

The Gap Between Leadership Policy and Practice: A Historical Perspective

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In spite of the rapid socio-cultural evolution that has taken place in the United States since its birth as a nation, there has been consistency in US Army policy with respect to leadership. Modern research in the military and social sciences has confirmed the psychological and military validity of the leadership philosophy prescribed by current Army regulations as well as those dating back to the late 18th century. But military leaders have demonstrated a continuing propensity to behave in ways at variance both with policy and with the interests of the service.¹ My purposes in this article are to review the fundamental themes stated in US Army leadership policy since 1778, and to illustrate how practice has regularly, and destructively, departed from them. I will then discuss how military socialization processes have guided new NCOs and officers into behavioral patterns that do not conform to policy, and suggest some ways in which these processes might be changed to bring leadership practice more nearly into consonance with policy.

Leadership Policy, 1778-1990

The origin of leadership policy in the US Army was Baron von Steuben's advice to officers in 1778. Captains and lieutenants were to "gain the love of their men," treat them with "kindness and humanity," and attend to "everything that may contribute to their health and convenience."² Steuben, with his focus on trust, caring, and affection, defined the first of three themes in US Army leadership policy. The earliest regulations published by the War Department (1821) explicitly linked Steuben's concepts with discipline and performance in combat:

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It is the intention of the government . . . that enlisted soldiers shall be treated with particular kindness and humanity; . . . that all in commission shall conduct, direct, and protect inferiors of every rank with the cares due men from whose patriotism, valour, and obedience they are to expect a part of their own reputation and glory. . . .

[E]very superior is strictly enjoined not to injure those under him, by abusive or unbecoming language, or by capricious or tyrannical conduct.

A spirit of good will, and even of brotherhood . . . [is] essential to the good of the service . . . [T]he most conciliatory of manners have been found perfectly compatible with the exercise of the strictest command.³

Between 1857 and 1915 these policies were condensed into two sentences on the first page of *Army Regulations*: "Military authority will be exercised with firmness, kindness, and justice. Superiors are forbidden to injure those under their authority by tyrannical or capricious conduct, or by abusive language."⁴

In 1915 policymakers in a change to *Army Regulations* reaffirmed the importance for military discipline of trust and affection across ranks:

Officers will keep in as close touch as possible with the men under their command and will strive to build up such relations of confidence and sympathy as will insure the free approach of their men to them for counsel and assistance. This relationship may be gained and maintained without relaxation of the bonds of discipline and with great credit to the service as a whole.⁵

With respect to duties of commanders, the US Army *Manual for Commanders of Large Units* (1930) declared: "His first object should be to secure the love of his men by his constant care for their well-being. The devotion that arises from that kind of attention knows no bounds and enables him to exact prodigies of valor on the day of battle."⁶

The second theme of leadership policy has been mutual respect for subordinates as a basis for discipline. Respect grew out of paternalistic concern for preserving soldiers' health and morale so they could fight. The 1841 edition of the *General Regulations* recognized soldiers' needs for social

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support in directing company commanders to keep members of squads together, and to transfer soldiers “for cogent reasons only.”⁷ Respect for the soldier’s off-duty time was reflected in the 1857 and 1889 *Regulations* with limitations on the length of the duty day.⁸

Early in the 20th century the concept of respect for soldiers as individuals began to appear in quasi-official publications. Moss, in his *Officers’ Manual* (1907), reminded officers that soldiers “are members of your profession . . . they are men and should be treated as such. Never swear, because they can only bear it in humiliating silence.”⁹ A military writer in 1918 pointed out a linkage between respect—downward—and discipline: “When you exact respect from soldiers, be sure you treat them with equal respect Consideration, courtesy, and respect from officers toward enlisted men are . . . parts of our discipline.”¹⁰ Official recognition that discipline has its roots in internal psychological processes came in 1928 in regulations that defined it as “that mental attitude and state of training which render obedience and proper conduct instinctive under all conditions.”¹¹ The editors of *The Officer’s Guide* in 1930 noted, “Good discipline results from mutual respect among good men.”¹²

At the beginning of the Second World War, General George C. Marshall wrote in a directive to his army commanders: “In a spirit of mutual respect and cooperation, the Army of the United States must now proceed with its high purpose of melding from the elements of democracy a disciplined, seasoned fighting force.”¹³ The editors of *The Officer’s Guide* in 1941 made explicit the importance of trust as well as mutual respect and affection as a foundation of discipline: “Discipline carries with it the spirit of teamwork and perfect trust.”¹⁴

During the First World War, a third leadership theme emerged: development in subordinates of the ability and confidence to act autonomously to further the fulfillment of the mission. Senior leaders praised the ability of American soldiers acting as individuals to achieve the objectives of their units. One said, “Their discipline during the [First] World War was largely a self-imposed code.”¹⁵ Another added:

The discipline upon which a successful army is built . . . endures when every semblance of authority has vanished . . . and when the only driving power that remains is the . . . spirit of the troops. [The soldier] knows what his comrades can do, and he knows they will always do the right thing.¹⁶

The Second World War demonstrated that discipline based on trust and respect for competent junior leaders enabled small units to

act promptly and aggressively when separated from their main forces or on independent missions requiring long advances and isolated action. During the period of training we must develop resourceful leaders of small units who can

act alone. The platoon leader can only be in one spot at a time, and [the] men must be trained to act correctly on their own.¹⁷

Following the Second World War there developed some uncertainty over the relationship between leadership and discipline. Though policy remained relatively constant, its interpreters oscillated between discipline arising from the brotherhood of soldiers and discipline imposed by superiors requiring unquestioning obedience.¹⁸ In 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the line had become authoritarian: "Military orders must be obeyed"; "The leader must obtain compliance."¹⁹ Concurrently, the 1950 edition of AR 600-10 defined discipline as "the outward manifestation of a mental attitude . . . that made . . . proper conduct . . . instinctive."²⁰ Throughout the Korean War and the following decade, the emphasis was on outward manifestations—looking good in contrast to being good—and on demanding respectful and compliant behavior from subordinates. Language about respect and care for subordinates remained in regulations, but it was not emphasized or amplified.

AR 600-20, published in 1962, gave fresh impetus to the old tradition of respect for subordinates: "Authority will impose its weight by the professional competence of leaders . . . rather than by the arbitrary methods of martinets."²¹ But the same regulation definitively relegated concern for subordinates to almost incidental status: "Every commander has two basic responsibilities in the following priority: accomplishment of his mission, and the care of his personnel and equipment. Normally, efficient accomplishment of the mission will help to satisfy the responsibility for personnel welfare."²²

Following the war in Vietnam, Army policy on leadership reflected confusion about how leaders should behave. In the early 1970s, service schools began to deemphasize training in leadership and focus on technical and tactical subjects. But in 1980 US Army Training and Doctrine Command inaugurated a decade of renewed interest in leadership by assigning the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth responsibility for developing doctrine and coordinating training in leadership throughout the Army.²³ Nonetheless, the 1980 edition of AR 600-20 continued to rank soldiers' welfare on the same level with maintenance of materiel. The paragraph enjoining leaders to build up "relations of confidence and sympathy" with their subordinates—which had been part of Army regulations since 1915—was dropped.²⁴ On the other hand, the 1980 regulation included passages that emphasized respect for subordinates: "Commanders should not rely on coercion when persuasive methods can effect the desired end;" and "Discipline can be seen in . . . mutual respect between senior and subordinate personnel."²⁵

In 1981 a particularized Army "leadership goal" was promulgated. It enjoined leaders to be "committed to mission accomplishment and the well-being of subordinates."²⁶ Though the goal gave greater visibility to

concern for soldiers, the language was vague, pallid, and non-specific compared to that in the regulations of 1915 and earlier. The 1983 edition of FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, is a 300-page potpourri in which the theories of many leadership constituencies are included. The Chief of Staff's White Paper on leadership (*Leadership Makes the Difference*, 1985) is more focused. Both emphasize concepts central to US Army leadership doctrine developed in the 160 years between Washington's encampment at Valley Forge and the beginning of the Second World War. FM 22-102, *Soldier Team Development* (1987), is more succinct than the former, more informative than the latter, and rigorously faithful to Steuben and the 19th-century concepts of leadership. These include competence on the part of leaders; command attention to subordinates' welfare; respect, honesty, and trust both up and down the hierarchy; development of subordinates; and discipline defined as the ability and readiness of junior personnel to use initiative and act correctly in the absence of orders or supervision.²⁷ FM 22-102 comes close to being an American expression of the German notion of *Auftragstaktik*, which refers to decentralized operations based on trust and respect between leader and follower and mutual confidence in each other's competence, judgment, and commitment.²⁸

But the complex nature of leader-follower relations has confused many executors of leadership policy. Leaders and followers can be allies or antagonists at different times and under varying circumstances. This complexity has too often tempted executors of leadership doctrine to seek a simple guiding principle. Regrettably, that principle has sometimes seemed to be that discipline can be achieved only through fear.

Leadership Practice, 1778-1990

During the 19th century, US Army officers writing about their enlisted men described them as "idle and improvident," "drunkards," "the refuse of mankind."²⁹ Many officers treated their men with casual violence, flogged them, and sometimes summarily executed them.³⁰ Though some officers were inspiring leaders who cared for their men in wartime, they were not rewarded for such behavior in peacetime.³¹ Flogging and executions disappeared in the late 19th century, but many officers used courts-martial as a substitute for leadership.³² They perceived rituals of subordination and punctilious enactment of senseless minutiae as manifestations of discipline.³³ Commanders often inspected destructively—criticizing minor discrepancies caustically and tearing up soldiers' displays of equipment.³⁴

Accounts by officers in the peacetime Army in the 19th and the first 40 years of the 20th centuries describe days filled mainly with recreation, sport, and social activities. Official duties occupied but two or three hours per day, and, with notable exceptions, there was little emphasis on study of

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leadership or other aspects of warmaking.³⁵ Of transcendent importance to an officer's career were compliance with administrative procedures and accountability for funds and property.³⁶ Patten's *Army Manual* of 1864 devoted only eight pages to the organization of the army, regiments, and companies, and to the duties of officers in peace and war. It included more than 200 pages describing and illustrating 154 forms required by the Subsistence, Quartermaster, and Adjutant General departments.³⁷ This tradition of according high priority to complex record-keeping has been a persistent distraction, even during combat, throughout the history of the Army.³⁸

Senior officers in wartime often treated subordinates with indifference amounting to brutality. A typical example from the First World War was an order by the commanding general of the 77th Infantry Division to the 1st Battalion, 308th Infantry, to "attack without regard for casualties" under circumstances that, as the battalion commander protested in vain, would lead to the battalion's encirclement and probable destruction for no purpose. The battalion attacked, was cut off, fought bravely for six days, and suffered 54 percent casualties while accomplishing nothing.³⁹ Another division fought well for a month and lost 500 men. Rather than congratulate his troops on their achievements, the commanding general ordered "enforcement of a stricter discipline."⁴⁰ This kind of distant, authoritarian, and even hostile attitude toward subordinates persisted into the Second World War. During the tense days in December 1941, just before the Japanese invaded the Philippines, senior officers routinely ordered their subordinates to accomplish such and such a task, adding "or it's your neck" or a similar threat.⁴¹

Following the Second World War, officers' behavior toward subordinates was the subject of a special investigative commission chaired by Lieutenant General James Doolittle. The commission found that most soldiers perceived that officers were not interested in their subordinates' needs, problems, or welfare; that officers did not give praise for good work; and that officers behaved in snobbish ways toward enlisted personnel.⁴² A more probing study was carried out by a group of social scientists organized by the Army to study soldiers' attitudes during the war. The scientists found that many soldiers perceived that their officers' disrespectful, arrogant, and arbitrary

treatment of them eroded morale, drove men to go AWOL, and destroyed teamwork.⁴³ One example of harassment unrelated to combat effectiveness was the practice of directing soldiers to set aside one set of equipment for inspections only, and never to use it.⁴⁴ On the other hand, in company-sized units in which officers were interested in their men, understood their needs, helped them, recognized their abilities, backed them up, and treated them fairly, morale was high, casualties were lower, and the units were more likely to be cohesive and effective.⁴⁵ Though such enlightened leadership behavior was congruent with doctrine, only a minority of officers had practiced it.

The doctrinal confusion over leadership during the interim between the Second World War and the Korean War was reflected in leaders' behavior. Some leaders believed in "imposing your will . . . even by the martinet method."⁴⁶ Others thought it was better to "keep rank and authority in the background; be informal genial, and friendly."⁴⁷ By the time the conflict began in Korea, authoritarianism was in the ascendant and the command climate was "one of apparent distrust for subordinates."⁴⁸ A participant in the war drew a portrait of many junior officers as unqualified, and of senior officers as self-seeking, incompetent, and indifferent to their men's welfare.⁴⁹ Senior commanders in Korea judged a large proportion of their officers in leadership positions to be "wholly unfitted for troop command."⁵⁰ That mistrust and incompetence among leaders should characterize the Army of 1950 is perhaps surprising given that most sergeants and most officers in the ranks of captain and above had had recent wartime experience. Those leaders who were successful during the Korean War followed doctrine: they trained their troops realistically, put priority on the combat mission and excluded trivia, took care of their subordinates, listened to them, and kept them informed.⁵¹

Studies conducted after the Korean War advocated leadership practices that had effectively been part of Army doctrine since 1820. The studies documented the importance of the leader's professional competence, his readiness to praise good work, his keeping the focus on the mission rather than on eyewash, and his ability to differentiate between failure resulting from ignorance and failure arising out of ill-will.⁵² During the war in Vietnam the leadership practices of an unusually large number of officers, particularly those in the field grades and higher, deviated from policy.⁵³ Lieutenant General William R. Peers, who had held divisional and corps level commands in Vietnam, sent a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, in which he pointed out that officers were shirking responsibility, lying, turning a blind eye to improper behavior by soldiers, commanding from a safe distance, ignoring their men's attitudes, and failing to enforce measures to ensure the troops' safety.⁵⁴ Though this type of behavior was not universal,⁵⁵ it was sufficiently widespread for General Westmoreland to ask the Army War College to investigate the issues of professionalism that General Peers had raised.

The War College's *Study on Military Professionalism* (1970) found that serving officers in all ranks perceived that if they were to achieve personal success they had to please their superiors rather than meet the legitimate needs of their troops or attend to the good of the service. They saw themselves as compelled to attain trivial short-term objectives through dishonest practices that injured the long-term fabric of the organization. The pressure to behave in this way seemed

to stem from a combination of self-oriented success-motivated actions, and a lack of professional skills on the part of middle and senior grade officers A scenario that was repeatedly described . . . [was] an ambitious, transitory commander—marginally skilled in the complexities of his duties—engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflected faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates.⁵⁶

The *Study on Military Professionalism* described the gap between the official values of the US Army and the actual practices of its officers as taught by powerful institutional socialization processes. The gap was not new; describing it without euphemism was. The study recommended a number of actions focused on strengthening officers' technical and tactical knowledge, stabilizing command tours, and encouraging initiative and learning by experience. It described as counterproductive judgmental leadership and the use of statistical indicators as bases for evaluating units and commanders. Some of these recommendations have been incorporated into policy. But research conducted over the past 15 years indicates that behavior at variance with leadership policy is still common.⁵⁷

Growing Effective Leaders

The *Study on Military Professionalism* revealed that Army officers hold ideals about how they should behave in their relationships with peers, superiors, and subordinates. Their ideals are the same as those embodied in policy. Pressures to behave differently come from socialization by an informal culture.⁵⁸ Leaders learn how to lead from those who lead them. They "quickly and simply determine right and wrong based on the values they observe in practice."⁵⁹ If we can reach an understanding of the processes that have led to the creation and perpetuation of informal cultural norms that are at variance with policy, and that are counterproductive, we can begin to devise a set of measures that would support leaders in behaving in ways congruent with policy.

Observations in contemporary US Army units indicate that the salient common characteristic of those few NCOs and officers whose behavior closely follows Army leadership policy is professional confidence.⁶⁰ The bases for

professional confidence in a military leader are knowledge of how to behave in a leadership role, knowledge of the technical aspects of the role, belief that he can trust his superiors to do their utmost to help him fulfill his role effectively, and the perception that his superiors trust him.⁶¹ Professional confidence is the product of interaction between the individual and systemic characteristics of a professional organization; it is not a personality trait. Men and women with a broad range of personalities enter upon leadership roles in the Army. How they behave, and whether they advance or retard the accomplishment of military missions, are largely functions of the socialization they experience in the service.

The socialization of junior leaders begins with their first contacts with the Army. Most new enlisted men and officers approach their time in uniform with foreboding because they are uncertain about whether they will be able to measure up. A traditional way of treating new arrivals in military institutions has been to compound their fears and doubts—e.g. shock treatment in basic training, beast barracks at West Point, derogation as an F.N.G. or “cherry” in Vietnam.⁶² Such approaches are contrary to announced policy, but they persist.⁶³

When a new leader, expecting to find guidance, structure, and support in his unit, encounters indifference, rebuff, and ridicule, his already shaky confidence dissolves. Not knowing what he is expected to know or do, and unsure about the bases and limits of his authority, he is likely to resort to authoritarian practices.⁶⁴ The authors of FM 22-100 cited many such practices as examples of improper leadership: concealing defects from an inspector, commanding through fear, punishing subordinates for the leader’s personal disappointments, making impossible demands.⁶⁵ Such instances are common in the US Army because it is pervaded with a culture of fear; subordinates perceive their superiors as punitive and malevolent, and superiors worry that their subordinates’ behavior will compromise their careers. In such a cultural climate professional confidence withers.

The question for the Army is how to grow the professionally confident leaders who can lead successfully in accordance with Army leadership policy. The behavior and backgrounds of officers and NCOs who have done so suggest two approaches—both of which are directed toward neutralizing the culture of fear and strengthening professional confidence. The first approach is to allow,

*Leaders learn how to lead from those
who lead them.*

and require, leaders to become expert in their fields. In practical terms, this means allowing leaders adequate time in the schoolhouse and in each assigned position to learn enough to feel competent. Learning by floundering embarrasses the leader and worries his subordinates. Lack of professional confidence is the primary reason why leaders behave arbitrarily and focus their attention on the next big event rather than on the long-term development of their personnel and their units. They feel too uncertain to define a long-term program and how to it in the face of their own ignorance and the unrelenting demands from insecure—and therefore unsupportive—superiors.

The schoolhouse is the place to role-play leadership situations to enable a new leader to approach his subordinates with confidence. School is where a leader can learn enough about how his equipment works not to have to fake motor stables, fear a maintenance inspection, or wonder whether his vehicle will function in combat. Field exercises during schooling afford opportunities for a new leader to discover what his weapons and equipment can and cannot do, and what effects terrain and weather have on them. He can continue to learn from his subordinates in his unit, but he will have some cognitive hooks on which to hang the new information, and he will have something to offer his subordinates as well. In peacetime there should be substantive incentives to learn, such as examinations that weigh significantly in determining eligibility for promotion.

The second approach to growing professionally confident leaders is to socialize them under supportive superiors. Supportive socialization is the foundation of *Auftragstaktik*. The commander develops his subordinate's professional competence and judgment so that it is feasible to repose trust in his initiative and grant him discretion in executing mission orders.⁶⁶ A supportive boss is not one who coddles his subordinates, overlooks slovenly performance, or praises mediocrity. He is one who takes the process of socializing his subordinates seriously, listens to them, talks army with them, encourages them to think creatively, and tells them when they are off on the wrong foot. He tries to teach them all he knows, tests them to see if they are getting it, and challenges them to improve on his ideas. He takes responsibility for setting priorities, establishing standards, warding off requirements that compromise unit capability, and creating an active-learning environment for his subordinate leaders. He gives them as much discretion as they can handle, takes the heat when they make mistakes, and works with them on how to do better. He accepts bad news with equanimity, keeps failures in perspective, sets the example in integrity and candor, and tolerates no lying. He respects and trusts his troops, knows and listens to his most junior subordinates, shares their hardships, and requires his subordinate leaders to do so also. He engages his subordinate leaders in addressing together the problems that face the unit, and keeps his and their focus on the outfit's long-term welfare. If a subordinate leader consistently or willfully fails to measure up to generally

accepted standards, the supportive boss quietly and without rancor eliminates him from the Army.⁶⁷

The principle that leaders should take care of their junior enlisted personnel has been acknowledged, if not always implemented, for two centuries. But it is too rarely understood in the US Army that if leaders are to take care of their troops, their commanders have to take care of them. This is the essence of *Auftragstaktik*, and it is an essence that most American military leaders do not acknowledge. For a boss to be supportive, he must have a supportive boss. Being supportive, at any level, entails risk, requires accessibility, and demands patience. It is time-consuming and exhausting. It is not possible to be a supportive boss if one is being harassed by an events-oriented superior, nit-picking inspectors, or higher-level staffs that view their roles as placing requirements on rather than assisting subordinate units.

Trust, respect, and affection across the ranks, taking care of the troops, and developing subordinates have been part of the leadership doctrine of the US Army for 212 years. We have known how to lead, but not enough commanders have done it effectively. Largely because they lacked professional confidence, our military leaders have clung to 18th-century authoritarianism. If the gap between leadership policy and praxis is to be narrowed, leaders need adequate professional preparation and they need supportive commanders. Supportive leadership has to start at the top and go all the way down; one professionally insecure leader in the chain will compromise the command climate for all below him.⁶⁸

NOTES

1. The bases for this assertion are documented in detail in the section on leadership practices that follows. Three typical references are Oscar W. Griswold "Practical Peacetime Leadership" (1931), in *The Infantry Journal Reader*, ed. J. I. Green (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1943), pp. 232-35 for the Army of the 1940s; David H. Hackworth, *About Face* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989) for the Army of the 1950s-1960s; and Faris R. Kirkland et al., *Unit Manning System Field Evaluation*, Technical Report Nr. 5 (ADA 207193) (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, September 1987) for the Army of the 1980s.

2. US Continental Congress, *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, Part 1* (Philadelphia; Styner & Cist, 1779), pp. 138, 141.

3. US War Department, *General Regulations for the Army* (Philadelphia: M. Carey & Sons, 1821), pp. 13, 15, 20.

4. These two sentences were in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the War Department's *Army Regulations* published by Harper & Brothers in 1857 (p. 1); by George W. Childs in 1862 (p. 9); and by the Government Printing Office in 1881 (p. 9), 1889 (p. 1), 1902 (p. 1), 1904 (p. 9), 1908 (p. 9), 1910 (p. 9) 1913, (p. 11), and 1923 (p. 479). They were in AR 600-10 from 1925 until 1958. They were present in AR 600-20 thereafter in modified form.

5. US War Department, Change to Army Regulations No. 35, dated 5 November 1915, applied to *Regulations for the Army of the United States* (Washington: GPO, 1913), p. 11, par. 3. This language appeared in every regulation on discipline until 1980: AR 600-10, 30 June 1925, 16 October 1929, 6 December 1938, 2 June 1942, 8 July 1944 (all par. 3); 15 December 1953, 19 December 1958 (both par. 4); AR 600-20, 3 July 1962, 31 January 1967, (both par. 34e), and 28 April 1971 (par. 5-7e).

6. US War Department, *A Manual for Commanders of Large Units (Provisional), Vol. I Operations* (Washington: GPO, 1930), par. 2.

7. US War Department, *General Regulations for the Army of the United States* (Washington: J. & G. S. Gideon, 1841), p. 11.
8. ~~US War Department, *Regulations for the Army of the United States* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1857), p. 114; and (Washington: GPO, 1889), p. 18.~~
9. James A. Moss, *Officers' Manual* (Menasha, Wisc.: George Banta, 1907), pp. 22-23.
10. C. A. Bach, "Leadership" (1918), in *The Infantry Journal Reader*, ed. J. I. Green (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1943), p. 238.
11. US War Department, Training Regulation 10-5, 15 August 1928, par. 3a; AR 600-10, 2 June 1942, 8 July 1944, 10 November 1950, 15 December 1953, 19 December 1958 (all par. 1); AR 600-20, 3 July 1962 and 31 January 1967 (both par. 28). The wording is slightly changed and discipline is linked with "individual and group training" in AR 600-20, 28 April 1971 and 15 October 1980, par. 5-1.
12. *The Officer's Guide*, 1st ed. (Washington: National Service Publishing Co., 1930 [later editions cited herein published in Harrisburg, Pa., by the Military Service Publishing Co.]), p. 286.
13. US War Department, Mobilization Regulations 1-10, *Morale*, quoted in *The Officer's Guide*, 4th ed. (1941), pp. 47-48.
14. *The Officer's Guide*, 5th ed. (1941), pp. 156-57.
15. *The Officer's Guide*, 1st ed. (1930), p. 4.
16. *The Officer's Guide*, 2d ed. (1936), pp. 299-300.
17. *The Officer's Guide*, 10th ed. (1944), pp. 191-92.
18. *The Officer's Guide*, 12th ed. (1947), p. 240; 13th ed. (1948), p. 247; 14th ed. (1949), pp. 339, 349.
19. *The Officer's Guide*, 15th ed. (1950), pp. 315-17, 327.
20. AR 600-10, 10 November 1950, with change 1 dated 8 May 1951, par. 1.
21. AR 600-20, 3 July 1962, par. 34e.
22. *Ibid.*, par. 10.
23. Robert A. Fitton, "Leadership Doctrine and Training: A Status Report," *Military Review*, 65 (May 1985), 29-41.
24. AR 600-20, 15 October 1980, par. 5-7e.
25. AR 600-20, 28 April 1971, par. 5-7e; 15 October 1980, par. 5-1.
26. Fitton, p.31.
27. US Department of the Army, *Military Leadership*, Field Manual 22-100 (Washington: GPO, 31 October 1983), pp. 16, 29, 32, 34-38, 42, 79, 142, 156, 193-94, 231, 238; *Leadership Makes the Difference*, DA Pamphlet 600-50 (Washington: GPO, 1985); *Soldier Team Development*, Field Manual 22-102 (Washington: GPO, March 1987), pp. v, 33, 36, 39, 47.
28. John T. Nelsen II, "Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle," *Parameters*, 17 (September 1987), 22-27; Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Auftragstaktik: In Its Proper Perspective," *Military Review*, 66 (October 1986), 50-56.
29. Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime 1784-1898* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 194-97; John R. Elting, *American Army Life* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982), p. 55.
30. Coffman, p. 198; Elting, p. 55; William L. Wessels, *Born to Be a Soldier: The Military Career of William Wing Loring of St. Augustine, Florida* (Ft. Worth, Tex.: Texas Christian Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 9-10.
31. Allan R. Millett, *The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army 1881-1925* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 100-06, 140-09.
32. Griswold, p. 235.
33. Thomas R. Phillips, "Leader and Led" (1939), in Green, p. 290.
34. Griswold, pp. 232-33.
35. Coffman, pp. 61-63, 185; Elting, p. 84; Millett, pp. 61, 74-75; William Wallace Ford, *Wagon Soldier* (North Adams, Mass.: Excelsior Printing, 1980), p. 75.
36. Ford, p. 64; Millett, pp. 49-50, 147, 149.
37. George Patten, *Patten's Army Manual Containing Instructions for Officers* (New York: J. W. Fortune, 1864); William H. Powell, *The Army Officer's Examiner* (New York; John Wiley, 1894).
38. For example, on the Philippine Insurrection see Millett, pp. 147, 149; and on the Korean War, see Hackworth, pp. 253, 327.
39. David R. Campbell, *Fighting Encircled: A Study in Leadership* (Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1987), pp. 9-10, 21.
40. Phillips, p. 297.
41. Richard D. Mallonee II, *The Naked Flagpole: Battle for Bataan* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980), pp. 16, 29.

42. US War Department, Bureau of Public Relations, *Report of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships*, May 1946.
43. Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., *The American Soldier. Vol. I: Adjustment During Army Life* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949), pp. 74, 85-87.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 386-87; Samuel A. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier. Vol. II: Combat and Its Aftermath* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949), pp. 49-51, 97, 112-21.
46. *The Officer's Guide*, 12th ed. (1947), p. 240.
47. *The Officer's Guide*, 13th ed. (1948), p. 247.
48. Campbell, p. 92.
49. Hackworth, pp. 46, 56, 58, 142, 228-32, 256, 259-60, 264-65, 283-84.
50. Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, June-November 1950* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), p. 84; see also p. 180.
51. Hackworth, pp. 65, 80, 89-90, 122, 139, 145ff, 161-62, 172, 228ff, 238ff.
52. Carl J. Lange et al., *A Study of Leadership in Army Infantry Platoons* (GWU HRRP RR1) (Presidio of Monterey, Calif.: US Army Leadership Research Unit, November 1958), pp. 33-34; Carl J. Lange and T. O. Jacobs, *Leadership in Army Infantry Platoons, Study II* (GWU HRRP RR5) (Presidio of Monterey, Calif.: US Army Leadership Research Unit, July 1960), pp. 37-38.
53. Cincinnatus [pseud.], *Self-Destruction* (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 65-70, 109-10, 151-52; Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1978), pp. 43-46, 56, 71-72, 80-86; William L. Hauser, *America's Army in Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 69, 96-108.
54. William R. Peers, "Leadership Requirements in a Counterinsurgency Environment," enclosure to memorandum for Chief of Staff, US Army, subject: The Son My Incident, dated 18 March 1970. Quoted in Cincinnatus, pp. 195-8.
55. James Jay Carafano. "Officership 1966-1971," *Military Review*, 69 (January 1989), 45-52.
56. US Department of the Army, *Study on Military Professionalism* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, 1970), pp. iii-iv.
57. Larry H. Ingraham, *The Boys in the Barracks* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1983); Faris R. Kirkland et al.; David H. Marlowe, *New Manning System Field Evaluation*, Technical Report Nr. 1 (ADA 162087) (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1 November 1985); J.A. Simonsen et al., "Excellence in the Combat Arms," *Military Review*, 65 (June 1985), 19-29.
58. The strength of the culture is evident in the fact that the *Study on Military Professionalism* was kept under wraps—away from the eyes of military officers as well as the public—for 13 years.
59. John C. Krysa, "Values: The Key to Unlocking Combat Power," *Military Review*, 67 (December 1987), 27.
60. The assertion that few leaders follow leadership policy is based on eight years of observation and interviewing in more than 100 battalions by the staff of the Department of Military Psychiatry of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research in response to taskings from the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and Commanding General of Training and Doctrine Command. See note 57 for representative reports.
61. Faris R. Kirkland, *Leading in COHORT Companies*. Report NP-88-13 (Washington: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 21 December 1987). See also FM 22-102. Trust is portrayed therein as the central theme of team-building, but it is discussed as an aspect of the relationship between leaders and private soldiers; it is equally important between leaders and their superiors.
62. For a description of "shock treatment" and the attitudes it embodies, see George C. Wilson, *Mud Soldiers* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), pp. 43-47, 92-102, 127-30, 172-73, 196-97.
63. FM 22-102, pp. 16-18, 24.
64. Norman F. Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), pp. 256-75.
65. FM 22-100 (1983), pp. 20-21, 74-75, 97, 100-03, 186-87.
66. Nelsen, pp. 24-26.
67. Compare this set of behavior with Nelsen's exposition of the evolution and purpose of *Auftragstaktik*, and with Echavarría's quotations from German practitioners.
68. Millett develops in superb detail in his biography of Bullard how General Pershing, anxious about the opinion French and British generals would have of American officers, initiated from the top a climate of fear that made supportive leadership almost impossible in the AEF.