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SMART POWER EMPLOYMENT OF THE NAVY SHIP

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Executive Summary

Title: SMART POWER EMPLOYMENT OF THE NAVY SHIP

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Thesis: The United States has committed to employing smart power in its foreign policy. Both Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates have made known that the future U.S. policy will use soft power to complement the United States' considerable hard power. The new policy has implications for the employment of naval ships, and future commanding officers have to understand how it will change their deployments and prepare their ship and crew accordingly.

Discussion: Smart power is the combination of hard and soft power. It is an approach that still requires a strong military, but also underscores the importance of alliances, partnerships, and institutions to create legitimacy for actions. In a report called the *CSIS Commission on Smart Power*, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) took a deep look at American foreign policy to find ways to improve its image abroad and America's influence. CSIS recommended that the United States focus on five foreign policy areas to rebuild its soft power and influence throughout the world: rebuilding alliances, partnerships, and institutions; renewing America's commitment to global development especially in public health; using public diplomacy to improve long term people-to-people relationships; increasing the benefits of trade by fostering economic integration; and addressing energy security and climate change through technology and innovation. The Navy is uniquely suited to further this strategy as it has performed diplomatic functions throughout its existence. When combined with political statements (and even in lieu of them), the presence of Navy ships can relay discrete signals such as a show of interest and a show of resolve. During more tense international environments a show of force may signal the United States' intent to act kinetically to resolve a crisis. Lately, U.S. deployments like Africa Partnership Station and naval responses to such international disasters as the relief efforts after the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia have begun to communicate that the presence of U.S. navy ships also signifies hope and assistance.

Conclusion: Although well prepare to fight the nation's next wars, the ships of the United States Navy do not prepare for its current deployments as thoroughly. Ship commanding officers have used their own ingenuity to prepare their crews for deployments like Africa Partnership Station. Future commanding officers will need to learn from previous deployers until the Navy develops permanent ways of training the crew and equipping the ship to execute this smart power strategy.

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Preface

This paper came from my desire to determine how an individual U.S. Navy ship could impact the “war of ideas.” What I discovered is that the new Maritime Strategy adequately describes the Navy’s role in this battle. However, as a Surface Warfare Officer, I wanted to know how to best prepare my ship for this new type of deployment mission. Deployments like Southern Partnership Station, Africa Partnership Station, and Pacific Partnership have become the norm, and these types of deployments will likely remain the norm as evidenced by statements from Secretary of Defense Gates to the importance of integrating hard and soft power. Therefore, it was important that the lessons learned get written and passed along to bridge the knowledge/experience gap that will be there until either every sailor has done this sort of deployment, or the inter-deployment training cycle and manning catches up to the new demands.

I am greatly thankful for the insights of CAPT Matthew Sharpe, commanding officer *USS San Jacinto*, CDR Martin Pompeo, former commanding officer *USS FtMcHenry*, CAPT Mark Mullin of OPNAV’s Irregular Warfare office, EWCS Al Hondo of *USS San Jacinto*, and LT Mark Devine of *USS San Jacinto* and for them taking the time to contribute to this paper.

I also extend my thanks to the faculty of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College for opportunity to complete this work, and particularly Professor Erin Simpson who mentored and guided me throughout this process.

Table of Contents

	Page
DISCLAIMER	3
PREFACE	4
INTRODUCTION	6
SMART POWER.....	7
DIPLOMATIC USES OF THE NAVY.....	10
THE NEW DEPLOYMENT.....	13
PREDEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST	20
CONCLUSION.....	22
BIBLIOGRAPHY	24

Introduction

The world faces an uncertain future, even more so now than ever before.

Economic conditions and wars have caused the decline of the relative military and financial power that the world's lone superpower had enjoyed since the 1990's. The United States of America's engagement in two wars simultaneously has strained its land forces, and its relative military might is expected to diminish further due to expected cutbacks in U.S. defense spending due to an ongoing global recession.

Perhaps the biggest concern is the United States' relative loss of influence throughout the world and its decreasing popularity. The reasons for the increased anti-Americanism throughout the globe are varied and remain up for debate; however, one thing for certain is that this negative sentiment has serious foreign policy implications. According to a Pew Global Attitudes poll published December 18, 2008, positive views of the United States declined in 26 of the 33 countries from where the question was posed in both 2002 and 2007.¹ And in an April 17, 2007 WorldPublicOpinion.org poll, majorities in all 15 of the publics polled about the United States' role in the world rejected the idea that "as the sole remaining superpower, the U.S. should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems."²

World opinion and the way that it perceives the United States matters, if for no other reason than that America is engaged in a "war of ideas", an ideological battle with Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda aims to exploit the gap between the perception of America that Americans hold, and the perception of America abroad.³ While the kinetic military might of America must also engage its enemies, it will not defeat the enemy alone. It "...is not simply whether we are capturing or killing more terrorists than are being recruited and

trained, but whether we are providing more opportunities than our enemies can destroy and whether we are addressing more grievances than they can record.”⁴

Sentiments like “smart power” are no longer only the discussion for think tanks. During her congressional confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that America “... must use what has been called "smart power," the full range of tools at our disposal — diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural — picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy.”⁵ The new policy has implications for the employment of naval ships, and future commanding officers have to understand how it will change their deployments and prepare their ship and crew accordingly.

Smart Power

In an eerie prescient sense, Anthony Blinken outlined the consequences of an America that did not win the global war of ideas. In the spring of 2002 issue of *Washington Quarterly*, he posits that a perception gap between the United States and the rest of the world existed, and that should it persist “... U.S. influence abroad will erode, and the partners the United States needs to advance its interests will stand down. The few real enemies the United States faces will find it easier both to avoid sanction and to recruit others to their cause.”⁶ In this same article, he promoted a smart power strategy to reverse the trend he had observed.

In 2007, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) took a deeper look at American foreign policy. This was a bipartisan effort conducted by a non-profit Washington, DC think tank aimed at finding recommendations on how to implement a

smart power strategy to attain our goals abroad. In its report, the commission describes smart power, raises points on why this is the correct policy to enact, and lays out recommendations for implementing smart power.

Power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to attain a desired outcome.⁷ Recently, policy makers have divided national power into two types, hard and soft power. Hard power is the nation's ability to impose its will upon another nation, normally with the use or threat of military force. The effectiveness of the "carrot and stick" approach to foreign policy depends on hard power and our willingness to use it. In international affairs parlance, or as Thucydides put it, "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." Becoming a strong nation meant having a strong economy to invest into a military force that could deter or defeat others.⁸

The United States has the most powerful military in the world and has applied its kinetic might to the Global War on Terror (GWOT), but as stated before, this hard power has not translated into success in this war of ideas. Our current strategy lacked soft power according to the CSIS report. Soft power is the nation's ability to influence the behavior of other nations without coercion. Central to soft power is legitimacy.

"If a people or nation believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead without using threats and bribes. Legitimacy can also reduce opposition to—and the costs of—using hard power when the situation demands. Appealing to others' values, interests, and preferences can, in certain circumstances, replace the dependence on carrots and sticks. Cooperation is always a matter of degree, and it is profoundly influenced by attraction."⁹

Soft power includes aspects of American culture outside of government like Hollywood and commercial products. However, it is the ideas of America captured in its

Constitution and Bill of Rights that it wants to promote abroad: namely, equality, and the right for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The example that America sets as a successful, thriving democracy is another message it wants to convey.

Smart power is the combination of both hard and soft power. It is an approach that still requires a strong military, but also underscores the importance of alliances, partnerships, and institutions to create legitimacy for actions. The CSIS report suggests that “...providing for the global good is central to this effort because it helps America reconcile its overwhelming power with the rest of the world’s interests and values.”¹⁰

The commission argues that the United States should again invest in the global good and provide things that only a powerful country like the United States can to all corners of the world. This is essentially the smart power strategy - U.S. military combined with America’s economic might with greater investments in its soft power.

Specifically, the United States should focus on five critical areas:

- Alliances, partnerships, and institutions: Rebuilding the foundation to deal with global challenges;
- Global development: Developing a unified approach, starting with public health;
- Public diplomacy: Improving access to international knowledge and learning;
- Economic integration: Increasing the benefits of trade for all people;
- Technology and innovation: Addressing climate change and energy insecurity.¹¹

While our foreign policy contains elements of the smart power approach this commission advocates, it is not institutionalized. It is almost ad hoc without strategic direction from the top, overdependence on one instrument of national power (namely the military), and without a whole of government approach that includes coordination of efforts throughout all the levels of interagencies.¹² This seems to be changing as the

diplomatic/humanitarian usage of the Navy in the past few years is starting to force interagency coordination on all levels.

Diplomatic Uses of the Navy

Although the U. S. Navy has not had a major ship-on-ship engagement since the Battle of Leyte Gulf during World War II, the nation has frequently leveraged its diplomatic prowess since then. In fact, since general naval battles have ceased, naval missions have become more and more political in the sense that its workings depend on a reaction from other countries that naval deployments evoke but do not directly induce.¹³ The very presence of a navy means something to other countries. Different countries interpret naval presence differently, depending on the context, but it means *something*, and the United States can use that fact for a variety of non-kinetic missions.

The meaning of naval presence and the types of diplomatic functions it already carries out should be explored. In his book *The Uses of Navies in Peacetime*, Charles D. Allen, Jr. does just that. He maintains that, at least in peacetime, navies provide visible signals of national intent in support of diplomatic discussions and apply force as necessary when diplomacy fails.¹⁴ Allen asserts that there are four basic ways in which navies can exert force during peace, short of a general war:¹⁵

- Intervention – landing ground forces in a country or otherwise projecting power ashore from the sea.
- Interposition – isolating a country from maritime access by another nation's interventionary force or by seaborne commerce, as in a blockade. It requires an overwhelming superior naval capability to control the sea.

- Interdiction – drawing down by attrition, but not completely stopping, maritime access to a country. It requires enough naval capability to deny use of the sea.
- Protection of sealines of communications (SLOCs) – protecting access to a country against interdiction or more generally sustaining one’s commerce at sea.

Each of the potential functions outlined above influence events ashore, which is the essential function of seapower.¹⁶

Allen points out other key points regarding signals that the navy can relay short of explicitly threatening kinetic engagement. These signals happen whether we are aware of them or not. The actual fact that a nation has a navy is a signal, and so is the shrinking or expanding of its size. The addition or withdrawal of forces can either indicate a country’s commitment to a region or a reduction of its interest in a region. Mastery of this so called “language of force” will be necessary for diplomats and for naval leaders.

For example, routine port visits, while to the sailors involved just a rare opportunity for rest and relaxation and a chance to replenish supplies, often mean more to the country visited. It can symbolize goodwill or a promise for better relation amongst two nations. It could relay confidence that a strong friend is at hand, or remove fear of an unintended threat of military action. Extended port visits for maintenance availabilities are good for the local economy and give the visited country the opportunity to test its maintenance facilities.

The United States Navy acts as a stabilizing force at times. During times of no hostilities, a stabilizing presence can support regional allies and incline neutrals to

become friends or deter potential adversaries in the region. If crises erupt, U.S. naval presence signals its intent to protect U.S. interests in the region and to support international law and convention (as in freedom of navigation operations). Larger and more permanent presence is normally perceived as more commitment. As with all signals, perceptions count, not reality.

Port visits and stabilizing presence represent what Allen describes as latent, relatively unfocused signals generated on a continuous basis by *routine peacetime presence*. Combining naval presence with a political statement of intent makes for a more effective message. Other discrete signals include a specific *show of interest*, naval presence that strengthens credibility of diplomatic pronouncements expressing concern but without commitment of action; a *show of resolve*, to show a commitment to a friend or give a potential enemy occasion to pause (this does not necessarily commit the U.S. to action; the size of the force matters more than the type of force for this signal); and a *show of force*, in which the use of force in a specific way is threatened to resolve a crisis or to influence its resolution to U.S. satisfaction (where a show of resolve *may* indicate what action we would take if the crisis were not resolved, a show of force must do so to be effective). The next step if a show of force is not effective is actual force, so the force prescribed should be of the type and size to avoid misinterpretation of goals and intentions.¹⁷

Allen assessed the types of signals that the United States conveyed during the Cold War, and it was certainly accurate for the time he wrote it and may still apply today. However, he mostly described a carrot-and-stick approach to foreign policy. Under the auspices of a smart power strategy as described earlier, future deployments will drive the

United States Navy to convey another signal – hope. By delivering aid and support, and building lasting partnerships with friends in order to improve the global standard of living, the navy will help solidify the legitimacy of United States ideals throughout the globe.

The New Deployment

Although the Secretary of State announced that diplomacy and smart power will shape U.S. policy, DoS resources will not sufficiently carry out that policy. The State Department, at least in the short run, will have to work closely with the Defense Department and more specifically, with combatant commanders (CoComs) to carry out foreign policy since they have more staff and resources in theatres all over the globe than the State Department. Only interagency cooperation between the DoS and DoD, at home and abroad, will guarantee execution of a meaningful foreign policy.

Fortunately, interagency collaboration is already occurring. When this cooperation is institutionalized, it will distinguish the new operations from those of the past. Deployments like the Africa Partnership Station (APS) and Southern Partnership Station (SPS) have already begun putting the new smart power strategy in action.

In October 2007, European Command launched the inaugural voyage of the Africa Partnership Station. The *USS Fort McHenry* (LSD 43), *HSV 2 Swift*, *USS Annapolis* (SSN 760), and *USS San Jacinto* (CG 56) deployed on a mission unlike any other ever undertaken in that region - to improve global security by building closer ties amongst allies.¹⁸ APS did this by training various African military and civilian agencies to patrol its waters and to secure their interests against threats. The ships worked with 14

African nations including Ghana, Cameroon, Senegal, Nigeria, Liberia, and Sao Tome and Principe.

The U.S. Navy has conducted training in this region in the past. However, what set this deployment apart were the international partners participating in the training. It was truly a cooperative international effort. Afloat Partnership Station worked with six European commands to train African militaries, including those from France and the United Kingdom.

Even more importantly, other United States government and nongovernmental agencies, and private industries participated in the deployment. These entities carried out training and humanitarian assistance alongside the U.S. Navy. These included the United States Coast Guard, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), UNICEF, Catholic Relief Services, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, Project HOPE, and Project Handclasp. This ensemble provided African nations with much needed training and conducted community outreach operations. These included:

- Providing African navies with visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) and oil platform protection training, small boat maintenance, and martial arts and leadership instruction.
- Repairing critical maritime infrastructure such as bouys and boat ramps.
- Navy Meteorology and Oceanography Command (NAVMETOC) representatives helping to develop a maritime forecasting capability to aid Sao Tome and Principe's weather warning system and prevent the unnecessary deaths of fishermen.¹⁹

- Such community outreach opportunities as painting and repairing schools, and playing soccer against community teams.
- Navy band playing a concert in a Gabonese public park.
- Holding receptions onboard Navy ships with African ambassadors and other community leaders.

Africa Partnership Stationing is an ongoing program that will happen at least once a year. The platforms may change, but the mission will not. Similar deployments occur with eastern African nations, as well.

And Africa is not the only region where this sort of smart power strategy is occurring. Deployments like these are happening in Latin America, also. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Commander Admiral Stavridis recognized the importance of the region to the United States and the security challenges inherent to the region.

Admiral Stavridis admits that these challenges do not have military solutions. He stated that the role of SOUTHCOM is "... not to launch tomahawk missiles here. It is effectively to launch ideas."²⁰ To accomplish this mission he reincarnated the 4th Fleet which now overlooks the activities of Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and other deployments such as Continuing Promise and Partnership of the Americas.

Partnership of the Americas (POA) is a deployment in which three U.S. warships and one Chilean warship circumnavigates South America while conducting maritime exercises.²¹ During POA 2007, navies and coast guards of 18 nations participated in exercises UNITAS Atlantic, UNITAS Pacific, and Panamax (a multiservice exercise to practice defense of the Panama Canal). Over 24 nations are expected to participate in future exercises.

To help alleviate the conditions of poverty, medical deployments have become regular in the region. Continuing Promise is a continuation of the humanitarian mission undertaken by the hospital ship *USNS Comfort*. The U.S. Navy partnered with Project HOPE (Health Opportunities for People Everywhere) for that deployment as *Comfort* visited twelve Central and South American countries in a four month period and treated over 99,000 patients in the region and distributed over \$3 million of medical supplies and medicines in 2007 alone. Two large deck amphibious ships, 60 Project HOPE volunteers, and volunteers from Operation Smile provided medical care and health education to the people in the region during Continuing Promise 2008.

Southern Partnership Station, like Africa Partnership Station, strives to build relations between nations in the region to ensure security in the region. Admiral Stavridis recognizes that there aren't enough resources to have P-3 or S-3 aircraft coverage everywhere to catch traffickers that have begun to use semi-submersible submarines to transport drugs in the region. Only well trained maritime forces throughout Latin America cooperating with one another can provide the amount of surveillance needed to catch traffickers whose tactics are ever improving.²² The U.S. Navy, U.S. governmental agencies, non-government organizations (NGOs), and private industry cooperated to carry out the mission of Southern Partnership Station. They collaborated on such training and humanitarian assistance as:

- Using trainers from Navy Expeditionary Training Command, Naval Criminal Investigative Service and the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group to teach about nonlethal weapons, waterborne security and coxswain techniques, port security and leadership.²³

- Renovating local primary schools, and delivering Project Handclasp medical supplies to local community centers.

The types of ships employed for these smart power missions run the gamut of cruiser and destroyers to big and small deck amphibious ships to high speed vessels. However, hospital ships make the greatest impact. No greater impact was made by a hospital ship than when the Pacific Command (PACOM) responded to the tsunami of 2004 that shook the Southeast Asia. In December 26, 2004, an earthquake off the coast of Indonesia caused a tsunami that killed over 220,000 in 11 countries. Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka suffered the most losses. By January 2005, twenty-four U.S. Navy ships and one USCG ship were on station delivering aid alongside other countries, NGOs, and international organizations like International Red Cross and United Nations. During the months that proceeded, the Pacific Command worked alongside these agencies to provide medical care and supplies, and deliver water and food. The hospital ship *USNS Mercy*, arguably, became the symbol for the entire effort. It was its first deployment since the Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm in 1990/1991.

It was a historic effort in that all those different and countries had never worked together for a humanitarian relief effort of that magnitude. While it has been hailed as a success, it also highlighted areas that needed improvement. On October 17, 2007, when speaking of the incident at the International Seapower Symposium, the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Roughead, (who was Commander of the Pacific Fleet during the relief effort), stated:

“...it demonstrated that in circumstance like that, the ability of maritime forces to come together, of navies and Marine Corps and Coast Guard to come together and provide relief was something that we had a unique capability to do.

But it also showed that without warning, there has to be a basis for those forces to come together. And that is why the area of humanitarian assistance is specified as an expanded capability in the strategy; not because, not just because there is a compelling need to help and assist others, but also because in those activities that we undertake in proactive humanitarian assistance, we developed the relationships, we develop the procedures, we develop the methods that allow us to be more effective, should something like that happen.”²⁴

On top of being a smart strategy to pursue, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations (HA/DR) enable the United States to develop procedures that will facilitate well-organized HA/DR operations in the future. PACOM has continued to gain experience in humanitarian assistance efforts with its Pacific Partnership deployments. In Pacific Partnership 2008, *USNS Mercy*, visited Philippines, Vietnam, Timor-Leste, Federated States of Micronesia and Papua New Guinea. Doctors from Australia, Canada, India, South Korea, Singapore and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) East Meets West Foundation, Operation Smile, Project HOPE, and University of California San Diego Pre-Dental Society worked alongside the doctors aboard *Mercy*. Seabees from Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 133 and volunteers from the hospital ship renovated a hospital in Chuuk State Hospital of Federal States of Micronesia.

The goodwill expressed by the United States toward the people of the region after the tsunami toward the region did not go unnoticed or unappreciated. According to a Pew Global Attitudes Project poll of June 23, 2005, “Positive opinions of the U.S. in Indonesia, which had plummeted to as low as 15% in 2003, also have rebounded to 38%. The U.S. tsunami aid effort has been widely hailed there; 79% of Indonesians say they have a more favorable view of the U.S. as a result of the relief efforts.”²⁵

Predeployment Checklist

From all accounts, most port visits while on deployment will look a lot like working ports. Instead of sailors enjoying the maximum possible amount of hours out on the town between duty days, each day inport will involve a full work day. MWR events will still occur, but sailors can expect to work at least eight hours before heading to liberty. And that is not the only difference future commanding officers and their crews have to look forward to from future deployments. As one senior chief petty officer put it, "Liberty is the mission."²⁶

Ambassador level receptions will become commonplace for each port. Community relations (COMREL) opportunities will become the norm. Working alongside other governmental agencies like USAID and DoS will become commonplace. An eclectic staff of many agencies, NGOs, and international officers may be embarked. The number embarked could reach over 180 on top ship's company. The *USS Ft McHenry* became a virtual floating university due to all of the classes and training held onboard throughout their deployment. Shuttling individuals to and fro the shore will occur constantly so maintaining the material condition of rhibs will be a challenge. And the load outs for future deployments may change from marine equipment to material for Navy Seabees.

So what does a ship do to prepare? The unit level training process does not adequately prepare a ship for this mission.²⁷ And of course, it is full, but there is time within intermediate level training phase to prepare. Some recommendations from lessons learned and best practices are listed:

- Get involved in the planning process early. A lot of agencies do not know what capabilities the Navy can bring. Navy leadership at these planning sessions can make each session more productive.
- Get the lessons learned from the last deployers. Their hands on experience will provide even better awareness training than academic instructors.
- Be prepared to throw a grand reception at every port. Purchase tables, carpet, tents, dinnerware and all the other trimmings before departing for the deployment.
- Develop techniques on how to train through an interpreter. It is different and more difficult than it sounds.
- Get a sailor from a country you are visiting to deploy with your command. For example, if working with Nigerian forces, get a Nigerian-American sailor to accompany. He or she knows the languages and the culture and could teach the crew.

As always, every crew member is an ambassador, and each encounter a foreigner has with a sailor is an opportunity for that individual to understand America. Conveying that will be imperative to a successful deployment. Taking advantage of the cultural awareness training that the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) provides upon deploying will assist to that end. Ships that create incentives for crewmembers to develop language skills to learn even a few phrases of a language spoken with a partner nation before deploying would find having that useful when training with that country.

Commands should prepare for additional administrative burdens. In addition to cultural preparations, the command leadership needs to implement a wellness plan that protects the crew from ailments common to the region (i.e. system for taking malaria pills.). Also important but often overlooked requirement includes reporting requirements. On top of the regular situation reports, commands should be prepared to conduct after action reviews for each port visit including information on any receptions held onboard and COMREL projects to fulfill the information requirements of the country team.

Preparations that would benefit navy ships but are outside of commanding officer's realm of influence are:

- Train sailors to become anthropologists (sort of). Right now soldiers help build human terrain systems (HTS) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sailors could learn the same techniques to get more accustomed to the cultures they encounter. After all, ship's company learns more from crews coming off deployments than from anthropologists with PhDs.
- Deployment rotation. The nation can take better advantage of the relationships that develop by resending the same ship and same individuals to a particular region. Individuals could become experts in that region by just the mere fact that they have deployed more than once and know their counterparts by name and face.
- Manning. Get the right people on the right ship. If a ship is going to visit Nigeria, get a Nigerian-American sailor to go, if possible. Place sailors with the appropriate language skills on ships that deploy to regions where their skills can be put to use. Make it a manning requirement.

- Training teams that specialize in giving lessons to foreign militaries in specific regions could be created. Teams could deploy on ships and conduct training alongside or, in case of minimum manning ships, instead of the crew.

The more that the Navy is able to institutionalize working relationships with other governmental agencies, the easier it will be to prepare for and execute future deployments. Make time in the intermediate training phase to work with other governmental and non-governmental agencies on HA/DR mission. It is a new mission that needs to be perfected at home before we enact it abroad. More opportunities could be created for junior officers to work in government agencies outside of the DoD like DoS and CIA to gain experiences and build relationships that will come in handy when working alongside country teams and meeting foreign ambassadors. And to help with the additional administrative requirements, databases could be developed for the information collected at each port call. Make it available to all agencies as ships get requests for this information over and over again from outside agencies.

Conclusion

Right now the unit level work up cycle of a U.S. Navy ship is geared toward perfecting its weaponry to inflict hard power. The hard power of the United States Navy is well known--Tomahawks missiles, strike aircraft, naval gunfire, small arms, surface-air and air-air interdiction, surface to surface missiles, torpedoes, delivering Marines onto a beach, and now missile defense. Ships also train toward executing security functions --

maritime domain awareness, intelligence gathering from over the horizon, enforcing UN sanctions on the open water. The United States Navy cannot abandon hard power. Its overwhelming hard power is the reason other countries want to train with the U.S. Navy.²⁸

However, the battle that is not being engaged directly is in the information realm, where the so called “war of ideas” needs to be won. In this war, kinetic military power will not be the only determinant to the outcome. Defense Secretary Gates stated that, “Based on my experience serving seven presidents as a former director of CIA and now as Secretary of Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use 'soft' power and for better integrating it with 'hard' power.”²⁹

Those are the type of missions the Navy needs to prepare for, now. As the new Maritime Strategy sets forth, the emphasis of Navy deployments will be on building relations, working with foreign navies and preventing crises. This new emphasis requires different skills from commanding officers and their crews. These differences will need to be examined and any capability gaps filled to succeed at this new mission.

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