illegal trafficking of immigrants. In October, Morocco unilaterally postponed the planned December summit between Prime Minister Yussufi and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar and recalled its ambassador.\textsuperscript{112}

On 31 January 2002, Mohammed’s son Abdelkrim Jattabi declared that Spain should indemnify Moroccan victims of Spain’s gas attacks in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{113} Tensions heightened when Moroccan authorities expelled Canary Islands officials visiting Western Sahara on 1 June 2002. On 6 July, the Moroccan foreign minister summoned the Spanish ambassador to protest the approach of five Spanish Marine ships to the Moroccan Coast (possibly in search of immigrant boats). Morocco further responded by placing an observation post on Perejil on 11 July.\textsuperscript{114} Sovereignty over this island had never been clarified, although Spain considered it as part of its Ceuta enclave. In the mind of Spanish leaders, Morocco’s act jeopardized the internationally recognized status quo.

\textsuperscript{111} Ignacio Cembrero, “Vecinos Alejados: Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos” Neighbors Far Apart: The Secrets of the Crisis Between Spain and Morocco (Barcelona: Circulo de Lectores, 2006), 18.

\textsuperscript{112} Agence France Presse, July 20, 2002, International section. “Isla de Perejil, La Consecuencia de 15 Meses de Tension entre España y Marruecos [Perejil Island,” [The Consequence of 15 Months of Tensions Between Spain and Morocco]. Obtained from www.nexis.com; translations by author. All the above-mentioned dates and facts come from this source.

\textsuperscript{113} In 1925, the Spanish Army sought to repel an advance by the Rif Emirate rebels who sought an end to Spanish Colonial rule in Morocco. The Spanish advance included toxic gas attacks on the rebels. Then-Colonel Francisco Franco led one of the legions in this attack. Bouarfa, Mohamed, Marruecos y España: El Eterno Problema [Morocco and Spain: The Eternal Problem], (Malaga: Editorial Algazara, 2002), 176.

\textsuperscript{114} “Isla de Perejil, La Consecuencia de 15 Meses de Tension entre España y Marruecos [Perejil Island,” [The Consequence of 15 Months of Tensions Between Spain and Morocco], Agence France Presse, July 20, 2002, International section. Obtained from www.nexis.com; translations by author. All the above-mentioned dates and facts come from this source.
Initially, both NATO and the EU "lamented the crisis, but described it as a bilateral issue." On 13 July, however, EC President Romano Prodi warned Morocco of "grave consequences" if it continued to occupy the island. On 14 July, the Danish Government, acting as EU president, demanded that Morocco withdraw its troops from the island. The next day, NATO officials asked Morocco to respect the status quo. On 17 July, after Madrid informed the UN Security Council and NATO, Spanish Marines occupied the island and dislodged the Moroccan soldiers. Moroccon Foreign Minister Mohammed Ben Aissa responded by stating that Morocco may declare war on Spain.

Between 19 and 20 July, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell intervened by urging both leaders to return the island to its demilitarized status before the standoff. Spanish Foreign Minister Palacios pledged that Spanish troops would be withdrawn if Morocco pledged not to remilitarize the island. When Morocco accepted this condition and pledged not to return to the island, the Spanish troops left.

D. SECURITIZED ISSUES

Spain’s geographic, cultural and historical ties to North Africa give Spain a valid argument for seeing itself as the diplomatic link between the two regions. But many of Spain’s securitized and politicized issues concern the region. These issues include:

- The security of Spain’s fishing rights in waters off the coast of Morocco (politicized).
- Sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla (securitized).

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116 Ibid.
118 “Cronología La Crisis entre España y Marruecos por la Isla del Perejil,”
120 Ibid.
121 “Cronología La Crisis entre España y Marruecos por la Isla del Perejil.”
of particular concern to Spain is the illegal immigration issue. Illegal immigration from Africa to Europe has increased dramatically in the last few years. According to the 2004 *Atlas of Moroccan Immigration*, some 300,000 Moroccans live legally in Spain, over 25% of the total legal immigrant population. The Atlas estimates that over 200,000 more live there illegally. Throughout the past decade, images of African immigrants in makeshift boats being rescued by the Spanish Coast Guard have sparked strong sentiments among Spaniards. A 2005 survey by the Real Instituto Elcano (a non-governmental agency that studies Spanish public opinion) revealed that 74% of Spaniards feel that immigration is Spain’s most important foreign policy issue, and 94% of those surveyed feel that Morocco is not doing enough to curb the flow.

Morocco is arguably undergoing the fastest rate of democratization in Africa. Along with constitutional reform, the monarchy has embarked in drastic modernization campaigns—from massive infrastructure projects, to recognizing civil rights. With this general goal in mind, Morocco has securitized or politicized the following:

- The challenge of illegal Islamic movements on the monarchy (securitized).
- Morocco’s poverty and quality of life (securitized).
- Morocco’s economic relationship with the EU (securitized).
- Relations with its African neighbors, particularly Algeria (securitized).
- Territorial integrity, including the annexation of Ceuta and Melilla (politicized).
- Sovereignty over the Western Sahara (securitized).

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122 Paloma Gonzalez Del Miño, *Las Relaciones entre España y Marruecos*, 78, 88.
124 Ibid., 177.
125 Gonzalez Del Miño, *Las Relaciones entre España y Marruecos*, 18–19.
126 Ibid., 30, 42.
Despite the increasing rate of modernization, Morocco faces an uphill battle. The 2004 Report on Human Development ranks Morocco 125th of 177 nations (the 2008 update ranks Morocco 127th, and Spain, 16th).\textsuperscript{127} About 70% of its 30 million people are younger than 35 years of age. Approximately 50% of the population is illiterate, and unemployment hovers at 15%. About 19% of Moroccans live in poverty.\textsuperscript{128} The pressure for emigration is high, as is the potential for unrest. There is evidence that King Mohammed VI has slowed down modernization in favor of social order. Islamist groups are thriving amidst the social strains in Morocco. Some of these movements are being integrated into the political arena, but others are not being recognized, likely because of their perceived threat to the throne.

E. COMPETING EXPLANATION: SPAIN SEEKS TO KEEP UP WITH FRENCH INFLUENCE IN THE MAGHREB

Before considering the influence of reassurance strategies in this case, this section weighs the evidence for the most plausible competing explanation: that Spain was driven by competition with France for influence and economic ties in North Africa. At the time of the Perejil standoff, France had strong relations with Morocco. French President Jacques Chirac’s first visit as head of state had been to Morocco, and Mohammed’s first visit as head of state had been to France.\textsuperscript{129} The two leaders quickly became close friends. According to Spanish journalist Ignacio Cembrero, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar was convinced that during the Perejil standoff, Chirac had guaranteed his support to Mohammed, and may have encouraged him to occupy the island.\textsuperscript{130} In 2002, it was revealed that France had blocked a proposed EC declaration of solidarity towards Spain during the crisis.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{127} Del Miño, Las Relaciones entre España y Marruecos, 46.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid. All the above statistics come from this source, but are based on the 2004 UN Development Programme Report on Human Development.
\textsuperscript{129} Ignacio Cembrero, “Vecinos Alejados: Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos,” 59.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 51.
Aznar felt that a quick rapprochement with Morocco would curtail what he perceived were French efforts at minimizing Spain’s ties to North Africa. In June 2003, Aznar told Moroccan Prime Minister Driss Jettou that “businessmen need to see us bonding; that will give them confidence.” Jettou allegedly told his aides later that day that time had been wasted over Perejil, and that confidence would take time to restore. Despite Aznar’s efforts, Morocco clearly preferred to do business with France. In 2007, Morocco agreed to French civilian and military projects worth 3 billion Euros. Morocco also picked French Energy Company Areva over Spanish company Iberdola to build its first nuclear reactor. Finally, Morocco purchased a 470 million Euro French attack frigate with state of the art technology. Moroccan Parliamentarian Abdelila Benkiran stated, “the French President’s visit may have affected Spanish interests in Morocco after signing contracts with France.” Spanish businessmen lamented the deals as a missed opportunity for Spanish business.

In addition to economic ties, Nicolas Sarkozy, who became president in 2007, sought to increase France’s political influence in the Maghreb. As candidate, he proposed that a new multilateral regime replace the Spanish-initiated Barcelona Process, which had been the forum for Euro-Maghreb relations since 1995. This 38-member multilateral organization had failed to reach meaningful consensus on any issue, as Israel’s membership caused frequent boycotts by the Muslim member states. On its 10th Anniversary summit in 2005, delegates who did attend could not even come to a

132 Ignacio Cembrero, “Vecinos Alejados: Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos,” 82.
133 Ignacio Cembrero, “Vecinos Alejados: Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos,” 82.
138 Ibid.
consensus on a definition for terrorism. European newspapers called the event a “fiasco.” Three years later, Sarkozy launched the Union of the Mediterranean in Paris. Although the summit did not achieve any meaningful consensus, all but one Arab leader attended. Many Spanish newspapers used the contrast as proof that Spain’s diplomatic influence in the Mediterranean was inferior to France’s. In other words, Spain is no France in the international system.

An editorial in a prominent Spanish newspaper called for a new Spanish role that “remains within the limits of a realistic pragmatism.”140 This pragmatism would involve forging as many commercial contracts as possible, while keeping a lower profile on Ceuta, Melilla, and Western Sahara. Aznar’s successor as prime minister, the Socialist Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, adopted this approach. The week before the Paris Summit in July 2008, as all eyes were on Sarkozy, Zapatero visited several nations in the Maghreb (including Morocco), and achieved important economic and political agreements. In December, Spain and Morocco signed a financial agreement worth 520 million Euros.141 Although the accord pales in comparison to the 3 billion Euros in agreements with France in 2007, this was Spain’s largest economic cooperation agreement in its history.142 This agreement enabled Spain to keep its place as Morocco’s second largest trade partner (after France).143

Although the French-Spanish competition for Moroccan business certainly motivated Spain to resolve its differences with Morocco, this explanation fails to explain why Morocco sought rapprochement with Spain. In addition, the timing of the French agreements with Morocco comes well after the de-escalation of Spain-Morocco tensions. The reassurance explanation covers these gaps, and is more convincing overall.

142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
F. THE SIGNALS OF REASSURANCE AND RECIPROCATION

After the Perejil crisis, tensions continued high, as King Mohammed began a diplomatic blitz to bring attention to Spain’s colonies in Morocco. However, in late 2002, a series of events gave Morocco an opportunity to send a signal of reassurance. In November, an oil tanker split in half near the Northern coast of Spain, releasing thousands of tons of crude into the Atlantic Ocean. It devastated the fishing industry in Northern Spain, which was already affected by Morocco’s denial of its fishing waters the year before. On 13 December, Mohammed took a “leap in the dark” by offering Spain use of Morocco’s territorial waters for Spanish fishing boats that had been affected by the oil spill.144 In a clear example of twenty-first century reassurance, Mohammed sent a signal that enhanced Spain’s position in a politicized issue—fishing rights. The king personally called Aznar and Spanish King Juan Carlos to inform them of his decision, demonstrating a transparency of his intentions.145

The Spanish Government felt reassured after the Moroccan King’s gesture. Aznar acknowledged the gesture at a press conference during the Copenhagen Council of Europe Summit that was taking place at the time, giving Morocco a much-needed positive image on the European stage.146 Three weeks later, the spiral of hope began. Bilateral working groups began working towards a resolution of political, immigration, and maritime issues.147 In a further demonstration of Moroccan transparency, Mohammed personally received Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacios in Agadir on 30 January 2003 to discuss the normalization of relations.148


145 Ignacio Cembrero, “Vecinos Alejados: Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos,” 75.

146 Trinidad Deiros-Monte, “Marruecos Ofrece sus Aguas Territoriales a Pescadores Espanoles Afectados.

147 Ignacio Cembrero, “Vecinos Alejados: Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos,” 75.

Foreign Relations Taieb Fassi Fihri recalls from this meeting, “His Majesty barely mentioned the crisis…he preferred to talk about the future, about the preparations for the summit, about our relations with the EU.”\(^{149}\) The visit led to the return of both ambassadors the following week. Four months later, on 16 May 2003, a terrorist attack in Casablanca killed 33. Spain quickly reassured Morocco by offering 300 million Euros in immediate aid, as well as technological and intelligence cooperation in the ensuing investigation. Spain essentially enhanced Morocco’s position in its securitized issue of extremist domestic terrorism.\(^{150}\) In October, the EU (without objection from Spain) agreed to grant preferential access to 96% of Moroccan agricultural products—enhancing Morocco’s securitized issue of fostering better economic ties with Europe.\(^{151}\) Morocco reciprocated in November 2003, by agreeing to resume monthly talks on illegal immigration - enhancing Spain’s position on one of its securitized issues.\(^{152}\)

On 10 February 2004, Spain and Morocco began planning a joint military exercise, called “Atlas 04.”\(^{153}\) The confidence building measure (CBM) took place in both nations. It involved 18 Spanish Air Force aircraft and 500 Spanish troops, and 16 Moroccan Air Force aircraft and 130 Moroccan troops, in search and rescue and crisis reaction missions.\(^{154}\) Both nations exchanged tactics and procedures, thereby reassuring each other in a more traditional example of the action in the military domain.

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\(^{149}\) Ignacio Cembrero, “Vecinos Alejados: Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos,” 76. Translation by author.

\(^{150}\) Ignacio Cembrero, “Vecinos Alejados: Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos,” 76.


\(^{152}\) Fernando Lazaro, “España y Marruecos Crean un Organo Contra la Inmigracion Ilegal que se Reunira Cada Mes,” [Spain and Morocco Create a Task Force Against illegal Immigration that Will Meet Each Month], *El Mundo*, 19 November 2003, Spain Section (p.1). Obtained from www.nexis.com on 28 February 2009; translations by author.


Morocco’s cooperation after the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks on Madrid commuter trains ironically sped the spiral of hope between the two nations. The attack killed 201 Spaniards. Several of the terrorists were Moroccan citizens and much of the planning took place in Morocco. The week after the attacks, a connection was made between these attacks and the Casablanca attack.\textsuperscript{155} The attacks brought a flurry of speculation that the cold relations between Spain and Morocco “caused a critical breakdown in communication over terrorists’ movements.”\textsuperscript{156} Morocco’s cooperation in the investigation and its eventual trial of the suspects in Morocco successfully reassured Spain and helped further the rapprochement.

Spain reciprocated these signals of reassurance in January 2005. Spain’s King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia visited Morocco and re-launched several joint projects that had been frozen at the time of the Perejil crisis. Among these projects was a new electric plant built by Spanish Energy Giant Endesa that would supply about 16\% of Morocco’s electricity.\textsuperscript{157} In the following month, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos announced new initiatives to regularize Moroccan immigrants in Spain, and urged all EU members to elevate Morocco’s status with respect to the EU, including granting policies to Morocco similar to those granted to Turkey.\textsuperscript{158}

In March 2005, Zapatero visited Morocco to discuss the Western Sahara issue. The Moroccan Government had been presenting its plan of autonomy for Western Sahara in several nations.\textsuperscript{159} The plan called for Moroccan sovereignty over an autonomous


\textsuperscript{157}Isambard Wilkinson, “Spain Fears ‘Bad Blood’ With Morocco.”


Western Sahara. Zapatero’s openness to this plan reassured Morocco in one of its most highly securitized issues—Western Sahara. Morocco reciprocated two months later by granting 119 fishing licenses to EU fishing companies (of which 100 are Spanish) as part of an EU-Morocco fisheries accord. The issue that began the Spain-Morocco standoff in 2001 was now resolved. The spiral of hope continued. During the July 2007 EU-Morocco Bilateral Association Council Meeting in Brussels, Spain petitioned the European Defense Council to invite Morocco to the September 2007 summit. Spanish Secretary of State for European Affairs Alberto Navarro expressed a need for Morocco to be more involved in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), especially since Moroccan troops participated in the Bosnia-Herzegovina mission, and because of the Moroccan military’s role in enforcing EU immigration policy. Navarro mentioned that “the bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco are currently at their best, and we have Rabat’s full cooperation on the efforts against illegal immigration.”

G. THE PRESENCE OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS

1. A signal of reassurance is likely to be reciprocated if the weaker state reassures first. If the weaker state is defensive because it feels less secure, and the stronger state is also defensive and has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate, then the burden is on the weaker state to “break” the “arms-hostility cycle.” It must convince the stronger state, through a signal of reassurance, that it wants to cooperate as well. Once it does, the chances that the stronger state will reciprocate are high.

This first condition is supported by this case. Morocco’s signal of reassurance is easy to identify in that it was the first positive diplomatic step taken by either nation after the Perejil crisis. Morocco had arguably begun the impasse with Spain by suspending the

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163 Ibid. The quotation is of Navarro’s answer during a press conference; translation by author.
talks on fishing rights for Spanish vessels. The gesture of allowing Spanish fishing vessels was the signal Spain needed to begin its long-awaited cooperation with Morocco. As predicted by this hypothesis, Spain indeed reciprocated.

2. Reassurance signals transmitted within a multilateral framework increase the chances for reciprocity. Other members of an international regime may encourage reciprocation.

This second hypothesis is not supported by this case. Rather than being prodded by a multilateral organization, Spain reciprocated Morocco’s initial reassurance signal primarily due to economic and political interests in the Maghreb. The competing explanation, that Spain sought to keep up with France’s engagement in the region, is relevant here and undermines this hypothesis. During the Perejil crisis, the EU could not offer its solidarity for Spain because of France’s dissent, nor could it encourage Spain to concede the standoff because of strong support by other members. Division in the EU rendered the international regime irrelevant as the standoff evolved.

Once reassurance signals were exchanged, several EU nations, namely Sweden and Ireland, pressed the EU to demand an explanation for the imprisonment of Moroccan journalists who had been critical of the Moroccan government.164 In fact, the Scandinavian states and Ireland proposed to add a paragraph to the long-awaited fisheries treaty that addressed the Western Sahara issue, namely, the issue of alleged Moroccan curtailment of civil liberties in Western Sahara.165 Ironically, both Spain and France found themselves united in opposing such an addition.166 So, instead of being a source of encouragement to reciprocate Morocco’s reassurance signals, the EU may have actually been an impediment to Spanish rapprochement with Morocco.

3. If the reassurer shows a transparency of its benign intentions through political rhetoric, diplomacy, and defensive postures, then a signal of reassurance is more likely to be reciprocated.

The third hypothesis is supported in this case. Only when transparency faltered did tensions rise. The frequent meetings between Spanish and Moroccan leaders after the

164 Ignacio Cembrero, “Vecinos Alejados: Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos,” 126.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
Perejil standoff increased transparency and led to rapprochement. Additionally, the CBM exercise in 2004 allowed both militaries to work together and develop relationships. The bilateral cooperation that followed the terrorist attacks allowed both nations to demonstrate their defensive intentions. France’s involvement also helped in this regard, as more diplomacy was required to keep France “in the loop” of the rapprochement.

4. A signal of reassurance is most likely to be reciprocated when it is perceived as costly. In other words, if the reassuree considers the reassurer’s signal costly, then it is likely to reciprocate.

This condition is difficult to measure, because, as explained in Chapter II, cost is interpreted differently in different nations. Mohammed’s invitation for Spanish ships to use Moroccan waters may not have been costly for Morocco, although there had been pressure from the military to keep Moroccan waters closed to European fishing. But the Spanish Government welcomed Mohammed’s empathy, especially because it concerned a highly politicized issue for Spain. The signal was small, but led to greater cooperation. So, in this case, Larson’s argument that small signals can lead to greater reciprocal gestures is more applicable than Kydd’s argument that only costly signals are effective.

H. CONCLUSION

Rapprochement between Morocco and Spain began when Morocco sent a signal of reassurance by allowing Spanish fishing vessels to operate in Moroccan waters. Until then, relations had been tense, especially during the Perejil crisis. Of the four conditions, two were present. First, the weaker state, Morocco, was the first to reassure. Second, transparency was prevalent before, throughout, and after the period of tensions.

Today, the relationship continues to be fragile, especially when securitized issues are involved, such as immigration, Ceuta, Melilla, and Western Sahara. On this last issue, French Ambassador to Madrid Olivier Schrameck writes, “With much bravery the Spanish government has made a diplomatic shift by supporting a process that will not guarantee Western Sahara more than a more or less wide-ranging autonomy, inside Morocco.”

Zapatero’s recent flexibility in the Western Sahara issue has enraged

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167 Ignacio Cembrero, “Vecinos Alejados: Memoire d’Alternance, Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos, 104.”
POLISARIO front leaders, and even hurt his approval ratings. Meanwhile, the Scandinavian states restrain further rapprochement with their civil liberties concerns.\textsuperscript{168} Could Western Sahara be the limit to the Spain-Morocco rapprochement?

While the explanation that Spain sought rapprochement with Morocco to stay competitive with French interests is valid, it is incomplete. It does not account for the fact that Morocco initiated the rapprochement. The reassurance exchange demonstrated Spain and Morocco’s awareness of each other’s securitized issues. Morocco’s initial signal of reassurance began a spiral of hope based on a series of positive gestures. Given the impetus of this spiral, the outlook is positive in the Spain-Morocco relationship.

\textsuperscript{168} Ignacio Cembrero, “Vecinos Alejados: Memoire d’Alternance, Los Secretos de la Crisis entre España y Marruecos, 104.
IV. CASE STUDY #2: EXPLAINING THE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN ITALY AND LIBYA

![Map of Italy and Libya]

Figure 2. Italy-Libya area of tensions (From Jesuit Rescue Service/USA, http://www.jrsusa.org/images/lampedusa_map.jpg)

A. INTRODUCTION

On 15 April 1986, Libya launched two Scud missiles at the Italian island of Lampedusa in an apparent retaliation for an American attack on Libya a few hours before.169 This event capped off two years of heightened tensions between Italy and Libya that included Libya-sponsored terrorist attacks in Italy. Twelve years after the Scud attack, the prime minister of Italy and the same Libyan ruler who directed the attacks toasted in celebration of a friendship treaty. What can explain this dramatic and positive rapprochement between two bitter antagonists with a deeply rooted history of colonialism and mistrust? This chapter argues that after years of cool relations overshadowed by international isolation, Libya sent a signal of reassurance to the west that played into one of Italy’s most securitized issues. The signal was enough to reassure Italy that Libya no longer had suspicious intentions. Soon after Libya’s signal, relations between the two Southern Mediterranean neighbors improved dramatically. This case represents another success of reassurance. Three of the four independent variables were

present during the rapprochement. The most plausible competing explanation for this rapprochement is that Italy successfully buck-passed a policy of compellence to the United States, and benefited from Libyan concessions as a result of U.S. pressure. This chapter will conclude that this competing explanation accounts for part of the case outcome but not all of it. Libya’s signal of reassurance prompted Italy to push for the elimination of international sanctions on Libya and increase its trade with the North African nation.

B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Libya’s tumultuous relationship with Italy dates back to 1911, when the young European power invaded the North African nation in its attempt to profit from a weakening Ottoman Empire. Italy’s claim to colonize Libya was internationally recognized by the end of World War I. The 1920s brought about an intense colonization, mostly by Northern Italian estate owners who sought more land for agriculture. By 1940, over 110,000 Italian settlers had come to Libya to develop over 225,000 hectares of land. Fascist colonial policy sought to exclude Libyans from any development project, thereby creating animosity among the native population. Moreover, Italy severely punished any Libyan resistance movement, sending “tens of thousands of Libyan insurrectionists to their deaths in concentration camps.” The colonial era continued until the end of World War II, when a defeated Italy had to hand over Libyan sovereignty to the victorious British and French.

On 24 December 1951, King Idris Al-Sanusi declared the creation of the Libyan state. The young country faced enormous difficulties: 90% illiteracy, mass poverty, and an infrastructure mostly destroyed during the North African campaigns of World War

171 Ibid., 32.
172 Ibid., 33.
173 Ibid.
175 Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 43.
II. Meanwhile, some 50,000 Italian settlers remained in Libya, and owned most of the fertile land.\textsuperscript{176} A dependence on foreign aid gave way to the rapid growth of Libya’s oil industry. Libya became “the fourth most prolific producer of oil.”\textsuperscript{177} The growth of Libyan nationalism and Pan-Arabism, combined with oil revenues, made the environment favorable for Colonel Mu’ammar Qadhafi to lead a successful coup d’état in 1969 that transformed Libya into a military dictatorship.\textsuperscript{178} It also led to the expulsion in 1970 of approximately 20,000 Italian settlers (of which some had been born in Libya).\textsuperscript{179} Despite Qadhafi’s animosity towards Italy, he continued selling Italy massive amounts of oil.

Relations between Libya and the West deteriorated during the 1980s. Qadhafi’s strong opposition to Israel and apparent support for international terrorism caused a sharp rise in tensions with the United States. These tensions were highlighted by the 1982 U.S. shoot-down of two Libyan jet fighters, a U.S.-imposed embargo on refined petroleum products from Libya, the revelation that Libya had supported the 1985 Fiumicino (Rome) and Vienna airport terrorist attacks, and the 1986 U.S. attack on Libya.\textsuperscript{180}

\textbf{C. RECENT TENSIONS}

On 27 December 1985, four gunmen entered Rome’s Fiumicino airport and threw grenades at the El Al and Trans World Airlines ticket counters. The ensuing shooting rampage ended with fourteen dead and more than 60 injured.\textsuperscript{181} The reaction to this terrorist attack was immediate, as Italians throughout the country felt threatened by terror. The attacks were quickly traced to an offshoot of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

\textsuperscript{176} Dirk Vandewalle, \textit{A History of Modern Libya}, 51.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 79. The Libyan Ruler’s name is spelled differently in various sources. For the purpose of this project, it will be spelled “Qadhafi,” as this is the way it is spelled in the U.S. State Department’s website. In Italian, most literature spells it “Gheddafi.”
\textsuperscript{179} “Libya Tells Exiled Italian Colonists It’s Time to Come Back Home,” \textit{The Independent} (London), 9 October 2004, Foreign News Section, 32.
\textsuperscript{180} Dirk Vandewalle, \textit{A History of Modern Libya}, 133–134.
rated the spiral of fear that had begun with Qadhafi’s repudiation of Italia April, operatives with links to a Libyan diploma in East Berlin placed a bomb in a West (PLO), with support from Libya. Three days after the attacks, Vice Secretary of the Italian Liberal Party Antonio Patuelli said, “tears are not enough to avoid other massacres. What is needed is a reappraisal of Italian foreign policy towards countries such as Qadhafi’s Libya, Syria and Iran.”182 Meanwhile, Libya’s official news agency JANA called the attacks “heroic actions by the sons of the martyrs” of Arab refugees killed in Beirut in 1982.183 On 30 December, Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi summoned Qadhafi’s envoy to protest Libya’s open support for the attacks.184 Craxi clearly directed his ire at Libya when he vowed to curb “states that allow terrorist groups to organize their bloody undertakings through tolerance or even support. Those who called the terrorist attack an act of heroism have unveiled a bloody and fanatical face. There can be no heroism in a massacre of innocent and defenseless civilians.”185 Craxi had effectively securitized terrorism and made a strong implication that Libya’s support for this securitized threat merited new Italian policy measures. Libya’s open support of terrorism greatly accelerated the spiral of fear that had begun with Qhadafi’s repudiation of Italian colonization.

In January 1986, the Reagan Administration froze all Libyan assets in the United States and issued a travel ban.186 Italy warned Italian businesses not to “exploit the U.S.-ordered withdrawal of American companies from Libya.”187 While Italy initially preferred to keep its policy in line with the rest of Europe’s, the evidence of Libyan connections to the Rome attack forced Italy to consider unilateral sanctions.188 On 5 April, operatives with links to a Libyan diplomat in East Berlin placed a bomb in a West

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183 Ibid.
185 Ibid.
Berlin nightclub frequented by U.S. servicemen. The explosion killed two U.S. servicemen and another person, while injuring over some 230, including 63 Americans. The incident securitized the issue of terrorism in the United States, prompting the 15 April attack. Shortly after the U.S. attack, Libya launched two Scud missiles towards Italy. Neither missile hit its target in Lampedusa. But the attack heightened tensions between Italy and Libya.

Italy put its armed forces on maximum alert shortly after the Scud attack. American naval vessels “took positions off Lampedusa along with Italian Navy units.” Craxi sent a note of protest to Libya and gave “clear directives to the Italian Armed Forces.” In a press conference, Craxi asked, “What do you think we should do next time? Send another note of protest? That would not be the view of the Italian Government, nor would it be the view of the overwhelming number of Italians.” He added, “we would not ever want to find ourselves in a condition where we need to react using military force…that is why we have invited the government of Tripoli to show caution, reflection, and responsibility.” In May, Qadhafi responded, “from now on, vis-à-vis Egypt, Italy and any country which we consider in a hostile position to us, we will treat as America [sic] treats the world now. Libya will not turn a blind eye to any

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193 Ibid.

new U.S. campaigns from Italy.” In September, Craxi said that had the Libyan missiles not missed, Qadhafi “would not be at his post now.” Italy and Libya seemed to be on the brink of war.

The coercive pressures on Libya did not initially change Libyan behavior. On 21 December 1988, Pan Am flight 103 exploded and crashed in Scotland, killing 259. Less than one year later, UTA flight 772 exploded and crashed in Niger, killing 171. Evidence strongly suggests that Libyan operatives were behind both incidents. On 14 November 1991, the United States obtained a grand jury indictment of two Libyan intelligence operatives working in Malta. France and the United Kingdom (the homelands of many of the victims) joined in the demands that Libya hand over the operatives for trial. Furthermore, these nations demanded that Libya renounce terrorism, compensate the victims’ families, and accept responsibility for its actions.

D. SECURITIZED ISSUES

Italy seeks to consolidate its position as a middle power. With regards to the Maghreb, Italians have felt a special connection in terms of geography, colonialism, and economic opportunities. Italy feels that it has a special responsibility to modernize the region after decades of colonial exploitation. At the same time, fear, xenophobia, and distrust exist as Italians cope with the reality of religious extremism, international terrorism, and immigration. Italy’s pertinent securitized and politicized issues include:

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197 Ibid., 59


199 Ibid., 117.

200 Ibid.

• International terrorism (securitized).
• Access to energy (securitized).
• Business access in North Africa (politicized).
• Immigration from North Africa (securitized).

Libya has heavily depended on its oil and natural gas supply to finance its economy. Because of Europe’s proximity and need for oil, Libya’s main interest is to keep its buyers buying. Libya has also undergone a drive for modernization, which involves building roads, providing better education, and eradicating poverty. Qaddafi is also interested in maintaining his power and repelling challenges to his rule. The main challenge is from radical Islamic groups that have garnered support from the impoverished Libyans. With regard to the region, Libya’s securitized issues include:

• Uncompensated colonial atrocities (securitized).
• Internal opposition to government by Islamist groups (securitized).
• Access to oil and gas markets (securitized).
• Pan-Arabism (politicized).
• Outside intervention (securitized).

E. COMPETING EXPLANATION: ITALY WAS ABLE TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH LIBYA BECAUSE IT “BUCK-PASSED” COERCIVE DIPLOMACY TO THE UNITED STATES

Did Italy “free-ride” on the West’s diplomatic initiatives towards Libya? “Free-riding” has been incorporated into the “buck-passing” strategy in the study of international relations. According to Mearsheimer, “a buck passer attempts to get another state to bear the burden of deterring or possibly fighting an aggressor, while it remains on the sidelines.”202 A buck-passer usually pursues one of four options. First, it can seek to improve diplomatic relations with the aggressor so that the main attention is given to the tensions between the aggressor and the “buck-catcher.”203 Second, it can refrain from maintaining close relations with the buck-catcher, so that relations with the aggressor can

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203 Ibid., 158.
be easier to improve. Third, a buck-passer can increase its military power, so that the aggressor is deterred from attacking the buck-passer and focuses instead on the buck-catcher. Finally, a buck-passer can aid the buck-catcher by increasing its power to deter (and defend against) the aggressor.\textsuperscript{204} In this case, the aggressor is Libya, the buck-passer is Italy, and the buck-catchers are the United States and the United Kingdom.

Italy’s first sign of buck passing occurred shortly after the Rome airport attack. Despite the tensions, Italy did not object to the EEC decision to refrain from imposing sanctions. By not imposing sanctions, Italy passed the buck to the United States, which had imposed sanctions a week after the attacks. Italy did however freeze Libyan assets.\textsuperscript{205} Italy also became the first European state to unilaterally suspend its arms sales to Libya.\textsuperscript{206} These actions pleased the United States. But Italy also kept a subtle, yet real engagement with Libya. Craxi’s successor, Giulio Andreotti, visited Libya several times.\textsuperscript{207} In a 5 June 1991 joint statement that followed a meeting between Andreotti and Qadhafi, both states expressed their “eagerness to give fresh impetus to their bilateral relations.” Meanwhile, Italy’s oil imports from Libya increased during the heightened tensions with the United States, from 19\% of total oil imports in 1980 to 33\% in 1987.\textsuperscript{208}

In 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 731, formally demanding that Libya respond to the allegations of involvement in the Pan Am and UTA attacks. Libya ignored the demands, prompting Resolution 748. This resolution imposed a ban on all flights into and out of Libya, an arms and aircraft parts embargo, and a

\textsuperscript{204} John Mearsheimer, \textit{The Tragedy of Great Power Politics}, 158.


diplomatic isolation of the North African state.\textsuperscript{209} As the passage of this resolution became imminent, Italy emphasized that its actions would be in accordance with the UN mandate. On 23 March, Foreign Minister Gianni DeMichelis stated, “We obviously hope that a solution is found that would contain the situation. But Italy will abide by the UN decisions as well as the EU position.”\textsuperscript{210} These words are indicative of a buck-pass because it demonstrated that Italy would not craft its own policy, but instead endorse the attitude that was coming out of Brussels and New York.

Although the sanctions did not apply to Libyan oil exports, they had a profound effect. Libya’s per-capita GDP fell from $7,311 to $5,896 between 1992 and 1999. By 1998, oil export earnings fell to their lowest level since the 1986 oil price crash.\textsuperscript{211} Libya’s tourist industry and commodity imports suffered from the flight ban.\textsuperscript{212} Meanwhile, Italy’s economic ties with Libya remained strong. Some 20.9\% of Libyan imports were from Italy, while Libyan oil imports by Italy remained at over 30\% of the total (19.35 million tons) in 1995. Libya continued to be Italy’s biggest supplier of oil.\textsuperscript{213}

In 1996, Italy’s new center-left Government’s policy towards Libya was best summarized by Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini: “The possibility of dialogue with Libya exists and is being explored because Italy believes in the possibility of a gradual normalization of its relations with Tripoli.”\textsuperscript{214} This clashed with U.S. policy, which signaled a tough stance amidst Qadhafi’s refusal to hand over the two alleged Lockerbie terrorists. In August, the U.S. Congress adopted the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which imposed sanctions on any non-U.S. company that invested over $40


\textsuperscript{212} Ibid.


million in Libya’s oil industry.\textsuperscript{215} Shortly after the U.S. vote, a spokesperson for the Italian Government told reporters, “we will follow this action with much concern. . . The American law on sanctions is inappropriate in the war on terrorism, and in the judgment of most experts and even many Americans, violates many norms of international law.”\textsuperscript{216}

By buck-passing compellence to the United States, Italy achieved its national security objectives regarding Libya without much cost. In 1992, shortly after the UN sanctions were imposed, Libya renounced terrorism.\textsuperscript{217} In 1999, Libya expelled the Abu Nidal organization, responsible for the Fiumicino attack.\textsuperscript{218} Libya also broke ties with radical Palestinian groups, shut down terrorist camps inside its borders, and extradited Islamist militants and suspected terrorists.\textsuperscript{219}

Whether or not Italy intended to be a buck-passer falls outside the scope of this thesis. But, if Italy’s intent was to pass the buck, it may have resulted in an inadvertent reassurance to Libya. By keeping subtle diplomatic relations, Italy kept Libya’s access to the European energy market open. Italy did not want to antagonize the United States, but may have felt that full support for U.S. policy might have increased the terrorist threat while limiting Italy’s access to oil. In all, Italy benefited from the tough American stance; but it also benefited by not fully embracing U.S. policy. By buck-passing, Italy demonstrated to Libya its desire to continue bilateral relations despite agreeing to multilateral condemnation. In all, instead of a competing explanation, the buck-passing argument may actually complement the reassurance argument.

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\item[\textsuperscript{215}] Dirk Vandewalle, \textit{A History of Modern Libya}, 171.
\item[\textsuperscript{219}] Ibid.
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F. THE SIGNALS OF REASSURANCE AND RECIPROCATION

Because Italy may have felt that further tensions could lead to more terrorist attacks, it opposed military action in 1986. In a speech, Andreotti stated,

The Libyan issue cannot be solved through a military action… Since some American naval bases are located in Italy, we would inevitably be the target of a potential reaction. On the other hand though, I don’t want to be considered as Libya’s lawyer and have no intention to be the main supporter of Qadhafi’s beatification. Surely, I believe that a diplomatic dialogue with the Colonel won’t be harmful for anyone.220

Although these words were not very reassuring to Libya, they were not hostile either. Italy continued buying large amounts of oil and gas. But, as American sanctions tightened after 1996, Qadhafi began to face threats from within. Unemployment reached 30% and inflation 50%, triggering civil unrest.221 At least two attempted military coups challenged Qadhafi, and an Islamic insurgency gained momentum.222 A dispute emerged between the regime’s pragmatists, who wanted Libya to improve its relations with the West, and the hardliners who wanted to stay defiant.223 It seemed that compellence was having its desired effect. But as pressure on Qadhafi grew from the inside, it started cracking from outside. In June 1998, the Organization of African States announced it would no longer enforce UN sanctions unless the United States agreed to conduct the Lockerbie trial in a third country.224 Other countries also began reevaluating effect of UN sanctions. Although many feel that Libya’s concessions in 1999 were the result of American pressure, the growing international support for reintegration suggests that internal—not external—issues pressured Libya to change its posture.

Italy may have noticed the growing domestic threat to Qadhafi and determined that the status quo regime was less threatening than an Islamic revolutionary regime. So


222 Ibid.

223 Ibid., 66.

the Italian Government decided to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate. In a joint declaration on 9 July 1998, Italy “acknowledged its colonial responsibilities” and pledged to indemnify the Libyan victims of colonial policies, help Libya clear mines placed during colonization, and aid in Libyan modernization. In August 1998, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to hold the Lockerbie trial in the Netherlands. The burden now fell on Libya to reassure Italy and the rest of the world that it preferred to improve relations. In April 1999, Qadhafi announced that Libya would comply with Resolution 731, and handed suspects Abdel Basset Ali Mohammed al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa over for trial in The Hague. UN sanctions were immediately suspended.

While the United States did not immediately reciprocate Libya’s reassurance, Italy did. The day after suspension, Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini met Qadhafi in Tripoli. During their meeting, Qadhafi told Dini, “Libya will become Italy’s bridge to Africa... And Italy will become Libya’s door to Europe.” Eight months later, Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema became the first European head of government to visit Libya since Andreotti’s last visit in 1991. On 6 August 1999, both nations agreed to construct a 600 km gas pipeline capable of conducting some 10,000 cubic meters of natural gas annually. In 2001, Qadhafi condemned the September 11 attacks and offered his support in locating Al Qaeda operatives. Italy reciprocated by increasing

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227 Ibid.


230 Ibid.


232 Karim Mezran, and de Maio, “Between the Past and the Future: Has a Shift in Italian-Libyan Relations Occurred, 446.
pressure on the EU to lift its sanctions and even threatened to lift them unilaterally. In October 2004, Qadhafi lifted a ban on former Italian settlers that had been expelled from Libya in 1970. Two days later, the EU lifted its sanctions. Rapprochement continued through 2008, when Italy agreed to pay Libya $5 billion in reparations for colonial era atrocities (see conclusion).

G. THE PRESENCE OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS

1. A signal of reassurance is likely to be reciprocated if the weaker state reassures first. If the weaker state is defensive because it feels less secure, and the stronger state is also defensive and has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate, then the burden is on the weaker state to “break” the “arms-hostility cycle.” It must convince the stronger state, through a signal of reassurance, that it wants to cooperate as well. Once it does, the chances that the stronger state will reciprocate are high.

   The first condition was present in this case, but the willingness of the weaker state to initiate reassurance was likely helped by indications from the stronger state that it would reciprocate. In this case, rapprochement began when Italy acknowledged its colonial responsibilities in 1998. Italy’s willingness to cooperate (and the American decision to hold the Lockerbie trial in a third country) put the burden on Libya—the state—to reassure. Qadhafi’s decision to hand over the suspected bombers began a “spiral of hope” that led to the suspension of UN sanctions and further rapprochement.

   2. Reassurance signals transmitted within a multilateral framework increase the chances for reciprocity. Other members of an international regime may encourage reciprocation.

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This condition is also supported by this case. Both the UN and EU played important roles. The international community dropped the UN sanctions when Qadhafi sent his signal of reassurance. Italy was quick to reciprocate unilaterally, as its leaders re-engaged Qadhafi in order to complete many commercial contracts that had been impeded by the sanctions. Italy led the push for the EU to drop its sanctions in 2004.

3. If the reassurer shows a transparency of its benign intentions through political rhetoric, diplomacy, and defensive postures, then a signal of reassurance is more likely to be reciprocated.

In the case of Italian relations with Libya, transparency has been challenging given Libya’s colonial resentment and Italy’s fears of Libyan ties to terrorism. After decades of tensions, the 1984 meeting between Andreotti and Qadhafi began a period of rapprochement. Andreotti acknowledged Italy’s commitment to Libya’s modernization, and kept the door open for an eventual compensation for Libya’s colonial hardships.236 Meanwhile, Qadhafi agreed to pay debts incurred from Italy throughout the 1970s.237

Qadhafi’s trust towards Craxi was enhanced when the Italian prime minister warned Qadhafi of the 1986 attack the day before it occurred, potentially saving his life.238 According to James Phillips, research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, “this seems like an attempt by some Italian leaders to try to ingratiate themselves with the Libyans, probably with the hope of paving the way for increased trade or investment.”239

4. A signal of reassurance is most likely to be reciprocated when it is perceived as costly. In other words, if the reassuree considers the reassurer’s signal costly, then it is likely to reciprocate.

Qadhafi’s signal of reassurance was costly because there was no guarantee that it would be reciprocated. Furthermore, Qadhafi abandoned his radical, anti-Western policy

237 Ibid.
that had won him support from the Muslim World. Although there was sufficient certainty that turning over the suspected terrorists would get the UN sanctions dropped, Qadhafi risked a political backlash in the region. A case can be made that Qadhafi’s decision was a result of compellence, and not reassurance. But there is no evidence that the United States was planning an attack. Meanwhile, Italy was reluctant to carry out any policy that violated sanctions. In all, the burden was on Qadhafi to send a costly signal.

H. CONCLUSION

Today, Libya and Italy enjoy the warmest relations in their history as neighbors. In August 2008, Italy agreed to pay Libya $5 billion in war reparations. The payments will be over 25 years, and will consist of investments in infrastructure such as the long-desired highway from the Egyptian border to the Tunisian border; housing projects; pensions for victims of Italian mines; and scholarships.240 Libya agreed to cooperate further on the illegal immigration issue, agreeing to more joint patrols and satellite monitoring of Libya’s southern borders.241 On 2 March 2009, Prime Minister Berlusconi addressed the Libyan Parliament in the presence of Qadhafi, as well as former Prime Ministers Andreotti and Dini—important players in this years-long rapprochement.242

There are still many challenges in the Libya-Italy relationship. Italian Nationalism, represented by the Northern League, and Libyan Islamic fundamentalism may undermine the progress already made. But this chapter explained how a spiral of fear between Libya-Italy that culminated in a Libya-backed terrorist attack in Rome and a missile attack on Italy, became a spiral of hope through reassurance. The argument that Italy benefited from the effects of U.S. compellence on Libya cannot be overlooked. But internal affairs—namely domestic threats to Qadhafi’s regime—may have had a greater role in Libya’s change in posture. In order to save his regime, Qadhafi may have had to reassure the world so that Libya could return to the world economy and reduce the


242 Ibid.
massive poverty that was fueling the domestic threats. In sum, the two arguments—buck passing and reassurance—complement each other. As Italy bypassed the more negative aspects of compellence, it was able to benefit from Libya’s isolation and Libya’s eventual concessions. Meanwhile, a steady trend of trust-building signals brought about a period of rapprochement. Today, there is little sign of a reversal of this rapprochement.
V. CASE STUDY #3: EXPLAINING THE IMPASSE BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND NICARAGUA

A. INTRODUCTION

In contrast to the previous two chapters, this chapter explains a case where reassurance failed. It involves the decades-long tense relations between Colombia and Nicaragua. Ships from the Colombian and Nicaraguan Navies have been patrolling what each country considers its territorial waters in the Western Caribbean Sea. In 2003, Colombia threatened to use force if Nicaragua began oil exploration in these waters.\(^{243}\) The tense situation took a turn for the worse in 2007, when the International Court of Justice (ICJ, or World Court) ruled that it had the jurisdiction to rule on the disputed

maritime boundary, which Colombia insisted was the 82nd meridian. Throughout 2008, the Nicaraguan Navy intercepted foreign fishing vessels in the area. At stake are the fishing and oil exploration rights in approximately 130,000 square kilometers of territorial waters. Also at stake is the growing tourism industry of the three largest islands in the archipelago—San Andres, Providencia, and Santa Catalina.

Nicaragua recognized Colombia’s sovereignty over the San Andres archipelago in 1928. However, since 1980, Nicaragua has insisted that it was forced to give up its claim to the islands under pressure from the United States, which occupied Nicaragua at the time of the agreement. In 2008, Nicaragua tried to reassure Colombia, but Colombia did not reciprocate the signal. Meanwhile, the Colombia-Nicaragua impasse has bled over into the recent diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Ecuador, leading to an escalation of tensions due to President Daniel Ortega’s open support for the FARC. Considering the current state of Colombia-Nicaragua tensions, why did Nicaragua’s signal of reassurance fail to bring rapprochement? This chapter argues that Colombia and Nicaragua have failed to resolve their impasse because of deep mistrust, lack of diplomatic transparency, and ineffective multilateralism in their relations. Furthermore, only one of the four proposed conditions was present at the time of Nicaragua’s signal.

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247 The author has visited San Andres and can attest to the important economic incentive for Colombia to maintain sovereignty over the islands.


249 FARC is the acronym for the narco-guerrilla movement Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. The group seeks to overthrow the Colombian Government through a guerrilla insurgency.
B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The origins of this dispute date to Spanish Colonial times. After Columbus’ initial exploration, the region was divided into three provinces, and the provincial administrations oversaw the Spanish conquest and colonization. Starting in the 1700s, Great Britain began taking interest in the region. The British began settling the Mosquito Coast (part of present day Nicaragua). They benefited from the lack of a supply route from the interior and began trading with the Miskito inhabitants. King Phillip V of Spain responded by assigning the region to the Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1739 with the hope that the viceroyalty could better protect the Spanish interests in the region.

Phillip V... gave her [New Granada] a right to the Mosquito Coast from Cape Gracias a Dios southward to Panama, with an indeterminate and indeterminable inner or western boundary and to the Archipelago of San Andres.

The “indeterminate and indeterminable border” mentioned in this charter would become the source of the present day dispute between Nicaragua, which was west of this indeterminate border, and Colombia, which was then part of Nueva Granada. In 1786, Britain agreed to evacuate its colonizers from the Mosquito Coast and the “adjacent islands.” Sensing that the British threat had passed, the Spanish king transferred jurisdiction over the region back to the Captaincy-General of Guatemala. Guatemala neglected San Andres, and the island descended into chaos and anarchy. Fearful of a British occupation, King Charles IV returned the islands to Nueva Granada in 1803.

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251 Ibid. The Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada is present-day Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama.
252 Ibid., 3.
254 Ibid.
The King has decided that the San Andres Islands and the Area of the Costa de Mosquitos—from the Cabo Gracias a Dios to up to the Chagres River—be set apart from the Captaincy-General of Guatemala and to be dependent on the Viceroyalty of Santa Fe.256

Britain’s threat to Spain diminished when the two kingdoms allied to fight Napoleon in Europe.257 Meanwhile, the Latin American colonies began seeking independence, and the ensuing revolutions soon reached the archipelago. In 1822, the islands of San Andres and Providencia declared their “adherence to the [independent Colombian] Constitution of Cucuta.”258 In 1824, Colombia and the United Provinces of Central America agreed to honor the colonial boundaries established in 1803.259 In 1828 Colombia agreed to recognize Nicaragua’s claim to the Mosquito Coast in return for Nicaragua’s recognition of Colombian sovereignty over San Andres.260

This agreement went unchallenged until 1903, when Panama declared its independence from Colombia. Nicaragua considered that Panama’s independence voided Colombia’s sovereignty over San Andres.261 Nicaragua did not, however, challenge Colombia at that time, as it was preoccupied by a civil war that led to a U.S. invasion in 1912.262 In 1925, during the U.S. occupation, President Carlos Solorzano submitted the claim to U.S. arbitration.263 U.S. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg supported a reaffirmation of the 1828 agreement.264 Despite Solorzano’s opposition, both states ratified the Treaty of Esguerra-Barcenas Meneses in 1928, which states,

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257 Ibid., 34.
258 Ibid., 35. The Constitution of Cucuta was the first constitution of an independent Gran Colombia.
259 Ibid.
261 Ibid., 72–73.
264 Ibid., 80. Kellogg won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1929 for signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact with France.
The Republic of Colombia recognizes the full and entire sovereignty of the Republic of Nicaragua over the Mosquito Coast between Cape Gracias a Dios and the San Juan River and over Mangle Grande and Mangle Chico Islands in the Atlantic Ocean. The Republic of Nicaragua recognizes the full and entire sovereignty of the Republic of Colombia over the islands of San Andres, Providencia, and Santa Catalina and over the other islands, islets and reefs forming a part of the San Andres Archipelago.265

There is evidence that the U.S. lobbied for the treaty’s ratification, but not that it coerced the Nicaraguan Government into signing the agreement.266 In fact, the Nicaraguan Congress amended the treaty to include, “The archipelago of San Andres that is mentioned in the first article of this treaty does not extend to the west of the 82\textsuperscript{nd} parallel of the Greenwich Meridian. . .”267

The departure of the U.S. Marines in 1933 gave way to the Somoza Dynasty. The San Andres issue was not raised again until 1972, when the U.S. ceded to Colombia three uninhabited coral cays north of San Andres that it had discovered in the 1800s. Nicaragua reacted to this by filing a formal protest, alleging that not only the cays, but the San Andres Archipelago, constitute part of Nicaragua’s continental platform, and that according to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, all the islands in the region belonged to Nicaragua.268 In support of this claim, Somoza also denounced the Esguerra-Barcenas Meneses Treaty, stating: “the 1928 treaty was not ‘a manifestation of voluntary sovereignty.’”269

In 1979, after a decades-long insurrection, the Sandinista Army overthrew Somoza. One of the first acts of the new Junta was to renounce the Esguerra-Barcenas Meneses Treaty on 5 February 1980. In the words of Commander Daniel Ortega,

\[\text{[Reference Citations]}\]
Historical circumstances since 1909 had prevented true defense of our continental shelf, jurisdictional waters and insular territories on the continental shelf. The absence of sovereignty was manifested by the imposition on our country of two treaties harmful to Nicaragua. . .the Barcenas Meneses-Esguerra Treaty, whose signing was imposed on Nicaragua in 1928 and whose ratification, also by force, occurred in 1930 . . .both acts were effected under total political and military occupation of Nicaragua by the United States.270

Within days of Ortega’s renunciation of the treaty, Colombian President Julio Cesar Turbay sent a naval task force of 500 Colombian Marines to San Andres. An Air Force Squadron was relocated to the San Andres Airport, and construction was hastened on a naval base. Colombia also recalled its ambassador to Nicaragua.271 The situation remained tense until President Belisario Betancur succeeded Turbay in 1982. Betancur’s strong opposition to the efforts by the Contras to overthrow the Sandinista regime won him praise by Ortega, and the San Andres impasse was suspended for a later date.272

C. RECENT TENSIONS

Tensions peaked in 1999, when Colombia and Honduras agreed to the 82nd meridian as the east-west maritime border between Colombia and Nicaragua, and the 15th parallel as the north-south maritime border between Honduras and both Nicaragua and Colombia. Nicaragua quickly filed a protest with the ICJ, disputing the 15th parallel as the border with Honduras. The Nicaraguan Army was placed on alert as Honduran troops were placed along the border. Both countries were at the brink of war.273 On 7 December 2001, Nicaragua filed a protest with the ICJ against Colombia, arguing that the

271 Ibid., 10.
272 Ibid., 17.
United States had imposed the Treaty of Esguerra-Barcenas. Colombia argued that debate on the treaty in the Nicaraguan Congress suggests a voluntary ratification.

In May 2003, Nicaragua granted exploration rights in the Southwestern Caribbean to four U.S. oil companies. The Colombian defense minister threatened to use force if any of the exploration was to take place east of the 82\textsuperscript{nd} meridian. The next day Nicaragua informed Colombia of the exact area where the exploration was to take place and Colombia confirmed that the area was not in its waters.

Tensions peaked again in 2007. On 20 July, Colombia held its traditional Independence Day military parade in San Andres, triggering harsh rhetoric from Ortega: “The distance between Colombia and San Andres is like from here to the moon, compared to the distance to the Nicaraguan Coast, which is this close! But President [Alvaro] Uribe came all the way here.”

On 13 December 2007, the ICJ pronounced its long-awaited ruling:

The Court finds that the 1928 Treaty between Colombia and Nicaragua settled the matter of sovereignty over the islands of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, that there is no extant legal dispute between the Parties on that question, and that the Court thus cannot have jurisdiction over the question; the Court further finds that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute concerning sovereignty over the other maritime features claimed by the Parties and upon the dispute concerning the maritime delimitation ... As regards the question of the scope and composition of the rest of the San Andrés Archipelago, the Court considers that the 1928 Treaty fails to provide answers as to which

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{274}“Nicaragua takes Colombia to World Court Over Disputed Caribbean Islands,” }\textit{Associated Press Worldstream}, \textit{International news Section}, 7 December 2001.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{275}Curtis and Curtis, “The Colombia-Nicaragua Dispute Over San Andres and Providencia,” 13–14.}


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{277}“Colombia Reconoce que Aguas Adjudicadas Pertenecen a Nicaragua,” [Colombia Recognizes Adjudicated Waters Belong to Nicaragua], }\textit{Deutsche Presse-Agentur}, 13 May 2003. Obtained from www.nexis.com on 31 March 2009.

other maritime features form part of the Archipelago. The Court thus finds that the issue has not been settled . . . and that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it.279

The ruling favored Colombia by putting to rest the question of sovereignty over the San Andres archipelago. But it did not resolve the question over the maritime border, mentioning that the 1928 treaty was not specific enough on the boundary.

Ortega has used the ICJ ruling to protest Colombia’s continued enforcement of the status quo. Immediately after the ruling, tensions escalated again, as Nicaraguan warships challenged Colombian vessels in the vicinity of the 82nd meridian. On 26 January 2008, Ortega accused Colombia of creating a “military tension because it is not accepting the ICJ ruling and maintains a military vigilance in the maritime zone that it claims, but that is actually no longer a border in accordance with the ruling.”280

Colombian President Uribe expressed in a 15 December 2007 Statement that “Colombia will continue to exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Archipelago and the corresponding maritime areas…until they are modified by appropriate juridical instruments.”281 In other words, until the ICJ makes a final ruling on the maritime border, it would continue to recognize the 82nd meridian as the border.

Tensions continued to escalate. On 2 February 2008, in a speech given next to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Ortega said “to touch Venezuela is to touch Nicaragua, and vice versa.”282 On 10 February 2008, a Nicaraguan Navy commander declared that his country was not intimidated by the presence of at Colombian vessels and


aircraft in the region.\textsuperscript{283} By 22 February, Nicaragua doubled its naval forces, declaring that it would patrol the waters east of the 82nd meridian.\textsuperscript{284} On 14 February, Uribe made an appeal to Colombian fishermen to avoid fishing west of the 82nd meridian to “avoid conflict with Nicaragua.”\textsuperscript{285} But on 9 March, the Nicaraguan navy seized two fishing vessels—one registered in the United States, the other in Honduras. Both vessels had left from San Andres and were fishing east of the 82nd meridian, but north of the 15th parallel, which, after the 2007 ICJ ruling between Nicaragua and Honduras, constituted Nicaraguan waters.\textsuperscript{286} It was later revealed that four other vessels had been intercepted by the Nicaraguan Navy near the 82nd meridian between February and March, but Colombia could not determine if the vessels had been intercepted in its waters.

On 1 March 2008, the Colombian military attacked a FARC camp 2000 meters inside Ecuadorian territory.\textsuperscript{287} The successful attack, which killed a prominent FARC leader, was strongly condemned by Ecuador, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Five days later, Ortega broke all relations with Colombia, arguing that for relations to be restored, it would be necessary for Colombia to “respect the ICJ ruling and not commit any more acts of terrorism like the one in Ecuador.”\textsuperscript{288} The militaries of Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, and Nicaragua were placed on alert. The possibility of war was real.


D. SECURITIZED INTERESTS

The following issues are security concerns for Colombia:

- The threat of the FARC, and the support of the FARC by Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua (securitized).
- Sovereignty over the San Andres archipelago (securitized).
- The Caribbean Tourism industry (highly politicized).
- Economic ties with the United States and Central America, especially free trade (highly politicized).
- Control over the Caribbean Sea drug trafficking routes (securitized).

The first securitized issue is of particular concern to Colombia. The alleged support by Colombia’s leftist neighbors is giving the weakened FARC a lifeline. In 2008, Colombia conducted a cross-border raid into Ecuador in which a FARC commander was killed. With respect to the third issue, the rapid growth of Colombia’s Caribbean Coast (including San Andres) tourism industry has made the issue politicized. Between January and October 2007 (just prior to the ICJ ruling), over 966,000 foreign citizens visited San Andres, over 100,000 more than in the same period in 2006. Twenty-nine Fifty-six cruise ships, carrying over 70,000 tourists, visited San Andres, Cartagena, and Santa Marta in 2007. Almost 6.5 million Colombian tourists visited San Andres between January and October 2007, over 5% more than in the same period in 2006. Colombia does not want to see this trend interrupted; Nicaragua would like to take over this promising tourism industry.

Nicaragua’s securitized issues are in line with Haftendorn’s argument that “most developing countries emphasize the economic, social, and domestic dimensions of security.” Nicaragua’s poor socioeconomic situation is crippling Ortega’s power. The pressure is on him to deliver economic programs. The San Andres region is not only a potentially helpful “cash cow” in terms of its growing tourism industry and promising

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290 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
energy resources, but it is also a rallying cry similar to King Mohammed’s rally behind Morocco’s claim on Perejil. Nicaragua’s pertinent securitized and politicized issues are:

- Fishing and oil exploration rights in the Western Caribbean Sea (securitized).
- Nicaragua’s claim on San Andres (politicized).
- Any threat to its alliance with Venezuela and Ecuador (securitized).
- Economic ties with the United States and Central America (securitized).
- Legacies of Nicaragua’s colonial past (securitized).

E. THE SIGNAL OF REASSURANCE AND THE LACK OF RECIPROCATION

A Rio Group Summit in the Dominican Republic in March 2008 provided an opportunity for a signal of reassurance. The summit’s timing could not have been more critical. The summit took place three weeks after the Colombian raid inside Ecuador, and gave the presidents of the countries involved a chance to address the issue in front of the international media. During the summit, Ortega demanded that Colombia withdraw its naval force from the 82nd meridian. Uribe responded by offering to pull his forces back, but requested that both nations work on a mechanism whereby security would be safeguarded.293 Uribe mentioned that narco traffickers have used the sea-lanes near the 82nd meridian and that this was the reason Colombia kept navy cruisers there. On 7 March, Ortega sent a signal of reassurance. He invited Colombia to participate in joint anti-narcotics patrols in the vicinity of the 82nd meridian.294 On 11 March, during an internationally televised press conference, Ortega reiterated his offer, mentioning that joint patrols would ease tensions by “buying time” until the ICJ ruling was announced.295

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But the next day, Ortega inspired distrust by declaring that Nicaragua had a right to a 200 nautical mile “fishing zone” that included waters east of the 82nd meridian.296

The signal of reassurance did not convince Colombia. Most press reports state that Ortega’s offer was to conduct joint patrols east of the 82nd meridian. By accepting Nicaragua’s help, Uribe may have felt that he would be legitimizing Nicaragua’s claims. Had the offer been to conduct joint patrols on the 82nd Meridian, the perception may have been positive. The day after Ortega’s petition, Colombian Foreign Minister Fernando Araujo stressed, “while the ICJ resolves the border dispute that is today the 82nd meridian, the status quo that has existed for decades is to be maintained.”297 On 14 March, Ortega insisted that “Uribe gave his word in front of the heads of state that were in the Dominican Republic. He said he would withdraw his ships to San Andres.”298

The joint patrols never took place. Ortega’s insistence on promoting a fishing zone east of the 82nd meridian, and the capture of seven more fishing boats between January and April 2008, discouraged Colombia from cooperating.299 Ortega’s support of the FARC further fueled Colombia’s distrust. In June, evidence from a laptop seized by the Colombian Army during its raid into Ecuador showed that Ortega actively supported the FARC, providing the group weapons (an issue since known as “FARC Gate”).300 In the July OAS Permanent Council Meeting, Colombian Ambassador Camilo Ospina blasted Ortega, and called for legal action against Nicaragua for supporting terrorism. Days after the speech, Nicaraguan Government Minister Ana Isabel Morales announced that Nicaragua was no longer interested in the joint patrols and would not conduct them

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297 Ibid.
298 “Ortega Recuerda Uribe ‘Compromiso’ Retirar Barcos meridiano 82.”
F. THE PRESENCE OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS

1. A signal of reassurance is likely to be reciprocated if the weaker state reassures first. If the weaker state is defensive because it feels less secure, and the stronger state is also defensive and has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate, then the burden is on the weaker state to “break” the “arms-hostility cycle.” It must convince the stronger state, through a signal of reassurance, that it wants to cooperate as well. Once it does, the chances that the stronger state will reciprocate are high.

This hypothesis is mostly supported in this case. Nicaragua is clearly the weaker state. But, Colombia has not demonstrated a willingness to cooperate because it feels that a signal of reassurance from Nicaragua is bait for exploitation. After Ortega invited Colombia to carry out the joint patrols, Ortega declared an area east of the 82nd meridian a fishing zone for Nicaragua and began issuing licenses to fishing vessels. If Colombia had agreed to the joint patrols, then how would the Colombian Navy react if any of its vessels spotted Nicaraguan-licensed vessels fishing east of the 82nd meridian?

2. Reassurance signals transmitted within a multilateral framework increase the chances for reciprocity. Other members of an international regime may encourage reciprocation.

This hypothesis is supported in this case. During the Rio Group Summit, the President of the Dominican Republic invited all the presidents to “finish this meeting with a hug and a handshake.” 302 At that point, in one of the most memorable moments in recent Latin American politics, Uribe stormed out of his seat, and went to Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa and shook his hand. Then he went over to Chavez and, amidst euphoric applause, hugged him. Then Ortega went over and hugged both leaders. 303 At that point, the

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303 Ibid.
tensions simmered. The signal of reassurance that Ortega had announced earlier during that summit was not reciprocated. The multilateral setting arguably prevented the tensions from escalating further. Relations are certainly not better off, and a reassurance exchange has not occurred. Other conditions likely overcame the positive elements of multilateralism.

3. If the reassurer shows a transparency of its benign intentions through political rhetoric, diplomacy, and defensive postures, then a signal of reassurance is more likely to be reciprocated.

This case demonstrates an example where the reassurer is transparent about the opposite of what this hypothesis calls for. Ortega’s behavior and political rhetoric do not inspire trust in Colombia. Instead, Colombian leaders are convinced that Ortega’s rhetoric and actions are characteristic of an aggressor. Nicaragua has been transparent in its intentions to act contrary to Colombia’s interests. Nicaragua’s granting of asylum to FARC operatives and Ortega’s public support for the guerrilla group only increase the threat of a deeply securitized issue for Colombia. Indeed, using the concepts outlined in Chapter II, deterrence is much more appropriate in this case.

On 4 February 2008, almost two months after the ICJ ruling (and a month before Nicaragua’s signal of reassurance), Ortega asked a crowd of supporters, “To whom does San Andres belong to?” and responded together with the crowd “to Nicaragua!” Daniel Ortega may be using the dispute to rally his country in light of the staggering domestic problems he faces. The ICJ ruling was clear in that it had no jurisdiction to rule on the actual San Andres Archipelago. But Ortega tried repeatedly to “spin” the ruling.

The island of San Andres was given to Colombia by the United States in 1928 when they occupied Nicaragua. [The U.S.] gave away what wasn’t theirs. . . The judgment states that the 82nd Meridian, which the Colombians claim to be the border with Nicaragua at sea, is not a border. They have had their ships there to prohibit Nicaraguans to fish in Nicaraguan waters, and they do not recognize what the ICJ dictated.


This type of rhetoric demonstrates how Ortega uses the Neanderthal mentality to justify his actions against Colombia over San Andres. But there is also rationality behind Ortega’s rhetoric. Nicaragua is facing staggering social and economic problems. In 2007, Nicaragua generated 100,000 fewer jobs than the average in the other Central American countries. That same year, inflation reached 16.88%, the highest in the region. Ortega’s popularity plunged from 64% during the first days of his administration, to 21% in 2007. The San Andres dispute gives Ortega an opportunity to distract the Nicaraguan people. As Mohammed rallied the Moroccan people during the Perejil standoff, Ortega is trying to rally the Nicaraguan people behind his cause in the San Andres standoff. The main difference is that Mohammed’s rhetoric was clearly defensive. He never supported Spain’s enemies, such as ETA (which is comparable to the FARC in its mission), and although he was a friend of Chirac, France is not nearly as antagonistic with Spain as Venezuela is with Colombia. It was much easier for Mohammed to reassure Spain of Morocco’s defensive intentions, than it is for Ortega to demonstrate any defensive intention towards Colombia. The offer of joint patrols seemed to contradict Ortega’s other rhetoric involving the enforcement of alleged Nicaraguan sovereignty over its waters. This is why Uribe didn’t “buy” the signal.

4. A signal of reassurance is most likely to be reciprocated when it is perceived as costly. In other words, if the reassuree considers the reassurer’s signal costly, then it is likely to reciprocate.

Ortega’s offer to conduct joint patrols east on the 82nd meridian, and calling the waters “Nicaraguan,” is hardly a costly signal. Ortega’s choice of words determined the cost. Had he offered to recognize the 82nd meridian as the border until the ICJ pronounced its ruling, then Colombia may have been reassured and possibly reciprocated. The absence of this condition is probably the strongest reason as to why reassurance failed. Colombia perceived Ortega’s offer as more of a trick whereby Nicaragua would attempt to advance its position at the expense of Colombia’s.


Nicaragua did not offer any concessions that would increase Colombia’s position in any of its securitized interests (e.g., ending its support for the FARC).

G. CONCLUSION

During the height of the tensions with Colombia, members from Ortega’s party called for Ortega’s resignation. Rising food and fuel prices sparked riots and strikes by truck drivers. Politicians demanded that Ortega focus more on Nicaragua’s problems and less on the San Andres issue. Meanwhile, the English speaking Miskitos demanded more autonomy, and even threatened secession. Ortega’s strategy of linking the San Andres issue with the FARC backfired. In May 2008, the opposition blasted Ortega for granting asylum for the survivors of the Colombian raid in Ecuador. The “FARC-Gate” scandal has plagued Ortega with more domestic and international problems.

This case study demonstrated a situation where a signal of reassurance was not reciprocated because the signal failed to convince the reassuree that the reassurer had defensive intentions. By not respecting the status quo until the ICJ makes its final ruling on a maritime border, Nicaragua was acting aggressively. A signal of reassurance needed to demonstrate a willingness to accept the status quo until the ruling. Furthermore, Ortega’s support for the FARC undermined a different securitized issue to a greater extent than the joint patrols could have enhanced Colombia’s position in the narco trafficking threat. Finally, although multilateralism was a factor, and the weaker state tried to reassure first, the signal was not costly enough to reassure Colombia.

Most experts do not venture to predict which way the ICJ will rule. Given Ortega’s challenges at home, it is likely he will continue to use the San Andres dispute as a rallying cry for support. If Nicaragua wins maritime territory in this dispute, Ortega will claim a victory. If the Court rules to uphold the border at the 82nd meridian, Ortega will then continue to demand that Colombia “return” San Andres, as he has since the 1970s. Given the current relationship, and the fallout over Nicaragua’s support of the FARC, it is unlikely that relations will improve until Ortega is out of office.

308 “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Central America and the Caribbean”.
309 The Miskitos live on the coast that is discussed above.
VI. CASE STUDY #4: EXPLAINING THE CYPRUS IMPASSE

Figure 4. Cyprus Area of Tensions (From: CIA World Factbook)

A. INTRODUCTION

The tense relationship between the two ethnic communities of Cyprus highlights the challenges to a successful reassurance strategy. Since Cyprus’ independence in 1960, there has been an atmosphere of social and political tension between the island’s ethnic Turkish and Greek inhabitants. The situation became an international crisis in 1974, when Turkish troops entered the island to protect the Turkish Cypriots after a military coup against the Cypriot Government that was backed by the military junta in Greece. The intervention resulted in a de facto partition of the island. The ensuing tensions put the Greek Cypriots and their ally Greece at the brink of war against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots on several occasions. In 1998, tensions peaked over a shipment of Russian S-300 missiles to Cyprus. In an effort to improve Cyprus’ international standing, bow to Greece’s preferences, and reassure the Turkish Cypriots, the Cypriot President ordered that the missiles be diverted to Crete. Although the move kept tensions from
escalating further, the Turkish Cypriots did not feel reassured and did not reciprocate the signal. Why did signals of reassurance fail to bring about a rapprochement among the Cypriots? This chapter concludes that while signals of reassurance kept the tensions in Cyprus from spiraling into war, they were not perceived as costly enough to bring about a meaningful rapprochement.

B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

For centuries, the people of Cyprus enjoyed long periods of autonomy with sporadic interventions by outside powers. When Cyprus became an independent state in 1960, roughly 80% of the population was ethnic Greek, and 18% ethnic Turkish.\textsuperscript{310} The Turks were descendants of immigrants who arrived during the Ottoman Empire’s 300-year rule. The ethnic Greeks had constantly resisted Ottoman rule, and from their revolts emerged a Greek Cypriot identity.\textsuperscript{311} British colonization of Cyprus began in 1878, as British troops sought a naval post in the Eastern Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{312} Greek Cypriots were hopeful that Britain would eventually allow for the island’s annexation by Greece (better known as \textit{enosis}). In 1915, Britain offered Greece \textit{enosis} in exchange for Greece’s support during World War I. The Greek king declined and declared a position of neutrality.\textsuperscript{313} After the war, Turkey recognized British sovereignty over Cyprus in the Treaty of Lausanne.\textsuperscript{314} The Greek Cypriots, led by Archbishop Makarios, continued to pursue \textit{enosis}, while the Turkish Cypriots felt that they were an endangered minority that

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{310} David Hannay, \textit{Cyprus: The Search for a Solution}, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 1. Hannay is a British diplomat who was profoundly involved in the Cyprus negotiations until 2003, 2.
\bibitem{314} The Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and the Allied Powers formally demarcated the borders of the Republic of Turkey, and settled the status of Greek citizens living in Turkey and Turkish citizens living in Greece. In addition, Turkey renounced its claims over many regions of the Middle East, as well as islands in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, including Cyprus (Please see Article 20 of the treaty).
\end{thebibliography}
required British protection.\textsuperscript{315} By 1960, tensions escalated amidst a reemergence of the Greek Cypriot insurgency—this time against British rule.

Although Cyprus was declared independent on 16 August 1960, its sovereignty was constrained by three treaties. First, “the Treaty of Guarantee forbade secession or the union of Cyprus with any other state.”\textsuperscript{316} In addition, it granted Greece, Turkey, and Britain the right to unilaterally intervene in Cyprus if any of these three countries felt that the status quo was being threatened.\textsuperscript{317} Second, the Treaty of Alliance (which was never implemented) sought a tripartite military force in Cyprus composed of Greek and Turkish troops. Finally, the Treaty of Establishment gave the U.K. the right to maintain two military bases on the island.\textsuperscript{318} The fragile peace achieved in 1960 did not last long. In 1963, Turkish Cypriots, led by Rauf Denktash, withdrew their participation in government.\textsuperscript{319} Communal fighting ensued, but in December, the guarantor states brokered a cease-fire. The U.K. agreed to provide 2,700 troops to maintain order in the most “sensitive” towns and agreed to patrol a “buffer zone” between the two communities.\textsuperscript{320} UN forces replaced the British in 1964, and have since patrolled what is now called the “Green Line.”\textsuperscript{321}

In May 1967, the Greek military overthrew the civilian government in Athens.\textsuperscript{322} The junta was sympathetic to enosis, and began supplying troops and arms to the Greek

\textsuperscript{315}David Hannay, \textit{Cyprus: The Search for a Solution}, 3.
\textsuperscript{316} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{317} Ibid. To clarify, the treaty states that “in case of a constitutional breach, consultations along the three [guarantors- Turkey, Greece, the U.K.] should lead to concerted action. Failing this, each guarantor reserved the right ‘to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs established by the treaty’”. - Costas Melakopides, “Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union for Greek-Turkish and Euro-Turkish Relations,” \textit{Mediterranean Quarterly}, Winter 2006, 76. Obtained from Project Muse (www.muse.jhu.edu) on 10 October 2009.
\textsuperscript{318} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{319} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid. The “Green line” is the name for the line that divides the Turkish Cypriot area of Cyprus on the Northern portion of the island, and the Greek Cypriot area on the Southern portion of the island. The line also divides the capital of Nicosia. Please see figure I for the geographical delineation of this line, also known as the “UN Buffer Zone.”
\textsuperscript{322} Andrew Borowiec, \textit{Cyprus: A Troubled Island}, 69.
Cypriot Nationalists. In November, without Makarios’ authorization, Greek Cypriot forces under the command of General Gregorios Grivas attacked a Turkish Cypriot enclave near Larnaca, killing 28 Turkish Cypriots. When Turkey threatened to invade the island in retaliation, Makarios appealed to the Soviet Union. U.S. President Lyndon Johnson warned that NATO would not support Turkey if an invasion triggered a hostile Soviet reaction. Turkey stood down. Tensions escalated again when Grivas, who was exiled after the 1964 incident, was allowed back in Cyprus in 1971. His death three years later emboldened the nationalist cause. “Thousands attended the funeral of the old warrior, chanting slogans of enosis.” Nicos Sampson succeeded Grivas, and continued leading the cause for enosis. Concerned at the Greek meddling in Cyprus, Makarios broke relations with the junta. In a letter to the media, Makarios wrote, “I have more than once so far felt, and in some cases touched, a hand invisibly extending from Athens and seeking to liquidate my human existence. For the sake of national expedience, however, I kept silent.”

One week later, that “invisible hand” became visible. On 15 July 1974, Sampson led a coup d’état that overthrew Makarios. Five days later, Turkey invaded Cyprus with 30,000 troops. The coup quickly collapsed, as did the military regime in Athens. Makarios returned to Cyprus after a brief tenure by Vice President Glafcos Clerides. Hundreds of thousands of Greek Cypriots were displaced to the southern portion of the island, while thousands of Turkish Cypriots sought refuge in the occupied area of the

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323 Andrew Borowiec, *Cyprus: A Troubled Island*, 69–70. Grivas was Greek officer born in Cyprus, and led the Greek Cypriot cause for enosis, or reunification with Greece.

324 David Hannay, *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*, 3.


327 Ibid., 75–77.

328 Ibid.

329 Ibid., 80. This quote is of a letter written by Makarios published in the *Washington Star News*, 7 July 1974. The Greek Cypriot leader had survived several assassination attempts, at least one being traced to Greek nationalists.


331 Ibid., 89.
The UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed Resolution 353, demanding “an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus.”

Turkey disregarded the resolution, and sent 5,000 farmers to the occupied area in an effort to enlarge the Turkish community in Cyprus. Meanwhile, Makarios and Clerides began a massive armament plan to deter the Turks from further invasion.

In an effort to de-escalate tensions, Makarios acceded to Denktash’s demand in 1977 that any negotiations lead to an “independent, nonaligned, bi-communal federal republic.” Makarios died on 3 August 1977, but his successor, Spiros Kyprianou, continued the negotiations two years later. In 1983, the UN General Assembly “voted that Turkey should remove its troops from Cyprus.” Denktash responded by declaring the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). On 18 November 1983, the UNSC passed resolution 541, which “deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus” and “calls upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus.” The ensuing isolation of the north denied the Turkish Cypriots the opportunity to benefit from the prosperity that was taking place in the south.

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335 Andrew Borowiec, *Cyprus: A Troubled Island*, 126. Until then, Makarios had insisted on a return to the status quo before the Turkish invasion. The agreement would be called “The Makarios-Denktash Guidelines.”

336 Ibid., 130.

337 Ibid., 81.

338 Ibid., 8.

339 United Nations Security Council Resolution 541, adopted on 18 November 1983. The vote was 13 for, 1 against (Pakistan) and 1 abstention (Japan). Obtained from www.un.org on 24 November 2009. Only Turkey has recognized the TRNC.

340 The economic prosperity in the south was aided by the immigration of some 60,000 Lebanese refugees, who came during the Civil War that began in 1975. “Their arrival, coupled with the business acumen of the Greek Cypriots, led to a construction boom in the southern part of the island.” - Ibid., 129. Tourism to Cyprus increased dramatically, and came to represent 25 % of Cyprus’ GDP. Meanwhile, “the Turkish north stagnated, helped only by Turkey and unable to make a dent in the wall of international hostility, fueled by an effective and constant Greek public relations effort. The outside world regarded the Turkish area to be under military occupation and had little sympathy for the Turkish Cypriot administration.” Andrew Borowiec, *Cyprus: A Troubled Island*, 129–130.
C. RECENT TENSIONS

The Greek Cypriot government pursued an aggressive armament agenda during the 1990s. By 1996, Cyprus had acquired “100 French-made AMX-30 tanks, 124 Russian armored vehicles, and 200 Greek-made Leonidas personnel carriers.” In 1993, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and Cypriot President Clerides signed a defense treaty, which bound Greece to defend Cyprus in the event of a Turkish movement south of the Green Line. In 1995, Turkey purchased 150 U.S. ATACM missiles. Cyprus responded by requesting that Greece install anti-missile defenses on the island.

Tensions escalated in 1996, when the European Motorcycle Federation staged a protest along the Green Line. Despite warnings by the Cypriot authorities to not cross into the TRNC, many motorcyclists entered the buffer zone and met Turkish nationalists who were waiting for them. Widespread fighting ensued. In one episode, three Turkish Cypriot policemen beat Greek Cypriot Tassos Isaac to death. The beating was captured on video and replayed throughout the world. Hundreds attended Isaac’s funeral, triggering new unrest. In one protest, Isaac’s cousin, Solomos Solomou, was shot dead by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces as he tried to take down the Turkish flag on the TRNC side of the border. The unrest brought the two sides to the brink of war.

D. SECURITIZED INTERESTS

Tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots involve around four main issues: governance, security, property, and territory. For the Republic of Cyprus, the following issues have been securitized:


343 Ibid.


345 Ibid., 27.

346 Ibid., 28.

347 David Hannay, Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, 27.
• The presence of some 35,000 Turkish troops on the island (securitized).

• The claim to private property by Greek Cypriots displaced in the 1974 Turkish intervention (politici zed). 348

• Reunification with under one sovereign state (securitized).

• The naturalization of some, and the deportation of other, Turkish “settlers” in Northern Cyprus, estimated between 35,000 and 100,000 (politici zed). 349

The Turkish Cypriots are concerned that reunification will endanger their community. To many, “division has solved the Cyprus problem. Today, they say, Cyprus is an island of two separate communities where the minority Turks are no longer subject to attacks and discrimination.” 350 Many Turkish Cypriot politicians prefer that the island remain divided, and that the international community recognize a sovereign TRNC. However, many Turkish Cypriots are aware that the TRNC’s economic situation sharply contrasts with the prosperity of the Republic of Cyprus. 351 Because of this disparity, many support reunification in order to reap the benefits of Cyprus’ economy and EU membership. The Turkish Cypriots’ securitized issues include:

• The economic isolation of Northern Cyprus (securitized).

• The permanence of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (securitized).

• The autonomy and sovereignty of the area that encompasses the TRNC (politicized). 352

348 In December 1996, the European Court of Human Rights “ordered Turkey to pay $640,000 to Mrs. Titina Loizidou, in compensation for her inability to use her property in Northern Cyprus. Mrs Loizidou is not a refugee or displaced person and was not living in Northern Cyprus at the time of the invasion.” Andrew Borowiec, Cyprus: A Troubled Island, 172–173. Since the TRNC is not internationally recognized, the court held that “the Turkish obligation to secure the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention on Human Rights extends to the Northern Part of Cyprus.” Other displaced Greek Cypriots have filed suit in this and other supranational courts, adding another dimension to this impasse.

349 David Hannay, Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, 43–44. The Greek Cypriots estimate that as many as 100,000 immigrants from Turkey live in Northern Cyprus, while Turkey estimates that there are some 35,000 immigrants.


351 “The per-capita GDP of the area under the control of the Government of Cyprus is almost four times that of the north. Moreover, there are serious structural problems in the Turkish Cypriot economy, such as great reliance on Turkey.” Andreas Theophanous, “Prospects for Solving the Cyprus Problem and the Role of the European Union,” Publius, 1 January 2000. Obtained from www.nexis.com on 26 November 2009.

352 David Hannay, Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, 43–44.
E. REASSURANCE NOT RECIPROCATED

In 1997, Cyprus was spending an estimated $2 million a day on armaments.\textsuperscript{353} One purchase involved a shipment of Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles.\textsuperscript{354} Russia’s announcement of the sale in January 1997 drew criticism from the United States and condemnation from Turkey. In fact, Turkey threatened to conduct a preemptive strike on the shipments “to prevent the missiles’ deployment in Cyprus.”\textsuperscript{355} Russia warned Turkey that any attack on Russian or Greek ships carrying the missiles would be considered a “casus belli.”\textsuperscript{356} Russian Ambassador Georgi Muradov told Cyprus television that the missiles would be shipped unless there was a “complete demilitarization between the two Cypriot communities or progress was reached in the Cyprus peace talks.”\textsuperscript{357} Meanwhile, Denktash announced, “if the S-300 missiles arrive, we will announce to the world that all talks on Cyprus have come to a complete end.”\textsuperscript{358} The standoff amounted to a “spiral of fear,” as both sides seemed determined to prevail.

Turkey’s warnings and Russia’s counter warnings continued throughout 1998. The EU also became involved when Austrian Foreign Minister, Wolfgang Schussel, remarked in late 1998, “the EU and its member states would simply not understand it if Clerides proceeded with this deployment when accession negotiations were under way and efforts were being made to achieve a Cyprus settlement before accession.”\textsuperscript{359} The implication had a profound effect, in that it brought the dispute to the forefront of Cyprus’ accession talks. Meanwhile, Turkey’s accession talks had explicitly become

\textsuperscript{353} Tom Streissguth, \textit{Cyprus: Divided Island}, 27.

\textsuperscript{354} Alex Efty, “Cyprus Buying Russian Missiles in Move Likely to Raise Tensions,” \textit{Associated Press}, 4 January 1997. Obtained from www.nexis.com on 18 November 2009. These missiles are comparable to the U.S. Patriot missile, and designed to shoot down enemy missiles or aircraft. In addition to this defensive capability, the S-300s could also reach the Turkish mainland if launched from Cyprus.


\textsuperscript{356} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{357} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{359} David Hannay, \textit{Cyprus: The Search for a Solution}, 94. The Austrian foreign minister spoke on behalf of the EU because Austria held the EU presidency at the time.
contingent on “supporting the UN-led negotiations on a Cyprus settlement.”360 In all, the EU’s involvement made Cyprus sensitive to EU demands to cancel the missile shipments, while making Turkey defiant to EU demands to stop threatening a preemptive strike.361

Clerides’ fateful decision to divert the missiles came during a visit to Athens in late December 1998. In his book, published in 2007, Clerides recounts his meeting with Greek Prime Minister Kostantinos Simitis:

I spoke for about 30 minutes, explaining the reasons for which the missiles had to be transported to Cyprus... ...After my detailed explanations, Simitis spoke giving the reasons for which the Greek government was against the transportation of the S-300s...My suggested compromise...[was] that the missiles would be moved to Crete...I mentioned that I was ready as the President of the Cypriot Democracy to take on the responsibility of the non-transportation of the missiles to Cyprus because I didn’t want to jeopardize the excellent relationship that both Greece and Cyprus had achieved with a lot of efforts.362

In addition to honoring the Greek request, Clerides also wanted to salvage the peace negotiations with Denktash, and felt that the diversion would “ward off the threat of Turkish military intervention.”363 But the signal was politically costly. Several ministers in Clerides’ coalition resigned, while most Greek Cypriots disagreed with the decision.364 One independent newspaper declared, “Greece and Cyprus had made a ‘humiliating climb-down’ in the face of pressure from the United States.”365 Instead of the quid pro quo that the Russians had implied before (Turkey withdraws its troops in

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360 David Hannay, *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*, 82.


362 Glafcos Clerides, *Negotiating for Cyprus: 1993-2003* (Mainz: Verlag, 2008). Although Clerides does not specify the main reason for his decision, one possibility is that he felt assured by the Greeks that they would defend Cyprus in the event of a Turkish attack. In his book, Clerides mentions the construction of a Greek Base in Cyprus as well as Greek offers of other less controversial missile defenses.


364 David Hannay, *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*, 27.

exchange for the abandonment of the missile plan), Turkey got its way without making a concession.\textsuperscript{366} Instead of reciprocating, Turkey’s foreign minister Ismail Cem called the decision “unacceptable” and stated, “If anyone reckons that Turkey is now going to give in to blackmail over this plan to deploy these missiles outside Cyprus, they are very much mistaken…This would exacerbate the tension between two neighboring countries.”\textsuperscript{367}

The missiles were paid for and stored in Crete until 2007.\textsuperscript{368} Although the spiral of fear had been halted, Turkey and the TRNC did not reciprocate the signal. Nevertheless, the international community was encouraged. The G-8 addressed the Cyprus dispute at the June 1999 Cologne-Bonn Summit and laid the groundwork for UNSC Resolution 1218.\textsuperscript{369} The resolution called for Secretary General Annan to use his good offices to broker new negotiations between the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC “without preconditions, all issues on the table, a commitment of continuing until a settlement is reached, and full consideration of all UN resolutions in effect.”\textsuperscript{370} The new round of negotiations would eventually produce the “Annan Plan.” In addition, the EU accepted Cyprus’ formal application for accession on 4 July 1999.\textsuperscript{371}

In August 1999, a massive earthquake devastated Turkey, killing at least 15,000.\textsuperscript{372} Greece immediately offered aid and technical expertise.\textsuperscript{373} Three weeks

\textsuperscript{366}“Russia, Greece Warn Against Turkey on Missiles.”

\textsuperscript{367} Michael Jansen, “Turks Oppose Crete Missile Deployment.” One year later, TRNC Representative Ahmet Erdengiz explained that the missile deployment had been “one of the Greek Cypriot’s greatest mistakes,” and that the “compromise” to place the missiles on Crete meant that “a NATO country – Greece – puts on its soil Russian missiles aimed at another NATO country – Turkey.” - Janet McMahon, “TRNC Washington Representative Ahmet Ergengiz,” \textit{Washington Report on Middle East Affairs}, 30 September 1999. Obtained from www.nexis.com on 26 November 2009.

\textsuperscript{368} “Cyprus Transfers Controversial S300 Missiles to Greece,” \textit{Xinhua General News Service}, 19 December 2007. Obtained from www.nexis.com on 19 November 2009. In 2007, the missiles were redeployed to the Greek mainland.

\textsuperscript{369} David Hannay, \textit{Cyprus: The Search for a Solution}, 103.

\textsuperscript{370} Ibid., 103.


\textsuperscript{373} Ibid.
later, an earthquake struck Athens, killing 140. The Turkish Government was quick to reciprocate by sending its rescue experts. “Television scenes of Turkish rescue experts searching for victims trapped in the rubble of a collapsed factory in Athens underlined the shift in attitudes from mutual distrust to unstinting cooperation.”374 Delegations from the two countries began meeting to discuss earthquake recovery. They eventually began discussing Cyprus. Many thought that Greek-Turkish rapprochement would spread to Cyprus. But as talks got under way, Denktash continued to demand that the TRNC be recognized.375 Meanwhile, the European Council met in Helsinki to consider new candidates. Greece insisted that no preconditions be attached to Cyprus’ accession, and practically made its support for any EU enlargement (and Turkey’s candidacy in particular) contingent on this demand.376 Despite Turkish objections, the Summit’s final declaration with regard to Cyprus was a clear victory for the Greek Cypriots.

The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of the accession negotiations, the council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this case the Council will take account of all-relevant factors.377

As talks continued through 2003, Denktash continued to demand the recognition of the TRNC and required that the outcome of any negotiation be a confederation of two equal semi-autonomous states on the island.378 This was unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots, who reminded the negotiators that Denktash himself obtained a Greek Cypriot concession to a one-state federation in 1977.379 Denktash also felt that the TRNC should

374 Kerin Hope, “Earthquake Diplomacy.”
375 David Hannay, Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, 108.
376 Ibid., 112.
379 Ibid. Emphasis added by author.
join the EU along with Turkey instead of Cyprus. Although Denktash was reelected in 2000, his views on EU accession began to cost him support among the Turkish Cypriots, who increasingly preferred reunification if it meant EU membership. It was clear that a lack of international recognition was devastating the TRNC’s economy, and that reunification with the Greek Cypriots would be the only way out of the crisis.

After 54 face-to-face meetings, 150 bilateral meetings, 192 pages of agreed-text, 6,000 more pages of draft, all costing over $3 million, Denktash pulled out of the working group in early 2003 over his reluctance to put the Annan Plan to a referendum. When Denktash walked out, the frustration was enormous. The Security Council demonstrated its frustration when it unanimously approved Resolution 1475.

[Third Paragraph—the Security Council] Regrets that, as described in the Secretary General’s report, due to the negative approach of the Turkish Cypriot leader, culminating in the position taken at the 10-11 March 2003 meeting in The Hague, it was not possible to reach agreement to put the plan to simultaneous referenda as suggested by the Secretary-General, and thus that the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots have been denied the opportunity to decide for themselves on a plan that would have permitted the reunification of Cyprus and as a consequence it will not be possible to achieve a comprehensive settlement before 16 April 2003.

F. THE PRESENCE OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS

1. A signal of reassurance is likely to be reciprocated if the weaker state reassures first. If the weaker state is defensive because it feels less secure, and the stronger state is also defensive and has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate, then the burden is on the weaker state to “break” the “arms-hostility

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380 David Hannay, *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*, 123.
381 Ibid., 123–124.
382 The economic disparity between Cyprus and the TRNC was most pronounced during this period (1999–2000). While the Greek Cypriot economy was growing on average 5%, Denktash was contemplating imposing a state of emergency in order to handle the economic crisis in the TRNC. – Janet McMahon, “Having Overcome 1974 Upheaval, Cyprus Now Boasts Healthy Economy, Anticipates EU Membership,” *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, 30 September 1999. Obtained from www.nexis.com on 26 November 2009.
383 David Hannay, *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*, 223.
384 UN Security Council 1475, adopted on 14 April 2003. Obtained from www.un.org on 21 November 2009. This resolution is explicit in assigning blame to the Turkish Cypriot side for the failure of the talks. The UNSC had also assigned blame to the Turkish side in 1992, when it passed UNSC Resolution 789 in response to failed talks in that year.
cycle.” It must convince the stronger state, through a signal of reassurance, that it wants to cooperate as well. Once it does, the chances that the stronger state will reciprocate are high.

This condition is not present in this case, but it is possible to infer indirect support for the hypothesis. This analysis identified two signals of reassurance, but they were sent by the stronger state, the Republic of Cyprus.\(^{385}\) Makarios’ 1977 concession to allow for a federated, bi-zonal state was an attempt to reassure the Turkish Cypriots, who felt that reunification would endanger their political autonomy. The TRNC did not reciprocate this signal. The S-300 missile diversion to Crete was another signal of reassurance, and was not reciprocated either. The fact that the Greek Cypriot side was willing to send signals of reassurance suggests that had the TRNC sent the first signal of reassurance, the Republic of Cyprus would have likely reciprocated, resulting in a likely rapprochement. In other words, had the weaker party initiated reassurance, its efforts would likely have been reciprocated, consistent with the proposition.

2. Reassurance signals transmitted within a multilateral framework increase the chances for reciprocity. Other members of an international regime may encourage reciprocation.

This condition is supported in this case. The EU and the UN were instrumental in keeping the Cypriot standoff from escalating into war. However, only Turkey—and not the international organization—had any real influence over Denktash and the TRNC. When Clerides ordered the diversion of missiles to Crete, the expectations for Turkish or TRNC reciprocation were high. However, Turkey’s continued hard line stance surprised the international community.\(^{386}\) Nevertheless, the move helped Cyprus’ international standing, and probably helped undo the “link” between the requirement for a settlement and the possibility of EU accession.

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\(^{385}\) When the military power of the TRNC is combined with that of Turkey and the Turkish troops on Cyprus, the TRNC-Turkey alliance is stronger and at least as strong as the military power of the Republic of Cyprus. This amplifies the implications of this condition, since the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the TRNC would make a weak TRNC much weaker. Since this has not happened, and since the Republic of Cyprus acted unilaterally in diverting the S-300 missiles, this condition was not met in this case.

3. If the reassurer shows a transparency of its benign intentions through political rhetoric, diplomacy, and defensive postures, then a signal of reassurance is more likely to be reciprocated.

This condition is not fulfilled in this case, which is more an example of the difficulties posed by the security dilemma. Robert Jervis explains that “While an understanding of the security dilemma and psychological dynamics will dampen some arms-hostility spirals, it will not change the fact that some policies aimed at security will threaten others.” In the case of Cyprus, neither side perceives the other’s intentions as benign. The Turkish Cypriots feel that the Greek Cypriots want to eliminate, or at least politically subordinate, the Turkish Cypriot population. The Greek Cypriots feel that the Turkish invasion and the presence of Turkish troops are indicative of an offensive intention. With regard to the possible scenarios for reassurance explained in Chapter II, this case points to a scenario in which reassurance is unlikely to succeed. Instead, a deterrence policy is more appropriate until both sides send signals costly enough to change their perceptions. Political statements, such as Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit’s rhetoric that “there are two completely independent states [in Cyprus],” and Denktash’s demands for equal recognition as a head of state, cannot be reconciled with calls by the Greek Cypriots for reunification under Greek Cypriot leadership.

4. A signal of reassurance is most likely to be reciprocated when it is perceived as costly. In other words, if the reassuree considers the reassurer’s signal costly, then it is likely to reciprocate.

This condition is not met in this case, and possibly had the greatest impact in the outcome of Clerides’ attempt to reassure the TRNC. The signals between the Republic of

387 The security dilemma is a commonly used term in political science, and refers to a situation where security-seeking states are faced with the daunting task of correctly interpreting other states’ intentions (dilemma of perception), and deciding on how to react to those perceptions (dilemma of response). A good explanation of this term can be found in Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).

388 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 76. The S-300 missile crisis underlines illustrates this assertion. The missiles have a defensive operation. However, their deployment was considered offensive by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey.

Cyprus and the TRNC were not costly enough for meaningful reassurance. To the Greek Cypriots, Makarios’ 1977 concession to allow reunification under a federation arrangement, as well as Clerides’ 1998 decision to divert the S-300 missiles, were costly signals. But as perceived by the Turkish Cypriots, the costs mainly involved domestic political criticism in the Republic of Cyprus rather than any significant constraint on Greek Cypriot military capabilities. As a result, the Turkish Cypriots did not send any costly signals in return. A complete Turkish troop withdrawal may be the costly signal required for a successful reassurance exchange.

G. CONCLUSION

The fifth iteration of the Annan Plan was submitted to both Cypriot communities in April 2004. The incentives associated with EU membership swayed a majority of Turkish Cypriots to vote in favor of the Annan Plan in April 2004. But 76% of the Greek Cypriots voted “no” in their referendum. Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos, who defeated Clerides in 2003 by pledging less flexibility in the negotiations, rejected eleven “last minute” Turkish Cypriot demands that had not been negotiated at the proximity talks. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots objected to the expectation of rebuilding the north’s economy immediately following ratification, while Turkish Cypriot obligations had no deadline. Several days after the vote, the Republic of Cyprus was admitted into the EU and the TRNC was officially exempted from the EU’s acquis communautaire. In response, the TRNC opened all checkpoints along the Green Line. Although there were no incidents along the border (contrary to Denktash’s

390 Although a majority of Turkish Cypriots were in favor of reunification, many prominent Turkish Cypriot politicians, including Denktash, campaigned against the Annan Plan.

391 Melakopides, “Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union for Greek-Turkish and Euro-Turkish Relations,” 86.

392 “Cyprus President Calls for ‘No’ Vote in Referendum on Reunification,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, 9 April 2004. Obtained from www.nexis.com on 22 November 2009. These demands include allowing Turkish troops to remain on the island for 14 more years, “the permission to allow 650 Turkish troops to remain in Cyprus [indefinitely], and a Turkish ‘right of intervention.’” - Costas Melakopides, “Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union for Greek-Turkish and Euro-Turkish Relations,” Mediterranean Quarterly 17:1 (Winter 2006), 86 (71–101).

393 “Cyprus President Calls for ‘No’ Vote in Referendum on Reunification,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, 9 April 2004.

394 David Hannay, Cyprus: The Search for a Solution, 220–221.
warnings), the social shock was enormous, as Turkish Cypriots witnessed firsthand the economic prosperity of the Greek Cypriot side.\textsuperscript{395} Since then, some 10,000 Turkish Cypriots have found employment in the south.\textsuperscript{396}

For many politicians, division is an acceptable solution to the dispute. Former Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said in 1999, “we don’t believe that a serious problem exists on Cyprus. Before the Turkish action in 1974, there was a constant conflict on the island—either genocide against the Turks or fractional conflicts between the different Greek groups. Since then, there has been uninterrupted peace.”\textsuperscript{397} Others on the Greek Cypriot side maintain that division is unacceptable, but will have to accept it for now, given the cost of reunification.

In all, a costly signal—preferably from the TRNC—is required in order for a meaningful reassurance exchange to begin. Author Thomas Streissguth writes,

The Greek Cypriots cannot expect cooperation from the Turkish side if they continue their economic blockade, ridicule the political and economic institutions of the TRNC, and limit the travel of foreign tourists to the Turkish sector…Turkey could afford a major gesture by reducing its large military contingent in Northern Cyprus. That might show good will, reassure the Greek Cypriots who live in constant fear of Turkey—and perhaps induce them to spend less on sophisticated weaponry.\textsuperscript{398}

Other necessary and costly signals involve securitized interests: allowing Turkish Cypriots to relocate freely in the Greek Cypriot side, halting Turkish settlements in the north, and incorporating both the Greek and Turkish languages in school curricula.\textsuperscript{399} Only a costly signal will break a “spiral of fear” with a “peace initiative.” Until then, deterrence will continue to be the only effective way to avoid war.

\textsuperscript{396} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{398} Tom Streissguth, \textit{Cyprus: A Divided Island}, 27.
\textsuperscript{399} Ibid.
VII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. SUMMATION AND CASE STUDY FINDINGS

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Table 1. The presence of the four conditions in each case study

This thesis sought to describe reassurance as a process in which one state sends a signal that enhances an adversary’s position in an issue that it has deemed vital to its security. If the signal is successful, the adversary will reciprocate, sending the reassurer another signal that enhances a securitized issue for the reassurer. The end goal is to build trust through reassurance. But on many occasions, signals of reassurance have been ignored, misinterpreted, or even exploited. The research question of this thesis is: “under what conditions is a signal of reassurance reciprocated?” The logical framework behind this thesis posits that of the four conditions gathered from the literature review, those present in the two case studies where a signal of reassurance was reciprocated (case study 1 and case study 2), and not present in the case studies where a signal of reassurance was not reciprocated (case study 3 and case study 4), are the most likely to have a major impact on the success or failure of reassurance. In accordance with the findings, the conditions are evaluated below, in rank order according to logical relevance.

Condition #3: If the reassurer shows a transparency of its benign intentions through political rhetoric, diplomacy, and defensive postures, then a signal of reassurance is more likely to be reciprocated.

This condition fares strongest in this project. In the two case studies where a signal of reassurance was reciprocated, this condition was present. In the two case studies where a signal of reassurance was not reciprocated, this condition was not
present. In the positive cases, government officials from both Morocco and Libya (the respective “reassurers”) met numerous times with the respective “reassurees” (Spain and Italy) and expressed their defensive intentions. In the case of Morocco, its concerns regarding domestic terrorism, its willingness to participate in CBMs, and its willingness to cooperate with Spain in the fisheries and immigration issues reassured Spain and encouraged it to reciprocate, namely with regard to EU-Morocco relations, the Western Sahara issue, and infrastructure projects. In the case of Libya, its willingness to cooperate on curbing illegal immigration to Italy, its change of policy regarding international terrorism, and its removal of its decades-long restriction on Italian settlers reassured Italy and encouraged it to reciprocate, namely with regard to energy purchases, compensation for colonial atrocities, and international support.

In the negative cases, this condition was not present. On the contrary, both Nicaragua and the TRNC kept their rhetoric antagonistic. Their postures were perceived as offensive the other side. Daniel Ortega constantly called for the “return” of San Andres, and Denktash constantly called for the TRNC’s recognition as an independent state. The Nicaraguan Navy’s actions in the Caribbean Sea, namely its active intervention against fishing vessels near San Andres, and Turkey’s actions in Cyprus were not perceived by Colombia or the Republic as Cyprus as defensive. Therefore, any signal of reassurance was not reciprocated.

**Condition #4:** A signal of reassurance is most likely to be reciprocated when it is perceived as costly. In other words, if the reassuree considers the reassurer’s signal costly, then it is likely to reciprocate.

This condition has the second strongest logical relevance to the research question. In neither of the conditions where reassurance was not reciprocated was the signal costly enough for the other side to reciprocate. In the case of Nicaragua, its signal was not perceived as costly. On the contrary, Colombia perceived Nicaragua’s offer to conduct joint patrols a trick to legitimize their presence in Colombian waters. In the case of Cyprus, the TRNC and Turkey considered Cyprus’ diversion of the S-300 missiles “blackmail” and a trick to obtain the demilitarization of the island without making a more meaningful concession.
In the first case study, this thesis concludes that the cost of Morocco’s signal of reassurance cannot be determined. Allowing Spanish fishermen to fish in Moroccan waters was not a costly signal. But the signal led to more costly signals of reassurance, such as Spain’s support of favorable EU economic policies towards Morocco, Moroccan acceptance of Western Saharan autonomy, and Moroccan cooperation in curbing illegal immigration. In essence, there is a new conclusion to be made, that small signals not considered costly can lead to more costly reciprocal signals, especially if other conditions are present.

In the case of Libya, there is little doubt that the surrender of the Lockerbie terrorists to the International Court of Justice was a costly signal. Arguments can be made that this signal was more a result of compellence or positive inducements. But Premier Qadhafi’s decision was also based on political calculations. He knew that this was a signal that would reassure the world and possibly end Libya’s isolation. His decision to hand over the terrorists essentially meant that he gave up leverage in the hopes that his action would be rewarded. It was. Italy was the first country to resume full diplomatic and economic relations after Libya’s signal.

**Condition #1:** A signal of reassurance is likely to be reciprocated if the weaker state reassures first. If the weaker state is defensive because it feels less secure, and the stronger state is also defensive and has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate, then the burden is on the weaker state to “break” the “arms-hostility cycle.” It must convince the stronger state, through a signal of reassurance, that it wants to cooperate as well. Once it does, the chances that the stronger state will reciprocate are high.

Although this condition is ranked third, it is about as logically relevant to the research question as Condition #4. In the two case studies where the signal of reassurance was reciprocated, the reassuring states (Morocco and Libya) were also the weaker of the two adversaries. In addition, the reassurees in both cases (Spain and Italy) made strong efforts to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate, be it with political rhetoric, or economic incentives, or pressure for international cooperation. In Case study #3, the weaker state (Nicaragua) also attempted to reassure first. But in this case, the signal was not costly, and its intentions were not benign. On the contrary, Ortega’s rhetoric was frequently hostile. This is why this condition is ranked third. The other two
seemed to have more influence on this outcome than this condition. Finally, in the Cyprus case, the weaker state is the TRNC, and there is little evidence to indicate that it has ever sent a signal of reassurance to the stronger Republic of Cyprus. The evidence from the case strongly suggests that, had the weaker party attempted reassurance, the gesture would have been reciprocated, thus indirectly supporting the hypothesis reflected in condition #1.

**Condition #2:** *Reassurance signals transmitted within a multilateral framework increase the chances for reciprocity. Other members of an international regime may encourage reciprocation.*

This condition has the least logical relevance to the research question. The case studies have shown that a potential for multilateralism to encourage the reciprocation of a reassurance signal exists. But in general, multilateralism has been ineffective and in some instances more of a hindrance in aiding a reassurance exchange. In the first case study (Morocco reassures Spain and Spain reciprocates), multilateralism hindered Spain’s efforts to reassure Morocco in terms of EU economic policy because some EU members expressed concern at Morocco’s human rights record. Instead of helping Spain reciprocate Morocco’s signal of reassurance, the EU’s involvement hindered Spain. Even France, Spain’s economic and political rival with respect to the Maghreb, supported Spain’s efforts in light of stiff resistance by Scandinavian countries to EU economic concessions to Morocco.

In the third and fourth case studies (both cases where a signal of reassurance was not reciprocated), the involvement of multilateral organizations—namely the UN, OAS, and EU—was ineffective at encouraging the reassurees to reciprocate signals of reassurance. Only in the second case (Libya reassures Italy and Italy reciprocates) was multilateralism a positive factor in the positive outcome.

**B. POLICY IMPLICATION 1: THE REASSURER MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT IT DOES NOT WANT TO EXPAND**

In addition to the conclusions presented in the previous section, this thesis has found other relevant conclusions that carry policy implications. The first of these additional conclusions is that a reassurer must convince the reassuree that it does not
want to expand its territory, or seek economic dominance over the reassuree, or otherwise intend aggressive or defensive actions. Simply sending a signal of reassurance in a securitized issue may not be enough to prompt reciprocation. In the first two case studies, a colonial heritage of suspicion hampered most initiatives at rapprochement. The former colonies in each case, Morocco and Libya, demonstrated expansionist ambitions and aggressive behavior that concerned Spain and Italy, the former colonizers. Only when Morocco and Libya convinced Spain and Italy that they did not seek expansion, and would not act offensively, did Spain and Italy reciprocate. Morocco’s concession of its territorial waters for fishing and acknowledgment of Western Sahara autonomy went a long way in reassuring Spain. Libya’s renunciation of international terrorism and its moderation of pan-Arabist rhetoric went a long way in reassuring Italy.

In contrast, the third and fourth case studies demonstrate how expansionist rhetoric hampers reassurance. Nicaragua’s insistence on expanding its sovereignty over what had been considered for decades Colombian territorial waters negated the later attempt to reassure Colombia. Likewise, the TRNC’s calls for international recognition of a separate Turkish Cypriot state hampered any effort of reassurance. Essentially, an expansionist posture contradicts reassurance and negates its potential. As a result, policymakers should be suspicious in applying reassurance as an influence strategy to expansionist states.

C. POLICY IMPLICATION 2: DOMESTIC POLITICS ARE AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION

Despite a state’s intentions, domestic politics will oftentimes prevent that state’s leaders from sending a signal of reassurance, or reciprocating one. Domestic politics is not always a constant, however, as it can also compel leaders to reassure stronger states. The second case study demonstrates the power of domestic politics, as Qadhafi needed international support in fending off internal challenges to his regime. Likewise, Morocco’s King Mohammed needed international legitimacy in order to quell domestic dissent, especially given the threat of Islamist groups inside the country. As a result, these two countries were willing to reassure their European adversaries and receive effective reciprocal signals.
In the third case study, Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega needed a rallying cry around an issue in order to uphold his grip on power. The San Andres dispute served as this cry, as Ortega invoked the dispute as an excuse for the nation’s deteriorating economic and social conditions. In the fourth case study, a great majority of the Greek Cypriots opposed Clerides’ signal of reassurance to the Turkish Cypriots. The perceived soft stance on the TRNC likely caused Clerides’ defeat in the 2003 elections.

Domestic politics stand in the way of meaningful reassurance exchanges in current international disputes. For example, eliminating the U.S. embargo on Cuba could go a long way in inviting reciprocal signals from the Caribbean adversary. But U.S. domestic politics has prevented the lifting of the embargo for decades. Reassuring developing countries by engaging in meaningful reforms to reduce the human input to climate change is also being hampered by U.S. domestic politics. Russian domestic politics is standing in the way of a meaningful reassurance exchange between Russia and former Soviet satellites in Europe and the Caucasus, as the desire to demonstrate Russian strength remains important to domestic audiences. In Latin America, domestic politics hampers efforts at reassurance between Chile and Bolivia, who for over a century have disputed coastal territory in the Atacama Desert.\textsuperscript{400}

D. POLICY IMPLICATION 3: SMALL SIGNALS OF REASSURANCE MUST BE EVENTUALLY COMPLEMENTED WITH LARGER SIGNALS

The costly signal dilemma can only be overcome with meaningful signals of reassurance. Since it is unlikely that a state will initiate a reassurance exchange with a costly signal, the best alternative is to start with small signals that can build over time. This thesis concludes that the school of thought advocated by Charles Osgood and Janice Stein, which advocates the potential of small signals of reassurance that can lead to more costly signals, is a more realistic approach to examining the effects of reassurance than Kydd’s school of thought, which advocates costly signals as the only form of effective reassurance. This thesis does not dispute the significance of costly signals; it merely concludes that less costly signals are more likely to be exchanged before any costly signal.

\textsuperscript{400} Class notes, NS 4560 Seminar on Latin America Security, Professor Marcus Berger. Monterey, CA.
is sent. In other words, states that wish to reassure will tend to “test the waters” with small signals before engaging in more costly ones.

Case study 1 demonstrates the potential of small signals. While Morocco’s fisheries concessions were not particularly costly signals, they led to costlier signals such as a moderating tone on the Western Sahara issue by both Spain and Morocco. The fisheries agreement led to costlier signals. In the second case study, however, Libya started a reassurance exchange with a costly signal, namely the handover of the Lockerbie terrorists. This case study is an exception to this finding. Case study 3 demonstrates how a small signal can be perceived as bait for exploitation, as Nicaragua’s offer to conduct joint patrols with the Colombian Navy along the maritime boundary did not sway Colombia to reciprocate. In case study #4, small signals between the TRNC and the Republic of Cyprus, as well as small signals between Turkey and Greece, did not amount to much. The mutual support achieved following the Greek and Turkish earthquakes was perceived as a promising start to a Greek-Turkish rapprochement that would spread to Cyprus. But because the cost of these signals did not increase, the exchange stalled, as specific demands by Cyprus (Turkish withdrawal from the TRNC) and the TRNC (international recognition of the TRNC) were never met nor approached.

E. POLICY IMPLICATION 4: SECURITIZED ISSUES INCLUDE ASYMMETRIC THREATS

As explained in Chapter II, reassurance should not only apply to traditional security issues such as arms races and troop buildups, but also to securitized issues that can include asymmetric threats. In the post-Cold War world, asymmetric threats are increasingly important when it comes to employing influence strategies such as reassurance. For example, reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal will do little to reassure Islamic extremists in Asia, while fostering a solution to the Israel-Palestinian dispute might. Furthermore, attacks on Taliban strongholds in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region tend to increase insecurity for local tribes, and for this reason may not be as effective as reassuring the tribal groups through institution building, education, and economic aid. In states with powerful ethnic minorities, reassurance can also take place domestically. For example, the Chilean Government’s signals of reassurance towards the
Mapuche Tribe in issues such as commerce, governance, and religious freedom may succeed in resolving an internal conflict that has persisted throughout Chilean history.\textsuperscript{401} In Nigeria, where insurgent groups are threatening the cohesion of the state as well as the oil resources, the government can reassure the people of the Niger Delta by improving their quality of life and cracking down on the out-of-control corruption. This type of reassurance can lead to fewer attacks by groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).\textsuperscript{402} In all, a policymaker needs to consider securitized issues when crafting a policy of reassurance. Much further study is needed on this aspect of what can be coined “internal reassurance.”

\textbf{F. POLICY IMPLICATION 5: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REASSURANCE DIMINISHES WHEN A PREVIOUSLY UNDESIRABLE STATUS QUO COMES TO BE PREFERRED}

Case Study 4 demonstrates how an unacceptable status quo can become acceptable over time and dash the hopes of a meaningful reassurance exchange. When 30,000 Turkish troops entered Cyprus in 1974, the UN condemned the invasion and called for an immediate withdrawal. Over the years this demand has stood, but the sense of urgency has diminished. Today, the Cyprus impasse has become “convenient.” The cost of rebuilding the North and of withdrawing the Turkish troops has increased to the point that maintaining the status quo seems more advantageous than beginning a period of rapprochement through reassurance. This scenario can be seen in numerous other regions, where an age-long dispute has assumed a sense of permanency that makes a “peace initiative” by either side much harder to send.

This scenario seems to be what Daniel Ortega seeks with respect to San Andres and the surrounding territorial waters. By making the dispute “permanent,” it gives the Nicaraguan case some legitimacy and eventually, it may become more convenient to leave the dispute “as is” than to seek a meaningful solution. This scenario also applies to

\textsuperscript{401} Class notes, NS 4560 Latin America Security, Professor Marcus Berger, Monterey, CA.
\textsuperscript{402} This topic served as a final exam question in NS3023, Introduction to Comparative Politics, Professor Sandra Leavitt, Monterey, CA.
the animosity between Cuba and the United States, as well as Ethiopia-Eritrea, India-Pakistan, and Algeria-Morocco. The opportunities for further study on the effect of time on lingering disputes are vast.

G. THE CAVEAT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPLOITATION

The outcome of a promising reassurance exchange after the end of World War I demonstrates how signals of reassurance can be exploited to the extent that they can worsen—not improve—the situation. The end of World War I left Europe in shambles. A centuries-long deep mistrust between states had only deepened, and the victorious Allies appeared more concerned about Germany’s future than before The Great War. In particular, France was greatly concerned over a future German attack. The costly signals needed to reassure the French included a complete German disarmament and the occupation of the Rhineland.403 To make matters worse, German antagonism would play into the hands of the Soviet Union, which was also a potential adversary for the allies.404 Russia pressured Germany to end negotiations with Britain and France, as an alliance would undermine the Russo-German bond that had been established in the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922.405 Germany chose to negotiate with both the Western powers and the Soviet Union at the same time.

Germany accepted to the Treaty of Locarno on 16 October 1925.406 The treaty involved a series of security guarantees among the Great Powers of the time, and involved Germany’s application for membership in the League of Nations. Although Germany’s acceptance of the treaty reassured France and Britain, Germany also signed bilateral treaties with Russia that kept suspicions high in Paris and London.407 Furthermore, German domestic politics kept the government from seeking full

405 Ibid., 27, 60–61.
406 Ibid., 68.
407 Ibid., 70.
rapprochement with the West. The goal of Locarno was German disarmament. But German economic prosperity “raised hopes for a return to great power status.”\textsuperscript{408} Despite promises to disarm, Germany imported poison gas from the Soviet Union, and exported arms to Russia.\textsuperscript{409} By 1930, it was clear that initial signals of reassurance to the West had not brought about meaningful rapprochement. Instead, the signals bought Germany time to rearm, and by 1933, after more reassurance attempts by Britain and France, tensions led to an imminent war.

The detail behind the “Spirit of Locarno” is beyond the scope of this thesis. But this prominent episode in history demonstrates that in some circumstances, deterrence will much more likely prevent a war than reassurance. Reassurance should not be used in every instance. Indeed, a policy of deterrence, compellence, or another influence strategy may be a better choice. This thesis has argued the case of four conditions that should be present for a signal of reassurance to be reciprocated. Each situation is ever changing, and while some of these conditions may be present in a particular scenario on a given day, they may not be present the following day. Reassurance can lead to rapprochement, or, like in the case of Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, war. Understanding the conditions that increase the likelihood for reassurance to lead to rapprochement may potentially avert war. Nevertheless, the dynamics behind confidence building between nations will always be challenging, and merit further study.

\textsuperscript{408} Stephanie Salzmann, \textit{Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union: Rapallo and After, 1922–1934}, 89.

\textsuperscript{409} Ibid., 89, 98.
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