BALANCING THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT APPROACHES: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENDING THE VIOLENCE IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

by

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December 2009

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Balancing the Direct and Indirect Approaches: Implications for Ending the Violence in Southern Thailand

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The instability in the Southern Border Provinces of Thailand resurged on January 4, 2004. The current conflict is more complicated because the government, the insurgency and the population all need to be recognized as players. Of these, the population is the most important actor, especially its interaction with the international community, as stated in the Dr. Gordon McCormick’s Counterinsurgency Model. The state and the counter-state are trying to use their own strategies to gain advantages in controlling the people and gaining international support, while simultaneously blocking the other side from doing so. According to Arreguin-Toft’s study, the state will win the war if it utilizes the same approach as the counter-state. The asymmetric warfare model of Arreguin-Toft applies well to this case since the use of direct strategy and strong force are not always the right approaches in every battle. Additionally, the forms of insurgency in the south of Thailand have changed from guerrilla warfare and indoctrination into the insurgents’ ideology as a tool to draw support from people into, instead, the use of violence in the form of terrorism. Because of these changes, the definition of “insurgency” in the south of Thailand needs to be redefined.

This thesis advocates the following. With regards to the people and the international communities, the Thai government should use only the indirect approach. The indirect approach is preferred when the insurgency controls the majority of people. The direct approach should be used only when majority of the people support the government and, apparently, have isolated themselves from the insurgency.

The final goal of this study is to provide a reference for comparison and application for the other cases of counterinsurgency that are occurring worldwide.

Insurgency, counterinsurgency, Islamic fundamentalism, Muslim separatism, transnational terrorism, terrorism, counterterrorism, Thailand.

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BALANCING THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT APPROACHES: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENDING THE VIOLENCE IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

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ABSTRACT

The instability in the Southern Border Provinces of Thailand resurfaced on January 4, 2004. The current conflict is more complicated because the government, the insurgency, and the population all need to be recognized as players. Of these, the population is the most important actor, especially its interaction with the international community, as stated in the Dr. Gordon McCormick’s Counterinsurgency Model. The state and the counter-state are trying to use their own strategies to gain advantages in controlling the people and gaining international support, while simultaneously blocking the other side from doing so. According to Arreguin-Toft’s study, the state will win the war if it utilizes the same approach as the counter-state. The asymmetric warfare model of Arreguin-Toft applies well to this case since the use of direct strategy and strong force are not always the right approaches in every battle. Additionally, the forms of insurgency in the south of Thailand have changed from guerrilla warfare and indoctrination into the insurgents’ ideology as a tool to draw support from people into, instead, the use of violence in the form of terrorism. Because of these changes, the definition of “insurgency” in the south of Thailand needs to be redefined.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFP         Philippines Armed Forces
ASG         Abu Sayyaf Group
BNPP        Barisan Nasional Pemberbasan Pattani
BRN         Barisan Revolusi Nasional
CA          Civil Affair
CCPT        Chinese Communist Party of Thailand
COIN        Counterinsurgency
CPM         Civil-Police-Military Joint Headquarters
CPT         Communist Party of Thailand
CSOC        Communist Security Operation Command
GAM         Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
GMP         Gerakan Mujahideen Patani
GMIP        Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani
GOI         Government of Indonesia
GWS         Guerrilla Warfare Strategy
HRW         Human Right Watch
IED         Improvised Explosive Devices
IO          Information Operations
ISOC        Internal Security Operations Command
JI          Jemmah Islamiyya
JSOTF-P     Joint Special Operations Task Force, Philippines
KMM         Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia
MCP         Malayan Communist Party
MOU         Memorandum of Understanding
MPAJA       Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army
MRLA        Malayan Races Liberation Army
OEF - P     Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines
PSYOP       Psychological Operations
PULO        Patani United Liberation Organization
SBPAC       Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center
SBPPBC      Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command
SEDZ        Special Economic Development Zone
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION

The insurgency in the southern provinces of Thailand has been resurging since January 4, 2004. The number of violent incidents, including deaths and casualties, attributed to the insurgency has increased during these four years and continues to grow daily. Until recently, no one has officially claimed responsibility for these incidents. The Thai government has tried to use both the direct and indirect approaches, which will be discussed later in this thesis, to deal with the situation and especially to reduce the violent incidents created by the insurgents. The government needs to restore the south of Thailand back to a position of peace as soon as possible by answering the following questions: which strategy is to be focused on, the direct or indirect approaches, or both; why do the insurgents who are Muslims use violence against Muslims themselves; and how can the Thai government put an end to the violence created by the insurgents in the southern part of Thailand?

The unrest in the south of Thailand involves many factors. However, the important factors that constitute the root causes of the current crisis are the following. First, there are the ethno-religious, cultural, and lingual differences of the people in the southern provinces and other parts of Thailand. Second, it is a fact that the southern region remains behind in terms of development, which ultimately has led to poverty and a low quality of life for the residents of that area. In addition, the people are also suffering from the injustice and malfunction of the central government. Third, the resistance that has emerged since Thailand annexed the province of Pattani more than 200 years ago. It is believed that there are differences in the objectives for the rebels or insurgents and the people in the south of Thailand. The rebels want to liberate the south from the central government and form a new country. But the people of the south just want the central government to recognize and accept the above differences between them and the people in the other parts of the country. If the above differences are recognized and accepted, the people in the south likely will be treated indiscriminately and equally by the central
government in relation to people in the other parts of the country. This, hopefully, will lead to justice and development in the south.

1. Purpose

The instability in the south of Thailand has become part of the national agenda. The purpose of this thesis is to study and make recommendations for the appropriate strategy needed to put an end to the violence. This author also expects to assess and evaluate the quality of the current government campaigns, and also try to come up with the real improvements needed for government campaigns in order to restore the three provinces back to a collective peaceful environment very soon. Moreover, this study hopes to serve as a reference for the comparison and application of other cases of counterinsurgency that are going on in the world today.

2. Structure of Analysis

This study is a qualitative research project utilizing some descriptive quantitative data from secondary sources to focus on analysis and measurement of the success or failure of the strategies of the state against the counter-state and population. The thesis is based on open sources and the reviews useful models and case studies such as Dr. Gordon McCormick’s Mystic Diamond, Arreguin-Toft’s Model, as well as the success of counterinsurgency campaigns against the communists in Malaya and Thailand, the Philippines counterinsurgency, and the Aceh Conflict. A comparison or contrast of each model and case is made in order to find out the most suitable answer to this study.

This thesis further indicates that the state and the counter-state are trying to use their own strategies to gain advantages in controlling the people and gaining international support, while simultaneously blocking the other side from doing so. Based on Arreguin-Toft’s study, the state will win the war if it utilizes the same approach as the counter-state.

As a consequence, the best advice for the Thai government is to use only an indirect approach for the people and the international community at any time. The indirect approach should also be used when the insurgency controls most of the people.
The only proper time to apply a direct approach is when most of the people support the government and have apparently separated themselves from the insurgency.

3. Plan for the Thesis

The thesis is divided into five chapters and one appendix. Chapter I is comprised of two parts. The first provides an introduction to the case. The research question of how the government can best put an end to the violence by choosing between the direct and indirect approaches is discussed, with the purpose of this thesis being to find the answer to that question. The methodology of this thesis is mainly qualitative with some descriptive quantitative research. Next, in the second part, the history of Thailand from the kingdom of absolute monarchy in the 13th century to the democracy today is provided. The background of the kingdom of Pattani and the three provinces, as well as the five insurgency groups in Thailand from the mid 20th century, which have the same main objective but differ in details and tactics, is discussed. Finally, the major incidents in the south that emphasize the failure of the assimilation policy and the use of the hot-hand of the government in the Kru Sae and Tak Bai incidents are presented, including the daily incidents, insurgent tactics, and the types of victims, most of whom are civilians, both Buddhists and Muslims.

Chapter II examines the privileged policy for Muslims after the unsuccessful attempt to unite the Muslims to the Thai identity. After that, the study places emphasis on the failure of the aggressive policies of the Thaksin government before September 2006 that worsened the disequilibrium, and the mix of direct and indirect strategies of the Juranont regime after September 2006, such as the implementation of information operations, more development projects, and the justice campaign, as well as the use of force in June 2007 that was, perhaps, considered a better application. Nonetheless, after the offensive operation, the incidents of violence have been decreasing in quantity, but the number of deaths and casualties continues to fluctuate.

Chapter III reviews the applicable theories and models from scholars, such as McCormick’s Mystic Diamond that implies the interaction among state, counter-state, people and international actors; and Arreguin-Toft’s Model that suggests the strong will
lose to the weak if the wrong strategy is applied. Bale clarifies the definition of terrorism, its victims and the need for media attention by terrorists. Finally, the comparison of the models and the definitions are provided.

Chapter IV shows the successes and failures of the similar selected cases, relative to the south of Thailand, by following the success of the counterinsurgency campaign against the communists in Malaya and Thailand, the Philippines counterinsurgency, and the Aceh Conflict. In each case the counterinsurgency models, including the case in the south of Thailand, are explained. The chapter concludes with applied scenarios from the models and cases for the state strategies.

Chapter V provides the author’s conclusions and suggestions from the study that the state needs to apply the strategies suggested by the Mystic Diamond and utilize the same approach as the counter-state according to Arreguin-Toft’s Model to end the unrest.

Appendix section A demonstrates the history of conflictions sequenced by years that led to the emergence of the counter-state. From secondary sources, Appendix section B illustrates the total number of incidents, the deaths and casualties in the south of Thailand annually from January 2004 to July 2009. From these illustrations, readers will find that after implementing the new strategies initiated by Prime Minister Julanont after the 2006 coup, the number of violent incidents have declined, but not the number of deaths and injuries. A breakdown of the kinds of victims from January 2004 to July 2009, most of whom are soft targets, is provided. Lastly, the comparison between Buddhist and Muslim victims from January 2004 to July 2009 illustrates the gender, age and religion of the victims, with the implication that there is no significant difference between Muslim and Buddhist victims after the offensive operation.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. The Kingdom of Thailand

The kingdom of Thailand, or Siam, is a country with a Constitutional Monarchy, located in southeast Asia, with an area of 513,000 square kilometers, and composed of 76 provinces and 62 million people (Minister of Interior: Department of Demography, 2009). The kingdom of Thailand was established in the 13th century with the first capital
city bearing the name Sukhothai. In the 15th century, the capital city was moved to Ayutthaya. During the last two centuries, the capital city of Thailand was finally moved and named Bangkok and is located in the central part of Thailand. King Rama IX is the beloved present king of all the Thai people. Following its establishment, the kingdom of Thailand has experienced a long history of fighting and domination over its neighboring countries. For the time being, Thailand is very peaceful with only some small conflicts along the boundaries with its neighbors such as Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. However, Thailand and its neighboring states have a collaborated committee to work on these problems. Moreover, in 1980, shortly before the end of Cold War, Thailand successfully used Reconciliation and Amnesty Programs to overcome the Thai Communism Party, which had tried to change the democratic regime to a communist administration (Storey, 2007). After the world turned toward a period of U.S. hegemony, Thailand and most of the ASEAN members chose to support the United States in the War on Terror after 9/11. Simultaneously, one additional threat to Thailand began with the insurgency in the three southernmost provinces along the border (Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat). These provinces historically have suffered from the annexation by Siam more than 200 years ago, and they showed indications of wanting to fight the government again. Then unpredicted unrest occurred on January, 4, 2004, and the insurgents declared war on the government by attacking a battalion in the Narathiwat province. After that, a number of violent incidents including bombings, shootings, and arsons have taken place daily.

More than 2,500–3,000 years into its history, Thailand and the Indo-China region were influenced by Brahmanism (Hinduism) and Buddhism from India, respectively. In the 7th–8th and 13th–14th centuries, before and after the Crusade War, Islam was brought to Southeast Asia and the south of Thailand. Nevertheless, Buddhism is the most widely held belief among the Thai people. Today, approximately 95 percent of Thai people believe in Buddhism, 4.5 percent believe in Islam, and 0.5 percent believes in other religions (Ampunan, 2007, p. 1). Currently 99 percent of Thai Muslims are Sunni and only one percent are Shia (Mahidol University, 2009). Eighty percent (2.3 million) of the Muslims in Thailand live in the three southernmost provinces, including the western
part of the Songkla province, the Satun province (Ampunan, 2007, p. 1). The southern border provinces of Thailand are shown in Figure 1. Not only are there differences in religion between the people of the three provinces and the rest of Thailand, but also in the background, ethnicity, culture, and the language (Jawi), differences which are actually more similar to the Malays than the Thais (Maisonti, 2004, p. 6).

Figure 1. The Southern Border Provinces of Thailand (From “Southern Thailand,” 2009)

2. The Chaos of the Former Kingdom of Pattani and the Present Southern Border Provinces of Thailand

The kingdom of Pattani experienced a long, independent history before its annexation to Thailand from the 7th to 18th century. The empire was a great region of seaports, fisheries and agriculture. First, the kingdom was influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism from India, beginning in the 7th century; then Islam was brought to the area and to other countries in Southeast Asia in the 13th–14th centuries. During that time, Pattani was invaded and colonized by the kingdom of Siam as Siam was rising to power, and it was released when Siam began to fall. After that, conflict in the area has re-
emerged over time. In the middle of the 20th century, a crisis exploded again when the king of Pattani, or “Sulatan,” was demoted to a normal citizen and the Assimilation Policy was enacted. Consequently, a written document was sent to the Thai government requesting recognition of the identity of the southern people, but the request encountered a negative response. Subsequently, many groups advocating resistance activities were established. Their tactics have evolved from those of guerrilla warfare into the well-known incidents of terrorism today. The details of the chronological events of Pattani are outlined in Appendix section A.

3. Insurgency Groups in Thailand

As mentioned above, the former Kingdom of Pattani was annexed to the southern border provinces of Thailand, which brought repression and fostered grievances among some of the elites of the former kingdom. Since then, a number of small resistance groups have formed among the people of the former Pattani. However, after the 1949 incident, the arrest of a Muslim leader (Appendix section A), the resistance of those small groups became very intense. Their common objective has remained an independent state, even though their approaches to gain that independence might be different. By 1980–1990, the groups were applying guerrilla warfare but encountered hard suppression from the Thai government that coordinated with the government of Malaysia. Secretly, many groups were subsequently reestablished, and on January 4, 2004, the day of the declaration of war on the government, the violence escalated and has continued to the present. Some factions disagree with targeting innocents and Muslims, but the brutality is far from receding. Many extremists misperceive that violence is only way to fight the invader, the Thais. However, it is estimated that the insurgents have 3,000 militants and 6,000 main supporters in the southern provinces now (“Daily News,” 2009). Moreover, most of the groups have also set up an office in third countries, especially in Europe and in the north of Africa. Apart from that, they have sent their students and militants to study Islamic principles and terrorism tactics in Islamic countries including Malaysia and Indonesia. The insurgent groups in southern Thailand are discussed in the following paragraphs in chronological order.
a. **Barisan Nasional Pemberbasan Pattani (BNPP)**

In 1959, the Barisan Nasional Pemberbasan Pattani, or Patani National Liberation Front (BNPP), was set up by Abdul Yhalal Nasare (Klaimanee, 2008, pp. 18–24). The aim of this group was to fight for independence from Thailand. Many Islamic students were recruited into the religious schools. New recruiters were trained in the jungles and later sent to Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan for further training. The group increased its strength and was supported by the Parti Islam from Malaysia until 1978 (Klaimanee, 2008, pp. 18–24). Notably, it seems like the movement of the group is rarely found in a report today.

b. **Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)**

On March 13, 1960, the group was founded by various Islamic teachers including Abdul Karim bin Hasan, Haji Harun Sulong, and Amin Tohmeena at the Dhamma Wittaya School in Yala province (Klaimanee, 2008, pp. 18–24). Many years later, this school served as the main location for conducting the group’s activities, training, and meetings. It was recently estimated that the BRN is the core group of the insurgency in the southern part of Thailand. The goal of the movement is the same as that of the BNPP, but they currently do not agree on who the leaders will be after they win the war. Furthermore, the group retains strong ties with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and the Pan Islamic State in Southeast Asia (Maisonti, 2004, pp. 10–14). At the time of its establishment, some leaders of the group wanted to fight by using political means, but later the group activities trended toward terrorism. Nonetheless, the BRN has been subsidized by Malaysia and the Middle East for its resources, training, activities, and meeting facilities. In 1977, the group was divided into the BRN-Congress (armed efforts), the BRN-Coordinate (political efforts), and in 1984, the BRN-Ulama, which focuses on religious rituals, was formed (Ampunan, 2007, pp. 9–13). In 2006, the government found a written document depicting the seven steps of revolution planned by Masae Usang, one of the BRN leaders. The details of these steps are the followings.

1. Creating public awareness of Islam (religion), Malay (nationality) and Patani homeland, invasion/occupation [by the Thai state] and the struggle for independence; 2. Creating mass support through religious teaching (at
various levels, including tadika, ponoh, private Islamic colleges, and provincial Islamic committees) 3. Setting up a secretive organizational structure; 4. Recruiting and training (ethnic Malay Muslim) youth to become militants, aiming to have 3,000-strong well trained and well disciplined troops; 5. Building nationalist and independence struggle ideology among government officials (of ethnic Malay Muslim origin) and ethnic Malay Muslims (of the southern border provinces) who went to work in Malaysia; 6. Launching a new wave of attacks; 7. Declaring a revolution [Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau & Piggott (2009, p. 20) quoted from Human Rights Watch (2007)].

c. Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO)

On January 22, 1968, the PULO was organized by Kabir Abdul Rahman, who graduated with a degree in political science from India (Klaimanee, 2008, pp. 18–19). The group was very effective during the period from 1970–1980 with strong support from Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Middle East. The objective of the group was to create an independent state by the reestablishment of five provinces including Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satun, and some border districts of Songkhla province. The leaders of the group were ancestrally related to an elite people from the area’s past. Primarily, the group was looking to fight for recognition of their ethnicity, but later they also claimed the Quran as their guide and sent students to Libya, Syria, Palestine, and the Middle East. The militants were trained not only by the countries that supported them, but also in the Budo Mountain and the north of Malaysia. In 1980, the group was also reformed into the New PULO. In 1988, the group split into the PULO-88 (Ampunan, 2007, p. 11). In 1998, the Thai government cooperated with the government of Malaysia to capture many leaders of the PULO. Although the group is not very powerful these days, speakers in Sweden and the north of Africa are interviewed by the western media quite often regarding the crises of southern Thailand. In addition, the PULO is infamous for its propaganda on the internet by creating many websites that attempt to discredit the government and promote the historical perception of the insurgents as freedom combatants, who later embraced the Muslim Jihad. In fact, many leaders of PULO disagree with the recent violent tactics on the ground; a senior PULO member was interviewed by Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau, and Piggott, (2009, p. 22). He stated that:
I fought for years in the jungle against the Thai state. I am still very much a [an ethnic Malay Muslim] nationalist and still dream of a free Patani Darul Salam. I will never hesitate to take up arms to fight again. But not like this, not the way this generation is conducting it. It seems like they are just killing for killing’s sake—creating fear to increase their power and control our people.

I don’t understand the insurgents. They are killing fellow Muslims, women, and children. I don’t understand what they are up to. Much of the conflict continues to be driven by resentment at the abuse and power of the [Thai] state. But you can’t just rise up and hit anybody. Whoever the insurgents see first, they attack. They engage in violence for the sake of violence.

d. Gerakan Mujahideen Patani (GMP) and Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani (GMIP)

On September 16, 1985, lead members of BNPP/BIPP, BRN-Coordinate, BRN-Ulama, and PULO met together and discussed their disunity. After that, the BBMP (Barisan Bersatu Mujahidin Patani) was formed as a coordinated operation center. However, the cooperation did not work well. Then, in 1986, the GMP (Gerakan Mujahideen Patani), a splinter group from BBMP was founded (Klaimanee, 2008, p. 22). The GMP conducted its activities in northern Malaysia with emphasis on political efforts. Subsequently, in 1995, the group broke away and became the GMIP with the shared aspiration of the Independent Islamic State, while expanding cooperation with the regional Islamic groups such as the KMM (Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia), the ASG (Abu Sayyaf), and JI (Jemmah Islamiyah). The GMIP specialized in urban bombing, using improvised explosive devices (IED) and raids by small groups of gunmen (Ampunan, 2007, p. 13).

e. The United Front for the Independence of Patani (BERSATU)

On August 31, 1989, the leaders of BIPP, BRN, GMP, and PULO came together again in order to tighten their cooperation, strengthen their capabilities, step forward in the same direction, and facilitate the receiving of international financial support. BERSATU means “together” in the Malaysian/Indonesian language. The goal of BERSATU is to fight for independence and act against the government of Thailand and its policies. The group calls for help from other Islamic groups and Muslim countries.
The BERSATU often holds meetings in Malaysia, led by the co-leader, Dr. Wan Kadir Che Man (Dr. Fadeh). However, there is no centralized controlling effort by him to unite activities. The groups’ members still carry out their operations freely, but with increased coordination (Klaimanee, 2008, pp. 18–24).

4. Major Incidents and “Daily Incidents” in the South

From January 4, 2004 to June 2008, there were more than 8,171 insurgency-related incidents, 3,071 deaths and 4,986 injuries (Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 2009). To date, the impetus to cease the violence is rarely found. As a matter of fact, the major events by which the government has had to bitterly learn the failures of its weak counter measure, and that such merciless responses could drive people to cooperate with the insurgency, are discussed in the following paragraphs.

a. The Declaration of War on January 4, 2004

After the Dusun Nyiur Incident in 1948 (Appendix section A), the southern Muslims experienced even more repression and grievances. There were many minor incidents and movements such as police checkpoint attacks, a small number of mass protests, trainings in the mountain areas, and school arsons, but the government underestimated the situation and did not prepare for the unpredicted disaster. As a matter of fact, at dawn of January 4, 2004, an unidentified group attacked the 4th development battalion from the jungle, in Narathiwat province, killing four soldiers on duty and stealing 380 M.16s, two M.60s, twenty-four 11 mm pistols, and seven RPG-7s. Other groups were also coordinately attacking police posts, setting schools afire, and burning tires on many roads in different places at the same time (Directorate of Intelligence, 2008). This incident appears to have been the insurgency’s attempt to announce its war on the Bangkok government.

b. Krue Sae Mosque Incident

On April 28, 2004, many young militants with homemade weapons simultaneously attacked eleven police and army checkpoints in Yala, Pattani, and Sonkha provinces. At the same time, thirty men mainly attacked the checkpoint near the Krue
Sae Mosque in Pattani province, then ran away and hid inside the Krue Sae Mosque, enticing the army to encompass them while they shouted aggressively and fired on some of the troops. The troops chose to crush them altogether. The result was that the thirty men in the mosque and at the other points were shot dead. The totally unexpected numbers pertaining to the intruders were reported to include 107 deaths, six injuries, and seventeen arrests; meanwhile, five officials were killed and fifteen were injured (“Kruesae Incident,” 2009). The incident was well planned with the intention of having young Muslims killed in a place symbolic of the Pattani Empire, in order to discredit the authority for its cruelty. The commander of the event was accused of having no critical thinking skills, but the fact is that the government had no clear strategy to deal with the new kind of threat, so the practitioners on the field had no guideline to implement and made the decision on the basis of what they thought they should do.

c. Tak Bai Incident

In order to trap Bangkok into an even more symbolic event, on October 25, 2004, 1,500 people came together in front of the Tak Bai police station, Narathiwat province, to blame the police for arresting the six innocent guards who gave their weapons to the insurgents. The people lacked detailed knowledge of the case, but the religious leaders and friends had told them to come. Without permission, some soldiers opened fire on the crowd and the situation quickly deteriorated. Next, 1,300 protestors were caught and loaded on trucks and sent to the army camp in Pattani province. Unfortunately, seventy-eight people, who were fasting in the month of Ramadan, died on the way (Klaimenee, 2008, p. 38). This was another well-planed event set to ruin the reputation of the regime by highlighting its brutality. The event was suddenly publicized to the public by the media, not excluding CD distribution by unknown sources. Eventually, when the situation is reconsidered, it will come to light that the ones who initially motivated the crowd are the real evil doers, using the suffering and death of innocent people as a tool for their hidden intention.
d. Had Yai Airport Bombing

The insurgency also expanded its area from mainly three southern provinces to the capital city of Songkha province by bombing the Had Yai Airport on two separate occasions. The first bombing, on April 3, 2005, resulted in one death and eighteen injuries. The second bombing, on September 16, 2006, around 2100, involved six synchronous bombings at large shopping centers and the airport. The attacks reportedly resulted in four deaths and sixty-seven injured victims (“Had Yai Airport Bombing,” 2009). The insurgency has on other infrequent occasions tried to expand its operations out of the three provinces.

e. “Daily Incidents,” Tactics and Victims

Since January 4, 2004, violent incidents have been occurring almost daily, and are now referred to as “Daily Violence.” These kinds of incidents include motorcycle drive-by shootings; several kinds of bombings using IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices); roadside bombs and ambushes on the police and army patrols; official building arsons; the beheading and burning of victims; leaflet propaganda; mass protests; and tire burnings and the dumping of twisted nails on the roads. The largest number of victims comes from the soft targets who cannot defend themselves, such as normal civilians (63 percent), while the military and police each account for 10-12 percent, respectively. In the beginning, the selected targets were symbols of the Thai government and associated with either Buddhist civilians, Buddhist monks, government teachers and schools, and the military and police. Eventually the targets have become random and could involve anyone, including Muslims themselves. From January 2004 to December 2008, the total count of dead and injured Buddhists was 4,279 (53 percent); the total number of dead and injured Muslims was 3,185 (39.5 percent) out of the total of 8,057 cases. Nonetheless, the total number of Muslim deaths reached 4,512 cases (56 percent), which is greater than the 3,383 deaths of Buddhists (42 percent) (Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 2009). More information about the victims and number of incidents is provided in Appendix section A.
II. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE AND STRATEGIES

A. THE INDISCRIMINATE AND PRIVILEGED POLICY FOR MUSLIMS

As stated in the introduction, 4.5 percent of Thai people are Muslim, and 80 percent of Muslims live in the southernmost provinces. Even though Thailand has changed many of its constitutions, no constitution has been written about the national religion, and thus anyone can believe in any faith. Nevertheless, for administrative purposes, in 1938 the government tried to establish a Thai identity for the whole country but instead created huge opposition in the three provinces. However, after the failure of assimilation for the southern people, the Thai government improved many of its policies for Muslims. Mahidol University (2009) raised many important issues, such as that a large number of Thai Muslims appreciate the kindness and financial support from his majesty the king for translating the Quran into Thai. Royally, each year the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday is held under his majesty’s patronage. His majesty has also appointed a state counselor for all Islamic affairs, or “Chularajamontri,” for a Muslim religious leader. Moreover, the government also provides a budget with which to build and renovate approximately 2,000 mosques and 200 Islamic schools. Ultimately, in the deep-south provinces, Muslim employees are allowed to leave for Muslim festivals and to work a half day on Friday, in order to allow for praying in a mosque; they are also extended a leave of four months with full salary for a Hajj pilgrim journey to Mecca. In addition, Mahidol University (2009) mentioned special legal provisions that have been incorporated in order to support the Islamic religion. Some of these are listed below.

- The 1974 act relating to mosques, in which the Ministry of Interior is responsible for the registration of mosques, and the registered mosque becomes a juristic person.
- The Royal Decree on religious Patronage of the Religion of Islam in 1945 and 1948 in which a counselor for Muslim affairs (Chularatchamontri) is to be appointed, and he is to be ex-officio President of the National Council for Muslims of Thailand as well.
• At an appropriate time, the Ministry of Education has been assigned to start the Islamic collage of Thailand so that Thai Muslims are provided with a place for studying and training.

• The National Council for Muslims of Thailand is to be established consisting of at least five members, all of whom must be Muslim, who are appointed and removed by virtue of the Royal Proclamation.

• Provincial councils for Muslims are by Decree to be set up in all provinces in which an appropriate number of Muslims are domiciled.

• Each provincial is authorized by the Decree to appoint a council for each mosque in its province. The mosque-council, consisting of at least seven members, all Muslim, is presided over by an Imam who is responsible for the missionary work in the locality and the administrative work of the mosque.

B. BEFORE SEPTEMBER 2006

1. Before the Thaksin Regime

In the period from 1948–1960, there were communist insurgents who fought for their ideology in Thailand, as well as in Malaya. As a result, Thailand encountered the southern separatists and the communist insurgency at the same time, even though the two groups had different ideologies. However, the groups shared an enemy, and that was why a measure of cooperation existed between them. Simultaneously, the United Kingdom and the Malaya government asked Thailand to help them defeat the Malaya communists by sealing the border and using as many other means as possible. The Thai government cooperated with the Malaya government. Following that agreement, the Malaya communists could no longer go back and forth though the Thai border again, and they received no support from the locals. Finally, they surrendered.

From 1970–1980, Thailand saw the rise of the PULO in the border jungles and in the north of Malaysia. Thai authorities tried very hard to suppress the PULO with the collaboration of Malaysia. In 1981, the Thai government, by General Prem Tinnasulanon, the Prime Minister, established the CPM43 and SBPAC as follows:
Civil-Police-Military Joint Headquarters (CPM 43) to coordinate security operations, which up to that time had not been synchronized and, therefore, created problems in implementation. One of the most important things that CPM 43 emphasized was to cease extra-judicial killings and disappearances. The government also launched a Policy of Attraction, aimed at drawing off sympathy from separatist groups by increasing political participation and lavishing economic development projects on the region. Large infrastructure projects, electricity and running water were brought into remote areas. Military personnel and government officials helped establish committees at the village level to promote economic development and security.

The establishment of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) was formed to facilitate correction of major problems in the administration, especially poor coordination among agencies, corruption and prejudice among officials. Corrupt and abusive behavior on the part of officials had been a significant source of grievance since the 1940s. The SBPAC was empowered to reward, punish or remove officials on the basis of performance. Besides government officials, the SBPAC was comprised also of local religious leaders, local community leaders, and scholars. There was an emphasis on understanding Thai-Malay Muslim culture. The center also held regular seminars for Thai-Malay Muslim leaders to air their grievances (Klaimanee, 2008, p. 32).

The two units were first led by the army, and later the SBPAC was controlled by the minister of interior. The two units worked very well with the increased cooperation from other officials, people, and the assistance of the government of Malaysia at that time. The government was very successful in minimizing the movement of the insurgency. In addition, the CPM43 was very effective in civil affairs, psychology and intelligence operations, so the government was able to access and control the people in an excellent manner. For a decade, the situation appeared to remain calm, but in actuality, recruiting activity for the insurgency continued and secret training continued in the Islamic schools and mountainous areas.

2. **The Thaksin Administration**

In 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra, an ex-police officer, became the Prime Minister. He was very successful in his own field, but not in security management. He not only reevaluated the activities of the southern insurgents as simply normal banditry, but also introduced numerous policies resulting in social disequilibrium and additional grievances
from the southern residents. Among the grievances were the cancellation of the SBPAC and CPM43, the declaration of martial law, the implementation of human abuses in Kru Sae and Tak Bai, the zoning of red villages, and the enactment of an emergency decree, respectively. These steps are discussed in more detail below.

In May 2002, by his own underestimation and in response to the agitation by the police in the area, Thaksin abolished the SBPAC and CPM43 and turned the power of security management over to the police. He also offered the declaration of the “War on Drugs,” which killed 2,500 individuals in an extrajudicial manner all over the country, including the south (Klaimanee, 2008, p. 35). After these actions, the number of violent incidents per year increased during the period from 2001-2004 from approximately 114, 82, and 84 to 1,843, respectively, as shown in Figure 4. The situation took a turn for the worse, and on June 27, 2003, the government reestablished the SBPAC and changed the name to the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command (SBPPBC) with similar roles to that of the old organization (Ampunan, 2007, p. 21). Unfortunately, the government realized that one of its biggest problems was the lack of both intelligence and cooperation from the people because access to villages was dismantled when the CPM43 was disbanded.

![Figure 2. The Number of Incidents (1993–2004) (From: “Terrorism,” 2009)](image-url)
On January 4, 2004, unpredictably, the insurgency started a war against the government and followed up with many incidents that escalated daily during the first four years. Suddenly, on January 5, 2004, Thaksin imposed martial law in the three provinces, allowing troops to make arrests without judicial warrant and detain a suspect within a seven day period. As previously mentioned, at first the threat of a terrorist insurgency was a very new issue for the Thai government, which lacked an understanding of not only how to deal with it, but how to develop a clear strategy for the low level practitioners. This gave the insurgency an opportunity to advance through its initiatives and unpredictable patterns. Fighting the insurgency by primarily responding to the insurgents’ initiative placed the Thai government in the position of underdog. Moreover, after Thaksin declared that he would not negotiate with the insurgents, field commanders used this declaration as the justification for the use of excessive force. This led to abuses of human rights in Krue Sae in April 2004 and in Tak Bai in October 2004. All of this negative effort was looked upon as evidence of the alienation and injustice experienced by the southern inhabitants, and motivated some of the people to help the counter-state. This furthered the social disequilibrium more than anyone expected.

Despite the above negative effort, December 5, 2004, became significant, not only significant as the king’s birthday, but also as the day that the Thai government under Thaksin asked all Thai people to fold paper birds, the symbol of peace, for later dropping onto the south. One hundred and twenty million paper birds were flown and dropped on to the southern border provinces of Thailand. Even so, there was still no sign of improved collaboration from the southern population.

The former paragraph is an example of the implementation of psychology operations at the national level. Only a few television and radio stations chose to broadcast peace-promoting programs initiated by the government. This was mainly because those programs did not bring about as much monetary benefit to the stations as broadcasting non-governmental programs. Should the government make a greater effort to support the peace promoting by promoting programs politically and monetarily, such a failure to maintain the psychology operations at the national level would occur. Despite
these actions, it was proven, nonetheless, that the Thai people had a willingness to help the southern people if an appropriate circumstance could be arranged.

In February 2005, Prime Minister Thaksin prioritized 1,580 southern villages for three levels of security: red, yellow, and green. The 350 red villages were judged to be sympathetic to the insurgents and would receive no funding because he was afraid that the funds would help the insurgency to enact more incidents of violence (BBC News, 2005). This decision not only highlighted the disparity between those 1,580 villages and provided incentives for people to further support the insurgents, they also displayed this disparity to external actors, the international community.

On July 19, 2005, the administration published the Emergency Decree, intended as a more acceptable form of martial law. The decree provided immunity from prosecution for the forces operating in the south, and suspended the jurisdiction of the court system to prosecute officials for their actions (Crisis Group, 2005): it gave more power to state officials to arrest and detain suspects. It failed to regain the trust of local people toward the government and somehow made the situation worse (AFP, 2006). As the HRW (2007) states:

The decree is to arrest and detain suspects without charge, restrict movement and communication, censor the media, and deny access to redress for victims of abuses by government officials and security personnel. The decree allowed authorities to detain suspects for 30 days or longer in unregistered “safe houses.” The legislation also created the possibility that detainees may be held in secret, undisclosed, or inaccessible locations where monitoring is impossible and there is no judicial oversight or access to legal counsel or family. (pp. 39-40)

C. AFTER SEPTEMBER 2006

On September 19, 2006, General Surayud Julanont, a former member of Special Forces, became Prime Minister after a bloodless military coup. He enacted the Internal Security Act in 2007 to reestablish the Internal Security Operations Command 4 (ISOC 4), which is commanded by the 4th Army Area Commander, a Lieutenant General. The ISOC4 is comprised of four organic units: (1) the CPM43 as a military wing; (2) the SBPAC as a socio-economic wing, which is organic regarding the mix of strategies
associated with peace building, reconciliation, and the use of security forces; (3) an intelligence center to coordinate all intelligence units in the higher and lower levels; and (4) the Police Special Task Force in charge of investigation and arresting of suspects.

1. The Use of Force

The CPM 43 deployed a six-month rotation of 18,000 police officers; 30,000 military troops from all parts of Thailand; and 18,000 local volunteers from the ministry of the interior, including 4,000 local soldiers from the 15th Light Infantry Division, widely over the provinces (Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau & Piggott, 2009, p. 107). The total number of personnel for the force was 66,000, or twenty-one Infantry Battalions of military troops (seven Infantry Regiments). The CPM 43 was subordinated by six main units, of which all the province task forces are commanded by a Major General, except Task Force Songkha, which is under a Colonel Commander:

- Task Force Yala (Task Force 1) is composed of troops from the 3rd and 4th Army Area, which is organized out of six battalions.
- Task Force Patani (Task Force 2) is composed of troops from the 2nd and 4th Army Area and organized out of six battalions.
- Task Force Narathiwat (Task Force 3) is composed of troops from the 1st and 4th Army Area and Marine Task Force which is organized out of nine battalions.
- Task Force Songkha (Task Force 4) is comprised of troops from the 4th Army Area, which is organized out of two to three battalions. The Task Force’s Area of Operation is the four districts of Songkha province that are also experiencing turmoil.
- Santhisuk Task Force is mainly subordinated by Special Force Detachments and CA & PSYOP teams that work with local village leaders to help build popular trust and confidence in the state’s security and measures.
- Anothai Task Force is the logistic and general support unit that consists of the teams of Explosive Ordnance Disposal and aviation teams.
The mission of the troops is to enhance security, restore law and order by daily patrols, and provide symbolic target escort such as for Buddhist monks and teachers. Apart from that, the mostly locally recruited 7,500 paramilitary plays an important role as a border patrol, light screening force, intelligence collection source, and civic action force. The paramilitary works very well by taking advantage of common elements such as the same local language and culture. Incidents of violence have fluctuated, but trended dramatically upward from January 2004 to May 2007, despite the fact that the numbers increased during the mid-year of every year. In June 2007, the government decided to begin an offensive of searching for suspects by enclosing villages related to the better intelligence that had been gained from the greater cooperation of the people. Later, a curfew enforcement was announced in an effort to limit the freedom of movement of the insurgents. The resulting aftermath was that the number of incidents was sharply reduced, though the number of deaths and casualties still fluctuated as is shown in Figure 3.

![Figure 3. The Total Number of Incidents from January 2004 to July 2009 (From: Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 2009)](figure3)

2. **The Policies of an Indirect Approach**

In the early part of 2004, after the insurgency launched an attack on the 4th development battalion in Narathiwat province, the King distributed His Majesty’s suggestion for the south crisis: “understand, reach out, and develop.” Unfortunately, this
suggestion had not been followed by the Thaksin government very well. In contrast, the Juranon government put forth a strong effort to manipulate that philosophy. In January 2007, the government set up an ad hoc Special Economic Development Zone (SEDZ) to promote economic development, and stimulate education and social satisfaction. In addressing the malfunctions of the justice system, the government tried to rebuild trust in the southern communities by dedicating a Justice Maintenance Center to examine reports of misbehaving officials. In addition, hundreds of Special Forces were sent to the Santisuk Force, which works with the chiefs of villages to build trust and confidence.

In October 2006, Prime Minister Julanont made a public apology to the south for the wrong policies of the previous government and welcomed the leaders of the insurgents to negotiate. He cancelled all the blacklists of the rebels and encouraged amnesty programs (Klaimanee, 2008, p. 79). Yet, no official agreement was made, and even though some of the PULO representatives in the countries that supported them have broadcast their intention to talk, it seems they cannot communicate to their field combatants, while the real leaders behind the violent incidents do not want to reveal themselves. In fact, the way that the insurgents communicate with the government is through the number of incidents in a given period of time, as well as the number of deaths, injuries, and the kinds of targets and victims. These statistics and actions indicate, more or less, what the insurgents are thinking.

Normally, regular forces are used for the direct approach that will be discussed later in the next chapter. However, in the south of Thailand operations, the regular forces are also used to conduct Civil Affair and Psychology Operations (CA and PSYOP) due to the shortages in a number of the most suitable units, specifically the Special Forces. Therefore, it was made mandatory by the army that the regular forces must also be trained to be able to conduct CA and PSYOP before their deployment. All battalions that will operate in the south are trained in CA and PSYOP for at least three months. Nevertheless, most regular forces are Infantry Battalions that possess many privates trained to fight only in a conventional warfare. It is very difficult to make those privates understand the concepts of CA and PSYOP and become capable of conducting such operations. In spite of this, these privates have gradually learned some skills on the job.
Normally each battalion from other parts of Thailand is deployed to the south for a period of six months and then replaced by a new battalion. However, the situation has lasted longer than expected, so that previously deployed battalions might be redeployed to the south again. This redeployment in turn results in an improvement in the CA and PSYOP skills of the individual soldiers. Although, there are many more CA and PSYOP missions, medical visits and agriculture teaching are the missions that are mostly provided to the villagers in the south by these battalions.

After approximately one year of implementing the new strategy, the number of violent incidents was statistically reduced, but the numbers of deaths and injuries have continued to fluctuate. The 4th Army Area and ISOC4 Commander was interviewed and stated that the number of red villages has been reduced to 217, and these villages were more accessible (Matichon, 2009). It is estimated that the insurgency has less freedom of movement as a result of the force pressure, and people are showing more satisfaction with the state’s numerous soft programs. Despite that perceived increase in satisfaction, though, the government could not estimate the exact attitude of the southern people regarding its new strategy, but the general election result of December 23, 2007 showed that about 77 percent of eligible people of the three provinces came to vote. It was approximately eight percent greater than in the capital city of Bangkok, as shown in Table 1. This was an important indicator that many people still support democracy and that not many people seek a new, independent state. Unfortunately, this implied support does not include the core groups of leaders and their covert fighters, as evidenced by the persisting daily violence, regardless of the majority opinion of the locals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of Constituency</th>
<th>Number of Participated Voters</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Yala</td>
<td></td>
<td>287,676</td>
<td>224,655</td>
<td>78.09</td>
<td>475,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Narathiwat</td>
<td></td>
<td>441,122</td>
<td>3425,87</td>
<td>77.66</td>
<td>719,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Pattani</td>
<td></td>
<td>390,050</td>
<td>303,517</td>
<td>76.64</td>
<td>642,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,148,974</td>
<td>2,866,028</td>
<td>69.08</td>
<td>5,710,883</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. The Voters of General Election on December 23, 2007 in the South Provinces (From: Office of the Election Commission of Thailand, 2007; and Population Column from Minister of Interior: Department of Demography, 2009)
III. COUNTERINSURGENCY MODELS

A. THE DIAMOND MODEL

Professor Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School is an internationally recognized expert in the field of Counterinsurgency (COIN). His Mystic Diamond is a useful model with which to apply and explain the interactive relationships among the State (COIN Force), Counter-State (Insurgent Force), Population, and International Community as shown above in Figure 4. The description indicated in Table 2 represents each interaction of the state and counter-state and the two actor’s strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Strategies</th>
<th>Insurgent Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To control people</td>
<td>1. To control people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To break counter-state control of people</td>
<td>2. To break government control of people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To strive counter-state force</td>
<td>3. To strive government force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. To undermine external support for counter-state</td>
<td>4. To undermine external support for government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. To foster an external support</td>
<td>5. To foster an external support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. The Description of each Interaction in Mystic Diamond in Figure 4
1. **Actors**

   *a. Government*

   The government is comprised of all official authorities including the military, police, and other official agencies that have the responsibility of counterinsurgency. The government will manipulate the five strategies shown in the Table 2.

   *b. Counter-state*

   The counter-state actor is composed of those groups and individuals resistant to the government for a variety of reasons, including differences in ethnicity, religion, political ideologies and goals; as well as for reasons of nationalism, political suppression, or grievances resulting from the government’s policies, etc. The counter-state will also employ the same five strategies as the state.

   *c. Population*

   This player represents all inhabitants who live in the area of conflict. The people may choose to support the state or counter-state, so that the latter two actors are in competition to draw the people to their respective side. Many scholars argue that the population is the key terrain and call this kind of war, “the war on people support.”

   *d. International Community*

   This element provides external support to, either the state or non-state actors.

2. **Strategies**

   *a. Strategy 1*

   Both sides need to control the people, or win the support of the people, in order to gain the advantage and receive intelligence. The government needs to build legitimacy and provide a response to what the people need in order to control them. This high degree of control depends on a high degree of consensus. During the attempts in
which the government tries to control people, the counter-state performs the same action. The counter-state uses IO and PSYOP, including either propaganda or threatening people in order to gain access to the infrastructure.

b. **Strategy 2**

Both actors need to counter and defeat the other side’s efforts to control the people. The government will conduct IO and PSYOP and counter-IO and PSYOP, while increasing security measures intended to separate the people from the counter-state, and deny the counter-state access to the infrastructure. The counter-state will operate upon the same stage by using IO and PSYOP and counter-IO and PSYOP to discredit the security measures.

c. **Strategy 3**

Both players will use force against each other. The state will neutralize, disrupt, and arrest the strength of counter-state. Meanwhile, during that time the counter-state will launch small to high scale operations within its capabilities, such as ambushes and attacks on officials.

d. **Strategies 4 and 5**

Both sides will attempt to draw external support from the international community while prohibiting the other from doing so, since both players need to achieve a level of legitimacy and righteousness from the international perspective. The government will utilize diplomacy to achieve corroboration and understanding from the externals. Without subsidization from outside the state, the counter-state will encounter difficulty in maintaining its resistance, since the external support always includes greater resources including financing, weapons, training, new technologies, and ideology. Also, if, from an international perspective, the state is regarded negatively, the state likely will be interfered with by the international actor.
B. ARREGUIN-TOFT’S ASYMMETRIC MODEL

Arreguin-Toft (2001) mentioned that strong actors will frequently lose the war between strong actors and weak actors if strong actors apply the wrong strategy. On the other hand, weak actors will win the battle if they utilize the right approach. He also mentioned that the percentages of incidents where the weak wins the conflict over the strong increased from the periods of 1800–1849 and from 1950–1998, while the victories of the strong have been decreasing, particularly in the period from 1950–1998, during which time the number of victories of the weak was ten percent greater than that of the strong. In addition, the better armed the weak is, the more chance there is that the strong will lose. Nevertheless, authoritarian strong actors win asymmetric wars more than democratic strong actors, regardless of the weak actors’ use of an indirect strategy. Arreguin-Toft (2001, p. 100) also defined the meaning of grand strategy, while Ampunan (2007, p. 43) described the definition of direct and indirect approaches as follows:

- Grand strategy refers to the totality of an actor’s resources directed toward military, political, economic, or other objectives.
- Direct Strategic Approach: This is an approach in which both factions of attack and defense use conventional maneuvers. Targets of the campaign aim to destroy the opponent’s armed forces, fighting as soldier-to-soldier, and following the rules of engagement.
Indirect Strategic Approach: This is an approach that is free from a pattern, but both factions use all kinds of means to conquer their opponent, including murdering, torturing, or detaining non-combatants.

Despite the fact that the meaning of the indirect approach above is not very clear, it, nonetheless, considers that other strategies—apart from the use of direct force—include diplomacy, IO and PSYOP, development, law enforcement and legitimacy, capacity building, soft power, and so on.

The outcomes of each course of action, as theorized by Arreguin-Toft (2001) are as quoted follows:

- **Hypothesis 1:** When strong actors attack using a direct strategy and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, strong actors should win quickly and decisively.
- **Hypothesis 2:** When strong actors attack with a direct strategy and weak actors defend using an indirect strategy, all other things being equal, weak actors should win.
- **Hypothesis 3:** When strong actors attack using an indirect strategy and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, strong actors should lose.
- **Hypothesis 4:** When strong actors employ barbarism to attack weak actors defending with guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS), all other things being equal, strong actors should win.
- **Hypothesis 5:** Strong actors are more likely to win same-approach interactions and lose opposite-approach interactions. (Klaimanee, 2008, p. 63)

C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A DEFINITION OF TERRORISM, VICTIMS, AND THE USE OF MEDIA BY TERRORISTS

Insurgent groups that resurged in the south of Thailand around 2004 have changed their approach from that of guerrilla warfare to terrorism. There has been more than one definition used to describe the word terrorism. In the contexts of this thesis, the author
has chosen to accept the definition used by many scholars that “terrorism” is a tactic for applying violence, instead of a group of individuals who act as terrorists. This tactic is commonly used in asymmetric warfare, which involves victims or targets chosen by terrorists and also the use of media as a tool for the terrorists to send messages to their audiences. Bale (2009) offered an example of the definition chosen by this author.

- Terrorism is the use or threatened use of violence, directed against victims selected for their symbolic or representative value, as a means of instilling anxiety in, transmitting one or more messages to, and thereby manipulating the perceptions and behavior of wider target audiences.
- Victims are never selected at random. They must not necessarily be civilians. The target has not to even be human (e.g., Statue of Liberty). A Victim is an instrument used by the perpetrators to represent something for the wider audiences.
- The relationship between terrorists and media is a symbiotic one. The media depends on terrorist to provide news worthy events. Terrorists rely upon the media to spread their message. Terrorist groups seek attention, but want to remain secret. The media amplifies the significance of the news, the psychological impact. The media is unwillingly helping the terrorists to reach a wider audience. Sensationalism can help spread fear and anxiety, and this facilitates one of the terrorist goals. If a terrorist event is suppressed, it might encourage terrorist to engage in larger scale of attacks that would be impossible to cover up. In other words it encourages the terrorists to do more harm than they would have initially.

D. COMPARISON OF THE MODELS AND DEFINITIONS

Referring to McCormick’s Model, most of the strategies should be considered using the indirect approach of Arreguin-Toft’s Model, except that of the government’s Strategy 3. If it is only using force against the others, it should be called the direct approach. The descriptive analysis of the Diamond Model above did not clarify that the state utilizes an indirect approach against the force of the counter-state. Simultaneously, the Strategy 3 of the counter-state can be an indirect approach when it uses a quick small
scale attack and suddenly runs away, but it can also be a direct approach when it is comparatively stronger and uses a high scale attack. However, if the government is successful in using Strategies 1, 2, 4 and 5 over the people and the international community, and the counter-state fails to do so, then Strategy 3, although a direct attack, shows no weakness.

Apart from the above, Arreguin-Toft explained the use of both direct and indirect strategies of the two players, but did not mention the international actor and only offered slight reference to the supportive population or national consensus (Arreguin-Toft, 2001 pp. 104, 109, 123). Thus, he tried to predict the outcomes of the wars by focusing on the strategies with the assumption that all other things were equal. Thus, his Strategy 3 is always accomplished when fighting the weak who use guerrilla warfare without the support of the people and the international actor, since it confirms Arreguin-Toft’s hypotheses 1, 4, and 5 that if both sides operate a direct strategy, or the strong force uses a direct approach against guerrilla warfare, or both sides apply the same strategy and all other things are equal, the strong actor will win.

Bale’s definition of terrorism, victims of terrorists, and the relationship between terrorist and media can be related to the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2 of the counter-state, which are to control people by threatening to block the control of the people by the state by discrediting the security measures, since the counter-state endeavors to control people both by propaganda and threats. The propaganda is targeted to influence the ideology or beliefs of the people, while the threatening of terrorist tactics is used to control the people through fear and to psychologically block the state’s control of the people. Therefore, the victims will be selected specifically for that purpose. Henceforth, the media is used to send messages to the state, the population and the international community related to these purposes. Those kinds of tactics are attuned and imitable in the information age and should be considered as indicative of the indirect strategy noted by Arreguin-Toft.
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IV. CASE STUDIES

In reviewing the related literatures on insurgency and counter-insurgency, many cases emerge of successful and failed insurgencies before and after the eras of colonization, the Cold War, and the information age. In those cases, the five strategies in the Mystic Diamond model play a very important role in the victory or defeat of the respective states. The direct strategy, discussed in Chapter 3, is not always applicable by states attempting to resolve an insurgency situation, especially when the counter-state has gained control of the people either by ideological indoctrination or through the use of violence. However, the direct strategy does work when the counter-state does not gain control over the people or lacks the support from people. As previously stated, conflicts between the state and counter-state are rooted in many factors, e.g., the conceptual differences in their ideologies, differences in ethnicities, socio-economic disparities, socio-psychological issues, and political problems.

Four cases of insurgencies, occurring in the countries that can be comparable geographically, ethnically, chronologically, religiously, and developmentally to the insurgency in the south of Thailand; were selected to be reviewed and analyzed in this study in order to discover possible solutions for resolving the insurgency in Thailand. Each of these cases also reflects a similar influence from colonization, the Cold War, and the information age. With these factors largely held constant, it is easier to assess the impact of the respective actors’ policy choices on reducing violence.

A. MALAYAN INSURGENCY (1930–1960)

Ampunan (2007) wrote that the insurgency of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was first formed in 1930 through Marxist inspiration and by Chinese Malaya members who opposed colonization. After 1937, the group was armed by the British to fight the Japanese who invaded Indo-China. After that, the group changed their name to the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) and the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). Then in 1948, the government of Malaya declared a state of emergency
due to the rise of violence caused by the group. Finally, in 1958–1960, the members of the group turned themselves in to the government.

Many factors contributed to the end of the MCP movement. The first was that the MCP utilized the Mao Zedong revolution to fight the government by attempting to enlarge the occupied territory from the jungles to the urban and city zones. However, accomplishing that plan required gaining a majority of support from the locals, but the MCP lacked that support because the group was ethnic Chinese, while the indigenous people were Malay, and the locals mostly admired the British, despite having been colonized for many years. Finally, the Maoist revolution in Malaya was merely a dream that never came true. In addition, the government used a form of restricted registration in which it became very easy to distinguish the Chinese from the Malays. Moreover, the food control campaign made survival for the MCP difficult. In addition, the sealing of the border through cooperation with the Thai authorities also put the counter-state in trouble, due to its safe haven being shut down. Apart from that, the government declared amnesty for the insurgents who wanted to surrender. Lastly, the Malaysian Police and Army worked in concert, i.e., the use of police to restore law and order in the cities and the use of the army to crush the Chinese guerrillas in the jungle, leading to the victory of Malaysian government. This was confirmed in Klaimanee (2008):

Although the military role in COIN was essential to success, it was limited. In the early years, the military had to assist the police and paramilitary forces in static security missions. But later on these tasks were gradually taken over by police and auxiliaries. Then, the military could turn to suppressing the guerrillas in the jungle. The military role in the Malayan Emergency was not of a typical character. Instead of operating as a large force and having their own command, units were dispersed and used in support of civil authority (p69).

By Mid-1954, the new Director of Operations…modified the strategy from “rolling up the insurgents from south to north” into destroying the insurgent organization in the weakest area first. An area clear of the insurgents would be declared as “white.” The government force then moved to other “black” areas and cleared each of them. This strategy gradually worked. By mid-1955, a third of Malaya’s population lived in cleared “white” areas, and the security forces were gradually being phased
down. There was a mass surrender during 1957-1958. The few tough black areas were finally cleared in 1959. The Emergency was officially terminated in July 1960 (p. 72).

According to the Diamond Model, the most important reason why the MCP was so easily defeated that the government responded to its needs for popularity (Strategy 1) and external support (Strategy 5). In this case, the support of the local people and the neighboring country was completely blocked. Apart from that, the counter-state could not control the villagers while the government was able to (Strategy 1 and 2). The ethno-nationalists played a very important role in separating the people from the counter-state, so that the Malays did not assist the Chinese insurgency in fighting the government and remained loyal to the government and the United Kingdom. Moreover, the cooperation between the Thai and Malaya governments was also indispensable in limiting the MCP’s access to its safe haven along the porous border (Strategy 4 and 5). Furthermore, the government directed the police force to treat insurgency-related activities as criminal incidents in order to gain more legitimacy, control the people, and enhance the positive perspective of the international actors (Strategy 1, 2, 4 and 5). Last but not least, according to hypotheses 1, 4, and 5 of Arreguin-Toft’s Model, if both sides utilize the same approach, the strong actor will win. In this case, the counter-state applied guerrilla warfare in order to fight directly, and the indirect approach used to control the people of the MCP did not work. The army successfully suppressed the militants in the jungle area. Finally, the government exploited the outcome by granting amnesty to the ex-combatants who surrendered. In that regard, that the government applied an indirect approach again in order to control the ex-counter-state members who transformed themselves into normal citizens.

B. COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THAILAND (1933–1980S)

The Chinese Communist Party of Thailand (CCPT) was founded in 1933 (Maisonti, 2004, p. 37) by Chinese members who were linked with communist parties in China and Vietnam. At that time, the Thais welcomed the Chinese to Thailand, but not the Chinese Communist Party. This caused the CCPT to drop the word Chinese in its name to become the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in 1942. After the MCP failed
in its efforts in Malaya, the CPT declared an armed struggle with the Thai government in 1961 (Maisonti, 2004, p. 38). The concept of the Mao Zedong revolution was utilized again in the jungle and mountainous areas, then spread to urban and city areas together with propaganda. According to the “domino theory,” if a country is turned into a communist administration, neighboring countries will be transformed into communist nations as well. The revolution began with Russia and spread to China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Therefore, it was projected that if Thailand were transformed into a communist state, the rest of Southeast Asia would follow suit and the region would become a collection of communist countries as well. This belief led to the great subsidization from the communist community for the CPT, including training and providing weapons, so that the number CPT members in the jungles grew very fast at that time.

According to Mao Zedong, one of the most important factors needed for revolution is the repression or grievances of the people stemming from government policies or from the government’s lack of control over the people. The CPT focused on farmers, laborers, and students. Unfortunately, after Thailand transformed into a democracy, there were many military coups, and the leaders of the country were solely drawn from those among the highest-ranking military leadership, or highly placed in the dictatorship. This was not acceptable to Thai people who were very disappointed with the situation because of the suspicion that they had never had a real democracy, but only a transformation of power from the absolute monarchy to the military dictatorship. As a consequence, the CPT exploited the disappointment of people as a political condition from which to draw support from people. This was implemented mostly by using radio broadcasts and other means of communications. A statement like, “Thailand will have a utopia and people will govern their own country, if people join the CPT,” was used. The radio also spread Anti-American propaganda, particularly about the growth of U.S. activities in Thailand (Maisonti, 2004, p. 38). Suddenly, after that propaganda wave, there was the chaos of mass protests led by university students and a responsive crush by the military. In October 1973, many of those students and also ordinary Thai people joined the CPT and were trained to be militants of the CPT. These militants were also
brainwashed through communist ideological indoctrination. The group of people who joined the CPT in October 1973 were later recognized as the “People of October.” During this time, the government, in response, tried to diminish the conflict by forming the Communist Operation Command (CSOC), as Maisonti (2004) notes:

The Thai government responded to the communist insurgency by establishing the Communist Suppression Operation Command (CSOC) which was led by the Royal Thai Army in December 1965, and charged with coordinating the various government agencies (Marks, 1996). The CSOC made a Thai Counterinsurgency Doctrine called the “CPM (Civil-Police-Military)” This doctrine authorized the coordinated application of all resources to the insurgency problem including a mix of civil, police, and purely military measures. The essential tasks of this doctrine were to militarily create security in the areas, to control by policing the population and resources, and to eliminate by civil service units the reasons for any grievance originating from the social or economic inequalities. (p. 39)

In the 1970s, many Chinese Thais went to visit their relatives in China, including some elite officials, and these Chinese Thais informed the elite officials of the difficulties regarding the turmoil in Thailand. Then the support for the CPT decreased, and many militants found themselves living hopelessly in the jungles. Many calls were heard from their relatives, as the militants sought a way to return home. In spite of the above difficulties, the number of CPT militants in 1979 remained high, i.e., 12,000 militants, and the CPT still successfully carried on activities in 35 out of 71 provinces (Randolph & Thompson, 1981; and Maisonti, 2004, p. 39). Subsequently, the Thai government exploited the fall of the CPT in 1980 and drew the militants back into the normal Thai society by offering them amnesty programs, and political opportunities. In order to make those militants who turned themselves in proud of their actions, the term “Thailand Development Coordinators” was adopted to refer to them. Many ex-CPTs who attended the amnesty program are now well-known politicians and Members of the House of Representatives. As Klaimanee (2008,) stated:

This new strategy caused hundreds of Communists to give up their armed struggle. This doctrine later became known as Prime Minister’s Order 66/2523, better known as “The Policy to win over the Communists.” This order was under the direction of then Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanon and the Army Operations Center Director Major General Chavalit Yongchayudth. Two years later in 1982, Prime Minister’s Order
65/2525, also known as the “Plan for the Political Offensive,” was announced. Order Number 66/2523 should be seen as establishing the political offensive to be used against the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), while 65/2525 provided for implementation (p. 31).

As previously stated, the end of the communists’ insurgency in Thailand reflects the premise of McCormick’s Diamond that when an insurgency receives less support from both outside the country and from the people, it finds itself in trouble. After fighting for a long time, many Thai comrades found that the promised Chinese Communist utopia was not the reality that they had struggled for, and the communist insurgency could no longer control the people, while the state could. Last but far from least, according to hypotheses 1, 4, and 5 of Arreguin-Toft’s Model, if both sides utilize the same approach, the strong actor will win. In this case, the militants who still remained in the jungle, after the majority of them had turned themselves in, had attempted the direct approach in fighting with the Thai government. The government, the stronger actor, then successfully used the direct approach to suppress the militants in the jungle. After its victory resulting from the direct approach, the government turned to apply an indirect approach to expand the outcome by granting amnesty to the ex-militants who agreed to surrender. In essence, the government applied an indirect approach to control the ex-counter-state. As a matter of fact, some militants had no choice but to surrender only to utilize the amnesty program offered by the government. But these ex-militants still believed in the communism ideology, and continued fighting for their ideology through the democratic channels, especially those who become the high-ranking members of the current government. Again, these ex-militants are trying to use an indirect approach in the current governmental arena to serve their own ideology and try to lead and gain control of the Thai society.

C. ABU SAYYAF (ASG) AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM IN THE PHILIPPINES (OEF-PHILIPPINES)

1. Abu Sayyaf (ASG)

Abu Sayyaf (ASG) was founded in 1991 by Abduragak Abubakar Janjalani, the ex-commando or mujahideen from Afghanistan. Abubakar was killed in 1998 and
Khadafi Janjalani became the leader before he was killed by Philippine troops in September 2006. After that, the leadership has been splintered. Abu Sayyaf means “Father of the Swordsman” in Arabic. The ASG movement was based in the southern Philippines, primarily the Sulu archipelago, Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi. Aquino (2009) presented the objectives of ASG:

- To wage jihad against the Philippine government in reaction to the so-called atrocities committed against Muslims in the Philippines.
- To unite the Philippine Muslims minority to fight for a separate Islamic state and encompassing the southern Philippines.
- To strengthen Islamic faith in the southern Philippines.
- To eliminate elements of oppression.
- To establish a government that implements Sharia law.

ASG has links to Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, a Saudi businessman; Osama Bin Ladin’s brother in-law who is living in the Philippines; Fathour Roman Al Gozi, Omar Patek and Dulmatin, all members of Jammah Islamiyah; and also other activities and groups associated with Philippine terrorists.

2. **Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines (OEF - Philippines)**

From January 2002 until July 31, 2002, the United States committed nearly 1,300 troops to the Philippines to assist Philippine armed forces (AFP) in operations against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the southern Philippines, on the island of Basilan southwest of Mindanao. From 2005 into 2007, the U.S. committed up to 450 military personnel to western Mindanao and Jolo island south of Basilan These U.S. non-combat, support operations were in response to Philippine President Arroyo’s strong support of the United States following the September 11 Al Qaeda attack on the United States. (Niksh, 2007)

Wilson (2006) wrote that the OEF-P succeeded against ASG on Basilan Island in 2002 by building the capacity of the Philippines Armed Forces (AFP) and utilizing Civil Affair and Information Operations. Many referred to this mission as the “Basilan Model,” which was based on an indirect approach. Primarily, in October 2001, the Pacific Command deployed a team of Special Forces to conduct a Preparation of the Area of Operation and to collect critical information in order to evaluate the root cause of the
conflict. In February 2002, 160 highly skilled Special Force operatives were added. The United States worked closely with the Philippines Armed Forces in numerous tasks including increasing legitimacy, securing the environment, protection of their people, patrolling, Humanitarian and Civic Action Projects, and extensive information collection. By August 2002, this cooperation had isolated more people from the insurgents in accordance with the increase in intelligence being reported. Many displaced persons who had fled from the unrest came back to the area. Following the success of the OEF-P, the United States and the Philippines agreed to organize the Joint Special Operations Task Force, Philippines (JSOTF-P) to counter the insurgency in Mindanao and Sulu Island as well.

The success of the indirect approach by capacity building and information operations in the Basilan Model is one of the great cases to study. The most important fact is that the ASG sustained its movement by kidnapping and extortion, so that when people were strongly protected and isolated, the insurgents lacked the necessary resources for their movement. This accomplishment is emphasized by the provision of external support to the state and the corresponding isolation of the people from the counter-state as depicted in the Diamond Model. The counter-state could not control the people while the government was successfully doing so. Also, the state was successful because it chose to use the right strategy. According to Arreguin-Toft, since the counter-state applied an indirect approach by threatening people and committing other violent incidents, the government chose to apply an indirect approach as well, through IO, capacity building, development, and so on. In accordance with hypothesis 5 of Arreguin-Toft’s Model, if both sides utilize the same approach, the strong actor will win.

D. ACEH CONFLICT

Aceh refers to the westernmost part of Sumatra Island and, geographically, the first sea port if one traveling from the Indian Ocean to Indonesia. For many Muslims in the region, it is considered and referred to as “Serambi Mekkah,” or the “Verandah of Mecca.” In the past, Aceh was also a kingdom ruled by the king (or Sultan). Aquino, Putranto, and Rodthong (2009) mentioned that Aceh experienced a long history of
resistance during the colonial periods of the Dutch beginning in 1874. Since then, the Acehnese struggle and resistance against foreign domination had never been completely suppressed until Aceh became part of the new Indonesian Republic that proclaimed independence from the Dutch in 1945. However, over time the government of Indonesia (GOI) failed to integrate the Acehnese culture and identity into the new republic, and failed similarly to effectively address issues affecting the Acehnese socio-economic and political interest. These failures created frustration and fostered grievances against the central government in Java, and further alienated the Acehnese. Consequently, this gave way to the rise and fall of several insurgent movements.

The first resistance uprising against the government was during the 1950s when the Acehnese joined other provinces in the “Darul Islam Movement” that advocated changing Indonesia’s secular state into an Islamic state. The conflict was sparked by a demand for independence. The central government, however, integrated the Aceh region into the North Sumatra province. This decision, of course, was met with dissatisfaction and grievances among the Acehnese. Later, more socio-economic and political issues significantly affected the Acehnese. After Suharto took power from Sukarno as president in 1967, the New Order regime, which was dominated by the armed forces, emerged. In 1970, the discovery of a huge oil and natural gas reserve in the north of Aceh by Exxon Mobil Company triggered a negative reaction in Aceh because all of the wealth that resulted from the discovery of oil and natural was transferred to Jakarta by the Suharto regime. The establishment of the Lhokseumawe Industrial Development Zone in 1977 drew the arrival of non-Acehnese workers, and at the same time increased the presence of armed forces to secure the national asset. The provincial government had no right to tax the oil and gas revenues, and as a result the provincial budget only received a small amount of the total revenue. Ridiculously, most of the Acehnese still worked in the agricultural sectors and fisheries, as they lacked the education and required skills for getting jobs in the modern industrial compound.

In the late 1970s, the Free Aceh Movement or “Gerakan Aceh Merdeka” (GAM) was formed under the leadership of Hasan di Tiro, a son of Tengku Cik di Tiro, who was a relative of the former sultan. The GAM began to oppose and challenge the Indonesian
regimes through decades of violent conflicts. Primarily, GAM was linked to the Darul Islam rebellion, but later GAM took opposition in the form of an ethno-nationalist movement. The government then launched a military operation to suppress the resistance and to maintain national integrity. The rebellion lacked the capability to challenge the government’s military forces, ultimately leading to the defeat of the rebellion because they failed to gain popular support from those Acehnese without religious motivation. Unable to defend the movement against the heavy military crush, Hasan di Tiro left Aceh in 1979 but continued his struggle and established a government in exile in Sweden.

A decade after the first rebellion, the second GAM reemerged in 1989 with 750 active members, and some 250 who had received military training in Libya (Ross, 2005, p. 42) and also better equipment captured from security forces. The suppression of the government quickly created a new generation of GAM from the family’s victims (Ross, 2005, p. 73). In 1990, the military again responded with a heavy-hand. Many of GAM’s military commanders were captured or killed. The government’s action was successful in that short period of time. By 1991, GAM was considered as having been defeated by the military. According to Human Right Watch (HRW, 2001, p. 8), in late 1998, 871 people were killed by the army, 387 were missing who were later presumed dead. More than 500 were listed under the status of “disappeared” and were never found. Tens of thousands of Acehnese were imprisoned and tortured in military camps. In addition, hundreds of rape cases and various human rights violations were reported.

In 1989, Vice President Habibie became the successor of Suharto and transformed the authoritarian regime into a democracy. Habibie offered an option to the Timorese to choose between integration into and separation from the state. Ultimately, the Timorese managed to gain total separation from Indonesia in 1999. Then many student groups in Aceh demonstrated seeking a similar referendum. According to Aquino, Putrato, and Rodthong (2009), the number of GAM fighters increased dramatically to some three thousand fighters with numerous assault rifles and grenade launchers, and controlled about 80 percent of Aceh’s villages.

In July 2001, Megawati Sukarnoputri became the President. She encouraged a strong policy, but the military could not defeat the GAM strongholds in some villages.
Eventually, East Timor separated from Indonesia on May 20, 2002, creating massive demonstrations across Aceh; according to some estimation, more than 500,000 Acehnese gathered in the capital city of Banda Aceh to support the referendum. As a result, on December 9, 2002, GAM agreed to enter into a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) with the government. The agreement later failed because both sides did not really trust each other, which ultimately lead to the collapse of the agreement in May 2003 (Shulze, 2003, p. 265).

On October 20, 2004, Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected President. One of his campaign platforms for the election was to promote peace in Aceh. Unpredictably, a rare tsunami disaster crashed into the west coast of Aceh on December 26, 2004, causing 200,000 Acehnese, out of a total population of four million, to perish in the wave. The Acehnese had an immediate need for both reconstruction and donations to ease their extreme suffering. Key players of the conflict were faced with a great pressure to respond reasonably. As a consequence, on August 15, 2005, in Helsinki, Finland, the government of Indonesia and GAM representatives took a constructive initiative to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) again, bringing an end to nearly three decades of armed conflict in Aceh. As a matter of fact, the two sides agreed to share 70 percent of the provincial benefit with Aceh, the remaining 30 percent with the central government. The MOU also required that the governor of Aceh result from an election. Finally, in mid-2006, Erwandi Eusuf, one of the GAM leaders, was elected governor of Aceh, the Autonomous Province of Indonesia.
The success of GAM consisted of many factors. First, it was the right decision of Hasan di Tiro to change the religious movement to an ethno-nationalist movement. The Achenese had, for a long time, all shared in the repression and grievances stemming from the Dutch and Indonesian governments, so that GAM increased the level of control over the people while the government completely disregarded any effort to control the people through a proper campaign. Nonetheless, in the first and second GAM movements, the GAM did not have enough control of the people or enough popularity. Consequently, the government used force and barbarism against the guerrilla forces. It was the right strategy during that time according to the Diamond’s Strategy 3 and Arreguin-Toft’s hypotheses 1, 4, and 5. On the contrary, in the third GAM movement, the GAM had sufficient popular support because the repression and grievances of the people had increased over time due to the growing socio-economic disparity in relation to what their condition should have been, had the Acehnese been in possession of their natural resources. Following that, the GAM had an opportunity and assistance with which to enlarge its
network and gain support among the countries helping it, including their neighboring
countries—such supports relevant to the Diamond’s Strategy 5. Furthermore, the
government refrained from its tendency to engage in mass killings in East Timor’s case
and also acceded to international pressure for the reconstruction, humanitarian and
disaster relief following the Tsunami, all of which aided in advancing the Diamond’s
Strategies 4 and 5 for the counter-state, while simultaneously making it worse for the
state. After that, the government was willing to use the hot-hand again, but it was the
wrong strategy at a time when the opponent was overwhelmingly successful in the use of
the Diamond’s Strategies 1, 2, 4, and 5, all of which are also considered as indirect
approaches by Arreguin-Toft. The government had no choice but to move to an indirect
approach according to Arreguin-Toft’s hypothesis 5, where the strong actor is more likely
to win same-approach interactions and lose opposite-approach interactions. Finally, the
crisis ended. There were no more deaths and casualties, and the GAM terminated the long
history of its armed struggle. In this case, the government did not win the war, but both
sides won the conflict.

E. EXPLANATION OF THE VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH OF THAILAND
BY THE MODELS AND CASE STUDIES

The first emergence of the insurgency was in the 1950s after the Assimilation
Policy ignited the repression and flamed the grievances of the people. The government
failed to use the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2 to control the people. The people suffered
from the injustice of the central government and their needs were not responded to
appropriately and adequately from the government. Then several resistance groups were
formed. However, these groups utilized guerrilla warfare and operated in the jungles and
mountains. Later, in the 1980s–1990s, CPM43 and SPBAC were established, and these
organizations successfully accessed and pulled people back into the central society by
providing the justice and trying to develop the southern provinces in all possible areas. The
next phase of operation during 1980s–1990s, the government subsequently used
force, as indicated by the Diamond’s Strategy 3, against the guerrilla warfare. At the
same time, the Diamond’s Strategies 4 and 5 were also applied. Strategy 5 was
implemented by asking for cooperation from Malaysian government. Once the Malaysian
government began cooperating with the Thai government, this cooperation essentially blocked any support from the Malaysian government to the insurgents. In the first round, the insurgency was suppressed and consequently disappeared from the government’s sight, but the hidden activities for the next round were still ongoing.

On January 4, 2004, the insurgency reemerged. This reemergence resulted from the government under Thaksin disestablishing some functional units in the south that had been successfully implemented the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2. At the same time, new policies that preferred the use of aggression were initiated and implemented by the Thaksin government prior the reemergence of the insurgency. While the Thaksin government had failed to apply Strategies 1 and 2, the invisible operations of the insurgency had been successful in advancing the Diamond’s Strategies 1, 2 and 5. The insurgency was secretly trained and funded by a rogue regime of both state and non-state actors. In this round of the Diamond Model, the insurgency first controls the people by ideology and belief, but later turns to the use of violence. Violent control implies not only threatening people, but also psychologically discrediting government security. In the Thai case, the government responded to the reemergence by reestablishing the CPM43 and the SBPAC, and setting up both an ad hoc Special Economic Development Zone (SEDZ) and the Justice Maintenance Center to improve upon the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2. In addition, the government initiated the Diamond’s Strategies 4 and 5 by arranging to broadcast a meeting with the other international actors to ensure an understanding of what the government was doing and how cruel the insurgency was. Task forces were also deployed in the three provinces and four districts of Sonkla provinces in order to enact the Diamond’s Strategy 3. The intent was not only to use force against the insurgency, but to restore law and order by legitimacy, security measures, and Information Operation (IO).

It is considered that in both rounds, the government followed Arreguin-Toft’s hypothesis 5: the strong force will win if both sides apply the same strategy. In the first phase, the government successfully applied an indirect approach against the insurgency’s indirect approach to control the people and to gain acceptance from the international community. Then the government used force against the force that had less support from
the other players. The government currently is doing the same thing in the new round of the counterinsurgency. It is estimated that a positive progression is recognized.

F. APPLIED SCENARIOS FROM THE MODELS AND CASE STUDIES FOR STATE STRATEGIES

![Diagram](image)

Figure 7. Chaiyo-Diamond model when Most of People Support for the Counter-State

![Diagram](image)

Figure 8. Chaiyo-Diamond model when Most of People Support for the State

As mentioned earlier in Chapter II, in 2004, His Majesty’s suggestion for the crisis in the south crisis is to understand, reach out, and develop. This suggestion emphasized that Strategies 1 and 2 be used to win the counter-state. Later, the Julanont government put forth strong effort to respond to His Majesty’s suggestion.

Because of the emphasis placed on the actor, the people, in Strategies 1 and 2, by the Thai government and also because of the violent approach currently used mainly by the insurgents to discredit the central government and to discourage and intimidate the southern people from supporting the state, this author feel compelled to investigate in
depth the actor—that is, the people—in Strategies 1 and 2, while holding the actor in Strategies 4 and 5, the international community, as a constant.

Holding this actor as a constant also makes it easier to assess the impact of the actor in Strategies 1 and 2 on the state and counter-state, while the state, in this case the Thai government currently emphasizes reducing the violent acts of the insurgents.

Holding the international community actor as a constant is equivalent to assuming that the state is capable of maintaining its achievement over the Diamond’s Strategies 4 and 5. Then, the remaining actors, people, state, and counter-state can be independently assessed and analyzed. The international community becomes statistically an independent variable from the other 3 actors. If it is possible to represent these variables in a statistical analysis, the covariance of the international community and any other variables becomes zero under this assumption. In other words, the above assumption allows that the assessment, analysis, and prediction of the people’s response to the state and counter-state can be done independently.

In a real situation, one actor or more could become a constant for many possible reasons. The following are some possible reasons. The state possesses a limited budget, manpower, and other resources with which to deal with all actors, thus making it compulsory for state to unequally weigh its dealings with each actor. Currently, the Thai government is choosing to assign more weight to the people because of His Majesty’s suggestion as mentioned above. Either the state or counter-state or both, intentionally or unintentionally, ignore some actors because of a failure to see the significance of those actors or because the state or counter-state or both have already made a judgment that it is useless to deal with such actors. A good example of this is when a government has already been deemed unacceptable by international community because it is not an elected government. Multiple failures to deal with some actors could cause the disregarding of them because there is no point seen in wasting the resources to deal with them with no expectation of improvement.
The followings are assessments and analyses of a modified Diamond model, the Chaiyo-Diamond model, depicting three possible scenarios whereby the international community actor is held as a constant.

Scenario 1, according to the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2, the state is restricted and prohibited from using a direct approach against people, no matter which people are close advocates of the state or the counter-state. The non-transparency, injustice, and the disparity of the state are considered as elements which will push people to join or assist the counter-state. Additionally, failure to apply the right approach can cause the utmost in terms of disaster to the state, as evidenced in several case studies, including the killing of East Timorese by the militia of Indonesia, an incident which caused external intervention, and the case of the October People of Thailand who embraced the ideology of the Communist Party after being crushed by state force. As a result, the state had to maintain merely an indirect approach toward the people.

Scenario 2, when the counter-state accomplishes the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2, apart from the Diamond’s Strategy 3, the government should apply an indirect strategy against the counter-state that will solicit support from the people, regardless of whether their initial motivation for supporting the counter-state is based in ideology, beliefs, fear, or resulting from grievances and negative opinions of the state. Granted, this scenario makes it difficult to distinguish the people from the insurgents, but the state should solely utilize an indirect approach to regain the people’s support, while proclaiming never to strike with force. Again, in this scenario, it is estimated that the counter-state successfully applies an indirect approach, and the state, according to Arreguin-Toft, then must utilize the same approach to win the war.

Lastly, Scenario 3, the counter-state maintains its strategy of violence and fails at using psychological pressure, which in turn discredits the government security, and only controls people by cruelty, thus leading to less approval from the people. Finally, the counter-state could lose control of the people by adhering to the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2. Then insurgents could be isolated from the majority of the people and their
membership declining. This is the appropriate time for the state to use the Diamond’s Strategy 3, or a direct approach, to neutralize the riot, as well as to sustain the state’s use of the Diamond’s Strategies 1 and 2.

From the case studies, in particular the Aceh conflict, when the resistance has less support from the population, the resistance has started to employ only direct force to the state in the form of guerrilla warfare. The state, in this case the Indonesian government, also used direct force to respond to the direct force of the resistance and the state defeated the resistance easily. This is the application at the right moment of scenario 3 discussed above by the Indonesian government. The victory of Indonesian government in an application of its direct force against the direct force of the resistance proved that the 5th hypothesis of Arreguin-Toft’s asymmetric model.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSION

The conflict in the southern provinces of Thailand has been ongoing since the kingdom of Thailand annexed its territory over Pattani and several resistance groups were formed. The Assimilation Policy of 1938 furthered the government’s repression—and fostered additional grievances from the local people—through sanctioned efforts to force the local people to accept the Thai identity. The southern people also perceived that they were left behind in terms of development and that they were treated unjustly. Since the government victoriously suppressed insurgents from 1989–1990s in the mountainous area, the rebels have now transformed themselves from guerrilla fighters into terrorist insurgents and have operated with dark village networks from January 4, 2004, until today. In this new round, the insurgency utilizes daily violence to control the people by fear and to psychologically discredit the security of the authority.

Primarily, the Thaksin administration undertook the following actions: disbanding the cooperative organizations like SBPAC and CPM43, declaring martial law, fostering a climate in which the failures of human abuses in Kru Sae and Tak Bai occurred, introducing the zoning of red villages, and enacting the emergency decree. The aftermath of such a policy further alienated the local people and motivated them to participate with the counter-state. Covertly, the insurgency tried to implant irredentism and distort the principles of religion in order to pull more members in and to train the militants. After September 2006, Prime Minster Surayud Julanont manipulated a new mixed strategy of indirect and direct policies by reforming the ISOC4, the head unit of SBPAC, into a socio-economic wing, and CPM43 into a military wing. The setup of an ad hoc Special Economic Development Zone (SEDZ) was also intended to support economic development, along with the Justice Maintenance Center intended to examine injustice. Besides that, the Santisuk Force was established to build trust and confidence. Moreover, up to 66,000 troops were deployed to restore and enforce law and order, and to employ IO and PSYOP throughout villages. Consequently, the insurgency has lost its freedom of movement and its popular support is declining. No one will support gangsters who kill
everyone they meet. Accordingly, the insurgency has tried to target more Muslims who are accused of being betrayers of Islam by the insurgents. However, the more people who are killed and wounded, the less people will support the rebellion, the more information will be reported to the security force, and the more condemnation will be expressed by the international community. As a consequence, the administration estimates that the current membership of the extremists is down dramatically, following the people’s decision to lend their hands to the government’s efforts to develop their provinces.

From the models, case studies, and applied scenarios for the state, it can be determined that the state and the counter-state are both trying to gain an advantage over the other by controlling the people and gaining international support, while, at the same time, blocking the other side from doing so. If one side obtains more success in the Diamond’s Strategies 1, 2, 4, and 5, it will be easier to overcome the other side. In addition, if the strong actor applies the same approach as the weak actor, the stronger side will win the war.

In the case of Thailand, in the first round of the insurgency’s emergence, the government was successful in their application of all the Diamond’s strategies, while the insurgency failed to do so. Yet, the insurgency did not give up its objective and covertly used the Diamond’s Strategies 1, 2, and 5. The underestimation and lack of control of the people by the government caused the insurgency to rise again in the latest round. The government tried to respond by reestablishing the previously successful strategies. The use of violence by the insurgency to control the people made it disadvantageous for the insurgents this time. It is considered that in both rounds, the government not only followed all the Diamond Model’s strategies, but also the Arreguin-Toft’s Model, especially its hypothesis 5: the strong force will win if both sides apply the same strategy. In the first phase, the government successfully applied an indirect approach against the insurgency’s indirect approach to control the people and to gain acceptance from the international community. Then, the government used force against the force, while the insurgents received less support from the other actors. Nonetheless, the crisis in the south is not at an end. The number of incidents is declining but still fluctuating. The insurgency can improve the efficiency of its application of the Diamond’s strategy, particularly its
efforts to control the people and ask for more international support, or it can move to a different approach suggested by Arreguin-Toft’s Model, which will affect the government’s next approach.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The crisis in the south of Thailand is estimated to be better in terms of the number of violent incidents. The government is probably on the right track for the time being, but the situation can change at anytime, especially if the insurgency develops more effective strategies to control the people and gain more external support, or if the insurgency adopts a new strategic approach that is different from the government’s. Therefore, it is highly recommended that the government maintain both direct and indirect strategies as outlined below.

1. **Indirect Approach is Solely Applied to the Population at All Times**

The government needs to sustain an indirect approach with the population, regardless of whether the majority of the people are with the government or the insurgency. The inefficacy of government, the injustice and inequality in applying laws, the sub-development of socio-economic support and welfare for the people, and an inadequacy of information operations and psychological operations can also push people to assist the insurgency. Accordingly, more subordinated programs are strongly advised as stated below:

- The government should enhance more educational programs and cooperation between Islamic schools and government schools.
- The government should campaign for more motivation for ethical officials to work in the south provinces, as well as for local personnel to go back to work in their hometowns.
- The government should frequently host public hearings to know what the people want from the government.
- The government should promote research and development programs in the area by subsidizing more budgets and scholars.
The government should appoint a councilor (Chularatchamontri) in Bangkok from the other parts of the country, not only from the central part.

The government should encourage officials who come from other parts of the country to study the southern culture, identity, Islamic teachings, and particularly the local language.

The government should gently inform the locals of the civic necessity to realize and pay respect to the official law and order in accordance with the other parts of the country, and not to rely solely on Islamic law.

The government needs to improve the medical and health care programs and medical resources for the locals. This type of policy is one of the best instruments for restoring the people’s support and royalty.

The government needs to reorganize and unite the cooperation of many official agencies in the area since they do not work in concert.

The government needs to publicly inform all programs of what exactly the government has done and their on-going projects, as well as to arrange a meeting with the media to discuss the media’s possible refrain from publishing the worst exaggerated violence in a given situation.

The government needs to reform all of its agencies and systems to comply with the principles of good governance with great accountability and transparency, which is one of the best preventive measures with which to impress the people and to keep them from going underground.

Official practitioners have to think globally but act locally, since good strategies often fail in the hands of the local authorities because they do not understand the bigger picture.

2. Continue Indirect Approach with International Actors at All Times

The external support form the international players is one of the key factors to countering the insurgency. The government has to be perceived as righteous, while
sustaining the collaboration with other states and non-state actors, including the neighboring countries in terms of information, counter measures, and other support. Moreover:

- The government has to maintain a high degree of cooperation with the other countries not supporting the insurgency.
- The government needs to share terrorist information and counter measures with the other international agencies and committees.
- The government needs to publicly inform the people and the international community of the brutality of the insurgents.
- The government has to increase the cooperation from Malaysian government, restrictively seal the border, continue the joint border patrols, and allow for dual nationalities, but those people possessing dual citizenships must openly declare their dual citizenship status by registering with the appropriate government official.

3. **Indirect Approach Is to Be Applied When Most of the People Support the Insurgency**

When most of the people are controlled by the insurgency, especially by its ideologies or beliefs, and the government is unsuccessful in controlling them, it is difficult to separate and distinguish the people from the insurgency. The government then needs to not only put more effort in to manipulating the same strategy and tactics as noted in Recommendation 1, but also to redirect the distorted ideologies in order to regain the people’s support. The direct strike application of force is very restricted in this situation. The regime also needs to enhance the following projects:

- The government needs to improve intelligence to dismantle and disrupt the dark networks and the movement of resources for the insurgency.
- The government needs to control and revise the laws regarding money laundering for charity, as well as the donations from those countries that support the insurgency in the south, because the insurgents depend heavily on those sources of financial support.
• Reconciliation and amnesty programs have to be maintained for insurgents and partisans who are arrested, allowing them to return to their normal lives.

• The government needs to negotiate and reconcile the requirements of the insurgency.

4. Direct Approach Is to Be Applied When Most of the People Support the Government

When the government gains support from majority of the people, especially by implementing those subordinated programs advised under the recommendation 1, it is then a suitable time to suppress the insurgency by force.

• The legitimate use of force by in accordance with the rules of engagement needs to be recognized.

• The best outcome is one that results in the fewest deaths and injuries. The official troops should not have to bear an image of cruelty.

• It will be most beneficial for the government to try to convert insurgents into normal people with positive opinions.

As a matter of fact, popular support is needed both for the success of the insurgency and the government. But support is difficult to measure. Additionally, from the study, force is still essential to sustain security and crush the rebellion when it is needed. Force can be applied within the other indirect approaches as well. As a consequence, it would be beneficial to conduct research on the measurement of support by the people for the insurgency or the government, as well as research on the appropriate number of the troops and how to deploy them, or the density of the troops in a counterinsurgency mission. All of these would be very interesting follow-ups to this study.
A. **CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATION OF PATTANI BACKGROUND**

The kingdom of Pattani experienced a long history, as Klaimanee (2008, pp. 15–24) chronologically noted:

- In the 7th century, the three southern provinces of Thailand were called the “Lankasuka Empire” and influenced by Hinduism. People lived their lives by fishing and agriculture.

- In the 9th–13th centuries, the Buddhism Empire of Srivichai, whose center was on Sumatra Island of the present Indonesia, expanded its power over the area of southern Indo-China including Lankasuka. At that time, the Lankasuka inhabitants changed their belief to Buddhism, and the prosperity of the trading sea ports were well known by the regional empires: China, India, and Arab.

- In the 13th century, the first kingdom of Thailand, named “Sukhothai,” was established and was growing.

- In the 13th–14th centuries, Islam was brought to Lankasuka, which was subsequently renamed as the Pattani Kingdom.

- In the 15th century, most of the Pattani people changed their religion from Buddhism to Islam.

- In the 16th–17th centuries, Pattani, Kelantan, Terengganu, Peris, Kedah, Laos, and Khmer (Cambodia) were dominated by Siam.

- In the mid 18th century, Ayuthaya lost the war to Myanmar. Then, Laos, Khmer, and Pattani separated from Ayuthaya.

- In 1782, King Rama I of Bangkok reestablished Thailand. The King had spread his power over the region again, including Pattani and the whole Malaya continent. At that time, Siam assigned Tengku, or Sulatan of Pattani, to rule his kingdom under the power of Siam; but later the Sulatan tried to rebel against Siam.
In the 19th–20th centuries, most of Southeast Asian nations except Thailand were colonized by the super power of Europe; as noted, France colonized Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; England colonized Burma and Malaya, including Peris, Kedah, and Terengganu from Siam; Indonesia was colonized by the Netherlands and Portugal (Berger, 2004, pp. 88–89).

In 1896, King Rama V organized Pattani into Nakhon Si Thammarat Circle, and the Sulatan of Pattani tried to oppose that again and was arrested. The Pattani Kingdom ended.

In 1932, the Circle Administration of Thailand was changed to Provinces including Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat.

In 1938, the government proclaimed an “Assimilation Policy” to unite all the Thai people, including Thai Muslims, in terms of Thai culture and identity. For example, the southern Muslims had to speak Thai, dress in Thai style, with no Islamic law or Islamic court. This rule had a severely negative impact on the people of the southern province.

In 1947, Haji Sulong Tohmeena, one of the Muslim leaders, sent a written request to the government for the “Pattani Ideology Association,” or “the Autonomous Provinces” that raised several demands that included: (1) the authority to govern themselves; (2) that 80 percent of the official personnel were to be Muslims; (3) that Jawi would the second official language together with Thai; (4) that additional Islamic schools would be built; (5) Islamic laws and courts were to be accepted; and (6) the benefit of all business of the four provinces (including Satun province) were to be used within their area.

In April, 1948, there was a clash between the police and local Muslims. As a result, 1,100 Muslims and 30 policemen died in Dusun Nyiur, Narathiwat.

In 1949, Haji Sulong Tohmeena was arrested.

In 1952, Haji Sulong was released and disappeared, but it was believed that he maintained his resistance in the north of Malaysia.
B. ADDITIONAL QUANTITATIVE ACCOUNT OF VIOLENCE

As previously mentioned, the leaders of the extremists never intended to negotiate directly with the government. The counter-state needs to be invisible and just to pressure the state by terror actions in order to psychologically overcome the state’s hold over the people. As a matter of fact, the ways that the insurgents communicate with the government is through the number of incidents in a period of time, the number deaths, injuries, the kinds of targets and victims. Those sorts of things will more or less demonstrate what they are thinking.

1. Total Number of Incidents in Each Year (January 2004–June 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-June 2008</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,171</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. The Number of Incidents in Each Year from January 2004–June 2008 (From: Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 2009)
2. The Kinds of Victims (January 2004–June 2008)

From January 2004 to June 2008, the largest number of victims involved the normal people or civilians, equaling 63 percent. The next largest targets were 12 percent military; ten percent police; four percent other official personnel; four percent government and non-government workers; four percent village guards; and three percent village chiefs, respectively. As a consequence, it is shown that the insurgents wanted to create fear and hatred among the people and officials, and to demonstrate psychologically the lack of an effective security measures on the part of the government. Meanwhile, in many cases, it is difficult to distinguish whether an incident was a normal crime or an incident created by the insurgency because the area in question is also chaotic with crime, drug trafficking, illegal business, and local political competition that sometimes use violence as a tool to discredit the opposition. Moreover, it is also hard to identify who
was responsible for the incidents, because the insurgents are also disguised as normal people or, as some people call them, “five minute bandits” or “friend by day, enemy by night.”


![Figure 10. The Number of Deaths and Casualties (January 2004-June 2008) (From: Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 2009)](image-url)
From January 2004 to June 2007, the incidents fluctuated but trended upward until the government conducted an offensive operation in June 2007 that caused a decrease in the number of incidents. However, the number of deaths and casualties still fluctuated and did not trend downward compared to the previous months before the crackdown policy. The decrease in incidents is not varied directly in relation to the deaths and casualties. On the other hand, it was noticed that the insurgency tried to escalate the incidents into ones of greater cruelty in order to maintain the fear of the people and to discredit the security efforts of the government. Moreover, it appears that when the insurgents were pressured by force intervention and limited in their freedom of movement, they resorted to the incidents of more violence to illustrate that they existed and to counter the tactics of the state’s use of force.
4. The Dead and Injured Victims by Religion (January 2004–June 2008)

In the beginning, the targets were focused on the symbols of the Thai government and Thai identity, which included Buddhist civilians, Buddhist monks, government teachers and schools, and the military and police. After that initial targeting, the subsequent targets became random to any local region including Muslims themselves. From January 2004 to December 2008, the total number of dead and injured Buddhists were 4,279 (53 percent), and the total number of dead and injured Muslims were 3,185 (39.5 percent) from a total of 8,057 cases. Nonetheless, the number of Muslim deaths was 4,512 (56 percent), which is greater than the 3,383 deaths of Buddhists (42 percent).

Figure 13. The Injured Victims by Religion, Gender, and Age from January 2007–July 2009
(From: Violence-related Injury Surveillance, 2009)

From January 2007–July 2009, the number of female victims (left hand) was far less than that of male victims. The ages of the victims were mostly from 20 to 49. There is no significant difference in the numbers of Buddhist victims (dark color) and Muslim victims (white color). Some victims were of unidentified religion (light color).
For the choosing of victims, the insurgency first selected symbolic targets of Thai identity and Buddhism, such as the government schools, teachers, and Buddhist monks. After that, the insurgency struck all types of victims, mostly soft targets including Muslims, and then took turns targeting the military, police, and other officials. It was unexpected that the number of deaths of Muslim victims was actually greater than that of Buddhist victims in the last couple of years. It is estimated that the cooperation of the people increased because the government initiated a greater variety of development projects and information operations. The southernmost people are obviously recognized by the government, but not so for a small group of rebels who are starving for independence. However, after the offensive operation in June 2007 (red circle), there was no significant difference in the number of Buddhist victims and Muslims victims.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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