THESIS

OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT BRAVO: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE ODB’S ADVISORY ROLE IN SUPPORT OF FID/COIN OPERATIONS

by

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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The United States (U.S.) military’s joint doctrine defines Irregular Warfare (IW) as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. [IW] favors indirect asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”\(^1\) The current operational environment and the future strategic estimate for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) presents the military with global IW challenges.\(^2\) There are five primary missions associated with IW\(^3\): Foreign Internal Defense (FID),\(^4\) Counterinsurgency (COIN),\(^5\) Unconventional Warfare (UW),\(^6\) Counterterrorism (CT),\(^7\) and Stability Operations (SO).\(^8\) Recently, policy makers


\(^2\) ADM Olson, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), stated that “[o]ur national security is threatened not only by terrorists and terrorist organizations, but also by fragile states either unwilling or unable to provide for the most basic needs of their people…stresses on underdeveloped and developing nations and societies, which in turn create regional instability and unrest. Eric Olson, “A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare,” Security Affairs Spring (2009):16, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/16/olson.php (accessed 01 August 2009).

\(^3\) From a IW briefing delivered by U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) staff officers for the IW conference held at Fort Bragg, NC. The briefing was provided by COL David Maxwell, G3—USASOC, in personal email correspondence.


\(^5\) Ibid., 137. Counterinsurgency (COIN) “are those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”

\(^6\) Unconventional Warfare (UW) “includes activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area”(CDR USSOCOM approved definition of UW, sent in an email sent to the LTG Mulholland, USASOC Cdr on 11 June 2009).


\(^8\) Ibid., 515. Stability Operations (SO) include “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”
declared that a key component to protecting U.S. interests at home and abroad includes an indirect approach to defeating lawlessness, international terrorism, and insurgent movements by providing advisory assistance to host nation (HN) security forces and local/regional government leaders. This advisory effort is called FID, and it is intended to boost a HN’s ability to prevent or defeat domestic and transnational insurgent movements that are operating within the HN’s sovereign borders. The HN’s overarching campaign to prevent or defeat these insurgent movements is called COIN. U.S. sponsored FID contributes to the HN government’s ability to take the lead in conducting an effective and sustainable COIN campaign. An effective and sustainable COIN campaign includes creating or assisting security forces and civic administrators to outperform the insurgents’ ability to control the populace. A sustainable and capable COIN security force is one that has the ability, at every level, to coordinate/execute operations against insurgents while protecting the population from insurgent attacks and/or intimidation.

U.S. Special Forces (USSF), with its structure and training, has historically led, and will continue to, lead FID endeavors for the U.S. DoD. Within USSF, Operational Detachment “B”s (ODB) have served, and will continue to, serve as both a command and control (C2) and an advisory element to ensure that USSF FID supports HN COIN strategies. This thesis will refer to the combined effort as “FID/COIN” although FID and COIN are separate missions under the U.S. military’s IW construct. Given that FID/COIN will be the primary operational role of USSF for the next decade coupled with the fact that ODBs function as the organizational entity responsible for synchronizing advisory efforts from the tactical to the operational level of warfare, this thesis will examine ODB employment, both past and present, to inform the reader on the ODB’s

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10 Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a similar concept to FID. Defined as “unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority,” Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual, 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance. (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009), 1–1. By doctrine, general purpose forces conduct SFA with Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) or imbedded advisory teams. The term SFA has gained notoriety, but it is still not included in USSF doctrine.
potential to contribute in FID/COIN operations. This thesis uses USSF doctrine and case studies from four distinctly different FID/COIN operations in: the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Republic of the Philippines (RP) to inform the reader on the ODB’s operational advisory capability with indigenous forces and local/regional government leaders at a level nested above its subordinate Operational Detachment “A”s (ODA).

The term nested, with regard to military operations, denotes mutually supporting plans and/or actions in which each level of command supports the plan of its next higher headquarters (HQ). GEN William E. Depuy, the first U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander, made the analogy that nested military concepts are like “mixing bowls in a kitchen. Each must fit within the confines of the larger and accommodate the next smaller and so on down to the squad, the tank, and the brave soldier himself.”11 To say that ODBs should assume advisory roles at a level nested above their subordinate ODAs means that at whatever level the ODA is operating (example: HN battalion), the ODB must operate at one echelon above (example: HN regiment comprised of two or more battalions) so that the HN COIN campaign is integrated from the tactical through the operational level of warfare.

The purpose of examining USSF doctrine for this thesis is three-fold: (1) it provides context to understand how USSF changed its doctrine from a UW mission to a two-part mission consisting of UW and FID/COIN, (2) it demonstrates how the founders of USSF envisioned the role of the “B” detachment as an operational advisory element, and (3) it helps to determine whether or not doctrine adequately addresses the ODBs’ potential to contribute in the FID/COIN arena.

The authors selected the case studies for the following reasons: (1) they demonstrate ODB advisory efforts at different stages in FID/COIN and (2) they describe how ODBs have operated in four distinctly different operational environments. The Republic of Vietnam (RVN) case study examines ODB employment in USSF’s first major FID/COIN operation. This first case study reveals a plan to broaden the ODBs’

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roles in order to better integrate the U.S. Government’s efforts with the RVN’s COIN strategy. The case study from OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) examines how ODB 520 operated in Iraq in March of 2003. ODB 520 transitioned from a unilateral direct action role hunting SCUD missiles to conducting advisory assistance in Ar Rutbah to restore stability following major combat operations. The third case study comes from OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan in 2004. This case study examines ODB advisory efforts in a maturing FID/COIN environment. In the OEF case study, the ODB advised several different militias tasked with stabilizing the Qalat region of eastern Afghanistan. This case study addresses how the advisory effort evolved from advising militias into training, advising, and legitimizing the newly formed Afghan National Army (ANA). The final case study comes from OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM – PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) in which ODB 110 advised a standing professional military from a sovereign nation that was (and still is) engaged in a protracted COIN campaign. This case study from OEF-P demonstrates the ODB’s ability to conduct advisory assistance in COIN environments with the HN taking the lead role in defeating insurgents.

The thesis will begin with background information defining the role and importance of ODBs in FID/COIN operations. The authors will then present a historic analysis of the ODB to show why the founders of USSF designed Special Forces Groups (SFG) to have ODBs and how ODBs were intended to be employed. Following the historical analysis, the thesis will include a doctrinal study of USSF field manuals from 1951 to 2001. The doctrinal study will provide a historic framework for ODB task organization, missions, and employment over the past half century. The authors will then present four case studies about ODBs operating in markedly different FID/COIN environments. Drawing from the doctrinal analysis and the case studies, the authors will offer recommendations on ODB training and manning in order to improve USSF’s capability in present and future COIN/FID operations.
Throughout this thesis, pseudonyms will be used when referring to soldiers of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) and below who are still on active duty. If the soldier is retired or no longer on active duty, their true name is used. The purpose of using these pseudonyms is to protect their identity.

While there is a significant amount of historic data regarding USSF and ODAs in particular, the ODB is a relatively unexamined operational entity of U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s (USASOC) forces. However, from the inception of USSF in 1952 to present, ODB’s have represented a unique stratum in the organizational structure of Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations. In fact, LTG David Fridovich, a career USSF officer and the Director, Center for Special Operations (CSO) at United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has said that because “ODBs offer a regional coordination and advisory piece” they “are the most important operational level in SF [USSF].”

The current task organization of each Special Forces Group - Airborne (SFG) resembles conventional force nomenclature and structure while maintaining its unique organizational design to conduct all facets of IW. Each regionally affiliated SFG includes three battalions (3rd and 5th SFGs recently activated a fourth battalion). The modern USSF battalion, depending upon its operational role, may take on several different titles: Operational Detachment “C” (ODC), Forward Operating Base (FOB), and Special Operations Task Force (SOTF). Within each USSF battalion, there are three operational companies. The USSF Company, depending upon its operational role, may take on several different titles: Operational Detachment “B” (ODB), B-Team, B-detachment, Advanced Operating Base (AOB), and Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE). From this point forward, this thesis will refer to this element as the ODB. Within each ODB, there are six Operational Detachments “A” (ODA). The ODA has been and remains the primary operational element for all USSF operations. See Figures 1, 2, and 3 for the current USSF task organization charts.

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12 Quote from a conversation between the authors and LTG David Fridovich on August 20, 2009, during a discussion at the 1st Regimental Formation, Fort Bragg, NC.
Figure 1. Line Wire Diagram of a current Special Forces Group (Airborne)<sup>13</sup>

Figure 2. Line Wire Diagram of a current Special Forces Battalion<sup>14</sup>

Figure 3. Line Wire Diagram for a current Special Forces Company (ODB)<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 3–17.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 3–25.
By design and by doctrinal decree, the ODB’s organizational capacity enables it to: (1) assume operational and advisory roles similar to an ODA, (2) provide C2 and synchronization to multiple ODAs much like an ODC, and (3) provide logistical, intelligence, and communications capabilities that are comparable to that of an ODC, although on a smaller scale. The ODB’s structure and amalgam of skilled personnel empowers it to be an integral IW entity.

USSF doctrine has undergone distinct changes over the past fifty-plus years. As with all U.S. Army doctrine, USSF doctrine has evolved given the changing strategic environment and the need to incorporate lessons learned from operational deployments and the joint training centers. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines doctrine as the “fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application.”

USSF expends manpower and funding to ensure that doctrine remains relevant.

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II. HISTORIC EXAMINATION OF THE ROLES AND
DOCTRINE OF ODBS FROM 1951–2009

The Department of the Army officially approved the formation of the 10th Special Forces Group—Airborne (SFG) on June 20, 1952.\(^{17}\) This determination came after years of staff work by MG Robert McClure,\(^{18}\) BG Russell Volckmann,\(^{19}\) and COL Aaron Bank\(^{20}\) as members of the Psychological Warfare Department on the U.S. Army Staff.\(^{21}\) The organizational and functional concept for USSF originated with the resistance campaigns undertaken by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, with its Jedburgh teams in German-occupied France and Belgium and with Detachment 101 in Japanese-occupied Burma. While the OSS’s level of contribution to the Allies’ victory is a matter of historic debate, the fact remains that military leaders and U.S. policy makers identified the operational and strategic potential of Unconventional Warfare (UW) in a war with the Soviet Union in Europe.

COL Aaron Bank, commonly accepted as the father of modern-day USSF, wrote the book, *From OSS to Green Berets*. Released in 1987, this book provides a first-hand account of the process of standing up 10th SFG. COL Bank’s account, along with early USSF doctrine and secondary sources about the history of USSF, provide a foundation for understanding the ODB’s initial force structure and operational roles. The initial task organization of what is now called an ODB comes from the operational groups (OG) of the OSS. In his book, COL Bank remarks that “[a]s guidelines, I considered the

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\(^{18}\) MG Robert McClure—The commander of the U.S. Army’s Psychological Warfare Division. MG McClure worked in the information operations/control field during and after WWII. He assembled the team and lead the process to stand up UW capability in the U.S. Army. Alfred H. Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare, Its Origins* (Kansas: University Press, 2002) 93–94.


\(^{21}\) Sutherland, 17.
capabilities and operational record of the only fixed or standard type of formation that we had in OSS. These were the three-man Jedburgh teams and the thirty-man operational groups (OG’s).”

This statement from COL Bank addresses the establishment of a “B” detachment that would operate at a higher echelon than the “A” detachments. COL Bank declared that the OSS’s OG concept led to USSF’s structure of “[t]en “A” teams [that] would compose a company.” In turn, three companies would be subordinate to one “B” team. Furthermore, COL Bank envisioned that “[t]he “B” team would be allocated a much larger sector and would coordinate and assist the activities of a number of “A” teams. And the very limited number of “C” teams would function with the upper indigenous (national and most important regional) echelon of a target country.” COL Bank’s descriptions reveal the framework for the modern ODB and the importance of nested advisory assistance.

MG McClure, BG Volckmann, and COL Bank did not design USSF to be a FID/COIN force but rather a UW force. As a result, the initial structure was designed to build a resistance movement, not advise/train/assist a force capable of defeating an insurgent element. However, early USSF doctrine recognized that UW-related skills and training transitioned well into FID/COIN because of comparable requisite traits including: cultural awareness, language ability, and ingenuity.

The initial USSF group structure used naming conventions different from the SFGs of today. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 31-20, U.S. Army Special Forces Group, from 1955 was the first doctrine for USSF. According to the 1955 FM the SFG would have three “provisional battalions.” The term “provisional” was used because the doctrine was written to explain how the unit would look when it was advising an indigenous (provisional) guerilla force. The provisional battalions were called Team

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22 Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets. (New York: Pocket Books, 1987), 176.
23 Ibid., 177.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
Forward-Cs (FCs). The term FC is equivalent to the current ODC (USSF battalion). Within each FC, there were five provisional companies called FBs. The FB is the equivalent of the modern ODB. In turn, each FB commanded 8 FAs which were the precursor to today’s ODA. Figure 4 represents the line wire diagram for an SFG in accordance with (IAW) 1955 doctrine:

![Line Wire Diagram for a 1955 SFG task organization](image)

The following is the first doctrinal mission statement for a “B” team in 1955:

“[t]he team FB infiltrates to a designated area within the enemy’s sphere of influence and organizes a district command composed of two or more guerrilla regiments and/or performs such other related missions as directed.”

From this first ODB mission statement it is apparent that the architects of USSF envisioned the “B” team as an advisory element designed to play an operational role in an environment presently known as IW.

Standing up the 10th SFG provided the starting point for the formation of the Special Forces Regiment that, by 2009, would consist of five active duty SFGs (1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 10th) and two National Guard SFGs (19th and 20th). While organizational structure, naming conventions, and doctrine (discussed, in-depth, later in this chapter)

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28 Ibid., 37.
evolved over USSF’s now 57-year history, USSF remains the only U.S. DoD Title 10 force that was, and is, specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct UW.

Given that doctrine is considered a key component in the U.S. military profession, the founders of USSF understood the importance of establishing doctrine in order to compete for legitimacy in the U.S. Army. Prior to 1951, the U.S. Army did not have any Irregular Warfare (IW) related doctrine.

The first field manuals (FM) addressing Unconventional Warfare (UW) came out in 1951 with the publication of *Field Manual 31-20, Operations Against Guerilla Forces*, and *FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare*. Applying 2009 joint definitions, *FM 31-20* can be said to be the first FID/COIN manual and *FM 31-21* is the first UW manual. However, because the authors wrote the 1951 FM prior to the formation of USSF, there is no mention of ODBs or any other equivalent structure. The 1951 FM’s biggest contribution is that it was the first U.S. Army doctrine to address COIN operations.

*FM 31-20, U.S. Army Special Forces Group*, published in 1955, was the first FM to focus specifically on USSF, its task organization, its core tasks, and its command relationships. As stated before, the FB’s mission statement in 1955 was to infiltrate “to a designated area within the enemy’s sphere of influence and organizes [sic] a district command composed of two or more guerrilla regiments and/or performs such other related missions as directed.” It is important to note that, although this mission statement reflects the ODB’s UW mission in 1955, the founders of USSF understood the importance of a nested advisory effort for FBs and FAs. The FA’s mission statement is similar to that of an FB except that FAs were to organize one regimental sized guerrilla force while the FB was to organize “two or more.” The doctrine writers recognized that in UW, just as in FID/COIN, it is important for the ODB to advise host nation (HN)

29 Title 10 Code of the U.S. Code outlines the legal roles of the U.S. Armed Forces as declared by the U.S. Congress.


31 The 1955 mission statement for an FA reads: “The team FA infiltrates to a designated area within the enemy’s sphere of influence and organizes a guerrilla regiment and/or performs such other related missions as directed.” Headquarters, Department of the Army, *U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20, U.S. Army Special Forces*. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 35.
forces at the next level above the ODA. Presumably, in accordance with 1955 doctrine, the single guerrilla regiment that the FA was to advise would operate under the control of a division (consisting of multiple regiments) that the FB was to advise. This is because, only through multi-echelon advisory assistance, can the HN’s tactical units plan/execute shaping and decisive operations which support the HN government’s countrywide COIN campaign.

The U.S. Army published the 1958 FM 31-20, *Guerilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations*, with only minor changes from the 1955 edition. With regard to the FB, the only noteworthy addition from the 1955 FM was a specific portion addressing nested advisory roles at the A, B, and C levels. According to the 1958 FM 31-20, in an effective and holistic UW campaign, the FB:

(need ellipses because quote start not a complete sentence)...has the capability of providing a district command organization to supervise the employment and control of two or more FA teams...[d]uring the early stages the FB team may be employed as an FA team prior to the requirement for a district command organization.32

The 1958 FM’s mention of the importance of integrated advisory assistance at multiple levels emphasizes the fact that the FBs were to ensure continuity of effort for their subordinate FAs.

While a majority of the 1961 FM remained unchanged from the 1958 version, there were significant changes to the table of organization and equipment (TOE) and unit designations. This FM ceased to refer to battalions, companies, and detachments as FCs, FBs, and FAs, respectively. The 1961 edition stated that the SFG had four companies (comparable to today’s battalion), each commanded by a lieutenant colonel (LTC/O-5). Every company had three Operational Detachments “B,” each commanded by a major (MAJ/O-4). In turn, each ODB had four Operational Detachments “A,” each one commanded by a captain (CPT/O-3).33 Figure 5 shows the 1958 task organization of a

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33 Ibid., 21.
SFG, and Figure 6 shows the 1958 task organization of a USSF company with its three subordinate ODBs.

Figure 5. Line Wire Diagram for a 1961 SFG task organization

Figure 6. Line Wire Diagram for a 1961 SF Company task organization

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In 1961, the ODB’s TOE swelled to 18 men, including an officer for each staff section: Executive Officer (XO), Adjutant (S1), Intelligence (S2), Operations (S3), and Logistics (S4). The ODB continued to have operational components similar to those of an ODA, but it now gained the staff functions of an ODC. Figure 7 is a graphical representation of an ODB TOE in 1961. Presumably, this TOE change was intended to have ODBs become more self-sufficient operational advisory elements.

Figure 7. TOE for a 1961 ODB

As the advisory role in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) became a priority in 1965, the U.S. Army updated *FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations*. This update added five additional Soldiers to the ODB, giving it 23 personnel. Figure 8 is a graphical representation of a 1965 ODB. Specifically, the modified TOE provided the ODB with more radio/communications specialists (note the duty description at the bottom row of the picture in Figure 8 – “CH RAD OP”).

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37 Ibid., 24.
Shortly after 5th SFG assumed command of USSF operations in South Vietnam, its leaders attempted to generate greater synergy among its operational detachments by creating and relying upon more ODBs. The ODB’s doctrinal mission in 1965 read:

[T]he operational detachment B likewise has the capability for and staff responsibilities [sic], however, to a slightly lesser extent than the C detachment. The B detachment has a training capability and, as such, is suited for commitment to those areas where training as well as command and control are of equal importance.


The 1965 FM 31-21 was the first field manual to address, in depth, the advisory role of USSF in FID/COIN operations. The Vietnam conflict forced USSF to shift its emphasis from UW to conducting FID in support of the RVN government’s COIN campaign. The following excerpt from the 1965 FM indicates an adaptation of doctrine amidst an ongoing war:

Certain Special Forces units are highly trained in both [UW] and [COIN] and have the capability of providing planning, training, advice, and operational assistance to selected indigenous forces in counterinsurgency operations. The utilization of [USSF] personnel in this mission is a valuable adjunct to the [COIN] capabilities of MAAG’s, Missions [sic], and unified commands. When adequately augmented by professional skills not found in the [SFGA], [USSF] can provide specialized advisory assistance in the solution of internal defense problems through a combination of advisory, psychological, and military civic action measures. The [SFGA], operating with civil affairs, psychological operations, military intelligence, signal, military police, medical, and engineer units can be formed into a special action force (SAF) which is a specially trained, tailored, and an immediately available U.S. Army [COIN] force. 41

The 1965 FM is significant because it addressed the importance of advisory assistance to political leadership. More specifically, the doctrine stipulated that USSF should assist in “training, advising, and providing operational assistance for host country military forces [and] civilian agencies engaged in [COIN] operations.” 42 Just as ODBs were to advise HN security forces at the next higher level than their subordinate ODAs, so too were they to assist HN political leaders at a higher echelon. As a result of ongoing COIN operations in South Vietnam, the 1965 authors indicated that ODAs as well as ODBs needed to “act as advisors to indigenous special forces, provincial authorities, and tribal leaders in the recruitment, organization, equipping, training, and operational employment of host country tribal elements or ethnic minority groups.” 43

42 Ibid., 181.
43 Ibid.
After several years of FID/COIN operations in the RVN, the Special Warfare Center (SWC) released an updated *FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations* in 1969. The 1969 edition of FM 31-21 featured a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for SFGs which used the same naming conventions and basic structure still used today. SFGs consisted of three battalions with three companies per battalion. The 1969 TOE marked the largest ODB in the history of USSF doctrine. Each company had 24 Soldiers (an increase of one Soldier from the 1965 FM) and their TOE was specifically designed to “provide for two distinct organizations: the company headquarters as organized for the conduct of UW or stability [FID] operations; and the company headquarters as organized for direct action missions.”  

Figure 9 is a graphical representation of the ODB’s TOE in 1969.

Figure 9. TOE for a 1969 ODB, largest ODB in USSF doctrinal history with 24 soldiers; current ODB has 11 soldiers

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The 1969 FM dedicated an entire section to the “[e]mployment of Special Forces in Stability Operations.”\textsuperscript{46} Although this had been addressed in previous doctrine, the updates in 1969 included additional guidance for USSF’s role as advisors for “lower echelon host country government officials.”\textsuperscript{47} ODBs were directed to “provide advisory and training assistance in functional fields that are of military or civil concern to province and district level governments. An important advantage gained by this employment is that it provides training and operational assistance to paramilitary or irregular forces maintained and directed by the province or district government.”\textsuperscript{48}

USSF doctrine changed little from 1969-1990. As the U.S. ended its involvement in South Vietnam and leaders re-focused on a conventional war in Europe against the Soviet Union, the emphasis on COIN decreased. The Special Warfare Center (SWC) released an updated version of FM 31-20 in 1977 with no significant updates to the 1969 edition. SWC did not update USSF doctrine until 1990.

The 1990 FM 31-20 \textit{Doctrine for Special Forces Operations} reflected the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. For the first time, USSF doctrine included the notion of a spectrum of conflict and the changing core missions of USSF to: direct action (DA),\textsuperscript{49} special reconnaissance (SR),\textsuperscript{50} UW, FID, civil affairs (CA),\textsuperscript{51}


\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 10–3.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{49} Direct Action - DA operations are normally short-duration operations with a limited scope requiring an SFODA to infiltrate a denied area, attack a target, and conduct a preplanned exfiltration. Headquarters, Department of the Army, \textit{U.S. Army Field Manual, 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations}. (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), 2–12.

\textsuperscript{50} Special Reconnaissance - SR operations are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SF, unilaterally or through surrogate or indigenous forces. The objective of SR operations is to confirm, refute, or obtain—by visual observation or other collection methods—information on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy. Ibid., 2–15.

\textsuperscript{51} Civil Affairs- Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Ibid., 88.
psychological operations (PSYOPS),\textsuperscript{52} CT, and humanitarian assistance (HA).\textsuperscript{53} UW remained the cornerstone of 1990 doctrine. However, the 1990 FM emphasized USSF’s ability to serve as an agile force in a rapidly changing operational environment. The 1990 FM outlined the specific functions of the SF Company:

- Plan and conduct SF operations separately or as part of a larger force.
- Train and prepare SF teams for deployment.
- Infiltrate and exfiltrate specified operational areas by air, land, or sea.
- Conduct operations in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods with minimal external direction and support.
- Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise or direct indigenous forces of up to regimental size in SO [special operations].\textsuperscript{54}

In addition to its SF-specific missions, the 1990 FM outlined several USSF missions in support of conventional force operations. This doctrinal trend towards greater conventional force interoperability came as a result of: (1) integrated USSF/conventional force rotations to the national training centers, (2) USSF becoming an official branch of the U.S. Army in 1987, rather than a collection of units with Soldiers and officers coming from the primary branches (infantry, armor, etc.), and (3) an Army-wide push towards combined arms warfare meant to better integrate light, mechanized, special operations, indirect fire, and air mobile forces.

By 1990, the ODB TOE receded from the 24 personnel in 1969 to just 11. This included the reduction of all formal staff functions. The decreased numbers likely resulted from several factors, including: (1) decreased slots for USSF; full strength ODAs

\textsuperscript{52} Psychological Operations- Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Headquarters, Department of the Army, \textit{U.S. Army Field Manual, 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations}. (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), 442–443.

\textsuperscript{53} Humanitarian Assistance - Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Ibid., 249.

took priority over large ODBs, (2) one of the ODB’s primary lines of operation (LOO) at this time was to serve as a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) for conventional force operations; 24 personnel were not required to fulfill this requirement, and (3) the role of USSF in U.S. Army doctrine declined as conventional warfare returned to primacy.

The most significant addition to this FM was the introduction of FID as a component of HN Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) efforts. The IDAD concept focused on “the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”\textsuperscript{55} Furthermore, “[t]he IDAD strategy [was] founded on the assumption that the [HN] is responsible for the development and execution of programs to prevent or defeat an insurgency.”\textsuperscript{56} With regard to FID, the 1990 FM stated that USSF units were to “advise, and assist HN military and paramilitary forces. The intent is to improve the tactical and technical proficiency of these forces so they can defeat the insurgency without direct U.S. involvement.”\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, the 1990 FM declared that ODBs were to help run the provincial area coordination center.\textsuperscript{58}

In 2001, the SWC released the first edition of \textit{FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations}. The 2001 edition marked the first significant update to USSF doctrine in eleven years. With the addition of updates in 2004 addressing the SOF joint planning and targeting process, this FM represents current USSF doctrine. Figure 10 is a graphical representation of the TOE for an ODB in accordance with 2001 doctrine.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 10–2.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 10–7.
A classified version of *FM 3-05.20, 2009* is in draft form and has not yet been released. The 2009 version will likely include ODB TOE changes as a result of recent and predicted operational employment. However, the ODB’s mission statement and specified tasks with respect to advisory assistance will not change substantially in the 2009 version of *FM 3-05.20*.60

The 2001 edition was the latest doctrine available to USSF at the beginning of OIF, OEF, and OEF-P. The 2001 FM addresses the criticality of FID/COIN as a component of U.S. military engagement. Specific to ODBs, the 2001 FM states that:

> [t]he SF Company plans and conducts SO activities in any operational environment-permissive, uncertain, or hostile…The SF Company commander, an experienced SF major…functions with its own operational

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60 Interview with CW3 John Monty (pseudonym) of the Special Warfare Director of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC on 18 August 2009.
detachment with its own assigned mission…[d]uring operations SFODB’s [act] as area commands providing C2 to the SFODAs.\textsuperscript{61}

The 2001 FM provides specified tasks for ODBs. While there are several tasks, two in particular support the ODB’s operational advisory role. In accordance with 2001 doctrine, ODBs “conduct operations in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods with minimal external direction and support [and] develop, organize, equip, train and advise or direct indigenous forces up to regiment size in SO [special operations] activities.”\textsuperscript{62} The mission statement, coupled with the tasks specified, supports the notion that ODBs remain doctrinally charged with fulfilling a nested advisory role above their ODAs in FID/COIN environments.

With respect to ODBs, USSF doctrine, despite its TOE changes and its evolving emphasis on FID/COIN rather than on UW alone, has changed little. The ODB mission statement in 2001 resembles the 1955 mission statement for a FB. The only notable difference is that the 2001 FM includes several additional tasks that the ODB must accomplish with regard to C2 and liaison with conventional forces.

Although the strategic environment has changed, the doctrinal decree that ODBs maintain the capability to serve as operational advisory elements has not changed.


\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 3–27.
III. CASE STUDIES

A. THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

*It may be time to change the “name of the game” as far as the overall view of how [USSF] are to be used in the Cold War. I seriously question the need for all of our [USSF] efforts and resources being trained for [a UW] role in the world today. My experience in Vietnam has convinced me that a major portion of these resources should be redirected toward the [COIN] side of the house.*

– COL John Spears, from his Commander’s Briefing Letter (1964–1965) as the outgoing 5th SFGA Cdr.63

1. Introduction

With a few noteworthy exceptions, a majority of USSF’s operations have been in support of FID/COIN with HN security forces and politicians. While some FID/COIN missions have included single-ODA missions to a country for training in skills such as: patrolling, shooting, raids, and airborne operations, other FID/COIN missions such as OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti in 1994 included five ODBs commanding “30 SFODAs which made up the entire U.S. presence outside Port-au-Prince, the capital city, and the city of Cap Hatien. This presence encompassed 90 percent of Haiti’s land area and was the peacekeeping effort for approximately 90 percent of Haiti’s 5 million Haitians.”64 However, it was the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), USSF’s first FID/COIN operation, which earned USSF its notoriety as an IW force.

A study of ODB operations in South Vietnam leads to two conclusions: (1) ODBs functioned very similarly to their subordinate ODAs and (2) USSF’s role as a FID/COIN force, rather than as a UW force as it was intended, placed unforeseen stresses on the organizational structure. Although USSF operated in the RVN from 1956–1971, this


case study examines ODBs’ general roles in the RVN after 5th SFG arrived in 1964. This time frame and limited scope encapsulates only a fragment of USSF’s operations in South Vietnam. The purpose of this look at ODBs in the RVN is to highlight ODB employment under 5th SFG in USSF’s first FID/COIN campaign.

2. Background

There are hundreds of books, journal articles, and even a movie starring John Wayne about the exploits of the “Green Berets” in the RVN. The breadth of USSF’s missions in South Vietnam is significant by any measure, but many historians agree that USSF’s most significant contribution to the campaign was that they “trained, and fielded the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups [CIDG] that fought a large share of the war throughout the most threatened regions of Vietnam.” Furthermore “[n]ot only did [USSF] organize these troops for their intended role of local village security, but [USSF] also employed them as line infantry in crucial battles of 1965 and Tet-68.”

3. Task Organization

While the role and criticality of ODBs in the RVN from 1956-1971 is relatively unheralded when compared to the exploits of ODAs, ODB contributions are not entirely undocumented. Much of the difficulty in piecing together ODBs’ lines of operation (LOO) comes from the non-doctrinal structure and ad hoc troop rotations of USSF until 5th SFG became the official group headquarters on October 1, 1964 under the command of COL John H. Spears. Prior to 5th SFG’s arrival, USSF detachments and individual Soldiers rotated into and out of the RVN on a temporary duty status (TDY) for 180 days at a time from Okinawa, Japan or Fort Bragg, NC. As a result, there was little continuity and synergy among ODBs and ODAs until 5th SFG arrived. In the summer of 1965, 5th

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65 Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) – Initially started by the CIA in the early 1960’s it was “one of the most successful innovations in [COIN]” until Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV) “changed the program to emphasize offensive operations rather than village security.” John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 128–129.


67 Ibid., 292.

68 Ibid., 87.
SFG included 4 ODCs, 11 ODBs, and 56 ODAs. USSF HQ in the RVN “controlled its basic operating A-Detachments through a convoluted hierarchy extending down through intermediate C-and B-Detachments.” ODAs occasionally functioned as ODBs. For example, in 1968 ODA-502 included 58 U.S. Soldiers (ODAs normally consist of 12 Soldiers) and, according to their detachment commander, SGM (R) William Phalen, ODA-502 had three subordinate ODAs. Figure 11 is the 5th SFG organizational structure on October 31, 1968.

![5th SFG Organizational Structure, October 1968](image)

Figure 11. 5th SFG Organizational Structure, October 1968

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71 Interview with SGM (R) William Phalen by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at his home in Fayetteville, NC on 18 August 2009. SGM (R) Phalen served as a commissioned officer and detachment commander of ODA-502. Following the Vietnam War, he returned to the NCO ranks and retired from active duty in 1990 as a SGM.

A-502, with its unlisted three subordinate A-detachments, operated as an equivalent organization to three B-detachments (B-55, B-51, and B-52) working directly for the 5th SFG headquarters (HQ). This line wire diagram, in conjunction with the A-502 commander’s explanation of 5th SFG’s command relationships in 1968, indicates organizational confusion.

4. Discussion

Although it is clear that ODBs had subordinate ODAs, there is no clear evidence to support the claim that ODBs routinely conducted advisory assistance at an operational level that was nested above the ODAs. Through several secondary source accounts of combat operations it is apparent that many ODBs primarily conducted tactical level advisory assistance at the expense of conducting operational level advisory assistance. In fact, historian, author, and USSF veteran Shelby Stanton proclaimed that “B-Detachments often shared the same battlefield danger as their A-Detachments.”73 On the whole, USSF conducted decentralized advisory operations. While such decentralization is often lauded and glamorized by veterans from the RVN and active duty members of the USSF regiment, the outgoing 5th SFG commander in 1964 determined that USSF needed to conduct its FID/COIN campaign with a more integrated approach. His solution to this shortcoming was “[t]he arrival of PCS74 “B” and “C” detachments [that] materially strengthened our command and control capability in-country.”75 COL Spears’ report states that prior to the arrival of PCS ODBs he found USSF elements in the RVN operating without clear purpose, out of touch with the real effort, contributing only a portion of their capability…[t]he detachments were supposed to be performing a [COIN] type mission, yet in many cases they understood the CIDG Program to be a type or variation of [UW] rather


74 Permanent Change of Station (PCS) meant that USSF elements rotated into the country for one year as opposed to the temporary duty status (TDY) of USSF personnel in Vietnam prior to 5th SFGA’s arrival. PCS provided greater continuity and accountability for USSF operations.

COL Spears’ recommendation for more ODBs to increase advisory efforts and improve synchronization among the ODAs resulted in an increase in the number of ODBs from 11 in 1965 to 16 in 1967.\(^7\)

COL Spears recognized the organizational and operational failure to achieve a nested advisory approach for RVN security forces and he attempted to improve the advisory force footprint in order to better support the RVN’s COIN strategy. As a result, COL Spears made several TOE changes for ODBs (and ODAs) to “better facilitate their support of the Vietnamese Special Forces training center, Project DELTA\(^7\) and other classified activities not directly under control of the 5th [SFG].”\(^7\)

COL Spears’ ODB TOE changes were designed to increase the ODBs’ capability to synchronize in-theater advisory efforts for both security forces and political leaders while retaining their “flexibility and training capability.”\(^8\)

COL Spears coupled his FID/COIN-focused TOE changes for ODBs with additional commander’s guidance. In an official memorandum addressed to “A, B, & C Operational Detachments” outlining his COIN program, COL Spears declared that he wanted ODBs to “coordinate with and assist sub-sector and sector [RVN politicians] in executing [the] pacification plan.”\(^8\)

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\(^7\) Project DELTA had a long-range reconnaissance and intelligence gathering mission as its basic operating concept. The typical reconnaissance element consisted of eight road patrol teams of four indigenous personnel each, and sixteen reconnaissance teams of two Special Forces and four indigenous personnel each. Ibid., 53–54.

\(^8\) Official Memorandum written by CPT Joseph Johnson, Assistant Adjutant for 5th SFGA, on 7 March 1965. *Troop Unit Change Request*. Primary source document is stored at the U.S. Army Special Forces Archives at Fort Bragg, NC (accessed on 18 August 2009), 5.

\(^8\) Official Memorandum written by CPT Joseph Johnson, Assistant Adjutant for 5th SFGA, on 1 January 1965. *The Special Forces Counterinsurgency Program*. Primary source document is stored at the U.S. Army Special Forces Archives at Fort Bragg, NC (accessed on 18 August 2009), 2.
directed “C, B, and especially the A detachments [to] advise local Vietnamese officials in the establishment of effective local government which offer to the people security and a democratic way of life.”\textsuperscript{82} COL Spears’ guidance demonstrates that he understood the importance of nested advisory assistance from the ODA to ODB to ODC level in civic-related matters to assist the RVN government’s COIN strategy.

5. Conclusion

Under 5th SFG’s control, ODBs played an increasing role in synchronizing the RVN’s COIN campaign. However, research reveals that ODBs in the RVN functioned similarly enough to ODAs that they were not a pivotal organizational entity within USSF. There is sufficient evidence that ODBs provided advisory assistance at a level above the ODAs with RVN political leaders. However, the evidence suggests that ODBs, on whole, did not provide advisory assistance to RVN security forces at an echelon above their subordinate ODAs. David Galula’s acclaimed 1964 book entitled, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice, stresses the importance of both capable COIN security forces and the administrative (political) capacity to defeat an insurgent force. The reasons for USSFs failure to synchronize its advisory efforts with the RVN security forces include, but are not limited to: (1) a failure to reorganize SFGs for COIN rather than UW, and (2) routinely employing HN irregular forces in conventional operations. Collectively, the ODBs’ inability to integrate the RVN’s security forces impeded U.S. efforts to help South Vietnam with its COIN campaign.

\textsuperscript{82} Official Memorandum written by CPT Joseph Johnson, Assistant Adjutant for 5\textsuperscript{th} SFGA, on 1 January 1965. The Special Forces Counterinsurgency Program. Primary source document is stored at the U.S. Army Special Forces Archives at Fort Bragg, NC (accessed on 18 August 2009).
B. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM—ODB 520 (IRAQ 2003):

1. Introduction

This case study from OIF reveals how an ODB conducting a unilateral SOF economy of force\textsuperscript{83} mission in Western Iraq transitioned to an advisory role that restored peace and order in Ar Rutbah following the conventional assault on Baghdad. Conducting multi-faceted advisory assistance with political leaders and law enforcement officials was not in ODB 520’s proscribed mission statement from its higher headquarters (HQ). Furthermore, advisory assistance was neither a specified/implied task nor an assigned follow-on mission. However, ODB 520 found itself thrust into a situation in which it had to revert back to historic and doctrinal roles of an ODB to provide advisory assistance to HN civic/political leaders and security force personnel. This impromptu advisory role focused on gaining situational awareness and achieving control in a key population center in Western Iraq. Furthermore, ODB 520 sought to restore a sense of dignity and normalcy to a town of people whose national government had recently been violently defeated by a foreign power. This case study reveals the dynamic operational capability of an ODB to transition from a unilateral direct action mission to an advisory FID mission.

2. Background

In December 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered General Tommy Franks, Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), to revise the DoD’s current strategy for conducting operations in the Middle East (Contingency Plan 1003)\textsuperscript{84}. President Bush approved an updated contingency plan, CONPLAN 1003V, that featured a “Running Start” concept that included a simultaneous ground and air campaign

\textsuperscript{83} Robert R. Leonhard. “The principle of economy of force advises us to employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary effects.” “Economy of Force.” Originally Published in “The Armchair General.” \url{http://www.jhuapl.edu/areas/warfare/papers/economyofforce.pdf} (accessed on 18 September 2009).

The new CONPLAN 1003V included the continual deployment of combat forces into Iraq as the campaign expanded, instead of waiting for a build-up of forces to posture outside of Iraq as in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Under CONPLAN 1003V, SOCCENT had three major missions in pending operations in Iraq. Its first mission was to support the Coalition Forces Air Component Command — orchestrated hunt for SCUDS in the western desert. The second was to support the Coalition Forces Land Component Command ground campaign directed at Baghdad by leveraging Kurdish combat power in northern Iraq to occupy the Iraqi forces there and prevent their reinforcement of the Iraqi Army around Baghdad. The third mission was to organize and employ Iraqi regime opposition groups in the south.

Furthermore, under CONPLAN 1003V, USCENTCOM gave operational control (OPCON) to 5th SFG over operations in Western Iraq. The area of responsibility (AOR) was referred to as Coalition Joint Special Operations Task Force-West (CJSOTF-W). Led by 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, CJSOTF-W was responsible for the counter-SCUD mission. Its task organization included two ODBs (520 & 530) and OPCON of special operations forces from the United Kingdom and Australia. In September of 2002, ODB 520, commanded by MAJ Gavrilis, deployed from Fort Campbell, KY in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Once the U.S. President initiated the invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, ODB 520 crossed the Iraqi border with the following mission statement: “ODB 520 conducts counter TBM (Theater Ballistic Missile) operations in Western Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).” ODB 520 was one of two ODBs tasked with preventing Israel from entering the conflict as a result of a SCUD attack on the Israeli homeland; the counter-SCUD mission was the strategic main effort for CJSOTF-West. “The SCUD threat was the number one priority of the intelligence community.”

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86 Ibid.
87 SCUD is the term for a series of Theater Ballistic Missiles developed by the former Soviet Union. During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq launched SCUDs at U.S. targets in Saudi Arabia. Iraq also launched SCUDS at Israel in an attempt to draw a response by Israel to undermine the Arab-U.S. Coalition.
88 Interview with LTC (R) James Gavrilis by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at the Naval Postgraduate School, CA, on 30 April 2009.
ODB 520’s key tasks included: (1) prevent a SCUD launch from Western Iraq at all costs, (2) deny freedom of movement for enemy forces in Western Iraq, (3) conduct Special Operations in support of conventional forces operating in Southern Iraq. MAJ Gavrilis was an experienced officer who, at the beginning of OIF, was a 15-year veteran with over 12 years of experience in Special Operations. Additionally, he had served as an infantry officer in the 25th Infantry Division, a member of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and as an ODA commander in 3rd SFG. Prior to crossing into Iraq, MAJ Gavrilis’s purpose, key tasks, and commander’s intent for ODB 520 was:

- to prevent Israel from entering the conflict and to prevent enemy missile attacks on U.S. forces or bases. We will accomplish this by infiltrating prior to the start of the conflict, interdicting the SCUD system at every point to include hide sites, launch sites, refuel/recharge sites, C4/communications, and the crews psychologically, by systematically clearing every potential SCUD location and facility, continuously and obviously (so they know we are here and control the territory) patrolling the AO, and by conducting DA or air strikes to prevent launches and to defeat forces that get in the way of accomplishing our mission.

After several weeks of searching suspected SCUD launch sites and engaging in direct-fire engagements with disparate Fedayeen forces, ODB 520 and its eight subordinate ODAs were positioned outside the city of Ar Rutbah. MAJ Gavrilis “viewed the city as a major complication in” his “mission to stop the ballistic missile launches from western Iraq.” “The last thing I expected to do once we entered Ar Rutbah, a Sunni city of about 25,000 in Anbar province near Jordan and Syria, was to begin postwar reconstruction. I had not planned or prepared for governing, nor had I received any guidance or assistance on how to do so.” MAJ Gavrilis identified the need to both clear the city of hostile forces and return civil administration and control to the local

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90 Interview with LTC (R) James Gavrilis by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at the Naval Postgraduate School, CA, on 30 April 2009.

91 Charles Briscoe et al., All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq (Fort Bragg: USASOC History Office, 2006), 33.

92 The Saddam Fedayeen were a group of approximately 40,000 that were extremely loyal to Saddam. Ibid., 6.


94 Ibid.
Iraqis as quickly as possible. Restoring Iraqi control over the daily functions of Ar Rutbah would permit ODB 520 and its ODAs to retain the flexibility to assume following-on missions from CJSOTF-W.

3. **Task Organization**

Immediately prior to entering Ar Rutbah, MAJ Gavrilis organized his forces to secure and clear the city of its hostile elements. Figure 12 is a graphical representation of ODB 520’s task organization. Figure 13 is a map showing the area of responsibility (AOR) of ODB 520 and its subordinate ODAs.

![Figure 12. Task Organization for ODB 520 in 2003](image)

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95 Interview with LTC (R) James Gavrilis by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at the Naval Postgraduate School, CA, on 30 April 2009.
ODB 520 consisted of both conventional and SOF forces. Upon entering Ar Rutbah, ODB 520 had operational control (OPCON) of eight ODAs. OBD 520 included nine organic members (Commander, Sergeant Major, Warrant Officer, Operations Non Commissioned Officer (NCO), 18D\(^{97}\), 18B\(^{98}\), 18C\(^{99}\), 18E\(^{100}\), and a supply sergeant), one U.S. Air Force (USAF) Enlisted Terminal Attack Controller (ETAC) to assist with close air support, four U.S. signals intelligence soldiers, two intelligence analysts, three Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) soldiers, one light wheeled vehicle mechanic, and three U.S. tactical psychological operations team soldiers with loudspeaker capability. Additionally, ODB 520 had OPCON of an Infantry Company from the 10th Mountain Division (approximately 120 personnel) and a three-man Civil Affairs (CA) team.

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\(^{97}\) Special Forces Medic.

\(^{98}\) Special Forces Weapons Specialist.

\(^{99}\) Special Forces Engineer (construction & demolitions)

\(^{100}\) Special Forces Communications (tactical radios, satellite communications, etc.) Specialist.
4. Discussion

Prior to entering Ar Rutbah, MAJ Gavrilis directed his forces to: limit collateral damage within the city, provide medical treatment to wounded enemy combatants, and distribute large quantities of Iraqi government surplus food that had been kept from the city’s residents in a secured warehouse. As a gesture of goodwill, MAJ Gavrilis instituted a cease-fire in an effort to establish trust and prove that ODB 520’s intent was to restore and maintain stability. 101 Within two hours of entering Ar Rutbah, ODB 520 and its eight ODAs had secured key portions of the city, confirmed that all of the hostile forces had been either eliminated or run off, and had begun to “plot out the civil administration of the city.”102

ODB 520 established its headquarters (HQ) in a centrally located police station that had been built by the British in 1927.103 Tactically, the police station provided ODB 520 with a defendable position. Operationally, the police station’s location supported ODB 520’s task of returning the city to a state of normalcy. Within hours of establishing security, MAJ Gavrilis held a meeting with the local leaders, senior police officers, and religious leaders in order to decide on a plan to restore order in Ar Rutbah. MAJ Gavrilis addressed two primary lines of operation (LOOs) with the city’s leaders:104 (1) identify Ar Rutbah’s civic leaders and re-instate their authority, and (2) re-establish the providing of basic needs to the city in order to prevent a descent into chaos.

In order to maintain and improve security, MAJ Gavrilis appointed an interim police chief who agreed to enforce a no weapons carrying policy for civilians. Additionally, the police chief initiated the process of manning the security checkpoints on the main roads leading into Ar Rutbah with members of his local police force. Prior to this agreement, U.S. soldiers manned these checkpoints themselves. Given the limited


102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.

number of U.S. forces in Ar Rutbah, the ODB 520 command team collectively recognized that integrating the security checkpoints with Iraqi policemen would be “essential for restoring local security, for protecting the city from outsiders, and for our [ODB 520] disengagement.”

Within eight hours of entering Ar Rutbah, ODB 520’s leaders had met with tribal and civic leaders to appoint a mayor and a city council. ODB 520’s ability to advise both political and law enforcement leaders set the conditions for U.S. forces to relinquish their responsibility for running the city of Ar Rutbah.

The second LOO that ODB 520 addressed was the restoration of the city’s basic services such as power and water. The mayor and the city council identified electricity as the most important service for the citizens of Ar Rutbah. Working through local contractors and utilizing the engineering skills on ODB 520 and its ODAs, the city had limited power restored within days. Additionally, ODB 520 organized and implemented a “volunteer day” to remove the hardened Iraqi Army fighting positions from Ar Rutbah’s schools in order to resume education for the children. In an attempt to increase the city’s food supply, ODB 520 identified local merchants with trading connections to suppliers in Jordan. Within days, the city had received several deliveries of fresh meat, fruit, and luxury items.

Unfortunately, the gains achieved by ODB 520 were lost because follow-on coalition forces did not maintain the same level of contact with the people of Ar Rutbah. “The distance between the locals and the troops widened. The Iraqis were eventually exposed and vulnerable to regime loyalists’ retribution and intimidation by foreign fighters.”

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106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., 33.
109 Ibid.
5. Conclusion

ODB 520 demonstrated its ability to advise in both a security and civic capacity. The restoration of power, re-opening schools, and facilitating the resupply of market items in Ar Rutbah were unrelated to ODB 520’s task of preventing a SCUD launch in Western Iraq. However, ODB 520’s ability to transition from a DA mission to a FID/COIN role indicates the ODB’s capability and organizational capacity to serve as an operational element.

C. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM—ODB 380 (AFGHANISTAN, 2004)

1. Introduction

This case study from OEF examines an ODB’s evolving FID/COIN mission from advising local militia forces that were organized, equipped, and employed to create a secure environment to equipping, training, and advising a newly-formed national force striving for recognized legitimacy from the citizens of Afghanistan. The time period of this case study represents the stage in FID/COIN when operational detachments (both A & B) must skillfully balance their advisory efforts between local militia forces and begin the process to legitimize a host nation (HN) government-sponsored national force. Once state-sponsored forces become operational, irregular forces continue to serve an important role in collecting intelligence and protecting the local populace. And, although the tactical and operational results will decrease initially, the process of building a force that demonstrates the HN government’s ability to protect its population from violence and intimidation from insurgent forces is an important process in COIN.

The OEF case study reveals the operational capability of an ODB, which actively pursued and assumed advisory roles to increase the HN’s COIN capability while simultaneously fulfilling the ODB’s C2 and logistical responsibilities to its subordinate ODAs. ODB 380’s dual advisory role with Afghani security forces, both militias and ANA, and working with regional political leaders one to two levels above ODA-affiliated political leaders, is in keeping with the spirit and decree of USSF doctrine. ODB 380’s struggle to legitimize the ANA came from both the infancy of the Afghani central
government and the challenges associated with converting local militia forces with local
goals/perspectives to a national force with national goals/perspectives.

Due to the operational environment and the HN’s reliance on local militia forces in lieu of a national force for a majority of ODB 380’s deployment to Afghanistan, ODB 380 was unable to institute a nested advisory plan for its correlated HN security forces down through the HN security forces working directly with ODB 380’s subordinate ODAs. In the latter stages of ODA 380’s OEF rotation, the Afghan government declared that the ANA would become the legitimate national force. Creating a nested advisory structure for the ANA unit working with the ODB down through the ANA units working with ODB 380’s five subordinate ODAs would have improved the ANA’s ability to plan/execute operations with decreasing levels of U.S. involvement. The ANA’s legitimization, in the eyes of the population, would likely have increased if the ANA had become more self-sufficient and if the local ANA’s actions were congruent with the Afghani Interim Authority (AIA)’s larger COIN campaign.

On the one hand, due to its operational integration and cohabitation with multiple Afghani security forces, ODB 380’s 2004 OEF rotation would have been in compliance with the 2009 Afghanistan COIN guidance from the current International Security Force Assistance (ISAF) Commander, GEN Stanley McChrystal:

…[b]uild local ownership and capacity. Together with [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – GIRoA] leaders, work all local issues with the local shura and community…[p]artner with ANSF, [l]ive, eat, and train together, plan and operate together, depend on one another.110

But on the other hand, because of ODA 380’s inability to institute a nested advisory approach to improve the legitimacy of the ANA at both the tactical and operational level, ODA 380 would not have met GEN McChrystal’s 2009 expectation to “[b]uild their [ANA] capacity to secure their own country…[i]ntegrate your command and control structures.”111


2. Background

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the military operation to topple the Taliban Government in Afghanistan and kill or capture Al Qaeda (AQ) elements being supported and quartered by the Taliban, began on October 19, 2001.\(^\text{112}\) By November of 2001, Afghani forces advised, equipped, and employed by 5th SFG, and assisted by lethal bombing support from the U.S. Air Force (USAF), controlled the cities of Kandahar and Kabul. The fall of these two key population centers “marked the collapse of the Taliban government and the disintegration of its fighting forces.”\(^\text{113}\) At this point, the AIA began its transition to running the country while coalition and U.S. forces continued to conduct offensive operations to kill/capture Al Qaeda leaders and defeat factionalized Taliban elements.\(^\text{114}\) In November of 2001, U.S. operations in OEF transitioned from UW to FID/COIN. However, the FID/COIN mission in November 2001 was challenging because there was no legitimate HN government to assist and there were no government-sponsored security forces with whom to work. In order to maintain a semblance of security, the AIA and USSF had to continue to rely on the tribal militias that existed prior to USSF’s arrival into Afghanistan.

In July of 2004, ODB 380, commanded by MAJ Rice (pseudonym), deployed from Fort Bragg, North Carolina in support of OEF. ODB 380 deployed to Afghanistan with the following mission statement: “ODB 380 conducts unconventional warfare/counterinsurgency operations O/A 22 July 04 – UTC [until complete] in JSOA Maryland and AO Cacti to kill/capture ACM [Anti-Coalition Militia].”\(^\text{115}\) The ODB’s key tasks included: (1) “conduct mounted and dismounted long range reconnaissance,” (2) “find, fix, kill/capture ACM,” (3) “conduct area assessments to include ISBs [intermediate support bases] for future use,” (4) conduct area assessments for future

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\(^\text{113}\) Ibid., 383.

\(^\text{114}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{115}\) Interview with LTC Cooper Rice (pseudonym) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC on 17 August 2009.
IO/HA/CA [information operations\textsuperscript{116}/humanitarian assistance/civil affairs] projects to influence the populace and separate the insurgents from their support bases.”\textsuperscript{117} MAJ Rice, at the time a 12-year military veteran with service as an infantry officer in the 82nd Airborne Division, 2nd Battalion/75th Ranger Regiment, and as an ODA commander in 3rd SFG, defined ODB 380’s desired end state as:

Friendly forces postured to continue combat operations integrated with IO/CA/HA. ACM support and influence disrupted in JSOA [joint special operations area] Maryland/AO [area of operations] Cacti. AO’s secured and stabilized IOT allow unimpeded progress during the post-election time period.\textsuperscript{118}

Qalat, the location of the ODB headquarters, had become a “hub of ACM [Anti Coalition Militia] activity flowing through the [operational] area...heavily influenced by Taliban leaders and HIG [Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin] terrorists.”\textsuperscript{119} Deh Afghanan (Fire Base Lane) had purportedly become a key node of “ACM build up in Bolan [with] reports of up to 200 ACM equipped with AK-47s, PKMs, RPGs, [and] recoilless rifles.”\textsuperscript{120} Intelligence reports on Shinkay (Fire Base Sweeny), included an “increase in ACM terrorist activity [in the] Maruf Valley.”\textsuperscript{121} Furthermore, multiple human intelligence sources reported a “large presence of ACM in [the] Arghastan and Maruf districts.”\textsuperscript{122}


\textsuperscript{117} Interview with LTC Cooper Rice (pseudonym) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC on 17 August 2009.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
3. Task Organization

MAJ Rice organized his ODB into three elements based upon the enemy situation, terrain, and operational requirements. Figure 14 is a graphical representation of ODB 380’s task organization. Figure 15 shows the location of ODB 380 in Eastern Afghanistan.

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123 Interview with LTC Cooper Rice (pseudonym) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC on 17 August 2009.
The three elements included: (1) ODB 380 located in Qalat, (2) two ODAs located in Deh Afghanan, and (3) three ODAs located in Shinkay (See Figure 15).

The members of ODB 380 included eight organic members (Commander, Sergeant Major, Warrant Officer, Operations Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) / 18D, 18B, 18E, and a supply sergeant), one Civil Affairs NCO, and one intelligence analyst. Additionally, ODB 380 included one category two (CAT II)
interpreter and one category one (CAT I) interpreter. The ODB in Qalat, including its two interpreters, had eleven people. Additionally, ODB 380 exercised operational control over approximately 40 Afghan Security Force (ASF) personnel.

The two ODAs located in Deh Afghanan lived together on Fire Base Lane. Although they were co-located in order to facilitate security and logistics, each ODA conducted its operations and advisory assistance separately. Together, these ODA’s included: 17 (8 from ODA 3XX and 9 from ODA 3XX) USSF qualified soldiers, two light wheeled vehicle mechanics, one USAF Enlisted Terminal Attack Controller (ETAC) to assist with close air support, one U.S. Army cook, one civilian contractor for engineer support, a twenty-man platoon from 2nd Battalion/35th Infantry Regiment/ 25th Infantry Division, eleven soldiers from the U.S. Army 528th Engineer Battalion, two U.S. embedded training team soldiers, two CAT II interpreters, 80 ANA soldiers, and 91 Afghan Security Force (ASF) soldiers. The ANA, in 2004, was a newly formed entity that consisted of soldiers from the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) with whom USSF had worked extensively from 2002 to 2004. The ASF, also largely drawn from the ranks of the AMF, were locally hired and trained forces meant to provide additional security on large scale and/or complex operations that the ANA was ill-equipped/trained to handle. The ASF were not intended to be an enduring force. However, their capability was important because they operated near or around their home villages. The ASF had greater situational awareness and innate intelligence gathering capability than their ANA counterparts who came from different regions of Afghanistan. The entire task force on Fire Base Lane, including both U.S. and Afghani nationals, consisted of 238 personnel.

The three ODAs located in Shinkay on Fire Base Sweeny, like those on Fire Base Lane, also lived together, but conducted most of their operations separately. Together, these three ODAs included: 26 [(10 from ODA 3XX, 8 from ODA 3XX, and 8 from ODA 3XX)] USSF qualified soldiers, four U.S. signals intelligence soldiers, two U.S. interpreters.

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129 A CAT I interpreter is a locally hired interpreter who does not have any vetting or a security clearance. CAT I interpreters are used for pure translation. A CAT II interpreter is a U.S. citizen with a secret clearance. They are used for more sensitive operations that require greater degrees of trust and legal accountability.

130 Interview with LTC Cooper Rice (pseudonym) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC on 17 August 2009.
tactical psychological operations team soldiers, two U.S. CA soldiers, two USAF ETAC’s, two U.S. intelligence analysts, three embedded training team soldiers, three CAT II interpreters, nine CAT I interpreters, one U.S. Army cook, 81 ANA soldiers, and 60 ASF soldiers. The entire task force on Fire Base Sweeny, including both U.S. and Afghani nationals, consisted of 195 personnel. 

4. Discussion

ODB 380 had several lines of operation (LOOs). As the ODB commander, MAJ Rice had to prioritize his LOOs in order to support mission objectives, provide command and control (C2) to ODAs, and provide logistical support to the ODAs. Of ODB 380’s LOOs, MAJ Rice rated his most crucial to be providing advisory assistance and intelligence fusion with an Afghani intelligence/paramilitary force called the National Defense Service (NDS). This superbly led forty-man element, which was co-located in Qalat with ODB 380, provided accurate and timely intelligence. More importantly, NDS’s leader provided keen insight into: ACM networks, ACM supporters among the local populace, the loyalty of ANA and ASF soldiers, and the veracity of information from local contacts. As the ODB commander, MAJ Rice met daily with this unit’s leader to discuss intelligence and operational matters. Establishing and maintaining trust with NDS became crucial to ODB 380’s accomplishment of its mission because there was not a comparable HN force in the area.

In addition to the NDS detachment, ODB 380 provided advisory assistance to a 120-man ANA battalion. Providing advisory assistance to this battalion served as ODB 380’s second highest priority LOO. This battalion, although limited in capability when compared to the NDS force, represented the new face of legitimacy for the Afghan government. MAJ Rice cultivated his relationship with the ANA battalion commander and his staff through daily meetings and planning sessions about present and future

131 Interview with LTC Cooper Rice (pseudonym) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC on 17 August 2009.

operations. ODB 380’s advisory relationship helped to shape operations in the area because this ANA battalion was continuously capable of providing a platoon to react to time sensitive intelligence. Furthermore, this ANA battalion included a mortar platoon whose assets could support the ODB’s operations as well as the ODAs’ operations in Dehafghanan and Shinkay. This ANA battalion had no formalized chain of command at the regimental or division level. Furthermore, this ANA battalion did not have any supervisory authority over the ANA units working directly with ODB 380’s subordinate ODAs.

The third advisory component of ODB 380’s operations consisted of a 40-man ASF element. ODB 380 relied primarily on this ASF element to provide reconnaissance, security, and operational capability in order to preclude the ODB from having to rely on the ODA’s indigenous forces for support for operations in Qalat. This 40-man force lived within ODB 380’s compound and provided MAJ Rice with the flexibility to move around Qalat to meet with local leaders, react to time sensitive targets, and, when called upon, support ODA operations. Once again, ODB 380 was the only U.S. element providing advisory assistance to this ASF force. This ASF force had no higher or lower echelons that would have better integrated ODB 380’s advisory efforts with the national COIN strategy in Afghanistan.

A less pressing, yet no less challenging LOO for ODB 380, included meeting with the provincial governor. The provincial governor, according to (now) LTC Rice, was an active Taliban supporter and political appointee. He provided little legitimate governance, but he did serve an important role in adjudicating local and provincial disputes. Even though his motives were often unscrupulous, the provincial governor was someone with whom MAJ Rice maintained an open dialogue because of his political influence. While acting on the age-old axiom of “keep your friends close and your enemies closer,” MAJ Rice conducted weekly and sometimes daily meetings with the governor of Qalat. In so doing, the ODB had greater influence in its AO. By keeping the

133 Interview with LTC Cooper Rice (pseudonym) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC on 17 August 2009.
134 Ibid.
provincial governor abreast of forthcoming reconstruction projects and limited operational matters, ODB 380 built leverage in shaping future operations in the province.

ODB 380 did not ignore its liaison role with U.S. conventional forces. While not its primary LOO (which is not always the case in recent USSF operations in OIF), ODB 380 provided key interface with elements of the 25th Infantry Division.

While ODB 380’s operational accomplishments were many, its most enduring and important accomplishment, according to its commander, was building strong personal relationships with leaders from the ANA, ASF, and the NDS. Persistent engagement with these units’ leaders paid dividends for ODB 380 and its attached ODAs. Developing strong relationships and trust with indigenous force leaders should be one of the ODB’s priorities because such relationships are critical in building an effective COIN team.

5. Conclusion

ODB 380, during its rotation to Afghanistan from July to December of 2004, worked as an operational advisory element. In accordance with doctrine, ODB 380 provided advisory assistance to both military/paramilitary forces as well as with regional/provincial political leaders. ODB’s co-habitation and relationships with multiple Afghani security elements enabled ODB 380 to be an active contributor in FID/COIN operations in Qalat and its surrounding areas. According to LTC Rice, ODB 380’s most noteworthy contribution to FID/COIN in Afghanistan was the relationships it built with Afghan security personnel (revived by subsequent OEF deployments). LTC Rice admitted that his two regrets were: (1) he did not do enough to support legitimizing the ANA, and (2) ODB 380 did not do enough to build formalized processes and command relationships to support a common COIN strategy in Afghanistan. Formalized and integrated advisory structures would likely have improved continuity and synergy among rotational USSF operational detachments (both “A” and “B”) that serve for 6–8 months at a time in Afghanistan. Such continuity would have steadily improved the capabilities and legitimacy of the ANA.
D. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (PHILIPPINES)—ODB 110 (2005–2006)

1. Introduction

This final case study captures the nuances and challenges of conducting FID/COIN with a professional military operating in a sovereign country, something not discussed in doctrine. Yet the USSF advisory role in the Republic of the Philippines (RP) marks the best case scenario for U.S. sponsored FID/COIN. The FID efforts in the RP demonstrate advisory assistance in a country with an integrated, albeit deficient, COIN strategy. The RP has an IDAD plan, and USSF advisory efforts have had to fit this IDAD strategy. USSF advisory efforts in OEF (P) featured a nested advisory approach from the ODB down through the ODA level.

In 2005, Task Force Comet consisted of one Philippine Army Brigade (104th Bde) and one Philippine Marine Corps Brigade (3rd Marine Bde). The parallel support and information sharing structures of the ODB with Task Force Comet and Philippine Army and Marine Brigade headquarters (HQ) in combination with ODA advisory efforts at the battalion level achieved commendable results. However, although the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was modeled after the U.S. military, the ODB commander had to learn the personalities, staff procedures, politics, limitations, and capabilities of the AFP in order to provide meaningful advisory assistance.

2. Background

The U.S.’s history in the Philippine Islands is a storied one. Furthermore, the U.S. Army’s historic role in the Philippine’s Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), where ODB 110 operated from October 2005 to March 2006, remains a topic of discussion among the Moro population on Sulu Island. Despite consistent engagement with the AFP in its struggle with communist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA) in Luzon throughout the 1980s and 90s, the Philippine government has remained guarded about the U.S. military presence within its borders. While the U.S. continued to provide

135 LTC John Mallory (pseudonym). Telephonic interview by the authors Major Brinker and Major Smith on 26 August 2009.
both direct and indirect FID to the AFP against the NPA, the AFP battled Islamic insurgents in the ARMM. The AFP fought the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) on Sulu Island in the 1970s and 1980s before battling its splinter group called the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the 1980s and 1990s. Beginning in the early 1990s, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), named after Rasul Sayyaf who ran a mujahidin camp in Afghanistan during the Soviet Invasion, inspired a stalwart following on Sulu and Basilan Islands.136 Elements from 1st SFG conducted FID/COIN with the AFP against the ASG on Basilan Island in 2002.137 In 2002, the Philippine government requested U.S. assistance in defeating insurgent elements on Sulu Island.138 The AFP and the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) Commander consulted the governor of Sulu Island, Governor Loong, on the prospect of U.S. operations on Sulu. The governor said that “what you [the U.S.] did on Basilan, I want on Sulu.”139

3. Task Organization

ODB 110 was the largest USSF element to deploy to Sulu Island to conduct FID in support of the RP’s COIN campaign. Initially, ODB 110 deployed to Sulu Island with its 7-man detachment and two ODAs. However, by December 2005, ODB 110 included: (1) a seven-man ODB (Commander, Sergeant Major, Operations Officer, Operations NCO, Operations Warrant, 18E, 18D.), (2) five ODAs, (3) three CA soldiers, (4) three intelligence analysts, (5) three signals intelligence personnel, and (6) two light wheeled mechanics. Additionally, ODB 110 had operational control (OPCON) of a U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) security platoon consisting of 25 personnel. ODB 110, including its enabling attachments, consisted of 43 U.S. personnel. Figure 16 is a visual representation of ODB 110’s task organization. Figure 17 depicts Southeast Asia and the Sulu Archipelago.

139 Ibid., 78. A quote from LTC Gregory Wilson, JSOTF-P Commander. The quote was included in the Hastings and Krishnamurti thesis.
Figure 16. Task Organization for ODB 110 in 2005\textsuperscript{140}

Figure 17. Operational Map from Sulu Island for ODB 110. Island is often referred to by its capital city of Jolo.\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{140}LTC John Mallory (pseudonym). Telephonic interview by the authors Major Brinker and Major Smith on 26 August 2009.

\textsuperscript{141}A map of the Sulu Archipelago, \url{www.lowlands-i.net/.../balanguingui-info.php}, accessed on 16 September 2009.
4. Discussion

ODB 110 deployed to Sulu Island, ARMM, Republic of the Philippines (RP) with the stated mission: “ODB 110 advises and assists [Joint Task Force] JTF Comet to defeat Abu Sayyaff and Jamah Islamiayah in order to protect Philippine and American citizens and interests from terrorist attack and enhance the legitimacy of the Philippine Government.”

ODB Commander, (now) LTC Mallory (pseudonym), a career Special Forces officer with experience in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) areas of responsibility (AOR), deployed his detachment from 1st Battalion, 1st SFG(A) in Okinawa, Japan to Camp Bautista on Sulu Island from October 20, 2005 to March 29, 2006.

Prior to deploying his ODB, MAJ Mallory (now LTC) declared his key tasks to be (in order of priority): “(1) AFP assessment/gain rapport, (2) conduct targeted CMO, (3) capacity building of AFP, (4) targeted kinetic operations against ASG/JI leaders, and (5) transition of COIN primacy to the Jolo [Sulu] police.”

The inherent constraints to operating in a sovereign country with constitutional limits on foreign military involvement made ODB 110’s advisory efforts significantly different from those of ODB 380 while operating in Afghanistan in 2004 and ODB 520 operating in Iraq in 2003. The RP constitution prohibits foreign nations from conducting direct combat operations on Philippine soil. The ODB’s co-location with TF Comet headquarters (HQ) on Camp Bautista proved fortuitous because their close proximity to the TF Comet staff enabled them to quickly build rapport and provide integrated advisory assistance at both the task force and brigade level early in the deployment. However, TF Comet leaders remained reluctant to allow ODAs to leave Camp Bautista and conduct advisory assistance with the Filipino Marine and Army battalions located on separate outposts across Sulu Island. Fortunately, TF Comet initiated OPERATION SHADOW and OPERATION TUGIS shortly after ODB 110’s arrival on the ground. OPERATION SHADOW, a Philippine Army operation on Sulu Island, and OPERATION TUGIS, a

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142 LTC John Mallory (pseudonym). Telephonic interview by the authors Major Brinker and Major Smith on 26 August 2009.
143 Ibid.
Philippine Marine Corps operation also on Sulu Island, both served to kill or capture ASG elements.\textsuperscript{144} “These two three-week operations allowed ODB 110 to assess the capability of TF Comet (both Marine and Army) units more completely and holistically than [ODB 110 or its subordinate ODAs] would have accomplished in six months of non-combat capacity building.”\textsuperscript{145} ODB 110 was able to identify areas of improvement for the AFP given these two operations, and enabled MAJ Mallory to convince the TF Comet commander to employ liaison coordination elements (LCEs) with each battalion to provide advisory assistance. As a result, Mallory’s ODAs (referred to as LCEs in OEF-P) now had the AFP’s authority to move on to AFP camps and conduct advisory assistance at the battalion level. With the LCEs co-located with each battalion and with ODB 110 located at TF Comet HQ on Camp Bautista, MAJ Mallory could now lead a nested advisory effort with a parallel information sharing structure at each AFP battalion. By assessing TF Comet’s ability during combat operations and providing sound advisory assistance, ODB 110 had accomplished its priority LOO: “AFP assessment/gain rapport.”\textsuperscript{146}

Following OPERATION SHADOW and OPERATION TUGIS, ODB 110 continued its advisory role with TF Comet while conducting targeted civil military operations (CMO). With the LCEs providing targeted CMO and tactical capacity-building advice to the AFP battalions in concert with ODB 110 influencing the Army and Marine Corps Brigade HQs on how, when, and where to focus its U.S.-funded CMO projects, USSF FID/COIN efforts on Sulu Island took on an integrated effect up and down TF Comet’s chain of command.

However, this nested advisory effort with the AFP was not without its challenges. The logistical constraints, politics, personalities, and inter-service rivalries among the AFP on Sulu Island impeded operational integration. The difference in advisory assistance with a professional military as compared to a marginally legitimate militia in Afghanistan became even more apparent. ODB 110 had to work within the traditions and

\textsuperscript{144} LTC John Mallory (pseudonym). Telephonic interview by the authors Major Brinker and Major Smith on 26 August 2009.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
bureaucracy of the AFP in order to influence the COIN effort. Mallory and his ODB had to work within the AFP system to generate operational initiative. For example, if MAJ Mallory and one of his LCE commanders believed that a particular AFP battalion should increase combat patrols in an area because of increased enemy activity, then the ODA commander would begin suggesting to the AFP battalion commander that he should seek permission from the AFP Brigade HQ to conduct increased patrolling operations. Concurrently, Mallory would work through the TF Comet commander or one of the two brigade commanders to produce a formal order tasking the battalion to conduct increased patrolling operations. This nested advisory effort with its inherent parallel information-sharing network ensured that the subordinate commanders retained initiative while not exceeding their operational freedom to conduct COIN operations. Such synchronization ensured that the TF Comet HQ retained situational awareness on all operations while subordinate battalion commanders exercised initiative in their respective areas. As MAJ Mallory put it, the ODB had to tailor its advisory efforts to use the AFP’s official orders process.

Mallory tasked his LCE commanders with figuring out what motivated their counterpart AFP battalion commanders to take operational initiative. For example, in the case of the 35th Infantry Battalion (IB), MAJ Mallory advised the TF Comet Commander to designate the 35th (IB) as the main effort on all brigade sized operations so that the 35th IB would put forth the requisite assets and command influence to achieve the best results for the brigade. The [AFP] battalion commanders needed formal orders from the TF Comet or Brigade Commander to initiate operations. According to LTC Mallory, it was his job, when necessary, to influence the higher-level commanders to provide the battalion commanders with formal orders to conduct offensive operations against insurgent groups.

In Western-style professional militaries, the staffs are normally an integral part of the military decision making process (MDMP). The RP modeled its military after the

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147 LTC John Mallory (pseudonym). Telephonic interview by the authors Major Brinker and Major Smith on 26 August 2009.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
U.S. military following Philippine independence from the U.S. in 1946. As such, ODB 110’s advisory efforts had to account for staff processes. However, unlike the U.S. military’s staffs, the TF Comet staffs did not lead the MDMP. Rather, the TF Comet commander led a commander-driven MDMP. As a result, MAJ Mallory had to ensure that the bulk of his advisory effort went towards working with the actual commander and not spending excessive hours with the staff. ODB 110 used its operations NCO to get an idea about what the AFP staffs (Army, Marine, and TF Comet) were going to propose to their commander so that MAJ Mallory could work in conjunction with, not in opposition to, what the AFP staff intended to propose to its commander.

In addition to TF Comet, ODB 110’s advisory efforts supported the RP’s IDAD strategy with assistance to Sulu Island’s civic leadership. The CA team attached to ODB 110 established a civil military operations center (CMOC) on Camp Bautista to assist the AFP in its coordination with local government leaders. This holistic approach to COIN, which comes straight from the U.S.’s IDAD strategy, became a critical LOO for ODB 110. Historically, the AFP had been perceived by the people on Sulu as a heavy-handed pacification force. One of ODB 110’s assigned tasks from Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) was to work to legitimize the AFP and the local government. The CMOC served as a focal point for both the AFP and Sulu’s political leaders to plan and coordinate CA projects. CA projects sought to prove to Sulu’s population that the RP government was receptive to its needs. ODB 110 realized that CA projects would be one of its most potent LOOs in an effort to isolate insurgent elements from the population. As such, ODB 110 used its advisory role to build support for and initiate targeted CA projects with both the AFP and Sulu’s political leaders. Again, because ODB 110 was conducting direct support FID to augment the RP’s COIN strategy on Sulu Island, it had to ensure that its advisory efforts kept the HN in the lead for all operations.

5. Conclusion

USSF doctrine does not provide a framework for ODB FID/COIN advisory operations in scenarios like OEF-P. This case study reveals how an ODB applied its advisory skills within the framework of working with a standing military. The advisory effort had to take into account the bureaucratic nature of professional militaries in order
to influence the operational tempo and focus. While ODB 380 in OEF had nearly absolute authority over its paid militias in order to shape its environment, ODB 110 had to work through the AFP on all matters in order to support the RP’s COIN strategy.
IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION

Capable advisory assistance at both the tactical and operational level of warfare in U.S. sponsored FID/COIN operations is important. Furthermore, the ODB’s role in USSF operations as the organizational entity that is responsible for integrating tactical and operational objectives is evident in both doctrine and practice. Although General (GEN) McChrystal, the current ISAF Commander in Afghanistan, is not referring directly to, or about, USSF in his Commander’s assessment to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) regarding COIN strategy in Afghanistan, his convictions about the necessity for nested advisory assistance for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are consistent with this thesis’s assertions about the ODB’s operational advisory role in all FID/COIN environments. With regard to advisory assistance with ANSF, GEN McChrystal states that U.S. forces must be “radically more integrated and partnered” with Afghan units.150 Furthermore, GEN McChrystal states that in order to achieve greater FID/COIN results in Afghanistan, ISAF advisors must expand “coalition force partnering at every echelon”151 With Afghanistan emerging as the U.S.’s most challenging FID/COIN struggle since South Vietnam, GEN McChrystal’s principles regarding advisory assistance in FID/COIN apply directly to ODBs because USSF will continue to conduct advisory missions, of varying scale, across the globe for the foreseeable future.

It is difficult to define precise or optimal employment for ODBs because, as shown in the case studies, operational environments can be vastly different. However, ODBs are capable, as shown in the case studies, of contributing to FID/COIN operations when they assume an operational advisory role with both HN forces and civic leaders. This thesis makes a case for the ODB as a flexible operational element. In order to enhance the ODB’s capacity to contribute in FID/COIN environments, the authors make four policy recommendations: (1) ODB command needs to be a 24-month assignment,

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(2) all ODB commanders should attend a Special Warfare Center (SWC) course designed
to educate and train USSF majors (MAJ) on operational-level advisory assistance, (3)
ODB table of organization and equipment (TOE) needs to add one additional captain
(CPT), who already has experience commanding an ODA, to the ODB staff, and (4)
ODB commanders need to be evaluated/rewarded for their HN advisory capability as
much as they are evaluated/rewarded for their C2/administrative capability.

Currently, ODB command for most of USSF MAJs lasts 12 months. Generally,
command at every other level in both USSF and in the conventional Army is 18-24
months. Because USSF will continue to engage in FID/COIN operations for the next
decade (even after conventional forces have returned to their traditional roles) coupled
with the fact that, both organizationally and functionally, ODBs are important in
FID/COIN because they integrate tactical and operational objectives, ODB command
needs to be 24 months. Modifying the current personnel rotation system to ensure that
ODB command lasts 24 months would improve continuity and create a cadre of USSF
officers who have a significant amount of experience conducting advisory assistance at
both the tactical and operational level of war.

ODBs are commanded by MAJs with experience as ODA commanders who have
also received additional professional military education (PME) at one of the four service
staff colleges (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) or at the Naval Postgraduate
School. While their PME exposes and prepares them, conceptually, for the operational
and strategic levels of war, the PME does not sufficiently address practical matters
regarding advisory assistance at the operational level with HN security forces or civic
leaders. If USSF is to remain the most capable “off-the-shelf” FID/COIN advisory
element in the DoD, then it must modify its PME to ensure that its MAJs are the best
trained and educated military advisors in the DoD. This thesis recommends a two-week
operational advisory course at the Special Warfare Center, taught by high-performing
former ODB commanders and battalion commanders, to pass on valuable lessons learned
and insights related to operational level advising in FID/COIN environments.

USSF doctrine, both past and present, supports the ODB’s role as an operational
advisory element at a level nested above the ODA. Doctrine dictates that ODBs provide
advisory assistance to both security forces and civic leaders at higher echelons than the ODA in order to achieve broader U.S. policy objectives. The case studies presented in this thesis revealed the ODB’s ability to execute dual (military & civic) advisory roles. With regard to doctrine, the authors identified one policy recommendation: a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) which includes one additional captain (CPT/O-3) who has already served as an ODA commander.

The current ODB TOE includes one CPT serving as the ODB executive officer (XO). The policy recommendation is for the ODB to have two XOs who both have experience commanding ODAs. If an additional experienced CPT were added to the ODB, then one CPT would serve as the XO for operations and one CPT would serve as the XO for administration, logistics, and support. These two XOs would take care of ODB-internal matters such as: reporting to ‘higher,’ planning/resourcing future operations, coordinating logistical support to ODAs, managing ODB financial and administrative issues, and engaging in conventional force liaison duties. The two XOs would already be keenly aware of the operational, logistic, and administrative needs of an ODA. Presumably, the XOs would have an understanding of the ODB’s functions. Furthermore, the ODB XO experience for both CPTs would benefit USSF in the future because these CPTs will likely become ODB commanders themselves. The addition of a USSF-qualified and experienced CPT on the ODB would enable the ODB commander to focus on his primary role of providing advisory assistance to HN security forces and civic leaders. The ODB Sergeant Major (SGM) and ODB Operations Warrant Officer would also be able to provide staff advisory assistance to their HN counterparts rather than spending time addressing ODB-internal matters.

Finally, the ODB commanders who communicate most effectively and generate results by, with, and through their HN counterparts need to be recognized and rewarded accordingly. It is not enough that an ODB commander is operationally savvy and provides sound C2 and logistical support to his subordinates. Instead, as GEN McChrystal states in his ISAF commanders assessment with regard to advisory assistance, “hard earned credibility and face to face relationships [with HN counterparts],
rather than close combat, will achieve success” in FID/COIN environments. USSF must ensure that it recognizes leaders who know how to work effectively with HN security forces and civic leaders. Only by recognizing and rewarding ODB commanders, sergeants major, and senior warrant officers who seek, assume, and effectively execute operational advisory roles with HN elements will USSF leaders/commanders ensure that their ODBs are focusing on what should be a primary line of operation in FID/COIN environments: integrated operational advisory assistance.

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LIST OF REFERENCES


Monty, John (pseudonym). Interview by authors Major Kirk Brinker and Major Dirk Smith, 18 August 2009.


Phalen, William. Interview by authors Major Kirk Brinker and Major Dirk Smith, 18 August 2009.


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