

Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War

JOHN W. JANDORA

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It is generally accepted that since 1989, there are seemingly more crises of wider variance with which the United States must contend. The military implication is that “to deal with such a wide range of possibilities, our armed forces must be capable of accomplishing a wide range of missions.”¹ Beyond that, American forces will have to adapt to some unusual mission activities and will consequently have to cope with some unusual threat situations.

During the Cold War, the ability of our primary adversary to raise, equip, sustain, and employ military forces was fairly well defined and well understood. The US defense establishment had few doubts regarding Soviet procedures for developing combat systems and mobilizing, deploying, and sustaining forces. It likewise had few doubts regarding Soviet procedures for supplying and otherwise supporting allies and surrogates—whether regime forces or insurgents. During the Gulf War, the Soviet model was applied to the Iraqi army wrongly and sometimes subconsciously. In the end, the false analogy did not matter. Coalition forces destroyed the Iraqi army in Kuwait through superior firepower, logistics, and technology. That victory was made easier than analysts had forecast by easy identification of Iraqi units and supply depots and the enemy’s static defensive scheme.

Other conflict situations—Lebanon in 1983 and more recently Somalia—presented different circumstances to planners. Threat forces were difficult to identify, and the battle area was not delimited by defensive works. One might be tempted to apply paradigms of insurgency to explain the outcomes of our involvement in those situations, but long-held views on insurgency must also be reconsidered. In the former pattern of international confrontation, there were usually two sides to every conflict, the regime in power and the insurgents. One side would have the support of the United

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States or others in the Western bloc, while the other side would have the support of the USSR or its allies. Such conflicts would be generated, enlarged, reduced, or extinguished largely in accordance with the policies and capabilities of the two superpowers. These post-World War II constraints have been removed. The nature of civil war has changed along with the demise of the bipolar world order.

Multidimensional factional conflict has now become a prevalent pattern of civil war. The Lebanon crisis, which was the precursor of this trend, is perhaps the paramount example. However, the pattern also fits Bosnia, Somalia, Afghanistan, and other countries. In these situations, one has to deal with numerous armed groups which align and realign in ever-changing alliances. While there are ways to distinguish the competing sides, simple dichotomy no longer suffices as a formula.

The characterization of the struggle in Lebanon as a religious conflict between Christians and Muslims, for example, merely obscured the real underlying antagonisms. In actuality, the Christians never presented a united front, so there was no "Christian cause." Within the dominant Maronite Christian sect, the Gemayel-led faction was often ruthless in dealing with its traditional rivals, the Chamoun and Franjiyah factions. As for the Greek Orthodox Christians, they adhered to an age-old distrust of the Maronites in general and so sought security in alliances with Muslim groups. The Druze, a heretical Islamic sect, manifested a similar lack of unity, at least until the Lebanese forces invaded their strongholds in the Shouf region. The Arslan loyalists did not cooperate with the Jumblat-led Popular Socialist Party (PSP), and their cooperation could not be expected, based on Lebanese history. Those two families headed factions which had been rivals for centuries. Similar traditional rivalries also divided the Shiite Muslims.²

The complexity of Lebanese factionalism was matched by the complexity of foreign involvement, a situation that evolved largely because neither the Western bloc nor the Soviet bloc had vital strategic interests at stake. A rather large number of countries—each with its own regional interests, in competition with the others—actively supported one or another of the factions. In addition to the United States and USSR, France, Syria, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and Saudi Arabia were involved in the Lebanese conflict.

America's military intervention in Lebanon in 1982-83 was limited in scope and duration. Had it been otherwise, we might have developed

Dr. John W. Jandora, Colonel USMCR, is a supervisory intelligence analyst with the US Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. He is a graduate of Georgetown University and holds an A.M. degree in Arabic and Islamic history and a Ph.D. in Near Eastern history, both from the University of Chicago. He is the author of *The March from Medina: A Revisionist Study of the Arab Conquests* (Kingston Press, 1990).

doctrine appropriate to such conflicts. Instead, those planning Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) found it necessary to include “nontraditional categories” of information in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process, just as they had to devise new concepts of battlefield operating systems.³ Beyond that experience, we should be able to minimize improvisation in assessing each nontraditional threat situation, as common features become evident. Those concerns, essential for intelligence analysis, are no less important for mission planning at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. As indicators of threat strengths and weaknesses, they help to identify and define a non-state actor’s center of gravity.⁴ Knowledge of nontraditional threat factors may well determine the success or failure of an operation.

Operations Other Than War

Mission profiles for US military forces will probably involve unilateral or multinational efforts to:

- buttress friendly regimes
- thwart criminal organizations or “criminal” regimes
- relieve the adverse effects of natural or economic disasters
- restore or maintain peace in an area or country
- protect Americans or allied personnel

The American defense establishment has coined the term operations other than war (OOTW) to identify this new mission set. In fact those mission activities are not new; what is different about them is their frequency and the many forms they have taken. Since the concept of OOTW has yet to be clearly defined, it may be useful here to consider a comprehensive list of relevant activities. They include: nation-building, security assistance, counterinsurgency or insurgency support, punitive strikes or raids, preemptive strikes, sanction or embargo enforcement, counter-terrorism, support to law enforcement (counter-drug, counter-smuggling, counter-piracy, counter-poaching), disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, noncombatant evacuation, combat search and rescue, and personnel recovery.⁵

It is difficult to generalize about such varying mission activities. Some are inherently of short duration, while others can continue—and have—for years. They span a wide range of operational environments. Some will occur under wholly peaceful circumstances. Others will start that way but evolve into armed confrontation. Yet others will take place under hostile conditions from the start. Obviously, only those which involve potential or actual force on force situations have threat implications. It is the threat perspective, though, which offers some basis for distinguishing among the various forms of operations other than war. Unlike conventional wars, many such operations pose situations in which the rules of engagement are either ambiguous or highly restrictive. Potential threat forces are another variable. They can include regime forces, insurgent or factional forces, terrorists,

Mission Activities	Potential Threat Forces				
	Regime Forces	Insurgent or Factional Forces	Terrorists	Criminal Organization	Armed Populace
Short Term					
Punitive Raid or Strike	X	X			X
Preemptive Strike	X	X			X
Counterterrorism					
Permissive		X	X		
Non-permissive	X		X		X
Disaster Relief				X	
Noncombatant Evacuation, Combat Search & Rescue, Personnel Recovery					
Permissive		X			
Non-permissive	X	X			X
Long Term					
Nation-building		X	X	X	
Security Assistance		X	X	X	
Counterinsurgency		X			X
Insurgency Support	X				
Sanction/Embargo Enforcement	X			X	X
Support to Law Enforcement		X	X	X	X
Humanitarian Relief			X	X	
Peacekeeping		X			X
Peace Enforcement	X	X			X

Table 1. Mission/Threat Correlation.

various kinds of criminal organizations, and armed groups among the populace at large. The correlation between missions and threat forces is shown in Table 1.⁶

Certain types of threats are much better understood than others. There are proven methods for assessing the capability of potentially hostile regimes to react to US military force, and many handbooks and case studies describe the organization and operations of insurgents, terrorists, and, to a lesser degree, drug traffickers. The material provides frameworks for assessing the capabilities of these potential threats. In contrast, there has been no comparable analysis of the power base of factional "armies," large criminal organizations, and armed groups among the populace. The following discourse suggests a framework for such analysis.

Three Difficult Threats

Consideration of factional "armies," large criminal organizations, and armed groups among a populace presents a subset of threat environments in which it is relatively difficult to identify the enemy. Notwithstanding the prob-

lem of identifying the opponent, we are still dealing with organizations, albeit at varying levels of sophistication. This commonality supports a consistent analytical method and a single set of relevant factors: motives, objectives, cohesion, leadership, tactics, armament, sustainability, and force generation. These concepts should be self-evident as to meaning, except for the last two. The term *sustainability* applies to operational logistics, the ability to support and sustain current operations or activities. The term *force generation* applies to change in capability over time. The concept is similar to force development but different in that it excludes the sophisticated functions of research, development, testing, and evaluation of new systems, force structuring, and doctrinal revision. It is convenient to begin at the low end of the organizational spectrum, with the armed populace, and continue with more enduring threats—large criminal organizations and factional forces.⁷

Armed Populace

Civilians will be driven to violence generally by one of three conditions: breakdown of social controls (the police and security functions of the state); economic deprivation; or threats to traditional values, either internally induced or externally generated.⁸ Examples of the third case include a serious scandal involving the ruler of a country or foreign pressure for his abdication or resignation. With the possible exception of the third case, the presence of US forces will not be the proximate cause of such conditions. However, American troops obviously could become targets of violence when deployed to prevent or suppress civil disorder. An understanding of the motives of mob action would help to assess persistence of the threat.

The foregoing motives generally define typical objectives of the “hostile crowd”: to seize or defend government offices or other important sites or terrain; to seize produce, other goods, or wealth; or to exact revenge or restore honor or status. In the course of pursuing these objectives, an enraged mob may deliberately or accidentally inflict casualties and damage. The threat to a downed pilot consequent to a punitive strike, for example, would be more serious in cases where the local people seek to avenge their loss or restore their honor.

Despite appearances, planners should not assume that militant mobs are random groupings. They likely have cohesion before they mobilize for action. Their solidarity derives from residence, ethnicity, occupation, economic status, society (e.g., brotherhood) membership, or some other factor. Ethnicity and societal membership are obviously the stronger bonds of the ones cited. Nonetheless, the inhabitants of a city quarter, despite being of diverse ethnic origin, might have common resentment toward a regime which failed to provide relief in the wake of a disaster. Unrelated groups of unemployed or underemployed persons, students, or factory workers might have common resentment toward their government for other reasons. Analysis of

the basis of cohesion would help identify the threat force as well as gauge its potential size and disposition.

To the extent that militant mobs are not random groupings, they likely have a ready-made leadership structure. Ethnic group members are responsive to their clan elders, who themselves conform to a traditional pecking order. Factory crews follow their foremen, who in turn follow the shop chief. Students rally behind their class or union leaders, who follow their school student president or student union president. Gang members obey their acknowledged leaders. It is important to note, however, that ethnic groups and fraternal societies, especially secret ones, usually have implicit, automatic rules of succession to leadership, while other groups do not.

Tactics would vary according to the composition of the militant mob and the prevailing sense of morality. If the group includes renegade soldiers, mutineers, deserters, gang members, or "popular defense force" members, it might be capable of teamwork. It is usually unlikely that any hostile mob would close with peacekeeping forces unless it had overwhelming numeric superiority at the point of contact or sought to carry out a ruse. A typical ploy would be to engage the peacekeepers only to lure them into an ambush. Otherwise, the militants are likely to maintain a stand-off distance by either exploiting urban terrain or using women and children as human shields.

Militant mobs can be expected to have limited capacity without access to weapons and ammunition. These will be more or less plentiful depending upon local customs of keeping arms, governmental practice of arming civilians, and the vulnerability of armories. In some countries the populace is allowed to keep arms and to carry them, especially in the hinterland. In other countries, the regime co-opts certain groups, such as students and laborers, into its civil defense and security scheme. Similarly, local elites may employ armed gang members for personal protection or local security. Such customs and practices bring about greater familiarity with weapons and possibly greater lethality in times of violence. Even when access to weapons is more restricted, the presence of military veterans among a mob could result in the capture of an armory and somewhat effective use of its contents. Some crew-served weapons could be brought into action. It is unlikely, though, that mobs and even popular defense forces would be able to employ tanks, surface-to-air missiles, or artillery, let alone high-technology systems. Such groups also would have difficulty sustaining their fight.

Unlike standing forces and militias, the armed populace depends almost exclusively on a static support base: the fighters must go home to provision. This condition can be a vulnerability if the conflict is protracted or changes locale. Conversely, it complicates the targeting efforts of the peacekeepers when the hostile force merges back into the larger society. Without mobile logistics, militant group action lacks sustainability; once it acquires that capability, a mob transitions to a militia.

Force generation is a complex factor with many elements: mobilization of manpower, materiel supply, financing, training, intelligence, technology transfer, and advice and assistance. It has limited relevance with regard to an armed populace because of the transient nature of mob action. However, the aspect of linkage, as it pertains to mobilization, does deserve consideration. A disturbance in one town or area becomes a national problem when related groups rise up in support. The relevant ties are those among student associations, labor unions, craft guilds, youth gangs, kin groups, and chapters of fraternal societies. If constituents of such groups rise up successively, they can force peacekeepers to confront an expanding problem. Linkage in itself, however, probably will not affect the long-term sustainment of an uprising, unless that uprising coalesces with an insurgency, mutiny, or other such movement.

Criminal Organizations

While the common motive of large criminal organizations is monetary gain, there can be differences in objective. Pirates and poachers focus on seizing goods; smugglers and narcotraffickers focus on delivering goods. Because of potential resistance or interdiction, all such groups must be capable of forceful action. They develop organizations that can bring decisive force to critical points. Such outlaw groups generally do have common bonds beyond the profit motive. Their cohesion is probably comparable to that of work crews which perform hazardous jobs. Moreover, when organizers rely on kinsmen for their manpower, they gain an added element of cohesion.

Where kin groups are involved in large-scale crime, they would probably be led by traditional elites. However, criminal leadership is usually determined by survival of the fittest—or, more accurately, the cleverest. There is no role here for longevity or regulated promotions. There are unwritten codes of loyalty, and infractions are summarily and severely punished. As a consequence of this brutal system, leaders may be more effective in reacting to challenges. Moreover, the top leadership may be immune to arrest, due to personal status, influence, or connections with the right people.

The tactics of criminal groups are relevant here only as they confront law enforcement or peace enforcement units. When caught at a disadvantage, criminals probably would take evasive action, following set procedure. Their concern would be to protect their goods and their conveyances, not to hold position. Criminal organizations would most likely employ offensive tactics when they are actively targeting law enforcement units. They probably would rely on deception and ambush to achieve their kills. Some criminal organizations have ties to insurgent or factional forces, which offer protection of routes, hide sites, and safe havens.

The business of crime rings is not warfare, but illegal movement or removal of goods. They arm themselves accordingly, using mostly small arms

and limited amounts of heavier ordnance, such as mines, machine guns, hand-held SAMs, and light antitank weapons. Given ties between different organizations, a criminal group will have little difficulty acquiring such armament; payment for services could take the form of an arms transfer. In cases where a criminal organization needs extra firepower, it can usually buy the services of mercenaries, terrorists, or factional or insurgent forces. The additional threat capabilities represented by such hirelings would have to be added to those of the criminal group itself.

The nature of illegal activities and the profits they represent also could ensure logistic sufficiency for criminal organizations. These groups steal, rent, or purchase the conveyances and the communications, electronics, avionics equipment, and repair parts needed for operations. As weapons are transferred between collaborating groups, so too are supplies and equipment.

Many of the factors that account for criminal organizations being serious, immediate threats also account for their becoming larger threats over time. If necessary, a criminal organization can increase its workforce through recruitment, purchase of services, agreement on mutual interest, bribery, or intimidation. Moreover, it can enter into long- or short-term alliances with—or otherwise co-opt—terrorists, youth gangs, insurgents, or factional forces. Networks in place for the illegal movement of goods provide criminal organizations with the means to sustain operations against counter-crime programs.

Financing for arms and supplies is directly related to market demand for the criminal group's product or service. While an effective law enforcement campaign could cause the cost of supply to escalate beyond an acceptable price limit, each situation will vary according to commodity, locality, and other circumstances. It could become easier to intercept payoffs than to curtail market demand, but criminal organizations have developed ingenious methods to launder money, divert payments into foreign bank accounts or real estate, or otherwise conceal money transfers.

As would a legitimate business, a crime ring will invest in training as necessary to sustain operations. Large criminal organizations usually can procure the instructional expertise needed to improve camouflage, deception, security of employees and goods (in shipment or storage), detection of law enforcement activity, and targeting of law enforcement officers. In some cases the effectiveness of training may be adversely affected by a need for secrecy. When failure to perform could result in death, the incentive to learn will likely be high.

Because intelligence information is necessary for survival, criminal organizations likely will develop networks of informers. They may be able to gain accomplices within governmental and law enforcement agencies through bribes or blackmail. They may be able to retain agents among the population at large through payoff or intimidation. Relevant information can be reported, via normal commercial means, through business offices which serve as fronts

for the organization. Beyond that, criminal groups have been known to procure and use sophisticated communications intercept systems.

Successful criminal groups will have the wherewithal to obtain technologically advanced arms and equipment. Besides communications intercept gear, they might procure sophisticated munitions, surveillance systems, and communications equipment, along with operator training. When attempting to improve their organization, procedures, or tradecraft, such groups could seek assistance from similar groups outside their area or from allied terrorists or insurgents.

Factional Forces

Factional forces, the last category of potential threat forces examined here, may be less familiar to the general public than either an armed populace or a criminal organization largely because the old Cold War dichotomy of regime forces versus insurgents does not apply in factional conflicts. Rather, we need to envision the multidimensional conflicts of Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Bosnia—the struggle of ethnic-based militias, which align themselves in changing patterns of alliance and opposition. While the characteristics of these forces will become apparent from the discussion, it is useful to define this force type by what it excludes. The concept of *factional forces* does not include the standing formations which have been and continue to be sustained by the regime in control of the capital. These are *regime forces*. Nor does it include classic insurgent forces, which are motivated by an ideology and are often supported by a foreign power which espouses or exploits the same ideology.

Describing armed forces as ethnic-based then raises questions as to what constitutes ethnicity. For this study it essentially amounts to common kinship—not religion or culture, although those two factors could also affect the self-identity of the group concerned. Apart from fiction, total homogeneity is unlikely. The core kin group can and will assimilate unrelated people—either long-time clients or newly admitted ones who may be displaced, dispossessed, or otherwise in need of group security.

The motives for a kin group of whatever size to take up arms and organize militarily are the same as those that affect an armed populace: breakdown of social controls, economic deprivation, or threat to traditional values. The corresponding objectives, however, are somewhat broader in scope. In the first case, the objective is to protect the kin group, its homeland, resources, and interests, by either defensive or offensive action. In the second case, it is to gain by forceful means a rightful or fair share in the allocation of goods and services. The objective in the final case is to defend or restore the traditional value system.

The basis of cohesion is of course a given; it is the bond of blood, whether real or fictional, and a sense of common destiny. Leadership often

conforms to a traditional pecking order. However, it may be that the leaders in peacetime are not the leaders in war. In this respect, an obvious change in the visibility and prominence of certain persons may be an indicator that hostilities are imminent. Moreover, the "war experience" may create conditions that allow individuals to rise in status through military prowess.

Tactics likely will derive from the traditional ethnic practice of war, unless the factional forces include significant numbers of veteran soldiers. Even then, military leaders are likely to apply economy of force considerations and resort to stratagems either to optimize advantages or to offset disadvantages. As a consequence, operations probably will involve stand-off attacks, blockades, hit-and-run actions, delaying actions, feints, raids, ambushes, and hostage-taking. Although not well understood in the modern West, hostage-taking in other parts of the world traditionally serves to intimidate adversaries or to influence negotiations between warring parties. Since it implies at least a temporary cessation of hostilities, negotiating can be a means of loss avoidance or, conversely, force preservation. The holding of hostages can be an important precondition for attaining that purpose.

The source of arms for factional forces varies according to the circumstances of the military buildup. Troops who quit the regime armed forces may bring individual and crew-served weapons with them. Otherwise, factional forces may gain weapons through cross-border trafficking, facilitated by a kindred clan, a commercial group, or a friendly foreign government. The accumulation of arms by the faction may start well before the resort to hostilities. One authority has observed, concerning countries with high instability, that "international arms smuggling usually begins two to five years in advance" of civil war.⁹

Factional armies have at least a rudimentary commissariat system, which allows them to displace and operate at a distance from their base for extended periods of time. Supplies may be carried by humans or animals over concealed routes, offering few opportunities for targeting. Cannibalization of damaged equipment will increase staying power over the near term.

As with criminal organizations, various factors allow for force generation over the longer term. A factional army, after mobilizing the manpower of a kinship group, can enlist support from other sources. One technique would be to appeal to a kindred people, evoking either traditional alliances with their code of mutual obligation or historic symbolism with its aura of sacred national cause. An example of the latter would be the mystique of the Battle of Kosovo, which recalls the steadfastness of the Serb nation in the face of extreme adversity. Another technique for gaining manpower would be to intimidate weaker ethnic groups. To the extent that such potential reinforcements are ready and able to move quickly, a factional army can expand its military strength relatively rapidly.

In the event of prolonged hostilities, a factional army may be able to gain considerable amounts of arms, equipment, and supplies by seizing them from opposing forces in the aftermath of battles, raids, or capitulations. Its logistic burden will be easier, though, if it comes into control of depots or factories that are equipped, or can be retooled, for military production. At a minimum, it will probably improvise, such as in producing explosives from fertilizer. If a factional army has large logistic requirements, it probably will have to retain control of a seaport, airfield, or overland route, depending on the geography involved. Faced with interdiction efforts, it could arrange to have arms and supplies floated ashore in bladders, dropped by parachute, or moved over back roads. In any case, it is likely that resupply operations will rely heavily on camouflage and deception. Foreign contacts will be critical. The faction will have to establish supply networks involving any number of links and conduits. Typical suppliers may include foreign governments and their agencies, commercial middlemen, smugglers, black marketeers, and front organizations (of otherwise legitimate businesses).

To finance its operations, the faction's leadership likely will rely on various complementary means of acquiring money, including donation, taxation, seizure, extortion, and sales of products or services. Likely donors would be friendly foreign governments and wealthy kinsmen living at home or abroad. Within its area of control, the faction could impose a variety of taxes. Aside from the more obvious head tax or market tax, the faction might levy transit fees or an employment tax, for example. Transit fees, similar to customs duties, are imposed on private commerce at ports of entry or at roadblocks. An employment tax, a percentage of wages, is paid by laborers in return for a guarantee of employment or continuation of employment. Apart from friendly sources, the financing effort may be directed at current or former adversaries as well. The latter may be subjected to extortion or to seizure of bank holdings and payrolls, especially when their defenses have lapsed. Regarding sales, the faction may use middlemen and front organizations where it cannot act as a vendor itself. It is quite possible that a peace enforcement contingent could end up procuring, via contractors, the products or services of a hostile faction.

Training within factional forces probably will not conform to any rigorous, formal program due to a lack of ammunition, time, facilities, or other resources. It is possible that over time factional forces could establish a structured training process, but at least initially, training will be improvised. Most requirements for training probably will be created by the acquisition of new weapons through capture, purchase, or outside support. Instructors can be provided from within or outside the factional army. An initial poor showing on the part of factional forces may be rectified over time through training, and the occurrence of such training may be difficult to detect, especially if it is low-profile activity.

The ability to collect and use intelligence also will contribute to the long-term sustainability of the factional army by reducing risk in operational decisionmaking. The faction will not likely possess technologically advanced collection systems, although it may receive sophisticated intelligence support from friendly powers. In most cases, factional forces will rely on an age-old means of intelligence—a network of informers. In many countries the infrastructure for such a network is provided by secret societies or brotherhoods, whose well-established, secure links can be used to pass instructions and receive reports. Otherwise, noncombatant supporters and allies of the faction may have jobs (e.g., driver, expeditor, cleaner) that allow them to obtain information of military significance. Such information can be relayed via agents, messengers, or phone lines, depending on local conditions, thus avoiding electronic transmission and reducing the chance of detection.

Given outside contacts and financing, factional forces probably would be able to obtain technologically advanced weapons, although cost could prevent their acquiring them in large quantities. In exceptional cases, the faction might have sufficient industrial skills to reverse-engineer and produce local versions of foreign-developed systems, probably in limited quantities. Whatever the means of acquisition, the objective most likely would be to obtain only a sufficient number to achieve psychological effects or temporary, local superiority. In most cases, the acquisition of such weapons can be considered a given. The more critical question is effective employment. If supply is limited, the opportunity for testing and practice likewise will be limited. However, such drawbacks may be offset through military advice and assistance from outside sources.

The sources for such support are varied. One source is friendly or otherwise supportive foreign governments, which could help in one of two ways. They may send trainers and technicians, on long- or short-term assignments, to the faction's area of operations, or they may allow the faction to recruit within their borders. Another source of operational and technical expertise is mercenary manpower, which might join the factional forces for monetary, religious, or ideological reasons. Depending on their proficiency, such augmentees could significantly upgrade the capabilities of a factional army.

In Conclusion

This examination of nontraditional threat types is not intended to expound on the various factors of analysis, which would require a small book. Its intent is to bridge a gap in threat awareness. Military planning and intelligence analysis must move beyond the Cold War mind-set and its preoccupation with standing, conventional forces. The framework presented above is intended to prompt further study, reflection, and exposition.

From an operational perspective, the parameters used to examine the three kinds of forces suggest a significant departure from routine order-of-battle factors of analysis. Moreover, much of the relevant information, because of its nature, probably will not be available from military intelligence sources. Planners will have to rely on other US governmental agencies and perhaps on foreign governmental and nongovernmental agencies for the information they seek. In many cases, protocols and procedures for information exchange will have to be established, if the threat parameters described here are accepted as valid.

This framework for analysis requires action in other areas as well. Units preparing for operations other than war should initially be made aware of the expanded intelligence requirements, and over the long term these requirements should be included in doctrinal publications. Units and schools training for such contingencies should be made aware of the full range of relevant threat types, and all types should be included, on a selective basis, in exercise scenarios and threat models. Senior military leaders should sensitize their staffs and subordinate commanders to nontraditional threat parameters, because these are in many instances indicators of an adversary's center of gravity.¹⁰ Successful targeting of that source of the adversary's power may depend on political and economic as well as military means.

NOTES

1. Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, 71 (Winter 1992-93), 36.

2. Among the numerous books on modern Lebanon, two provide excellent insights on factionalism within each of the main confessional groups. These are Helena Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985) and B. J. Odeh, *Lebanon: Dynamics of Crisis* (London: Zed Books, 1985).

3. See S. L. Arnold and David T. Stahl, "A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War," *Parameters*, 23 (Winter 1993-94), 7-8.

4. As defined in FM 100-5 (p. 6-7), center of gravity is "that characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." For commentaries on the application of this concept, see Steven Metz and Frederick M. Downey, "Centers of Gravity and Strategic Planning," *Military Review*, 68 (April 1988), 22-33; and William W. Mendel and Lamar Tooke, "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity," *Military Review*, 73 (June 1993), 2-11.

5. Note that this list differs from the list of mission activities in FM 100-5 since the latter includes some missions which do not involve a hostile situation and excludes others, particularly support to law enforcement, which do.

6. Note that where multiple threat force types are indicated for a mission activity, they may or may not all be present at the same time or place. The chart merely shows the range of possibilities.

7. The following discussion is based on observations of hostilities in various parts of the world over a six-year period. Specific cases and sources are for the most part omitted due to security classification.

8. This paradigm may seem rather simplistic. However, it needs to be so. One is easily overwhelmed by the hundreds of works on *conflict*, which espouse quantitative, behavioralist, and other approaches. The real concern here is the generation of destructive power among "civilians," not the rationalization of its existence.

9. Lyman A. Shaffer, "Illegal Arms Traffic," in *New Dimensions in Transnational Crime*, ed. Donald E. J. McNamara and Philip John Sted (New York: John Jay Press, 1982), p. 115.

10. For a similar suggestion, see William A. Stofft and Gary L. Guertner, *Ethnic Conflict: Implications for the Army of the Future*, Strategic Studies Institute Report (Carlisle: US Army War College, 1994), pp. 12-13. Without discussing indicators, the authors argue for "matching patterns of ethnic conflicts with centers of gravity" that allow for political constraints.