Combat Readiness and the Canadian Army

CSC 1997

Subject Area – Topical Issues

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Combat Readiness and the Canadian Army

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Thesis: The Canadian Army is incapable of executing National Defense tasks as assigned by Canadian Defense Policy.

Background: The Canadian Army has a history of being ill prepared for major conflicts. A combination of negligent senior leadership in both the Army and the Government has allowed the Canadian Army’s combat readiness decline to the point where it is not capable of safely executing either assigned warfighting or operations other than war tasks. The present, unacceptable, situation has been exacerbated by the naïve belief that the end of the Cold War has negated the requirement for combat ready conventional forces. The consequent rush to realize the “peace dividend” has resulted in reduced defense spending and an accelerated decline in the capabilities and effectiveness of the Army. The Army is undermanned, ill equipped and poorly trained. However, through a process of reorganizing, restructuring and making modest equipment acquisitions the Army can make radical improvements in its levels of combat readiness. Many of these changes involve emotional and politically explosive issues, primarily those issues dealing with the Reserves. Without significant changes in the manner in which the resources of the Canadian Army are managed, and without concrete improvements to equipment and training methodology the Army will slowly devolve into little more than a heavily armed constabulary.

Recommendation: The political and military leadership of the Canadian Army must address the issue of combat readiness immediately in order to ensure that the Army is organized, trained and equipped to execute assigned and potential future tasks.
## Combat Readiness and the Canadian Army

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COMBAT READINESS

AND

THE CANADIAN ARMY

Prepared For: LtCol Jacocks and Col Grayson
Prepared By: Maj D.R. Drew
Conference Group 2
30 Mar 97
AND
THE CANADIAN ARMY

“The Canadian field force was from its inception compromised by a military leadership that had for too long concentrated on bureaucratic, political, strateo-diplomatic and technical pursuits to the neglect of its operational and tactical quintessence. Having forsaken its Great War professional legacy and military raison d’être during the interwar years, the Canadian High Command proved incapable of conducting worthwhile training in Britain. The overseas army thus largely wasted its time and had to be retaught by others the business of war, which truly professional armies had long recognized was more profitably studied in peace.” (English, 1995, p.xiv).1

It has been nearly fifty-two years since the end of the Second World War, a war that Canada’s Army entered unprepared because it was poorly lead by Generals who forgot or never knew what their purpose in life was and by politicians who didn’t understand or disregarded the consequences of neglecting national defense issues. It is a shameful reflection on those same functionaries that the above quote is as relevant regarding today’s Army as it was regarding the Army of 1939.

The end of the Cold War has resulted in the grab for a “peace dividend” that has characterized the end of the last two world wars in which Canada has fought. As in the past, the defeat of a major enemy has led to the short sighted and utopian view that the world is now a safer place and that nations will work together in peace for the common good of all people. History has taught us that irresponsible naïveté of this nature is generally rewarded with a stiff dose of realism which is paid for in copious quantities of the blood of patriotic sons. Who would have dreamed that the Nazi gryphon would have raised itself from the ashes of the Weimar Republic a scant 20 years after the “War to end all Wars?” And that the results would have been a world in ruin and 60,000,000 dead?
It is difficult to convince the electorate and the government that there is a requirement for a robust and highly capable military when there is no evidence of a major military threat to Canadian sovereignty. The average civilian is not interested in supporting a seemingly unnecessary military when he or she is concerned as to whether or not the children will be able to go to university and the government is concerned with being reelected. Balancing the budget is important but it must not be done by jeopardizing the future security of Canada. While it is understood that all government institutions will need to tighten their belts, it must also be understood that the Department of National Defense and the Army have been saluting and tightening for nine years and they can tighten no further.

The Canadian Army has absorbed fiscal body blows to the point where further reductions will guarantee the collapse of warfighting skills. The Army will be rendered incapable of executing those tasks assigned in Canadian Defense Policy (CDP), less peace observing missions. The implications of such developments are to the uninitiated inconsequential; however, in an emergency they will be more politically and militarily catastrophic than they were in 1939.

Lack of adequate funding has had significant and negative effects on combat readiness and these effects are jeopardizing the Army’s ability to maintain “general purpose combat capabilities.” Since the Army’s ability to maintain a warfighting capability represents the foundation for its very existence -- that is to defend Canada and its interests -- the maintenance of those skills must be the fundamental aim to which all Army energies and resources are focused.
The aim of this paper is to suggest a strategy to defend the Canadian Army’s vital ground: the maintenance of general-purpose combat capabilities. Accepting present fiscal realities, it is intended to demonstrate that through a process of reorganizing, restructuring and making modest equipment acquisitions, the Army can radically improve its combat readiness and thus guard and enhance its essential combat capabilities.

Before this process can be initiated CDP must be examined to determine just what, exactly, the Army is expected to do and what its assigned and implied tasks are.

The Army’s foremost assigned military task is the protection of Canada’s sovereignty. That task can be paired with our primary national aim, as outlined in Canadian Foreign Policy (CFP) that Canada will continue secure as an independent political entity. Additional assigned tasks are, in order of priority: assist in the defense of North America; ensure the security of Canada’s NATO allies through the provision of ground forces in the form of a mechanized brigade group; and, to contribute to peace and security throughout the world by committing forces in support of United Nations (UN) operations. Implied tasks include execution of internal security operations such as those seen during the Oka crisis of 1990 and assistance to civilian authority such as disaster relief, search and rescue, etc.

The last White Paper on Defense in 1994 reaffirms the commitment of combat capable ground forces to the European Theater which in turn confirms the requirement for ground forces capable of operating in high intensity warfare. The Canadian Army is therefore expected to be able to operate effectively and efficiently throughout the conflict spectrum from low intensity peace keeping and peace enforcement operations (and
internal security operations) potentially to the high intensity maneuver warfare battlefields of today and tomorrow.

Having determined what the Army is supposed to do, its ability to execute those tasks, i.e. its combat readiness, must be assessed in order to identify and address institutional weaknesses. The three components of combat readiness are manpower, equipment and training.

Manpower. The Canadian Army is composed of the Regular Force and the Reserve Force, or Militia.

The Regular Force has approximately 20,000 members, approximately half of which serve in what can be termed the Field Force comprised of three mechanized brigade groups and a divisional level, or task force, headquarters. The units of the brigade groups are manned at an artificially low level, or peacetime strength. In Regular Force infantry battalions, for example, that means average strengths are around 550 all ranks vice 860 all ranks in a wartime established strength (WES) battalion, or about 65% of WES.

The problem with the artificially low peacetime strengths of units is that they are neither equipped nor provided with a chain of command to effect rapid assumption of WES status. One of the reasons that permanent or Regular units are maintained is to have highly professional forces capable of meeting sudden contingencies, i.e., to be rapidly deployable. In the event that the contingency requires a WES unit, much reorganizing and reinforcing must be effected at the last minute. While this is certainly possible it does not enhance unit integrity and it has the effect of stripping other peacetime established units. For example, in 1992 Second Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry (2PPCLI) reinforced 3PPCLI with 175 all ranks and was then subsequently ordered to replace that unit in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Consequently, it was necessary to reinforce 2PPCLI with over 500 augmentees, the majority of whom were Reservists. Reorganization and predeployment preparations took three months of intensive training and that was to prepare for a low intensity peace enforcement operation, not high intensity war.

From the narrow and strict perspective of present strengths, it is not considered imprudent nor inaccurate to deduce that in an emergency the Canadian Army is now capable of rapidly deploying, at best, two fully manned (WES) brigades of Regulars. Should it be necessary to deploy those forces, the Regular Force would be totally committed with only school, headquarters and Regular Support Staff (RSS) left in Canada.

The Militia has approximately 17,000 members who along with the Regulars are organized geographically into four Land Force Areas (LFA), which are further subdivided into 14 districts. There are 132 Militia units located in 111 cities and towns across the country. The 1994 White Paper on Defense stated that the Militia was to be reduced to 14,500 by 1999; however, a recent update to the Special Commission on the Restructure of the Reserves (SCRR) now states that the Militia is to be increased to 18,500. Finally, the SCRR has recommended that the 14 Militia Districts be reorganized into nine Brigade Groups with the four LFA headquarters also being reorganized into Divisional headquarters. The intent is that the Militia, thus reorganized, would form the basis of a Corps.
The 1994 White Paper also reaffirmed the Government’s commitment to Total Force. The White Paper identified the Militia’s primary role within the new mobilization plan. That plan envisions mobilization in four stages: the first stage in terms of “force generation” includes all the measures needed to prepare elements of the Army to undertake new operational tasks and to sustain and support them within the existing framework; the second stage, “force enhancement,” calls for the improvement of the existing forces through provision of more resources and the possible formation of temporary units; the third stage, “force expansion,” necessitates the enlargement of the Army, permanent changes in structures, roles, and tasks, and the likely creation of new units; the fourth stage, “national mobilization,” requires preparing the Army and the nation for a major global war. Apparently, according to the SCRR, there is no detailed plan in existence for stages 3 and 4 of mobilization although the White Paper “considers it prudent to have ready ‘no cost’ plans.”

“The Militia is intended to augment and sustain the Regular Force in the context of the first two phases of mobilization: that is to provide individually selected reservists, rather than whole Reserve platoons and companies, to the Regular Force for the purposes, among other things, of fulfilling Canada’s international peacekeeping commitments.” In addition the Militia is to serve as the basis for full scale mobilization and to serve as the link between the military and the community at large.

Should a contingency appear tomorrow, (consider an unforeseen war) there are a large number of Reservists who have had sufficient experience to be able to report with minimum delay to the nearest Regular Force unit as reinforcements (this may not be true in the future as many military skills, including physical fitness, are perishable). The
consequence of removing these experienced Reservists from their units is that they are often the most capable and motivated members of those units. They are typically the cream of the junior leadership and the effects of their loss as reinforcements to the Regular Army could be nothing but negative.

Perhaps stripping the Militia would provide sufficient manpower, assume 3000 all ranks, to flush out the three Regular Force brigades in an emergency. The result, however, would be that the majority of Reserve units would be, in the short term, left hollow, unable to train and unable to generate any further reinforcements. An assumption of that nature begs the question as to what further use the Militia can be?

**Equipment.** In 1987, at the height of the Cold War, a review of CDP concluded that there was a serious gap between the capabilities and commitments of the Canadian Army. The Government, through the White Paper on Defense of 1987, committed to narrowing that identified gap by reinforcing the Canadian commitment to the defense of Europe and by implementing an extensive reequipping program in order to modernize and prevent “rust out” of existing weapons systems and vehicle fleets.\(^6\)

By 1990, and before any significant funds could be committed to the revitalization of the Army, the Cold War had collapsed and the White Paper on Defense of 1987 was considered to be little more than Cold War rhetoric.\(^7\) Within two years the Government announced the closing of both bases in Germany and the withdrawal of NATO committed ground and air forces. In addition the purchase of new main battle tanks was canceled and armored vehicle acquisitions for the Reserves were delayed.

The Army is in the process of receiving 200 new Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) APCs which are being distributed on a scale designed to replace the aging M113 variants.
or Armored Vehicle General Purpose (AVGP) in three of Canada’s nine Regular infantry battalions. While those vehicles represent a major improvement in protection and firepower the Government has not committed to buying further additional LAVs to upgrade and modernize the remainder of the infantry; two thirds of the Regular infantry will remain mounted in obsolete equipment. In addition, the Army’s main battle tank, the Leopard 1, though upgraded with new armor, imaging and gun systems, is not considered to be a suitable main battle tank by the Germans nor the Dutch. Both of these countries have replaced that tank with the significantly more powerful Leopard 2. The infantry remains without a mid-range anti armor system (800-2000 meters), the artillery has no MLRS nor counterbattery capability and neither the Army nor the Air Force possesses attack helicopters. Other systems requiring replacement or improvement include communications systems, short range air defense, heavy machine guns and personal environmental clothing and equipment.

These equipment shortcomings place the Army at a significant disadvantage in a maneuver warfare environment and it is clearly one of the reasons that Canada did not commit ground combat troops to the Allied Coalition during the Gulf War. That was over six years ago and not one of these issues has been completely resolved. These equipment issues are vitally important, as the need for modern weapons and equipment is as important at the low end of today’s conflict spectrum as they are at the high end. To substantiate that statement it is only necessary to look at the immediate and follow on successes of NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) in Yugoslavia vice the performance of UNPROFOR. In the words of U.S. Army Major General Willian L. Nash “to be effective, a military force must ultimately be capable of decisive combat operations; one
of the key factors of success [in the Former Yugoslavia] is an overwhelming, credible warfighting capability.”

Although the Army is capable of training for fighting a high intensity war (prior to WWII the Germans trained using cars and trucks with tubes representing guns) it is neither equipped to fight a high intensity war or to safely impose peace. The obvious deduction is that the Government is not serious about honoring its defense commitments (to its allies and worse, to Canada), or that it does not care about the safety and security of the soldiers of the Canadian Army because it knows full well that “Johnny Canuck” will go and do the best he can with what he has at hand, like he always has. (The casualty rates will no doubt provide elected officials with plenty of material in which to profess righteous indignation and to call for the resignation of other elected officials.) The latter point is one that has not been lost on the rank and file and it remains a detrimental influence on morale.

The equipment status of the Regular Army, as bad as it sounds, is nowhere near as absurd as that of the Militia. Reserve infantry units are all dismounted and lack full complements of small arms, support weapons such as light mortars, machine guns and anti armor weapons, and winter warfare equipment. Armored units are either equipped with jeeps or AVGPs except for one Total Force unit that is equipped with Leopard 1A5 tanks. Most artillery units are equipped with only the obsolete towed 105 C1 howitzer, engineer units have no heavy combat engineering equipment and the litany goes on. Unlike some American Guard and Reserve units, there are no Militia units that are equipped to assume warfighting roles on mobilization. That fact is the product of CDP and the “new” mobilization plan mentioned in the 1994 White Paper.
There are those in the military and the Government who would say that the answer to the equipment problem, for both the Regular and Reserve components, would be solved in an emergency through the process of mobilization. They view mobilization as the “deux ex machina” that will allow Canada to devote its energies to military enterprise in order to deal with the next major threat. The appropriate response to those who entrust their futures to that mobilization myth is that they should take their heads out of the sand.

Mobilization is the product of manpower, national will, natural resources and industrial capacity. Assuming that the Government decided to react to a particular emergency by mobilizing there is no doubt that there would be sufficient young men and women to fill the ranks of the Army’s units. But what would they wear and where would their weapons be? They may be able to get uniforms and small arms but the answer is that mobilization would be at the very best a four year process. Consider the following example.

There are no tank plants in Canada. The General Dynamics Land System (GDLS) Tank Plant estimates that a plant could be constructed based on Canadian industrial capabilities in 30 months. Adding on a further 18 months for the production cycle as envisioned by GDLS brings the total to 48 months from initialization until the first tank rolls off the assembly line. GDLS is presently producing approximately 100 Abrams M1 tanks a year and they can surge to a production rate of 300 a year by tripling their shifts. The point is that tank construction periods remain at a fixed rate, the high tech nature of major warfighting systems has driven production time lines into years as opposed to weeks or months for similar systems during WWII.
Suffice it to say that Canadian industry is not geared to react quickly to a mobilization order; it would take at least four years before major, sophisticated weapons systems could be produced in sufficient numbers to begin to properly equip the Canadian Army. Canadian leadership should not assume that mobilization will be the unmolested process that it was 50 years ago; the ICBM and inter continental bombers have erased Canada’s past advantage of “splendid isolation.” Bearing those points in mind, the adage of “come as you are wars” or “come as you are conflicts” has substantial meaning.14

It is not illogical to conclude that it would be in the best interest of Canada to ensure that those forces maintained during peacetime are equipped in a fashion that will allow them to “win (or contribute to winning) the first battle.” Missing, or merely wounding, the bear with your only bullet presents a situation with rather distasteful options. Those options will not only effect the hunter, they will effect the whole village.

**Training.** Although the Army has a requirement to train for high intensity war it no longer has sufficient funds to conduct training at a level or at a frequency required to teach and develop warfighting leaders and commanders. For example, most training in infantry units since 1992 has been oriented towards the sub unit or company level, usually without the benefit of support from armor or any other combat arm, or towards operations in anticipation of operational deployment on UN missions. In 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1CMBG), for example, the result has been that generations of these commanders have “punched their tickets” as section, platoon, company, battalion and brigade commanders without having “earned their warfighting spurs” in a combined arms arena.
The U.S. Army has taken a very serious approach towards training for war and their methods are well worth examining. In the late 1970’s they determined that there was a requirement to objectively assess combat readiness at the unit and brigade level. In response to that perceived requirement the U.S. Army developed the National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin, California. Battalions and brigades deploy to NTC to be tested by a capable and realistic opposing force that fights to win. Both forces use weapons effects simulators such as the multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) to determine the outcome of tactical engagements. Teams of evaluators, acting as umpires, supervise, record and collate factual results. In this manner success or failure can be accurately gauged and strengths and weaknesses identified. Training plans and objectives can then be formulated for the express purpose of improving individual command (and indirectly leadership) skills, unit teamwork and combat capabilities. This training vehicle is also used to develop and test new doctrine.

The results of NTC deployments may determine whether or not a commander is sufficiently capable of assuming more senior command responsibilities. It will most certainly act as a tremendous incentive to focus the commanding officer and his unit on their raison d’être: warfighting. This system of objective assessment also tends to reinforce a warrior mentality in battalion and brigade commanders; it is an influence that reminds them of their responsibilities and duties to their nation and their soldiers throughout their careers.

While it is clear that professional competency has been adversely effected by the focus on low intensity conflict skills and reduced training budgets, Canadian Army leadership must accept responsibility for the sorry state of the training of warfighting
commanders. In spite of dedicating large numbers of staff officers to study training facilities and equipment, the Army has failed to improve its field training methodology during the past 20 years. No weapons effects simulators have been purchased, no improvements to training realism have been implemented and no formal method of objective commander performance evaluations has been adopted. There is no way to practically test or develop doctrine. There is no uniform standard to achieve and thus anyone, regardless of their suitability, can be promoted and appointed to command positions in combat arms units. The only objective assessment of infantry battalion commanders at this time is the annual staff inspections that judge unit administrative competence. While administrative competence is certainly an important issue it certainly is not the measuring stick that should be used to measure the suitability of commanders’ warfighting skills. The consequences of this neglectful approach to training commanders have been compounded since 1992 when UN operations became the primary focus of Army operations and training.

Having noted the Army’s failure to improve practical training methodology it is necessary to report that the Army has moved forward in commander’s training through the use of computer simulated battle group trainers. While these training aids represent a significant enhancement in training warfighting commanders they are only a complement to the conduct of actual field operations.

Continued neglect of the Army’s combined arms warfighting capabilities will pave the way to future disasters comparable to those suffered by Canadian, British, French, Polish, and Russian armies at the beginning of WWII. The Germans developed the Blitzkrieg (in peacetime) and used it to devastating effect on the Allied armies
because they learned to focus the combat power of mechanized combat arms and close air support and combine it with rapid movement to defeat their opponents; they realized the synergistic potential of maneuver warfare.

While the Germans developed their warfighting skills in peacetime, the Canadian Army was doing foot drill and inspecting kit in armories scattered about the country. The Germans became experts, professionals, in the art of conducting war; their Canadian equivalents remained rank amateurs. The cost for being ill prepared was paid in Canadian blood and only proved to illustrate, for the umpteenth time since the beginning of recorded history, that it is highly imprudent to step onto a battlefield with an enemy that is better equipped, better trained and led, and more capable. The Canadian soldier should not have to pay with his life in wartime to learn a trade that was denied to him by negligent leadership in peacetime.

 Fixes. The problems facing the Army represent what is essentially a life and death crisis; either fix the problems and fix them fast or the Army will die. Radical procedures that are messy and that frequently involve much shedding of blood are usually the treatment that will give the patient the best chances for survival and recovery; radical surgery is what the Army needs now.

The Militia, as it is configured and organized today, must go! The Militia’s warfighting military worth represents nothing more than the soldiers that can be immediately assimilated into the Regular Army. Present circumstances dictate that only a fraction of Reservists are suitable for operational duty. A figure of 3000 operationally ready Reservists has been used in this paper. It could be argued that more Reservists are prepared for rapid operational deployment; however, the counter argument to that would
be that the Regulars probably don’t have sufficient equipment to support additional reinforcements. The Militia cannot be mobilized to form brigades, divisions, corps and armies because there is, and will be, no equipment for four years after mobilization is begun. Without specifically stating such, the mobilization plan discussed in the 1994 White Paper confirms that the Government has no intention of ever seeing the Militia produce anything more than individual augmentees to the Regular Army.

The Militia’s often-touted “bridge to the community” is also overrated and overused. In many small communities the Militia represents an important link between patriotic citizens and Regiments that made monumental sacrifices during the Wars. Unfortunately, the plain truth is that in most cities, the centers of population, many units are understrength and the civilian population is either unaware or only peripherally aware that the Army or the Militia even exists and most do not care one way or the other. So close the armories and sell them off, reduce the Regiments to nil strength and come up with a better way of producing Reservists.

Why not offer Reservists something tangible, such as a program that would provide intensive summer training at Regular Force schools for five consecutive summers combined with a university or college tuition program? This type of program implemented correctly has two potential major benefits. First, the education incentives could be used to attract more of the best, brightest and fittest students, and possibly a more complete cross section of society. These student soldiers, upon completion of their training and education, would then be released to function in Canadian society with the benefit of the discipline and maturity provided by five summers of military training and a trade or profession from the educational institution of their choice. Second, training
could be conducted with one standard. The Army is presently going through a very costly rewrite and reorganization of course training plans in an effort to create uniform standards for both components. This is not only time consuming and costly but also has the detrimental effects of lowering Regular Forces standards and producing an inferior product. Block courses do not provide the same challenge to leaders and commanders; anyone can complete a marathon in 26 one-mile segments. The hottest fires make the best steel.

Total Force, the mantra of the politically correct Regular is not dead, it never was alive. The Gulf War proved that when even fully equipped National Guard and Reserve units that had been identified as round out forces for Regular divisions were incapable of achieving sufficient levels of combat readiness after four months of intensive training at NTC.\textsuperscript{17}

The Reservists who proudly serve Canada are doing so from within a system that is the product of the First World War. The Militia is not organized, equipped or supported by the necessary legislation to give it the legitimate force potential for successful employment in war or operations other than war in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century. A new and radical approach free of political interference must be developed\textsuperscript{18} and implemented if Canada is to realize full defense returns for its invested defense dollar. That is not to say that a radically reorganized or reconfigured Militia will mean less money invested, it means there needs to be a better way to invest that money. An appropriate solution should be the product of another paper that deals uniquely with this particular and very emotional issue.
The issue of equipment is not as difficult or expensive an issue as one might think. For example, the Government has missed several opportunities to buy new main battle tanks at rock bottom prices; at least one of these opportunities was related to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) which would have seen the Army exchanging the old Leopard 1 with our German allies for newer, more modern Leopard 2 tanks. A cheap upgrade for Canada which would have allowed NATO to stay within treaty imposed restrictions of MBTs while concurrently allowing for a more combat capable Canadian Army. The Army doesn’t need the best MBT, it just needs a good one to replace the Leopard hulls which are rapidly approaching the end of their useful lifespan. More deals will appear.

Other systems that require quick fix modernizing are already in production and can be purchased off-the-shelf from our American allies (and largest trading partner). An excellent example would be the kevlar helmet, which the U.S. Army has had since 1982, which provides outstanding protection for the soldier’s head. Had that helmet been purchased in the 80’s, there is at least one soldier, killed during live field firing, that would be alive today (Force Protection is of vital importance to the senior leadership of the American Forces; it is clearly not weighted with the same importance by the senior leadership of the Canadian Forces). Although the concept of buying off the shelf runs contrary to the Canadian practice of developing more expensive and generally less utile equipment (such as the Ross Rifle), it would quickly and radically improve the security and capabilities of deployed forces.

Finally, regarding equipment, it is time that the Canadian Army began synchronizing its equipment buying programs with those of the Americans. Time and
time again the Army is directed for political and economic reasons to find a Canadian solution to a military problem. With finite research and development funds the Army usually ends up concocting, or purchasing, a piece of equipment to satisfy some political purpose rather than procuring the right product for the soldier on the ground. The very costly ERYX missile system, the ’84 pattern rucksack, defective plastic C7 magazines, defective .50 caliber barrels, poor quality combat boots, the Iltis jeep replacement, and the 11/4 ton truck replacement are only a few examples of politically driven buys of substandard or unnecessary military equipment.

The American Forces have consistently developed the finest military equipment in the world since the mid 80’s. That their troops are equipped with the best environmental clothing, the best weapons, the best body armor etc. is a source of considerable pride. Economic interests should drive the Canadian Army to dovetail equipment acquisition with American buys and thus effect savings in research and development and production costs. (This concept was forwarded by Lieutenant General G. Reay the Commander of the Army in 1993, and he was quickly and publicly overruled by then Defense Minister Kim Campbell.) Furthermore, it is possible that a common approach to R and D may give Canada exclusive jurisdiction in the development of certain types of equipment such as cold weather clothing. Properly negotiated, Canada could possibly end up with a bigger piece of the big joint U.S./Canada defense procurement pie.

Training for war must be realistic so that soldiers and their commanders do not encounter surprises when they close with the enemy for the first time on the battlefield. Surprise tends to precipitate disaster. Commanders at all levels, but particularly at the
battalion and brigade level, need to be objectively confirmed. The American Army has clearly indicated that the professionalism of their forces is directly attributable to the success of the NTC as a warfighting trainer. Canadian commanders need to be exposed to the same training opportunities and in this case another “dovetailing” opportunity presents itself. It is not beyond the capability of the Canadian Army to develop its own version of the NTC. In doing so, it could develop a center with a potentially greater capacity than that required for the Canadian Army so that it could be used by other armies, i.e. most likely U.S. forces but also other NATO armies. This type of arrangement would allow for external economic support of the NTC and also for reciprocal training activities at other U.S. and NATO training facilities. Other benefits could include combined training that would not only allow for greater interoperability with our closest ally but also for the Canadian Army to have the opportunity to train with supporting arms such as attack helicopters.

An improved level of combined training has two other positive aspects with potential that must be considered. First, from an alliance perspective, the Canadian Army could easily combine with American formations in order to round out or round up divisions or corps. If an agreement could be reached in peacetime with respect to the establishment of Canadian/American (CANAM) formations brigade affiliations could be established with U.S. divisions. For example, 1CMBG could focus on training in the west with 3 Armored Division, and 2CMBG could affiliate with the east coast USMC II Marine Expeditionary Force. Associations would certainly enhance training opportunities and operational versatility. And, they could lead to a more logical distribution of equipment, such as the concentration of MBTs in 1CMBG where the most suitable
maneuver training areas for heavy armored forces in Canada exist. Equipping separate
brigades for specific roles would allow the Government and the Army an extra measure
of flexibility when determining force composition for different missions while allowing
those brigades to focus on the perfection of their particular warfighting skills.

Finally, training needs to test and develop the skills of senior commanders.
During WWII Canadian soldiers proved to be tough, fit and capable soldiers and their
performance throughout was unquestionably valorous. Those soldiers were poorly led by
a senior leadership that never was able to grasp the essentials of maneuver warfare.
Divisional and brigade commanders with few exceptions were unaggressive,
unimaginative, plodding and tactically challenged.21 Their performance was so poor
during the Normandy campaign that the 1st Canadian Army was switched from being the
spearhead of the Allied armies to fulfilling the secondary role of clearing north west
Europe. Historical evidence supports and reinforces the position that, for the purposes of
professional competence warfighting skills must be developed, honed and maintained at
brigade and divisional level. “As the study of the Canadian case reveals, rapid expansion
and budgetary increases do not, cannot, and will not compensate for an army’s neglect of
itself.”22

This paper has addressed a number of serious issues that are presently confronting
Canada and the Canadian Army. While numerous problems have been identified, the
solutions presented represent ideas and concepts meant to act as catalysts for innovative
thought and imaginative solutions. Freedom of thought has not been sufficiently
encouraged in the Canadian Army and an atmosphere of intellectual stagnation pervades
the officer corps. As a result, critical debate has been replaced with the apathetic
acceptance of concepts ranging from Total Force to force structure to physical training standards.

In its present state the Army is not capable of executing those tasks assigned to it by the Canadian Government. The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the bipolar global power structure have created a highly volatile security environment. Ethnic, economic, religious, state, environmental and even criminal factors are the elements of instability which will rapidly, and unexpectedly, create violent conflict, conflict that will threaten whole continents, perhaps civilizations. If Canada wishes to protect its own interests and actively participate as a calm and rationale influence on the global stage, it will require the forces necessary to safely and firmly enforce peace. The enforcement of peace may mean supporting UN operations or it may mean warfighting. The Canadian Government’s sincerity and resolve will be measured by its commitment to providing adequate protection and warfighting equipment to those citizens charged with upholding commitments to the Canadian people and their allies.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


NOTES

4 Ibid Chap 3 p.3.
7 Ibid p. 69.
10 Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, Chap 10 p. 4-6. Although the report is not specific with respect to the types and quantities of equipment shortages the status of equipment in the Reserves is common knowledge.
16 Ibid p. 111.
18 Paul F. Braim, “An Earlier Revolution in Military Affairs,” *Parameters: The U.S. Army War College Quarterly* Autumn 1996: 152. An example used to illustrate that the sorry state of the U.S. Army in the Spanish American War was directly attributable to petty interferences in organization, operations, and command by President William McKinley and by a Congress influenced by state militia leaders.
19 Chapman 103. Chief of NTC Operations Group emphasizing “the leadership training advantage of having the chain of command recognize their tactical and technical responsibilities through the objective process of the NTC after action report. This process reveals ‘the good and strong’ and in turn creates corrective action and learning in short order.”
21 English 305-315.
22 Ibid 314.