NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES: DISCONNECTED WITH THE NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY?

BY

COLONEL KJELL I. BAEKKEN
Norwegian Army

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This paper addresses one means of the Norwegian security policy, the Norwegian Armed Forces. It looks into the contemporary state of the Forces, and examines if it is organized, equipped and trained in a manner that serves its primary purpose – to be one of the nation’s most effective tools in securing its vital interests. This paper argues that it is time to take a closer look at Norway’s security objectives and how the Armed Forces is organized. Since Norwegian sovereignty and safeguarding of the offshore wealth are vital objectives, it is understandable that the Government has prioritized the Navy and the Air Force. But, it must also be recognized that there has to be a trustworthy land component present to support the two other Services and to safeguard these two ends. Furthermore, White Paper 48 clearly states that working with Allies is vital and that Norway will continue to rely on the UN, NATO and the U.S. Since most of this cooperation today is related to ground operations it indicates that the Army must be prioritized more than what is the case today, not necessarily on behalf of the two other Services.
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Colonel Kjell I. Baekken
Norwegian Army

Colonel Phillip Tissue
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
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...The primary goal with this Strategic Defense Concept is to give guidance to the Norwegian Defense Forces at the strategic level...

—Defense Minister Anne-Grethe Strøm-Erichsen

Background, Thesis and Outline

The above mentioned Strategic Defense Concept, “Evne til Innsats,” was released September 1, 2009. The purpose of this document is to provide guidance to the Norwegian Defense Forces and thus create symbiosis between political ends and military means. While the intent is superb, it remains to be seen if words will be followed by appropriate action.

This paper will address only one means of the Norwegian security policy, the Norwegian Armed Forces. It will look into the contemporary state of the Norwegian Armed Forces, and examine if it is organized, equipped and trained in a manner that serves its primary purpose – to be one of the nation’s most effective tools in securing its vital interests. Are the political ends, the means, the ways and the risks involved coherent, as recommended by Harry S. Jarger? Accordingly, “…Ends, ways and means that lead to the achievement of the desired end state within acceptable bounds of feasibility, suitability, acceptability, and risk are valid strategies for considerations by the decision maker…”

The entering assumption is that Norway faces a dilemma, much like many Western nations, when it comes to the composition of the military forces and how to invest in these forces to meet relevant challenges listed in the National Security Policy.
These initial thoughts lead to the central thesis question guiding this Strategic Research Paper (SRP): is the current and future organizational structure within the Norwegian Armed Forces aligned with Norwegian Security Policy? The intent here is to point out potential disconnects between the Norwegian Armed Forces and the current Norwegian Security Policy, and propose how to mitigate these disconnects.

Firstly, this SRP will look at the security challenges Norway traditionally has faced, and is facing today as well as in the future. Secondly, it will address the current Norwegian Security Policy which is stated in White Paper Number 48 (2007-2008), and look at the objectives this document deems necessary to safeguard Norway’s interests.\(^5\) Thirdly, it is significant to take a closer look at the Armed Forces, how it is organized and the balance between the different Services which comprise the Forces. Additionally, it is important to discuss how Norway interacts with cooperative international security organizations and how Norway views the transatlantic dimension as well as that of the United States of America. Finally, the paper will address whether the Armed Forces is an effective means to an end, or not? This paper will conclude with a series of initiatives to mitigate possible flaws likely to disconnect the Armed Forces from the ends listed in the Norwegian Security Policy.

**Norwegian Security Challenges**

Historically Norway has been a liberal peace-loving country with a “Wilsonian” outlook. Norway has traditionally maintained a strong link to the U.S. – the so-called transatlantic link. This was especially significant during the Cold War when Norway chose, literally, to be on the frontline against the former Soviet Union, given that Norway entered NATO in 1949. This country has also pursued a policy of protecting its security ends by supporting cooperative international organizations like the UN and OSCE.
Furthermore, as a small nation-state, Norway has always depended upon international law as an important means to settle disputes, as the country does in the question of which rights different nations have in the Barents Sea. These mechanisms have all been important parts of the complex Norwegian Security Policy, aimed at fending off threats to the country. Current challenges are not fewer now than during the Cold War, on the contrary. The security challenges have increased in both numbers and complexity since non-state players, like Al-Qaeda, have emerged together with traditional nation-state actors. Among the latter we find that Russia today has taken up a new and increasingly offensive posture with strategic bombers flying off of the Norwegian coast together with Russian naval exercises conducted among Norwegian oil platforms in the North Sea. This is clearly a demonstration of both capability and will on their behalf. Furthermore, the successful transit of two German merchant vessels, the first ever to make it through the formerly impenetrable Northwest Passage, brings about new security challenges for Norway because of extra, easier and faster access to Norwegian oilfields. In 2005 Commodore Admiral (ret) Jacob Børresen wrote an article about the new security challenges facing Norway as a small nation-state. He makes a strong argument that Norwegian security is linked to the USA. This paper concurs with this assertion that Norway is in a particularly difficult situation since this country is a border state to Russia and that both nations have strong interests in offshore resources. On the other hand the argument about Russia being a threat can of course be countered by the fact that the neighbor to the east has never waged war on Norway; in fact the Russians liberated substantial parts of Norway from the Nazi regime in 1945. But, it is important to note that this attitude can change. In October 2009, we witnessed
a Russian exercise in western Russia and Belarus, with more than 10,000 troops taking part. During this exercise a notional enemy was created; NATO was the chosen fictive enemy this time. This and similar exercises trouble Russia’s small border states which see a new and more potent Russia rising while NATO and the U.S. are focused elsewhere. Thucydides once described this relationship eloquently; “…since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the stronger do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

Looking at history one can find resemblances in Norway’s strategic situation leading up to German attack in 1940 and the situation today. Norway has a geo-strategic important location; it has vast offshore natural resources, and a peace-loving populace not overly interested in investing in a strong military. This makes the country vulnerable and that is why Norway continues to militarily support the U.S. in conflicts Norway otherwise would not engage in. This kind of support for the U.S. has usually been true, but lately Norwegian support for U.S.-led operations has met some friction in the Norwegian Government, probably caused by a more introverted view on security. What is equally important in the argument put forth by the retired Commodore Admiral is that Norway needs to secure its territorial waters to be able to safeguard the natural resources which are the basis for Norwegian wealth. This argument is supported by Alan W. Dowd and Alexander Moens in an article in the magazine Military Officer in which they state; “It’s a region rich on resources, especially oil and natural gas. Not coincidentally, old enemies – and even old friends – are ramping up their efforts throughout the region to explore, stake their respective claims, and flex their military muscle.” This is the Norwegian dilemma. For obvious reasons Norway needs to
protect their offshore resources (or interests) which are the foundation for Norwegian wealth while at the same time be able to support NATO and the U.S. in current military operations. To further emphasize what huge resources are at stake, the Arctic might hold 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 90 billion barrels of oil.\textsuperscript{11} Hence, the words of the Alfred Thayer Mahan, the well known naval military theorist, who states that a nation-state needs a militarized naval power to protect all of its resources, supports the Norwegian prioritizing.\textsuperscript{12}

It seems obvious that none of the three Nordic countries are either willing, or have the financial backbone, to invest enough to have a strong enough military individually in support of these resources. Hence, to strengthen its position in this matter Norway has joined with Finland and Sweden in a Nordic Security Partnership to stand stronger in the North. This partnering should be exploited further to include traditional allies like the U.S., Canada and Denmark in order to close ranks and unite on this issue. A common purpose with a common front can bring closure to this delicate problem. In this context it is worth mentioning that Norway is ranked as the number three oil exporting country in the world,\textsuperscript{13} with huge economic benefits arising from this industry.\textsuperscript{14} Hence, it can be argued that the Norwegian focus on a capacity for over water surveillance is legitimate. The key question however, is whether the investments in five new frigates, and in the near future 48 new fighter aircraft, are the correct means. It can probably be argued that other means like Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), as the Canadians are looking in to, and submarines with unique strategic capabilities, could accomplish this surveillance and protection of sovereignty as well, and at a lesser
price.\textsuperscript{15} One part of the Norwegian strategy in the North that seems to be missing though is a convincing ground force to complete this overall strategy.

That said, protection of the offshore resources must not blind Norway from what is happening right now - the near time ends. Norway and many other countries face a new and long lasting challenge, the fight against transnational extremist groups, named Overseas Contingency Operations by the Obama administration.\textsuperscript{16} This fight together with our coalition partners is mentioned in White Paper number 48 as key to secure our ends;"…Together with Allies defend Norway and NATO against attacks…"\textsuperscript{17} Today it is a fact that such cooperation mainly is related to ground combat and counter insurgency fighting such as the case in Afghanistan. This observation is supported by several noted historians and national security analysts, among them Hew Stachan,\textsuperscript{18} Montgomery McFate and Andrea V Jackson.\textsuperscript{19} General Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of ISAF, gives the same message in his initial assessment of 30 August 09.\textsuperscript{20} This is why Norway has to partake in such operations; hence also fulfilling its near term ends. What is more important is that Norway’s participation will create goodwill from coalition partners and will generate time to firmly safeguard the vital long term ends. One can also argue that Norway is part of this fight precisely because the U.S. asked for support. By showing support, Norway safeguards one of its vital national interests, its strong defense link to the U.S. Pure national interests must not be overlooked of course; however, this does not always work as the Georgian case proves.\textsuperscript{21} It can be argued that Norway is in a different situation than Georgia because of Norway’s strategic location, its NATO membership and its vast offshore resources. Consequently the U.S.
cannot allow an aggressor to take control over the country since this will destabilize the
global economy as well as the fundamental credibility of the NATO Alliance.

Norway is part of an increasingly more multipolar world were non-state actors like
Al-Qaeda poses a threat to global peace, which naturally includes Norwegian security.
Norway has recognized this, but what seems to be an open question however; is what
Norway considers most important; to protect the long term offshore resources or to take
part in the security challenges of today and the near future? One can argue that Norway
currently aims for both these challenges since Norway is building a Navy and an Air
Force for offshore presence and overwater surveillance, and they also have ground
forces in Afghanistan and Chad. The question though is whether the Norwegian support
for Afghanistan and Chad is viewed by the Allies to be sufficient? With the strain the
U.S. and other countries experience today all extra support would be appreciated,
hence the Norwegian involvement in different contemporary operations abroad must be
boosted. This paper posits that Norwegian participation in NATO and U.S.-led ground
operations binds both NATO and the U.S. more tightly to Norwegian security. President
Obama underlined this in his Nobel Peace Prize speech saying; “…The other is a
conflict that America did not seek; one in which we are joined by 43 other countries –
including Norway – in an effort to defend ourselves and all nations from further
attacks…” Furthermore, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre asserts the same
in his speech on NATO’s and the U.S.’ importance to Norway; “…this does not signify
that all our security related questions are found in NATO. But, our membership in NATO
and our transatlantic link are the anchor of Norway’s security policy…” Key to this
statement though is if the current security policy will achieve the most important end of
them all; getting support from its Allies when needed? This dilemma is not new, the balance between the inward and outward look has historically been a problem for Norway. Since independence in 1905 it has been possible to discern what seems to be a trend in Norwegian security policy: a conflict of interest between an outward-looking tendency and a more introverted, isolationist impulse.

**Norwegian Security Policy**

The current Norwegian Security Policy is found in White Paper 48. The ends, ways, means and risks given as national directives in this document are broken down further in the Strategic Defense Concept. What seems to be a fact is that for the last eight years the objectives of Norwegian security policy have been stable and they greatly resemble comparable Western countries’ objectives. For a nation-state, stable objectives over time are admirable since it gives predictability for, among others, the military. The questions one can raise though are whether this security policy is in concert with the global security challenges and if Norway is reluctant to change its security policy? The national objectives at the strategic level have been transformed into objectives at the operational level in the National Defense Strategy;

- Alone and together with Allies secure Norwegian sovereignty, Norwegian rights and interests, as well as ensuring Norwegian freedom of action in the face of military or other pressure.
- Together with Allies, through participation in multinational peace operations and international defense cooperation, anchored in a clear and unmistakable international law, contribute to peace, stability, the enforcement of international
law and respect for human rights, and to prevent the use of force by state and non-state actors against Norway and NATO.

- Together with Allies, contribute to the collective defense of Norway and other Allies in accordance with our Alliance commitments, and to meet different kinds of assaults and attacks with force in order to safeguard Norwegian and collective security.

- Contribute to safeguarding Norwegian societal security, save lives and limit the consequences of accidents, catastrophes, assaults and attacks from state and non-state actors.

This paper has alluded to the fact that the current security policy has a different focus than previously enunciated. For Norway it appears to be a new risk analysis which has given the document a clear focus towards the northern parts of Norway. The northward focus is rooted in a perception of a multi-polar world and the rise of new powers such as China, Brazil, India and again Russia. It is important to recognize that this Norwegian security policy must encompass objectives on how to protect future scarce oil and natural gas resources and how to deal with the effects of a prolonged recession we live through now.

This new focus is confirmed by the Norwegian Secretary of State, Jonas Gahr Støre, “…the development in the North has been the strategic focus for this Government the last four years.” Additionally, the Norwegian Minister of Defense states that the most important defense policy challenges in the years to come are the development in the northern parts of Norway’s sphere of interests, especially offshore. She links these challenges to the future development of the Norwegian Armed Forces.
as well, and she asserts that this is the driving factor for the future organizational
structure and balance of the Armed Forces. The way the Norwegian security policy is
realized into effect has two flaws; firstly the unitary focus to the North does not
encompass a credible ground element and secondly the consequences of this strong
focus towards the North harms the important objectives which states that it is important
to work with Allies.

The Norwegian Armed Forces

General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, asserts that one central
task of the U.S. Army is to be able to prevail in protracted counter insurgency operations
(COIN). This statement is also true for the 4,800 strong Norwegian Army.

The Norwegian Armed Forces have been drawn down in numbers the last twenty
years. The transition of the Norwegian military from an “anti-invasion” force focused on
national defense to a modern, flexible and Alliance-adjusted security policy tool with an
out-of-area focus came about because of changes in the global threat picture.
The reduction in all Services, where the Army took the largest cuts, resulted in a very
small Norwegian military. Looking at an official briefing from the Defense Staff, the
current peacetime manning of the Armed Forces is just under 25,000 strong and the
strength after mobilization is not more than 83,000, including some 50,000 Home Guard
forces. The Armed Forces is a mix of conscripts and professionals, of which roughly
30 % are professionals. The Armed Forces are divided in defense branches, or
Services, labeled the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Home Guard. The table
below includes officers, non-commissioned officers, civilians and conscripts.
The size of a country’s Armed Forces eventually comes down to funding, or “how much threat Norway is willing to pay for.” Norway experienced a significant decline in the Defense budget a decade ago, but today the budget has been stabilized at just about 31.5 billion Norwegian kroner (NOK), equal to 5.6 billion U.S. dollars. This is roughly 1.9 % of the total GDP which is below the 2.0 % NATO asks of member countries. In comparison the U.S. spends more than 4.0 % of its GDP on the military. Comparing Norway to several European countries, the Netherlands spends 1.6 % of its GDP, Finland spends 2.0 % of its GDP and Denmark spends 1.3 % of its GDP on defense. Even though Norway spends more than Denmark and the Netherlands, one can argue that Norway could easily spend more on her defense since the country is ranked number five of the countries in the world when it comes to GDP per capita and Norway is also more at risk, due to its strategic location bordering Russia, and its vast natural resources. On the same list, the USA is ranked number ten, the Netherlands number nineteen, Denmark number thirty and finally Finland number thirty-one. A relative comparison shows that Norway spends less on her defense than countries to which she can be compared. The table beneath shows parts of the budget for 2008, 2009 and the proposed budget for 2010.

### Table 1- Manning. Military and civilian employees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Of which conscripts</th>
<th>% of the peacetime manning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>&lt;30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central support</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>&lt;28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and command support</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>&lt;15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>&lt;11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Guard</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>24,700</td>
<td><strong>8,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 – Operations and Maintenance Costs in billion NOK

The preponderance of the budget is tied to personnel related costs, i.e. manning. The budget shows a willingness to strengthen the Army more than the other Services. The grim reality however, is that new not funded tasks in the 2009 budget may lead to negative growth for the Army. This is critical for the Army because absence of extra funding will put an even stronger toll on Army personnel.

The acquisition of modern materiel and equipment for the Armed Forces is a constant battle between the Services. The Norwegian military uses in the region of 7.7 billion NOK of the defense budget in purchasing equipment and materiel every year, this is more than 24.0 % of the total budget. Numbers from the acquisition strategy for the Norwegian Armed Forces in the timeframe 2009 to 2016 are depicted in table 3.36

Table 3 – acquisitions in billion NOK

The interesting part of the investments strategy though is that the better part of the funding the most recent years, 21 billion NOK, has been directed towards the Navy’s five new frigates and only 5 billion NOK has been founded outside the Defense budget.37 Moreover, the forty-eight new fighter aircraft for the Air Force will cost close to
42.0 billion NOK and only 24 billion NOK is planned to be founded outside the Defense budget.\textsuperscript{38}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>New Frigates 2009-2012</th>
<th>New Frigates 2013-2016</th>
<th>New Fighter Aircraft</th>
<th>Total incl. Frigates and Fighter Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 – acquisitions with frigates and new fighter aircraft in billion NOK

Even though the Army is the largest Service carrying out most of the current operations on behalf of the Government, it is clearly not getting its share of the acquisition part of the budget, as table 4 depicts. One can of course argue that this seems to be typical of any military since ships and planes are more expensive than tanks, for example. The Army’s expenses rest with manpower. Even so, the Norwegian Army needs suitable material and equipment to perform its tasks, both as part of the defense in Northern Norway and in contemporary operations abroad. This noticeable priority of monetary resources towards the Air Force and the Navy is almost certainly linked to the previously mentioned focus to the North.

The neglect of the Army however has had an obvious toll on the Service. Going through official reports from the Norwegian Office of the Auditor General\textsuperscript{39} dating back to 2001 it is noticeable that the Army is the one Service in the worst condition, as described by the following quotes: “…The Army is characterized by critical personnel shortage and personnel exhaustion,\textsuperscript{40} and “…The consequences of shortage of equipment leads to severe lack of readiness in the Army.\textsuperscript{41} These two examples of a relatively hard critique from the Auditor General are only partially agreed upon by the
Minister of Defense and the Chief of Defense who to some extent also admit some of these flaws but in general deny the criticism.

The situation does not become better when one knows that the Army typically has been the chosen Service to partake in operations led by other cooperative international organizations. Indeed, since 1947, until this day, Norway has taken part in more than 42 operations with more than 72,000 personnel. Looking at operations from Korea to Lebanon and Iraq, to the contemporary fight in Afghanistan and Chad, they have all more or less been heavily reliant on the Army.\textsuperscript{42} One must not conceal the fact that the Navy and the Air Force have taken part in some of these operations, but not with the same operational tempo and not with the same strain on materiel, equipment or personnel as the Army. Typically the Navy and the Air Force have been tasked to perform national operations to maintain our national sovereignty, to watch over our resources at sea, and to safeguard the northern borders of NATO and Schengen. Nevertheless, it is in light of this disproportion between the Services that one can surely argue that there is either a failure in recognizing that the security environment of the world has changed, or that the biased funding towards new frigates and fighter aircraft actually are deliberate choices and part of the long term security policy. Understanding the last White Paper and the statements of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, it has likely been a deliberate choice.

This paper upholds that the organizational structure and balance within the Armed Forces needs correcting. The Army is neither prioritized with funding for operations and maintenance nor for acquisition of new materiel and equipment. This has been the fact the last years and it will continue in the future with the result that the
Army will wither and not be able to prevail in either national operations in the North or protracted COIN operations abroad. Another aspect which is often overlooked is that partaking in ground operations together with Allies gives the Army competence which it cannot get anywhere else. This is also a useful skill set to preserve.

The purpose of a national strategy is to create strategic effect. In light of this it is safe to say that a Norwegian decrease in ground operations with its Allies affects the security policy’s short term objectives, consequently long term ends will be affected and our reliance on NATO and the U.S. will deteriorate. Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affair Jonas Gahr Støre underlines the importance of the Alliance and that it doesn’t forget its commitments in its traditional areas of interest, i.e. also in the North; “…For NATO’s member countries security at home, locally, is still cardinal. The populace must perceive that NATO is relevant for their security.43” To be able to get this support Norway needs to maintain its own ability to protect its own interests, at sea, in the air and on the ground. The Norwegian Armed Forces of today are not capable of being an effective deterrence in the North; this is especially true for the Army. This is well documented by the last Chief of Staff of the Army who in a to-the-point formulation said that the Norwegian Army was capable of defending one part of the capital Oslo, only.44 In light of this statement it is relevant to ask if the Norwegians are relying on NATO and the U.S. to safeguard their territory.

Today it is obvious that Norway is looking at its security interests through the lens of pure national interests which is to safeguard the offshore resources by means of a relatively strong Navy and Air Force. What can be perceived as weakening of the Army can be a second and third order effect of the policy of “realpolitik” where Norway is
advocating a more inward focus, protecting their offshore resources. The current focus might be efficient today but Robert H. Dorff says that “…Strategy must emphasize effectiveness because failure, however efficiently executed, creates much greater risk of undesirable and unanticipated multiordered consequences…”\textsuperscript{45}

**Norway’s Relationship with Cooperative International Organizations**

Norway’s ability to work with their Allies in the framework of UN, NATO or other cooperative international organization listed as task five in “Evne til Innsats,” is promoted as quite important.\textsuperscript{46} All official documents put forward that statement. But, this paper has earlier alluded to the fact that Norway has challenges balancing their inward and out-ward security policy. Helge Blakkisrud summarizes this well in an article where he describes Norway’s conduct from 1905 until today.\textsuperscript{47} The fact is that Norway has changed its security policy of non-alliance in peace and neutrality in war, toward relying on military cooperation with larger powers and a strong supporter of collective solutions and international law as important to solve problems between nation-states.

What is Norway’s relationship with the cooperative international organizations in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century? First of all, the number of such organizations has increased and all of them have influenced Norwegian security policy in one way or another. Norway became a member of the Nordic Council (NC) in 1952. Despite the fact that the Nordic countries chose different security paths, it is still a broad consensus that the positive cooperation must continue even though the work the last five to six decades has changed character to a focus more on security and stability in the areas adjacent to the Nordic countries – towards Russia and the Baltic Region. For Norway the most significant part of this work is tied to the so-called Barents Cooperation. The work of this organization is of major importance because of resource management on the Continental Shelf and within the
200-mile economic zone. The change in resource management back in the 1970s marked a new and very important increase in prosperity for Norway. It also marked a new and potentially dangerous development concerning the ownership of the vast resources in these waters.

In 1972 Norway held a referendum to become part of the European Union (EU). It was a close call and the nation rejected the Government’s proposal by a slim majority (53.5%). Based on the changes in Europe the Government foresaw a development where most of the countries with which Norway interacted, among them Great Britain, became part of the EU. This trend would eventually leave Norway alone outside the EU. Thus, to be able to meet the economic challenges and cooperation in Europe, Norway became part of the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1993. In 1992, Norway became an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU) in order to cope with various military challenges. This was a Norwegian attempt to tie other countries to a collective security of Europe, but this failed since WEU later on was interwoven with the EU in a new initiative called the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The Government once more in 1994 applied for Norwegian membership in the EU: once again the Norwegian people said “no.” This was an even closer call than the first time, 52.2% of the population voted against membership. After the referendum Norway again fell back on the EEA agreement. The referendum left unresolved security questions for Norway since the WEU was dismantled and the EU had a military body Norway was not a part of. Norway understood the need for a European security organization of which they were a member, hence the country promoted the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) vigorously. Despite Norwegian efforts to make OSCE
the organization for security in Europe, it failed mostly due to the fact that nearly all European countries are part of the EU. An alternative for Norway could be to work for President Medvedev’s recently proposed draft for a new pan-European security treaty.\textsuperscript{49}

To abandon NATO in favor of Russia would be a severe strategic turn of events for Norway since this treaty will replace NATO so it is not likely that either the Norwegian Government, or NATO or above all the U.S., will be in favor of this drafty treaty since it will undermine the very basis for NATO.\textsuperscript{50}

As a consequence of the absence of a firm regional security organization of which Norway is part, Norway depends on NATO which has been the cornerstone of Norwegian security the last six decades. This reliance is confirmed by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre in a speech he held in Oslo this year.\textsuperscript{51}

When one then knows that the U.S., as part of NATO, virtually has been functioning as a bilateral guarantor for Norway, this paper asserts that the U.S. still plays a very critical role in Norway’s security. Hence, Norway must enhance its relationship with the U.S. in order to solve the near term objectives. The UN will continue to play an important role in the Norwegian view on security because of the need to adhere to international law before action can be taken as Norway has advanced its own security through the UN since 1947.\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{Conclusion with Recommendation}

Norway must strengthen the Army in order to meet both national and international requirements. Balance within the Armed Forces has been discussed as important. Is balance in this context equality between the Services? No, it is not. As Professor Nathan Freier says; “…Balance is achieved between departments -- not always within and between them as in the past…”\textsuperscript{53} For Norway it is time to take a
closer look at its security objectives and how the Armed Forces should be organized, balanced and what core competencies the different Services should have in order to be effective. The Services can and will be different in the future because of a changed threat environment. Since Norwegian sovereignty and safeguarding of the offshore wealth are vital objectives, it is understandable that the Government has prioritized the Navy and the Air Force. But, it must also be recognized that there has to be a trustworthy land component present to support the two other Services and to safeguard these two ends. A new and somewhat more potent Army will ensure that a possible future aggressor cannot easily seize key infrastructure needed by the two other Services in Northern Norway and thereafter present the Norwegians with a fait accompli. This paper asserts that the Northward strategy needs an adequate land component in order to be a feasible strategy.

What’s more, the White Paper 48 clearly states that working with Allies is vital and that Norway will continue to rely on the UN, NATO and the U.S. Solidarity to the Alliance – and to the United States in particular – has been the core of Norway’s grand strategy since the days of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{54} Norway’s relationship with the U.S. has never been seriously challenged by any Norwegian Government, not even the neo-conservatives who rose to power in 2000. Even the shift in the U.S. after 9/11 towards a more aggressive foreign policy did not seriously jeopardize Norway’s link to the United States.\textsuperscript{55} On the contrary, Norway contributed with fighter planes and a ground task force in Afghanistan, and it also deployed an engineer squadron to occupied Iraq.

In order to understand this reliance it is vital to understand how U.S. hegemony works in Norway. From the Cold War until today, it is fair to say that the U.S.
exercised Gramscian hegemony towards Norway.\textsuperscript{56} This has been institutionalized through a set of formal and informal political and military practices such as bilateral security and defense talks which are part of the maintenance of Norway's transatlantic relations. Military cooperation started with the military assistance program and has included the prepositioning of military equipment and use of military bases on Norwegian soil. Furthermore, reinforcement plans, the earmarking of U.S. forces to Norway and participation in regular exercises in Norway have been part of this program. In return, Norway has exported military equipment and raw materials to the U.S. such as magnesium which was used for the napalm bombs during the Vietnam War and laser objectives for missiles which were used in Iraq in 2003. Indeed, there are important points of divergence between Norway and the U.S. on the legal basis for military intervention, threat assessments and the approach to terrorism. However, these divergences have not been a dominating issue in the debate within Norway. Core security and defense documents in Norway simply recognize the differences between Europe and the U.S. and the dominant role of the latter in international relations.\textsuperscript{57} Norway strives to maintain its primary bilateral security partnership and this is more important than how U.S. foreign policy translates into Norway's domestic and foreign policy traditions and image. The motive for this seemingly permissiveness though is in a vulnerable small nation-state's necessity for a larger state to ensure its security.

Only to a certain extent does Norway meet this strategy today through its work with Allies on several arenas, essentially in ground operations. The fact that this cooperation is mostly related to ground operations indicates that the Army must be prioritized more than what is the case today, not necessarily on behalf of the two other
Services. The transatlantic link and the U.S. will also in the future be the cornerstone of Norway’s security because of the marginalized situation Norway is in within the European community. Consequently, Norway must continue to support the U.S. in order to be viewed as a reliable and trustworthy partner, hence receiving support when the nation needs it most.

This paper recommends the Armed Forces be given more resources at least in the range of the 2 percent of GDP as NATO recommends. The bulk of the budget increase should be prioritized to the Army since this is the Service which predominantly works with Allies and is the Service currently less capable to deal with threats in the North. This will bring a realistic balance to the Armed Forces which are needed to ensure that the objectives in the national security policy are met. It is vital that Norwegian Security Policy reflects both the short term ends and the long term ends as equally important. The nation cannot allow the long term objectives to take priority over the short term objectives. This paper asserts that the Isolationist “Realpolitik” view of the world will not safeguard Norway, on the contrary. Blakkisrud states skepticism however concerning Norway’s ability to change their outlook; “The conflict between realism and idealism as a leading aspect of Norwegian foreign policy is therefore expected to dominate debate on foreign policy priorities in the years to come.” On the other hand, Norway has always relied on help from others to safeguard its security, and there is no evidence that this will change in the near future. Hence, the investments in capabilities whose sole purpose are to secure interests in the North will fail because Norway as a small nation-state will never become powerful enough to not rely on NATO and the U.S. if an aggressor finds Norway attractive in the future. Our security policy must include
more than a statement of cooperation; it must be a real security policy with innovative means to go with it in order to gain more political effect [goodwill] for our effort.

This SRP suggests the following feasible, sustainable and acceptable concrete actions to be taken in order to mitigate the minor flaws that exist between the security objectives and the means available:

- Harmonize our Defense Policy tools [Armed Forces] better with our Security Policy objectives to convert force contributions into political influence. 59
- Increase participation in operations abroad; either with forces, monetary or other resources in order to gain political goodwill for the future.
  - As one of the world’s richest countries Norway can easily increase its monetary support to the Afghan National Army in order to free up U.S. funds to other activity.
- Find a better balance within the Armed Forces. 60
- Increase the budget for the Armed Forces at least to the 2.0 % NATO asks of its members. Strengthen the Army with this 1.6 billion NOK increase.
- The Army is less than 30 % of the Armed Forces and the Service does most of the operations abroad today. Hence, it is a need to boost the Army manning somewhat in order to increase readiness, quality and ability to be a trustworthy Service for the new focus towards the North and to partake even more in operations abroad.
- Adjust core competencies in the Services to meet different contingency demands in order to use funding for prioritized activities.
• Continue to build future support and strengthen the relationship with the U.S and other partners by offering already purchased Frigates with the U.S. built AEGIS system as part of a European or U.S. missile defense.

• In order to free up additional funding the following should be scrutinized;
  • Re-examine the number of new fighter aircraft and look into other capabilities like UAVs for overwater surveillance. These can also be an important tool for coalition forces in current and future COIN operations.
  • Re-examine the number of motor torpedo boats Norway needs.
  • Stop using the military as a means for regional and industrial development.

Risk Assessment

Since Norway is one of the world’s wealthiest countries the recommendations should be acceptable to the political leadership. I see the following risks with the proposed recommendation:

• Norway will reduce its overwater capability in the North when it comes to air to air and air to ground.
• The Army will primarily be equipped and trained for COIN and will thus have some reduced competency in high intensity operations.
• Other parts of society will be marginally influenced by the 0.1 % budget increase going to the Armed Forces.

Even though there are some risks involved with this proposal the benefits in this recommendation outweigh the risks presented.
Endnotes


2 The title and the document, “Evne til Innsats,” translate from Norwegian as “Ability to Employ Military Means.” The intent of the document is to facilitate a broad understanding of the role of the Norwegian Armed Forces, to chart a way forward for the future, and to help align political ends and military means.

3 Harry R. Jarger, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book for Big Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2006), 69.


8 War games: Jitters in Eastern Europe over Russia’s military maneuvers, “The Economist” (October 2009): 64.


14 Norway exports almost 2.5 million barrels a day and with the current oil price of approximately 70 $ a barrel, this totals to about $ 175 000 000 a day.


20 Commander, NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, Commander’s Initial Assessment, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (Kabul: August 30, 2009), 5.

21 When Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 the U.S. did not intervene. The U.S. demonstrated support through several means. They didn’t intervene because it was not in their national interest even though Georgia sends troops to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of the U.S.


25 The objectives are: To prevent war and the emergence of various kinds of threats to Norwegian and collective security, to contribute to peace, stability and the further development of the international rule of law, to uphold Norwegian sovereignty, Norwegian rights and interests, and protect Norwegian freedom of action in the face of political, military and other kinds of pressure, together with Allies defend Norway and NATO against assault and attack, and to protect society against assault and attack from state and non-state actors.


29 The number 4800 which the Army uses differs from and is smaller than the 7200 which the Defense Staff uses as the official size of the Army. The reason for this is that the Defense Staff allow for both drafting of new conscripts [July and January] to be part of the official size of the Army while the Army only allow for one of the drafting to be part of the official number.


31 One Norwegian krone (NOK) is equivalent to 0.18 US dollar.


39 The Office of the Auditor General shall ensure that the community's resources and assets are used and administered in keeping with the Storting's decisions. They do this through auditing, monitoring and guidance.


48 By the early 1990s, it seemed too many in Europe and North America that the time had come for a rebalancing of the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic and for concrete steps to be taken by the European member countries to assume greater responsibility for their common security and defense. European countries embarked upon a process designed to provide a genuine European military capability without unnecessary duplication of the command structures, planning staffs and military assets and capabilities already available within NATO, while simultaneously strengthening their contribution to the Alliance’s missions and activities.


56 Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is tied to his conception of the capitalist state, which he claims rules through force plus consent.


60 Balance must be found between the Services. Because of new and more diverse security challenges this balance can result in different tasks and competence for the different Services. E.g. the Navy and Air Force can predominantly train for a traditional high intensity conflict while the Army is equipped and trained for counter insurgency operations. This way of looking at balance is advocated by Nathan Freier in the article “Defining and Operationalizing “Balance” in Defense Strategy.” http://csis.org/publication/defining-and-operationalizing-%E2%80%9Cbalance%E2%80%9D-defense-strategy (accessed November 11, 2009).