ARMS CONTROL AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

by

JEFFREY S. McKITTRICK

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff are designated as the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense. In this capacity they provide advice concerning not only the development and employment of arms but also proposals to control arms. Yet as Richard Burt noted before joining the State Department,

Understandably, the military services viewed arms control as part of a larger threat to their traditional prerogatives. By framing military issues as arms control problems, civilian dominated organizations . . . gained considerable influence at the expense of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus . . . the military services along with the Joint Chiefs were gradually pushed to adopt more extreme views on arms control. As a result, their views gradually lost credibility and they began to be perceived as obstacles to agreement.1

How valid is that observation? How much influence have the Joint Chiefs of Staff had on US arms control policy? To answer those questions, this article will identify the roles the JCS can play, examine some of the issues involved in the SALT process, evaluate the various ways in which the JCS has organized for arms control, and recommend ways to improve the ability of the JCS to provide useful advice, on a timely basis, in the arms control policy formulation process.

In this effort, it is assumed that there is something unique and inherently valuable concerning the advice from senior officers who have spent their entire lives in the defense of the nation. If this is true, then steps should be taken to insure that such advice is properly formulated, rendered, and taken into account.

JCS ROLES

Viewing the JCS as a unitary actor presenting the combined, integrated advice of the uniformed military ignores the reality of the JCS structure. The Chiefs are Joint Chiefs, not combined Chiefs. They operate as a committee, which requires consensus on “Joint” positions. This requirement can result in “lowest common denominator” positions being formed in order to insure support by all the services. The decision-making process is lengthy and laborious, requiring action officers on the Joint Staff to coordinate with the services numerous times trying to find the right words that will be acceptable to all. This process alone very nearly precludes the Joint Chiefs from being able to influence actions and policy in a complex, rapidly changing situation, as they are unable to provide timely advice. Further,
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the legal requirement to rotate officers and the strictures against multiple assignments to the Joint Staff prevent the building of institutional knowledge of how the system works and militates against the formation of a “shadow” system, which bureaucracies often develop in order to short-circuit formal, complex procedures. The rotation requirements also hinder the development of individual and institutional subject matter expertise on the Joint Staff.

These organizational strictures are a result of putative fears of the emergence of the “man on horseback” military leader who might seize control of the government. The result is a situation which dictates that once the civilian leadership has decided what it desires, the military leadership has little choice but to comply or resign. Thus the tradition of civilian control of the military has large implications for the role the JCS is allowed to play.

The Joint Chiefs can play one of three roles in the arms control process. As an obstructor, they can oppose arms control proposals that are generated by other government agencies. This obstruction role can be fulfilled by the JCS acting as any other player in the interagency process, but is even more politically potent when they are testifying before Congress. Traditionally interested in gathering information to understand, if not impede, administration defense budget proposals, Congress frequently encourages “end runs” by the military. The threat of this happening is often enough of an incentive for an administration to structure its proposals in a way that is acceptable to the Joint Chiefs in order to preclude such divisive actions.

The JCS can also act as an arms control moderator. They can set the outer limits of what is acceptable to them on an arms control issue with the implicit threat of acting as an obstructor should an unacceptable position be adopted by the administration. As a moderator they can analyze specific proposals with a view to suggesting modifications of the proposals to fit within the bounds of acceptability they have defined.

Finally, the JCS can act as an arms control initiator, as many exhort them to do. As an initiator, the JCS could develop and propose arms control policy to be adopted by the administration or develop and propose positions to be taken at arms control negotiations. Rather than merely reacting to views or proposals of other agencies, the Joint Chiefs would in fact take the lead in generating arms control policy.

The inclination to perform in a particular role seems to be at least as much a function of the individuals who serve as chiefs of staff as it is of the capability of the JCS organization to act in this capacity. For example, General Bruce Palmer, Army Vice Chief of Staff, testified at the congressional hearings on SALT I, “I think we all must remember though that the Chiefs are military advisors and they should not make arms limitations proposals.” General David Jones, Chairman of the JCS, took a different view of his role. During the SALT II negotiations, for example, when faced with continued Soviet reluctance to include the Backfire bomber in their aggregares, General Jones came up with a proposal to either “count or counter” the Backfire.

Currently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff seem to view the moderator role as the most appropriate: “Nuclear arms control agreements can help provide the boundaries for the problems of nuclear armaments and can help assuage the world’s fears of nuclear war.”

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However, the JCS may choose to adopt different roles for different arms control issue areas. They may, for example, simultaneously act as an obstructor to proposals for comprehensive test bans, as a moderator of proposals for strategic arms limitations, and as an initiator of proposals for negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

The role the JCS adopts on any particular issue or at any particular time says little about the amount of influence they will have on the arms control policy process. While it may be generally true that they will have influence in the obstructionist role (due to the President’s desire for their stamp of approval), it does not necessarily follow that they will always be influential in this role, nor that they will be more influential as an obstructor than, say, as a moderator. Instead, influence is often a function of other factors.

THE JCS AND SALT

Toward the end of 1966, a small group was set up in the State Department under Raymond Garthoff to examine the issues involved in negotiating strategic arms limitations with the Soviets. Defense Secretary McNamara specifically wanted the JCS excluded from this process, fearing that “something like this would trigger a lot of conflict with the Chiefs.” By March 1967 the JCS had achieved only a minimum involvement in the preparation for SALT. The JCS Chairman, General Wheeler, “was persuaded that strategic arms control could be in the national security interest. By dint of long argumentation in 1968, he had brought the Chiefs around to this point of view.”

Further, General Wheeler designated Air Force Maj. Gen. Royal Allison to act as his Special Assistant for Strategic Arms Negotiations.

Although the Committee of Deputies, with the staff support of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ostensibly was the proponent for SALT, President Johnson and Secretary McNamara felt that too much ACDA involvement would almost guarantee JCS opposition. As a result, an ad hoc group was set up in July 1968 under OSD’s office of International Security Affairs, then headed by Paul Warnke. Morton Halperin, one of Warnke’s deputies, chaired this group, which came to be known as the SALT Committee, and Allison, newly promoted to Lieutenant General, sat on the committee. By mid-August, the SALT Committee had worked out a consensus proposal. The Chiefs were brought on board by the simple expedient of having the proposal sidestep the two toughest issues, MIRVs and ABMs. “What the SALT package came down to was basically a freeze on long-range offensive missiles mixed with a little regulation of defensive ABMs.”

The new Republican administration saw no need to continue along the same lines in SALT as its Democratic predecessor. “Still less did it admire the method and the work that had shaped the 1968 enterprise. Tailoring a SALT proposal to suit Joint Chiefs of Staff attitudes seemed, understandably, something to be avoided in the future.”

Therefore, Henry Kissinger directed a reevaluation of the US position to “reflect not bureaucratic compromise, but careful analysis of consequences and objectives.”

This reevaluation was to be done under the aegis of ACDA and its new director, Gerard Smith. The resulting study, NSSM 28, was presented to the National Security Council in June 1969 and was immediately questioned by General Wheeler. The Chairman of the JCS had “serious doubts” about the adequacy of the verification provisions of the ACDA study.

Determined not to repeat their experience with the limited test ban treaty, when McNamara’s staff had done the work and the JCS had not even been allowed a representative on the negotiating delegation, the Joint Chiefs succeeded in getting Lieutenant General Allison designated as the JCS representative to the SALT delegation. Allison worked out of the office of the chairman and was supported by the chairman’s staff. Although Gerard Smith, as chief negotiator and the director of ACDA, was extremely pleased with Allison’s performance and in fact unsuccessfully lobbied for his
promotion to full general, this proved to be irrelevant. Kissinger’s maneuvering with back-channel communications to Moscow essentially closed out the entire SALT delegation, ACDA and JCS alike, from the real negotiation process.

When Admiral Thomas Moorer became the JCS Chairman in 1970, he developed and obtained the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs on the following guidelines concerning strategic arms limitations:

- Do not try to achieve identical force types on both sides; allow for asymmetries.
- Deal in launch vehicles, not missiles.
- Achieve equal aggregates, with freedom to mix for both sides.
- Do not try to control technological improvements; it is impossible to do and opens both sides to charges of cheating.
- Do not deny to the United States a capability the other side has.
- Do not make unilateral statements; they are not binding.

How well were these guidelines followed? On the issue of so-called Forward Based Systems (FBS) in Europe, the Soviets naturally wanted to include the US European-based, nuclear-capable systems in any agreement limiting strategic nuclear arms. The Joint Chiefs adamantly opposed any such inclusion on the grounds that it would degrade US conventional capabilities in Europe. Many of those systems were, and are, dual-capable; that is, capable of delivering conventional or nuclear weapons. Although some ACDA and State Department personnel appeared willing to make concessions on FBS, the President and Kissinger rightly saw the problems which would be created with our NATO allies and refused to include FBS in SALT. The Soviets eventually agreed to the US position, and the JCS position was vindicated.

The ABM issue is less clear. Since the 1960s the JCS had advocated an ABM system, over McNamara’s opposition. President Johnson in December 1966 had authorized going ahead with an ABM system but deliberately had left its purpose vague. McNamara characterized it as an anti-Chinese system, and the JCS characterized it as the start of an anti-Soviet system. Kissinger agreed with JCS and the Defense Department, not because he wanted an ABM system, but because he hoped to use it as a bargaining chip to get agreement with the Soviets on limiting offensive systems.

President Nixon agreed with Kissinger, and in March 1971 he approved the four-site ABM program. By 1972, however, it became apparent that the Soviets were quite eager to constrain more tightly the technologically superior American ABM program. The United States, on the other hand, was hoping to constrain the Soviets’ numerically superior offensive ballistic missile program, which by mid-1972 was almost 50 percent larger than the American force. A decision was made to agree to an ABM treaty as the Soviets desired, in the hopes of getting an equitable agreement on offensive arms. The Joint Chiefs had serious reservations about this, but agreed on the basis of assurances by their civilian superiors to support various programs such as the Trident, the B-1 bomber, and ABM defenses around the national capital and ICBM sites.

This time, however, their agreement cut two ways. Not only did it affect the JCS position on the ABM treaty, but also their position on offensive strategic arms. By December 1971, given the Soviet preponderance in numbers of launchers, the Joint Chiefs were opposing a freeze on these systems. The resulting codification of US inferiority in this area, they felt, would set a dangerous precedent. But by 1972, the JCS had agreed to unequal levels of launchers. Their concerns were allayed by the promised deployment of Trident and B-1 to help close the gap, by a US lead in MIRV technology which partially offset a Soviet lead in launchers, and by the fact that SALT I was an interim agreement to last only five years. At the end of that time, either a more complete agreement on the limitation of strategic arms would be reached or a strategic arms buildup by the United States would end Soviet numerical superiority. Ambassador Gerard Smith had also made a unilateral statement to the Soviets that failure to achieve more complete limitations in five years (by 1977)
could jeopardize "US supreme interests" and could be a basis for withdrawal from the ABM treaty.\textsuperscript{21}

The five-year deadline came and went without an agreement, and the Carter Administration in 1977 showed no indications of withdrawing from the ABM treaty. However, the Senate had noted the JCS concerns about SALT I. Legislation was sponsored by Senator Henry Jackson requiring that future agreements on limiting strategic arms must result in equal levels (of what, was not specified) for both sides. SALT I had met the first two of Admiral Moorer's guidelines; it failed to meet the remaining four.

After SALT I was signed, Lieutenant General Allison was replaced as the JCS representative, apparently due to Senator Jackson's displeasure with the SALT I treaty and Allison's role in bringing it about. Jackson charged Allison with having joined "those disarmers" in ACDA and having failed to push the proper military positions.\textsuperscript{22} Since Jackson was a ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Moorer could hardly afford to rebuff his requests to replace Allison. Senator Jackson's choice for a replacement for Allison (who retired from the Air Force following his dismissal from SALT) was Lieutenant General Edward Rowny. Rowny was the US representative to the NATO Military Committee and not at all eager to move to the JCS and SALT. Conversations with Jackson and Moorer persuaded him, however, and he assumed the job he was to hold for the next six and a half years.

Rather than work out of the Chairman's office as Allison had done, Rowny was placed under the Director of the Joint Staff, a position soon to be filled by Lieutenant General George Seignious, a future director of ACDA. The JCS SALT office was removed from the office of the Chairman and placed under the International Negotiations Branch in the J-5 Directorate. Thus, Rowny was more a JCS staff officer working on SALT than the Chairman's personal representative to SALT as Allison had been.

Despite this subordination of SALT in the JCS hierarchy, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson personally urged the Chiefs to take a more active role in the SALT process. He called on them to move from what I had observed to have been their posture of objections and criticism of what others had proposed, to a positive posture of developing their own proposals . . . . All enthusiastically agreed with me, but in fact there was no change, and the JCS continued to treat SALT as just any other staff function through which officers were rotated the same as for any other function.\textsuperscript{23}

Ambassador Johnson finally decided that the JCS "structure is incapable of originating concepts and proposals, because it is designed to react to the propositions of others, whether from within or without the services, rather than originate action."\textsuperscript{24}

The initial concern of the JCS in SALT II centered around a ceiling of equal aggregates of launchers for both sides. Having surrendered numerical equality in SALT I, the Joint Chiefs were determined to force adherence to the Jackson Amendment. By late 1973, a US position was formulated that, in Kissinger's words, "gave everybody what they wanted . . . . the Chiefs' prize was equal aggregates; Ambassador Johnson got his ceiling of 2350; Schlesinger prevailed with his theory of equal MIRV throwweights."\textsuperscript{25} But even with this consensus position the JCS had to beat back other attempts, such as the one to couple an extension of the interim agreement (SALT I) with limitations on MIRV deployment.\textsuperscript{26}

On the issue of forward-based systems there was uncertainty as to whether the Soviets would agree to their exclusion in the next round of SALT, as they had in SALT I. Certainly their public and private statements indicated that they would not. Nonetheless, when a Soviet general advised Rowny that the Soviets would again acquiesce if the United States remained firm, Rowny reported that information to the Joint Chiefs. They were skeptical, so Rowny took the information to Schlesinger. He too was skeptical, but agreed to try. The Soviets eventually gave up on that
demand, and forward-based systems were excluded from SALT II. 27

Despite the doubts of the JCS, President Carter sent Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Moscow in March 1977 with a new set of "comprehensive proposals" for the Soviets' consideration. 28 The Joint Chiefs were concerned because the proposals called for a 50 percent reduction in the heavy SS-18 missile instead of their complete elimination and because the Backfire bomber was not included at all. 29 The immediate rejection of these proposals by the Soviets put the Carter Administration back on the SALT path walked by its two predecessors.

Substantively, the JCS had four major concerns in SALT II. They desired a limit of 1250 on MIRVed ballistic missile launchers; the inclusion of the Backfire bomber in the Soviet aggregate; the exclusion of land- and sea-based cruise missiles from the treaty; and some way to balance the unilateral right the Soviets had to Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBM). Although the JCS recommended a level of 1250 on MIRVed ballistic missile launchers, Brzezinski was recommending a level of 1100 to 1150. President Carter compromised at 1200, which became the level agreed to in the SALT II treaty. 30

The JCS desire to include the Backfire bomber in the Soviet aggregate was based on its intercontinental range and payload. Both were closer to the other Soviet heavy bombers than to the US FB-111, which was excluded. The Soviets, however, disputed the US data and claimed that the Backfire was a medium bomber, not a heavy bomber, and thus should be excluded. President Carter subsequently accepted a promise from Brezhnev not to increase the radius of action nor the annual production rate (understood to be 30 per year) of the Backfire—a promise Rowny termed "militarily worthless" 31 and a rate the Soviets now seem to be exceeding. 32 On cruise missiles, the JCS were successful in getting the SALT restrictions to apply only to air-launched cruise missiles, not ground- or sea-launched ones.

On the question of MLBMs, the JCS had no realistic chance of succeeding. The SALT I treaty had granted the Soviets the right to maintain MLBMs. Given the precedent set in SALT I, the best the United States could do was to limit the SS-18 to current numbers and to put a cap of ten on the number of MIRV warheads each SS-18 could have.

The JCS view toward SALT II can be considered as lukewarm support at best. In May 1979, Lieutenant General Rowny resigned as the JCS representative to SALT because, in his view, the treaty achieved was unequal, was not verifiable, undermined deterrence, did not contribute to stability, could weaken NATO, and did not curb the Soviet buildup. 33 General David Jones, Chairman of the JCS from 1978 to 1982, termed the treaty "a modest but useful step in a long range process which must include the resolve to provide adequate capabilities to maintain strategic equivalence coupled with vigorous efforts to achieve further substantial reductions." 34 "The most serious concern," General Jones went on to say, "of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this regard is the risk that SALT II could be allowed to become a tranquilizer to the American people in which case the adverse trends ... could well become irreversible." 35

Nevertheless, during the transition to the Reagan Administration, the JCS, acting in its role as a moderator, teamed up with Secretary of State Alexander Haig to persuade other incoming political appointees not to discard the positions which had been developed by previous administrations concerning strategic arms limitations and intermediate-range nuclear force modernizations and negotiations. 36 Further, they successfully urged in governmental councils that the United States continue to abide by the provisions of the unratified SALT II treaty, 37 and they advocated deep reductions in strategic nuclear forces in the upcoming START negotiations. 38

On 11 September 1981 the Joint Chiefs agreed to form an additional flag position for the JCS representative to the intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) negotiations. They further decided to reorganize and place the JCS START and INF representatives under the J5, Director for Plans and Policy, rather
than under the Director of the Joint Staff. The Nuclear Negotiations Division was also moved and placed under the JCS Representatives for Nuclear Negotiations. General David Jones, Chairman at that time, claims there were organizational reasons for this change. First, the J5 was responsible for the formulation of policy and development of positions agreeable to all the Joint Chiefs. Having the JCS representative work for the director, as had been the case with Rowny, created a disjuncture between the JCS planner (the J5) and the JCS operator (Rowny). Putting the JCS representatives under the J5 would close the gap and would keep the J5 from being cut out of the picture. Further, Jones points out that the new representatives were only one-star officers and therefore it was more appropriate to put them under the J5 (a three-star) than it would have been in Rowny’s case (also a three-star). While the latter point is certainly true, it is not clear whether that was a cause or an effect of the reorganization. As to the first point, Rowny claims the reorganization was made because the Joint Chiefs wanted more control over the representatives and they felt the best way to get it was to put them under one of the Joint Staff officers. Whatever the case, although both JCS representatives serve as full members of the US delegations to the respective negotiations, there is some concern that their lower position in the JCS hierarchy makes them less influential than the other full members.

**JCS INFLUENCE IN ARMS CONTROL**

While some people, like John Kenneth Galbraith, hold the view that “military influence on arms negotiations is like the influence of a heroin pusher on drug traffic,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff certainly have not dominated the arms control process. As General George Brown wryly noted, they have always rendered advice, even if it has not been solicited or followed.

At the beginning of the SALT process, McNamara excluded the Joint Chiefs, and at the end of SALT I in May 1972, the final negotiations were conducted in Moscow by Nixon and Kissinger while the entire SALT delegation remained in Helsinki. Thus, the Joint Chiefs were left out of the formulation of certain specifics with regard to ICBMs, SLBMs, and the two ABM sites. While Admiral Moorer was “consulted” by telephone from Moscow hours before the agreements were signed, the small amount of time available effectively precluded any counterproposals from the Joint Chiefs and left them with the choice of saying yes or no. The Chiefs chose to give a qualified yes in exchange for the set of “assurances” they had developed in response to NDSM 164 of 1 May 1972, which had first presented the SLBM proposal.

Nor were the Joint Chiefs asked to comment, until after the fact, on the accords reached at Vladivostok in 1974. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs, while acknowledging that “specific elements of the JCS position ‘were altered,’” supported the Vladivostok accord.

These experiences have led some observers to conclude that JCS influence has been politically constrained and diminished. Lieutenant General Rowny claims that “what has happened is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have primarily been advising the Secretary of Defense and only secondarily the President. In the past several years they have been competing with second and third rung political appointees for the ear of the Secretary of Defense.” Rowny further describes the SALT II policy formulation process as being totally run by State and Defense, with the Joint Chiefs either being told what had happened or being given 24 hours to object to what was planned.

Admiral Moorer has testified, “It has been my observation, as well as my experience, that the opinions and positions of military personnel are being progressively downgraded, and in many cases ignored.” Admiral Moorer went on to say that as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs he met with the Secretary of Defense four or five times per day and with the President four or five times per week, whereas in 1978 the Chairman was meeting with the Secretary of Defense, at
best, once a day and with the President quite less frequently.51

The implication, of course, is that the declining amount of contact with top civilian policymakers resulted in declining influence. But as the Steadman Report pointed out, "While the JCS are essentially reactive on arms control matters, this is an area in which their judgment of what proposals are acceptable for national security has weighed heavily in the formulation of national policy."52 General Jones testified in 1978 that he believed "our (JCS) involvement is better now than it has been in the past. I am not just talking about General Rowny, but talking about the involvement of the Joint Chiefs in the SALT negotiations."53

The representative himself must also be effective. To do this, he requires both credibility and influence with the Chairman and the individual Chiefs. For example, there is some evidence that the Joint Chiefs resented Lieutenant General Allison's privileged position as the Chairman's personal representative to SALT and, as a consequence, he had little influence with them.54 However, Admiral Moorer claims this made little difference, since Moorer personally set up the guidelines for JCS positions on SALT, attended every high-level SALT meeting at the White House, and never faced a disagreement among the Chiefs on SALT while he was the Chairman.55

The influence of the Joint Chiefs, as an organization, must also be considered. As General Jones has commented, the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body do not have much influence. Rather, it is the individuals serving on the Joint Chiefs who may or may not have influence, depending upon their personal relationships with the President, Secretary of Defense, and other Chiefs.56 Moorer agrees with this observation and goes even further in claiming that organizational issues do not matter; what matters is who is serving in the positions.57 Yet Jones qualifies his statement by pointing out that the JCS has the most influence when the White House needs its blessing on a particular policy; arms control is one of the few issue areas where it needs that blessing.58 But even then personalities intrude. Jones feels that the mechanism was there for the JCS to have been heard during SALT II, but that Rowny felt cut out because Paul Warnke, the director of ACDA, did not trust him. Even organizational changes could not overcome that mutual lack of trust, confidence, and communication.59

Finally, in discussing the influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one must look at its relationship with Congress. As a corporate body, JCS influence is usually confined to that of "approving" administration positions, thereby assuaging congressional concerns about the military efficacy of those positions. But as individuals, either representing their respective services or as senior military officers qualified to give expert advice, the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman's relationships are somewhat different. As a corporate body, the Joint Chiefs feel a duty to support the wishes of their commander-in-chief, the President, and his appointed officials. As individual chiefs, they feel a duty to represent the best interests of their services and the national security interests of the nation as they see them. Thus, as General Jones points out, the JCS never attempts end-runs around the President to Congress, even though the individual Chiefs often do.60

**IMPROVING JCS EFFECTIVENESS**

It is a mistake to conclude, as many have, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been moving more toward an obstructionist role in arms control policy and that they have lost credibility and influence in the process. Rather, one should conclude that the roles the JCS have played, and will play, vary according to the specific issue involved, and that their influence has been largely a function of the personal relationships between the Chiefs, the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and the President.

There are, however, measures which can be taken to improve JCS advice on arms control issues in an attempt to increase the trust and confidence reposed by their civilian
superiors. These changes should be made with the following goals in mind:

- To improve the timeliness of advice.
- To improve the quality of advice.
- To provide for input from all the services.
- To regularize and institutionalize the JCS arms control process.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have tried at least four different approaches to organizing for arms control. In the Eisenhower Administration, the Chairman himself, with the support of his small office staff, did most of the JCS work on arms control issues. During the Johnson Administration, as the SALT process got off the ground and actual negotiations were imminent, it became clear that the Chairman would either have to be away from his other duties for extended periods of time or appoint an individual to represent the JCS. Lieutenant General Allison became the first such representative. In 1973, Lieutenant General Rowny was appointed as the representative and placed under the Director of the Joint Staff. There was not another reorganization until 1981, when two new officers were appointed as the JCS representatives to the START and INF delegations and were placed under the J5, Director for Plans and Policy. In every instance, reorganization was accompanied by changes in personnel. Which one served as the impetus is not clear, but what is clear is that JCS reorganization and personnel changes go hand-in-hand.

The JCS would be best served under the current circumstances by a return to the original, pre-1973 organization. A lieutenant general, working out of the office of the Chairman, would have the requisite prestige and authority to provide advice directly to the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and other government agencies, which in turn would improve the timeliness of that advice. The representative should serve as a full member of the US delegation to negotiations. In the case of different negotiations occurring simultaneously, a three-star officer should be appointed to represent the JCS at each one.

Each representative should have his own staff of ten to 15 officers to analyze the specific issues involved in that negotiation and to provide recommendations to the representative. Within that staff should be four senior officers, one from each service, to represent their particular service’s view of the issues involved in that negotiation. The officers appointed would be subject to approval by the Chairman and should serve extended tours with the JCS in order to develop the requisite expertise and continuity necessary to provide quality advice.61

The Director, Plans and Policy (J5) should have the responsibility for developing negotiating guidelines for all the representatives to insure coordinated efforts among the various negotiations. Since the J5 is a Joint Staff officer responsible to all the Joint Chiefs, the individual services would have this mechanism for providing input to the arms control process. The negotiating guidelines would in turn be provided to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who would then have the direct responsibility for insuring coordination among the various representatives.

It would seem reasonable to assign an Air Force officer to the START negotiations since two-thirds of the strategic triad (ICBMs and bombers) belong to the Air Force. An Army officer should be assigned to the MBFR talks, since those deal with the conventional force balance in Europe where the Army, as the ground force component, is most directly involved. Any INF negotiations should have an Army officer as the JCS representative, since such talks must necessarily focus on land-based, long-range missiles in Europe, which have direct implications for the deterrence of conventional ground attack by the Warsaw Pact. Any renegotiation of the ABM treaty, or any new negotiations on ABMs, should have an Army officer as the JCS representative, since ballistic missile defense is an Army mission.

Legal and bureaucratic obstacles may make it difficult to enact this proposal. It may require amendment of the National Security Act (to extend tours of officers on the Joint Staff and raise the total number of officers beyond the 400 authorized) and legislation to raise the number of flag officer
slots the services are allowed. Further, there is no guarantee that the Defense Department, or indeed other agencies with arms control interests, would allow such a proposal even to be recommended by the administration. The first may fear a degradation of its power relative to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the second may fear a degradation of their influence on arms control policy.

It must be remembered, however, that no amount of reorganization can overcome obstacles raised by poor interpersonal relations. As Secretary of the Army John Marsh reminds us, "The operation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense in large measure depend on the relationship of the individuals and the management styles of both." 62

Nonetheless, the introduction in the House and the Senate of a number of bills on JCS reform indicates that the time may be propitious for change. Passage of a bill which strengthened the Chairman of the JCS by making him a member of the National Security Council, putting him in the military chain of command, giving him more control over officers assigned to the Joint Staff, and allowing him more authority to set the Joint Chiefs’ agenda would enhance the capability of the JCS to provide timely, quality advice in general and to act more effectively in the arms control process.

NOTES

2. While not a role, per se, it should be pointed out that the JCS can also perform the function of providing continuity when administrations change. Whether, or how well, they do this, of course, often depends on the particular issue and whether the JCS desires to continue the past policy on it.
7. Ibid., p. 91.
14. Smith, pp. 41-42.
15. Interview with Moorer, 18 March 1983.
22. Smith, p. 443.
24. Ibid., p. 81.
27. Interview with Edward Rowny, 7 January 1983.
29. Carter wanted to reduce strategic forces to 150 on each side. The Chiefs played a role in educating him as to the difficulty in achieving this.
30. Interview with Rowny, 7 January 1983.
33. Statement by Rowny in Military Implications of SALT II.
34. Statement by David Jones in Military Implications of SALT II, p. 155.
35. Ibid., p. 154.
36. Interview with Jones, 18 March 1983.
39. Interview with Jones, 17 March 1983.
40. Interview with Rowny, 7 January 1983.
41. Ibid.
42. Interview by Frank Reynolds on ABC Special, "Arms and Security: How Much is Enough?" 1972.

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45. Ibid., p. 326.
49. Statement by Rowny, Military Implications of SALT II, p. 54.
50. Interview with Rowny, 7 January 1983.
54. Ibid.
55. Interview with Moorer, 17 March 1983.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Interview with Jones, 18 March 1983.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Some might think it unworkable to give to the Chairman veto power over service nominees, but Admiral Moorer claims to have successfully vetoed three nominees by General Westmoreland for the position of J3. Westmoreland finally nominated an officer acceptable to Moorer.