SECURITY ASSISTANCE REVISITED:
HOW TO WIN FRIENDS
AND NOT LOSE INFLUENCE

by

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One of the central justifications for the US security assistance program is that it wins influence with recipient nations. Official statements to this effect abound. In a statement before the House Committee on Appropriations, for example, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated that security assistance helped the United States "maintain regional balances and a degree of influence among Western oriented nations." Lieutenant General H. M. Fish argued in 1976 against eliminating US military-advisor positions in Latin America because doing so "would greatly reduce United States influence on significant elements of host governments."

In their pursuit of foreign policy objectives, nations have relied on the granting of foreign aid to afford them a political presence, called access, which might be developed well enough to provide the leverage to influence the international and domestic behavior of the recipient. Access is the capability to communicate with the relevant power groups, and perhaps even those out of power. Security assistance provides, among other things, the presence in another country to communicate. An extensive presence does not assure, however, that the donor, or patron, can control or even influence the policy choices of the recipient, or client—witness such recent examples as the Soviet military sales to Peru and the extent of Soviet military assistance to Somalia in the 1960s and early 1970s or that of the United States to Iran under the Shah, Nicaragua under Somoza, and Ethiopia before the revolution of 1974.

Influence is the ability of a patron state to affect the foreign and domestic policy behavior of a recipient country to further the interests of the patron. Foreign aid and its security assistance component establish a long-term assistance relationship that has the capacity to affect the behavior of both client and patron, however. And though the specific assistance may be intended for short-term effect, the consequences are often long-term. An assistance relationship must not be seen as unidirectional; in reality, the parties interact in some ways that are clearly antithetical to the interests of the donor. What may happen is the creation of reverse influence. A recipient of US assistance, to illustrate, acquires access to power groups in the United States and institutionalizes lobbying power in order to further its own interests, often arguing that it is indispensable to the security of the United States or, as in the case of Iran under the Shah, making its security assistance part of a lucrative trade package. This reverse flow of influence can make it difficult for the United States to disengage from a relationship that no longer serves its own interests. Such circumstances can lead to the violation of what Hans Morgenthau called one of the cardinal rules of responsible statesmanship: a strong nation should not allow a weak ally to determine its foreign policy.
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This article presents case studies of US security assistance and influence with regard to Brazil, Nicaragua, and Peru. The studies are particularly illustrative because influence has been a preeminent justification for security assistance to Latin America as the United States has variously attempted to promote pro-American attitudes, continental solidarity, democratic values, and respect for human rights. The policy lessons of these three cases, however, would certainly apply beyond Latin America to other areas of the complex world of the 1980s. A central argument of this essay is that security assistance must be understood as a critical part of a complex bilateral relationship, not discrete and easily manipulated to suit short-term requirements.

**BRAZIL: INFLUENCING AN EMERGING POWER**

The character of contemporary US-Brazilian security relations has been shaped by a number of factors, briefly summarized as follows:

- The two states have close historical ties and complementary geopolitical strategic views.
- The Brazilian military has been the dominant force in government since the 1964 revolution.
- Brazil aspires to great-power status on the basis of its territorial size, its population, its technological sophistication, and its sizable and highly professional armed forces.
- Recent policy disagreements between the two countries have centered on human rights and nuclear power technology.

A security assistance relationship has existed with Brazil since the 1922 establishment of a US naval mission in Rio de Janeiro. The relationship expanded considerably with military cooperation during World War II—a degree of cooperation that included the division-size Brazilian expeditionary force in the Italian theater and US access to Brazilian air and naval facilities for operations in the South Atlantic and North Africa. This common experience in World War II provided the institutional framework for continued cooperation after the war through such vehicles as the Joint US-Brazilian Military Commission; the founding of the Superior War College on the model of the US Army War College; a mutual security pact signed in 1952; and training and exchange programs between the two countries in which thousands of Brazilian military officers have participated. In addition, Brazil has repeatedly supported the concept of hemispheric defense, that support having been perhaps best exemplified by Brazil’s having the largest Latin American contingent in the Dominican Republic in 1965 as part of the OAS-backed Inter-American Peace Force.

This background notwithstanding, US-Brazilian security relations have been strained in recent years, principally as the result of two highly charged issues: US human rights policy and US objections to a nuclear technology deal between Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany. With reference to the first of these issues, Brazil objected strongly to the perceived lack of evenhandedness in the Carter Administration’s application of its human rights policy. Brazil maintained that it was singled out unfairly for criticism, and, in a note dated 22 March 1977, the Brazilian government let it be known that it refused to be included any longer in the US military assistance program. In commenting on Brazilian termination of the assistance agreement, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry stated that the US Executive’s 1977 report on human rights in Brazil contained tendentious and unacceptable comments and judgments, and that such an examination by organs of the US Government constituted a violation of the principle of noninterference, which both governments subscribed to upon signing the UN and OAS charters.  

Another reason for Brazil’s willingness to see the military assistance program terminated certainly had to be the rapid development of the Brazilian arms industry. Brazil’s feeling of technological vulnerability had declined by
the mid-1970s, precisely at a time when the United States was perceived to be insensitive to Brazil’s special problems.

Brazil was also irritated in 1977 by the manner in which the Carter Administration acted upon its objections to her receipt of a full-cycle nuclear energy package from Germany. Instead of inviting Brazil to participate in high-level consultations on the matter, the United States opted to first deal directly with Germany. The transaction should not have been a surprise to US officials. Nuclear energy is an integral part of Brazil’s industrial development plan because of that country’s severe shortage of fossil fuels. Further, in 1972 the Brazilian government had refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, arguing,

It institutionalize[s] the inequality of nations. The treaty accepts the premise that the strong countries will become even stronger and the weak will become weaker . . . . [The] treaty is the most flagrant example of the whole process of freezing . . . . the structure of world power.

In addition to withdrawing from the US military assistance program, Brazil withdrew from the Joint US-Brazilian Military Commission and its Washington counterpart, the US-Brazilian Defense Commission, and terminated the editorial support it had been giving to the Portuguese language version of the US Army periodical Military Review.

Bilateral relations have improved since 1977 as a result of efforts by both parties. In 1979 Congress began to require a human rights report on all United Nations members, removing the irritant of selectivity. Meanwhile, relations between the Brazilian and US militaries have endured through traditional professional attachments, an eagerness to maintain contacts, the continuation of such programs as the UNITAS naval exercises, joint participation in the Inter-American Defense Board and College, parallel perceptions of the external threat to the hemisphere, joint participation in such high-level multilateral and bilateral military consultations as the meetings of the Inter-American service chiefs, and intelligence exchanges. Further, in 1981 the US and Brazilian Armies instituted the annual Mark Clark-Magalhaes de Morais General Officer Lecture Exchange program to commemorate Brazilian-American cooperation in the Italian campaign during World War II and to help promote a sophisticated dialogue on military professionalism.

Against this background it is not easy to isolate and identify with any precision the effect of US security assistance on Brazilian domestic and foreign policy behavior. Broadly speaking, however, that assistance, reinforcing the close ties between the two states, probably contributed to the evolution of a development-minded, strongly anti-communist, pro-Western, military-civilian technocratic elite that has been at the helm in Brazil since 1964. This same group was able to establish a political system with limited participation that has emphasized high economic growth rates, social tranquility, political deradicalization, and technological self-sufficiency as integral to national security. These strategies, in turn, helped Brazil achieve the so-called economic miracle of an annual growth rate of nearly 10 percent in the late 1960s and the 1970s. In foreign relations, the Brazilian military government has pursued an active, anti-communist policy based on the interdependence of the nations of the free world. President Castello Branco stated in 1964, "We cannot forget that we have a basic [policy] which stems from

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cultural and political fidelity to the Western democratic system." Close relations with the United States have been critical to this policy. This outlook partially explains why Brazil sent the largest Latin American contingent to the Dominican Republic in 1965 and led the campaign for the initiation of an Inter-American peacekeeping force—an otherwise unpopular concept with most Latin American countries in the past decade—and why Brazil continues to uphold the principle of collective security encompassed in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

Thus, any influence gained in the pursuit of US relations with Brazil can be described as part of a complex convergence of interests; more has been involved than the putative benefits of security assistance. National interests have driven Brazil and the United States to close relations in the past and to cooler relations in more recent years. The security assistance relationship (in a residual status since 1977) has been important because it has symbolized agreement on larger interests, not because Brazil has depended upon the assistance for vital military support nor because it has contributed significantly to US security. The official termination of the military assistance program in 1977 and the cooling of bilateral relations have not by any means signaled the end of US-Brazilian military ties; these ties continue because of the concept of an interdependent free world. Future relations between Brazil and the United States will likely prosper if they rest upon mutual confidence, maturity, and US acceptance of a more autonomous Brazilian world role.

NICARAGUA: THE LONG-TERM RISKS OF INTIMACY

The United States began its security assistance relationship with Nicaragua in the 1920s, when US Marines interceded to quell Cesar Augusto Sandino's rebellion and establish internal stability. The Nicaraguan National Guard was created by the United States to supplant the Marines as a non-political internal security force intended to bring a semblance of order to what was otherwise a climate of anarchy provoked by the traditional political parties. The Somoza dynasty began in 1932 when Anastasio Somoza García turned the Guardia Nacional into a personal guard—a function it retained until the ouster of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in July 1979. In recognition of Nicaragua's important strategic location in Central America, proximate to the southern flank and to the Panama Canal, and in order to reinforce Somoza's strong anticomunist international orientation and the country's consistent support for US foreign policy, the United States provided the security assistance that made the Guardia Nacional one of the most effective military forces in Central America.

Nicaragua demonstrates the potential for US security assistance policy to both succeed in the short term and fail in the long term. This is not to imply that US security assistance was alone sufficient to maintain the corrupt Somoza dynasty in power for so long a period of time or that it, alone, led to the current problems in Sandinista Nicaragua and to the tensions in US-Nicaraguan relations. Other factors were also critical in generating these problems—the ineptitude and corruptibility of the political opposition, the role of the national guard as the institutional personification of Somoza, and the uncanny ability of the Somozas to manipulate US support in order to maintain control in Nicaragua. The Somozas availed themselves of an extremely close relationship with the United States, making use of the following instruments of influence:

- Somoza's military contacts in the United States (he graduated from West Point in 1946);
- the influential Somoza lobby in the US Congress;
- the same Nicaraguan Ambassador in Washington for 36 years—Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa (a Somoza family member), dean of the diplomatic corps and an astute lobbyist;
- the English fluency of the Somoza family, permitting direct and comfortable communication with US officials, the media, and others;
• the individual career concerns of US diplomats and military officers assigned to Nicaragua;
• US service rivalries, domestic political shifts, and conflicting US foreign policy objectives.

The United States developed in Nicaragua what appeared to be the ideal situation for exercising influence over a country's internal and external behavior through security assistance: a West Point graduate as president; US equipment, doctrine, and training programs for the Guardia Nacional; a US Military Advisory Group continuously present; and a recipient disposed to support US foreign policy. The assistance was received by the Nicaraguan military as tangible proof that the United States "recognized their legitimate needs for defensive military equipment and forces to operate and maintain it." Moreover, the program was conducted in an atmosphere of friendly openness, appreciation, and mutual respect. Thus the Guardia Nacional became a more efficient military organization, apparently capable of maintaining the internal security occasionally threatened by the Sandinista rebels, who were supported by Cuba in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, Nicaragua was participating in regional defense activities through the Central American Defense Council, along with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Important also, the relationship netted the United States other dividends: a staunch anticommunist voice in a Central America deemed perennially vulnerable to subversion, a consistent supporter of US policy initiatives in the Organization of American States and the United Nations, and such tangible benefits as facilities for naval communications.

Thus security assistance was to some degree instrumental in developing and maintaining a dependable ally. But the internal dynamics of the supported nation confirmed the dangers of uncritically maintaining an intimate assistance relationship over the long term. That relationship collapsed in July 1979, some months after the United States terminated its assistance, with the ouster of Somoza. The United States now faces the challenge of achieving access and influence in a different political order, one in which the United States is resented because of its close association with the preceding regime. In terms of reverse influence, there is evidence to indicate that Somoza attempted to block passage of the 1978 Panama Canal treaties through the pro-Somoza and anti-treaties lobby in the US Congress. Somoza's attitude toward the treaties was shaped by his own disagreements with the Panamanian chief of state, Brigadier General Omar Torrijos, over foreign and domestic policies. Somoza's supporters in high positions within the US government were also instrumental in prolonging his tenure in office, thus complicating US efforts to mediate peace in Nicaragua in the latter stages of the civil war in 1979.

To summarize, the course of the US security relationship with Nicaragua demonstrates the hazards of separating purely military and security considerations from the broader context of foreign policy, which would include such considerations as human rights and democratic political evolution. Our Nicaraguan venture also provides a salient example—as does the case of US relations with Iran—of the costs incurred by the patron state when it allows itself to be manipulated by the client. While it became increasingly evident that Anastasio Somoza, like his family predecessors, manipulated the symbols and substance of US political, economic, and military support to maintain his authoritarian and corrupt regime in power, the regime also became politically isolated within Nicaragua and in Latin America. That growing isolation presented perplexing problems to a US government that attempted to distance itself, then disengage completely from the Somoza regime, and finally establish a working relationship with the revolutionary government that came to power. As the events in Nicaragua demonstrate, in nations with weak political institutions, security assistance can create or heighten an imbalance of power and consequently retard the formation of countervailing pressure groups and alternative
leadership. With weak countervailing groups to moderate policy and demand accountability, there are no checks on the exercise of authority. The result may be irresponsibility, corruption, and the perpetuation of authoritarianism. In this regard, the warning of Yugoslav writer Mihajlo Mihailov may prove prophetic:

Right wing dictatorships are essentially the fifth column of totalitarianism ... [and] practically every present-day totalitarian country was authoritarian or partly authoritarian before the Communists came to power.9

PERU: THE MILITARY AND NATIONALISM

Three factors have been decisive in determining the context, or climate, of the US-Peruvian security assistance relationship in recent years:

- the Peruvian nationalist revolution of 1968 with its modernizing character;
- the disagreements between the United States and Peru on tuna boat seizures involving the 200-mile limit, and on the Peruvian nationalization of US companies, particularly the 1968 International Petroleum Company case;
- Peru’s rearmament program and the introduction of Soviet equipment into the inventory of the Peruvian armed forces since 1974, partially an outcome of the US refusal to sell sophisticated aircraft to Peru in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The Peruvian military, considered among the most professional in Latin America,10 became the central actor in Peru’s national affairs upon seizing power on 3 October 1968. Its efforts to institutionalize massive economic and social reforms under the rubric of the “Peruvian Revolution” met with failure; however, it did bring about significant institutional restructuring. Economic problems and the growth of new political forces soon led to a decision to turn political control back to civilians. That return to civilian rule was marked by the election in 1980 of Fernando Belaunde Terry.

Until World War II, US-Peruvian military relations were minimal.11 The doctrine of hemispheric defense, then given institutional form in the Inter-American Defense Board, led in 1947 to the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Thereafter, the concept of defending the hemisphere against external attack provided the basis for mutual defense pacts between the United States and most Latin American countries. On 22 February 1952, the United States and Peru signed a mutual defense assistance agreement committing both governments to make available to each other equipment, materials, services, or other military assistance ... designed to promote the defense of the Western Hemisphere ... in accordance with defense plans under which both Governments will participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere.12

Consistent with these objectives, the United States provided grant materiel valued at $59.3 million to the three Peruvian military services from 1950 to 1965. At the apogee of the military assistance program, in 1966, the US Military Assistance Advisory Group numbered 66 members. That advisory group was expelled in May 1969, however, in the dispute over Peru’s enforcement of its claim of sovereignty over the ocean area extending 200 miles from its coastline, and the violation of that 200-mile limit by US tuna boats. Adding to the tension was Peruvian disenchantment with the military assistance program because of its failure to provide equipment for external defense, a consequence of US emphasis on counterinsurgency and civic action. The virtual abandonment of hemispheric defense in favor of internal security doctrines was based partially on the desire to give a new orientation to the military consistent with the nation-building philosophy of the Alliance for Progress.13 In accordance with the US doctrinal shift toward nation-building activities for the military, the military assistance program, after 1961, helped equip four
Peruvian engineer battalions. Additionally, funds from the Agency for International Development and Export-Import Bank loans were made available to purchase road-building equipment that was turned over to the military. The internal security emphasis was then accompanied by pressure to reduce military expenditures to free funds for internal development. The new American military emphasis coincided in Peru with the increasing obsolescence of much World War II and Korean War materiel. With the gradual elimination of the United States grant aid program, military modernization became more expensive for Peru. Moreover, the emphasis on counterinsurgency threatened to make regional defense irrelevant to the Peruvian military.

Luigi Einaudi, currently State Department Director of Policy Planning for Latin America, argued that the changed emphasis seemed to suggest to many Peruvian officers that

the United States sought to deny the very institutional being of the...military by making of them a special political police. These suspicions were heightened by US delays and later refusals to allow acquisition of 'sophisticated' military weapons. When the Peruvian air force tried to purchase Northrup Aviation’s F-5,...the US Government procrastinated under Congressional pressure until it was too late to prevent the angry purchase of more expensive and sophisticated French Mirages capable of twice the speed of sound.

That aircraft purchase breached the Latin American sophistication threshold and ultimately led to reactive purchases by Peru's neighbors, Chile and Ecuador.

After Peru's elected civilian government had made this purchase in 1967, with the unanimous support of Peru's Congress, the United States, which had resumed economic assistance in 1966 after freezing it in 1965 over the [disputed] status of the International Petroleum Company, reduced economic assistance again because of legislation and pressures emanating from the US Congress. Thus the Peruvians first went to the French for Mirages and then in the mid-1970s to the Soviets for tanks, artillery, antiaircraft guns, rocket launchers, surface-to-air missiles, and Sukhoi ground attack fighter-bombers.

Certainly, US security assistance was a major contributor to the professional development of the Peruvian armed forces. But then, not unexpectedly, the denial of sophisticated weapons tended to alienate them from US influence and induced them to seek military equipment elsewhere, ultimately cutting the United States off for some time from even the possibility of exercising influence. US security assistance to Peru thus demonstrates the limits and dangers of trying to dictate to a recipient its military needs and the roles to be played by its armed forces. One of the objectives of US security assistance is to promote professionalism, confidence, and self-reliance. These qualities are desirable because they strengthen the capabilities of the recipient; but in developing such qualities in the recipient, the security assistance may alter the originally unequal donor-recipient relationship, concurrently altering the rules of the game for exerting influence.

BEYOND LATIN AMERICA: US POLICY FOR THE 1980s

The findings of these case studies minimize the role that security assistance has played in furthering US foreign policy interests, recognize its limits, and warn about its dangers. Moreover, they emphasize the need to view security assistance as part of a broad relationship based on agreement on larger interests. As long as that level of agreement endures, security assistance will remain a useful policy instrument. Of these findings, the limits of influence to be gained through security assistance need to be emphasized. Influence is not an end in itself. It must be seen as a means to an end—to help promote a climate that increases the security of the United States.
A security assistance relationship is by its nature politically sensitive, intrusive, and of high visibility. Further, the relationship creates a dynamic, unequal interdependence of national interests, an interdependence that can diminish the leverage of the supplier. Ultimately the supplier’s influence over the recipient’s policies reaches a clear threshold of national interests that the recipient will not sacrifice. The threshold concept is amply illustrated in the cases of US assistance to a host of countries including Greece, Turkey, Israel, Brazil, and Peru, all of which have been close allies of the United States.

The breakdown of consensus, both at home and abroad, in threat perception also has served to dilute the political influence of security assistance. International developments such as détente, nuclear parity, the emergence of a multipolar world, partial displacement of the East-West division by North-South issues, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the diffusion of conventional military power, the American experience in Vietnam, nuclear proliferation, and the emergence of non-military forms of power (principally petroleum) have done much to erode the original rationale for US security assistance—the need to contain the spread of monolithic communism represented by the Soviet Union and its allies. Until the mid-1960s the United States could depend on this minimum consensus among its friends and allies to justify its extensive assistance programs, but the threat perceptions of the recipient nations have diverged in recent years. In the 1980s the United States can at best expect to have a common threat perception with only a few states. Third World states will have a variety of political-military options from which to choose in the conduct of their foreign relations, and the superpowers will have increasingly less influence on such choices. Additionally, with the diffusion of military capabilities and the emergence of sophisticated military export industries in such countries as Brazil, Israel, Pakistan, and Argentina, there will develop a more complex web of technological relationships in which the role of the superpowers will be reduced. Reducing technological and arms dependence will be a strategic imperative for many states as they strive for greater autonomy in both their internal and external affairs, and as they strive to free themselves from superpower competition.

At home, in the United States, the consensual underpinnings for security assistance underwent a dramatic transformation in the 1970s, compounding the traditional resistance to foreign aid. This transformation culminated in the human rights provisions of the 1976 Foreign Assistance Act, in the Carter Administration’s 1977 policy guideline to the effect that the burden of proof for the need for arms transfers rested with the proponents, and in the reemphasis on human rights considerations contained in the 1978 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The overthrow of the Shah of Iran in January 1979, the events in Iran during the fall and winter of 1979-80, and the Sandinista victory over Somoza in July 1979 increased congressional and public skepticism of the efficacy of the US security assistance program. The insurgencies in Guatemala and El Salvador heightened these concerns at a time when the Reagan Administration had adopted a more pragmatic approach to security assistance and arms transfers.

These considerations make imperative a tighter conceptualization of the efficacy of security assistance in the months and years ahead, particularly with regard to the notion of influence. A review of official justifications for security assistance over the past three decades reveals an appalling lack of definition of terms. “Influence” is left undefined and unassessed in most available official literature dealing with security assistance. Left unassessed, it is therefore presumed to be self-evident that through the instrument of security assistance the United States is able to affect the internal and external policy behavior of recipient military institutions and governments in a manner congenial with US foreign policy interests. Alvin Z. Rubinstein concludes that a superpower will typically “persist in giving aid to client states in the face of continued failures to bring about changes in their
behavior” largely because of the perception of “the accretion of regional and global advantages that it sees as stemming from facilitating a client’s general policy orientation.” Moreover, he states:

It is likely that elites in superpowers show little inclination to curtail the indiscriminate quest for influence in the Third World for a combination of . . . reasons: the competition among key bureaucracies for power, a larger share of scarce resources, the indication of a certain line of policy; a continued fascination with the mystique of shaping events and trends in the Third World; and the rational dimensions of the geostrategic arguments.19

The belief in the efficacy of security assistance is also a consequence, as John Spanier and others have argued, of the persistent perception among American leadership elites that the application of military power and technology can solve complex political problems.20 Security assistance cannot substitute for domestic tranquility, strong political institutions, adequate alternative leadership, and imaginative diplomacy. Vietnam demonstrates this lesson amply, and so does contemporary El Salvador. It is clear that the “influence” justification for security assistance is open to serious reappraisal. Proponents of security assistance often fail to distinguish between access and influence, preferring to assert the latter when the operational reality is only access. And access, as the case studies indicate, is no guarantee of ability to influence a recipient’s behavior; in itself, access only offers the illusion of influence and power. Moreover, in instances in which behavior is influenced, it is difficult to isolate security assistance as a controlling factor. The best that can be said is that security assistance should be a component of a larger assistance relationship that includes economic and political support.

It is equally clear that security assistance often creates a long-term bilateral relationship from which it is difficult for the United States to disengage should changing circumstances warrant it. Such disengagement is made even more difficult by the reverse-influence process, wherein the recipient acquires lobbying power in the foreign policy community of the United States and in reality determines US policy—witness the examples of Greece, Israel, Nicaragua, Iran, and Vietnam. At that juncture foreign policy and its security assistance component become meshed with US domestic policy. Stated another way, security assistance entails a trade-off between short-term objectives and long-term liabilities. The assistance creates expectations in the decision-making elites of both the patron nation and the client nation, who may view the assistance as an end in itself rather than an instrument, or as supportive of certain policies that they favor irrespective of US policy interests.

The US security assistance program must be adapted to changing global realities if it is to be productive. In the past, the simple bipolar, East-West division of the world permitted easy anti-communist, internal-security, nation-building, and collective-security justifications for the program. For a variety of reasons, those justifications will no longer alone suffice. The United States must adopt a more pragmatic attitude toward security assistance as a source of influence, an attitude that recognizes the limitations of security assistance in affecting the values of recipient military institutions and the behavior of recipient governments. Security assistance can be a useful tool, on occasion perhaps a decisive one, if employed skillfully to promote the common interests of the ally and the United States.

NOTES


4. Ibid., p. 5.


8. On this point see Steve C. Ropp, “Panama and the Cuban Connection in Central America,” unpublished paper, New Mexico State University, November 1979.


11. This interpretive account of postwar US-Peruvian military relations is based on Luigi R. Einaudi, Peruvian Military Relations with the United States (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1971), pp. 29-36.


14. Einaudi, Peruvian Military Relations, p. 34.

15. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

16. Ibid., p. 35.

17. Ibid.

