In Search of a Twenty-First-Century
Air-Leadership Model
Fodder for Your Professional Reading

Dr. David R. Mets*

Editorial Abstract: Where can future aerospace leaders find guidance and inspiration? One route is to reap the benefit of past experience through a vigorous professional reading program. In the latest installment of his popular “fodder” series of articles, Dr. Mets provides the air warrior-scholar with a sampler of important books on aerospace leadership.

Read and reread the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Make them your models. This is the only way to become a great general and to master the art of war. With your own genius enlightened by this study, you will reject all maxims opposed to these great commanders.

—Napoléon Bonaparte

The quest for a key to successful air leadership is as old as airpower itself. An Air Force Academy was first proposed in Congress in 1919, and by 1931 Randolph Air Force Base (AFB) was known as “The West Point of the Air.” Yet, until fairly recently, professional air warriors have had slim pickings when they looked for case studies in airpower leadership. For a long time, we have had many biographies of soldiers and seamen, but common percep-

*I wish to acknowledge the fine help I received in the preparation of this article: thanks to Col Dennis Drew, USAF, retired; Col Phillip Meilinger, USAF, retired; Lt Col Robert Colella, USAF; and Maj Richard Boltz, USAF. All of its defects are my responsibility.
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tions hold that airmen are not a contemplat­
tive lot and have little inclination toward lit­
erary efforts. Few of them have set pen to
paper to tell either their own life stories or
those of other flyers. Still fewer scholars and
foundations have felt sufficiently competent
to undertake such studies. But in the past two
decades, that void has begun to be filled.

This article first explores the nature of
models. What are they? What are they good
for? What are they not good for? It then turns
to sources of biographical material on airmen
and the nature of biography as a vehicle for ex­
ploring the subject of air leadership. It further
examines the advantages of the biographical
approach and its shortcomings. The article il­
lustrates these matters with reviews of two forth­
coming books about air leadership—one on
Maj Gen Mason M. Patrick and the other on
Adm Joseph M. Reeves. It then suggests some
possible benefits as well as the limitations of bi­
ographies and, in keeping with my “fodder” se­
ries of articles, closes with a “10-Book Sampler
for Professional Reading.”

I am not sure to what degree either
Napoléon or his marshals followed his ad­
vice. Certainly, his interpreter Carl von
Clausewitz held that it takes more than maxims
and that genius—intuitive judgment—is the
-crucial element.

What Is a Model?

A model is an artificial construct; it is not
real. It is a simplification of reality. At the very
best, it is an approximation of reality. It has
no more authority than the credibility of its
originator. Its utility is that it yields a con­
ceptual framework and perhaps a commonly un­
derstood vocabulary that enables us to ana­
yze and discuss a problem. It is an academic
device to facilitate explanation and learning.
-But it cannot be used as a definitive guide to
action. It can help in thinking about leader­
ship, but it will certainly not make anyone a
good leader. Consequently, all the abstract lit­
erature on leadership and all the air-leader
biographies can do nothing more than sug­
gest. Thus, one should certainly consider
Napoléon’s maxims but should do so in the
light of his or her own genius—that is, pro­
-fessional judgment.

We have about as many leadership models
as leaders. When I attended Squadron Officer
School (SOS) in 1959, the institution’s model
was Body, Mind, Soul. Yet, we received in­
struction from a parade of dignitaries from
the flights over Schweinfurt, Germany, and
other unpleasant places who gave us their
own prescriptions for successful leadership.
They were all different, but as I saw it, they
merely described their own leadership styles.
Some left out the need for professional
knowledge, and some even omitted courage—
perhaps taking it for granted. West Point’s
motto for the last century has been Duty,
Honor, Country, and a recent version of the
Air Force’s core values calls for “integrity,
service before self, and excellence in all that
we do.” Still another maxim depicted by Prof.
Dennis Drew suggests, “Know yourself, know
your job, set the example, accept responsibili­
-ty, foster teamwork, and care for people.”
The point is that no universal model for leader­
ship exists. Drew suggests that leadership is
highly situational, with the exception that
one cannot compromise the constants of in­
tegrity, service before self, and the continual
search for excellence. I suppose that is
largely the old SOS model of Body, Mind,
Soul—just in other words.

We encounter so many models of a positive
kind that they become a bit bewildering. Either
they are so complex that no one can begin to
use them in all their dimensions in a crisis, or
they are so simplified that they become use­
less platitudes in the real world. Perhaps a
leadership model cast in a negative way would
prove more useful—specifying a set of things
to avoid rather than identifying desirable
practices. One should avoid being unlucky,
unhealthy, short, ugly, hesitant, cowardly,
reckless, lazy, careless, dishonest, tactless, reti­
cent, and pushy, just as one should not be­
come a workaholic, martinet, dummy, or an
intellectual “geek.” Readers will quickly per­
ceive that many of those attributes, like luck,
are not within the leader’s control. They will
also see that only a very fine line separates some of them. Officers never want to say a dishonest word. Neither do they want to appear tactless when the general’s wife asks what they think of her new hat.

So what’s an aspiring leader to do if these models are so ambiguous, uncontrollable, and contradictory? He or she can resort to autobiographies and biographies—some positive, others negative, and all imperfect in one way or another. Some very fine people provide examples to avoid. Near the end of his days, Adm William Halsey lamented that it would have been better had Adm Raymond Spruance taken his place during the Battle of Leyte Gulf and had Halsey replaced Spruance during the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Gen Ira Eaker was one of the finest officers in Air Force history, but what led to his relief as commander of Eighth Air Force, just as it approached its culminating point? Gen Haywood Hansell, as fine a Southern gentleman as ever graced the portals of Maxwell AFB, Alabama, was relieved hardly six weeks after his first B-29 attack on Japan. Why? Why was Air Marshal Hugh Dowding, whose leadership proved essential to victory in the Battle of Britain, shunted aside soon afterwards? All of these people have biographies that might be useful in suggesting things to avoid—like bad luck, if possible. But people who try too hard to avoid bad luck will surely never accomplish anything positive. Any air leader knows that one surefire way to bring the accident rate down is to stop flying.

We can do something about the “Body” part of the 1959 SOS model. Indeed, we in the Air Force have done so. There are far fewer smokers among us now, and our Air Force gymnasiums are far more heavily populated than before. But dwelling on physical problems is pointless since only the individual can solve them.

The man who inspired this series of “fodder” articles in Aerospace Power Journal, Col Roger Nye, once remarked on the unlikelihood of leadership training doing much to change the basic value systems (“Soul”) of successful young people. He said that if a “crook” entered such training, he would likely remain a crook when he graduated. The training does some good for the group as a whole through the process of elimination. Even if few members of the group are more honest by graduation, the class as a whole may indeed have more integrity. Over the course of the training, some dishonest people will be expelled, and some will self-select out. But if crooks wiggle through, they will likely lack integrity forever after. The point is that our hopes of making substantial moral improvements in individuals through preaching or training may be pretty dim, despite all our efforts. Setting an example may help, but coercing or coaxing people to be honest, humane, and all the rest is a formidable task.

For individuals, perhaps the most promising area for improvement lies in SOS’s region of the “Mind.” They can strive for excellence during formal training and education, and they can enhance those results through a serious program of professional reading when not so engaged. Unhappily, that will never eliminate the need for seasoned professional judgments (read guesses) because we can never know all the facts that bear on our strategic, operational, and tactical problems. But such striving might well reduce the number of “unknowns” and increase the number of “knowns,” thus improving the odds that the final professional judgment will be right—or more so than the enemy’s, at any rate. In other words, inherent in attributing success to luck is the danger of failing to prepare one’s self to take advantage of good fortune when it does appear.

Possible Sources for Leadership Models

Many possible sources can help in the building of personal leadership models. They might include after-action reports, end-of-tour reports, diaries, interviews, personal papers, leaders’ published articles, visits to battlefields or the homes and schools of leaders, alumni magazines, memoirs, autobiographies, and biographies. All but the last two sources would
prove difficult for the aspiring air warrior-scholar to use in the field. Most of the others feed into autobiographies and biographies, but we know that the very act of selecting such materials filters things and skews interpretations. Thus, although we know that completely unbiased biographies don’t exist, they are nonetheless the most usable resources we have for the greater parts of our careers.

Advantages of Biography as a Vehicle for Studying Leadership

Many students of leadership have difficulty relating theoretical studies to the real world. Many such studies recognize this and employ case studies, either to prove their point or explain it. But these treatments still tend toward the abstract. Too, the cases employed will often seem superficial and open to question. Many aspiring leaders find biographies less abstract—more grounded in real-world experience. Moreover, because we all must look at the world through human eyes, the biography almost automatically has more appeal because it deals with an individual. That tends to make it more entertaining than other kinds of books. The publishing industry knows that, so we find many more biographies of leaders than we do books on the subject of leadership. For the officer in the field, that means that biographies may be much more available and easier to use than other sources of information on leadership. My earlier comment about bias does not mean that biographies are necessarily untrue—only that the positive side of the truth seems to get a much more thorough treatment than the negative.

Shortcomings of Biography as a Vehicle for Studying Leadership

One of the most serious difficulties with biography is the tendency to overemphasize the importance of an individual. Every biogra-
Napoléon’s marshals; it is crucial to air leadership today.

All that aside, military biographies have always been and will continue to be attractive tools for the study of leadership. Aspiring air leaders have found themselves handicapped in this until recent times because of the scarcity of good biographies of air leaders. In the last two decades, that deficiency has been partially repaired (see the “sampler” at the end of this article). Plenty of biographies will keep readers busy for some time to come.

Samples of Biographies

Recent, worthy biographies that one might use for the positive side of an air leadership model include books about Air Force generals Henry Arnold, Carl Spaatz, Hoyt Vandenberg, Billy Mitchell, Curtis LeMay, Claire Chennault, and Mason Patrick. All of our potential subjects do not have Air Force ties, and, obviously, piloting is not the same as air leadership. Our list might include Navy admirals William Moffett, Joseph M. Reeves, Raymond Spruance, and Ernest King. Neither Moffett nor Reeves were pilots although both earned observer wings. Both King and Patrick won pilot wings, but neither ever really served on an aircrew. Spruance had no wings at all but undoubtedly must rank among the most impressive air leaders in American history. Certainly, readers should not limit themselves to Americans, for good works exist on Air Marshals Arthur Tedder, Keith Parks, Arthur Coningham, and Hugh Dowding. More recently, Lt Col Eric Ash, the editor of this journal, has done a corrective to the picture we have of the early days of the Royal Air Force in his book on Sir Frederick Sykes. Further, David Irving has written controversial works on Hermann Göring and Erhard Milch. There are many biographies on Göring, but most explore the sensational side of his character and don’t have much to say about air leadership that is worthwhile. Indeed, biographical literature on the senior leaders of the Luftwaffe is rather thin.

Current Air-Leadership Biographies

Here, we turn to a closer look at two brand-new biographies—one on Maj Gen Mason Patrick, who commanded the US Army Air Service and Air Corps during their most formative years (Robert P. White’s Mason Patrick and the Fight for Air Service Independence [Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, forthcoming in September 2001]). The other, from the same period, is about Adm Joseph Mason Reeves, who was the commander of the first American aircraft carrier, the USS Langley, and, ultimately, of the entire US fleet (Thomas Wildenberg’s All the Factors of Victory: Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of Carrier Air Power [Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, forthcoming in Spring 2001]).

Both General Patrick and Admiral Reeves lived in the shadows of the more noted air leaders Brig Gen William Mitchell and Adm William Moffett. Patrick was Mitchell’s boss, first with the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) Air Service in France in World War I and later as the chief of the Army Air Service from 1921 until Mitchell’s resignation in 1926. Moffett was at the political vortex in Washington from his appointment as chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics in 1921 until his death in the 1933 crash of the airship Akron. Moffett was not Reeves’s boss, but he had visibility in Washington while Reeves was at sea doing the day-to-day labor to integrate aviation into the Navy. Too, Moffett was an adept politician—at least as able as Mitchell at that art—and good at public relations as well. As with Patrick and Mitchell, Reeves lived somewhat in the shadow of the more visible Moffett. Many books and articles have been written about Mitchell, and a feature motion picture with Gary Cooper (a Mel Gibson equivalent of an earlier day) in the role of Mitchell enjoyed wide circulation. Moffett’s reputation benefited from the work of a splendid biographer seven years ago, with the publication of William F. Trimble’s Admiral William A. Moffett: Architect of Naval Aviation. Now, both Patrick and Reeves emerge from
the shadows because of the labors of two fine
scholars, Robert P. White and Thomas
Wildenberg.

Robert White is well suited to do a work on
Patrick. He is a retired Air Force officer with
long experience in writing and teaching in the
Air Force History and Museums Program. He
is now the civilian historian for the Air Force
Office of Scientific Research. At one time, he
was chief of the Air Staff History Office. A
Pennsylvanian, White has master’s degrees in
history and government as well as a PhD from
Ohio State. The biography of Patrick is an
adaptation of his dissertation, but it does not
suffer from the usual defects found in that sort
of work. White also seems at home with tech­
nology, perhaps as a result of his military ser­
vice with the National Security Agency.

Thomas Wildenberg has a varied but fine
background for the work at hand. Like White,
he is at home with technology, in part the re­
sult of having earned a bachelor’s degree in
mechanical engineering from New York Uni­
versity. He also holds an MBA from the same
school as well as another master’s in library and
information services from the University of
Maryland. His scholarship has focused almost
entirely on naval history. His second book, De­s­
tined for Glory: Dive Bombing, Midway and the Ev­
olution of Carrier Air Power, is a fine piece of work
and has received excellent reviews. 17

Neither book is a complete biography. As al­
ways, authors are prisoners of their sources,
limited to what they can find in archives and
elsewhere. One finds a little more of the sub­
ject’s personal history in Mason Patrick and the

Both Billy Mitchell and Mason Patrick actively promoted an airpower synergy among military air forces, aircraft indus­
try, and commercial airlines. Among other things, they supported record long-distance flights to impress upon both the
media and the public the idea of aircraft and engine reliability. One such episode was John MacReady and Oakley
Kelly’s first transcontinental flight in the Fokker T-2 on 2 May 1923 in 26 hours.
Fight for Air Service Independence, but the book focuses on Patrick's service in the 1920s rather than his World War I work—and still less on his personal life. He was a West Pointer, second in his class there, and a friend of John Joseph Pershing, Army chief of staff. From the beginning, Pershing had very high regard for Patrick's intelligence, common sense, and mission orientation and sought him out to bring order out of the chaos that was the Air Service of the AEF. For practically identical reasons, Pershing drafted Patrick back into the Air Service to restore order among postwar airmen. One of the major instigators of disorder in both cases was Billy Mitchell.

In the years that followed, Patrick did manage to exert a measure of control over the behavior of his assistant—no mean trick since Mitchell probably was politically untouchable and certainly rich. Patrick was far from the reactionary lackey of the General Staff that the Mitchell worshipers have sometimes made him out to be (although Mitchell himself made no such accusation). Rather, General Patrick was a low-profile man who operated within the system yet was adept at making many of the very gains for the Air Service that Mitchell sought but failed to effect. They differed not in ideas but methods. Both favored an independent air force: Mitchell demanded it immediately, but his boss had a better grasp of what was possible. As White shows, the chief had enough sense to see that independence in the 1920s was beyond reach. Yet it was possible to take several very substantial steps toward that goal through less flamboyant methods.

Through his major influence on the Army's Lassiter Board and his labor with friends on the General Staff, as well as his work with Congress and the press, Patrick yielded several favorable outcomes. One was the General Staff's official blessing of the idea that air forces might have an independent role to play before mobilizing armies came into contact. Another was gaining general Army acceptance of the notion of two kinds of airpower: air service and air force. Patrick won approval to reduce the number of resources applied to the first and increase those devoted to the second. Too, he managed to persuade the General Staff to accept the notion that the air force portion should not be farmed out to the control of divisions and other subordinate units. Rather, centralized control would permit the massing of air forces against targets in any threatened area and permit their use in independent operations, the ground situation permitting. Those ideas are not too far removed from the ones of the present-day Air Force, although ground forces still seem discontented with centralized control (but they now have their own "air service" forces in the form of helicopters).

Benjamin Foulois, later the chief of the Air Corps, found himself constantly at odds with Mitchell, who remained a bur under Patrick's saddle. Yet, all three men—and the Air Service in general—shared much the same view of the world and the role of airpower in it. At times, Foulois was more radical than Mitchell and quite prone to "shoot from the hip." But for most of Patrick's tenure, Foulois was stationed in Germany, where he could not stir up chaos in the Washington arena. According to White, his man managed all these problems and kept a lid on things from the Ostfriesland bombing trials in 1921 to the relief of Mitchell as his assistant in early 1925.

Mitchell fans have denigrated Patrick over the court-martial trial, but the chief had in fact requested Mitchell's reappointment for another term as his assistant. However, the secretary of war did not honor the request. Mitchell was not demoted. Rather, the rank went with the assistant's position, and when Mitchell had to transfer out of it, he merely reverted to his permanent rank—as many, many Air Service men had done at the end of World War I (though not the senator's son).

Mitchell's court-martial in late 1925 is an oft-repeated tale. Unfortunately, Bob White cannot compete with Gary Cooper in dramatizing that dimension of the story. But Mason Patrick went on to win a substantial "half loaf" with the Air Corps Act of 1926. He got the name changed to Corps, which implied both a real combat mission and served as a step on the road to an independent air force. The act
also authorized a substantial air buildup that both he and Mitchell had fervently desired. Patrick retired the next year, and Congress never did appropriate the monies it had promised in 1926—but by then, Patrick was retired and no longer responsible.

With Mason Patrick and the Fight for Air Service Independence, Robert White does a substantial service for airpower historiography. He balances the picture by providing an important corrective to the Billy Mitchell legend and at the same time gives due credit to Mitchell's boss, who lived out of the limelight but nonetheless did more than has been recognized heretofore. I recommend this book most strongly to the readers of Aerospace Power Journal. The neophyte air leader could do worse than adopt Mason Patrick as a role model.

That young leader might do equally well to choose Adm Joseph Mason Reeves as yet another pillar of his or her study of air leadership. Unhappily, Tom Wildenberg could do no more with the youth and private life of Reeves than could White with Patrick. Young air warrior-scholars are at least as interested in how the people they study got to be great air leaders as they are in the way they behaved once they reached the pinnacle. Again, biographers can go only as far as their reliable sources let them, so we are inevitably left with a partial picture with some "knowns" and many "unknowns." Air leaders must simply make the assumptions that compensate for missing information.

Like practically all of the admirals of his day and well beyond, Reeves attended the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Born in 1872, he graduated in 1894, 37th in a class of 47, more distinguished for his football than his academics. He spent much of the ensuing time at sea, but his only combat time came briefly in the Spanish-American War. Over the years, he gained substantial recognition as a master of technology and especially as a gunnery expert. As with army artillery, this was conducive to an association with aviation from the earliest times. As Wildenberg makes clear, the battleship admirals were not so disdainful of aviation as they were persuaded of its precious contribution to gunnery warfare at sea.

Assuming one had established air superiority over a battle area, one's guns were quite able to take the enemy under accurate fire long before he could return the favor. In all probability, the admiral who could sink an enemy's carrier first would then use air superiority for gun spotting to destroy his adversary's battlewagons well before they could hurt him with observing fire from their upper decks. Thus, battleship sailors had powerful motivation to get behind the development of good carriers and aircraft even without the incentives Mitchell provided. But the clear and present threat remained that if the Navy did not develop aviation on its own, then Mitchell would take it away— as had happened in Great Britain.

One of the reactions of the Navy was to create the Bureau of Aeronautics and promote Moffett to rear admiral in charge—an admirable choice. It showed Congress that the Navy did not need an external prod and at the same time brought in someone politically savvy and an expert in organizational development and public relations. Further, Moffett had powerful political backing from his friends in Illinois, which helped in the competition with Mitchell. He well understood that he had to have ships, money, and a protected career track for his aviators. He himself was not a pilot. Immediately after taking office, though, he created an aircraft-
observer’s course down at Pensacola, Florida, which included all parts of the pilot’s flying syllabus except the solo. Thus, he was able to pin on wings of a sort, and that seemed to help with his own aviators—and even with Congress. Because Reeves was too old to undertake the whole syllabus, he too went through the observer’s course.

Earlier, Reeves had served as skipper of the new collier Jupiter, and when the Navy converted it to the first US aircraft carrier USS Langley in 1924, he became her first commander. For the next decade and more, Reeves labored on developing the procedures, tactics, and carrier doctrine aboard the Langley and the third carrier, the USS Saratoga. Meanwhile, back in Washington, Moffett was providing top cover, funding, policy, and personnel, which allowed Reeves the time and resources to pursue other matters.

As Wildenberg and Trimble so adeptly show, the personalities of these two great leaders, both gunnery men and neither a pilot, enabled them to lead feisty aviators. Thus, they successfully integrated aviation into the US Navy, making it the leading naval force in the world—even after the disaster at Pearl Harbor. This was no mean feat. The qualities in Reeves that the prospective air leader might seek to emulate include a solid commitment to excellence and a continual desire for improvement (this long, long before the Total Quality Management folks came along in the 1990s). His firm but understanding personality enabled him to impose his will on such spirited pilots as Marc Mitscher, greatly increasing the numbers in carrier deck loads and choreographing deck operations to significantly increase the sortie rate. He did so with far, far fewer accidents and injuries than the pilots thought would be inevitable. Like Patrick, Reeves operated in such a reformist (as opposed to a radical or conservative) manner, relating well with the service heavyweights, that he had made a substantial advance toward making the carrier a capital ship long before Pearl Harbor. Clearly, he had the requisite imagination and initiative. But he, Patrick, and Moffett combined those virtues with endurance. Progress takes time, and all three officers stayed in the saddle far longer than usual. Had Wildenberg found more documentation on Reeves’s family life, we might have a better estimate of his selflessness. Certainly, he was more dedicated to his profession than most officers. But it also appears that his family life may have been such that it required far less of his attention than one might expect. Evidently, he and Admiral King had this in common. Both men seem to have concentrated their time and attention on their profession to a degree rarely seen.

Undoubtedly, Moffett especially, but also Reeves, demanded much of their people. But they cared for their charges deeply and went to great lengths to take care of them. As with Patrick, the aspiring air leader could do worse than use Wildenberg’s fine book as a building block for a personal leadership model.
Possible Outcomes of Studying Leadership through Biography

Perhaps the most significant gain young officers can realize through this approach to leadership would come in the form of additions to a personal database. Most models assert that professional knowledge is one of the primary foundations of leadership. When the moment of truth comes, people never have all the data they need. But armed with a lifetime of study, they can at least increase their inventory of “knowns” and reduce their shortfall of “unknowns.” That does not guarantee that their choices will be correct. But it will improve the odds that their guesses will be better than their adversary’s.

More than that, though, the biographical approach seems more enjoyable than other methods. It also does something to cultivate a critical—hopefully, not cynical—approach to decision making. The biographical approach makes it much easier to identify poor choices and to say to one’s self, “There, but for the grace of God, go I.” Even if such study does not yield guidelines useful in dealing with immediate real-world problems, it may nonetheless preserve composure under stress. People have a strong tendency to feel alone under such conditions. But it helps to know that other leaders, in other places, in other times have always faced fatigue, danger, and uncertainty and survived—“This, too, will pass.”

Improbable Outcomes

The benefits of biographical study—and study in general—have limits. It will not guarantee wisdom, charisma, certain victory, wealth, fame, love, self-fulfillment, or good looks; neither will it eliminate the need for the final guess. It might improve the odds for some of those things, but let us hope that the future does not hold the same thing that confronted Patrick and Reeves, both of whom lived to see the horrors of World War II. It’s difficult to imagine anything worse—except losing that war. Perhaps if we prepare well enough, were a third world war to occur, we could prevent an even more terrible outcome.

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<td>One of America’s greatest military educators, Nye was a West Pointer, an authority on George Patton, a tank commander in combat in Korea, and a long-time faculty member at the US Military Academy. He earned a PhD from Columbia University.</td>
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<td>This book contains biographical chapters on many Air Force leaders. Frisbee, a retired Air Force officer, was an editor of Air Force Magazine and head of the History Department at the Air Force Academy.</td>
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<td><strong>Eight for Greater Depth</strong></td>
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Mission with LeMay: My Story by Curtis E. LeMay with MacKinlay Kantor. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965. We have a biography of General LeMay, but it was written quickly for the popular market, leaving room for an authoritative, academic work on his life. Thus, the serving air warrior might as well use this book of memoirs, which is widely available.

Sir Frederick Sykes and the Air Revolution, 1912–1918 by Eric Ash. London: Frank Cass, 1999. As was the case with Mason Patrick and Joseph Reeves, Sykes was overshadowed by someone more notable—in this case, Hugh Trenchard. This book gives us a complete picture. The author, who holds a PhD from the University of Calgary, is an Air Force officer and a graduate of and former teacher at the US Air Force Academy. At this writing, he is the editor of Aerospace Power Journal.

One for Good Measure

American Airpower Biography: A Survey of the Field by Phillip S. Meilinger. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995. This pamphlet summarizes the status of biographical writing about air leaders. Easily available to serving air warriors, it amplifies many of the ideas in this article.

*I do not mean to imply that this is a definitive bibliography of military biographies—only a starter list of readable, widely available books. Most of them should be readily available in the field.
IN SEARCH OF A TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY AIR-LEADERSHIP MODEL

Notes


4. Halsey had been criticized at Leyte for leaving the amphibious force unprotected while he went off chasing a decaying Japanese carrier force; earlier, Spruance had been criticized during the landings in the Mariana Islands for failing to pursue the Japanese carrier forces. The current biography of Halsey is Elmer B. Potter’s Bull Halsey (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Thomas Hughes is preparing a new one. See also Thomas B. Buell’s fine work The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (1974; reprint, Annapolis Naval Institute Press, 1987).

5. The answer is not really in the biography written by James Parton, “Air Force Spoken Here: General Ira Eaker and the Command of the Air” (Bethesda, Md.: Adler & Adler, 1986). Parton was General Eaker’s aide during World War II.

6. Haywood S. Hansell’s The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta: HigginsMcArthur, Longino & Porter, 1972), and Strategic Air War against Japan (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Airpower Research Institute, 1980), give his interpretation of the campaigns but do not answer our question. I believe he was too much the gentleman to explore such subjects in print.


15. Trimble, 266.


