THE LIBYAN CONVERSION IN THREE ACTS: WHY QADHAFI GAVE UP HIS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM

by

Keith R. Blakely

March 2010

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                              James A. Russell

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This thesis analyzes Libya’s historic 2003 decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and normalize relations with the West. Despite the political and scholarly claims at the time, this thesis shows that the effectiveness of any specific policy instrument is best evaluated in the dynamic domestic and global geopolitical and economic contexts within which they are exercised. A within case comparison of the 2003 reversal and two other Libyan policy reversals allows us to hold a number of key variables constant, while allowing U.S. coercive instruments to vary. This thesis generally finds that U.S. policy instruments were most effective when they worked to magnify or exacerbate an antecedent condition. Specific lessons learned from the Libyan case could apply to counter proliferation efforts vs. Iran, as well as future U.S. policy in Africa.
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ABSTRACT

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<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>Africa Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPSAs</td>
<td>Exploration and Production-Sharing Arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILSA</td>
<td>Iran-Libya Sanctions Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFG</td>
<td>Libyan Islamic Fighting Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Command Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
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<tr>
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I. INTRODUCTION

On December 19, 2003, Muammar al-Qadhafi announced Libya’s decision to dismantle all components of its nonconventional weapons programs; the existence of which he had denied for decades. In fact, as recently as January 2003, Qadhafi had told an American reporter that it was “crazy to think that Libya” had a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.1 This dramatic policy reversal “marks the first time in 30 years that any such nation has ended such a program without a regime change.”2 Libya also satisfied all the other conditions set forth by the United States and Britain to end economic sanctions including payments to the victims of the Pan Am flight 103 bombing and a renunciation of terrorism. What explains the Libyan reversal after decades of resistance? Could the lessons learned from Libya apply to other rogue states, such as Iran?

A. PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS

A consensus exists in the literature that U.S. policy toward Libya was decisive, but there is a debate on which aspect of it—coercion or engagement—was the key. At the time of the Libyan reversal, the debate was framed along politically partisan lines. President Bush himself stated that the example of U.S. force in Afghanistan and Iraq was the decisive factor in Libya’s decision. “Nine months of intense negotiations succeeded with Libya while 12 years of diplomacy with Iraq did not...Words must be credible, and no one can now doubt the word of America.”3 In the other camp, Clinton administration officials credited secret negotiations underway since the 1999 surrender of the two Pan Am flight 103-terror suspects.4 The Libyans also claimed that the decision was not made

3 George W. Bush, remarks made during the first presidential debate with John Kerry in the fall of 2004.
under duress but rather that it was a result of “a careful study of the country’s future in all its domains...conforming to the aspirations of the Libyan leadership and people.” Qadhafi’s son and heir apparent, Seif al-Islam, claimed the December 19 agreement was a “win-win deal” for both sides.

Scholarly explanations are similarly divided on the role of coercion and diplomacy. Mary-Jane Deeb credits the Bush doctrine’s perceived threat to the Qadhafi regime as the decisive factor. St. John, Vandewalle and Boucek all discount the role of force and emphasize the role of long-term diplomacy. Jentleson and Whytock argue that Libya’s policy reversal was the most successful case of coercive diplomacy since the Cuban missile crisis but that the threat of force was not the key ingredient. They find that “although not the factor claimed by the Bush administration, U.S. credibility on the use of force was a factor.”

The weakness of these explanations is that they do not isolate the influence of the engagement and coercion variables, and therefore, cannot determine whether one or the other, or a balanced combination of the two, was responsible for it. The broader literature on U.S. coercive diplomacy toward Libya suffers from a similar infirmity. Coercive diplomacy usually involves the use of two key policy instruments: sanctions and the threat of force. Economic sanctions are widely credited with having a coercive effect on Libyan policymaking decisions. The threat of force is also widely credited with having

10 Ibid., 80.
such an effect. However, since these instruments are both used in the same timeframe, it is again impossible to isolate their effects. Both literatures also tend to focus on U.S. policy instruments exclusively, and ignore other potential explanatory factors, which is especially problematic given that it is known that coercive diplomacy usually does not work. Many embattled target governments resist in the face of overwhelming force. Saddam Hussein chose to go down fighting rather than submit to U.S. demands. Castro subjected Cuba to decades of punishing U.S. sanctions rather than give in to U.S. demands.

Another key problem with evaluating the effectiveness of specific instruments of coercion is that policy decisions are likely to be the product of many interacting influences. The U.S. instruments of coercive diplomacy might factor into the decision-making process but so might many other considerations. If the U.S. invasion of Iraq increased ‘coercive credibility’ to the point that Qadhafi decided he had to settle all outstanding differences with the West, why did the bombing of Libya’s two largest cities in 1986 not produce a similar result? Similarly, if the 2003 reversal was the result of U.S. economic sanctions, why did greater sanctions by both the United States and the UN between 1992 and 1999 not produce such a reversal? This thesis shows that the effectiveness of any specific policy instrument is best evaluated in the dynamic domestic and global geopolitical and economic contexts within which they are exercised.

A within case comparison of Libyan policy changes makes it possible to hold a number of key variables constants, while allowing U.S. coercive instruments to vary. Both the key decision maker and the official ideology have remained relatively constant since 1969. Of course, an individual’s decision-making process and ideology evolve over time, but as his September 2009 speech at the UN shows, Qadhafi still claims that the

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Green Book guides his foreign policy. Qadhafi’s ideology is largely inspired by Nasser’s Pan-Arab socialism of the 1950s but is also influenced by Qadhafi’s personal interpretation of Islam. The ‘Third Universal Theory’ first espoused in 1972 describes a middle way between western liberalism (capitalism and democracy) and communism. For the purposes of this thesis, the key characteristics of Qadhafi’s ideology that determine whether a policy constitutes an ideological reversal are activist militancy and anti-western/imperialism. See the Appendix for a more detailed discussion of official Libyan Ideology.

On the other side, U.S. policy has evolved through presidential doctrines and the relative emphasis on sanctions and threats has thus varied. U.S. sanctions have been used against Libya since the Carter administration when Libya was placed on the state sponsors of terror list in 1979. As relations between Libya and the United States grew more hostile in the 1980s, economic ties between the two nations were completely cut-off. In the wake of the Pan Am and UTA airline bombings, economic sanctions were employed by the UN until the surrender of the terror suspects in 1999. U.S. sanctions remained in effect until after the 2003 Libyan reversal. Military force has been used in multiple naval skirmishes beginning in 1982 under the Reagan administration and culminating in the 1986 U.S. bombing raid. The George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations did not use force against Libya directly, but they both employed preemptive strikes against suspected terror and WMD facilities. Finally, September 11, 2001 led to a shift from the previous policy of pre-emption against facilities to the Bush Doctrine’s pre-emption against regimes. Jentleson and Whytock divide U.S. policy toward Libya into three periods. The first, 1981–1988, was characterized by sanctions and military force. The second, 1989–1998, shifted toward a more multilateral threat of force and sanction-based strategy. The third, 1999–2003, was characterized by secret


16 Specifically tomahawk cruise missile strikes in Iraq in 1993 and 1996, as well as in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998.

negotiations, the end of UN sanctions and the changing nature of the U.S. military threat according to the Bush doctrine. These three periods correspond to the three significant Libyan policy changes studied in this thesis.

B. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LIBYAN POLICY CHANGE

The most dramatic policy change is the 2003 abandonment of the WMD program and public acceptance of previous acts of terrorism. It clearly constitutes a turn away from Qadhafi’s anti-imperialist ideology. However, this was not the first significant step in the move away from Qadhafi’s ideology. To evaluate what worked in 2003, this thesis explores what factors were at play in other policy reversals. Therefore, the study also includes two previous policy reversals; the sharp drop in all forms of militancy that occurred in 1987, and the surrender of the two Pan Am flight 103 terror suspects in 1999, both of which constitute significant reversals of policy. After over a decade of aggression in the form of deployment of conventional military force, support for insurgents and overt support for terrorism, nearly all forms of military activism ceased in 1987. The number of troops deployed outside Libya dropped from over 16,000 at a peak in 1983 to zero in 1988. Destabilization efforts in the developing world stopped. Terrorist acts slowed to a trickle. In 1999, the two Pan Am flight 103-terror suspects were surrendered for trial in the Netherlands after eight years of negotiations. The 1987, 1999 and 2003 policy reversals were all contrary to state ideology, and each happened in the context of a different level of U.S. military threat and sanctions, as well as different levels of internal dissent and greatly different international environments. By comparing the differences in coercive policies in the context of different domestic and international environments, the effectiveness of the U.S. policy instruments can be better evaluated. In general, this thesis


19 Mario J. Azevedo, A History of War in Chad, 148. Although a small number of Libyans remained inside the Aouzou Strip inside Chad until 1994, they never posed a threat to Chad as they had up to that point.

finds that despite the claims at the time, U.S. attempts to coerce Libyan policy were most effective when they magnified domestic or international pressures already influencing Libyan decision making.

C. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: COERCIVE POLICY INSTRUMENTS

Two instruments of U.S. foreign policy represent two key independent variables: military force and sanctions. Jentleson and Whytock define “coercive credibility” as “the coercer state convincingly conveys to the target state that noncooperation has consequences.”\(^{21}\) However, this definition is of limited use because whether a target state was ‘convinced’ is only measurable by response, which makes the argument tautological (if the target responded, it must have been convinced). A better method of measuring military threats is by the coercer’s objectives and commitment to a military solution. This thesis uses George, Hall and Simons’ categorization of policy objectives. A type A objective is one that attempts to convince the target “to stop short of the goal.” A type B objective attempts to get the target “to undo the action.” A type C is aimed at “cessation of the opponent’s hostile behavior through a demand for change in the composition of the adversary’s government or in the nature of the regime.”\(^{22}\) The distinction between types B and C is key to understanding effective coercion because type C can cross the upper limit of proportional coercion. In other words, because regime change is usually a threat to the personal survival of the targeted leader, coercion fails because the cost of compliance is as high as, or higher than, the cost of continuing to resist.

Objective alone is not enough to measure the coerciveness of a threat; it must be linked to the coercer’s level of commitment. The U.S. commitment to coercing Libya in 1986 was limited to covert logistics and intelligence support to Libya’s enemies in Chad, naval skirmishes in the Mediterranean and a single ‘retaliatory’ air raid, even though the objective was both policy and regime change (Type B/C). The U.S. commitment to Operation Desert Shield/Storm was more sustained involving hundreds of thousands of


\(^{22}\) George, Hall, and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 10.
troops deployed over a period of months, while the objective was exclusively policy change (Type B). The U.S. commitment to Operation Iraqi Freedom was greater still lasting over six years to date. By categorizing external threats according to their objective type (limited or existential) and the overall commitment (short-term or sustained), a more complete measure of ‘coercive credibility’ is attained. In the case of Libya, external threats were most likely to coerce a policy reversal when they were existential and sustained.

Libya is an excellent target nation to study the effectiveness of economic sanctions because the economy is almost entirely dependent on oil exports and it is a rentier state. In rentier states, rents accrue directly to the state from an external source, and “only a few are engaged in the generation of this rent (wealth), the majority being only involved in the distribution or utilization of it.”23 As the government loses its ability to fulfill its distributive social contract, it becomes more vulnerable to internal dissent. Conversely, the more money coming in, the more secure the regime becomes because it can afford to buy-off internal dissent and to pay for a larger security apparatus. Libya should have been very vulnerable to economic sanctions, just as Iraq was after the 1991 Gulf War. However, unlike Iraq, the multilateral sanctions never actually targeted Libya’s oil sales. The United States stopped buying Libyan oil in the 1980s but the UN sanctions did not restrict Europe from continuing to buy Libyan oil. However, both U.S. and UN sanctions did target Libya’s oil industry infrastructure. Bans on oil industry equipment and technology exports to Libya were intended to inflict an economic cost that would coerce a policy change. Since the desired policy change was eventually achieved, it is tempting to credit the sanctions alone. However, this approach is logically backward. If the sanctions were intended to coerce a policy change by damaging Libya’s oil industry, the effectiveness of the sanctions must be measured by their effect on Libyan oil production. Additionally, the changing price of oil would have an even more pronounced

influence on the Libyan economy than oil production. Taken together, the effect on Libyan oil production and the global economic context provide a better means to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions and an instrument of coercion.

Although Libyan government reports are not reliable, the volume of Libyan oil sold on the international market is available from international sources (Figure 1). Multiplying exports by the price of oil (Figure 2) produces income to the state (Figure 3). Since the regime’s security is dependent on buying-off potential opposition, the larger the population, the more patronage is required. If the income remained constant while the population was increasing, the regime would become less able to fulfill its rentier social contract. At the time of the Young Officer’s coup in 1969, Libya had a population of less than two million. Today, it is over six million. Thus, oil revenue is divided by population for the final measure of state capacity (Figure 4). This graph shows that despite the changing nature of different sanctions imposed by different countries, Libyan oil earnings were more dependent upon the international price of oil than anything else.

**Thousand Barrels per Day**

![Graph showing volume of Libyan oil sold on the international market from 1968 to 2008.](image)

Figure 1. Volume of Libyan Oil Sold on the International Market.24

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Figure 2. Exports by the Price of Oil\textsuperscript{25}

Regime Income in Billions, 2008 $ US

Figure 3. Income to the State\textsuperscript{26}


\textsuperscript{26} Figure 3 is the product of the annual production times the average international price of oil calculated in 2008 $US.
The following analysis evaluates the costs and benefits associated with each policy change studied employing the standards used by Jentleson and Whytock: reciprocity and proportionality. The former measures the diplomatic instrument while the latter measures the level of threat. “‘Reciprocity’ involves an explicit, or at least mutually tacit, understanding of linkage between the coercer’s carrots and the target’s concessions.” In other words, it is the ‘deal on the table.’ If the deal is accepted, the Libyan policy change results in an immediate and overt response. This would be a highly reciprocal arrangement. If there is no ‘deal on the table,’ a policy change results in slow or muted U.S. reaction. A Libyan policy change made in the hopes of being countered with a beneficial U.S. policy, or in response to other factors, is not a reciprocal arrangement.

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27 Figure 4 is the annual totals from Figure 3 divided by Libya’s annual population as measured by the World Bank, World Development Indicator, [http://datafinder.worldbank.org/about-world-development-indicators](http://datafinder.worldbank.org/about-world-development-indicators).

Proportionality” refers to the relationship within the coercer’s strategy between the scope and nature of the objectives being pursued and the instruments being used in their pursuit. The more the coercer demands of the target, the higher the target’s costs of compliance and the greater the need for the coercer’s strategy to increase the costs of noncompliance and the benefits of compliance.29

In other words, the coercive influence must be strong enough to equal the costs of the target’s policy change or continued resistance. There is an upper and lower limit of proportionality. The lower limit is zero meaning that a coercive policy has such a low coercive influence on the policy maker’s decision-making process that it does not even enter the cost/benefit analysis. However, some policy changes are not coercible. For example, regime change is often a matter of life or death for the targeted policy maker. The cost of economic sanctions never is proportional with the cost of regime change. Sanctions that damage a targeted country’s economy, and therefore, reduce the government’s ability to distribute patronage to quell internal dissent, may result in the leader accepting the demands of the sanction’s sender. More often than not, however, the leader attempts to coup-proof the regime and assumes a repressive ‘bunker mentality’ rather than comply with the demands of the coercer, as happened in Saddam’s Iraq under sanctions.

A non-coerced policy change involves a *quid pro quo*, usually the product of negotiations. Those policy changes that result from a *quid pro quo* response (both reciprocal and proportional) are credited to incentives and not coercion. For example, a negotiated settlement in which both parties are seen to compromise a similar amount is not a coerced agreement. On the other hand, if one party compromises much more than the other party does, the agreement is considered to be coerced by something. This does not mean that all unreciprocated or non-proportional Libyan policy changes are due to specific U.S. policy instruments. The Libyan government could be reacting to factors known or unknown to U.S. policy makers or negotiators. It does, however, show the degree to which these policy changes were a response to negotiated incentives.

Table 1 summarizes the general values of the variables for each of the three cases.

Table 1. General Values of the Variables for Each of the Three Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy Objective</th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Sanctions</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>B and C</td>
<td>Existential But limited</td>
<td>Not Very Effective</td>
<td>Not Proportional Not Reciprocal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Non-existential And Limited</td>
<td>Somewhat Effective</td>
<td>Proportional Reciprocal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Implied Existential And Sustained</td>
<td>Not Very Effective</td>
<td>Somewhat-Proportional Somewhat-Reciprocal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assigning values to the variables helps explain the coercive mechanisms of the three policy reversals. However, it is not until the domestic and international context of each policy reversal is considered can the influence of specific U.S. policy instruments be evaluated.

D. ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS

In addition to the terms of the policy change and the specific instruments designed to produce it, this analysis also considers the influence of two types of antecedent conditions: domestic pressure groups and the overall role of the changing international environment. Unless the domestic and international contexts of the Libyan policy changes are accounted for, what seems a reaction to a specific coercive policy may be a result of a completely different decision-making calculus. In general, this thesis finds that the antecedent conditions were more influential than any particular U.S. or UN policy instrument by itself. However, in all three cases, when the policy instrument worked to magnify or exacerbate an antecedent condition, it was more effective.

E. ROADMAP

This thesis examines the particular environments in which the three policy changes were made and how the two U.S. policy instruments of sanctions and threats of military force contributed. Chapter II discusses the 1987 abandonment of military
activism, arguing that while U.S. military force was employed in the year before this reversal, several other domestic considerations contributed more significantly to the change in policy. Chapter III reviews the decision to surrender the two Pan Am flight 103 terror suspects in 1999. This policy change occurred in the context of significant sanctions, and some level of U.S. threat of force, but again, domestic factors, especially the rise and fall of anti-Qadhafi Islamists, and international factors, especially the end of the Cold War and the New World Order, were also important. Chapter IV studies the international and domestic environment in which the 2003 reversal occurs. During this short period, the defeat of the Islamists and end of multilateral sanctions are countered by an increasing threat of military force after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Finally, Chapter V draws conclusions from the comparative analysis of all three decisions, and considers their implications for coercive diplomacy in other rogue states, as well as future policy toward Libya and Africa.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF MILITANT ACTIVISM

Nineteen eighty-seven marks the end of Libyan militancy. After nearly a decade of aggressive foreign policy, the Libyan military stood down, material support for insurgents abruptly dropped off and the number of sponsored terrorist acts fell sharply. What explains this policy reversal? This chapter explores the historical context of this policy change and measures the effects of U.S. policy instruments to determine how, and how much, they influenced Libyan decision making.

A. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MILITANT ACTIVISM

Political and economic conditions in the 1960s and 1970s set the stage for a rise in Libyan military activism. The coup that deposed King Idris in 1969 came at a time of unprecedented anti-western sentiment in the Arab world. Nasser’s United Arab Republic had disintegrated in 1961. The combined militaries of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were soundly defeated by Israel in 1967. The Arab world blamed both of these developments on Western support of Israel. Finally, despite Qadhafi’s strident Pan Arab rhetoric and willingness to support an anti-Israel war effort, Egypt and Syria chose not to include, or even inform, Libya prior to their Pan Arab attack on Israel in 1973. Inside Libya, simmering Arab resentment against Israel and the West combined with a sense of abandonment with regard to the rest of the Arab world. Libya was left to go it alone against what it determined ‘Imperialist’ powers and their puppet states.

Economically, the coup came at a time of unprecedented, and still increasing, state wealth in Libya. In the last ten years of the monarchy, oil’s contribution to Libya’s GDP jumped from 27 percent to 65 percent.\(^{30}\) Four years after the coup, oil was the only commodity Libya exported.\(^{31}\) At the same time, the price began a climb from around $18/barrel in 1973 to a high of over $90/barrel in 1979 (Figure 1). The 1973 Arab-Israeli war created a boom in the price of oil that that would last over a decade and resulted in an


\(^{31}\) Ibid., 113.
estimated $95 billion windfall. This income was largely collected by the state under Exploration and Production-Sharing Arrangements (EPSAs) first implemented in 1973. This arrangement granted international oil companies rights over Libyan acreage but left sub-surface mineral rights in the hands of the state. The companies were in effect made contractors of the Libyan state. This new and increasing income stream meant the Libyan government was fueled by almost unlimited funds during the 1970s. Of the $26.3 billion government budget in 1975, $23 billion was funded out of oil revenues that accrued directly to the state. By 1971, the petroleum sector had come to account for 70 percent of its GDP. The rest of the economy taken together only contributed about 20 percent of its GDP. In sum, Libya, being left out of the Pan Arab war against Israel in 1973, provided the inspiration and ideological justification for an ambitious militant foreign policy. In addition, huge inflows of oil revenue following the 1973 war provided the means to sustain an activist militant foreign policy. Moreover, because of the rentier nature of the state, little domestic resistance existed as long as oil revenues remained high.

Prior to 1973, Qadhafi and the other self-proclaimed ‘Young Officers’ of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), were ideological disciples of Nasser. In fact, Qadhafi openly sought Nasser’s praise and support after the 1969 coup. “Tell President Nasser we made this revolution for him. He can take everything of ours and add it to the rest of the Arab world’s resources to be used for the battle [against Israel, and for Arab unity].” However, Nasser died less than a year after the Libyan coup. Egypt’s new president, Anwar El Sadat, did not consider Qadhafi a dependable ally. The ‘October War’ of 1973 between the combined forces of Egypt and Syria against Israel marks a pivotal moment for Qadhafi. Sadat and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad initiated a Pan-

34 Ibid., 111.
Arab attack against Israel without including or even informing him. The resulting peace treaty between Egypt and Israel meant that Qadhafi had lost a key ally in his own anti-Israeli agenda. From that point on, Qadhafi’s ideology and military activism became more his own.

His 1973 Zuwara speech signaled the direction of his ‘cultural revolution.’ In Islamic and Bedouin terms, Qadhafi prescribed a form of direct popular democracy. It rejected both the representative government of the West and socialist institutions of the East. People’s Power, or direct democracy, was imposed at every level of Libyan society, with the notable exception of the oil sector. Traditional interest groups were marginalized as popular committees were placed in charge of all government activities. Within two years, the dismantling of the country’s institutions in favor of the popular committees led to political chaos, inefficiency and waste. Technocrats within the RCC wanted a more orderly, planned political system and a carefully designed economic plan. Qadhafi’s faction wanted to maintain the revolution domestically and pursue a more activist foreign policy. Tension between the factions resulted in a failed ‘technocratic coup’ in August 1975. The coup leaders fled to Tunis, where they would remain the voice of the opposition. Qadhafi used the opportunity to consolidate his personal control over the RCC and push forward his revolutionary agenda.

The 1975-failed technocratic coup marks the beginning of Libya’s ideological foreign policy activism. Its three main instruments were conventional military force, support to insurgents and sponsorship of terrorism. These were generally applied according to what Deeb calls the national interest pyramid (Figure 5). Conventional force was mostly used against Libya’s neighbors, destabilization against governments (further down the pyramid) not an immediate security threat and terrorism against the West and Israel (at the bottom of the pyramid).

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38 Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 85.
39 Ibid., 101.
40 Ibid.
The higher the target country is in this pyramid, the more likely foreign policy it is motivated by core security-led concerns. The lower on the pyramid, the more likely foreign policy it is motivated by ideology.

Figure 5. Deeb’s Neo-Realist Libyan National Interest Pyramid

Qadhafi had already increased the size of the army from 6,500 in 1969 to 20,000 in 1970. The huge increase in oil revenue after 1973, in conjunction with Egypt’s peace settlement with Israel, led to an increase in military spending from $60 million in 1970 to $2.3 billion in 1979.\(^{42}\) In the early 1980s, arms imports comprised over 40 percent of imports.\(^{43}\) By 1987, Libya had more weapons than it could use.\(^{44}\) Its relatively small population made manning Qadhafi’s war machines a challenge. Universal conscription

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became law in 1978. That year, the size of the military increased to nearly 55,000 simply to operate all the weapons Libya was buying.\textsuperscript{45} Qadhafi bolstered his national armed forces with mercenaries. The Islamic Legion, inspired by the French Foreign Legion, was to be composed of foreign volunteers who would spearhead Libya’s trans-Saharan military adventures. However, most were poor Saharan immigrants pressed into service.\textsuperscript{46} The size of the army peaked at 68,000 in 1987.\textsuperscript{47} Four interventions in Chad were by far the largest uses of the Libyan military outside Libya.\textsuperscript{48} Table 2 shows the scale of Libyan conventional military deployments. Despite continuing Pan-Arab, anti-Zionist and anti-Western rhetoric, most men and material were used against the least ideological targets.\textsuperscript{49}

**Table 2. Libyan Troops Deployed: Uganda and Chad**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972–5</td>
<td>400\textsuperscript{50}</td>
<td>Advisors for not recognizing Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976–7</td>
<td>Approx 400+</td>
<td>Advisors post Israeli raid on Entebbe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978–9</td>
<td>4,500\textsuperscript{51}</td>
<td>2,500 Libyans and 2,000 Islamic Legion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>3,000\textsuperscript{52–53}</td>
<td>Fire Support for Frolinat rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2,000–3,000</td>
<td>Fire Support for Volcan rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>14,000\textsuperscript{54}</td>
<td>7,000 Libyans, 7,000 Islamic Legion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>10,000\textsuperscript{55}</td>
<td>Est. withdrawn into Aouzou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Est. withdrawn into Aouzou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>16,000\textsuperscript{56}</td>
<td>9,000 Libyans, 7,000 Islamic Legion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{46} Foltz, “Libya’s Military Power,” 57.


\textsuperscript{48} Qadhafi also used his military to defend Idi Amin in 1979.


\textsuperscript{50} Azevedo, *A History of War in Chad*, 147.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 152.

\textsuperscript{52} Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 154.


\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 381.

\textsuperscript{55} Azevedo, *A History of War in Chad*, 148.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 149.
Libyan Troops Deployed to Chad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>9,000 Libyans, 7,000 Islamic Legion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>7,000(^{57})</td>
<td>Libyans supporting GUNT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>8,000(^{58})</td>
<td>Libyans supporting GUNT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>15,000(^{59})</td>
<td>French and Chadian sources claim 20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No reliable data exists on Libyan sponsored destabilization attempts globally. However, Lemarchand’s data for Africa provides some perspective as to the number and scope of destabilization efforts (Table 3). Qadhafi’s anti-Imperialist ideology combined with huge oil revenues to produce a foreign policy of destabilization of any government deemed a puppet of the West. As Lemarchand’s data shows, Libyan destabilization efforts ranged from financial support of rebel groups to coup attempts by Libyan trained commandos. After 1987, these numerous and diverse destabilization efforts would end.

Table 3. Libyan-Sponsored Attempts at Destabilization: 1976–1986\(^{60}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Fasso</td>
<td>1982–83</td>
<td>Arms and funding to Colonel Sankara, thus contributing to his successful military takeover (1983).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Arms and funding for abortive coup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Abortive raid against Arlit by Libyan trained Tamchakent elements (Touaregs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Abortive raid by Libyan-trained commandos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1975–85</td>
<td>Military and financial assistance to southern based rebellion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975, 76, 83</td>
<td>Abortive Libyan-sponsored coups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1978–85</td>
<td>Military and financial support to Somalian Salvation Front.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>1976–84</td>
<td>Mil. and financial support to Polisario</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{58}\) Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 169.

\(^{59}\) Ibid.

Finally, Libya trained terrorists and provided them "rent-free offices, headquarters, and villas." In 1980, Libya established the Anti-Imperialism Centre, also known as the Mathaba International, an international think-tank of terrorist policy. As was noted at the time, “no regime was as brazen and arrogant in terrorist policies as Libya.” Table 4 shows the number of terrorist acts attributed to Libya went from a high of over two dozen attacks in 1984 to only a few just three years later.

Table 4. Libyan Supported Terrorist Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 Pre-airstrike</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 Post-airstrike</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By 1987, all forms of ideologically militant foreign policy almost completely stopped, with the notable exception of two commercial airline bombings. What caused this policy change? U.S. sanctions and military force were employed prior to the change, but as the rest of this chapter shows, other factors loom larger in the explanation.

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64 Collins, “Dissuading State Support of Terrorism; Strikes or Sanctions?” 5.
B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: U.S. POLICY FACTORS

1. Negotiations

The 1987 reversal could not have been affected by U.S. diplomacy because there was none. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya had been completely severed in the years before, and the Reagan administration sought to force an end to Libya’s military activism without a ‘deal on the table.’ In 1985, the United States increased military aid to anti-Libyan Chadian forces and considered sponsoring a Chadian overthrow of the Libyan government.65 No reciprocity was offered before the 1987 reversal, none was given after, and Libya remained rhetorically committed to using terrorism against the United States and other imperialist powers.

2. Sanctions

When the United States designated Libya a ‘state sponsor of terror’ in December 1979, four different types of sanctions took effect: restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a ban on the sale and export of defense related items, strict limitations on dual-use items, and the United States would vote to oppose loans and aid from international financial institutions.66 In 1982, Reagan banned the import of Libyan crude oil and the export of oil and refinery equipment to Libya. In 1985, refined petroleum products were added to the import ban.67 After Libya was implicated in terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports later in 1985, all trade between the United States and Libya was blocked. All commercial contracts with American oil companies were suspended, and all Libyan government assets in the United States were frozen.68 Simply put, the United States had cut all economic relations with Libya by 1986. No effect on the Libyan economy was


immediately apparent. The drop in oil exports to the United States was completely offset by increased exports to Europe, especially Italy.\(^6^9\) Only the ban on U.S. oil industry technology had a substantial affect. Since U.S. oil companies initially opened most of the Libyan oil fields in the late 1950s and 1960s, their continued productivity was dependent on United States produced spare parts. However, this effect became significant only over time, and could not have contributed significantly to the decision to end most forms of militancy in 1987.


Libya’s territorial claim over the Gulf of Sidra was the impetus for numerous and escalating U.S. naval provocations beginning in 1980. In September 1980, a Libyan fighter fired a missile at an American EC-135. In August 1981, two Libyan SU-22s fired missiles at two Navy F-14s escorting the Libyan planes out of a U.S. declared exercise area in disputed waters. The F-14s evaded the missiles and then shot down the two Russian-built fighters. In 1983, two F-14s once again intercepted a Libyan fighter over the Gulf of Sidra, but no shots were exchanged.\(^7^0\) The naval skirmishes peaked in March 1986 when U.S. forces inside the Gulf of Sidra responded to Libyan fire by sinking two Libyan patrol boats and damaging Libyan ground-based radar and missile sites.\(^7^1\)

The nature of U.S. military force changed after Libya was found responsible for the April 5, 1986, Berlin disco bombing. Operation El Dorado Canyon was launched on April 15 in retaliation for this and other acts of terrorism. Over 100 U.S. aircraft were involved in strikes on five sets of targets within Libya. Among them were Qadhafi’s command and control center, two military airfields, and two terrorist training camps.\(^7^2\) The raid caused “considerable damage to Libya’s terrorist infrastructure and generated


\(^7^0\) Ibid., 8.

\(^7^1\) Foltz, “Libya’s Military Power,” 60.

\(^7^2\) McFall, “From Rogue to Vogue: Why Did Libya Give Up Its Weapons of Mass Destruction?,” 17.
short-term political instability in Tripoli,” demonstrating a credible (although limited) threat to the Qadhafi regime. The U.S. air raid was an attempt to force both policy change and regime change, since Qadhafi’s residence was targeted.

The 1986 raid initially seemed successful. Qadhafi did not appear on television for two days after the raid. There were rumors of an organized domestic resistance. The response to government calls for anti-U.S. rallies was lackluster. However, Qadhafi was able to rally public support with nationalist and revolutionary rhetoric within 48 hours. After a short period of chaos, Qadhafi reconsolidated his position and even managed to deflect domestic resentment over the economic downturn to resentment of the U.S. attack. On one hand, the 1986 raid raised the cost of supporting terrorism. On the other hand, its limited nature weakened U.S. coercive credibility.

C. ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS

1. Defeat in Chad

The most significant contributor to the end of activist militancy was the 1987 defeat in Chad. Qadhafi had suffered small-scale military defeats since the late 1970s. The Egyptian army destroyed dozens of Libyan tanks and aircraft in a border skirmish in 1977. The attempt to defend Idi Amin from a Tanzanian invasion in 1979 was a complete failure and cost Libya between 400 and 600 dead and nearly 1,000 wounded.  

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73 Collins, “Dissuading State Support of Terrorism; Strikes or Sanctions?,” 5.
75 Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 142.
76 Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics, 32.
77 Ibid., 33.
80 Yehudit Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 154.
out of a deployed force of only 4,500, along with nearly all its military equipment. Libya also suffered significant losses in Chad prior to 1987, but the September 1987 defeat was by far the worst. Chadian forces not only defeated the Libyan forces deployed inside Chad but also pushed north into Libyan territory destroying an air base and killing hundreds. As many as 3,600 Libyan troops were killed in 1987, and between $1 and $1.5 billion in military equipment destroyed or captured. A nation one-fiftieth the size of the United States had suffered as many killed in one year as the United States had in eight years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Qadhafi had committed over a third of his army and over half of his Air Force and lost. This defeat contributed to the abandonment of military activism in two different ways. First, it was destructive enough to limit the ability of the Libyan military to deploy effectively until re-equipped, at a time when re-equipping was much more difficult because of collapsing oil revenues. Second, the military was demoralized and a growing threat to the Qadhafi regime. The military already posed a significant threat to the Qadhafi government. As the military’s operational tempo increased, so too did the number of acts of military rebellion. Harris counts “fifteen serious assassination attempts…almost all conducted by the military” between 1976 and 1985. That trend would only become more pronounced after the defeat in Chad. Qadhafi had to concentrate on securing his regime rather than large-scale military activism abroad.

2. **Oil Bust**

Oil revenue declined dramatically in the mid 1980s (Figure 3) mostly because of a steadily declining international price of oil after 1979 (Figure 2). The economic impact was substantial, especially coming on the heels of domestic economic disasters caused by

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81 Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 373.


83 As evidenced by an increase in Libyan arms purchases after 1987. Despite flat government revenues, Libya’s arms imports as a percentage of total imports grew seven percent in the two years after the defeat in Chad. O’Sullivan, *Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism*, 207.

‘revolutionary’ economic policies. Economic performance in Libya was often substantially worse than that in other OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries due to mismanagement and radical economic reforms. The economic impact of Libyan mismanagement and the collapse of the international price of oil were far more damaging to Libya’s economy than U.S. sanctions. At the same time, the Qadhafi government was becoming more threatened by a demoralized military; it was losing the economic means to quell domestic resentment. The oil bust not only made it harder to continue a policy of activist militancy because of an inability to buy replacement military equipment, but also, because the government was less able to co-opt domestic resentment through patronage.

3. Domestic Factors

By the late 1980s, the Libyan people were also reaching the limit of revolution. Qadhafi’s radical ideology had been imposed on the people though ubiquitous ‘popular’ committees intended to mobilize support for the regime. The popular committees were, in theory, institutions of direct democracy by which the people could directly control their government. In reality, a small clique at the top of the Qadhafi government made important domestic and foreign policy decisions. Soon, the popular committees were not even trusted to manage routine affairs without potentially threatening the regime. In 1976, revolutionary committees were instituted as a supervisory network inside every popular committee level of government, society and the military. They were primarily composed of young Qadhafi loyalists responsible to Qadhafi himself and endowed with sweeping and arbitrary power to ensure the loyalty to the government. By 1980, the revolutionary committees had become a key element of the regime’s security apparatus. They were given the right to pursue the ‘physical liquidation of the enemies of the revolution’ abroad and the authority to create revolutionary courts based on the ‘law of

85 O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism, 188.
the revolution.\textsuperscript{87} The result was a police state. What began as an experiment in direct democracy and political mobilization evolved into an authoritarian mechanism to secure Qadhafi’s rule.

As the Libyan economy dropped off in the mid 1980s, and the government was less able to distribute patronage; the revolutionary committees became the focus of popular resentment. Beginning in 1987, Qadhafi sought to deflect the widespread resentment of his security apparatus from his person. He publicly denounced the abuses of his revolutionary committees and security organizations. “They have lost their way; they have inflicted damage and hurt. A revolutionary should not be an oppressor. I would like to be able to show the contrary is true: that the Committees love the masses.”\textsuperscript{88} Large numbers of political prisoners were released. In 1988, Qadhafi personally participated in the destruction of the Tripoli’s central prison and supervised the destruction of thousands of security files on Libyan citizens.\textsuperscript{89} Opposition figures were invited to return to Libya. Perhaps most dramatic of all, the late 1980s ‘liberalizations’ was the Great Green Charter of Human Rights in 1988, which included a ban on capital punishment.\textsuperscript{90} The fact that his domestic liberalization was essentially simultaneous with the 1987 foreign policy reversal, suggest that both were largely a response to domestic pressure.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The objective of regime change was clearly a failure and was quickly abandoned. The question is whether the policy objective of countering Libya’s militant activism was achieved because of U.S. policy instruments. Sanctions that began in 1979 increased until economic and diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya were completely


\textsuperscript{88} Quoted from Libyan national TV in, Martinez, \textit{The Libyan Paradox}, 34.

\textsuperscript{89} Vandewalle, \textit{A History of Modern Libya}, 143.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 144. Of course, none of these ‘Human Rights’ limited Qadhafi’s arbitrary rule. In fact, as the Islamists became a greater internal threat to the regime, Qadhafi reversed his ban on capital punishment to better combat the emerging threat (Mattes, “The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees,” 109). The Revolutionary Committees were once again charged with defending the regime in the face of an internal threat (Vandewalle, \textit{A History of Modern Libya}, 144).
cut by 1986. The threat of force also gradually increased until the 1985 U.S. bombing of Libyan targets. The pace of terrorist attacks may have slowed in response to the accumulating costs of sanctions and the demonstrated willingness of the United States to undertake military retaliation against future attacks. However, the combined cost of these policy instruments was still not high or sustained enough to stop the practice on their own or in combination.

U.S. policy had a limited effect on Libya’s use of terrorism after 1987, and no significant effect on the abandonment of other forms of militancy. Qadhafi’s opposition to the West ideologically contributed to his regime’s legitimacy, and the minimal costs of unilateral sanctions were far too low to cause him to forego these legitimacy benefits. The U.S. raid in 1986 increased the cost of terrorism, but instead of abandoning it, Qadhafi focused his efforts on fewer, more damaging acts of terror. Libya’s abandonment of other forms of militancy is better explained by the combination of the defeat in Chad, and the collapse in the international price of oil that resulted in an increase in domestic dissent. If the boom in oil prices provided Qadhafi the means to execute his activist foreign policy while meeting his obligations under a rentier social contract, then the collapse in oil prices constrained his activism and reduced rentier redistribution, and thus, domestic legitimacy. In the end, the 1987 policy reversal was far less affected by U.S. policy than by domestic factors.
III. THE LOCKERBIE REVERSAL

On March 19, 1999, Qadhafi announced that he would allow two Libyan terror suspects, Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah, to be tried by a Scottish court created in the Netherlands. The surrender of the two terror suspects is generally held as a successful case of multilateral sanctions coercing a policy change. More significantly, it is also held as the first significant step toward normalization with the West. This chapter explores both claims. First, by analyzing nature of the U.S. threat of force and the effects of the multilateral sanctions against Libya in the 1990s, the coercive power of these two policy instruments can be gauged. Second, by analyzing the changing domestic and international contexts of the 1999 decision, the ideological change within the Qadhafi regime can be better understood.

This chapter finds that although the sanctions were having some effect on the Libyan economy, it was not significant enough to coerce an ideological reversal independently. Additionally, the threat of internal dissent resulting from a depressed economy had already been countered by effective government suppression by the time of the 1999 decision. Ultimately, the most effective aspect of the multilateral sanctions was international isolation of Libya, and Qadhafi, in particular. As a result of UN sanctions, Libya became increasingly isolated diplomatically and economically during the 1990s. Ideologically, Qadhafi struggled to reconcile his Pan Arab ambitions, with no support from the rest of the Arab world, and the United States dominated New World Order. In the end, Qadhafi found a way to free Libya of the UN sanctions while saving face by complying with the British and French demands but refusing most of the American demands and maintaining a lighter version of his core ideology. Thus, the 1999 policy change is best understood as a response to UN diplomatic sanctions rather than a U.S.-coerced decision or an ideological shift toward the West.


A. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH

The 1999 policy reversal happened in a very different international political environment than the 1987 policy change. Qadhafi had lost his largest arms supplier and Cold War advocate when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772 bombings in 1988 and 1989, respectively, were the bloodiest acts of terrorism in the world prior to 9/11. They galvanized European support for multilateral military, diplomatic and economic sanctions against Libya. By 1991, the Bush administration had shifted from a policy goal of regime change to a more limited goal of policy change.93 This is not to say that the threat of U.S. military force was off the table. Absent the Soviet counter-balance, the United States demonstrated a new willingness and ability to use military force in the Middle East. The liberation of Kuwait in 1991 also demonstrated that some of America’s Cold War adversaries, such as Syria and Czechoslovakia, were now willing to join a U.S. led international coalition to enforce international law. Operation Desert Shield/Storm was not a direct threat to Libya, but the New World Order represented an emerging American leadership in the Middle East and growing Libyan isolation worldwide. “The successful U.S. intervention in inter-Arab affairs made it clear to Qaddafi that the New World Order was to Tripoli’s detriment.”94

1. Military Threat

President George H. W. Bush delivered a speech on August 2, 1990 in which he outlined what came to be known as the “Rogue Doctrine.”95 It was the first articulation of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. The doctrine called for U.S. intervention against rogue states that sponsored terrorism, pursued WMD capability, and/or violated the human rights of their own people.96 This described Libya, as well as Iraq, whose army

94 Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics, 123.
96 St. Johns, Libya and the United States, 159.
was rolling across the Kuwaiti border as the speech was delivered.97 More significantly, the Rogue Doctrine was geared toward policy change (or a type B policy objective) rather than regime change (or a type C policy objective).98 By early 1991, the Bush administration had abandoned the Reagan era covert policy to destabilize the Qadhafi regime because of the potentially negative propaganda value.99 Instead of actively pursuing regime change in Libya, U.S. policy fell more in-line with European policy toward Libya, which had always been a type B policy objective. In October 1991, a French magistrate issued an international arrest warrant for the arrest of four Libyan agents for their involvement in the 1989 UTA bombing. One month later, in November 1991, the United States and U.K. governments indicted two Libyan agents for the 1988 Pan Am flight 103 bombing. This shared grievance against Libyan sponsored terrorism forged a coalition within the UN Security Council, which produced resolution 731, passed in January 1992. It deplored Libya’s lack of cooperation in both terror investigations.100 Libya’s intransigence resulted in Security Council support for escalating multilateral sanctions but not escalating military force, as was the case with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The early 1990s brought a general international consensus that terrorism as a state policy was to be countered through military deterrent and sanctions. Gross violations of international borders were to be countered with force. However, because of the need to hold a large international coalition together, type B and not type C policy objectives were adopted against both Libya and Iraq. From Qadhafi’s perspective, Libya risked becoming more isolated for its radical policies but his rule and personal survival were less threatened by powers outside of Libya.

Desert Storm represented a significant change in U.S. policy toward the Middle East in both scale, objective and level of commitment. The Reagan administration had employed military force in the Middle East on a relatively small scale and only for short durations. The U.S. bombing raid on Libya was in support of a policy objective of regime

98 Regime change would not become the goal of U.S. policy again until after September 11, 2001 and the Bush Doctrine’s justification of preventive war.
change. However, the limited nature of the attack, like the withdrawal of U.S. peacekeepers from Beirut after a suicide bomber attacked their barracks in 1983, demonstrated the limited nature of U.S. military commitment in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{101} The forceful U.S. reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait implied an increased U.S. willingness to commit forces in the Middle East in the post-Cold War context. Desert Shield/Storm was the largest deployment of U.S. military force since Vietnam. After a six-month buildup, an international coalition of 737,000 troops (500,000 U.S.), comprising over 38 nations, were in the Persian Gulf region ready to use force to liberate Kuwait.\textsuperscript{102} After over a month of air strikes, the ground war only lasted 100 hours. Although Desert Storm demonstrated Qadhafi’s potential vulnerability to U.S. power, it did not represent an immediate threat. The objective of Desert Storm was the liberation of Kuwait, not the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. In the New World Order, as long as Qadhafi did not threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of other states, he was only subject to containment and isolation under the Rogue Doctrine.

Qadhafi’s response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the U.S. led counter-offensive demonstrates how little he felt threatened by U.S. force and how much he felt threatened by political isolation. He first responded to the unhindered use of U.S. military power in anti-imperialist terms. At the outset of the war, he stated, “We wish Iraq to triumph and America to be defeated.”\textsuperscript{103} He saw the war as “an imperialist mission and [an expression of] hatred against Arabs.”\textsuperscript{104} To rid the region of U.S. forces, he proposed a Pan Arab alternative (the Libya-PLO\textsuperscript{105} plan), in which both Iraqi and Western forces would be replaced by an Arab-Islamic force in Saudi Arabia and a UN force in Kuwait. This plan was ignored at the Arab League summit in August of 1990. Qadhafi tried again, alongside Jordan, Sudan and the PLO, to find an Arab solution to the conflict but was


\textsuperscript{103} Tripoli TV, January 17, 1991, in Ronen, \textit{Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics}, 142.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., February 14, 1991; JANA, January 27, 1991 (BBC).

\textsuperscript{105} Palestinian Liberation Organization.
again ignored by most of the Arab world.\textsuperscript{106} Libya’s position began to moderate in September 1990 when Qadhafi’s offer of humanitarian aid to Iraq was refused because he would not openly support Iraq’s legal claim to Kuwait. After Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak warned Qadhafi, in November of 1990, that his explicitly anti-Western stance would invite U.S. hostility after the Iraq conflict, Libyan policy went from staunch opposition to tentative support for the coalition to liberate Kuwait, including an offer to contribute troops to the United Nations’ effort.\textsuperscript{107} The timing of this reversal, and the military and diplomatic events that preceded it, shows that diplomatic isolation, especially from the Arab world, and an implied threat of military force, drove the decision.

In sum, although the United States had assumed to demonstrate a more forceful role in the Middle East in the 1990s, the military threat to Libya had not increased. It did, however, still represent a retaliatory threat for terrorist or WMD initiatives. Bush Sr. and Clinton threatened to use force against Libyan WMD facilities in Rabta and Tarhuna, respectively.\textsuperscript{108} However, because regime change was no longer a goal of U.S. policy, the threat to the regime was actually decreased. The more significant threat to Qadhafi was further isolation and marginalization in the New World Order as the Arab world accommodated the West leaving an ideological Libya isolated even in its own neighborhood.

\textbf{2. Sanctions}

As noted above, the United States had seized all Libyan assets held in the United States and cut all economic and diplomatic ties by 1986 (Table 5).


\footnote{107 Ibid. “An offer that was discretely rejected.”}

\footnote{108 Freedman, \textit{Deterrence}, 93.}
Table 5. Sanctions Against Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. Sanctions against Libya</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Ban on military equipment sales to Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Libya declared a state sponsor of terror as a result:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Controls on exports of dual-use items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. A ban on most economic assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. U.S. opposition to loans and aid from international institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>U.S. passports declared invalid for travel to Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Ban on Libyan crude oil import to the United States and of U.S. equipment oil and gas equipment to Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Ban on Libyan refined petroleum products from Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1986</td>
<td>Ban on all exports and imports between the United States and Libya, Libyan government assets in the United States are frozen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1986</td>
<td>U.S. bomber attack targets near Tripoli and Benghazi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) penalizes firms making more than $40 million investment in the Libyan energy sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>U.S. State Department renews the travel ban on Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>ILSA is reauthorized for another five years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2005</td>
<td>United States announces it will lift U.S. sanctions and restore full diplomatic relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Libya is removed from the state sponsors of terror list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2006</td>
<td>ILSA renamed ISA because Libya is removed from the sanctions act.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| <strong>UN and European Sanctions against Libya</strong>                                                                                      |
| April 1986 | European ministers agree to reduce the number of Libyan diplomats in Europe and their mobility. |
| May 1986   | G7 leaders vow to fight terrorism and single out Libya specifically.                                                            |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>UN Security Council passes resolution 731, which calls for the Libyan government to cooperate with the terror investigations into Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1992</td>
<td>UN Security Council passes resolution 748, which calls for the surrender of suspects in the Lockerbie and UTA cases, and threatens an air travel ban, arms sales ban and limitation on diplomatic personnel at Libyan embassies worldwide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1992</td>
<td>UN Security Council passes resolution 883, strengthening the previous resolution, banning oil industry equipment and freezing Libyan assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1998</td>
<td>UN Security Council passes resolution 1192, which promises to suspend UN sanctions when the two terror suspects are turned over.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UN resolution 748, the first multilateral sanctions, was passed in 1992 with much fanfare. At the time, this was hailed as, “the first time in the history of the international struggle against modern terrorism that a broad multilateral coalition had succeeded in imposing and enforcing effective sanctions against a terrorism-sponsoring state under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council.” The UN sanctions banned all international commercial aviation ties with Libya, imposed an international arms embargo, and called on UN member states to ‘significantly reduce’ the number and level of staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and to ‘restrict or control the movement’ of all such staff who remained. The UN sanctions were strengthened in November 1993 with resolution 883, which added a worldwide freeze on Libyan assets and an embargo on export of oil industry equipment to Libya. The United States increased the overall economic pressure against Libya in 1996 when the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)

109 Matar and Thabit, *Lockerbie and Libya*, 64.
110 Ibid., 25.
111 Although Libya was given three weeks to recall all but long-term investments held off-shore; O’Sullivan, *Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism*, 197.
became law. The U.S. Act sought to isolate Libya further by penalizing foreign companies that invested in the United States and invested more than $40 million per year in Libyan or Iranian oil and gas industries. As part of the Clinton administration’s rogue state policy, the ILSA was designed to isolate radical regimes, combat terrorism and check the proliferation of WMD. Although lawmakers did not explicitly state the specific goals of the ILSA at the time, the Act was re-evaluated in response to Libya’s 1999 reversal, suggesting that it was in part intended to reinforce UN sanctions.

The effectiveness of the UN sanctions can be judged three ways. First, how much of what they set out to achieve was actually achieved. Second, how much of an effect they actually had on the Libyan economy and government. Third, how Libya reacted to them.

a. Objectives and Results

The UN made four demands for the lifting of sanctions: First, cease all terrorist activity, including support to the IRA (Irish Republican Army). Second, accept responsibility for previous acts of terrorism, including Pan Am flight 103. Third, cooperate with ongoing investigations, including handing over the two indicted Pan Am suspects and cooperating with French authorities in the matter of the UTA bombing. Fourth, pay appropriate compensation for previous acts of terrorism. It immediately suspended sanctions in 1999 after Libya surrendered the two Pan Am suspects for trial and committed to complying with the specific demands of Britain and France with regard to support for the IRA and resolution of the UTA bombing, respectively. Qadhafi did not accept responsibility for previous acts of terrorism or compensate Pam Am flight 103 victims, and thus, only complied with two of the four UN demands. As a result, the United States maintained its unilateral sanctions. Thus, the United States was, again, the only country that imposed significant sanctions and maintained a potential threat of force.

113 Although no third party nation has been penalized according to the ILSA for trading with Libya; Ronen, Qadafi’s Libya in World Politics, 51.
114 Richard Tanter, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 121.
115 Matar and Thabit, Lockerbie and Libya, 207.
against Libya. From the European perspective, it can be argued that the multilateral sanctions did achieve all of their policy objectives. However, if the UN sanctions are to be evaluated according to their stated goals, the 1999 policy reversal only satisfied half of the UN demands.

\textit{b. Economic Costs}

The sanctions were not damaging enough to the Libyan economy to cause the 1999 policy reversal by themselves. Several scholars have argued that U.S. sanctions on export of oil technology stymied Libya’s mostly American built infrastructure.\textsuperscript{116} The UN sanctions of 1993 also banned the export of oil production equipment to Libya and should have had an immediate effect, as spare parts became unavailable. However, oil production after 1993 only decreased slightly and then remained relatively constant until 2003 (Figure 1). O’Sullivan credits the steady level of production to opening new oil fields to exploration, with equipment bought on the black market, while production at existing fields fell at a rate of 8 percent per year.\textsuperscript{117} This suggests that, at least in the short term, Libya effectively busted the economic sanctions. Surely, the multilateral ban on oil technology had some effect on Libyan decision making. However, considering the fact that Libya met or exceeded its OPEC production quota every year, the multilateral sanctions were, in effect, the limiting factor on production was the quota rather than sanctions.\textsuperscript{118} Also, considering that Libya did not make any concessions to end U.S. sanctions, but instead chose to settle with the Europeans alone, the argument that the 1999 policy change was a result of economic sanctions is not supported by the evidence.

\textit{c. Diplomatic Costs}

The UN ban on commercial air travel had a greater influence on the policy reversal. Qadhafi saw the UN sanctions, in general, and the commercial air travel ban in particular, as a product of a U.S., French and British led coalition in the UN Security

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item O’Sullivan, \textit{Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism}, 201.
\item Ibid., 195.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
He thus responded by trying to build a coalition of states friendly to himself to defy the diplomatic sanctions, first among Arabs, then among Muslims and finally among Africans. Libyan Foreign Minister Omar Mustafa Al-Muntasser denounced the sanctions as a “crusade against Arabs and Muslims.” On April 19, 1995, a Libyan commercial airliner flew from Tripoli to Saudi Arabia in violation of the UN sanctions, carrying pilgrims on the hajj. The UN sanctions committee met, at Egypt’s request, and granted Libyan pilgrims permission to travel to Mecca from Libya, but only on Egyptian aircraft. This compromise allowed 8,000 pilgrims to travel from Libya to Mecca in the rest of 1995. Qadhafi portrayed the compromise as a great anti-imperialist victory. “No American can prevent us from reaching Mecca, even if we have to do it by swimming there in a sea of blood.” The next year he refused to use Egyptian aircraft for flights to Mecca, seeking to force further concessions from the (United Nations). However, in the end, Qadhafi’s diplomatic sanctions busting effort did not rally significant support from other Arab states, which generally complied with UN sanctions. After more than two decades of attempting to build a Pan Arab coalition against the West (Table 6), the Arab world’s neutral response to the international sanctions of 1992 was the last straw for Qadhafi.

We sacrificed everything [for them], even our children’s bread…We exhausted our economy for their sake. [Now] the fig leaf has been dropped and everything has been laid bare: The Arabs are these days reserves for the [U.S.] Marines…It would not be surprising if [the Arabs] were overcome with joy listening to the [Security Council sanctions] resolutions.

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119 The final vote on resolution 748 was ten for and zero against with five abstentions. China, Morocco, Cape Verde, India and Zimbabwe abstained; Matar and Thabit, *Lockeberie and Libya*, 24.


121 Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 50.


123 Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 125.
Sub-Saharan African countries were more receptive to Qadhafi’s calls to defy UN sanctions. Qadhafi portrayed himself as “a beleaguered revolutionary, standing firm against the forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism.” The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was the only regional organization to defy the UN ban on commercial air travel to and from Libya. Having received more diplomatic support from sub-Saharan African states, Qadhafi declared in 1998 that Pan-Arabism was a

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126 Among the many African leaders that flew to Libya to show support for their African neighbor were the presidents of Gambia, Liberia, Tanzania, Uganda and Nelson Mandela. Although Mandela flew into Tunis and drove to Tripoli and did not violate the U.N. ban; St. Johns, *Libya and the United States*, 175.
‘mirage’ and that, “Africans and not Arabs are Libya’s real supporters.”127 In March 1999, he announced, “I have no time to lose talking with Arabs…I now talk about Pan-Africanism and African unity.”128

The persistence with which Qadhafi attempted to defy the UN travel ban shows that resisting political isolation was a significant motivating factor in his decision making process. His behavior after UN sanctions were lifted reinforces this conclusion. He invited a procession of African heads of state to Tripoli to pay their respects and to attend his announcement of several diplomatic initiatives. He portrayed himself as an African elder statesman, attempting to resolve disputes in Congo, the Horn of Africa, Sierra Leone and Sudan.129 He brokered a cease-fire between Congo and Uganda in April 1999 and later hosted a five-nation summit on Congo.130 His larger political ambitions in Africa included creation of a United States of Africa, a goal long shared (if only rhetorically) by African states.131 In sum, Qadhafi sought to create a new and prominent role for himself and his country in the New World Order. Arab indifference to the UN sanctions and reliance on U.S. military leadership after 1991 convinced Qadhafi that there was no such role for him among Arab states. If he were going to forge a new international leadership role for himself, it would require an end to political isolation, specifically an end to the UN flight ban.

B. ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS

Domestic factors help explain why Qadhafi took seven years to comply with the European demands contained in the UN sanctions even if he had largely abandoned the Pan Arab goal years before 1999. Actually, Qadhafi was not secure enough domestically to abandon his protection of Libyan terrorists in the years immediately after the


130 St. Johns, Libya and the United States, 177.

imposition of multilateral sanctions. “The decade and a half between 1986 and the end of the century represented the most difficult years the regime ever faced.” Internal threats came from increasing resentment of the ubiquitous revolutionary committees, a demoralized and rebellious military, and newly mobilized Islamist groups, all of which was catalyzed by the decline in the international price of oil, and thus, of patronage resources. Qadhafi’s response was to ethnicize the armed forces to shore up loyalty there, suppress Islamists insurgents brutally, and diffuse popular dissent by promising political and economic liberalization. He also insulated himself behind new layers of security, while fragmenting adversaries within the regime. By 1999, he had suppressed the most dangerous domestic threats to his regime, and cleared the way to make the unpopular decision to comply with some of the UN demands.

Defeat in Chad, international weapons sanctions and a stagnant economy all combined to make the Libyan military even more of a potential threat to the Qadhafi government in the 1990s. His response was to fragment the military and to create additional, more loyal, security organizations. Qadhafi sought to bypass both the military and tribal leaders historically considered protectors of the Libyan government by distributing economic resources directly to local figures, thus constructing a new set of patrimonial networks. In 1991, the Ministry of Defense was abolished. By 1995, Qadhafi declared the army dissolved, putting in its place popular militias, which were supposed to defend the nation against all forms of aggression. Libya was divided into 1,500 communes, each a self-governing mini-replica of the larger state, and each responsible for its own defense. The local leaders and their militias were largely ineffective, but the change in patronage distribution succeeded in undermining both military and traditional tribal distribution streams. Resentment against this new patronage arraignment took the form of several serious coup attempts beginning in 1992. In

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133 Martinez, *The Libyan Paradox*, 92.
136 Ibid., 96.
1993, a group of captains from the Warfalla tribe led a coup attempt as an expression of military and tribal resentment.\textsuperscript{137} Despite the execution of six generals and arrest of 1,500 people after the 1993 attempt,\textsuperscript{138} by 1998 coup plots and assassination attempts measured in the dozens.\textsuperscript{139} Qadhafi responded by building new layers of security around himself. Eastern European mercenaries were widely employed. Revolutionary committees within the military were given back their arbitrary power to ensure loyalty. At the end of the 1980s, the Revolutionary Guard only measured 2,000. After the mid 1990s, the Revolutionary Guard had grown to 40,000 and was the most trusted military force by the government.\textsuperscript{140} Some observers at the time described the growing numbers of individuals with more loyal tribal affiliations obtaining high rank in the nation’s security organizations as the “re-tribalization” of Libya.\textsuperscript{141} In the end, the military and traditional tribal threats to the regime had been repressed or fragmented by 1999, giving Qadhafi the security he needed to undertake the rapprochement with the West that he desired.

The early 1990s also saw the return of mujahidin who had fought the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. These ‘Afghan Arabs’ posed a threat to the regime. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which trained in Afghanistan, began to confront the regime openly in 1995. The Islamist violence escalated in the late 1990s, especially after a prison uprising allowed 400 mostly Islamist prisoners to escape.\textsuperscript{142} Islamists undertook an assassination attempt on Qadhafi in March 1996.\textsuperscript{143} However, the Islamist threat in Libya was less coordinated and less effective than in other Arab countries at this time, such as Algeria. The Islamists were suppressed with a combination of

\textsuperscript{137} Ronen, \textit{Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics}, 50.
\textsuperscript{138} Deeb, “Qadhafi’s Changed Policy,” 147.
\textsuperscript{140} Martinez, \textit{The Libyan Paradox}, 94.
\textsuperscript{141} Mansour O. El-Kikhia, \textit{Libya’s Qaddafi. The Politics of Contradiction} (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1997).
\textsuperscript{142} “400 Prisoners Said to Be Free After Riot,” \textit{LA Times}, March 25, 1996.
\textsuperscript{143} UNHCR, March 9, 1996.
Revolutionary Guards, local militias and mercenaries from the former Soviet Union and Cuba. By 1999, armed resistance had “dwindled to the odd shootout between policemen and diehard insurgents hiding in the hills.”

At the same time that the rebellious military, tribes and Islamist were being repressed, the limited political and economic liberalizations of the late 1980s were reducing popular dissent. In 1988, the Great Green Charter of Human Rights codified several laws and punishments in reaction to popular resentment against security forces and police excesses. In 1989, a new Ministry of Justice was created. The objective of the economic liberalizations was to increase the size of the private sector (at this time 70 to 75 percent of employees worked for the state) and reduce government spending, especially on subsidies to publicly owned corporations. The ban on private retail trade was lifted in 1987. A year later, the state’s monopoly on imports and exports was abandoned. Economic liberalization did not include privatization of the oil sector, and thus, did not further threaten the regime’s distributive networks. Real liberalization would have threatened the regime’s survival, and was thus not pursued, but the “subterfuge” succeeded in shoring up the regime.

By 1999, Qadhafi was secure enough to prepare the population for the decision to comply with some of the UN demands. The balance of power within the regime between hard-liners, led mostly by members of the revolutionary committees, and the pragmatists, led by Libya’s Energy Minister, Abdallah Salim al-Badri and Foreign Minister, Omar Mustafa al-Muntasser, was tipping toward the pragmatists. Just before the terror suspects were handed over for trial, a series of articles in the state-owned Al-Jamajiriya criticized the intransigence of the hard-liners and “their inability to recognize prevailing

146 Vandewalle, *Qadhafi’s Libya*, 35.
147 Except in oil and heavy industry, which were strictly the domains of the government.
149 Vandewalle, *Qadhafi’s Libya*, 216.
150 Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 54.
global realities.” Qadhafi himself announced, “we cannot stand in the way of progress...The fashion now is the free market and investments.” Yet, when he announced the two terror suspects would be remanded for trial, he could not resist the urge to spin the decision in anti-Imperialist rhetoric. Qadhafi boasted that the United States and Britain had suffered a “historic defeat” and that “I do not want a pardon from America. On the contrary, it is an honor for me to stay on the US blacklist forever.” Clearly, Qadhafi still felt the need to appease more ideological interest groups inside Libya. Internationally, Libya expressed the hope that the compromise would lead to a “new opportunity for forging equitable relations..., based upon mutual respect and noninterference in Libya’s internal affairs.” The divergence in rhetoric shows that Qadhafi was concerned with the domestic reaction to this ideological reversal, but interested in ending his long standoff with the West.

C. CONCLUSION

Qadhafi’s decision to comply with the European demands and surrender the two suspects was affected by a combination of factors. Economic sanctions alone were not effective enough to coerce an ideological reversal. Nor was the threat of military force. The air travel ban had the greatest impact on Qadhafi’s personal ambitions, and therefore, received the most reaction from the Libyan government. Like the 1987 reversal, and despite the claims of political leaders at the time, Qadhafi’s decision was more influenced by macro-economic and international geopolitical changes. In the context of the end of the Cold War, the failure of any Arab cooperative politics and the rise of U.S. military dominance and political leadership in the Middle East, political isolation was the most compelling instrument employed against Qadhafi. The 1999 reversal happened seven years after the UN sanctions took effect only because it took that long for the Qadhafi

152 Ibid.
153 Tripoli TV, March 19, 1999 (BBC), quoting Qadhafi’s first official announcement of the imminent surrender of the suspects and the anticipated suspension of sanctions. Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics, 54.
154 Ibid., April 5, 1999.
regime to suppress the domestic threats emerging from the military defeat in Chad, the collapse in oil prices, the rise of the Islamists returning from Afghanistan, and to build an alternate, Pan-African, coalition behind his coveted international leadership role.
IV. THE 2003 ‘CONVERSION’

The trend that began when the Soviet Union collapsed became more unilaterally U.S. driven after September 11, 2001. The right side and the rogue side, as defined by the United States, would morph into an ‘axis of evil’ and ‘you’re either with us or against us.’ Libya had successfully divided the opposition in the UN Security Council in 1999, but two years later, the Bush doctrine would threaten to put Libya back on the isolated side of history. The December 19, 2003 announcement that Libya would abandon the pursuit of WMD and renounce terrorism came as economic and diplomatic conditions were improving. “A leading Arab source dubbed the Libyan move ‘the mother of all surprises,’ ironically echoing Saddam Hussein. Other Arab sources referred to the ‘bomb of renunciation of the dream of the bomb.’” Why did Libya make this final and complete policy reversal when its diplomatic and economic isolation was already ending? Of the three instruments of U.S. foreign policy, only the threat of military force was increasing during the period leading up to the 2003 reversal. However, this increased ‘coercive credibility’ was not significant enough to compel a complete capitulation to all U.S. demands. This chapter shows that the 2003 reversal was a continuation of the Libyan policy change that began in 1998. The “conversion” of Libya from an anti-Western state bent on developing WMD to a partner against terrorism and a model for non-proliferation is also the story of the victory of the pragmatic faction within the Libyan government over the ideological faction. The fear of being defined a rogue state, outside the normal international family of nations, motivated Libya to reverse policy in 1999 only grew more powerful in the years leading up to 2003, and helped tip the scales in favor of the pragmatic “conversion.” September 11, and the resulting U.S. political and military activism in the Middle East, also made a WMD program a security liability rather than a deterrent, further reducing the ideological faction’s influence. Qadhafi’s

155 The term ‘conversion’ with regard to Libya’s rapprochement with the West was coined by Luis Martinez meaning that following the 1999 Lockerbie reversal, the Qadhafi regime actively sought to situate itself on the “good side”—that is to say the side of the United States” in “Libya: the Conversion of a ‘Terrorist State,’” Mediterranean Politics 11 (July 2006): 151–165.

156 Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics, 65.
personal ideology had changed from Pan-Arabism to Pan-Africanism in the late 1990s providing a forum for the ideological faction’s anti-Western policies and rhetoric. However, unlike Pan Arabism, Pan Africanism was not as widely supported.\textsuperscript{157} In the end, the “conversion” was more a result of failed and unpopular ideological policies and larger geopolitical and macro-economic trends than of U.S. coercion. U.S. policy magnified the forces already working against the ideological faction’s policies and helped tip the scale in favor of the pragmatic faction.

After 1999, Qadhafi’s quest for a new leadership role in Africa changed from a means to end UN sanctions to a central ideological tenant of Libyan policy. African leaders served Qadhafi well during the UN sanctions. Qadhafi repaid this support with an ambitious Pan-African agenda. Only months after the UN sanctions were suspended, Qadhafi personally led the effort to reform the OAU according to his own designs. He hosted a special summit in Sirte, Libya, to amend the OAU charter, which was attended by 45 African leaders at a cost to Libya of $45 million.\textsuperscript{158} Although the summit did not completely endorse Qadhafi’s vision of African unity embodied in a ‘United States of Africa,’ the Sirte Declaration called for the creation of several Pan-African institutions.\textsuperscript{159} The following year’s OAU summit in Lome, Togo, in February 2000, won a majority decision to replace the OAU with the African Union (AU) within one year, which was accomplished on March 26, 2001, largely due to Qadhafi’s efforts and sponsorship.\textsuperscript{160} Qadhafi’s efforts were not only successful because of his generous checkbook diplomacy. Libyan leadership in Africa was far less threatening than it had been in the previous decades. Unlike the revolutionary policies of the 1970s and early 1980s, Libyan leadership in Africa after 1999 depended on cooperation. Qadhafi himself signaled this less confrontational shift as early as 1998. “In the era of national liberation,

\textsuperscript{157} The African Union is still used as an anti-American podium. As recently as September 2009, AU members of parliament were brought to Libya to cheer the return of Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi. “African MPs Cheer Lockerbie Bomber,” \textit{BBC News}, September 9, 2009.


\textsuperscript{159} Such as a central continental bank, a monetary fund, an investment bank, a pan-African parliament and a supreme court. \textit{Al-Hayat}, September 10, 1999.

\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Africa Research Bulletin}, July 1–31, 2000; Ronen, \textit{Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics}, 194.
I struggled alongside Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Algeria, Palestine...But today, we can throw away our guns and work for peace and development. This is my role. War has had its day.”

Ironically, while Qadhafi was winning African support for the new AU, African immigrants in Libya were suffering unprecedented abuse. Sub-Saharan migrants had been arriving in Libya in large numbers since the 1990s, most intending to reach Europe. However, many stayed in Libya. Libyan cities also attracted large populations of sub-Saharan migrants because of ‘open border’ policies and relaxed work visa requirements in the name of Pan African unity. By 2000, Libyan officials acknowledged that Libya’s population of 5 million Libyan consisted of 1.4 million black Africans. Self identified Arab Libyans tended to blame African migrants for crime, unemployment, poverty and AIDS. In late September 2000, anti-immigrant riots in a town just west of Tripoli resulted in the deaths of between 150 and 500. Libya quietly deported many African migrants while maintaining pro-migrant policies in an attempt to quell domestic resentment while maintaining African support for Libya’s Pan African leadership role. Many Libyans came to resent the Qadhafi’s Pan African policies and feared that Libyan foreign policy would, once again, lead the nation to financial ruin. “Tripolitans curse the opening of the borders, which has turned them into a minority in their own capital. This serves as yet another manifestation of the almost ‘one-man show’ that is Libyan foreign policy…” During the 1990s, Pan African, and anti-Western, rhetoric served the specific policy goal of ending UN sanctions. After 1999, it only seemed to serve Qadhafi’s ego, further reducing the ideological faction’s influence. September 11, 2001, and the resulting Bush Doctrine, would further reduce the attractiveness of ideological

162 Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 192.
163 Radio Tripoli, October 9, 2000 (BBC), Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 199.
164 Martinez, *The Libyan Paradox*, 111.
166 Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 192.
167 Solomon and Swart, “Libyan Foreign Policy in Flux,” 481.
policies. Conversely, the improving economy, mostly due to higher oil prices and improved economic relations with European countries, strengthened the pragmatic faction’s influence, eventually producing the 2003 ‘conversion.’

A. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

1. The End of Multilateral Sanctions

Despite the claims of several scholars to the contrary, sanctions had little to do with the 2003 reversal.\textsuperscript{168} International support for the isolation of Libya had evaporated in 1999. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert L. Neumann noted in July 1999:

Much of the world has been quick to welcome Libya back into the community of nations. On the political front, a number of nations have re-established diplomatic relations, and Libya has become much more active in regional organizations. On the economic front, immediately following the suspension of UN sanctions proscribing direct air travel to and from Libya, foreign airlines opened direct routes to Tripoli. Foreign firms have also welcomed Libya’s indications of interest in large infrastructure projects, including in the petroleum sector and aircraft purchases.\textsuperscript{169}

After 1999, the United States was the alone in attempting to isolate Libya, and thus almost by definition, ineffective. The suspended UN sanctions stood little chance of being reinstated after Europe had reengaged Libya economically and diplomatically.

Economic explanations also ring hollow because the Libyan economy improved dramatically after 1999, primarily due to the surging international price of oil (Figure 2). After years of stagnation, economic growth turned robust, inflation subsided and reserves of international currencies grew.\textsuperscript{170} The economy grew from $5.9 billion in 1998 to $13.4 billion in 2003.\textsuperscript{171} The suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 opened the door for foreign

\textsuperscript{168} According to Jentelson and Whytock, “U.S. unilateral sanctions were the technological and economic key;” Jentleson and Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya?,” 78; Newnham maintains that the prospect of the suspended U.N. sanctions being reinstated significantly influenced the 2003 WMD reversal; Newnham, “Carrots, Sticks and Bombs,” 89.

\textsuperscript{169} Ronald E. Neumann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near East Asia, Testimony before the House of International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Washington, D.C., July 22, 1999.


\textsuperscript{171} Solomon and Swart. “Libya’s Foreign Policy in Flux,” 477.
oil companies to re-enter Libya, and in 2000, 2001 and 2002, international oil and gas executives ranked Libya as the top exploration spot in the world.\textsuperscript{172} Britain was quick to normalize economic and diplomatic relations in 1999 followed by other European countries (Tables 7 and 8).\textsuperscript{173} The influence of U.S. economic sanctions alone was not significant enough to have coerced the 2003 reversal.

Table 7. European Rapprochement Timelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>French and German-Libyan Rapprochement Timeline</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 2004</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>British-Libyan Rapprochement Timeline</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1999</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{174} Indyk, “The Iraq War Did Not Force Gaddafi’s Hand.”


\textsuperscript{176} Solomon and Swart. “Libya’s Foreign Policy in Flux,” 486.


\textsuperscript{178} Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 70.

\textsuperscript{179} Matar and Thabit, *Lockerbie and Libya*, 81.

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>Libya voted chairman of the UN Human Rights Commission over U.S. objections.(^{181})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2003</td>
<td>Libya formally accepts responsibility for bombing Pan Am flight 103 and pay $2.7 billion to the families of the victims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>UN Security Council votes 13–0(^{182}) to remove economic sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>Prime Minister Tony Blair visits Qadhafi in Libya.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. U.S.-Libyan Rapprochement Timeline:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>Following the Lockerbie surrender, U.S. and Libyan officials meet for the first time in 18 years to discuss UN sanctions.(^{183})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2001</td>
<td>ILSA extended for another five years because of outstanding U.S./UN demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>United States renews unilateral sanctions against Libya for the seventeenth consecutive year.(^{184})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2003</td>
<td>Libya formally accepts responsibility for bombing Pan Am flight 103 and pay $2.7 billion to the families of the victims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>UN Security Council votes 13-0(^{185}) to remove economic sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2003</td>
<td>Libya announces it will surrender its WMD program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2004</td>
<td>United States lifts travel ban to Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>U.S. Congressional delegation visits Tripoli.(^{186})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>United States lifts ILSA. Only a ban on military sales, direct flights and continued freeze of Libyan assets held in the United States remain in effect.(^{187})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>United States opens a Liaison Office in Tripoli.(^{188})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{181}\) Thirty-three countries voted in favor; 17 abstained, including Britain and other European states. Only the United States, Canada and Guatemala voted against Libya. Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 61.

\(^{182}\) The United States and France abstained.

\(^{183}\) Vandewalle, *Qaddafi’s Libya*, 179.

\(^{184}\) Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 61.

\(^{185}\) The United States and France abstained.

\(^{186}\) Vandewalle, *Qaddafi’s Libya*, 183.

\(^{187}\) Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 68.

\(^{188}\) Solomon and Swart, “Libya’s Foreign Policy in Flux,” 488.
2. Diplomacy and Negotiations

Several scholars and diplomats credit the 2003 conversion to U.S./British negotiations with Libya that began after the 1999 Lockerbie compromise. According to St Johns, “Libya was a win, not for a strategy of preemptive strikes, but for a policy of engagement, supported by persistent, patient diplomacy.” 193 U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk, who led the secret talks with Libya between 1999 and 2000, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and British Prime Minister Tony Blair make similar contentions. 194 The argument that diplomacy was the decisive factor in the 2003 reversal is based largely on timing. 195 According to Ronen, “Libyan leaders claimed that although it was announced only at the end of 2003, the decision had been made nine months earlier during secret trilateral negotiations among Washington, London, and Tripoli. The ‘Iraqi effect’ was thus entirely ‘irrelevant’…” 196 However, whenever in 2003 the decision was made, no evidence exists that the U.S./British bargaining position changed. Nevertheless, the ‘grand bargain’ explanation assumes that an acceptable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 2004</td>
<td>United States lifts trade and transportation sanctions, unfreezing $1.3 billion Libyan assets held in the United States189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>‘Full and Complete’ diplomatic relations restored.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>Libya removed from the state sponsors of terrorism list, removing the last U.S. sanctions.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2008</td>
<td>U.S. ambassador arrives in Libya after 36-year absence.192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

189 Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 69.
190 Luis, *The Libyan Paradox*, 44.
191 Newnham, “Carrots, Sticks and Bombs,” 92.
192 Ibid., 77.
195 Ironically, the argument that the U.S. invasion of Iraq and capture of Saddam Hussein was the decisive factor in the Libyan decision is also based on timing. Indyk, “The Iraq War did not Force Gaddafi’s Hand”; Boucek, “Libya’s Return to the Fold?,” 1.
196 Ronen, *Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics*, 67.
‘reciprocal’ arrangement was agreed upon after prolonged secret negotiations. Flynt Leverett contends that there was an explicit *quid pro quo*: In exchange for Libya dismantling its WMD program, the United States would lift sanctions by the end of 2004. However, the evidence suggests that unlike the agreement reached with the UN in 1999, the 2003 reversal was not met with an immediate or reciprocal response. The fact that the United States was slower to lift sanctions and normalize relations than European countries or the UN suggests that there was in fact no ‘grand bargain.’ It took four months for the United States to suspend the ILSA and two and a half years to end sanctions against Libya completely (Table 8). In 2009, Qadhafi himself stated that Libya was not compensated for its 2003 reversal: “Regrettably, Libya did not benefit from this historic action that it took in the service of world peace. Libya was not rewarded for this historic action that was done. I would say Libya benefited, but was not rewarded.” The slow U.S. response and Qadhafi’s statement suggest that Libya was not responding to a new offer on the table but rather that it was responding to other factors.

B. ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS

By the time of the 1999 reversal, the Qadhafi government had already successfully repressed most domestic opposition, making it more secure than it had been for most of the 1990s. Qadhafi had also successfully insulated himself behind concentric rings of loyal security forces. The military had been fragmented to the point that it no longer posed a significant threat to the regime. The Islamists were defeated. In addition, the economy was improving, mostly because of a surging international oil price. Free from these domestic constraints, the Qadhafi government could make policy without fear of domestic repercussions. This newly regained regime security also brought about an internal debate as to the direction of the government, post UN sanctions.

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After the 1999 Lockerbie compromise, the Qadhafi government was still divided into two factions. The pragmatists, given voice by Qadhafi’s son Seif al-Islam, pushed to settle all differences with the West, and with the U.S. specifically, to normalized diplomatic relations and modernize the Libyan economy. The ideologues, led by many of the original ‘revolutionaries,’ pressed for continued opposition to the West, or at least, the United States. However, their position was undermined by Qadhafi’s abandonment of the original ‘revolutionary’ ideology in favor of a less confrontational Pan-Africanism. The WMD program was central long-standing goal of the ideological faction. Both factions had enough influence to initiate policy between 1999 and 2003, and a mix of ideology and pragmatism so animated Libyan foreign policy in these years: the pragmatists were attempting to normalize economically and diplomatically with the West while the ideologues were pressing ahead with the clandestine WMD program. “Even as Libya intensified its efforts to move closer to the West, it had from the mid-1990s been undertaking serious…efforts to acquire nuclear technology. According to a senior U.S. official, procurement accelerated after the suspension of the United Nations sanctions in 1999.” The 9/11 attack, and the resulting Bush Doctrine, made the pragmatists’ normalization agenda more urgent, and the ideologues’ agenda more dangerous, by converting the WMD program from a security guarantee to a security risk. Despite Qadhafi’s face-saving anti-Western rhetoric at the AU and UN, the 2003 conversion marked the victory of the pragmatic faction inside the Libyan government.

C. GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

WMD initially made strategic sense to the Qadhafi regime in three ways. First, WMD would help Libya’s small population secure its large, potentially valuable, territory. Second, WMD could not be used against the regime by a potentially

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203 Takeyh, “The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold,” 69.
rebellious military, unlike most other weapon systems.\textsuperscript{204} Third, WMD would be a powerful deterrent against another U.S. attack. The New World Order and 9/11 changed this security calculation. The potential threat of Algerian or Egyptian claims\textsuperscript{205} on Libyan territory were less likely after Operation Desert Shield/Storm had demonstrated the international consensus for upholding international law, especially with respect to international borders. In addition, the development of complex weapons systems had proven more costly and controversial than anticipated by Libyan decision makers.\textsuperscript{206} Lastly, and most significantly with regard to the timing of the 2003 conversion, under the Bush Doctrine, the United States became willing to commit U.S. forces against governments that sought to acquire WMD. The deterrent benefit of WMD had turned into a security risk.

The September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks and consequent Bush Doctrine changed the nature of the external threat, as well as the value of WMD. The risk of a unilateral U.S. imposed regime change increased. Previously, the use of U.S. military force was limited to tit-for-tat strikes against supporters of terrorism\textsuperscript{207} and sustained economic sanctions. However, these were instruments intended to produce a policy change. The ‘War on Terror’ introduced a credible existential and sustained threat. Although Libya was not specifically included in the ‘Axis of Evil’ identified by President Bush in January 2002, Under-Secretary of State John Bolton identified it as an additional “rogue state” intent on acquiring WMD.\textsuperscript{208} “The Libyan leadership had the feeling that the Bush administration’s justification for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein could be applied equally to Libya: namely that Libya was developing a nuclear and chemical


\textsuperscript{205} “The country’s lucrative oil fields have, at various times, been coveted by neighbors such as Algeria. And Libya’s unsteady relations with Egypt have caused sporadic tension on Libya’s eastern flank,” Takeyh, “The Rogue Who Came in from the Cold,” 69.

\textsuperscript{206} As stated by Libyan Prime Minister, Shukri Ghanem in Fidler, Huband and Khalaf, “Return to the Fold: How Gadaffi was Persuaded to Give up his Nuclear Goals.”

\textsuperscript{207} As demonstrated by President Clinton’s cruise missile strikes against Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998.

\textsuperscript{208} Jentleson and Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya?, 73.
weapons program, that Libya was a terrorist state, headed by an anti-Israeli dictator.”209 World events indirectly increased U.S. enmity toward Libya. The end of the Cold War left it a ‘rogue state’ in the New World Order, and 9/11 pushed it toward the ‘axis of evil.’ This increasing threat tipped the balance of power among Libyan policymaking factions toward the pragmatists.

The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq tipped the balance further. U.S. willingness to act with a small coalition, and without UN approval, increased the potential threat to Libya. The Taliban was overthrown by an ‘alliance’ of Afghan tribes, with the help of NATO airpower, and the approval of the UN. This was not a significant change to the international status quo. It was understood after 9/11 that overt acts of terrorism would invite international support for military retaliation. However, the U.S. invasion of Iraq demonstrated that no longer was a ‘smoking gun’ or widespread international support required for the United States to use decisive force. Despite the claims of Libyan diplomats to the contrary, the invasion of Iraq accelerated rapprochement with the West. “Some Arabs who were in regular conversations with Libyan officials say the regime was increasingly desperate to secure a deal as the war in Iraq loomed, worried that ‘it would be next’ in some unspecified way.”210 In September 2003, Qadhafi told Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, “I will do whatever the Americans want, because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was afraid.”211 Also, the relatively quick capture of Baghdad ended any illusion that Arab states, individually or collectively, could defend their homelands. Even though the Iraqis were countering an invasion of their homeland in 2003 and ground fighting lasted much longer than in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the intensity of the resistance in OIF (as measured by the number of troops killed per days of ground combat) was weaker than in 1991.212 Despite the existential nature of threat, it took only 21 days for U.S. forces to take Baghdad. Tripoli would be much easier to

209 Martinez, The Libyan Paradox, 46.
210 Fidler, Huband and Khalaf, “Return to the Fold: How Gadaffi was Persuaded to Give up his Nuclear Goals.”
212 Stephen T. Hosmer, Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion was so Weak (Arlington: Rand Corporation, 2007), 127.
capture given its coastal location. In sum, the new policy objective and commitment to the use of military force must have weighed heavily in Qadhafi’s decision-making process after 2001. However, because Libya was not explicitly targeted by the Bush Doctrine, the influence accelerated the pace of the already ongoing ‘conversion’ rather than caused it.

D. CONCLUSION

The pragmatic faction within the Qadhafi government had already made the strategic decision to reengage with Europe, and had significant policymaking influence, when Libya turned the Lockerbie bombers over in 1999. Yet, the ideological faction still had enough influence at that time to resist the specific U.S. demands. In effect, the 1999 decision can be viewed as a compromise between pragmatic and ideological factions, showing a balance of power between then prevailed at the time; pragmatic toward Europe while remaining ideological toward the United States. The 2003 acceptance of all U.S. demands marked the end of the ideological faction’s foreign policy influence. The WMD program represented a core policy goal of the ‘revolutionaries.’ Libyans’ generally xenophobic reaction to sub-Saharan migrants betrayed the thin commitment to Pan African unity. At the same time, the ideological faction was being discredited internally, 9/11 and the quick U.S. led regime change in Iraq made continued opposition to the U.S. a riskier proposition. In the years leading up to the 2003 decision, the ideological faction had lost credibility domestically and was seen as increasingly dangerous in the new international environment. Additionally, the pragmatic faction’s economic and diplomatic success reengaging Europe provided a tangible incentive to continued pragmatic policies. In the end, the instruments of U.S. policy were not influential enough by themselves to cause the 2003 conversion. The larger international and domestic Libyan contexts played a much greater role than any specific U.S. policy instrument. This is not to say that a credible threat of force, diplomacy or sanctions were irrelevant. U.S. policy was most effective when it helped the pragmatic faction within the Libyan government seem the more credible policy choice. The increasing ‘coercive credibility’ following 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq supported pragmatic Libyan policymaking. The economic and
diplomatic benefits of reconciliation with Europe also supported the pragmatic faction’s policies. The conversion was complete when the pragmatic faction was influential enough to surrender one of the core policy goals of the ‘revolutionaries,’ the WMD program, and consign ideology to empty official rhetoric.
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

This work began by asking one simple question: What explains the Libyan reversal after decades of resistance? The answer is not as simple as some have argued. The within case comparison method employed in this thesis was useful for two reasons. Primarily, it put U.S. policy factors into proper context, rather than focusing narrowly upon them as the only possible driving forces in the conversion. Many politicians and some scholars have claimed that one particular policy instrument was essential in forcing Libyan reversals, and several correlations seem to support their specific claims. Libya stopped most militant activism after the 1986 U.S. bombing raid, and therefore, U.S. military power was decisive in the 1987 reversal. The two Lockerbie suspects were surrendered with the explicit promise that UN sanctions would be suspended, and therefore, the multilateral sanctions were decisive in the 1999 reversal. The Libyan WMD program was the subject of negotiations for months before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and therefore, the negotiations and diplomatic engagement were the decisive ingredient in the 2003 reversal. However, none of these correlations was in fact causal. In fact, when considered in the larger context of the changing domestic and international scenes of the 1980s and 1990s, it becomes obvious that U.S. policy instruments were not the singular cause that some claim. Only when domestic and international antecedent conditions are taken into account can the influence of U.S. policy can be evaluated.

The second reason the within case comparison proved useful is that it reduced the number of variables at play, while allowing for variation in the values of those that remain. The Qadhafi government has survived since 1969. To this day, Qadhafi and his close confidants retain complete control over the important policy decisions of the country. The examination of why the same decision makers made different decisions when faced with similar U.S. policy instruments, allowed for a complete and balanced analysis. If the use of military force and sanctions in 1987 did not coerce an abandonment of the WMD program then, why did continuing unilateral sanctions and the perceived
threat of force cause the complete abandonment in 2003? The obvious answer is that antecedent conditions had changed, both domestically and internationally. A decision that made sense in the Cold War no longer made sense after 9/11. The within case comparison helps draw out the contextual differences between previous policy reversals and the influence of specific U.S. policy instruments.

The first significant Libyan policy reversal examined in this thesis occurred in 1987. It marked the end of most forms of Libyan militant activism. Years of Libyan belligerence resulted in increasing U.S. sanctions and military confrontation, which culminated in the complete severing of U.S. economic and diplomatic relations and the U.S. bombing raid in 1986. One year later, Libya had stopped almost all aspects of its militant activism. At the time, U.S. politicians credited Libya quiescence to effective U.S. policy. The timing of a culminating U.S. policy of coercion and the Libyan reversal seemed to support their claim. However, other events were more influential than U.S. policy. The Libyan military was demoralized by a crushing defeat in Chad in 1987. It is doubtful that the Libyan military had the will or capability to sustain military operations in any theater outside Libya immediately after 1987. Additionally, the influence of unilateral U.S. sanctions was largely offset with European oil consumers and was dwarfed in influence by the collapse of the international price of oil. Despite increasing U.S. sanctions, macro-economic conditions greatly inhibited Libya’s ability to conduct its expansionist and belligerent foreign policy. There is no doubt that U.S. policy increased the price of Libyan sponsorship of terrorism. However, the domestic context of a defeated military and the international context of crashing oil prices were more significant factors than U.S. policy in the 1987 reversal.

The second Libyan policy reversal was the 1999 surrender of the Lockerbie bombing suspects. At the time, it was hailed as a successful example of U.S. and UN coercive policy. Again, because the UN sanctions did not limit Libyan oil exports, the direct impact on the Libyan economy was not enough to coerce an ideological shift. However, the end of the Cold War and the New World Order changed the security calculus of the Libyan government. After the loss of the Soviet arms supplier and the potential political cover provided during the Cold War, Libya was more easily isolated
for its use of terrorism. Additionally, in the post-Cold War context of the years leading up to the 1999 compromise, the Libyan government was beginning to split into two factions. One faction pressed to normalize diplomatic and economic relations with the West, while the other continued to define itself in ideological opposition to the West. The decision to surrender the Lockerbie suspects would be the first major policy decision in which the pragmatic faction held sway over Qadhafi’s final decision. That said, the 1999 decision is not a complete shift toward the West or away from anti-Western ideology. The decision to spit the UN coalition against Libya by accepting European demands while continuing to resist many key U.S. demands, likely showed the continuing influence of the ideologues. In addition, even with the explicit *quid pro quo* offer of ending UN sanctions on the table, it was only after the domestic threats to Qadhafi’s government, and himself, were neutralized that he felt secure enough to accept the European aspects of the UN demands. Clearly, the domestic and international contexts of the 1999 decision played a more influential role than specific U.S. policy instruments.

The pragmatic faction within the Libyan government became more influential after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, eventually producing the 2003 conversion, as Qadhafi himself looked for a face-saving way to end Libya’s, and his, isolation. The Bush Doctrine accelerated, but did not cause, Libyan acceptance of U.S. demands to accept responsibility for previous acts of terrorism, compensate victims and finally to abandon the WMD program. Even when U.S. policy instruments are analyzed according to the policy objective, level of threat, effectiveness of sanctions and proportionality and reciprocity of negotiated settlements, none alone can account for such a complete capitulation. Table 9 shows the differing values of the independent variables examined in all three policy reversals. Despite some intriguing correlations already identified, no obvious causal relationship exists. It is only when the instruments of U.S. policy worked to magnify the isolation of the Libyan leadership, and when that leadership felt secure enough to make a potentially unpopular decision, that their influence on the 2003 reversal can be understood.
Table 9. Differing Values of the Variables for Each of the Three Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy Objective</th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Sanctions</th>
<th>Result</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>B and C</td>
<td>Existential</td>
<td>Not Very</td>
<td>Not Proportional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>But limited</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Not Reciprocal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Non-existential</td>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>And Limited</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Reciprocal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Implied Existential</td>
<td>Not Very</td>
<td>Somewhat-Proportional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>And Sustained</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>Somewhat-Reciprocal</td>
</tr>
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B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

1. The Libyan Model in Farsi

At first glance, Iran seems to be a good candidate for application of the ‘Libyan model.’ Both countries are dependent on oil exports for the majority of their national income and would be vulnerable to sanctions. Both seek a regional leadership role. Both defined their political identity in opposition to the United States. Iran’s government is also struggling with an internal division between a pragmatic faction and an ideological faction. If U.S. policy could magnify antecedent conditions in Iran, as in Libya, perhaps Iran could be convinced to abandon its quest for WMD as well.

The first step of designing the appropriate policy is to define the desired end state. U.S. policy toward Iran is in transition. Until recently, Libya and Iran were subjected to nearly identical U.S. policy. In fact, the ILSA targeted both countries with the same sanctions regime. Also like Libya, the U.S. has menaced Iran’s coast, and at times, skirmished with Iranian naval and air forces. However, since the election of President Obama, the goal of U.S. policy toward Iran has changed. During the Bush administration, Iran was explicitly included in the “Axis of Evil.” U.S. policy was clearly gear toward regime change, or a type C objective. President Obama, equally explicitly, changed the
goal of U.S. policy to non-proliferation, or type B objective. To date, the new emphasis on engagement has not produced any Iranian concessions. However, continued Iranian defiance has won some support for a more stringent sanctions regime. Russia and France have recently joined the United States in calling for targeted multilateral sanctions. Although, like in the case of Libya, it is unlikely that oil consuming nations, like China and India, will agree to an embargo on Iranian oil. Thus, if regime change is off the table and an oil embargo is not likely, what U.S. policies would be most effective? The answer is whatever helps discredit the ideologues and makes their policy more risky, expensive or unpopular.

The second step of designing the appropriate U.S. policy is to account for the antecedent conditions already at work. Iran today is caught between an ideological faction that has taken over the government and a somewhat popular pragmatic faction that is out of power. Like in Libya, the WMD program is central to the ideological faction’s policy of resisting the United States. Unlike in Libya, the ideological faction has not been discredited enough to allow the pragmatic faction to make policy. In addition, unlike in Libya, U.S. policy toward Iran has not helped discredit or make ideological decision making more costly.

Iranian non-compliance with regard its nuclear program could be made more costly in several ways but not militarily. The United States lacks the same ‘coercive credibility’ it had with Libya for several reasons. First, Iran is a much harder target. The size of Iran and its military dwarf Libya’s. Additionally, the nuclear facilities are hardened targets deep inside the country’s borders. Even if regime change in Iran were an implied threat, it would be a much more ambitious undertaking than regime change in Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya. Although the supreme leader rules as a dictator, succession has not been as divisive, or life threatening, as in many Arab governments. The Libyan government could be decapitated within days. The Iranian government is a complex mix


of theocrats, revolutionaries and politicians all on top of an institutionalized authoritarian government. For all these reasons, the threat of force against Iran today is less convincing than it was against Libya in 2003.

In Qadhafi’s case, the abandonment of WMD required two key ingredients. First, the pragmatic faction inside the government had to hold sway over a discredited ideological faction, and second, the Qadhafi government had to be secure enough to make potentially unpopular policy decisions. In Iran, the cost of ideological policy is not high enough to warrant capitulating to U.S. demands. Additionally, concessions from the current Iranian government are unlikely as long as the opposition remains a threat.

However, because the ideological faction is sensitive to domestic opposition, targeted sanctions and international diplomatic isolation can be effective in discrediting the government in the eyes of the Iranian people. Iran is likely to be as susceptible to diplomatic isolation as Libya was except for different reasons. Whereas Qadhafi reacted to diplomatic isolation because of his international ambitions, the Iranian people are more likely to blame their government’s policies for additional international stigma. If the Iranians could be diplomatically sanctioned, as Libya was, the Iranian people would be less supportive of government policies that further isolate them internationally. The United States should call for a UN ban on Iranian commercial air travel until Iran complies with rules set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency. As was the case with Libya, the most effective means to coerce the Iranian government would be to employ policy instruments in such a way as to magnify existing trends.

C. LOOKING AHEAD

Libya has successfully rehabilitated its economic and diplomatic relations with the world. European and U.S. oil companies are back in force. The Qadhafi government sits atop huge oil revenues once again. Qadhafi spends most of this wealth pragmatically, reinvesting in the oil industry and other national infrastructure projects. Libya also continues to sponsor AU projects despite Qadhafi’s failed bid to extend his AU presidency. When Qadhafi goes, Libyan support of Pan-Africanism will go with him, if
not sooner. Until this happens, the United States and Qadhafi have shared interests in Africa. The 2009 AFRICOM posture statement calls for the development of security infrastructure at the national, regional and continental levels to defeat Al-Qaeda, conduct peace operations and fight WMD proliferation. Qadhafi has cooperated with the United States on all three of these issues and has shown an ongoing enthusiasm for Pan-African projects. In the near term, the United States and Libya have a common interest in the security of Africa. The United States should offer a joint purchase of non-lethal military equipment to build an Africa Standby Force (ASF) infrastructure. Specifically, Libya could help finance the purchase of C-130 cargo aircraft to allow AU peacekeepers to self-deploy and resupply while deployed. Libyan sponsorship could effectively double AFRICOM’s equipment purchasing budget and jump-start some of the most ambitious and expensive AU security projects. The window of opportunity for such a cooperative venture between Libya and AFRICOM will probably only last as long as Qadhafi remains in power, but could reinforce the position of the pragmatists before the inevitable post-Qadhafi power struggle, potentially again tipping the balance. The risk of Libya returning to an anti-Western orientation is not likely considering the economic benefits of normalization with the West. Libya is a success story. However, it is still a dictatorship. Qadhafi’s heir apparent, Seif al-Isam, seems intent on continuing Libya’s pragmatic/authoritarian policy. U.S. policy needs to continue to make anti-Western policy costly while incentivizing cooperation.


APPENDIX. LIBYAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY

To make a useful study of what constitutes an ideological policy reversal, a brief review of the tenants of Qadhafi’s official state ideology is required. The context of Libyan ideology begins with Nasser’s Pan-Arab nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s, but is also highly influenced by Islam. Where Nasser was a secular socialist whose great project of a great Pan-Arab union of nations, Qadhafi could not completely subordinate Islam to his ideology. As Francois Burgat summarized,

Qadhafi has been more religious than Nasser and closer to the traditional values of Islam…Qadhafi from the beginning attempted to make Libya the first Arab state to embark upon at least a partial re-Islamization.217

What made early Libyan ideology different from Nasser’s Pan-Arab socialism was a new emphasis on Islam. It retained all of the revolutionary ideology of the 1950s and 60s, specifically anti-Israel, pan-Arab and anti-colonialism, but where Nasser was a secular nationalist, Qadhafi was inspired by Sufi Islam. As a result, nightclubs and cafes were closed, alcohol has banned, fasting was legally enforced during Ramadan and the regime publicly promised to impose shariah.218 At the time, shortly after the 1967 Arab defeat against Israel and before the successful Iranian revolution, Qadhafi’s semi-religiously justified coup was welcomed by the Muslim world. As described in 1983,

More than any other single event marked the beginning of the Islamic revival…Coming after decades of seemingly irreversible Westernization throughout Islamdom, his actions gave heart to [Muslim] legalists everywhere and attracted worldwide attention to the Shari’a.219

Tellingly, when his concept of Pan-Arabism was threatened by more traditional Islamists, like the Muslim Brotherhood, they were quickly declared enemies of the state. According to his logic, if a different Islamist vision became a threat to his regime, it was

also a threat to all his revolutionary goals, and therefore, must be an agent of the West. From an interview in 1987, it is clear that his version of Islam is the only version compatible with his revolution.

Today what we call Muslim Brothers... are the servants of imperialism. They are members of the reactionary right-wing; [they are] the enemies of progress, of socialism, and Arab unity.\textsuperscript{220}

This mix of religious and political ideologies was codified in 1972 when Qadhafi released the \textit{Green Book} in three small volumes. Inspired by Mao Zedong’s \textit{Little Red Book}, Qadhafi’s ‘new gospel’ was influenced by Bedouin culture, Islam, Marxism, Fascism and a confused mixture of other ideologies. Most significantly to any official ‘state’ ideology was the Third Universal Theory, which was a rejection of capitalism and communism as economic models as well as man-made laws (constitutions, political parties and parliamentary democracy) as political models. Instead, the only legitimate form of government was ‘direct democracy’ through ‘popular congresses and committees’ in which consensus substitutes for elections.\textsuperscript{221}

In place of capitalism (or communism), the \textit{Green Book} prescribes a middle course of Arab socialism. It declares that every person is entitled to a house, a vehicle and an income but that working for a wage is a form of slavery and money should be abolished.

However, owning more than one house leads to rent, which leads to usury, which is un-Islamic. Therefore, ownership of more than one home or car per family was forbidden. Bank accounts were limited to $34,000 in holdings. Commerce and private trade was abolished, which ended any amount of a mixed domestic economy. Of course, favored members of the ‘workers committees’ were allowed to ignore these laws, which led to widespread corruption.\textsuperscript{222}


\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., 5.
Despite all the official populist egalitarian rhetoric, Libyan government institutions are characterized by centralization and neo-patrimonialism\textsuperscript{223} common in rentier states.\textsuperscript{224} Whether Qadhafi actually believes any of his socialist ideology or whether it is simply a means to control the economy, and therefore, potential rivals is debatable. What is not debatable is that only a relatively small population floating on oil could afford such controlled economy. To this day, the Libyan economy is a prototypical rentier economy. It is this complete control of the economy, from which nearly all the nation’s wealth is generated by the government that allows Libya to pursue such an activist, and expensive, foreign policy agenda.

One of Qadhafi’s first and most ambitious foreign policy initiatives was the union of Libyan, Syria and Egypt along the same model as the original United Arab Republic (UAR) between Egypt and Syria. Nasser’s death in 1970 ended the project. Egypt’s new president refused Qadhafi’s attempts to join the two nations, as did all other Arab leaders. Qadhafi’s response was the ‘Zuwara speech’ of 1973. In it, Qadhafi spelled out how greater Arab unity was not possible under the existing forms of government. His logic was simply that because all Arabs naturally want to participate in a greater Arab union, the failure of that project is due to governments frustrating that desire. Only through the dismantling of the state’s institutions can the will of the people be realized. Where communists hold that a vanguard party unlocks the potential power of the people’s will, ‘direct democracy’ was the new means to achieve a Pan-Arab state. Conveniently, it also justified the destruction of most other state institutions that could pose a threat to the regime. This revolutionary ideology was further codified in the \textit{Green Book} and reached a revolutionary peak of sorts in 1977 when Qadhafi proclaimed beginning of the \textit{jamahiri} system, or people’s power. As Burgat explains, it was the ideological justification for some of Libya’s most violent foreign policy projects.


The Sabha declaration marked the beginning of a period of activism and subversive diplomacy aimed at spreading the tenants of the Libyan leader’s thoughts. Embassies were transformed into People’s Bureaus; ministries, the army and police disappeared, at least in theory. All organized institutions within the country, from the local to the national level, were disbanded; the Leninist utopia, with its call for the dissolution of the state, was ardently pursued.225

Discerning how Qadhafi’s Neo-Nasser ideology is applied to foreign policy is best summed up by Kenneth Pollack.

In the 1970s, Qadhafi had three driving foreign policy ambitions. First was the goal of Arab unification, of which a crucial component was the eradication of the State of Israel from the ‘Arab’ Middle East. Second was the support and strengthening of Islamic states and Muslim minorities throughout the world. Last was the battle against ‘Imperialism’.226

Although Pollack greatly simplifies the official rhetoric, these three goals make a useful yard stick to measure policy reversals.


226 Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 360.


“Crude Oil Prices since 1861.” *British Petroleum; Statistical Review of World Energy* 2009. 


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