THE BALOCH-ISLAMABAD TENSIONS: PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

by

Gregory D. Pipes

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Thesis Co-Advisors: S. Paul Kapur
Feroz H. Khan

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Pakistan’s “other problem,” the insurgency of the ethnic Baloch, is threatening to tear the nation apart. It is an old problem with deep wounds both in Islamabad and among the Baloch people. While explanations of this problem vary, they tend to follow two primary theories. One theory, called here the “Islamabad Theory,” asserts that the blame for the difficulty between Islamabad and the Baloch lies in the policies and strategies taken by the Pakistani government. A second theory, which this thesis labels the “Baloch Theory,” places the blame for the lack of Baloch integration on the culture and capabilities of the Baloch people. Their hierarchical, chief-centered culture, as well as capabilities gained through foreign influences has pushed them away from integration with Islamabad. This thesis evaluates both theories to ascertain which theory more accurately reflects the realities inherent in the Baloch-Islamabad problem. It finds that components of each theory significantly contribute to the problems. In particular, the Sardari system, as described in the Baloch theory, presents tremendous obstacles for integration. However, after evaluating each theory, this thesis concludes that the Islamabad theory most accurately explains the failure of the Baloch people to integrate into Pakistan.
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Gregory D. Pipes
Major, United States Army
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1998
A.A., Defense Language Institute, 2008

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Author: Gregory D. Pipes

Approved by: S. Paul Kapur, Ph.D.
Thesis Co-Advisor

Feroz Hassan Khan, Brigadier (Ret), Pakistan Army
Thesis Co-Advisor

Harold A. Trinkunas, Ph.D.
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs
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ABSTRACT

Pakistan’s “other problem,” the insurgency of the ethnic Baloch, is threatening to tear the nation apart. It is an old problem with deep wounds both in Islamabad and among the Baloch people. While explanations of this problem vary, they tend to follow two primary theories. One theory, called here the “Islamabad Theory,” asserts that the blame for the difficulty between Islamabad and the Baloch lies in the policies and strategies taken by the Pakistani government. A second theory, which this thesis labels the “Baloch Theory,” places the blame for the lack of Baloch integration on the culture and capabilities of the Baloch people. Their hierarchical, chief-centered culture, as well as capabilities gained through foreign influences has pushed them away from integration with Islamabad. This thesis evaluates both theories to ascertain which theory more accurately reflects the realities inherent in the Baloch-Islamabad problem. It finds that components of each theory significantly contribute to the problems. In particular, the Sardari system, as described in the Baloch theory, presents tremendous obstacles for integration. However, after evaluating each theory, this thesis concludes that the Islamabad theory most accurately explains the failure of the Baloch people to integrate into Pakistan.
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I am not the source of any wisdom or knowledge. I thank my Creator for granting me the ability to complete this.

"The fear of the LORD is the beginning of wisdom, and knowledge of the Holy One is understanding." – Proverbs 9:10

“Above every knowledgeable one, there is one who is even more knowledgeable.” – Yousuf 12:76
I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

A little known insurgency in Southwest Asia is threatening to tear the nation of Pakistan apart. The Baloch tribes, a grouping of 5 million about which Henry Kissinger said in 1962, “I wouldn’t know [this] problem if it hit me in the face”¹ are gaining relevance in Pakistan, the region, and the world. The separatist movement here has strategic impacts felt in Kabul, Delhi, and Washington. It has economic impacts felt in Tehran, Dubai, Beijing, and Central Asia. It is impacting the daily lives of people all over Pakistan. Were the irredentist movement to achieve their goal of an independent Balochistan, calls for separate homelands for Pakistan’s other movements would amplify.² The result would be a government in Islamabad with even less control than they have today. Most experts agree that the existence of Pakistan could be jeopardized.³ This would forever change the economic, political, and strategic landscape of South and Southwest Asia.

The insurgency is just one of the problems that Islamabad has among these people. Social unrest, illiteracy, and economic underdevelopment add to this ongoing crisis. Furthermore, international pressure from India, Iran, China, Afghanistan, and Central Asia complicates Pakistan’s choices. These countries have strategic energy and economic interests tied up in Balochistan by means of pipelines, ports, and roads. With so much on the line with the Baloch, why has the government of Pakistan been thus far unable to quell insurgent violence, address grievances, and bring the people into the mainstream? It cannot be for

² The “nations” of Sindh, Gilgit Baltistan, and Balochistan are members of Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). They live (at least partially) within the borders of Pakistan. Furthermore, many have also called for a separate homeland for Pashtuns.
³ Waheed Khan, "Pakistan's Other Problem Area: Baluchistan," Time Magazine, November 1, 2009; and Nicholas Schmidle, To Live or To Perish Forever: Two Tumultuous Years in Pakistan (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2009), 74.
a lack of tools. The government has a vast array of resources at its disposal. To put down an insurgency, it has a highly capable army, well-equipped police force, and an extensive network of paramilitary forces. To address economic grievances, it receives billions of dollars in foreign aid and investment each year and has a growing economy.\textsuperscript{4} To address political problems, it has a functioning, democratically elected central government. Furthermore, should not the common bonds of Islam form religious linkages between the Baloch and the home for South Asia’s Muslims, Pakistan? Yet, despite over sixty years of attempts, the government of Pakistan has been unable to achieve the integration of the Baloch into the mainstream.

This puzzle has received the attention of politicians, scholars, and military leaders for decades. However, there is no universal understanding of the problem among the Baloch, much less a clear solution. Instead, two competing theories emerge. The first theory, labeled here the “Islamabad theory,”\textsuperscript{5} reflects the viewpoints of many outside of Pakistan. Under the Islamabad theory, the Baloch problems can be explained by looking at strategies undertaken by the central government. These policies, according to the theory, have pushed the Baloch even further away from national integration. Supporters of the Islamabad theory say that the Baloch have been politically abused, economically exploited, and have been on the receiving end of excessive military force. The second theory, labeled here the “Baloch theory,” emphasizes the challenging human geography of the Baloch. The Pakistani government, press, and academia tend to lean on this as the principal explanation of the Baloch problem. The Baloch theory argues that the culture and capabilities of the Baloch has made national integration especially difficult. In particular, the Baloch theory places the blame


\textsuperscript{5} From 1947 to 1960, Karachi was the capital of Pakistan. However, for the sake of simplicity, the name “Islamabad” is synonymous with the central government of Pakistan, regardless of the actual location of the national capital during the time period under consideration. Thus, actions taken by the government prior to the establishment of Islamabad as a capital will still be included in this term.
at the feet of the Baloch chiefs, the Sardars, and their tribal system. Additionally, the theory looks to the capabilities that the Baloch gain through foreign influences as a likely source of the Baloch-Islamabad problems. Those favoring the Baloch theory pay little heed to the strategies of Islamabad. Likewise, those critical of Islamabad’s strategies do not give much weight to the Baloch theory. Objective analysis that balances and evaluates both conditions and strategies does not exist. As a result, readers are left with an incomplete picture of the problem, as well as possible solutions, for the Baloch and Islamabad.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

The presence of two competing theories influencing contemporary work on the Baloch demands their analysis. Unfortunately, a systematic analysis of both the Baloch and Islamabad theories does not exist. This thesis intends to meet that need and determine which theory more accurately reflects the situation between Pakistan and the Baloch. For the Islamabad theory, which this thesis addresses first, numerous questions arise. How have the policies of Islamabad with respect to the Baloch succeeded or failed? Are there times in which policies brought integration closer to reality? How have government policies pushed the province away from the mainstream? For the Baloch theory, we consider a different set of questions. How have conditions affected the problem among the Baloch? How have cultural, political, and international factors influenced integration into Pakistan?

C. RELEVANCE

Today, as never before, the world has its eyes on Pakistan. From President Obama’s Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy in South Asia to the continuing threat of nuclear war with India, many observe it with tremendous concern. But, this focus on Pakistan has not been a result of problems among the Baloch. The focus of international concern has been on the Islamist violence originating in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA). In many ways, the international community is much like Kissinger in 1962. This, after all, is Pakistan’s “other problem.” So then, why study this little known “problem”?

The successful integration of the Baloch into the nation of Pakistan is timely and relevant. Domestic, regional, and international factors weigh heavily on this issue. Domestically, the territory occupied by the Baloch, mostly southern Balochistan province, represents for Pakistan a possible way out of their current economic downturn. Through utilizing the abundant natural resources, establishing international pipelines, and completing the construction and utilization of Gwadar seaport, the Baloch territory is a potential economic boon to Pakistan. Without stability in this war-torn region, however, Pakistan cannot possibly succeed at even one of these ambitious projects. Furthermore, a successful separatist movement among the Baloch would threaten the existence of the Pakistani state. It would inspire existing movements among the Sindhi, Gilgit, and Pashtun peoples and could result in the disintegration of Pakistan. Regionally, Balochistan has tremendous economic and strategic importance. Currently two international energy pipelines are designed to transit Baloch territory. The Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, also called the “pipeline for peace” is closest to construction. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline is also coming closer to reality. If the Baloch are not integrated into the national scene, these international pipelines would become prime targets for rebels who are well experienced at pipeline destruction.

Regional neighbors, to include the United States and her allies in Afghanistan, can also see the importance of the Baloch for the control of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. These international terrorist groups house their

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6 Waheed Khan, “Pakistan's Other Problem Area: Baluchistan.”
8 As will be demonstrated in Chapter III, the Baloch separatists’ primary method of achieving national attention is through the explosion of natural gas pipelines bound for major urban areas. Pipeline destruction is relatively easy, results in few casualties, if any, and yet affects thousands of Pakistanis.
leadership in Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan.\textsuperscript{9} Many of the attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan originate from Balochistan province.\textsuperscript{10} Since the Baloch are firmly against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, they could be utilized as an ally to fight against them.\textsuperscript{11} Furthermore, if the Pakistani Army is successful at pushing Islamists out of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the Islamists may try to seek refuge in Baloch tribal areas. This only increases the importance of solving the Baloch issue. There is also ample evidence of opium and weapons smuggling through Baloch-controlled territories.

The Baloch represent a potential tipping point for the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. This is the only majority Muslim state with nuclear weapons. This is also a nation on relatively friendly terms with the United States and the European Union. The demise of Pakistan would create problems worldwide. Additionally, the situation among the Baloch highlights how nations deal with separatist movements within their borders. Separatist movements are present worldwide and affect large and small states as well as developed and undeveloped nations. A study of the Baloch of Pakistan offers insight into how nations respond to the conditions in un-integrated lands and employ strategies of integration.

D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

The challenge in this thesis is to link the individual factors present in conditions and strategies to the actual problems and potential solutions for the Baloch. For the Islamabad theory, this thesis must look at linkages between the strategies of Islamabad and the integration of the Pakistani Baloch. It must discuss how political policies have affected integration over the last sixty years. This thesis must evaluate the connection between economic underdevelopment and exploitation to the problems in the province. This thesis must deal with the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{9} Schmidle, \textit{To Live or To Perish Forever}, 75.
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Frederic Grare, “E-mail Conversation with Gregory Pipes” (Monterey, CA, December 5, 2008).
\end{itemize}
issue of military actions against the Baloch. It must determine if military actions improve or devolve the integration of the Baloch. Finally, this thesis must evaluate the claims of the Islamabad theory by pitting government policies against insurgent activities.

For the Baloch theory, this thesis must first evaluate the claim that Baloch culture affects this problem. It must observe the hierarchical nature of the Baloch tribes and determine how this structure relates to their resistance to join Pakistan. Second, this thesis must consider the contentious issue of foreign involvement among the Baloch. It must discuss the likelihood that foreign governments such as India and Afghanistan are physically, financially, or logistically providing aid to separatist movements in Balochistan. It must also analyze how a political involvement, mostly in the form of drug trafficking, affects the integration of the Baloch. Finally, this thesis must evaluate the reactions of other peripheral ethnic groups to Islamabad’s policies. For this task, this thesis compares the Baloch to the Bengalis of East Pakistan.

After addressing these challenges, this thesis argues that the Baloch theory holds certain validities, especially regarding the relationship of the Sardari system to integration. However, the final analysis illustrates that the principle reason for the Baloch-Islamabad tensions, and their failure to integrate into Pakistani life, is best explained with the Islamabad theory. The Islamabad theory best predicts the interaction between the Baloch insurgency and the government’s policies. As Islamabad addresses grievances, the insurgency becomes pacified. Likewise, exacerbation of grievances by the center intensifies insurgent activities.

E. LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature on the issues surrounding Balochistan is sparse, often outdated, and often fraught with pro-Islamabad or pro-separatist biases. Furthermore, no author attempts to systematically analyze both conditions among the Baloch and Pakistani policies pertaining to integration. It is this gap in the literature that this
thesis strives to fill. Along individual subjects relevant to the Baloch issue, a
decent population of scholarly and media literature exists.

The central question regarding the Baloch integration is the nature of the
Baloch insurgency. Labeled “miscreants" by some, “nationalists” and “freedom
fighters” by others, these are the ethnic Baloch who have taken up arms against
the central government of Pakistan. They have done so four times in history.
Explanations for the causes of these insurgencies are not uniform. Instead, we
see a divide in analysis. Pro-government literature focuses on the causes
stemming from the Baloch people while other work focuses on the actions of the
Pakistani government. Abid Husain Shah, for example, lists five causes for the
1973 insurgency. These were Baloch demands for a separate state, the
influence of the tribal system, economic causes unjustly inflated by the Sardars,
the tribal chiefs, and the influence of foreign governments. He completely
neglects to list the refusal of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to grant
Balochistan full provincial rights and his dismissal of the Balochistan assembly.
Selig Harrison cites this as the spark that set off the insurgency. On the other
side, Tarique Niazi argues that there is a direct link between the state of
Pakistan's policies and the rise of insurgencies. He demonstrates this through
each of the four insurgencies. However, unlike Shah, Niazi does not heed the
role that the conditions on the ground played in each of these insurgencies.
Others follow suit by neglecting to address or dismissing the environmental
factors on the Baloch insurgencies. Frederic Graré's listed reasons for the 2002
resurgence of Baloch nationalism stand in contrast to Shah’s. He cites
expropriation, marginalization, and dispossession at the hands of the central
government upon the Baloch people. Selig Harrison, perhaps the most

12 Abid Hussain Shah, The Volatile Situation of Balochistan - Options to Bring it into
Streamline (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School (Master's Thesis), 2007), 34.
13 Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 34.
14 Tarique Niazi, “Democracy, Development and Terrorism; The Case of Baluchistan
respected scholar on the Baloch, has written extensively on the Baloch, their culture, and their strategic setting. However, in works ranging from 1981 to 2009, he sees their nationalism rooted in their culture but sees the insurgencies rooted in Pakistani government actions. So, we see a divide between scholars. Some reference the conditions on the ground, the Baloch, as causing the insurgent uprisings. Others do not link conditions to the violence. Few analytically consider that conditions of culture and capabilities could contribute to the violence. They point their fingers to Islamabad and her strategies.

1. The Islamabad Theory

Islamabad’s strategies towards integration of the Baloch revolve around three themes. These are politics, military operations, and economic development. For politics, most analysts note that the central government has not afforded the Baloch full democratic rights. Few, however, link this political strategy with integration of the people. One notable exception is Tarique Niazi, who links the denial of democracy to insurgent violence. Specifically, Niazi notes, “Since Pakistan’s independence, insurgent violence in Baluchistan broke out in response to the state’s attempt at suppressing the democratic will of the people…”16 Another exception is Selig Harrison’s work on the Baloch people. He also notes this connection between denials of democracy and violence.17 Frederic Graré discusses how elections in the last decade retained this pattern of denying full democratic rights to the Baloch.18

The topic of appropriate use of military force nets different perspectives. Many make note of excessive violence against civilians, women and children, and property. Expectedly, most analysts outside of Pakistan see military action against the Baloch as generally excessive. They argue that the Pakistani government has been heavy-handed in its attempts to forcibly integrate the

17 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, 25.
18 Grare, “Pakistan,” 11.
Baloch into the nation. A prime example is the 1974 Chamalang attack. In this operation, at the height of the third Baloch insurgency, the Army attacked a massing of Baloch women, children, and livestock in order to draw out the hiding Baloch guerillas. Harrison links the military activity at Chamalang in 1974 with current bitterness amongst Baloch.\(^\text{19}\) A. B. Awan states, “the Chamalang operation inflicted permanent scars of hatred and mistrust.”\(^\text{20}\) Yet, as Tariq Niazi points out, the Chamalang operation, brutal though it was, helped the government defeat the insurgency.\(^\text{21}\) On this point, Shah agrees with Niazi. While not mentioning Chamalang by name nor making mention of the attacks on unarmed families, he describes Chamalang as a “turning point” in the third insurgency that caused the Baloch to change their approach.\(^\text{22}\) Chamalang also “left no doubt in the minds of miscreants about the resolve of the army to establish the writ of the law.”\(^\text{23}\) Another key example of the accusation of excessive force is the mass disappearances of Baloch in the last few years. Irfan Hussain argues that the military force exercised in these disappearances is excessive and only serves to increase the ranks of the separatists.\(^\text{24}\) Most link these disappearances with President Musharraf, but others say that President Zardari has continued this tactic.

Economic development for the Baloch is a crossroads between the sovereignty of the Pakistani state and the property of the Baloch. Robert G. Wirsing calls the expropriation of natural resources as the most persistent grievance of the Baloch.\(^\text{25}\) Niazi asserts that this usage of Baloch natural

\(^\text{19}\) Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 38.
\(^\text{22}\) Shah, “The Volatile Situation in Balochistan,” 39.
\(^\text{23}\) Ibid., 41.
resources by the Pakistani government is “at the core of the continuing violence.” However, others see the issue of economics differently. They see it as a tool used by the tribal chiefs to retain their power and deprive their citizens.

2. The Baloch Theory

Conditions present among the Baloch people center around two crucial areas. These are the culture of the Baloch tribes and their enhanced, foreign-sourced capabilities.

Regarding the culture of the Baloch tribes, the critical element discussed in literature is the hierarchical nature of their tribal organization. However, few outside of Pakistan link this cultural with the problem of Balochistan’s integration. Shah argues that the tribal organization of the Baloch is a great contributor to the current problems in Balochistan. It contributes to the “deplorable political landscape that has given rise to certain complex crises in the region.” Zaresh Khan places the blame for the Baloch grievances squarely on the shoulders of the tribal chiefs. He states, “upheavals and tranquility in Balochistan have largely been dependent upon the caprice and whims of self-centered Baloch chieftains and feudal lords.” Justin Dunne cites the relevance of the Baloch chiefs to their political problems, as well as tacking on the cultural divide between Baloch and Pubjabis to the political landscape of Balochistan. Outside of Pakistan, though, cultural discussions are largely anthropological in nature and do not link culture to Balochistan’s problems. Paul Titus, Selig Harrison, and T. Hungerford Holdich all explain that the Baloch leadership system and tribal culture differ from the

28 Zaresh Khan, “Inside Balochistan Crises.”
30 Zaresh Khan, “Inside Balochistan Crises.”
Pashtun, Awan, Harrison, and Graré, have explained that the Baloch are not Islamic fundamentalists. Graré emphasizes that they are not to be lumped in with the Taliban or al-Qaeda, despite the government’s efforts to do so. Louis Buffardi, Graré, and Harrison have shown how the Baloch have utilized alliances, to include Marxism, to bolster their position against the government of Pakistan. However, they do not link the cultural conditions of the Baloch to their resistance to Pakistan’s writ.

As for international involvement in the Baloch separatist movements, nearly all literature comes out of Pakistan. Qaiser Janjua highlights the possible role of India in Balochistan, arguing that for economic and political reasons India is interested in a destabilized Balochistan. He also argues that Afghanistan has been a consistent supporter of Baloch nationalism. This drumbeat of international aid to Baloch separatists is echoed in the Pakistani press. Mariana Babaar wrote in 2006 that India is “fomenting trouble in Pakistan via Afghanistan.” When Christine Fair anecdotally confirmed Indian involvement in Iranian Balochistan, citing both financial and logistical support to separatists, the Pakistani press wrote extensively on this revelation. An editorial in the

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33 Grare, "Pakistan," 11; Awan, Baluchistan, 149; and Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, 8.

34 Grare, “Pakistan,” 11.


37 Janjua, "In the Shadow of the Durand Line," 51.

38 Mariana Baabar, "How India is Fomenting Trouble in Pakistan via Afghanistan," The News, April 15, 2006.

Pakistani Daily Times asserted that Fair’s statement “has put an end to the yes-or-no debate about India’s interference inside Pakistan and its use of a ‘facilitator’ Afghanistan government for doing so.” Politicians, naturally, join in this argument. In 2004, the Balochistan Chief Minister, Jam Mohammad Yusuf, accused India of operating camps for their Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) inside Balochistan. Outside of Pakistan, though, the rhetoric changes on the subject of international involvement with the Baloch. Graré acknowledges the Pakistani accusations of Indian influence in Balochistan but dismisses its relevance. Waheed Khan likewise acknowledges the accusations of Indian influence in Balochistan. Yet, he also dismisses it for lack of evidence.

A review of historical and contemporary literature on the Baloch-Islamabad tensions reveals a consistent divide in analyses. Many authors focus on the policies of Islamabad as the causal mechanism for these problems. Others instead look to the conditions of culture and capabilities as the primary explanation of Baloch-Islamabad tensions. Few look at both conditions and policies. This thesis fills this gap by addressing and evaluating each theory.

F. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis systematically analyzes and evaluates both the Islamabad and Baloch theories. It evaluates the conditions on the ground among the Baloch people, seeing how their culture and foreign-gained capabilities have shaped the problems the Baloch have with the central Pakistani government. It examines a comparison of the Baloch behaviors to those of the Bengalis of East Pakistan. It also examines the impact of Pakistani strategies towards solving the Baloch

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41 While the chief minister of Balochistan from 2002-2007 and an ethnic Baloch, he is a member of the Pakistani Muslim League (Q), at the time aligned with Musharraf, and not a Baloch nationalist.
44 Waheed Khan, "Pakistan's Other Problem Area: Baluchistan."
problem. This thesis evaluates the impacts of Islamabad’s political, economic, and military policies. It also examines the correlation between Islamabad’s policies and insurgent activities.

In order to analyze these theories, this thesis relies on a wide variety of sources. First, are anthropological works on the Baloch people. This helps to understand the conditions of culture in Balochistan. Second, are historical works of the previous four Baloch insurgencies against the Pakistani government. Third, are research products produced from think tanks across the globe that analyze the current uprising. One of these that proves valuable in understanding the insurgency is the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). The SATP provides a database of insurgent attacks in Balochistan. This data is helpful for establishing trends of insurgent attacks. Finally, this thesis considers the contemporary media, both for statements from officials and for more recent analysis.

G. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis begins with a historical overview of the relationship between Islamabad and the Baloch. It then has two chapters that address the theories in order. The first section deals with the Islamabad theory. The second section addresses the Baloch theory. A final chapter summarizes findings and makes policy recommendations.
II. BACKGROUND HISTORY OF THE TENSIONS BETWEEN ISLAMABAD AND THE BALOCH PEOPLE

A. INTRODUCTION

There are ample resources that document the physical and human geography, as well as millennia of historical background on the Baloch. Many, such as Dunne and Awan, have labored to explain the Baloch conditions under the British. Others have dug even further, highlighting the Baloch resistance to authority from ancient times. Rather than rehash what has already been well documented, this section gives a historical perspective on the relationship of the Baloch with the Pakistani government from 1947 to 2009. In so doing, this section gives the reader a basis of understanding of what the government of Pakistan has tried to accomplish with the Baloch over the past sixty years. It supports the initial claim of this thesis that the Baloch have never integrated into the national picture of Pakistan. In order to demonstrate this situation, this section highlights the four Baloch insurgencies, as well as the significant efforts of the government to integrate the province. Figure 1 shows an ethnicity-based map of Pakistan. The Baloch people live predominantly in the tri-border region of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.
B. ACCESSION INTO PAKISTAN—THE FIRST BALOCH INSURGENCY

As it became evident that British India would divide into the two states of India and Pakistan, the Baloch-populated states lobbied the British for independence. This request denied, they declared independence on August 15, 1947. This was one day after Pakistan gained their independence. This declaration was supported by the fact that since 1876 Kalat, the largest and most influential Baloch state, had been an autonomous state under the British Raj. 45 The Khan of Kalat offered to Pakistan a special relationship of autonomy in which Pakistan would maintain authority on defense, foreign policy, and communications. 46 In addition to the Khan, the Kalat Assembly voted in favor of

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independence. Symbolizing the willingness of the Baloch to work with, but not under Pakistan, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, a member of the Kalat Assembly, said the following:

If Pakistan wants to treat us as a sovereign people we are ready to extend our friendship. But if Pakistan does not do so and forces us to accept this fate, flying in the face of democratic principle, every Baluch will fight for freedom.\footnote{Harrison, \textit{In Afghanistan’s Shadow}, 25.}

In March 1948, despite these democratic attempts for autonomy, the Pakistani government utilized military force to coerce the Khan of Kalat to pledge allegiance to Pakistan. In resistance to this, the prince of Kalat took up arms against the Pakistani government. He established his resistance from Afghanistan with a humble force of 700 tribesmen. In late 1948, this uprising was brought under control by the central government.\footnote{Niazi, “Democracy, Development and Terrorism,” 274.}

C. THE RESPONSE TO ONE UNIT—THE SECOND INSURGENCY

The second Baloch insurgency was in direct response to the One Unit scheme. One Unit was the 1955 reorganization of Pakistan’s provinces into two provinces—East and West Pakistan. It was largely a response to the growing political power of the numerically dominant Bengalis in East Pakistan. In order to prevent Bengali domination, general and later president Ayub Khan combined the provinces and tribal areas of West Pakistan into one province. While the most apparent justification for One Unit was to marginalize the electoral power of the Bengalis, this scheme marginalized Baloch as well. Perhaps a secondary motivation was, as Niazi asserts, to prevent those on the periphery of the government from dominating the elites.\footnote{Ibid., 275.} In theory, the Baloch, Pashtuns, Sindhis, and Bengalis could not ally themselves together and overpower the ruling Punjabis and the India-born Muhajirs. Within the time period of One Unit, the government continued its marginalization of the Baloch. For example, during
the fifteen-year span of One Unit, Balochistan had nine chief commissioners. None of these commissioners were Baloch. The response of the Baloch was initially nonviolent. The prince of Kalat formed a Balochi Peoples Party with the intention of ending One Unit. The Khan of Kalat mobilized the tribal chiefs, the Sardars, against One Unit. However, before any violent insurgency was initiated, the Army arrested the Khan on October 6, 1958. The Army also attacked those who protested against the government. This ultimately led to Ayub Khan declaring martial law the next day. While intended to prevent violence, the arresting of the Khan had the opposite effect. Violence spread throughout the Balochistan areas. The government deployed tanks, artillery, and many troops into the region. In the mid 1960s, this insurgency had a spike of violence that was so large that some label it as a separate insurgency. It occurred after the government forcibly removed the title of Sardar from several tribal chiefs. In 1970, Ayub Khan’s successor General Yahya Khan ended One Unit, established the province of Balochistan, and announced upcoming elections. Immediately the violence stopped.

D. BANGLADESH’S SHADOW—THE THIRD BALOCH INSURGENCY

Following the disastrous defeat of the Pakistani military in the 1971 Civil War, the government approved a new constitution. For the Baloch, this was a highly successful and optimistic time. They achieved their goal of the dissolution of One Unit and the central government was in a weakened position following the war. Thus, the newly elected Baloch politicians were under considerable internal pressure to push Islamabad for greater Baloch autonomy. This was partly a success as the 1973 national constitution reduced the role of the central government in the provinces. However, as Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto began to see the Balochistan assembly pushing away from Islamabad, he dismissed the

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51 Ibid., 276.
52 Ibid., 280.
53 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, 34.
provincial assembly. The immediate response from the Baloch was war. As Baloch insurgents began to ambush Army convoys, Bhutto allied with the Shah of Iran. What followed was the largest war in Balochistan, a civil war that largely went unnoticed by the outside world. In this war, 55,000 Baloch fought against the 80,000 deployed Pakistani soldiers, as well as Iranian helicopter gunships. It was in this insurgency that the Chamalang incident occurred. As previously discussed, this operation significantly altered the tactics of the insurgency, causing it to simmer to a low level until Bhutto’s arrest in the 1977 coup. Bhutto’s arrest and General Zia’s favorable treatment of the Baloch ended the third insurgency.

E. THE FOURTH INSURGENCY—RESOURCES AND THE MILITARY

In 2002, the initiation of the Gwadar development project touched off a fourth insurgency in the Pakistani province of Balochistan. Gwadar, a once sleepy fishing village close to the Iranian border, was infused with millions of dollars of foreign and domestic investment. The goal was to transform it into a major hub port designed to rival Dubai. While initial promises from the government spoke of local inclusion in the benefits of this project, the perception among the Baloch was different. They sensed this to be yet another example of expropriation of their resources for the benefit of the central government. From 2002–2009, this rate of insurgent attacks skyrocketed. In 2002, there was an average of one attack every four months. In 2008, the height

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55 Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, 36.
of the insurgency, there were over 33 attacks per month. The military under President General Pervez Musharraf did not stand idly by. At a conference of corps commanders in 2006, Musharraf defiantly emphasized that, “the writ of the Pakistani government will never be challenged. Let that be a warning... if anyone challenges the writ of the government, I will crush it.” The causes for this insurgency, which continues today, are generally seen by the Baloch to be democracy, military excesses, and economic exploitation. The government, however, places the blame at the feet of the Sardars and foreign governments, namely India and Afghanistan.

F. ATTEMPTS AT INTEGRATION

In attempts to integrate the province into Pakistan, the central government has taken different strategies throughout history. Pakistan's first policy was a “closed-border” policy that did little to help the Baloch people. It did, however, seem to uphold the Baloch’s traditional sense of autonomy. However, under Bhutto’s tenure as prime minister, the government instead adopted a “forward policy” that emphasized the need for development and integration of the province. This attempt to integrate the province by the writ of the government set the conditions for the third insurgency. Following Bhutto’s arrest, the new dictator, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, significantly pacified the Baloch. He released an estimated 6,000 prisoners of the third insurgency. Furthermore, he declared amnesty for any remaining insurgents, to include those in hiding in Afghanistan. While Zia’s acts of reconciliation quelled the insurgency, he did

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59 Data on the rate of attack in Balochistan during the fourth insurgency comes from the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) and their Balochistan-specific reporting website: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/index.html.


62 Ibid.

63 Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 40.
little more to address the problems among the Baloch. From the start of Zia’s reign until 2002, Baloch problems were small and, consequently, ignored by the central government. It was only after the start of the fourth insurgency that the government began taking further steps to attempt integration. The most significant step taken since 2002 was the creation of the Senate Committee on Balochistan. In 2004, the Prime Minister ordered the establishment of this committee and charged it with the task of responding to the challenges in Balochistan. The government addressed not only the law and order situation but also the political demands of the Baloch. The result was a report that recommended significant changes in the government’s military, political, economic, and energy policies regarding the Baloch. The response from the Baloch was profound. As Chapter II demonstrates, the committee’s report coincided with a 70 percent drop in insurgent violence from the previous three months. Since Musharraf’s resignation in 2008, the new Pakistani President, Asif Ali Zardari, himself of Baloch descent, has reached out to solve the Baloch issue. He initiated the “Balochistan Package,” a combination of measures aimed at addressing the languishing demands of the Baloch and integrating them into the nation.

G. CONCLUSION

The Baloch people have yet to be integrated into the Pakistani mainstream. Despite numerous efforts undertaken by the government, they remain outside of the government’s writ and continue to voice their displeasure with the actions of Islamabad. With this historical understanding in hand, this thesis now turns to the two competing theories. Which one better explains the sources of the Baloch-Islamabad tensions? Which provides a better pathway to integration and reconciliation?

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64 Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, 40.
III. THE ISLAMABAD THEORY

The Islamabad theory posits that the actions of the central government of Pakistan have been the key factor that has stood in the way of Baloch integration to Pakistan. Advocates of this theory argue that the government of Pakistan is to blame for the lack of integration among the Baloch. The Islamabad theory’s three components include political oppression, military excess, and economic expropriation. This chapter evaluates these components and then examines correlative data between insurgent attacks and Islamabad’s policies.

A. INTRODUCTION

The Islamabad theory advocates that the principle explanation of the persistent tensions between the Baloch and Islamabad can be found when we examine the policies of Islamabad toward the Baloch.

This chapter first evaluates the components of the Islamabad theory. Specifically, it looks at its key components of political and economic deprivation, as well as excessive use of military force. It then further analyzes the Islamabad theory by overlaying Islamabad’s strategies with monthly levels of insurgent attacks. This chapter examines insurgent attack levels throughout the fourth insurgency. It then compares these attack levels to Islamabad’s implementation of Baloch-oriented policies and strategies. By doing this comparison, this evaluation holds the recipient, the Baloch, constant and vary the policies of Islamabad. If the Islamabad theory is an accurate explanation for the Baloch-Islamabad tensions, we should see that the reactions of the Baloch vary with the changing policies of Islamabad. Some policies should cause integration while others should push the Baloch away.

B. POLITICAL DEPRIVATION

The political component to the Islamabad theory is that the central government of Pakistan has regularly denied democracy to the Baloch. As a
result of this, the government has diminished their ability to integrate this people group. For the Baloch, democracy denied appears in the forced Baloch incorporation into Pakistan, the One Unit scheme, the 1973–77 uprising, and the 2002 elections. As previously stated, Niazi asserts that these events directly caused each of the four Baloch uprisings.

Proponents of the Islamabad theory point to the four insurgencies as the times when the Baloch were denied democracy. An analysis of these events reveals that Islamabad was largely out of step with democratic principles when executing policies towards the Baloch. As previously stated, the Khan of Kalat, the chief of the princely states that today makeup Balochistan, declared independence on August 15, 1947. In addition to the Khan, the Kalat Assembly voted in favor of independence. In March 1948, despite these democratic attempts for autonomy, the Pakistani government utilized military force to coerce the Khan of Kalat to pledge allegiance to Pakistan. The One Unit scheme is an additional example of democracy denied to the Baloch. It is linked to the second insurgency. Within Baloch politics during One Unit, the government continued its marginalization of the Baloch. As the Baloch began to rebel, the Army arrested the Khan on October 6, 1958. The Army also attacked those who protested against the government. This ultimately led to Ayub Khan declaring martial law the next day.67 In 1970, Ayub Khan’s successor General Yahya Khan ended One Unit, established the province of Balochistan, and announced upcoming elections. Immediately the violence stopped. It is possible that this point in Baloch history is most important for the government of Pakistan to understand. When democratic rights increased, insurgent violence ceased. When autonomy was pledged, the tide of nationalism ebbed. Following successful elections in 1971, the newly elected Baloch politicians began to push away from Islamabad.68 In response, Bhutto promptly dismissed the assembly. This incited the third insurgency. Pakistan proved once again that the policy of restricting

68 Ibid., 280.
democracy yielded the fruit of ever increasing violence. The final example of the
government of Pakistan’s denial of democracy to the Baloch came in 2002. At
the time, the beleaguered President General Pervez Musharraf was trying to
legitimate his office. To do so, he sought provincial governments whom he could
manipulate, particularly in Balochistan.\(^6\) He sought a coalition with the Mutahida
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an Islamic political party made up of several
fundamentalist Islamic groups. Groups tied to the government worked to
manipulate the vote in Balochistan, resulting in a provincial win for the MMA.\(^7\)
This victory, exacted at the expense of Baloch democracy, helped to legitimize
Musharraf’s rule. This enabled Musharraf to advance an agenda of exploitation
on Balochistan without political resistance from the provincial assembly.\(^8\)
Without a voice, the Baloch resorted again to an insurgency. This insurgency
persists today. An analysis of peace in Balochistan yields the conclusion that the
central government should have learned in 1970. Expanding democratic rights
and autonomy in Balochistan yields peace and an increase in the government’s
ability to maintain their writ in the land. There was no simpler way for the
government to diminish their writ than to deny democracy to the Baloch. Thus,
we see that, like with the Bengalis, the political component to the Islamabad
theory reflects the reality of the Baloch integration.

The next section of the Islamabad theory examines the argument that, in
addition to political policies, Islamabad’s economic policies likewise hampered
the integration of the Baloch.

C. ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION

This component of the Islamabad theory argues that the government of
Pakistan has economically exploited the Baloch. In doing so, they have
decreased the ability of the Baloch tribes to integrate into the nation. To evaluate

\(^7\) Grare, “Pakistan,” 11.
\(^8\) Niazi, “Democracy, Development and Terrorism,” 284.
this aspect of the Islamabad theory, this section looks at how resource expropriation, biased financial policies, and the withholding of financial benefits affected integration.

1. **Expropriation of Resources**

The central government made policies to utilize the natural resources present in the provinces for the benefit of the central government. In the Baloch territories, natural resources exist underground in the form of minerals and energy resources. Harrison points to these energy resources as a key reason why so many have fought over Balochistan. The Sui gas field located in Balochistan was the largest natural gas field in Pakistan. The name Sui gas is synonymous with natural gas in Pakistan. In total, the province of Balochistan provides the nation with between 36 and 45 percent of the national demand for natural gas. Despite this, many districts in Balochistan are still without gas transmission facilities, to include areas immediately surrounding the Sui gas field. Only four of the twenty-six Balochistan districts receive natural gas. They remain the most poor and economically backward province after the first 60 years of Pakistani independence. Under Musharraf, the military stepped up their presence in Balochistan, centering their operations and cantonments on resource-rich areas. Additionally, the Musharraf government took significant steps to expand oil drilling and other mineral exploration in the province. This was without the consent of the Baloch. The expropriation of natural resources is the most persistent grievance of the Baloch.

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72 Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, 7.
75 Grare, “Pakistan,” 5.
It is clear that the expropriation of natural resources has been a policy of Islamabad that has negatively affected the integration of the Baloch into the national scene.

2. Biased Financial Policies

The biased financial policies of the government have been evident in Balochistan. Here, the government undertook mega projects without the consent, counsel, or profit sharing of the Baloch. In 2002, Musharraf received international attention as the critical ally of the United States in the Afghanistan War. He utilized this attention to initiate the Gwadar project, a mega-project with intentions to establish a deep-water port that would rival the best ports in the world. This port, in the middle of the Balochistan coast, was a cooperative project with China. Lying near the rich resources of Balochistan, the port would transform the small Baloch town of Gwadar from a population of 5,000 to millions. Many Baloch feared this project would place them in the minority within their own territory. In response to this development project, Baloch insurgents launched multiple attacks on Gwadar and other key development projects. This campaign gained international attention when two Chinese engineers working on the Gwadar project were assassinated in 2006. The government of Pakistan ignored the concerns that the Baloch had over Gwadar. Once again in a position of not being heard, the Baloch resistance movement began to undermine the Pakistani writ in the region. So, the economic portion of the Islamabad theory continues to reflect the reality of the problems that Islamabad has had with the Baloch.

3. Exclusion from National Benefits

A final economic consideration is the exclusion of the Baloch from national benefits. As a percentage of GDP, Balochistan has not experienced a rise in their

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78 Wirsing, *Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources*, 16.
79 Ibid., 27.
share of the national income. In fact, it has declined. Between 1972–73 and 1999–2000, Balochistan’s share of the GDP declined from 4.5 to 3.7 percent.\textsuperscript{81} For natural gas, Balochistan received only 12.4 percent of its due royalties. The further exploration and development of the region under Musharraf was executed without the consent of the Baloch,\textsuperscript{82} and likely without any intent of profit sharing. Consequently, the central government implemented policies in Balochistan that were intended to deprive the people of proper development. The natural outcome of this was violent resistance.

In evaluation of the economic aspect of the Islamabad theory, it is clear that the economic policies of Islamabad have hindered their national integration.

D. MILITARY EXCESS

A final component of the Islamabad theory that this chapter considers is the argument that excessive military force has pushed back integration. The Pakistani government has traditionally utilized military force against the Baloch as a tool to maintain their writ over the people. Has this worked? Have excessive military actions—actions that targeted civilians or personal property—affect the integration of these people groups to Islamabad?

Many scholars have documented the excesses of the Pakistani military towards the Baloch. The intentional targeting of civilians, the destruction of crops, the assassination of resistance leaders, and the kidnapping of dissidents has marred the image of a government trying to preserve unity.

The military excess in Balochistan has been characterized by the targeting of the nationalist movement’s leadership. However, this strategy has not served to crush the resistance, as Islamabad has wished. Instead, it has served to only incite more resistance and thereby reduce the integration of the Baloch into Pakistan. This targeting began early in the resistance. During the second

\textsuperscript{81} Wirsing, \textit{Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources}, 24.

\textsuperscript{82} Grare, “Pakistan,” 5.
insurgency, it was characterized by the actions of the military while arresting the Khan of Kalat. The Army took ancestral valuables, detained supporters, and “roughed up” protesters.\textsuperscript{83} In response to the resistance that grew out of the Khan’s arrest, the Army bombed villages suspected of harboring insurgents.\textsuperscript{84} At other times, the Army responded to insurgency by burning the crops of Baloch leaders.\textsuperscript{85} The 1973–77 War was characterized harassing and resettling of civilians,\textsuperscript{86} killing of women and children,\textsuperscript{87} and Army brutality.\textsuperscript{88} Finally, the insurgency that began in 2002 has been marked with allegations of as many as thousands of Baloch kidnapped by the Army.\textsuperscript{89} The problem with using excessive military force in Balochistan was well articulated by columnist Irfan Hussain.

By brutalizing the population, you only make new enemies. We should have learned this lesson from our army’s experience in East Pakistan in 1971. An unknown number of people, possibly numbering in the hundreds of thousands, were killed; women were raped; and villages torched in an attempt to cow down the Bengali people. But far from submitting, the Mukti Bahini recruited more volunteers to its cause.\textsuperscript{90}

This section has demonstrated that through the excessive use of military force, the Baloch are only less likely to integrate and the path towards reconciliation becomes strewn with obstacles. Whether or not the Baloch interpretations of military excesses are factually accurate does not soften their

\textsuperscript{83} Harrison, \textit{In Afghanistan's Shadow}, 27.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 276.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 277.
\textsuperscript{89} Hussain, "'Disappearances' Without a Trace."
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
importance. The Chamalang operation, the past treatment of the Khan, and the recent suspicious deaths of Baloch leaders pose tremendous hurdles to the process of national integration.

E. POLICIES AND INSURGENT ACTIVITY

A final stage in evaluating the Islamabad theory is a comparison of insurgent activity to Islamabad’s policies. This is accomplished in three increments. The first increment is to present the raw data on monthly insurgent attacks on government targets from the Baloch. Second, this section lists a chronology of Islamabad’s efforts to end the insurgency and integrate the Baloch into Pakistan. Finally, the section overlays Islamabad’s efforts at integration onto the monthly rates of insurgent attacks and then evaluates for correlation. If the insurgency is highly sensitive to Islamabad’s actions, it will lend significant support to the Islamabad theory.

The fourth insurgency provides fertile ground for this analysis for three reasons. First, the data available on the specifics of insurgent attacks in the fourth insurgency is more complete than for any other insurgency. Second, Islamabad has employed a greater variety of soft and heavy-handed approaches towards the Baloch in the fourth insurgency than in any other insurgency. Consequently, the variation of the independent variable will be greater, thereby allowing for a more thorough evaluation. Finally, the fourth insurgency is ongoing today. A detailed analysis of this insurgency and Islamabad’s actions can bolster policy recommendations that this thesis gives at its conclusion.


The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)\textsuperscript{91} provides the most comprehensive database that details the insurgent attacks in the province of

\textsuperscript{91} Data on the attacks in Balochistan province from 2003 to 2009 come from the South Asia Terrorism Portal’s annual timelines of Balochistan. These timelines are available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/timeline/index.html.
Balochistan during the fourth insurgency.\footnote{The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) provides similar data as the SATP database. While it is better organized than the SATP, it starts its analysis in October 2004, does not include all of 2009, and provides fewer details of each incident than the SATP database.} The SATP registers all nongovernmental violence in the province and provides details behind each occurrence. From 2003 to 2009, the SATP recorded 1633 attacks in the province of Balochistan. A significant problem in literature that covers the fourth insurgency is that most data utilizes provincial levels of violence to track the insurgency. However, violence in the province of Balochistan is not constrained to Baloch insurgents alone. As previously stated, the Taliban and other sectarian groups, unaffiliated with the Baloch, operate in northern Balochistan. Furthermore, the Baloch tribes have a long history of inter-tribal conflict. Fortunately, the violent groups in Balochistan have differing intentions and, consequently, differing methods of employing their violence. This enables the dissection of the SATP’s database in order to isolate the likely responsible parties behind the attacks. For example, an attack on a NATO convoy, a Shi’ite procession, or a girls’ school is likely to be the responsibility of an Islamist organization. Additionally, the Baloch are well-known for inter-tribal violence. This analysis does not consider inter-tribal violence to be pertinent to an examination of the Islamabad theory. However, this analysis does regard attacks on policemen, gas pipelines or anything in Gwadar, for example, as likely the responsibility of a Baloch insurgent group. Table 1 presents the detailed screening criteria that this assessment utilizes to isolate attacks that are likely of Baloch origin.
This analysis is regrettably flawed at this step. Without complete knowledge of each event, specifically in targeted killings, it is inevitable that some spillover between the categories may occur. It is likely that many of the targeted killings are the responsibility of the Baloch insurgency. However, it is also likely that any such spillover would happen in both directions and have a minimal impact on the overall analysis. Undoubtedly, attacks on Pakistani security forces, for example, are not solely the *modus operandi* of the Baloch. After screening the SATP's database on Balochistan attacks, the analysis determined that 1277 attacks were likely to be the responsibility of the Baloch insurgency. When separated by month, we see how the volume of attacks has changed from 2003 to 2009. This is reflected in Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible Group</th>
<th>Normal Targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baloch Insurgents</td>
<td>Energy links (gas pipelines, electricity infrastructure); transport links (rail, highway, air); mega projects; Punjabis; Security forces; political rivals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamist (Taliban, Al-Qaeda, etc.)</td>
<td>NATO convoys; Shi’a/Sunni gatherings; religious institutions; suicide attacks; girls schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Tribal, undetermined)</td>
<td>Tribal killings; targeted killings without clear affiliation; unaffiliated civilians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Screening Criteria for Balochistan Attacks
In 2003, there was an average of 1.5 attacks per month. By 2008, that average had jumped to over 33 attacks per month. The first annual decrease in attacks was seen in 2009 with approximately 22 attacks each month. Armed with this data, we can now examine Islamabad’s policies toward the Baloch and see if the volume of insurgent attacks correlates with policy implementation.

2. Islamabad’s Policies Towards the Baloch, 2003–2009

In order to examine Islamabad’s policies towards the Baloch and their subsequent reaction, this analysis looks at thirteen of Islamabad’s significant policy events. They encompass the three components of the Islamabad theory—politics, economics, and military actions. They also vary between “carrots” of favorable actions towards the Baloch and “sticks” of kinetic actions taken by Islamabad to enforce their writ. This carrot and stick approach to analyzing Islamabad’s policies towards the Baloch is reflected in Islamabad’s strategy to integrating the Baloch into the nation. Khuram Iqbal describes Pakistan’s counter-insurgency strategy as involving military and law enforcement power
coupled with economic development. This “carrot and stick” approach seems to be a constant presence in Islamabad’s policies and strategies. The idea is that by extending economic development to the populace through mega projects, the strength of the Sardar is weakened and grievances become fewer. Furthermore, the state is obliged to punish and pursue those that do harm through insurgent violence. According to Iqbal, the state clamps down on “all forms of dissent.”

Islamabad theory states that the incipient causes for the Baloch resistance are the policies of the central government. Therefore, according to the Islamabad theory, we should see a consistent correlation between these different types of policies and insurgent activity. We should see that whenever Islamabad takes steps to address the grievances of the Baloch, specifically in the realm of politics, economics, or military actions, the insurgent attacks decline. Likewise, Islamabad theory predicts that whenever these grievances are exacerbated by Islamabad, the attacks should increase. These trends should be consistent across the 84 months considered here, if the Islamabad theory most accurately explains the Baloch-Islamabad tensions.

Table 2 lists the thirteen significant occurrences of Islamabad’s policy implementation from 2003 to 2009. Reflected in Table 2 are the corresponding changes in levels of Baloch insurgent violence. The percent change in attacks is calculated by comparing the average level of attacks in the previous three months to the average level of attacks in the three months following the policy event. This permits observations of the trends of attacks as opposed to simply one-month changes in attack volumes. Table 2 also includes the herein unexplained low volumes of attacks between March-May 2006.

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94 Ibid., 3.
Table 2. Significant policy events, 2003-2009, with corresponding changes in attack levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2005</td>
<td>Army sets up new base near Sui</td>
<td>216.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2005</td>
<td>Govt. agrees to withdraw troops deployed between Dera Bugti and Sui</td>
<td>-73.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan presentation of results</td>
<td>-70.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>Large military campaign begins</td>
<td>855.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March-May 2006</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-53.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2006</td>
<td>PM Aziz rules out amnesty for “miscreants”</td>
<td>141.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2006</td>
<td>Death of Baloch Leader Bugti</td>
<td>160.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2006</td>
<td>BNP president Mengal arrested</td>
<td>92.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2007</td>
<td>Marri, Baloch Liberation Army chief, killed</td>
<td>26.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2008</td>
<td>Pakistan general election</td>
<td>32.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2008</td>
<td>PM says that military operations in Balochistan have stopped; military agrees to withdraw; Mengal released</td>
<td>-14.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2008</td>
<td>Musharraf Resigns</td>
<td>-47.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2008</td>
<td>Zardari’s Balochistan Package announced</td>
<td>-59.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td>Zardari’s Second Package announced</td>
<td>-33.68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Analysis

First, this analysis demonstrates several correlations between policy events and insurgent levels of violence. Specifically, we see that when Islamabad addressed Baloch grievances through reduced military presence, offers of economic assistance, and moves towards a more complete democracy, attacks most often decreased. Likewise, when Islamabad opened military bases in Baloch areas, conducted military campaigns against the insurgents, and offered disincentives to integration, attacks generally increased.

It appears from the above data that the Islamabad theory reflects the outcomes of the Baloch insurgency. However, the data above is only reflective of months of Islamabad’s policy events. If the Islamabad theory is highly applicable, it should be able to explain most, if not all, of the significant changes in attack levels. Of the 84 months considered, only 44 had a significant level of attacks (greater than 10 in one month). Of these 44, 17 experienced either no
change or a decrease in attack levels when comparing the previous three months to the following three months. There was an increase in the level of attacks in 27 of the 44 months. Of the 17 that saw a decrease, the eight of the ten largest decreases occurred within two months of one of a significant policy event described in Table 2. Of the 27 months with an increase, all of the largest 10 changes occurred within two months of a policy event listed in Table 1. This bolsters support for the Islamabad theory as we see that significant changes in violence nearly always occurred near a major policy event.

However, there are two significant exceptions to these trends. The first exception is the period of March, April, and May 2006. These were the only months that experienced significant change in attack volumes without a correlating policy event. Despite being sandwiched between a new military offensive, which saw tremendously high Baloch violence and the death of Nawab Bugti in August 2006, these months experienced a sharp drop in violence. In fact, May and June 2006 saw only five Baloch attacks each. When compared with 24 in January and 36 in November, this change deserves some attention. How can this drop be explained? Research of news headlines reveals only greater causes for increased violence. In April, the arrest of former Balochistan Chief Minister and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) chief Akhtar Mengal sparked protests across the province. Yet, the SATP only recorded seven attacks that month. Additionally, Islamabad banned the BLA in April, labeling it a terrorist organization. One could argue that these months of relative calm were a product of the military offensive in December and January. It prompted Musharraf to declare the problem with the Baloch to have been brought under control with life returning to normal.\textsuperscript{95} However, should military action have been the reason for the rapid drop in insurgent attacks, we would expect that to be a trend throughout other military actions. However, this does not seem to be the case.

A second notable exception in the data is the 2008 elections. This should have been seen as a “carrot” to the Baloch. The government was offering elections that did not face the same accusations of rigging seen in 2002. However, the insurgent leaders called on the Baloch to boycott the elections and attacked many of the polling places throughout their territories. The calls for boycott were mostly seen as a rejection of the notion of integration altogether. This actually lends some credence to the Baloch theory, as it was clearly the Baloch leadership, in direct contravention to Islamabad’s steps at appeasement that caused the spike in violence. However, this is the only significant exception in this data. If the ignition source for Baloch violence were the Sardars, and not Islamabad’s policies, we would see a greater disconnect between the policy events and the levels of violence.

This data strongly suggests that when offered appeasement of their grievances; the Baloch insurgency tempers its attacks. The Baloch further integrate. The insurgency responded quickly to the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan’s initial report, seeing the degree to which some in Islamabad were sympathetic to their complaints. It also responded significantly to the change in leadership upon Musharraf’s resignation in 2008. However, the data also points to when the insurgency reacts with violence. Unfortunately, their escalations often outweigh their instances of temperance. The military campaign of early 2006 saw three months of triple-digit escalation. Additionally, the alleged targeted killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in August of that same year caused a large spike in violence.

Of anecdotal significance is the tribal jirga, or council meeting, that the Bugti tribe held on August 24, 2006. In this jirga, the first of its kind in Dera Bugti, the Bugtis agreed to abandon the Sardari system.96 This held the potential to pave the way for reconciliation between the Bugtis and Islamabad and

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96 South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Balochistan Timeline—2006.”
significantly ease the Baloch-Islamabad problems. However, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti’s death two days later undoubtedly erased all hopes of reconciliation.

F. CONCLUSION

This analysis gives strong support to the Islamabad theory. It seems that whenever Islamabad employed strategies designed to integrate the Baloch into the country, the insurgency was quick to respond. This not only gives support to the Islamabad theory. It also serves as a valuable predictive tool for future policy decisions from Islamabad. It seems that the insurgency is very quick to respond with increased violence when faced with Islamabad’s military power. Additionally, though, this data shows that the insurgency of the Baloch separatists is malleable and that Islamabad can make significant strides to quell the violence by utilizing their economic and political tools.

It is clear that the Islamabad theory holds key validities in each of its components. Islamabad has been less than ideal in their political dealings with the Baloch and has withheld the privileges of democratic participation among the Baloch. Likewise, Islamabad has expropriated resources, denied revenue, and withheld benefits from the Baloch. Additionally, the excessive use of military force has only created roadblocks to integration. In this chapter, we saw these principles come to life when we compared the levels of insurgent attacks to the policies from Islamabad. Consequently, the evidence seems to fit the parts of the theory. This only bolsters the claims laid down by the Islamabad theory. This thesis now turns to an evaluation of the Baloch theory.
IV. THE BALOCH THEORY

The Baloch theory asserts that the tribal culture of the Baloch and their foreign-gained capabilities are the prime reasons for the failure of the Baloch to integrate into Pakistan. The theory consists of the two components: culture and capabilities. These conditions are present on the ground and, according to the theory, are the principal factors that inhibit any efforts to reconcile Islamabad to the Baloch. This chapter first evaluates the tribal culture component of the Baloch theory. It then assesses the impact of foreign influences on the capability of the Baloch to resist Islamabad. Finally, this chapter analyzes the Baloch theory by conducting a case study comparing how the Baloch and the Bengalis reacted to similar policies from Islamabad. This method allows us to vary cultural differences while holding the actions of Islamabad constant. Therefore, if the Baloch theory accurately reflects the sources of Baloch-Islamabad tensions, we will find that the Baloch have reacted differently than did the Bengalis. First, though, this section evaluates the two components of the Baloch theory, starting with tribal culture.

A. THE TRIBAL CULTURE OF THE BALOCH

Traipsing along the rugged border on the western edge of the Raj, British Colonel T. Hungerford Holdich observed first-hand the rugged terrain of the Baloch tribal areas. It was 1909, and due to the ignorance created by the “closed-border” policy of the Raj, few British officers knew anything of the tribal people of their protectorate. He labored to explain the differences between the Pashtuns of the northern borderlands and Baloch of the south. He called these differences between these tribes “radical.” Even though he could see that they

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97 Holdich, The Indian Borderland, 180.
98 Ibid., 183.
all followed Islam, for example, he recognized that even in this “vital principle of existence,” they were not of the same mind.\textsuperscript{99} This British Colonel observed that the Baloch people are
easier to deal with and to control than the [Pashtun], owing to his tribal organization, and his freedom from bigoted fanaticism or blind allegiance to his priest. He respects and honors the chief of his clan, who possesses far greater authority in the tribal councils than is the case with the [Pashtun]. The [Pashtun] is…very much under the influence of the Mullah…\textsuperscript{100}

The Pashtun were under the religious influence of their Mullah, whereas the Baloch were allegiant to their tribal chief.\textsuperscript{101} He also commented on the “far greater authority” of the Baloch chief, called a Sardar. He chronicled the key difference between the Baloch and the Pashtun—their tribal organization. Hungerford also called the Baloch, “easier to deal with and to control” than the Pashtun.\textsuperscript{102} His statement was reflective of the British attempts to gain sovereignty of the region as part of their “Great Game” with Russia. The Baloch formed London’s southern buffer zone against Moscow. Yet in order to gain their submission, the British had to accomplish a feat never before achieved with the Baloch. They had to conquer them. Unlike previous failed efforts of the crown to control Pashtun-dominated Afghanistan, the “diplomatic coup” of the Baloch Khan of Kalat in 1876 ensured British rule over the Baloch without a shot fired.\textsuperscript{103} However, the Pakistani government has enjoyed no such ease in dealing with the Baloch. What role can this tribal system play in the integration of the Baloch into the mainstream of Pakistan? Are the Sardars and their Sardari system the principle reason for the Baloch-Islamabad tensions, as the Baloch theory suggests?

\textsuperscript{99} Holdich, \textit{The Indian Borderland}, 183.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 185–186.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 185.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Schmidle, \textit{To Live or To Perish Forever}, 85.
This section analyzes the argument that the Sardars and their hierarchical tribal structure are a primary reason why the tribes of the Pakistani Baloch have rejected the government of Pakistan as their ultimate political authority. The theory posits that the hierarchical nature of these tribes elevates a tribal chief to such a high level that integration in the state would result in the unacceptable loss of the chief’s power and prestige. Therefore, the Sardari system itself becomes the chief impediment to successful integration. Former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf vociferously advocated this explanation of the Baloch problem, blaming the Sardars for inciting violence as a means of preserving their power and tribal traditions.\textsuperscript{104} He identified five Baloch leaders, calling them “anti-development Sardars” and stated, “the Sardars have been pampered in the past—but no more. The writ of the state will be established in Balochistan.”\textsuperscript{105} He was not the first president to hold these thoughts. Previous attempts to dismantle the Sardari system reflect Musharraf’s belief that the Sardars were the problem. Ayub Khan and Z.A. Bhutto both tried to dismantle it as part of their efforts to integrate the Baloch. In order to effectively assess this claim and belief, this section first examines the nature of the Baloch tribes and their Sardars. It then looks at the anthropological work on the process of integrating tribes into states.

1. The Baloch—Chief-Centered Tribes

The Pakistani Baloch are a collection of hierarchical chief-centered tribes, a factor that the Baloch theory argues is critical to their resistance to Islamabad. In most literature describing the Baloch, two characteristics precede all other descriptions. First, is their moderation in Islam. Second, is the hierarchical nature of their tribal culture. When discussing the nature of the Baloch, Akbar S. Ahmed wrote the following:

\textsuperscript{104} Schmidle, \textit{To Live or To Perish Forever}, 79.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
The tribe is a self-contained world. At its centre is the Sardar or chief of the tribe. Tall, full-bearded, in flowing clothes and heavy turban, the Sardar is not unlike Sean Connery playing a tribal chief. He symbolizes Baloch custom and tribal tradition. Honor, hospitality, and bravery are displayed in his behavior. The tribe revels in his glory. The word of the Sardar is law, his authority total. In an area threatened by nature and, often, invading tribes unity under the Sardar became the key to survival. The Baloch have a saying, ‘the Baloch will swear on the Holy Quran but never on the head of the Sardar.106

The tribal groups of the Baloch are characterized by being centered upon their Sardar. The cornerstone of tribal loyalty is allegiance to the Sardar.107 The Sardar is the pinnacle of a hierarchical pyramid of status and authority in the Baloch culture.108 Presiding over most tribal issues, the decisions of the Sardar are final.109 Without the approval of the Sardar, acceptance in the tribal group is impossible.110 As he enters an area, his knees and feet are touched and kissed by fellow tribesmen.111 Even youths who rebel against the Sardar system find that maintaining allegiance to their Sardar is honorable.112 The Sardar, tradition, and honor seem to stand in conflict with submission to Islamabad. Among the Baloch, the state poses a threat to the power of the Sardar. If the Baloch were to accept the state, the Sardar’s absolute sway over the people would be diminished. By threatening the Sardar, the entire fabric of Balochi culture is under attack. So as long as the Sardars resist the state, the state cannot hold absolute authority over the Baloch.

108 Ibid.,” 667.
109 Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 91.
110 Titus, “Honor the Baloch, Buy the Pashtun,” 675.
111 Weaver, Pakistan, 89.
While this theory argues that the Sardari system of the Baloch make them hostile towards state domination, we see resistance in other forms of domination as well. As previously stated, the Baloch are moderate Muslims. Unlike the Pashtuns to the north, an egalitarian group wherein Islamism has taken a firm hold, the Baloch have rejected fundamentalist Islam. This is because Islamism demands that religion be the chief arbiter of tribal issues. Consequently, as we see in the Sardar’s relationship to the state, fundamentalist Islam supplants the Sardar and reduces his power. As proof of this heavy influence of the Sardar, it is important to consider the Makran Baloch, an egalitarian, non-hierarchical Baloch tribe. They, like the Pashtun, and unlike their Baloch brethren, have come under the influence of Islamism.\textsuperscript{113} The Makran Baloch’s tribal organization left it open to outside domination.

2. Hierarchical Tribes and the State

You would not know it by examining the Baloch-Islamabad experience, but social science consistently demonstrates that hierarchical tribes more easily integrate into states than do egalitarian, acephalous (head-less, or without a chief) tribes. In order to bring a hierarchical tribe under state control, the state has a simple, yet daunting task. It must bring the chief under their control. The rest of the tribe will follow. This is because with hierarchical tribes, the members of the tribe follow one leader, often extending throughout multiple communities and over a large geographical area. Louis Dumont defines hierarchical societies as those with a “ladder of\textit{ command} in which the lower rungs are encompassed in the higher ones in regular succession.”\textsuperscript{114} The hierarchical society directs individuals and sub-groups to unify the society. The tribes’ bases for identity lie not in their outside authorities, but in themselves. As a result, identity and


political allegiance will lie within the tribe. Consequently, if the state can penetrate the tribal leadership, it can penetrate the entire tribe.

By contrast, acephalous tribes are often difficult to bring under state control. When these peoples are on the peripheries of the state, they are, as James C. Scott says, “ungraspable” by the state. It is the acephalous tribes, not the hierarchical ones, which often earn the title “barbarians.” The hierarchical tribes often earn a different reputation, owing to their tribal organization. Yet the experience of the Pakistani government with the Baloch has been anything but easy. Therefore, if the fault is bound up in the hierarchical nature of the Baloch, this theory can point to only one source—the Sardars. If the Sardar does not submit to the writ of the state, his subjects will likewise rebel.

3. Conclusion

A first point of the Baloch theory is that due to the heavy influence of the Sardar as given by the hierarchical tribal culture, the Baloch have rejected the state of Pakistan. This component of the Baloch theory works reasonably well to explain some aspects of the Baloch problem. It demonstrates the centrality of the Sardar’s leadership and somewhat validates Musharraf’s criticisms. However, it is incomplete. We now add to the Baloch theory by discussing the possibilities of foreign sources adding to the capabilities of the Baloch.

B. CAPABILITIES—THE “FOREIGN HAND” AMONG THE BALOCH

The second component of the Baloch theory involves the enhanced capabilities of the Baloch. It asserts that the Baloch are receiving help from foreign sources. This pushes them away from Islamabad, making integration even more difficult. This idea of foreign influence on the Baloch insurgency takes

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117 Ibid., 140.
many forms, but often many see it as more critical to the Baloch-Islamabad tensions than Islamabad’s policies. This was evident in journalist Nicholas Schmidle’s interaction with a Pakistani Naval officer in Karachi. “The trouble in Baluchistan,” the officer told Schmidle, “is because of an international dimension…There are outside hands helping these rebels. Why are you people fighting proxy wars in my country?” The “helping hands” to which the officer referenced take two forms. In one form is the assertion of the Baloch theory that foreign governments are actively supporting the Baloch insurgency. These accusations include help from a wide variety of intelligence agencies including the CIA, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing of India), Israeli Moussad, British MI-6, Afghanistan, and Russian services. However, the most prominent discussions of foreign government interference point to assistance from Indian and Afghan hands. Beyond governmental support, the second form of “helping hands” is the influx of cash brought about by the extensive smuggling network run by the Baloch. Opium and other illicit drugs regularly transit Balochistan destined for global markets. Guns, ammunition, and other black market supplies make the return trip with destinations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the case of smuggling, the Baloch-Islamabad tensions are good for business. With a government unable to enforce its writ on a large swath of land, the smuggling industry faces fewer challenges. This in turn creates a stronger incentive to push away from Islamabad. This section of the Baloch theory examines both components of outside help. However, it looks first to the importance of outside assistance to insurgencies.

Theory on insurgent movements reflects the argument of a “helping hand.” In his seminal work on counterinsurgency warfare, David Galula posits that a lasting cause is necessary for the success of an insurgency. Without this cause, a band of rebels without a cause are simply miscreants with a plot to

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118 Schmidle, To Live or To Perish Forever, 92–93.
seize power. An insurgency needs a cause. But, Galula does not identify a cause as being the only “prerequisite for a successful insurgency.” He points out the impact of what he calls “outside support.” Outside support in the form of military assistance becomes absolutely required as the insurgency progresses. The need for better supplies, advanced strategies, and improved information operations is crucial for the insurgency’s survival. In acquiring these necessities, the insurgent has three choices. First, the insurgent can get them from the counterinsurgent, the military against which he fights. The Afghan mujahedeen were exceptional at this skill. A prime example of this is today’s Afghan air force, made up of refit Russian helicopters captured by the mujahedeen.\textsuperscript{120} His second option is to receive them via an external hand of support.\textsuperscript{121} Most scholars agree that without the external support of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and others, the Soviets would have remained in Afghanistan. Third, the insurgent can raise the money by means of illicit trade. From drugs to diamonds, many insurgencies maintain their momentum by illegal enterprise. Galula shows us that a successful insurgency must have outside assistance in order to survive. With the Baloch conducting their fourth insurgency, it seems to make sense that they are receiving some support from foreign sources. Historical evidence confirms such foreign support in the past insurgencies.

1. A Historical Perspective on Foreign Involvement with the Baloch

The Soviets and Afghans dominate the historical evidence of foreign support to Baloch nationalist and separatist movements. The Baloch issue gained international attention following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Many feared that the Soviets would invade Baloch territories in order to secure a route to the Arabian Sea. A.B. Awan shared this fear, saying,


\textsuperscript{121} Galula, \textit{Counterinsurgency Warfare}, 24.
the most ominous threat comes from the occupation, in fact, annexation of Afghanistan... With Soviet air power installed at the sprawling Shindand air base near Herat, a mere 350 miles from the coastline, and at Qandahar, with more bases in the offing, backed by the new rail-road link over the Amu Darya at Hairatan, the Soviet Posture is menacing and frightening. It is in this light that Baluchistan has to be seen.122

Selig Harrison likewise acknowledged this nightmare as he described a potential scenario. “Armed with sophisticated Soviet weaponry, a determined Baluch guerilla army, using Afghanistan as a staging area, proclaims an independent People’s Republic of Baluchistan in part of what is now southwestern Pakistan.”123 Harrison’s 1981 work on the Baloch, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations seizes on the possibility of expanded Soviet control among the Baloch. However, Harrison’s final conclusion on the threat of Soviet influence on the Baloch was not as grim. Harrison asserted that while the Soviets saw a benefit from a fractured Pakistan, they did not see in the Baloch a group of people well organized and motivated along Marxist-Leninist lines.124 They were hopeful that a communist revolution would emerge within the Baloch, but were reticent to become directly involved.125 For their part, the Soviets enjoyed a good image among the Baloch as many Baloch sensed that the Soviets were friendly to underprivileged third world peoples.126 Consequently, the Baloch tribal leaders welcomed the idea of help from the Soviets.127 While Marxist ideologies did take some hold among the Baloch, most notably with Khair Bux Marri, the Sardar of the violent Marri tribe,

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122 Awan, Baluchistan, 317.
123 Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan," 137.
124 Ibid., 131, 138.
125 Ibid., 130.
126 Ibid., 137.
the Marxist ideology did not trump pushes for independence from Pakistan. It was this ideological lack of commitment that pushed Moscow away.\textsuperscript{128}

Kabul, on the other hand, has played a much larger role in supporting Baloch separatism. They provided political and logistical support to the first three Baloch insurgencies, most notably in the form of refuge from Islamabad. In the first insurgency, Abdul Karim, the prince of Kalat, staged his insurgency from Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{129} While there, he petitioned both Moscow and Kabul for support.\textsuperscript{130} According to Pakistani sources, Karim’s insurgency received significant support from Kabul, an assertion that Baloch nationalists deny.\textsuperscript{131} After getting released from jail, Abdul Karim launched the second Baloch insurgency. Islamabad insisted that again Karim had negotiated with Afghanistan for support of the insurgency.\textsuperscript{132} Despite being armed with little evidence of this assertion, the belief that Afghanistan was helping Baloch rebels continued. The third insurgency saw the most direct support from Kabul. Mohammad Daud, the prime minister of Afghanistan, permitted the Pararis, a large group of Baloch rebels, to establish two camps on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. While labeled “refugee camps,” the Pararis utilized them as their insurgent headquarters.\textsuperscript{133} As part of his pacification of the Baloch, Zia extended amnesty the Baloch rebels living in Afghanistan, thereby allowing their return to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{134}

A notable event involving foreign governments and the Baloch occurred in 1973. Tipped off by Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the Sardar of the Bugti tribe the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{128} Harrison, \textit{In Afghanistan’s Shadow}, 138.
\bibitem{129} Ibid., 26.
\bibitem{130} Niazi, “Democracy, Development and Terrorism,” 274.
\bibitem{131} Harrison, \textit{In Afghanistan’s Shadow}, 26.
\bibitem{132} Ibid., 28.
\bibitem{133} Ibid., 39.
\bibitem{134} Ibid., 40.
\end{thebibliography}
police in Islamabad uncovered a massive arms shipment in the Iraqi embassy.\textsuperscript{135} This shipment included five hundred Soviet submachine guns, a thousand grenades, and thousands of rounds of ammunition.\textsuperscript{136} The Pakistani media asserted that the weapons were destined for anti-Pakistan insurrectionists.\textsuperscript{137} Prime Minister Bhutto linked them to the Baloch.\textsuperscript{138} The Iraqi government claimed they were destined for Iranian Baloch rebels. Many now assert that Prime Minister Bhutto’s push to label the Pakistani Baloch as the arms’ recipients was a ploy to declare martial law days later.\textsuperscript{139}

It is clear that historically the Baloch have received outside assistance. However, it is also clear that this assistance has not been substantial. The Afghan government permitting the establishment of a few tent camps is much different than providing tanks, artillery, or direct maneuver support. For this reason, the Baloch of the third insurgency fought Iranian helicopter gunships with nineteenth century Enfield rifles.\textsuperscript{140} Is the fourth insurgency any different? If there is government-level assistance, is it more substantial than in the previous three insurgencies? What roles do the apolitical influences of drugs and gun smuggling play? This next section evaluates at possibilities of foreign governmental influence in today’s ongoing insurgency.

2. Foreign Government Influence

This thesis is not assuming that it will prove or disprove the existence of foreign meddling in the Baloch insurgency. While the Pakistani government maintains that it has ample evidence of Afghan and Indian involvement, most outside of Pakistan disagree. As of this publication, the government of Pakistan

\textsuperscript{135} Harrison, \textit{In Afghanistan's Shadow}, 35. Bugti’s actions not only describe how the Iraqi weapons scandal occurred. They also reveal the depth of rivalry between the Sardars.

\textsuperscript{136} Awan, \textit{Baluchistan}, 271.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{138} Harrison, \textit{In Afghanistan's Shadow}, 35.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.

has yet to make such evidence public. Recently, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asserted that there is no evidence of India’s involvement in Balochistan despite Pakistani allegations.\(^{141}\) Given the lack of published evidence, this section discusses the most common accusations from Pakistani sources and evaluates the interests of India and Afghanistan in the Baloch.

\subsection{Accusation: Indian Consulates}

Many Pakistanis assert that the strongest demonstration of India’s support of the Baloch insurgency has been in the form of an inordinate number of Indian consulates in Afghanistan. Khalid Khokar asserts that these 26 “centers of terrorism” are the primary conduits by which the Indians are “planning, commissioning and preparing acts of terrorism in Balochistan.”\(^{142}\) Khokar does not expand on his calculation of 26 consulates. The Indian government acknowledges only three consulates and one embassy.\(^{143}\) Pakistani Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed asserts that these consulates “serve as launching pads for undertaking covert operations against Pakistan from the Afghan soil.”\(^{144}\) There is an abundance of references in Indian and Pakistani periodicals to Indian activity in Afghanistan in support of the Baloch. However, nearly all are based upon anecdotal research and incomplete knowledge.

Therefore, it is important to consider the established facts. India does have three consulates in Afghanistan. Only one, Kandahar, is in close enough proximity to aid the Baloch. Is India unusual in having three consulates and one embassy in Afghanistan? Iran and Pakistan also have consulates in Kandahar. Pakistan also has consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. Regarding


\(^{144}\) Mariana Babaar, "How India is Fomenting Trouble in Pakistan via Afghanistan," \textit{The News}, April 15, 2006.
official consulates, India is not conducting any unusual activity. Khokar’s number (some report as many as 40 consulates) undoubtedly reflects the possibility that India is operating out of their consulates and out of a series of undeclared camps. This is a possibility. Consequently, the accusation of Indian consulates being used to support Baloch rebels cannot be dismissed outright. However, though, we should be reticent to accept it as established fact.

Furthermore, some Indian actions seem to indicate that Delhi may be supporting the insurgency through Afghanistan. At the conference of nonaligned states in Egypt last year, both Prime Ministers Gilani of Pakistan and Singh of India agreed to look at the Baloch issue. Many in the Indian press took this as a tacit admission of involvement with the Baloch. As previously stated, C. Christine Fair asserted that the Indian consulate in Iranian Balochistan has been a supporter of Baloch separatists there.

b. **Accusation: Advanced Supplies**

A convincing argument in support of the “foreign hand” argument is the improved military capabilities of the Baloch insurgency. As previously noted, the Baloch lack of outside support in the third insurgency forced them to fight with their nineteenth century rifles against Islamabad and Tehran’s jets, gunships, and artillery. The fourth insurgency has witnessed a marked change in insurgent technology. They have repeatedly utilized rockets, hand grenades, land mines, and advanced explosives in their operations. Furthermore, despite the duration of the fourth insurgency, now in its eighth year, the insurgents are still capable of launching many attacks. Without an industrial base, how are the Baloch acquiring such capabilities and technologies? Many point to a supply base coming from foreign governments sympathetic to the Baloch. This argument is compelling. However, foreign governments are not the only routes through which the Baloch can acquire advanced weaponry.

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c. *India’s Interests in Balochistan*

To assess the likelihood that India is “fomenting trouble in Balochistan,” it is important to consider India’s interests in such action. How could a destabilized Balochistan help India? Likewise, how could a successful Baloch insurgency hurt India? Some point to India’s strategic concerns, especially with respect to Pakistan. Concerned about denying Pakistan strategic depth, some argue that India has exploited Afghan-Pakistani tensions. By creating chaos in Pakistan’s western border regions, it eases India’s tensions on the India-Pakistan border and reduces the relevance of the Kashmir issue. While these factors may in some part describe India’s interests regarding Balochistan, they do not provide as clear a picture as India’s economic situation, especially as far as energy is concerned.

Economically, India seeks to retain its meteoric rise and ascendancy into the world’s great powers. Despite the current global economic downturn, India has sustained strong economic growth. Its gross domestic product (GDP) has consistently exceeded 6 percent since 2000. In 2008, India’s GDP growth outpaced the top 20 world economies. Critical to their economic progress has been a reliance on fossil fuels. Without these fuels, their economic infrastructure would grind to a halt. Unfortunately, Indian domestic energy resources cannot meet these energy requirements. India lacks the necessary deposits of oil, natural gas, and uranium to fuel its economy. Consequently, it has scanned the globe in search of energy partners to meet demands. In doing so, India has created relationships with nations in South America, Africa, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. The Baloch territories play into this picture, particularly regarding pipelines and the Gwadar port.

Pipeline geopolitics suggest that India is interested in the stability of the Baloch territories. As stated in the introduction of this thesis, the pipelines originating from Turkmenistan and Iran will transit Baloch homelands. Therefore, Baloch instability would be detrimental to Indian interests. International pipelines transiting these tribal areas would be opportune targets for insurgents. A primary
reason that the Baloch insurgent groups have repeatedly targeted natural gas pipelines is because it affects thousands of people downstream. For example, an explosion near Sui, a large Bugti tribe city, will affect gas customers in Karachi. This gives their cause more attention. If Baloch activity could affect gas supplies to India, it would raise the Baloch issue to a much higher level. Furthermore, India’s energy supplies would be insecure. The pipeline factor shows how Indian involvement in the Baloch insurgency could be detrimental to Indian energy interests.

However, Gwadar port (Figure 3) presents an alternative view of Indian interests. At Gwadar instability is beneficial to India. The project to build a deep-water, year-round operational hub port contains the potential to restore Pakistan’s economy while bolstering strategic and economic interests of China, Pakistan’s closest ally. Not surprisingly, India has criticized the development of the Gwadar port. India’s naval chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, said that Gwadar could be used by Pakistan to “take control over the world energy jugular.”146 In Gwadar, many see serious strategic implications for India. Gwadar port gives Beijing an “outpost on the Indian Ocean”147 as well as strategic depth to the Pakistani navy.

In response to the development of Gwadar, India is helping Iran with a competing project in Chabahar. India’s economic alliance with Iran is in direct response to the economic threat of Gwadar. Chabahar’s location, only 120 miles from Gwadar, is astonishingly close. It shares the Gwadar advantages of being outside the Strait of Hormuz and is accessible from Central Asia. India’s help in building Chabahar is helping to pave the way for Central Asian access. Although Chabahar is not as developed as Gwadar, it contains significant potential for Iran and India. Additionally, in 2003 the Indian Border Roads Organization announced plans to build a 200-kilometer road that would connect Chabahar to Afghanistan’s garland route.\textsuperscript{148} India has also forged an economic alliance with Afghanistan. In 2007, India became Afghanistan’s fifth largest donor with $750 million in aid given each year. India also took steps to include Afghanistan in the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation

\textsuperscript{148} Niazi, “Gwadar,” 2005.
India's goal in Afghanistan is to use it as a door through which they may gain access to the CARs. As India races Pakistan and China for access to Central Asia, a destabilized Balochistan is advantageous to India.

Additionally, Gwadar presents a threat to India's pursuit of regional hegemony. Ashley Tellis posits that "India seeks to provide a modicum of hegemonic stability...to the region at large." India's hegemonic power has been rooted in military victories while maintained by economic prowess. India has sought to maintain that position. Of critical importance to India's economy is India's ability to ship goods overseas. Hindrances in shipping lanes can severely damage their standing. India's principal economic competitor is China. India sees China as an external threat to Indian regional hegemony. Furthermore, India knows that Pakistan, through the help of an external partner, could limit India's hegemonic ambitions. As India looks out across its landscape, it sees growing Chinese influence surrounding it. The deep naval ties that China holds with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar serve to make India wary of Chinese involvement elsewhere in the Indian Ocean. Chinese involvement in Tibet and Nepal can only enhance an Indian sense of Chinese encirclement. Furthermore, as the regional hegemon of South Asia, they must maintain the status quo. Gwadar is upsetting to India as it is disrupting this regional stability. It affords Pakistan naval depth, offers the Chinese a future naval base, and guarantees a shifting of the balance of power in the Arabian Sea.

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151 Ibid.


Therefore, it is clear that Indian interests with the Baloch are by no means simple. Pipeline issues point away from Indian interest in Baloch instability. Gwadar port points in the opposite direction. A myriad of additional issues are tangentially related to this issue as well. India’s own concerns with domestic insurgencies, prospects of Indo-Pakistani rapprochement, and India’s image of a “responsible power,” as President Obama affirmed,\(^\text{155}\) head a list of additional Indian concerns with the Baloch issue. However, it seems that the only large benefit to supporting a Baloch insurgency is a reduced effectiveness of Gwadar port. While Gwadar does threaten Indian hegemonic perceptions, the price that India would pay in lost energy security, reduced international standing, as well as increased insurgent activity in India should not be ignored. This section now turns to Afghanistan and considers its interests in stoking the Baloch rebellion.

\[d. \quad \textbf{Afghanistan's Interests with the Baloch}\]

Afghanistan’s interests in the Baloch and their territory appear to be more linked to historical and ideological themes rather than economic factors. Afghanistan has traditionally been an advocate of Baloch separatism from Islamabad.\(^\text{156}\) Many perceive this interest to be founded in the concept of Pashtunistan, an ethnically based homeland for Pashtuns. Some concepts of Pashtunistan extend beyond the territories of Pashto-speaking peoples and include the Baloch as well. Figure 3 is a representation of a Pashtunistan that includes the Baloch tribal areas.


\(^{156}\) Harrison, \textit{In Afghanistan's Shadow}, 141.
This incorporation of the Baloch territories into Afghanistan links back to the seventeenth century. Ahmad Shah Durrani, then the king of Afghanistan, ruled over the Baloch state of Kalat for fourteen years. Consequently, when Kabul complains about the British-demarcated border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Durand Line, it occasionally includes the Baloch as part of their rightful territory. In 1978, the Afghan Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin said that the Durand Line “tore us apart” and that, “we will do our historical duty when the time is right.” As a result of this commitment to the Afghan interpretation of the Afghan-Pakistan border, Amin said that the “Baloch nationalist movement is very dear to us.” Naturally, today the inclusion of the Baloch territories into landlocked Afghanistan would have profound benefits for

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157 Harrison, *In Afghanistan’s Shadow*, 141.
158 Ibid., 144.
Afghanistan. While these benefits are apparent, Afghanistan will suffer from a loss of pipeline revenues if the TAPI pipeline is not established. This is contingent upon Baloch pacification.

Selig Harrison pointed out in 1981 that one glance at the map of Balochistan reveals its relevance to many international players. Many more countries have economic, strategic, and political interests in the integration of the Baloch people. This thesis does not analyze the interests of China, Iran, the United States, or Britain. It instead focuses on India and Afghanistan as politicians, journalists, and other Pakistani leaders most often cite them for causing the troubles with the Baloch. However, it is important now to turn to the potential of smuggling as a foreign source by which the Baloch can receive enhanced capabilities.

3. Apolitical Influence on Baloch Capabilities: Smuggling

The Baloch are intimately involved in the smuggling of drugs and guns in and out of Afghanistan. The export route for Afghan opium is most often via Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. Afghanistan’s most volatile region, Helmand province, borders the Chagai district, Balochistan province’s largest district. Baramcha, a city in Chagai, serves as a major smuggling center as well as a base for heroin production. The “kingpin” of Baramcha is Haji Juma Khan, a Baloch who, until his arrest in 2008, ran a large and powerful smuggling network. The smuggling of drugs, guns, and even inexpensive Iranian oil has caused the Iranian government to begin sealing the Iran-Pakistan border with a concrete fence. For the Baloch, illicit trade is lucrative. The income generated

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159 Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 2.
161 Ibid.
form illicit trading enhances Baloch insurgent capabilities. They can easily turn to the black market to acquire rockets, hand grenades, rifles, explosives, and ammunition.\(^{163}\)

Svante E. Cornell sees a direct link between the strength of insurgent resistance and the trafficking of narcotics. As the business of drugs gets tied in to insurgent groups, these groups get stronger while the state becomes weaker.\(^{164}\) This is not because of the narcotics themselves, but because of the economic power of the drug trade. Cornell’s argument is not that drugs cause wars, but that they are especially relevant to protracting a civil war.\(^{165}\) A result is that the insurgents begin to embrace economic motivations for continuing the war.\(^{166}\) Cornell’s arguments make sense when we consider the Baloch. If they integrate into Pakistan, the law and order situation would improve as far as Islamabad is concerned. This would mean improved border security and an increased amount of law enforcement along trafficking routes. As a result, smugglers would be profoundly affected by Baloch integration.

Therefore, the smuggling of drugs and guns provides a financial resource for the Baloch insurgency, props up involved Sardars, and reduces Baloch inclinations towards joining the Pakistani mainstream. It seems to answer the questions regarding the enhanced capabilities of the Baloch insurgency, especially with respect to advanced weapons. It also provides possible incentives to push the Baloch away from Islamabad.

C. COMPARING CULTURES, CAPABILITIES, AND RESPONSES

The Baloch theory posits that the culture and capabilities of the Baloch tribes are the determining factors in their resistance to integration into the Pakistani state. There is something particularly rebellious about the Baloch, who

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\(^{163}\) Grare, “Pakistan,” 10.


\(^{165}\) Ibid., 208.

\(^{166}\) Ibid., 209.
when combined with foreign enhancements to their capabilities, are increasingly unlikely to integrate into Pakistan. Baloch resistance is not due to the policies of Islamabad, the theory argues. Were this an accurate explanation of Baloch-Islamabad tensions, what would we find? We would find that in cases where Islamabad acted similarly to other peripheral ethnic groups, those groups would have displayed a differing level of integration than the Baloch. Other peripheral ethnic groups would have responded in a manner consistent with their culture and capabilities. If the Baloch theory is valid, we would not find many similarities in the integration of other ethnic groups, particularly groups whose culture and capabilities significantly differ from the Baloch.

This understanding forms the basis for a final evaluation of the Baloch theory. This section conducts an analysis of the Baloch theory by comparing the Baloch to the Bengalis of former East Pakistan. The Bengalis were an ethnic group culturally different and armed with very different capabilities when compared to the Baloch. Furthermore, they were on the receiving end of policies from Islamabad that are continuing in Baloch-oriented policies today. Therefore, if the Baloch theory is valid, we should expect to find that the resistance of the Bengalis to Islamabad was markedly different than today’s resistance of the Baloch. This would demonstrate that it is the Baloch culture and capabilities, not the actions of Islamabad, which push the Baloch away from national integration. However, if we find similarities in the Baloch and Bengalis in their reactions to the state, the Baloch theory may be brought into question. For a historical background of the Bengali grievances and the 1971 War, the author recommends Christophe Jaffrelot’s work, A History of Pakistan and its Origins.

1. **Case Selection**

To compare the Baloch to the Bengalis is not a new concept. Among the Baloch, nationalists are quick to draw comparisons between East Pakistan and the Baloch’s irredentist struggle. The Bengalis, after all, conducted a successful separatist movement that resulted in civil war, independence from Pakistan, and
the creation of Bangladesh. To illustrate this, a Baloch senator remarked, “the other day there was a delegation from Bangladesh sitting in the visitor’s gallery of the house, and if we don’t resolve matters, the next could be from Balochistan.”\textsuperscript{167} The separatists attempt to compare the Baloch to the Bengalis in order to show Islamabad that policies that caused the “second partition” in 1971 may cause a third. However, this thesis utilizes this comparison for a different purpose. A comparison of the Baloch to the Bengalis permits an analysis of the Baloch culture and capabilities and their responses to similar policies from Islamabad. While most critics of the Bengali-Baloch comparison highlight the differences between the two cultures, this analysis sees these differences as assets. The culture, history, and capabilities of the Baloch and the Bengalis are vastly different. Consequently, should the Baloch theory hold true, similar actions by Islamabad should produce different reactions from the Baloch than it produced from the Bengalis. In order to validate this case selection, this section first explains how the Baloch are different than the Bengalis. It then explains how the policies of Islamabad toward both were similar. Finally, this evaluation of the Baloch theory compares the reaction of both people groups.

2. Differences Between Bengalis and Baloch

It is important to note the differences between the Bengalis and the Baloch. Were the Baloch and Bengalis similar in their cultures and capabilities, it would be a pointless endeavor to compare their reactions to Islamabad through a lens of culture and capabilities.

a. Culture

Culturally, the Baloch share some similarities with Bengalis of East Pakistan. However, these similarities are few. Their only commonalities lie in religion and marriage. Both the Bengalis of East Pakistan and the Baloch have a population that predominantly consists of Sunni Muslims who follow the

\textsuperscript{167} Mohammad Malick, "Don't Turn Balochistan into Bangladesh," \textit{The News}, June 7, 2008.
moderate Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. They also both follow the custom of arranged marriages. However, after these two factors we see few similarities. Three areas of cultural differences are most evident. They are natural geography, human factors, and history.

Natural geographic factors define the first set of differences between the Baloch and the Bengalis. The Baloch occupy a large area of inhospitable deserts and harsh mountains. The Bengalis live in a much smaller area that is dominated by a large alluvial, deltaic plain. The Baloch live outside of the monsoon belt, while each year hundreds of Bengalis die in monsoon floods. Nineteen people per square kilometer occupy the Baloch lands. In 1974, three years after independence from Pakistan, the former East Pakistanis numbered 71 million, well over fourteen times the Baloch population. Furthermore, their small land area contributed to their population density being 460 people per square kilometer, 24 times the population density of the Baloch. This has tremendous social impacts as factors such as access to agriculture, conflict, and political structures reflect their geographical context. A factor stemming directly from physical geography is the peoples' lifestyles. The Baloch are predominantly nomadic people whose subsistence depends upon limited agriculture and pastoralism. Two-thirds of the Bengalis, on the other

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170 Gratton, Baluchi, 22.

171 Bertocci, Bengali, 29.

172 Gratton, Baluchi, 22.


175 Gratton, Baluchi, 22.
hand, are farmers, owing largely to the overabundance of water.\textsuperscript{176} Consequently, nearly all Bengalis, save the residents of Dhaka, live in small, established villages.\textsuperscript{177} Many Baloch spend their winters in tents as they herd their sheep, goats, cattle, and camels across the desert.\textsuperscript{178}

Human factors illustrate the next set of Baloch-Bengali differences. Demographically, the Bengalis outnumber the Baloch drastically. Bengali population hovers around 100 million, whereas most statistics claim that the Baloch of Pakistan are numbered at less than 5 million. This gives rise to their differences in social structure. Stemming from a need to control vast areas of terrain, the Baloch political structure developed into a hereditary chieftainship as discussed earlier. The Bengalis, owing largely to their densely packed population and village lifestyle, became dependent upon established governments to control political power.\textsuperscript{179} Among the Bengalis, a large-scale hierarchical system did not develop. However, we see that the Baloch are defined by the tribal system in which they operate. The Bengalis have no such tribal identity. Another product of this context is the propensity towards conflict among these peoples. The Baloch have a historical reputation of being a strong warrior class, owing to their need to defend their territory from foreign forces and other tribes.\textsuperscript{180} The Bengalis, though, see a much lower level of conflict. They were regarded by the British as an effeminate non-martial race\textsuperscript{181} and rarely see conflict escalate beyond the village level.\textsuperscript{182} A final critical human difference is the land structures among these peoples. Stemming from their chief-centered society, few Baloch own land. Traditionally among the Baloch, land is vested into

\textsuperscript{176} Bertocci, \textit{Bengali}, 30.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{178} Gratton, \textit{Baluchi}, 23.
\textsuperscript{179} Bertocci, \textit{Bengali}, 33.
\textsuperscript{180} Gratton, \textit{Baluchi}, 23.
\textsuperscript{181} Heather Streets, \textit{Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial India} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 168.
\textsuperscript{182} Bertocci, \textit{Bengali}, 33.
the tribe in a feudalistic system. The Bengalis, though, enjoy a high percentage of land ownership, individually owned on family farms.

A final set of key differences is evident in the histories of these people. First, we consider religion. Islam migrated with the Baloch when they migrated, according to tradition, from the Middle East. The Baloch consider themselves to be direct descendants of Amir Hamza, an uncle of the prophet Muhammad. Islam came to the Bengalis through Mughal conquest, long after the Baloch became Muslims. Furthermore, the Bengalis, while also Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School, are not universally Muslim. The Bengalis of East Pakistan represented roughly half of the total Bengali population in South Asia in 1947. The other half, mostly Hindus, occupied the Indian state of West Bengal. Even within the Muslim-majority East Pakistan, only 85 percent of the Bengalis were Muslim. The remainders were mostly Hindu with some Christians and Buddhist as well. An additional point of history that divides these peoples is the influence of the British. Throughout most of the British experience in India, the colonialists did not affect the Baloch. This changed in 1876 when the British bought off the Baloch leadership in order to create a buffer zone of crown-sympathetic tribes to counter Russian influence. As a result, the Baloch experienced 71 years of British indirect rule. The Bengalis, however, were the recipients of significant British influence. The East India Trading Company, the forerunner to the Raj, set its capital in the Bengali city of Calcutta. The British directly ruled over the Bengalis from 1757 to 1947. For 190 years, the Raj had tremendous influence on the Bengali way of life, to include the establishment of English as a medium for higher-level education. A final historical difference is

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183 Gratton, Baluchi, 23.
184 Bertocci, Bengali, 31.
185 Gratton, Baluchi, 22.
186 Bertocci, Bengali, 29.
187 Ibid., 33.
188 Ibid., 29.
seen in partition. The Muslims of Bengal fought to join Pakistan, celebrating when they became Pakistanis. The Baloch, however, resisted the government of Pakistan from, literally, “day one.”

**b. Capabilities**

Differences in their foreign-granted capabilities are also prevalent between the Baloch and the Bengalis. During their fight for independence from Pakistan, the Bengalis enjoyed an unequivocally direct hand of support from India. India openly trained the Bengali resistance, the Mukhti Bahini. They provided military training, protection, and weapons.\(^{189}\) When war did break out, India willingly deployed its own troops to fight Pakistan. The Baloch insurgencies have enjoyed some support from foreign sources. Specifically, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union provided sanctuary and some guidance to the Baloch. Iraq was accused of smuggling weapons to the Baloch. However, their support has never reached the level of India’s support to the Bengalis. Not once has a foreign army publicly deployed troops alongside the Baloch in their campaigns against Islamabad.\(^{190}\) Additionally, the Baloch profit significantly from the illicit trade of drugs and guns. The Bengalis did not have large-scale profits from such activities. Their foreign-based capabilities were significantly different than the Baloch.

We see that there is a substantial amount of cultural and capabilities-based differences between the Baloch and the Bengalis. Consequently, the Baloch theory predicts that, given the immense differences between these peoples, they should react differently to similar policies from Islamabad.

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\(^{190}\) Gratton, *Baluchi*, 23.
3. Similarities in Islamabad’s Actions

Thus far, this section has demonstrated that the cultures and capabilities of the Baloch and Bengalis are strikingly different. Consequently, this evaluation has two unique dependent variables, the reactive behaviors of the Baloch and the Bengalis to Islamabad. At this point, the evaluation assesses the independent variable, Islamabad’s policies. In order for this variable to be truly independent, though, this analysis must demonstrate that it has been nearly identical for both of the dependent variables. That is, the policies of Islamabad towards the Baloch must be similar to the policies of the Bengalis of East Pakistan.

Islamabad has employed similar policies and tactics among the Baloch that it did towards the Bengalis. As a result of these similar policies, this chapter is able to evaluate the influence of cultural differences between the two ethnic groups upon their resistances to national integration. The similar policies include the denial of democracy, natural resource expropriation, exclusion from national benefits, and excessive military force.

a. Denial of Democracy

Among the Bengalis of East Pakistan, three critical events revealed Islamabad’s refusal to extend full democratic rights to their countrymen. First was the One Unit Scheme, where the four provinces of West Pakistan were combined into one province to electorally marginalize the populous Bengalis.\(^{191}\) Second was the refusal of the central government to consider the Six Point Program, a proposal designed to grant the province of East Pakistan greater democratic rights.\(^{192}\) The final indication of democracy denied was the refusal of the Punjabi-dominated central government to permit the majority party, the Bengali-dominated Awami League to form a new government after the 1970 elections.\(^{193}\)

\(^{191}\) Niazi, “Democracy, Development and Terrorism,” 275.
\(^{192}\) Jaffrelot, A History of Pakistan, 52.
\(^{193}\) Ibid., 198.
For the Baloch, Islamabad also denied them democracy. As previously discussed in Chapter II, these political policies often resulted in heightened insurgent activities if not the start of new uprisings. So regarding political treatment, the Bengalis and the Baloch experienced similar policies.

b. Natural Resource Expropriation

The central government has made policies toward both the Baloch and the Bengalis to utilize their natural resources for the benefit of the central government. In East Pakistan, the primary resource concerned was jute. From 1962–1971, profits from jute exports provided Pakistan with over half of all foreign exchange earnings. At one point, Pakistan enjoyed a 65 percent market share of the global jute trade. The national government rapidly nationalized the jute trade. Despite the wealth of raw material in East Pakistan, the western province was the principal beneficiary. The government also controlled the foreign exchange rate at which East Pakistan would get paid for the jute. This was solely for the benefit of the central government.

For the Baloch, their experience is similar. As seen in Chapter II, the Baloch have consistently seen the center utilize their natural resources for the benefit of Islamabad. Resources under ground, over land, and on the coastline have come under direct control of Islamabad, often to the detriment of the Baloch. These policies have been a constant source of angst among the Baloch.

195 Ibid.
c. Exclusion from National Benefits

An additional similarity is the exclusion of the Bengalis and Baloch from national benefits. In East Pakistan, the central government’s policies excluded the Bengalis from their proper share of national income, aid, and other benefits. Despite their demographic dominance over West Pakistan, they continually saw international aid being used to finance projects in the West.\(^{198}\) Under President Ayub Khan, only one third of the national development was aimed at East Pakistan.\(^{199}\)

The Baloch, as previously discussed, have also experienced the government’s policies of economic exclusion. As a percentage of GDP, Balochistan has not experienced a rise in their share of the national income. In fact, it has declined. Between 1972–73 and 1999–2000, Balochistan’s share of the GDP declined from 4.5 to 3.7 percent.\(^{200}\) For natural gas, Balochistan received only 12.4 percent of its due royalties.

d. Excessive Military Force

A final component of similarity between Islamabad’s policies towards the Baloch and the Bengalis of East Pakistan is excessive military force. The Pakistani government has traditionally utilized military force against both the Baloch and the Bengalis as a tool to maintain their writ over the people. Among the Bengalis in East Pakistan, the violence exhibited on March 25, 1971, “Operation Searchlight,” sparked the 1971 Civil War. In Operation Searchlight, the Pakistani military, backed by pro-Pakistani militias and Islamic groups, attacked the campus of Dhaka University and other sites of resistance, to include Hindu villages.\(^{201}\) Following the outrage of these assassinations, Awami League chief Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s ally, Major Ziaur Rahman, officially declared

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\(^{199}\) Ibid., 50.


Throughout the next nine months, most estimate that between 1 and 3 million Bengalis lost their lives in the war. Rounaq Jahan asserts that the Army’s actions were clearly genocidal.203

Chapter II elaborated on the topic of military excess towards the Baloch. During each insurgency, the Army or other paramilitary forces have conducted operations that go beyond the normally accepted pale of appropriate uses of force. Consequentially, it is clear that the Baloch experienced the same policies felt by the Bengalis.

4. Comparing the Baloch and Bengali Reactions

As previously discussed, the response to many of the Islamabad policies towards the Baloch has been armed struggle. Their four insurgencies coincide with controversial policies from Islamabad. Granted, these policies often found their genesis in a desire by Islamabad to integrate the Baloch into Pakistan. When the military coerced the Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan, it was for the purpose of Baloch integration. When One Unit unified West Pakistan, it was, arguably, to integrate the western province and prevent dominance from the Bengalis. When Musharraf pursued economic mega-projects in southern Balochistan, a stated goal was the improvement of the lives of the Baloch.204 However, each of these policies and strategies aimed at integration has resulted in protest, strikes, violence, and an insurgent, anti-integration campaign.

We find a similar result among the Bengalis. They likewise protested, conducted province-wide strikes, and rioted. They also mounted political campaigns to voice their grievances. Like the Baloch, the Bengalis launched an insurgent campaign under the name Mukhti Bahini. This group conducted a guerilla campaign for the state of Bangladesh.205

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202 Jaffrelot, A History of Pakistan, 56.
204 Schmidle, To Live or To Perish Forever, 70.
205 Jaffrelot, A History of Pakistan, 75.
These similarities in behaviors from two significantly different peripheral ethnic groups suggest a weakness in the Baloch theory. Certain aspects of the Baloch theory may contribute to the problem of Baloch-Islamabad tensions. Specifically, the role of the Sardar is conclusive. Should the Sardars uniformly submit to Islamabad’s rule, the problem of Baloch-Islamabad tensions could disappear overnight. However, this evaluation of the theory offers conclusive evidence that the culture and capabilities of the Baloch are not the principle reasons for the problems between them and Islamabad.

D. CONCLUSION

The Baloch theory posits that the culture and capabilities of the Baloch most adequately explains the difficulty in their integration into Pakistan. The culture of the Baloch puts the Sardar at the helm of the tribe. According to the theory, the Sardar’s refusal to submit to Islamabad is due to their desire to maintain their political power and influence. So, until the Sardars submit, there can be no integration. The Baloch theory sees this as a primary cause of the Baloch tribes’ failure to integrate. By studying the anthropological evidence of the nature of hierarchical tribes, it is clear that the role of the Sardars cannot be underestimated. Their submission to Islamabad could spell an end to the Baloch-Islamabad tensions. However, when comparing the Sardars’ reactions to Britain in 1876 to their reactions to Pakistan after 1947 suggests that the role of the central government ought not be ignored either.

The theory also sees the influence of foreign sources upon the capabilities of the Baloch resistance as key to the problem. If there is a “foreign hand” of influence among the Baloch, be it a foreign government or apolitical smuggling, it would serve to push them away from Islamabad. It certainly cannot help them integrate into Pakistan. This analysis finds no conclusive proof of foreign activity with the Baloch and doubts its relevance. However, It seems that the most significant and demonstrable foreign factor is the illicit drug trade. This shores up the insurgency and provides disincentives to integration.
Finally, this chapter compared the Baloch to the Bengalis of East Pakistan. It found that despite differing culture and capabilities, they reacted in much the same manner towards similar policies from Islamabad. This leads us to conclude that factors of culture and capability can contribute to tensions between Islamabad and peripheral ethnic groups. However, it is far more likely that the incipient causes are external to those groups.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. TWO THEORIES

This thesis addressed the two competing theories of the problems between the Baloch and Islamabad. On one hand is the Islamabad theory. This theory claims that it is the policy of Islamabad and their strategies for attaining integration with the Baloch that has caused the lack of integration. This theory contains three key components. The first is the denial of democracy. This component argues that Islamabad’s denial of democracy to the Baloch has been the driving force pushing the Baloch away from integration. The second component is economic exploitation. Citing natural resource expropriation, detrimental financial policies, and exclusion from national benefits, this component asserts that Islamabad’s economic policies towards the Baloch have hindered integration. The Islamabad theory also argues that military excess towards the Baloch has not caused them to acquiesce and integrate with the nation. Instead, it has pushed them further away. This thesis then demonstrated the correlative nature of Baloch insurgent attacks and Islamabad’s policies throughout the fourth insurgency. It then evaluated the response of the Baloch by looking at levels of insurgent attacks. It found overwhelming evidence of a correlation between “sticks” and increased violence, as well as between “carrots” and decreased violence. It showed that the Baloch insurgency is strongly affected by policy events originating in Islamabad. This created a strong predictive tool for future policy choices. It also gave significant support to the Islamabad theory.

The second theory that this thesis addressed was the Baloch theory, an argument advocated by many in Pakistan. This theory posits that it is the conditions within the Baloch people that have made national integration so difficult. Two principle components emerge from this theory. First is the cultural argument. This argument asserts that the Sardars, the chiefs of the Baloch tribes, and their associated hierarchical system, the Sardari system, is a major
impediment to the national integration of the Baloch. The second component of the Baloch theory is the capabilities argument. It argues that the capabilities of the Baloch to resist integration into Pakistan have been significantly heightened because of foreign influences on the Baloch. From foreign nations, namely India and Afghanistan to apolitical sources of influence, namely drugs and weapons smuggling, the foreign influences on the Baloch enable them to push away from Islamabad. We further evaluated this theory by comparing the responses of the Baloch to Islamabad with the responses of the East Pakistani Bengalis to Islamabad. If the Baloch theory was the best explanation of the Islamabad-Baloch tensions, an analysis of these two peoples would yield different results in the reactions of these people groups to Islamabad. Analysis instead demonstrated that the Bengalis of East Pakistan and the Pakistani Baloch reacted in a very similar manner to the policies of Islamabad. This left the Baloch theory weakened.

While the analysis demonstrated that the Baloch theory was likely not the prime cause of tensions between Islamabad and the Baloch, it did yield valid understandings about the hurdles to integration. While not the instigators of the ongoing problems, the Sardars are in a hierarchical position to alleviate these tensions and integrate into Pakistan. They are also, consequently, in a position to continue resistance and push for a separate nation. The role of the Sardars is key.

B. RESULTS

This thesis evaluated both theories in detail. In doing so, it achieved the following results. Under the Baloch theory, it found that the cultural argument contributes significantly to the understanding of the Baloch problem. It is extremely difficult for Islamabad to integrate a people whose powerful leaders stand in direct opposition to Islamabad’s control. Furthermore, this thesis found that international influence is a factor among the Baloch. In particular, the Baloch involvement in the illicit drug trade demands more attention. However,
international involvement is not significant enough to completely describe the reasons for Baloch difficulty in integration. Furthermore, as we saw with the comparative study of the East Pakistani Bengalis to the Baloch, culture and capabilities did not determine the propensity of these people to fight Islamabad’s policies. Consequently, the Baloch theory is likely not the primary cause of the failure of the Baloch to integrate into Pakistan.

Following analysis of the Islamabad theory, this thesis found that Islamabad’s policies towards the Baloch have often backfired, resulting in less integration. The most important policy has been the denial of democracy throughout Pakistan’s history. This seems to delegitimize Islamabad in the eyes of the Baloch and only furthers their discontent. In addition to the political component to the Islamabad theory, the economic policies of Islamabad have likewise pushed the Baloch away from integration. Biased policies, economic marginalization, and the denial of resources, have fostered strong nationalist sentiments. The issue of military excess towards the Baloch damages chances for their national integration. As a result, we saw that the policies of Islamabad towards the Baloch are probably the primary reason why we see the Baloch-Islamabad tensions today.

While this analysis shows that the Islamabad theory best explains the problems one sees in the Baloch-Islamabad relationship, it is dangerous to eliminate the Baloch theory. One cannot look at the Baloch situation from the position of only one of these theories. Appropriate analysis of problems between Islamabad and the Baloch must include both theories. In particular, analysis must bear in mind the power of the Baloch culture as embodied in the Sardari system. To ignore this is to ignore a critical component of the Baloch-Islamabad problem. Additionally, one should not forget the power of democracy among the Baloch. Democracy denied will invariably result in violent uprisings.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS

The final section of this thesis makes recommendations to policymakers in the United States, Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan. They reflect the author’s desire to see the Baloch integrated into the mainstream of Pakistani social, political, and economic life. These recommendations also reflect the author’s desire to see a peaceful, prosperous Pakistan as well as a stable subcontinent.

1. United States

As relations with Pakistan continue to be vital to U.S. policy in South Asia, the United States should take the following four steps.

First, the United States needs a cadre of policy makers who understand the principles outlined in this thesis. The Baloch-Islamabad problem does not currently pose such a critical issue as the Taliban in Pakistan. However, while not a “hot issue,” it is clear that if left unchecked, the Baloch problem could have significant strategic implications. In conversations with military officers at the author’s institution, a military graduate school, it became evident that few leaders are aware of Pakistan’s “other” problem. Kissinger’s ignorance in 1962 is still reflected in many parts of the U.S. government today.

Second, as seen by this thesis, the presence of democracy for the Baloch leads to a decrease in violence. The United States should encourage Pakistan to keep democratic gains intact. While not a new issue in Islamabad-Washington dialogues, the maintenance of democracy in Pakistan is vital for its survival.

Third, the Obama administration has placed more emphasis on accountability for the aid given to Pakistan. The Kerry-Lugar Bill symbolizes this as it places significant conditions on U.S. financial backing of Pakistan. While this has angered many in Pakistan, it is a responsible step away from previous funding. It is an affront to American interests for the advancement of democracy to arm Pakistani action against the Baloch. Additionally, Washington must be careful as it considers the sale of unmanned aerial vehicles to Pakistan. These
drones, while touted as being “unarmed,” could be easily modified and used to strike Baloch villages. This will only exacerbate the problem in Balochistan.

Finally, the United States must place a greater emphasis on stemming the tide of illegal drugs out of Afghanistan. This provides funding for the Baloch insurgents and weakens the law and order situation in Balochistan. It may also, as argued in this thesis, give incentive for the insurgents to continue their fight and avoid resolution.

2. Pakistan

Undoubtedly, the player with the greatest challenge in this situation is the government of Pakistan. It has options, though, which must be considered if it wants to avoid a worst-case scenario in Balochistan.

First, Pakistan needs to ensure that democracy is a fixed element of Baloch society. This is the fastest way to achieve Baloch integration. The transition to civilian rule following Musharraf’s departure is encouraging. Furthermore, the deliberate steps of the Senate in 2005 and President Zardari in 2008 to address Baloch grievances have proven to reduce violence.

The ultimate crisis among the Baloch is the lack of legitimacy for Islamabad. In the Baloch mind, the government, an outside source of authority, is illegitimate. What can Islamabad do to change this situation? The government of Pakistan asserts that Indian rule over Indian administered Kashmir is illegitimate without a plebiscite confirming India’s authority. This thesis challenges Pakistan to extend the same logic to Balochistan. Were the government to win a plebiscite in Balochistan, particularly among the Baloch tribes, it would be a massive blow to the insurgency and would significantly bolster Baloch integration.

The second major challenge for Islamabad is to address the Sardari system. Islamabad must understand the Sardari system and work with it, not
against it. It must learn how to co-opt the Sardars as the British did. It must encourage dialogue between the center and the periphery.

The government of Pakistan needs to refrain from utilizing their military to establish their authority among the Baloch. As this thesis demonstrates, military action against the Baloch increases insurgent violence and creates long lasting memories. This includes disappearances and the excessive use of paramilitary forces.

Finally, the government of Pakistan needs to extend economic opportunities to Baloch, especially in Gwadar. While Gwadar port was initially billed as an economic boon to the locals, it has not proven that way. Baloch fears of Gwadar upsetting their majority in Balochistan are gaining traction in recent news reports.206

If Pakistan can continue the pattern of democracy in Baloch, refrain from military excess, reach out to the Sardars, and provide economic development, the situation with the Baloch may be brought back from the brink. Furthermore, it is possible that the Baloch could actually integrate into the mainstream of Pakistani life.

3. India and Afghanistan

While the international community is not in agreement on India’s or Afghanistan’s involvement with the Baloch separatist movement, one thing is clear. Involvement is not in their best interests. It is detrimental to regional stability and compromises their security as well as energy interests in the region. A destabilized Balochistan spells only trouble for both India and Afghanistan.

Consequently, the governments of India and Afghanistan should cease operations, if any exist, which promote the instability of Pakistan. They should assist the Baloch in creating the conditions within Pakistan and Afghanistan to receive the TAPI pipeline, which will transit both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

D. CONCLUSION

All parties involved with the Baloch and Pakistan must understand that we cannot examine the Baloch-Islamabad problem through the lens of only one theory. This problem is not strictly a result of the Baloch people and their environment, hostile that it is to integration. Nor is this problem completely the fault of the central government of Pakistan. As policymakers appreciate the points enumerated in this thesis, a more complete image of the Baloch-Islamabad tensions will arise.
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