BUILDING CAPACITY FROM WITHIN: THE NEED FOR A ROTARY WING SFA CAPABILITY

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Building Partnership Capacity from Within: The Need for a Rotary Wing SFA Capability

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The latest National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy are replete with guidance for building partnership capacity (BPC). Although the United States has executed similar type operations since the 1950s, but under the guise of other operational constructs, they were relatively small-scale and received little attention at the strategic level. In an era of persistent conflict, some senior leaders within the military are beginning to realize the importance of BPC and its direct linkage to national security. However, much like past efforts, BPC related activities lack a concerted focus as does the types of units designated or designed to conduct this unique type of training, particularly in the field of rotary wing aviation. This paper examines strategic guidance for BPC, depicts a strategic environment that requires the force to be re-balanced, reviews historical examples in which bureaucracy and inter-service rivalries hampered over-all training efforts, and on-going BPC efforts utilizing current aviation force structure and “specialized” units. This paper concludes with a series of recommendations that support the development of a Joint Rotary Wing Security Force
Assistance (SFA) organization along with the utilization of general purpose aviation forces to meet future BPC demands.
Training is a significant and vital method of furnishing military assistance to most of the less developed countries. The training, carried out both in the United States...and in recipient countries can do far more than merely teach recipients to use military equipment and materials. It brings foreign nationals into close contact with United States citizens under conditions which tend to promote an appreciation of the values of our civilization and way of life.

—Composite Report of the President’s Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program

Strategic Guidance and Direction

This statement, made in 1959, by Committee Chairman William H. Draper underscores the importance of what is termed today as “Building Partnership Capacity,” otherwise referred to as “BPC.” Although naming conventions have varied over the years and terminology has been broadly defined, one constant remains, and that is the United States recognition of effective partnering with developing countries and its direct linkage to national security.

Although the term “Building Partnership Capacity” is relatively new, the concept is not. As far back as 1950, the United States sought to assist developing and/or vulnerable countries through various means, for two primary reasons. First, providing support to lesser developed countries located in strategically important regions of the world enables those countries to secure their borders and strengthen their internal security. Secondly, by possessing internal security, external players within that region pose less of a threat. During the bi-polar era of the Cold War, the only external threat given much attention was the Soviet Union and the potential spread of Communism in the Western Hemisphere. As a result, the United States pursued an aggressive
campaign during the 1970’s and 1980’s throughout Latin and Central America in the form of military assistance programs. Although limited in scope and grossly under-funded, these programs proved effective in assisting governments combating leftist insurgents, supplied and trained by Cuban guerilla cadres, who in turn were supported by the Soviet Union.¹

The United States’ strategy for BPC comes in many forms, many of which stem from the Department of Defense (DoD). It is important to understand the framework and direction of the strategic guidance set forth by DoD and their plan to support the effort. This paper will examine four subject areas to determine whether or not DoD should invest in building capacity from within its formations or through the development of new or “specialized” organizations. First, a review of the most recent National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) and Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), as it pertains to BPC, will show that this unique mission has recently received immense focus and has become a means by which “The Long War” can be won. Second, a brief portrayal of the strategic environment suggests that the United States is involved in a “persistent conflict” in which the greatest enemy is time. Unlike combat operations of the past, there may be no definable end that looks like victory as it is commonly viewed from an American perspective; therefore, the traditional mindset amongst senior military leaders as it pertains to organizational transformation must change. Third, the episodic evolution of past capacity building efforts undertaken by the United States military reveal some inter-service rivalries as well as intra-service rivalries (which still exist today) on how and who best is suited for such a unique mission. Fourth, organizing for
BPC activities will prove to be a significant challenge in what is known as a VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous) environment. So, should DoD invest in “specialized” forces or rely on general purpose forces (GPF) to conduct BPC activities; or is a combination of both of these type forces the solution when the demand exceeds capacity, as is currently the case in Iraq and Afghanistan and for the foreseeable future? In an attempt to answer the previous question, this paper will address incremental steps for growth within the current force structure that will provide potential solutions for both current and future capacity building capabilities. Finally, additional recommendations using the DOTLMPF (doctrine, organization, training, leader development, material, personnel, and facilities) construct will provide a holistic approach that DoD can use to identify where specific shortcomings and deficiencies exist.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) and the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) are the four major documents that assist in determining key priorities, direct force planning, and ultimately describe the campaign plan construct.² These four principal documents are replete with guidance and direction for BPC. Specifically, the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) refers to BPC in its description of the strategic framework by stating “Our strategy seeks to build the capacity of fragile or vulnerable partners to withstand internal threats and external aggression while improving the capacity of the international system itself to withstand the challenge posed by rogue states and would-be hegemons.”³ It goes onto state that the essential ingredients of long-term successes of capacity building are economic development, institution building, establishing the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation and good
governance, providing basic services to the people, and training and equipping indigenous military and police forces.\textsuperscript{4} The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS), which is the implementation tool of the NDS, but unfortunately pre-dates the latest NDS, recognized the importance of BPC and termed it as “SC (Security Cooperation) complements other national-level efforts to prevent conflict and promote mutual security interests. These activities encourage nations to develop, modernize and transform their own capabilities, thereby increasing the capabilities of partners and helping them to help themselves.\textsuperscript{5} The draft 2008 NMS, which was never published primarily due to the ongoing presidential election and subsequent Bush-Obama transition, did maintain the theme of BPC by emphasizing capacity building through persistent engagement of allied and international partners.\textsuperscript{6}

In lieu of the 2008 NMS, the GDF and GEF were produced and released. These two key documents are more directive in nature in that they provide a start point for military planners to refine the objectives set forth in the NDS and NMS. In a paper published by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7, LTG James D. Thurman, entitled \textit{Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Conflict}, he cites the 2008 GDF requirement to reduce specific capability gaps within the force by:\textsuperscript{7}

- Increase capabilities to build partner capacity by training, advising, and assisting foreign security forces as well as interdependent joint force/interagency packages proficient in performing large-scale civil-military operations needed for stability operations and enabling/transitioning civil authorities.

- Reduce capability gaps in GPF (General Purpose Forces) capability to deploy, plan, and execute missions with indigenous forces and the capability to synchronize and support stability operations.
• Increase DoD capability and capacity to train and equip foreign forces at the operational and tactical levels and to advise foreign defense ministries and military institutions at the strategic level. Efforts should focus on closing gaps in the capability and capacity to train, advise, and assist foreign forces for the purpose of internal defense, stability operations, and counterinsurgency.

Likewise, other services have published similar correspondence which examines the requirements set forth in these strategic documents. For example, the Air Force published its own guidance entitled *Air Force Global Partnership Strategy: Building Partnerships for the 21st Century*. In it, it details the ends, ways, and means for their specific service to build partnership capacity. Specifically, its four primary objectives are:

- Establish, sustain, and expand Global Partnerships that are mutually beneficial.
- Provide global partners the capability and capacity necessary to provide for their own national security.
- Establish the capacity to train, advise, and assist foreign air forces, while conducting partnership activities using USAF Airmen with the appropriate language and cultural skills.
- Develop and enhance partnership capabilities to ensure interoperability, integration, and interdependence, as appropriate.

Because BPC is not an official doctrinal term per se, the separate armed services are charged with the mission of translating the strategic guidance into definable doctrinal missions by which commanders and staffs can plan and execute upon. Common amongst all the services are the accepted doctrinal terms that fall within the context of BPC, such as Security Assistance (SA), Security Cooperation (SC), and
Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Each of these terms has a separate and distinct meaning and are primarily executed by the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Another term, similar to the BPC in that it is relatively new in the military lexicon, is Security Force Assistance (SFA). It is defined as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.” Although not considered a statutory program like the previously mentioned activities, its primary purpose is to streamline the military component’s efforts of SA, SC, and FID, not including economic and governance issues. Table 1 below depicts how SFA relates with other security cooperation activities.

Figure 1: Relationship of Security Force Assistance with Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, and Foreign Internal Defense

Beyond simply defining these terms, is the responsibility for assigning proponency to execute these complex programs. In the past, each service has seen fit
to interpret strategic guidance somewhat differently which has led to a decentralized effort on behalf of DoD while conducting BPC related activities. Furthermore, organizations within each of the services have often created capability gaps that have hampered collective BPC efforts in support of security cooperation programs. SFA attempts to cut across the legacy security cooperation activities to effectively integrate efforts across DoD components.\textsuperscript{11} To provide more rigor to the application of SFA across DoD, the Deputy Secretary of Defense assigned proponency to several departments. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was designated as the military component Joint SFA proponent with the charter of leading the collaborative development and integration of all SFA activities.\textsuperscript{12} Embedded within this proponency is the responsibility to coordinate with the Service Chiefs to identify shortfalls and capability gaps within their respective forces, and in turn make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to resolve SFA issues.

To date, the US Army is the only component that has applied an SFA methodology while anticipating future force requirements. But the majority, if not all, of the Army future force requirements revolve around the brigade-based full-spectrum force called the Brigade Combat Team. The Army began the transformation process of brigade combat teams in 2003. Because it is considered a full-spectrum capable force, multiple enablers (e.g. logistical support, military intelligence, signal support, etc) automatically fall within the design construct.

Army Aviation, however, which has the inherent mission of providing direct support to land component forces, has typically lagged behind “Big Army” during times
of transformation. This is largely due to its supporting function within the maneuver arm of the Army, but more importantly because of the fiscal issues associated with transformation. Historically, Army Aviation has seen fit to invest the majority of its allocated budget in modernization, procurement, upgrading existing aviation systems, developing new systems, and buying off-the-shelf equipment. This rubric has served the Army well thus far, but may need to adapt to a new environment.

Current and future operations dictate a paradigm shift. If Army Aviation is committed to supporting not only the brigade combat team, but DoD writ large, throughout the spectrum of conflict, it too requires the capacity and capabilities to operate in Phase 0 (Shaping Operations) through Phase 4 (Stability Operations).

**Strategic Environment**

Today’s U.S. Armed Forces were structured principally to conduct major combat operations, but what some may find surprising is that the military history of the United States is one characterized by “limited” operations, interrupted by episodes of major combat.13 Historically, the challenge for military planners has been building the right force for the future fight; because the United States military was designed to do one thing…fight and win the nation’s wars. Recently, HQDA established a working group made up of representatives from the operations and intelligence communities as well as senior Army leaders to assess future force structure requirements given the future security environment.14 The findings of the group were initially published in a CSA (Chief of Staff of the Army) White Paper and expounded upon in an article written by General George Casey, entitled “America’s Army In an Era of Persistent Conflict.”15 It outlines the following characteristics needed in the future force:
• Versatile – units with scalable force packages and equipped with adaptable equipment capable of defeating/preventing a wide range of unpredictable threats.\textsuperscript{16}

• Expeditionary – units organized and trained to operate across the spectrum of conflict on a small-scale basis and possess a working knowledge of the host nation language/populace.\textsuperscript{17}

• Interoperable - units capable of operating in conjunction with coalition forces or by, with, and through host nation partners.\textsuperscript{18}

Past, current, and potential future conflicts provide ample evidence to re-balance the force taking into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of technological advancements juxtaposed with the human, cultural, and political aspects of capacity building efforts.

Episodic Evolution

There’s an old saying \textit{where the head goes--the body will follow}; such has been the case in Army Aviation when it comes to transformation. Army Aviation came into its own as a result of the Howze Board conducted in 1962. Out of the desire to control rotary wing assets in the close air support role, the Army cited two specific areas which were of most concern to leaders during that time, scheduling and timing. The Army believed that only through the direct control of organic assets could the difficulty associated with these two areas be eliminated. Also, since the division was the primary land component force best suited for combined arms, and the use of rotary wing assets during engagements was more responsive than U.S. Air Force assets, the aircraft should be organic to Army divisions.\textsuperscript{19}
This mindset, although beneficial in the beginning and through much of the Cold War Era, has longed since plagued senior leaders when developing force structure. Until recently, Army Aviation has not experienced sweeping changes in its formations, mainly because senior Army leaders have traditionally focused their efforts on ground force transformation. This allowed aviation senior leaders to focus on what was most important at the time, technology instead of structure.

As the Army begins to divest itself of the “Cold War force Structure” into types of units that are considered high-demand- low density (HDLD), Army Aviation needs to follow suit to meet future demands. A recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report to Congress provided the following information while addressing the debate surrounding the creation of special U.S. Army units to meet future security requirements:

While the Army has recently changed from a division-based force to a brigade-centric force, it has resisted the creation of special units to deal with counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory operations. In contrast, there have been a number of proposals to create new units and organizations better suited to address the challenges of these mission areas. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ recent challenge to the Army to organize and prepare for asymmetric warfare and advising and training foreign armies could renew and elevate this debate.

If Army leaders, specifically in the aviation community, heed the Secretary of Defense’s challenge, it would be prudent for them to look to the past in order to examine the episodic evolution of organizations that are best suited to address the challenges mentioned above.

Unlike the Army, the U.S. Air Force approached new roles and missions from a somewhat different perspective. Responding to a mandate made by President John F. Kennedy’s in 1961 to develop a “wholly different kind of force and a wholly different kind
of military training”21, the Air Force activated the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron. The Army’s response (primarily land-based focus) to the mandate was to re-focus the mission of Special Forces from guerilla operations to counter-guerilla operations22.

The 4400th, soon to be subordinate to the newly formed Special Air Warfare Center, was equipped with a wide array of rotary and fixed wing aircraft. The squadron was designed to train foreign air force personnel in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, a newly developed theory/strategy used to “indirectly” fight an enemy.23 The U.S. Army’s response to both the Presidential Directive and the Air Force’s initiative was seen as an attempt to take full responsibility of COIN operations, which the Vietnam War was categorized as prior to the build-up in 1965.24 To counter the Air Force’s effort, the Army forwarded a message to Secretary of Defense McNamara that outlined a plan for sole-proponency of counter-insurgency operations in Vietnam.25 Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay objected out of fear that the Army would attempt to provide its own air support if the Air Force did not, and pursued a plan to expand the COIN capabilities within the Air Force. Despite the inter-service rivalries, the squadron operated successfully training and advising Vietnamese aircrews for four years until the United States began its build-up of forces in 1965; after which its mission shifted mostly to direct action in support of conventional land operations.26 As the war escalated, so did the efforts of building capacity within the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). An organization known as the Military Assistance Command –Vietnam (MAC-V) had the mission of assisting the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to maintain internal security against subversion and insurgency and to resist external threats. MAC-V undertook the
massive role of *Vietnamization* in 1967 in an attempt to relieve the burden of U.S. armed forces from supporting ARVN combat operations and eventually allow the withdrawal of U.S. forces. A major effort during the *Vietnamization* process was the delivery of over 500 helicopters and subsequent training of helicopter crews and maintenance personnel.\(^{27}\) The decision to expand the capabilities of the South Vietnamese Air Force came as a result of General W. Momyer, the Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV) deputy for air and the Seventh Air Force Commander, decision to "provide the VNAF with the capability to assume complete support for the ARVN."\(^{28}\) This caused major concern within the Army due to the fact that the helicopters scheduled for use by U.S. units would now be diverted to the VNAF. The overall expansion effort was further complicated because of the misperception of roles and responsibilities between the two services. At the time, the Air Force had proponency for advising the Vietnamese Air Force which owned all the helicopters; however, Army aviation units had conducted the majority of the training undergone by VNAF helicopter units and crews. Army aviation units had also operated with VNAF helicopter units for years leading up to the build-up effort.\(^{29}\) To further complicate the build-up, MAC-V assigned Army advisors and a U.S. Army Combat Aviation Group the mission of training new VNAF helicopter units.\(^{30}\) This elaborate expansion effort went far beyond basic helicopter training. In 1969, Department of the Army approved a plan to train over 3,000 Vietnamese pilots and mechanics not only in aviation-related skills, but English-language proficiency.\(^{31}\) In 1971 MACV completed its helicopter activation program and touted it as a success; however, it had significantly curtailed helicopter support to U.S. Army combat units.\(^{32}\)
Throughout the remaining years of U.S. presence in Vietnam, rivalry between the Army and the Air Force remained a constant source of conflict, primarily due to each service’s doctrinal perception of how aviation is best utilized when supporting ground forces. The Army’s view was that organic assets that habitually operate with ground forces are best suited to support ground operations, whereas the Air Force maintained its historical position of centralized control of all aviation assets.\(^{33}\)

The post-Vietnam era had a dramatic effect on all the military services due to the largely perceived defeat in what was considered a “limited war”. Not only were the conventional forces gutted, but units across the services that were activated to conduct COIN operations, specifically the unique mission of training indigenous forces, all but disappeared. DoD shifted its focus back to one of high intensity conflict which mostly overshadowed the proponents for maintaining a force that specialized in COIN operations.

Not until the early 1980s did DoD realize the effects of their self-imposed constraints of solely focusing on high intensity operations. Desert One, the failed rescue attempt of American hostages in Iran in April of 1980, became the catalyst for re-prioritizing DoD efforts to develop organizations and capabilities to conduct operations outside the high intensity conflict spectrum.

COIN, as it was referred to throughout the 1960s and 70s, had morphed into a new mission set known as Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Formally written into doctrine by the newly formed United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), FID became an impetus for both the Army and the Air Force to garner resources within their respective special operations communities. The Air Force Special
Operations Command cited a Joint Mission Analysis conducted by USSOCOM that called for an aviation-FID capability with “uniquely skilled personnel and for short take-off and landing aircraft.” in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) area of responsibility.\textsuperscript{34} As a result, AFSOC submitted a statement of needs to USSOCOM calling for the development of a unit solely dedicated to conducting FID operations.\textsuperscript{35} The Army however, expressed reservations as it normally had in the past when such matters arose concerning aviation roles and responsibilities. In 1991, General Carl Stiner, USSOCOM Commander, directed that the evolving aviation-FID be “joint”, which meant both Army SOF and Air Force SOF equipment and personnel be assigned to a single unit. United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), along with the United States Aviation Center (USAAVNC), resisted the initiative and claimed that such scarce resources should not be dedicated to an aviation-FID capability, but rather should be dedicated to providing direct support to special operations ground forces as it was currently doing with the 160\textsuperscript{th} Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). Also, the resistance was primarily rooted in the fear that ongoing initiatives to modernize the fleet of aircraft assigned to the 160\textsuperscript{th} SOAR would be jeopardized.\textsuperscript{36}

The historical constraints of developing capabilities within our own force to provide adequate capacity building efforts to partner nations still exist today. Four decades of operational experience coupled with the on-going efforts today in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate the cost of not being prepared. DoD has a choice -- either maintain the status quo and accept that for each conflict there will be separate and desynchronized effort that “rushes” to build capacity, or organize a capability designed to
provide partner nations with a focused, capabilities-based approach to build capacity throughout the spectrum of conflict.

Organizing for Rotary Wing Security Force Assistance

The success of BPC lies within the organization(s) conducting the actual mission. The 2008 GEF specifies eight means in achieving the strategic goal of “Winning the Long War,”\textsuperscript{37} two of which focus on force structure. First, military planners within the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) must take into consideration “The Total Force”\textsuperscript{38} when developing security cooperation programs. The depth and breadth of future BPC-related missions far exceeds the capability of one service, especially one specific force within a service. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates alluded to this in a speech by stating

\ldots arguably the most important component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole.\textsuperscript{39}

The second force structure means is listed as “Organization Excellence,”\textsuperscript{40} which can be interpreted as building the right force to handle the array of missions that fall within the context of BPC. Many services, but one in particular, has taken advantage of this by building organizations, albeit ad hoc, within Iraq and Afghanistan where there’s an on-going effort to build a self-sufficient aviation capability. The Air Force Component Command of the Unites States Central Command re-activated two historical expeditionary forces to direct the efforts of re-building aviation capacity. The 321\textsuperscript{st} Air Expeditionary Wing in Iraq and the 438\textsuperscript{th} Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) in Afghanistan are hybrid forces comprised of fixed wing aircraft, rotary wing aircraft, and numerous aviation related equipment sets and are manned with personnel from the Air Force,
Army, and contract personnel from various defense contractors. They have the mission of developing, synchronizing, and sustaining an aviation force that meets the security needs of the respective country in which their deployed. Responsible for a wide array of functions and capabilities (e.g. pilot training, maintenance, logistics, etc.), these two commands have made great strides training and advising their respective counterparts. However, the fact still remains these units evolved from a requirement that was not given adequate consideration during what is known as “Phase 0” operations.

Other services, such as the Army, found itself jumping on the capacity building bandwagon when in 2006 then Army Vice Chief of Staff General Dick Cody directed the realignment of the Foreign Aircraft Training and Sustainment program, which supported the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and National Training Center (NTC) opposing force mission with Mi17 helicopters, to the Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence (USAACE). The 3-210th Aviation Regiment, under the command of the 110th Aviation Brigade, was activated and given the mission of Aviation Foreign Internal Defense in support of US Security Cooperation Programs in support of the Global War on Terrorism. This too, was an initiative undertaken due to an immediate and evolving requirement, but has since lost most of its relevance because of competing requirements and the continued reluctance of Army senior leaders to embrace the RW SFA mission.

Prior to 9-11, but more pointedly, prior to DoD’s realization of having insufficient capacity to conduct BPC on a broad scale, there did exist a capability that provided partner nations a holistic approach to airpower employment. The 6th Special Operations Squadron, a subordinate unit of the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC),
was activated in 1994 for the specific purpose of providing combatant commanders the ability to assess, train, advise and assist foreign aviation forces.\textsuperscript{42} The one-of-a-kind squadron, specifically designed to conduct operations throughout the spectrum of conflict, is currently DOD’s sole permanently standing unit for training partner aviation forces. Despite the unit’s criticality prior to 9-11, and especially over the past eight years, limitations do exist, of which the majority lie within the manpower area. Built on the premise that such a unique capability would be employed in conjunction with other security cooperation activities in several GCC areas of responsibility, the majority of which are small-scale by nature and in scope, the unit was never designed for mass employment. It was purposely designed to reflect and operate similar to a United States Special Forces Operational Detachment –Alpha (ODA) and Operational Detachment-Bravo (ODB). Similar to the geographically oriented Special Forces Groups, 6\textsuperscript{th} SOS teams deploys tailorable teams specific to the needs of the host nation.\textsuperscript{43}

Although the aforementioned units past and current endeavors have produced positive results within the realm of aviation capacity of supported host nations, DoD continues to struggle with a concerted effort focused on future requirements and capabilities. To accurately address organizational requirements for training partner nation aviation forces, it’s important to review the capabilities within DoD that currently exist.

Table 1 below depicts a raw data comparison between each service. The left column focuses on four distinct areas: Ranking (i.e. which service possesses more RW aircraft and aviation-related personnel); Mission Focus (i.e. the environment a particular service conducts the preponderance of its missions); Type of Airframes (i.e. what
role/mission services are designed to perform; and Training Capacity (i.e. does that service have the capacity to conduct RW training at the institutional level).  

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<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
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<td>Search &amp; Rescue SME; Limited land force support SME</td>
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<td>ATEC utilizes USAACE</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>USMC utilizes HELTRARON 8</td>
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Table 1

Preponderance of equipment/personnel as well as current mission profile does not fully address roles and responsibilities for BPC, nor is the above table all inclusive of the on-going BPC efforts of each service. For example, both the U.S. Army (USAACE) and U.S. Navy (HELTRARON 8) institutional flight schools have provided individual flight school instruction to designated partner nations for over thirty years as part of previous security cooperation agreements. The Marine Aviation and Weapons Tactics School – One (MAWTS 1), considered to be the premier certification course for advanced tactical training, trains foreign students as well. Also not clearly evident on the above table, is the expeditionary capability that is absolutely vital for future BPC/SFA organizations. The Marines, Navy, and the Air Force far exceed the Army in their current capacity to project future capacity building efforts. But, what the above table does illustrate is that there is untapped collective potential at the organization and individual level that DoD should capitalize upon when determining who, when, where and to what extent a RW BPC/SFA capability should be organized and/or employed.
Beyond simply examining the physical capabilities of each service is the difficult task of assessing the demand for a DoD RW BPC/SFA capability. Aside from the challenges of dynamic strategic environment and potential future hot-spots, cost and benefit will undoubtedly be determining factors in future BPC/SFA organizations. Recently, a RAND study was conducted at the request of USASOC to determine the feasibility of such an organization. The study examined a series of U.S. operations conducted post–World War II to present. The operations were categorized into five separate levels with monetary expenditure and average mission duration defining the level of effort:

- Level 1 – routine security operations conducted over a 3-5 year period costing single-digit millions (e.g. Basic Security Assistance/Cooperation Agreements)
- Level 2 – train and equip security operations conducted over a 3-5 year period costing double-digit millions (e.g. African Contingency Operations Training Assistance, Global peace Operations Initiative, and Trans-Sahel Counter-terrorism Initiative)
- Level 3 – up-scaled train and equip security operations over a 3-5 year period costing triple-digit millions (e.g. Liberia Train and Equip, East African Counter-terrorism Initiative, and Operation Focus Relief)
- Level 4 – security operations conducted in conjunction with U.S. limited direct operations over a 3-5 year period costing single digit billions (e.g. OEF-Philippines, CJTF- Horn of Africa, and Colombia)
• Level 5 – major U.S. combat operations conducted primarily by GPF forces costing triple-digit billions (e.g. Vietnam, Korea, Desert Storm/Shield, UN/NATO Balkans, OEF, and OIF)

The analysis applied to these operations revealed that Level 5 operations are almost 1,000 times more expensive than a Level 3 operation, therefore implying if there is a 1/1000\textsuperscript{th} chance of a Level 3 operation succeeding, thereby preventing a Level 5 operation, the Level 3 operation is the preferable choice.\textsuperscript{47} So, should DoD invest in a capability to conduct RW BPC/SFA operations as part of national capacity building efforts that might one day avoid massive and repetitive deployments of U.S. forces to conduct major combat operations? Unequivocally, yes.

**Incremental Growth**

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently stated in a memo to the National Security Advisor, General James Jones (Retired) “building partner capacity is an essential national security requirement that will endure for the foreseeable future.” DoD, USSOCOM, and the Global Combatant Commanders (GCC) are beginning to realize the increasing importance of BPC/SFA operations, and the reported cost-benefit ratio makes the mission more than desirable given the recent demand-spike from U.S. allies and potential future partner nations. Although most historical assessments have revolved around ground forces, RW SFA is now viewed as a vital component of BPC-type efforts. But drastic change will not come quickly. On-going operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, current transformation initiatives, and budgeting preclude such an effort. DoD must build upon existing organizations and expertise. The missions of the 321\textsuperscript{st} Air Expeditionary Wing in Iraq and the 438\textsuperscript{th} Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) must endure into the foreseeable future. Although some have referred to their efforts as a “pick-up
game,” both organizations have undoubtedly evolved into an integral part of the overall U.S. strategy within those regions, and to hastily dissolve, or even scale back, those units as troop drawdown occurs would diminish the overall BPC mission. Once the respective partner nation aviation force is adequately trained and can sustain itself, the mission should revert to standing security cooperation agreements between DoD, DoS, and CENTCOM. But the tools/organization through which COCOM’s conduct BPC/SFA have to evolve to ensure efforts are properly monitored and reinforced. TRADOC’s Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate, Future Warfare Division recently proposed establishing a Theater Military Assistance Advisory Group – Forward (TMAAG-F) under each COCOM’s Army Service Component Command (ASCC) that has the mission of ensuring the availability and readiness of all military units and selected individual skill sets required to support steady state BPC/SFA operations. TMAAGs, with a robust organic aviation cell, would provide the necessary subject matter expertise to sustain the efforts of elements like the 321st and 438th during the transition. The demand for large-scale training decreases.

The 6th SOS’s, as DoD’s sole designated Aviation FID unit, capacity needs to be expanded in the near term to better provide partner nations an enduring commitment that will allow multiple engagements over an extended period of time. USSOCOM, as the joint proponent for BPC/SFA, must have the capability to draw from aviation forces within the GPF to augment 6th SOS’s efforts in countries that have aircraft common to a particular service (e.g. Army UH-60, Marine AH-1, Army/Navy OH-58, etc) but may not be common in 6th SOS’s portfolio of rotary wing aircraft.
Eventually, AFSOC and 6th SOS should look to divest itself from proponency of the RW SFA mission to provide a more concerted effort to building capacity of partner nation fixed-wing (FW) forces. A Joint RW SFA organization needs to be established within USSOCOM and should subsume all services. This joint organization will provide core capabilities and have the ability to draw from the GPF for specific/unique skill sets in support of a COCOM’s security cooperation plan.

**DOTMLPF Recommendations**

A DOTLMPF analysis provides a comprehensive viewpoint when force structure changes are being considered. The following DOTMLPF recommendations are considered long term, but require immediate and sustained attention if momentum is to be maintained in building a RW BPC/SFA capability:

- **Doctrine:** There is no current RW SFA doctrine; however, the core fundamentals of SFA and/or FID as found in Joint Pub (JP) 3-07.1, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3.1, and FM 3-07.1 remain the same regardless of the support provided. Since the recommendation is a Joint RW SFA force, JP 3-07.1 requires amplification on organizations and responsibilities designed to conduct FID/SFA.

- **Organization:** DoD has provided adequate guidance to the armed services to examine the development of “specialized units” to conduct BPC/SFA missions; however, little to no resources have been allocated for specific force development. Regardless, USSOCOM, in conjunction with the other services, should form an Integrated Capabilities Development Team (ICDT) to assess capability gaps across DoD, which should lead to a DOTMLPF
change recommendation (DCR) for the development of a RW SFA joint force.\textsuperscript{49}

- **Training:** The PME system requires expansion at the institutional level to address the growing requirement for advisors in the GCC AORs. Emphasis should be given to the priority countries within a respective GCC AOR. Aviation specific training should only be directed towards partner nations in which new capabilities are being developed and to those countries that are capable of self-sustainment after SFA support has ended.

- **Leadership:** A Joint RW SFA organization requires experienced Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers with requisite skills in SFA related activities. An additional skill identifier (ASI) for O-3s and E-7s and above should be implemented allowing individuals to attend appropriate PME and serve in an SFA capacity for the duration of their career.

- **Material:** The recommended Joint RW SFA organization requires certain types of aircraft that are common to partner nation aviation forces. For example, the 3-210\textsuperscript{th} AVN Regiment owned and operated six Mi-17 helicopters for two purposes, maintain proficiency of assigned aircrews and conduct training of foreign aircrews in CONUS. The 6\textsuperscript{th} SOS also has organic helicopters, but primarily uses them for in-house training. Their expeditionary mission and contractual agreements with partner nations allow them to utilize that military’s aircraft while conducting SFA activities. Without the ability to train and maintain proficiency in unique aircraft, a RW SFA organization’s effectiveness is drastically reduced.
Personnel: Personalities and human nature are determining factors when "specialized" units are formed and manned. Building a RW SFA organization should be no different. Assignment to such an organization should be done through an accession process along with psychological assessments to determine mental aptitude for the complex environments SFA operations are likely to take place. SFA trained personnel must possess multiple competencies above and beyond their technical expertise such as cultural and language training.

Facilities: Similar to the complex process used for force development, the military construction (MILCON) process is as difficult. The physical footprint required for the proposed Joint RW SFA organization would be relatively small compared to that of an Aviation Battalion, because of the limited number of organic aircraft and the continuous deployment cycle of advisory and assistance teams (AAT). Since the organization would be a direct reporting unit (DRU) to USSOCOM, either MacDill AFB, FL or Hurlburt Field, FL (co-located with 6th SOS) would be optimal for home basing.

Summary/Conclusion

Assuming strategic decisions on national security, budgeting, and mission priorities for the armed services, as they pertain to BPC, continue on the current course, the U.S. military will fall short of its requirement to adequately train partner nation aviation forces when and where they are needed most. The single-most important challenge for senior military leaders is how to balance the force in order to conduct effective operations throughout the spectrum of conflict, realizing that Phase 0
operations are just as, if not more important, than Phase 3, 4, and 5 operations. A Joint RW SFA organization, such as the one proposed in this paper and augmented with specific general purpose force (GPF) capabilities on a mission-by-mission basis, will provide GCCs the ability to strategically affect a partner nation’s military capacity.

Aviation, in and of itself, is a strategic asset, albeit an expensive asset. As indicated previously, the values of training partner nations far outweigh the costly endeavors of major combat operations. Current and potential future partner nations will normally not seek to purchase and/or maintain high tech aircraft similar to that of advanced nations. Therefore, the cost to train developing partner nations cannot be compared to what it costs to procure, maintain, and modernize advanced systems.

In an era of persistent conflict where threats come in many forms, demands placed upon the military will be as complex and uncertain as the environments in which they will be required to operate. Senior military leaders must continuously asses the need to develop new capabilities and break through historical barriers to build the right force, at the right time, in the right place.

Endnotes

1 The Democratic Sustainment Course at the US Army School of the Americas; The DISAM Journal, Fall 1999; Russell W, Ramsey, Ph. D., p. 84

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3 NDS 2008; Robert M. Gates, June 2008 p.6

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5 2004 NMS; Richard B. Myers; 2004, p12

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8 United States Air Force Global Partnership Strategy; Michael B. Donley, Norton A. Schwartz; p. ii


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16 George W. Casey, Jr., “America’s Army In an Era of Persistent Conflict,” Army, Vol. 58, Iss. 10 (October 2008) 20, in ProQuest (accessed December 5, 2009).

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24 Ibid., 3.

25 Ibid., 4.
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