THE ARMY’S STRATEGIC FAILURE TO TRAIN ITS STAFFS ON DESIGN

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The U.S. Army has fought the vast majority of its conflicts, including the current Global War on Terrorism, in low intensity environments. Why then, even with this vast of experience, is the United States Army still struggling to train its staffs in Design? Even after seven years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has failed to establish a base line training program across all branches to instruct its officers in the fundamentals of design and planning. This SRP begins with an analysis of how this lack of training is impacting the current battlefield. This discussion is based on firsthand experience and peer accounts of our struggle to train staffs on design while simultaneously conducted combat operations. The paper reviews the Army’s current school curriculums to determine whether they are now adjusting to fix this strategic void. The Army must establish a creditable training program to train its commanders, who are responsible for leading their staffs and training their staff officers, who themselves have the burden of building and executing the commander’s vision. It closes with recommendations on where and how the Army should be training its future commanders and staff officers on the fundamentals of Design.
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The U.S. Army has fought the vast majority of its conflicts, including the current Global War on Terrorism, in low intensity environments. Why then, even with this vast of experience, is the United States Army still struggling to train its staffs in Design? Even after seven years of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has failed to establish a base line training program across all branches to instruct its officers in the fundamentals of design and planning. This SRP begins with an analysis of how this lack of training is impacting the current battlefield. This discussion is based on firsthand experience and peer accounts of our struggle to train staffs on design while simultaneously conducted combat operations. The paper reviews the Army’s current school curriculums to determine whether they are now adjusting to fix this strategic void. The Army must establish a creditable training program to train its commanders, who are responsible for leading their staffs and training their staff officers, who themselves have the burden of building and executing the commander’s vision. It closes with recommendations on where and how the Army should be training its future commanders and staff officers on the fundamentals of Design.
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This SRP analyzes the Army’s strategic leadership’s failure to recognize the need to develop an Army wide leader development strategy to educate and train its staffs on design. The Design methodology is an approach that helps commanders and staffs to understand a complex problem for which they are tasked to find a best solution. Understanding the problem set is the most critical issue in planning and executing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and any future hybrid conflicts. When the Army’s strategic leaders directed General David Petraeus in early 2005 to develop a new counterinsurgency field manual which discusses several aspects of the current design methodology, they failed to develop a strategic education and training plan for officers to incorporate the manuals contents or to adapt the new design methodology. Only very recently has TRADOC directed a planning group to fix this oversight. This paper shows how this lack of education and training has impacted the Army profession and disadvantaged our deployed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. It concludes with a proposed strategy for filling this void in the education and training of the Army’s officer corps.

There I was

I learned about this education and training failure first hand in July 2007 as I began my tour as the Deputy Commander of 1st Brigade Combat Team, (BCT) of the 101st Airborne Division. I assembled the entire brigade staff to begin the process of understanding our problem set and to develop the Brigade’s campaign plan in preparation for its deployment to Iraq. The staff consisted of three majors who had recently graduated from the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) course and two captains
who recently graduated from the Infantry Captains Career Course (ICCC), along with several other majors, including representatives of Civil Affairs, Information Operations, Engineers, and the Brigade Chaplain. I began the session by walking them through our method for developing a campaign plan for our 15-month deployment. Due to my lack of familiarity with current Army doctrine, I called our plan a campaign plan instead of an operations plan. I asked the staff whether they were familiar with the new FM 3-24, the design concept, logical lines of operations, and the concept of a campaign plan and what it is used for. I was amazed when the staff remained dead silent. I knew at this point that the Army had failed on a strategic level to develop an education and training plan for its staff officers on the fundamentals of understanding a counterinsurgency problem set outlined in the new FM 3-24 and on the emerging doctrine on Design.

**Impact on the Force**

The Army’s Revised Final Draft FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, defines design as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them.” Design methodology assists the commander and his staff in “understanding, visualizing, and describing the operational environment and to develop approaches to solving complex, ill-structured problems. Design occurs throughout the operations process before and during detailed planning, through preparation, and during execution and assessment.” It is intended to complement our traditional Military Decision Making Process, MDMP.

The overall impact of this negligence to educate staff officers and commanders on the design methodology can be seen throughout all the ranks. Soldiers’ frustrations increase during their unit’s deployment as conditions continue to deteriorate even
though they successfully destroy terrorist cells in their specific area of operation. This frustration turns to hopelessness as units return for their second and third deployments only to find the situation sometimes even worse than it was during their first deployment. Much of this frustration and hopelessness arises from their inability to define the complex problem set of counterinsurgency operations.

This lack of training on how to better understand a complex problem is having tremendous effects at many different levels. Most significantly, the lack of understanding has made the Iraq war, along with the Afghanistan war, seem a lot more complicated. Military officers are being told that future conflicts will involve hybrid threats. A TRADOC article predicts “we will face future threats-combinations of conventional, unconventional, criminal and terrorist groups, intermingled with local populations, and syndicated to counter our advantages.” These future hybrid conflicts, along with our current counterinsurgency fights, will be conducted in complex and difficult environments, presenting an extremely difficult problem set. If commanders and staffs cannot define the problem, how can they be expected to find a solution? Because staffs do not know a methodology for understanding a complex problem, they struggle to find a right solution. In this complex environment, aware that nothing they do seems to make a difference, they become passive or virtually paralyzed. When the staff feels they are not making any progress and they cannot figure out the way ahead, they become frustrated and revert back to what they have been trained to do, which is to hunt down and kill terrorists.

If future commanders and staffs are trained and educated on the Design methodology they can better understand their problem set. They will then realize that, in
the case of a counterinsurgency, having 90% of the staff focused on killing insurgents is not the right solution to their complex problem. A step in the right direction may be focusing 90% of their unit’s institutional energy on securing the population and fixing the local economy and political problems. If the Army does not fix our education and training system soon, we will continue to find ourselves unable to adequately assess the problem and will therefore continue to muddle through our operations.

Because staff members arrive untrained in Design and because most arrive just in time to board the deployment aircraft, the receiving unit’s leaders must set time aside for training on Design. This training then takes place as units are preparing for deployment, or even worse, in country after deployment. This problem can only be rectified if the unit is fortunate enough to have someone on the staff who is familiar with the Design methodology.

**Dazed and Confused**

Many officers who have tried to educate themselves on Design have found this is not as easy as they expected. Officers who try on their own to understand the complexity of design have several field manuals, pamphlets, and briefings to choose from, which is part of the problem.

Currently neither Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* nor Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* discuss Design. However, once Design is implemented into Army doctrine and in school houses, it will be only a matter of time before the Joint Community will follow. The new Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, offers the best definition: “Design inquires into the nature of a problem to conceive a framework for solving the problem. In general, planning is problem solving, while design is problem setting and design focuses on learning about the nature of an unfamiliar problem.”4 FM
3-24 adds that “Design focuses on framing the problem rather than developing courses of action.”\(^5\) The Training and Doctrine Command, (TRADOC) has continued to evolve their definition of design. One of their earlier definitions was published in Pamphlet 525-5-500, *The Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design*. In this pamphlet TRADOC describes Design as “the act of working out the form of something (visualizing), requiring considerable research, thought, modeling, iterative adjustments and re-design to pull together the rational with the natural; intended to guide the making of something else.”\(^6\) The Army War College published a Campaign Planning Handbook in 2009, which Defines design as “a methodology to apply strategic thinking (critical, creative, and systems) to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them.”\(^7\) The Chief of Doctrine and Education Group, Joint Force Command defined Design as “an approach to critical and creative thinking that enables a commander to create understanding about a unique situation and to visualize and describe how to generate change.”\(^8\)

With all of these manuals, pamphlets, and issue papers to review, there is little doubt that an officer can become lost and confused in the sea of information on Design. It is easy for officers to be disjointed with their peers as each one interprets each manual in their own way. The good news is that TRADOC Headquarters has recognized that the Design methodology has not matured. So they are working diligently to come up with a final Design definition.

**The Current Plan and Situation**

General Dempsey, CG of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, spoke at the Association of the United States Army’s Chapter Presidents’ Dinner in Washington, D.C. on 4 October 2009. He reported that “my direction to the Combined
Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth [Kansas] last spring was to integrate the concept of ‘Design’ into FM 5-0 to ensure all leaders develop the ability to understand and frame complex problems to complement our traditional Military Decision Making Process.”9

A paper issued by TRADOC Headquarters in 2009 called A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army discusses the TRADOC Commander’s directive on introducing the Design concept into our doctrine through the re-writing on FM 5-0, The Operations Process: “Design complements the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and will be incorporated into leader education and training. The creative thinking accessible to us through an appreciation of Design will be a cornerstone of our leader development strategy for our military leaders.”10

The paper continues to describe the TRADOC Commander’s Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) by breaking down the four stages of an officer’s career progression: 1) pre-commissioning through first unit, 2) junior leaders, 3) mid-grade leaders, and 4) senior leaders. The discussion of career progression does not mention Design specifically; however mid-grade leaders must demonstrate competence in handling ambiguous and complex situations. Senior leaders must astutely manage complexity and anticipate transitions at the campaign level.

Not mentioned in either article is General Dempsey’s directive to create a planning team for developing the overall Army’s Professional Military Education, (PME) on Design. This tasking has fallen on the shoulders of a group of five officers called the Deputy Commandant Initiatives Group, (DCIG) located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The DCIG is currently working on implementing General Dempsey’s directives and developing a detailed education glide path that lays out in detail at what rank an officer
needs to learn about Design and designating the Army school responsible for teaching Design.

Currently, general guidance and directives have been issued by TRADOC Headquarters and the DCIG to the Army school houses. However, the DCIG is still working on a Professional Military Education plan for the TRADOC Commander’s final approval. Each school house is at different levels of compliance as they quickly adjust their own internal curriculums to meet the TRADOC Commander’s directive.

The DCIG current education program starts with the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC), which informs new lieutenants on how to implement critical thinking. At the Captains Career Course, new captains will be introduced to critical and creative thinking, staff operations, and MDMP. At the Intermediate Level Education (ILE), officers will be exposed to the Design methodology for the first time, to include application in exercises. Officers selected for the SAMS program will continue to learn about the theoretical basis of Design and its application. Officers attending the Army War College will continue to learn about the theoretical basis of Design and the application of Design.

One example of a Captain’s Career Course is the Civil Affairs School located at Fort Bragg, N.C. This course is designed for new captains and majors to receive the Civil Affairs MOS identifier. The course consists of seven weeks focus on basic civil affairs duties and responsibilities, followed by a short practical field exercise. Nowhere in their course do students discuss Design or the Civil Affairs officers’ role in the Design process. The Civil Affairs training officer admitted, “We look for the Intermediate Level Education to educate and train our officers on Design.”

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The Army’s primary school for the education and training of majors from all branches is the Intermediate Level Education course located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. One of the lead officers in the DCIG planning cell reports that, “Currently they have an 8-hour core curriculum class and a 14 hour elective class on Design. The current ILE students, Class 10-01, will be the first class to be afforded these two classes on Design.”

The U.S. War College has introduced design into its curriculum for the past two years through their Theater Strategy and Campaigning Course. The War College faculty are currently conducting experiential Design exercises with the intent of analyzing what is the best method for educating and training officers on the Design methodology.

There are two populations of officers who will miss some type of formal education on Design. First is the largest pool: Army officers who have graduated from ILE after the introduction of design, but will not be selected to attend the War College. The second group also graduated from ILE after the introduction on Design, but will defer the War College in order to deploy with their units to either Iraq or Afghanistan. The void in education on Design of these two groups should be addressed by the DCIG.

General Dempsey should get credit for starting the Design ball rolling and getting the Army to take the first step in the right direction. However, we have a long road ahead before we have an approved and combat-tested PME on educating and training all the Army’s leaders on Design.

Recognizing and Managing Change

The Revised Final Draft of FM 5-0 includes a section titled “Recognizing and Managing Transitions.” It proclaims that, “a quality Army requires versatile leaders-critical and creative thinkers who can recognize and manage not just friendly transitions
but those of adversaries as well." Versatile and creative officers are not just needed in combat, but also in garrison. In view of the changing strategic environment and the adaptability of our enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the previous TRADOC leadership was slow to recognize the need to change the Army’s strategic leadership education and training strategy.

In order not to make the same mistakes in the future and to be a learning institution, Army leaders should take an honest look internally and analyze where we made some mistakes. Before we can fix a problem, we must first understand what the problem is. Specifically, we should ask why it has taken five years for Army leaders to issue guidance on developing a plan for educating our officers on Design.

The early evidence that the Army should change came during the summer of 2004 when “Ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq convinced Army leadership that new counterinsurgency doctrine was needed. LTC Jan Horvath at the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth was given the mission to fill the gap quickly, and in October 2004 he produced Field Manual (Interim) 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations." However the Army missed an opportunity in 2005 when the directive was given to form a planning group under General Petraeus to re-write the Army’s counterinsurgency manual. Professor Conrad Crane, the lead director for the rewriting of FM 3-24 writes, “The Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth had a new commander, LTG David Petraeus, fresh from his second tour in Iraq. He had a vision to use Fort Leavenworth as an “Engine of Change” to make the Army an improved learning organization better equipped to fight irregular wars, as well as to handle any other assigned missions in an uncertain future.” Since the Combined Arms Center is a
subordinate headquarters of TRADOC, General Petraeus’ vision should have been an indicator that change might be needed. Someone at the TRADOC level should have recognized the significance of this planning group and issued some initial guidance to begin parallel planning for possible changes to the current education and training of our officers on understanding a complex problem set. Other indicators should have been recognized: 1) in Afghanistan we were making no progress in fighting a low-intensity war with no end in sight; 2) we had been fighting a war in Iraq for two years with no end in sight; 3) the Army was starting to realize we were transitioning to a counterinsurgency fight, which presented a very complex problem set; 4) the authors of the new FM 3-24 were promulgating new ideas on Design, identifying influencing factors like economic development, governance, religion, culture, understanding the operational environment, and solving the right problem. All of these issues eventually were elaborated in separate sections of the new FM5-0 chapter on Design. We need to do a better job in the future in responding to changing events and unfamiliar situations. We must ensure that we manage and monitor that change so we can anticipate situations and remain agile enough to adjust our leader’s education and training in a timely manner.

Issues with the Current Plan

The Leader Development Strategy claims that, “We must develop leaders by challenging them with ‘complexity’ and ‘extended time’. The task, then, is to replicate the challenges of complexity and extended time in the training environment--at schools, training centers, and home stations.”16 Extended time is needed to replicate the normal combat environment so a training unit has the time to implement the Design methodology and to understand the context of influencing factors, to identify with a course of action, to continually assess and adapt as needed, and to effectively monitor
changing threats in order to effectively transition from one form of operation to another.
As a former observer controller (O/C) and as a former OPFOR Battalion Commander at the Joint Readiness Training Center, and as a member of a rotational unit, my assessment of this directive is that it will be hard to implement based on the current CTC rotational timelines. Currently units spend only 4 to 5 days at the Army CTCs conducting force-on-force exercises. A large portion of their CTC time is used to conduct company Situation Training Exercises (STX). Five days does not allow units to proceed through each of the steps listed above. So unless changes are made in the Training Center format, we will fail to meet the TRADOC Commander’s directive to train our leaders in extended time scenarios.

There is a lack of oversight of all the school houses’ implementation of the TRADOC directives on Design. The Design methodology is a new and complex topic. Issuance of directives and TRADOC guidance are not in themselves sufficient to ensure that officers are being effectively trained and educated. TRADOC representatives should visit all Army schoolhouses to observe and assess the quality and adequacy of training and education on Design. Failure at one step in the education and training on Design in the overall Professional Military Education process will have a negative effect on the next higher step.

Many of the Army officers will never have any formal instruction on Design because they graduated from ILE after the implementation of the design classes and because they will never attend the Army War College. It will be impossible to catch these officers up formally on the Design methodology. However, some of this population will assume command of deploying units and will defer the War College. The
The Army’s new FM 5-0 Revised Final Draft (RFD), chapter 1 on Design falls short in two critical areas. First, it asserts that the Design methodology is not a process; second, it fails to give any examples of the directed Design outputs. Stating that Design is not a process has confused the school houses on the proper way to educate and train students on Design. The new FM 5-0 RFD, chapter on Design makes 15 references to products that a staff must produce from the Design methodology—such as texts, narratives, environmental frame narratives, design concepts, etc. However there is not one example of what these products should look like. This lack of graphic illustrations was a deliberate decision in order to not constrain or to influence commanders on how to use the Design methodology. Examples were not offered because of concerns that the field manual examples or Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, (TTPs) for these products would lead commanders to believe these products are the only right solutions. This refusal to develop and promulgate standard templates places the burden of developing these Design products on the same staff individuals who have not yet received proper education and training on Design. This current practice of limiting the content of our FMs would work great if we were operating at a 1980s Army’s tempo. Then commanders had more time available for educating and training their officers because our Army was not fighting two wars. Then it was common to have a mandatory weekly Officers Professional Development, (OPD). Sessions covered a wide range of topics, followed by an officer’s call at the officer’s club. These formal and informal learning opportunities are no longer available or make sense because of high
deployment tempos and limited family time. A commander’s biggest concern then was how well his unit would perform during his CTC rotation. We should review our own Leader Development Strategy: “The demands of current conflicts have resulted in extended tactical tours lengths and backlogs at our professional military education institutions.”17 With no end in sight to the high operational tempo, we need to err on the side of providing too much information on Design for our deploying units, rather than not enough.

**Recommended Solutions**

To meet the TRADOC Commander’s directive to provide our leaders the opportunity to train in an environment that will replicate the challenges of complexity and extended time, we must first change the current way the CTCs are being utilized. We must stop wasting the vast amount of training resources of our CTCs needed to conduct company STX lanes. The responsibility for training companies should fall on the division and BCT commanders as part of their home station training. If needed, contractors should be used to set up the STX lanes or even provide the observer controllers, OPFOR, and role players. Then the CTCs will again focus on providing the resources needed to challenge leaders on how to handle complexity and work through the design methodology. Deleting the STX training requirement gains the CTCs 14 solid days for leaders and their staffs to operate in a complex and extended time environment, thereby meeting the TRADOC Commander’s directive.

It will take several years before the Design methodology permeates the Army—before its intent is truly understood and implemented during deployments. It is also safe to say that the current Design doctrine will go through a series of growing pains and inevitable changes. Therefore, it is critical that we get the Professional Military
Education correct. A failure at one level of PME will have effects on the next higher level. To ensure the Army gets the PME correct from the beginning, a special Design Committee needs to be established for a minimum of two years prior to the TRADOC Commanders final approval of the PME on Design. The Design Committee should serve as the single voice for all things on Design. This Committee would publish new guidance or directives, answer questions, gather feedback from deploying units, deploy forward to see how units are implementing the Design methodology, and -most importantly- visit all the school houses for quality control on the implementation of the Design curriculum. The Committee would be given the authority to direct changes to curriculums that failed to follow the PME directives.

The Design Committee will also be responsible for facilitating a bi-annual Design Conference at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The intent of the Design Conference is to have an open forum for all the school houses’ action officers on Design to share issues and insights. They will discuss any directed changes in Design from the TRADOC Commander and engage in professional dialogue on the best educational and training TTPs. Also, they will conduct after-action reviews on the initial design curriculum.

Until the PME on Design is operating, the Army will have to accept the fact that a large portion of the Army will receive no formal education on Design. Those officers will have already been through ILE and will not be selected to attend the War College. However Design information can be made available by tasking the Design Committee to build a educational CD for distribution and a Design webpage, which will offer several professional developmental classes on Design.
There is another category of officers with whom the Army cannot afford to assume risk. They are the battalion and brigade commanders who will miss the formal Design education because they have already graduated from ILE and have not yet attended the War College. This group of officers decided to defer their War College year in order to deploy with their units to combat. The DCIG are currently trying to fill this void through conducting a travel road show on Design to requesting units. They are reviewing the possibility of incorporating Design classes into the Leadership Training Program, (LTP) at the Joint Readiness Training Center. This is a good initiative for getting education and training on Design out to the force. But the traveling road show has its limitations, mainly because it reaches only a small group of commanders since the DCIG representative goes only to those units that request assistance. A better way to expose commanders to Design is during the Army’s Pre-Command Courses.

Teaching Design at the Pre-Command Course should serve as a temporary fix until ILE students become commanders. The Pre-Command Course will have two options for classes on Design: 1) the DCIG travel Design road show or 2) train their own cadre on Design. This will expose the commanders to Design, inform them about what their future staff officers are learning at ILE, and stimulate open professional discussions about Design.

The Army’s new FM 5-0, Revised Final Draft, The Operations Process clearly states that the Design methodology is not a process and it offers no examples of the 15 directed products or outputs. These omissions are failing deploying units by placing the burden on them to develop their own methodology for implementing Design and then designing the required products. These are the same units whose staff officers are
quickly thrown together, pushed through a CTC, and quickly deployed forward. Staff members are not showing up until after their unit has completed LTP or even after their validation CTC rotation is complete. Some officers are PCSing to their units only to board a plane two months later for a 15-month deployment. Units do not have the time and experience to learn and incorporate Design autonomously. Commanders and staffs will open the current FM5-0 on Design and discover the really complex problem is trying to figure out a process for learning Design and visualizing what their products should look like.

Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, defines education as “instruction with increased knowledge, skill, and/or experience as the desired outcome for the student.” If then defines training as “an organized, structured process based on sound principles of learning designed to increase the capability of individuals or units to perform specified tasks or skills. Training increases the ability to perform in known situations with emphasis on competency, physical and mental skills, knowledge and concepts.” Due to the high operational tempo of our Army, our field manual authors have got to find the right balance between these two types of learning. We can take a lesson from LTG Petraeus philosophy prior to publishing the new FM 3-24: “He convened a unique gathering at Fort Leavenworth to critique the product. He personally approved the quest list which included representatives from the CIA, USAID, and State Department and officers from other services and countries.” If the Army is serious about operating in the future in coordination with other instruments of national and international partners during its conflicts, it is time to recognize we are again at a decision point. It is time to update some critical manuals that we know will be used by
the interagency officials to facilitate joint operations. FM 5-0 and its chapter on Design will be one of those critical manuals. FM 5-0 should be written as a field manual with the intent of training not only our own Army officers but also representatives from joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners (JIIM).

Therefore the following changes need to be incorporated into the new FM 5-0. It must lay out the Design methodology as a process. Certain events or steps should occur before others. For example, planners cannot begin with “Considering Operational Approaches” before they have finished “Identifying the Problem.” Second, the FM must provide examples of all the numerous products, narratives, and concepts that are mentioned throughout the Design chapter. We must not forget two things: 1) FMs are designed to provide answers and or examples, not generate more questions, and 2) commanders are smart enough to figure that they have the freedom to adjust or interpret the manual's advice and products to the experience and unique capabilities of their units.

Summary

Fixing this problem requires finding the right balance between the officer’s education and training on Design. General Dempsey has made two challenging statements about the education and training of our future leaders: first, he promises that “We’ll build an institution that’s agile enough to redesign itself on a compressed timeline.” Then he specifies that “we need to focus on leader development strategy that create leaders that understand the context of the factors influencing the military situation, can assess and adapt those actions based on the interactions and circumstances, and be able to effectively transition from one form of operations to another.”
General Dempsey is primarily concerned with preparing our leaders to deploy forward to combat. However, I believe we cannot forget that these comments are just as important for all officers. This guidance applies whether you are deployed forward, working at TRADOC, the Pentagon, or an AC/RC position. In my opinion, we are five years behind in acknowledging that the combat environment was changing and that the education and training environment needed to change accordingly. Hopefully, we have learned from our mistakes and will heed our own advice about becoming agile enough to redesign ourselves in the future. Such adaptability will be critical when the next set of environmental conditions change and we need to transition our education and training methodology once again by updating our leader development strategy. Design offers a holistic approach to understanding a complex problem. The Army needs to apply that same holistic approach in changing our CTCs, our educational institutions, and even how we write our field manuals in order to properly educate and train our deploying forces on Design.

Endnotes


2 Ibid


5 Ibid.


14 Dr Conrad Crane, *Minting New COIN: The Development and Content of Contemporary American Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, (unpublished manuscript provided by the author), p. 1

15 Crane., p.2


18 Nelson.


21 Crane, 9.

22 Dempsey, 8.
