ARE WE THERE YET?
ANYONE HAVE A MAP?

BY

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USAWC CLASS OF 2010

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During the last 8 years substantial discussion has been conducted on whether or not the United States Government is organized to utilize all aspects of National Power to reach the National Security Objectives of the United States. One of the most commonly discussed disconnects is the formation of the Homeland Security Council to focus on the domestic component of national security. The purpose of this Strategy Research Project is to examine what changes have been recommended toward more effectively organizing the Government/Congress/Executive Branch to achieve our national security objectives. Beginning with the rapid reorganization of the government for increased security post 9-11 up to the implementation of the latest Presidential Security Directive on the National Security Council (NSC) recommendations on the “right” way to address the myriad of interagency and interdepartmental friction points have been offered. These offering come from both conservative, bi-partisan, and liberal think tanks alike. This paper will examine the various recommendations from organizations and individuals across the spectrum of political leanings. The main focus will be on the recommendations since the formation of the Homeland Security Council focusing on its utility, authorities and will include the recent changes by the Obama administration as it moves through its first year in office. Additional areas for improvement such as Interagency Coordination and the role of the National Security Advisor will also be examined. Finally a discussion of the common themes in each analysis as well as a roadmap will be offered highlighting the critical actions that these commonalities indicate United States national leadership should undertake.
At the beginning of any discussion on national security it would be helpful to highlight the published roles and responsibilities of the lead organization to address domestic national security issues and coordination, the Homeland Security Council.

Homeland Security Council

In the wake of 9-11 the government attempted to address the disconnects within the interagency that led to the largest single terrorist attack on US soil and to prevent it from happening again. By Presidential directive the White House Office of Homeland Security was established. The presidential directive on October 29, 2001 that established the Office of Homeland Security also created the Homeland Security Council. Presidential Homeland Security Directive 1 establishes that securing Americans from terrorist threats or attacks is a critical national security function. It requires extensive coordination across a broad spectrum of Federal, State, and local agencies to reduce the potential for terrorist attacks and to mitigate damage should such an attack occur. The Homeland Security Council (HSC) “shall ensure coordination of all homeland security-related activities among executive departments and agencies and promote the effective development and implementation of all homeland security policies.”

The Homeland Security Council is organized in the same manner as the National Security Council with a Principals Committee, a Deputies Committee and Policy Coordination Committees. The HSC Principals Committee (HSC/PC) is the senior interagency forum under the HSC for homeland security issues. The HSC/PC meets at the call of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, in consultation with the regular attendees of the HSC/PC. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security determines the agenda, in consultation with the regular attendees, and shall ensure that
all necessary papers are prepared. When global terrorism with domestic implications is on the agenda of the HSC/PC, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall perform these tasks in concert.

The HSC Deputies Committee (HSC/DC) serves as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting homeland security. The HSC/DC can task and review the work of the HSC interagency groups. The HSC/DC helps ensure that issues brought before the HSC/PC or the HSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for action. The HSC/DC meets at the call of its Chairman. Any regular member of the HSC/DC may request a meeting of the HSC/DC for prompt crisis management. For all meetings, the Chairman shall determine the agenda, in consultation with the regular members, and shall ensure that necessary papers are prepared.

The HSC Policy Coordination Committees (HSC/PCCs) coordinate the development and implementation of homeland security policies by multiple departments and agencies throughout the Federal government, and coordinate those policies with State and local governments. The HSC/PCCs is the main day-to-day forum for interagency coordination of homeland security policy. They provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the HSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. Each HSC/PCC shall include representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the HSC/DC. There are eleven HSC/PCCs established for the following functional areas, each to be chaired by the designated Senior Director from the Office of
Homeland Security: Detection, Surveillance, and Intelligence (by the Senior Director, Intelligence and Detection), Plans, Training, Exercises, and Evaluation (by the Senior Director, Policy and Plans), Law Enforcement and Investigation (by the Senior Director, Intelligence and Detection), Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Consequence Management (by the Senior Director, Response and Recovery), Key Asset, Border, Territorial Waters, and Airspace Security (by the Senior Director, Protection and Prevention), Domestic Transportation Security (by the Senior Director, Protection and Prevention), Research and Development (by the Senior Director, Research and Development), Medical and Public Health Preparedness (by the Senior Director, Protection and Prevention), Domestic Threat Response and Incident Management (by the Senior Director, Response and Recovery), Economic Consequences (by the Senior Director, Response and Recovery), and Public Affairs (by the Senior Director, Communications). Each HSC/PCC also has an Executive Secretary to be designated by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security (from the staff of the HSC). The Executive Secretary of each HSC/PCC assists his or her Chair in scheduling the meetings of the HSC/PCC, determining the agenda, recording the actions taken and tasks assigned, and ensuring timely responses to the central policy-making committees of the HSC system. The Chairman of each HSC/PCC, in consultation with its Executive Secretary, may invite representatives of other executive departments and agencies to attend meetings of the HSC/PCC, when appropriate.²

The council is intended to address homeland security and is a carbon copy of the National Security council but is focused only on domestic security issues. This integration of various organizations, to include the FBI and CIA, is an attempt to remedy
the information sharing issues that lead to the lack of discovery of the 9-11 conspirators.³

Cato Institute

The Cato Institute, founded in 1977, is a non-profit public policy research foundation headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Institute is named for Cato's Letters, a series of libertarian pamphlets that helped lay the philosophical foundation for the American Revolution. The mission of the Cato Institute is to increase the understanding of public policies based on the principles of limited government, free markets, individual liberty, and peace.⁴

As early as mid 2002, as the Bush Administration was instituting its response to the 9-11 attacks the critics began to second guess the actions being taken. The Cato Institute published a critical review of the Bush attempts to integrate the government to increase national security called The New Homeland Security Apparatus, Impeding the Fight against Agile Terrorists. The Cato Institute highlighted three, what they felt were critical shortcoming of the idea of an Office for Homeland Security (OHS) and its Homeland Security Council. First are the authorities to execute its stated mission to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks.⁵ The cabinet level National Homeland Security Agency, an organization very similar to the OHS, was recommended in the congressionally mandated US Commission on National Security /21st Century. The OHS as it is established now will not have any authority to enforce implementation of its plans. The core problem include legal constraints on what such government entities can do and the multitude of departments and agencies - each claiming a unique, if not premiere, role – involved in fighting terrorism. The State
Department (DoS), the Defense Department (DoD), and the Justice Department (DoJ) and its Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) justify their involvement but their prominent role in the security function of the federal government. These turf battles have become institutional and lead to the practice of not sharing information with outside agencies. It was this “stove piping” of information that contributed to 9-11. The one promise embodied in the formation of OHS is that there would be one single point to coordinate the government’s efforts against terrorism. OHS has no statutory authority over other cabinet departments or agencies, and they know it.

The CATO Institute report also highlights that the National Security Council is already organized and manned to tackle Homeland Security, so why wasn’t it given responsibility for it? The NSC is a statutorily empowered organization; everything the HSC lacks is resident in the NSC already. Information sharing, arguably the shining example of failure leading up to 9-11, will be critical to the execution of the OHS/HSC mission. However HSC will only have access to information from law enforcement. Additionally it will have another intelligence analysis office that will seemingly duplicate other efforts and could exacerbate the lack of information sharing. The NSC as defined by the White House “the National Security council is the Presidents principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with senior national security advisors and cabinet officials…The Council also serves as the Presidents principal arm for coordinating these policies amount the various government agencies” The regular member of the NSC are the President, Vice-President, Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense and the National Security Advisor. The president may invite whomever he feels they are required. An expansion of the organization chart of the NSC to include
those in the HSC but not already in the NSC would serve the same purpose as the HSC.

Additionally following along with the logic trail that the HSC is a domestic counterpart to the NSC leads us to the re-learn the lessons of 9-11. A demarcation between domestic and foreign efforts to fight terrorism will lead to lethal results.\(^8\) The CATO institute asserts that the HSC is a bureaucratic clone of the NSC that has too narrow a focus on terrorism and has no authorities to truly integrate the efforts of the national security apparatus. The President and only the President can direct priorities, demand cooperation, and command implementation. His orders can further the needed coordination and integration of government efforts far more than can the OHS director.\(^9\) The Cato Institute is not alone in its criticism of the organization for national security other organizations have added to the debate.

**Brookings Institute**

The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit public policy organization based in Washington, DC. Their mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations that advance three broad goals: Strengthen American democracy; Foster the economic and social welfare, security and opportunity of all Americans and Secure a more open, safe, prosperous and cooperative international system.\(^10\)

Immediately after the formation of the Department of Homeland Security in October 2001, the Brookings institute made several recommendations to the Senate Committee on Government Affairs that support and build on the premise of a single organization focused on focusing the elements of national power toward preventing terrorist threats and attacks on the United States. They caution that reorganizing for the
sole purpose of reorganizing is not the panacea for what lead to the 9-11 attacks. First is that terrorism must be a priority. It is a sad but very real fact that no amount of organizational surgery could have forced agencies to focus on the terrorist threats as much as the actions of nineteen individuals did on September 11th. For now, the lack of priority of attention is not an issue – though some organizational changes may be necessary to sustain interest in countering terrorism in the years to come.11

The second reason Brookings highlights for considering any organizational changes for national security is the fact that responsibility for homeland security is widely dispersed. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) more than 70 agencies spend money on counter terrorist activities, excluding DoD and DoS. They point out the diffusion of responsibility is inherent to the problem of national security that all the entities seek to tackle. Homeland security is, by its very nature, a highly decentralized activity. The actions or decisions at the outer edges of activities, a custom agent with a hunch about a car that ends up containing bomb making material to the young firefighter who directs subway passengers away from the twin towers, are at least as crucial to the success as decisions made at the center. Managing, coordinating, leading and mobilizing the disparate players in national security so that their decisions add up to a nation more secure, better prepared and more responsive to the terrorist threat is the organizational challenge of homeland security.12

According to Brookings centralization alone will not be enough. The institutional biases and “turf” battles are perhaps the most difficult to overcome. Some areas are by their very nature hard to integrate. Intelligence is the most obvious the intelligence arms of domestic law enforcement and the vast and relevant resources of the CIA and NSA
could not possibly be brought under the direct authority of any cabinet level homeland security official. The daunting broader reality is the need for any domestically oriented security authority to coordinate the international policy agencies and activities under the aegis of the NSC. And looking in the other organizational direction, it has to link up with police, health, rescue, and other units under the authority of the governors and mayors throughout the land. Even as the country was stung by the 9-11 attacks and was moving together toward organizing to fight terrorism then Director of Homeland Security Gov Tom Ridge upon his appointment alluded to the intra-governmental challenges by stating “the only turf we should be worried about protecting is the turf we stand on.”

During the last almost nine years private thinks tanks are not the only organization that has been looking at the problem of effectively organizing for national security, the Congress of the United States through the Congressional Research Service has also been engaged and critical of the processes put in place.

**Congressional Research Service**

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) serves as shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. Established by Congress in 1914 as a separate department within the Library of Congress, the Congressional Research Service serves the Congress throughout the legislative process by providing comprehensive and reliable legislative research and analysis that are timely, objective, authoritative, and confidential, thereby contributing to an informed national legislature.

In the recent report “Organizing the US Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates” the Congressional Research Service highlighted what it believes are the leading issues with how the whole of government is approaching National Security. The first area of concern is that civilian agency capacity
is too limited. The key players in the National Security and Homeland Security Councils for the most part do not have the sufficient capacity, or the necessary capabilities, to support their national security roles and responsibilities. This is due in part to an overall growth in requirements for civilian engagement – for the flexible use of soft power – in the post-9/11, globalized world. Civilian agencies it is argued, are under resourced, understaffed, non-optimally organized and trained, and or lack the necessary expeditionary institutional culture. The example of Dept of State and USAID’s inability to quickly deploy personnel to carry out reconstruction work in aftermath of major combat in Iraq and Afghanistan is often held up. This premise could also be applied to other agencies such as Justice and Treasury that might play a role in a complex contingency. This lack of capacity leads to unmet important requirements or worse puts the mission on entities that may not be prepared or capable of successfully accomplishing the mission.

Secondly, a product of the shifting of missions in execution away from the civilian agency responsible is now a criticism that the Department of Defense (DoD) role is too big. That DoD has too large a role in economic reconstruction, training of foreign police forces and humanitarian assistance. The argument is that DoD is encroaching on the missions of civilian agencies. The critics argue that the DoD lead will either do more harm than good due to a lack of expertise or send the wrong message to our international partner nations. Domestically it has been posited that the near term solution of the military removes any impetus on Washington to source and prepare the very civilian agencies that are complaining the DoD is in their lane.
Third, Interagency coordination and integration mechanisms are insufficient is a still a problem. The process of interagency coordination for planning and executing national security activities is based on an array of formal mechanisms and informal practices. A factor that may affect the effectiveness of any of these methods includes the authorities of the coordinating bodies or individuals, the resources they control, and the access they enjoy to the top decision makers. This lack of effective coordination can leave gaps in planning undetected, lead to wasted resources, duplication of effort, working at cross purposes to each other, sends confusing messages to partners, and demonstrates a lack of unity and in the worse case can lead to failures in execution.

Lastly, is the National Security system founded in 1947 is still relevant? As discussed earlier the NSC was designed to support presidential decision making on national security issue. It is the system by which designated leaders of executive branch agencies and presidential advisors review, clarify and prepare specific issues for presidential decision. As a rule, how that decision- support function works in practice depends on the discretion of the President.

A number of observers comment that the current US National security decision making process – the “NSC process” – is insufficiently rigorous. “Rigor” may refer, for example; to the timeliness of information – and proposal-sharing among agencies before committee meetings or to the demonstrated ability of the process to highlight all important sides of an issue. This failing of the system may not fully and effectively take account of input from key advisors. In addition, important logical gaps may go undetected or unquestioned.
Common Themes

Throughout the authors research of this topic and highlighted in the previous discussion is the constant return to the mantra of two ideas. The interagency coordination process is broken, or at best hamstrung by biases, parochialism and resources constraints, and the blame for this condition rests with the NSC, specifically the National Security Advisor.

Interagency Coordination Mechanisms. The blame game for 9/11 clearly highlighted the need for better “interagency” cooperation and coordination across the entire national security apparatus. Volumes have been written and this lack of “working together” is a theme that runs through a majority the body of work addressing the topic of “organizing for National Security.” The root cause of these failing have been previously highlighted as linked to culture, parochialism, resource fights and self preservation of roles and missions within each of the agencies involved. The “fix” to address this overarching issue was the formation of the Department of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council whose missions were to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks for the Department and to be responsible for advising and assisting the President with respect to all aspects of homeland security and will serve as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland security related activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of homeland security policies for the Council. The HSC never fully achieved agency status due to its 1) never publishing basic information such as its central organizational structure; where, from whom, and how the public may obtain information about it, rules of procedure, substantive rules of general applicability and
statements of general policy 2) omission from the annual volumes of the United States Government manual and 3) lack of an authorization to receive appropriations as an agency within the Executive Office of the President. The very mechanism created in the wake of 9/11 to prevent the repeat of 9/11 has become mired in the very bureaucracy and system it was created to cut thorough and manage.

*Role of the National Security Advisor.* No discussion on the way the interagency works can be complete without discussing the role of the NSA. Like the NSC the role of the NSA has been changed over time to be in line with the preferences of the President he or she serves. Of note is that this preference has not been under Congressional scrutiny. The role of the NSA has, however, become so well established in recent years that Congress has been increasingly prepared to grant the incumbent significant statutory responsibilities. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and other legislation provides for statutory roles for the National Security Advisor. Executive Orders provide other formal responsibilities. The position has become institutionalized and the exercise of its functions has remained an integral part of the conduct of national security policy in all recent administrations.

Some observers believe that these established duties which extend beyond the offering of advice and counsel to the President will inevitably lead to a determination to include the appointment of a National Security Advisor among those requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. Proponents of this advice and consent of the Senate cite the benefit of providing a legislative role in the appointment of one of the most important officials in the Federal Government, increased order, regularity and
formalization of the process, and ultimately greater accountability for NSC influence and decisions.\textsuperscript{21}

The increasing difficulties in separating national security issues from other issues within the White House staffs has led some to make recommendations to erase the lines between the different areas, law enforcement, economics and national security to name a few. The Project for National Security Reform a non-partisan task force that has studied the structure of national policy making has made some broad reaching proposals. One key proposal was expanding the role of the National Security Advisor and merging the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council.\textsuperscript{22}

**Obama Administration Initiatives**

The Obama administration has taken some initial steps toward reform of the National Security process. It started soon after the inauguration with President Obama quickly publishing Presidential Policy Directive – 1 delineating the Organizational of the National Security Council System. While this directive was substantively the same as previous administrations it set the stage for his National Security Advisor GEN James Jones to move out on reform. What followed next from the GEN. Jones, the NSA, was not status quo. The National Security advisor published The 21st Century Interagency Process. Clearly GEN. Jones had been aware of the friction impeding the previous administration in its efforts to coordinate national security issues. The Memorandum states “To succeed, the United States must integrate its ability to employ all the elements of national power in a cohesive manner. In order to deal with the world as it is, rather than how we wish it were, the National Security Council must be transformed to meet the realities of the new century.”\textsuperscript{23} It further states that those that participate in the interagency process – regardless of position – do so as representatives of their
respective agencies. They also serve the nation’s greater interests by being participants in a unique process to resolve common problems and advance common policies. The interagency process therefore must advance the interests of the Administration as a whole and all participants should engage in the process from that perspective.24

GEN Jones lists specific guiding principles for the new NSC as; a strategic process focused on integration of the activities of all government agencies involved in dealing with the expanded notion of 21st Century national security issues, an agile NSC with deliberative decision making capable of dealing with multiple major issues at once, a transparent process that while focused on advising the President on his daily national security activities remains responsive to the views and perspectives of all members of the National Security Council, transparency through regular communications to include informal meetings, a predictable process that serves the President by not holding interagency meetings on short notice with inadequate preparation unless it is an emergency, and an NSC that monitors strategic implantation in order to achieve concrete results within the time agreed upon.

This memorandum signals a reorientation of the NSC staff and clearly defines the expectations GEN Jones, and by extension the President, has for the new order of business on national security issues. An adjunct of this new process was the study of, recommendation to, and subsequent decision by the President to merge the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council into the National Security Staff. In the President’s press statement announcing the decision he highlighted several key decisions: The full integration of White House staff supporting national security and homeland security into the new "National Security Staff" under the direction of the
National Security Advisor and will end the artificial divide between White House staff who have been dealing with national security and homeland security issues; Maintaining of the Homeland Security Council as the principle venue for interagency deliberations on issues that affect the security of the homeland; the establishment of new directorates and positions within the National Security Staff to deal with new and emerging 21st Century challenges associated with cyber-security, WMD terrorism, trans-border security, information sharing, and resilience policy, including preparedness and response; retention of the position of Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (AP/HSCT) as the Presidents principal White House advisor on these issues, with direct and immediate access to me; and the creation of a new Global Engagement Directorate to drive comprehensive engagement policies that leverage diplomacy, communications, international development and assistance, and domestic engagement and outreach in pursuit of a host of national security objectives, including those related to homeland security.25

As stated in the press release the President feels this is the best way to organize the White House to effectively and efficiently leverage the tremendous talent and expertise of the dedicated Americans who work within it. The creation of the National Security Staff and the other recommendations from the study that he approved will help to keep our country safe and our Homeland secure.26

A New Road Map or Just Back to Basics?

The following is one approach to navigating toward a more secure nation. It attempts to distill the most common faults articulated over the past eight years in criticism of our national security apparatus. Accountability, resource management and leadership, mostly the lack of each, has contributed to the large majority of what has
been written on organizing for national security. Some have even posited that the national security system, centered on the National Security Act of 1947, should be scrapped in its entirety for a whole new interagency approach stating that like the age of services, the interagency Age will become possible only when Congress reorganizes the national security system by statute.27

Accountability. A common thread in all of the arguments presented for re-doing this portion of government or that in order to better achieve our national security objectives is that all the parties do not play well together. They fail to see past their own parochial issues and to the national objective. Some have argued it is because this thing called “National Security” is a behemoth that is so interwoven across the entire government that it is its own worst enemy for coordination. The interwoven nature of the challenge should lend itself to cooperation not deter it. It is the lack of accountability of those that act as de-railers that contributes to the inability to achieve effective and efficient use of our national power. One would be hard pressed to find anyone who would contest that the lack of interagency coordination and cooperation lead to, or at least did not allow us to prevent, the attacks of 9/11. For the past eight years the clarion call has been to reorganize, reengage partners and cooperate for national security. However loud this call as been, and it seems the current administration is listening, no quantitative process has been articulated that will hold those responsible for our national security accountable. What mechanism currently in place holds those that do not cooperate accountable? It is only after we have failure that we look to hold someone accountable. We do not hold those that are not properly focused accountable when their
actions or inactions, which ultimately could lead to a failure, manifest themselves initially.

*Resources.* The amount of resources put against a problem is a good indicator of its importance. Arguably National Security has gotten the lion’s share of resources since 9/11. How these resources have been applied is often questioned. These resources need to be used as a lever to move the whole of government into line with the President’s priorities for national security. The funding of additional State Department personnel to help improve the department’s ability to deploy expertise in economic and governance is an example. Additionally, Presidential latitude to move resources from one program to another in an expeditious manner to both exploit success and not reinforce failure. This reallocation across departments could also spur a proper level of effort toward the achievement of the set objectives.

*Leadership.* Leadership at the Department level and within the NSS is the lynchpin for the successful implementation of any administration’s national security policies. The Obama administration has tried to take into consideration all of the diverse opinions on how to better meet our national security objectives. After considerable deliberation the President has taken the opportunity to evolve the NSC organization established after 9/11 into one team focused inwardly and outwardly at the same with the NSS acting as the coordination mechanism. GEN Jones has put his specific guidance which should help focus those in on the team toward the common objective. Ultimately it will be President Obama and by proxy, GEN Jones, who will be ultimately responsible for determining if the new structure is effective and efficient as stated in its formation.
As time goes on and issues are addressed it remains to be seen if President Obama and his National Security Advisor have much patience for what has been up to this point the much criticized status quo within the interagency. Time will tell if they are willing to take the drastic and most likely unpopular step to make a change in leadership of a particular department if that department appears to be an impediment to achieving national security objectives. Will we see a shift in resources or a recommendation eliminate programs that are not contributing to the synergy the administration would like to achieve from the effort in support of national security? Or will the leadership in Congress push for more oversight or involvement in the formation of the national security team if accountability and ultimately resources are reallocated away a congressional interest.

If the President and his team from the very start hold those accountable that lose sight of the bigger picture, national security, because they are blinded by bias, culture or self-preservation the spirit of cooperation in the interagency will be the rule not the exception as has been written. Resource management will be critical to enable and prioritize the various initiatives undertaken to secure our nation. There also needs to be a willingness to move resources as needed. Ultimately, it will be the President himself that will make or break any National Security structure. The President has chosen a National Security Advisor in GEN Jones that has quickly tried to implement change to evolve the NSS into a value added proposition. Any success the NSA has will be directly tied to how much the President empowers and supports him as he moves forward to lead the NSS. President Obama has moved out smartly in forming his National Security team, our national security rests in how well he leads it when it is easy
but more importantly when it starts to become difficult to balance the spoken and unspoken intricacies of the interagency.

Endnotes


2 Ibid.,

3 CATO Institute, The New Homeland Security Apparatus – Impeding the Fight against Agile Terrorist, Foreign Policy Briefing No. 70 June 26, 2002, 1


6 Ibid., 3.

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9 Ibid., 5.

10 The Brookings Institute Homepage http://www.brookings.edu/about.aspx accessed 9 January 2010


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16 Ibid., 8.

17 Ibid., 11.
18 George W. Bush, Executive Order 13228 of October 8, 2001 (Washington DC, The White House)


21 Ibid., 30.

22 Ibid.


24 Ibid., 2

25 Barrack Obama, Statement by the President of the United States on the White Organization for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, May 26, 2009

26 Ibid.
