BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY: PRIORITIES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

by

Lars Zimmermann

December 2009

Thesis Advisor: David S. Yost
Second Reader: Daniel Moran

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Britain, France and Germany: Priorities for the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy

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The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This thesis analyzes areas of consensus and distinctiveness in the security and defense policies of the European Union’s three big powers: Britain, France and Germany. Owing in part to divergent historical experiences in the twentieth century and before, Britain, France and Germany have retained distinct national interests. These interests, in combination with each country’s individual security cultures, have determined British, French and German priorities for the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Germany has advocated the concept of “civilian power Europe,” while Britain and France have sought to strengthen the EU’s military capabilities. Furthermore, London and Paris continue to have national security objectives that are not reflected in the ESDP. While Germany’s security and defense agenda beyond NATO is almost entirely supported by the ESDP, Britain and France pursue security and defense policy agendas outside the European Union’s framework on a national basis. However, there are signs of convergence in the views of London, Paris and Berlin. Examples include the general consensus on threat perceptions, the more compatible policies toward NATO, the limited progress in the European Union headquarters debate, the conduct of several civilian and military ESDP operations, and last but not least the very existence of the December 2003 European Security Strategy.
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BRITAIN, FRANCE AND GERMANY: PRIORITIES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

Lars Zimmermann
Lieutenant, German Navy

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (EUROPE AND EURASIA)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2009

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>Crisis Response Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defense Policy Guidelines</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>European Union Force</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD Congo</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

According to Simon Hix, Professor of European and Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science,

The West European nation-state remains the sovereign actor in foreign policy issues so, instead of the EU developing an autonomous identity and capacity on the global stage, it is simply a vehicle for the member states to pursue those parts of their foreign policy which coincide. When the interests of the states diverge the EU becomes incapacitated and the member states pursue their interests independently of the EU.¹

Britain, France, and Germany² are the most influential European Union member states in all aspects of policy making, including the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This thesis investigates the question: what are the national priorities for ESDP of Britain, France and Germany?

This raises the following sub-questions: are the interests of London, Paris, and Berlin fully reflected in the ESDP? Which country has the most influence and leaves the biggest footprint in the European Union’s security and defense policy-making? What explains its influence? What distinguishes a country’s national foreign policy agenda from its ESDP agenda? To what extent do the national priorities of Britain, France, and Germany fundamentally differ? To what extent have they converged over time?

B. IMPORTANCE

Further institutional and political integration in the EU appears to have become more difficult at this stage. The cumbersome approval process of the Lisbon Treaty, and Britain’s and France’s opposition to departing from intergovernmental structures in the


² The term “Germany” refers to West Germany when the thesis discusses the period from 1949 to 1990.
ESDP suggest that little fundamental institutional innovation in ESDP is at hand. Therefore this thesis concentrates on the operational dimension—threats identified, goals, strategies, doctrines, and civilian and military operations—to explore signs of deepening integration. According to Philip H. Gordon’s judgment in 1997:

[T]he end of the Cold War, the widening of the Union, the continued differences in EU members’ strategic culture, *ambitions*, values, and historical relationships, and the lack—even after forty years of integration—of a European identity sufficient to permit delegation of sovereignty to centralized institutions mean that EU foreign policy cooperation will probably remain limited, fragmented, and intergovernmental.3

What has happened in the subsequent decade? This thesis investigates the ambitions of Britain, France and Germany as part of their priorities for ESDP to identify commonalities and differences among them. Of special interest are the national goals that these countries pursue outside the EU framework since they serve as indicators of areas of disparity. Once these areas have been identified, it will be possible to evaluate their potential impact on further ESDP integration.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

This thesis investigates the hypothesis that each EU member state’s agenda for the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) contains only items which have a reasonable chance of gaining approval in the European Council. In other words, it examines the possibility that EU member states have two foreign policy agendas: one that is pursued on a national basis and one that they try to implement on the EU level. During its EU presidency, when it has an opportunity to serve as the EU’s agenda setter, a member state might push its limits a little further to increase its national influence regarding the ESDP.

While Germany emphasizes the “soft power” aspects of ESDP, such as police and rule of law missions, Britain and France want to strengthen the EU’s military or “hard power” capabilities. This difference in approach has been reflected in the countries’ mission deployments, civilian and military. These operational approaches serve as indicators of national priorities and capabilities.

Furthermore, Britain and France are the only EU countries that possess a realistic military capacity to conduct expeditionary operations unilaterally. Over time, as integration has proceeded and the European Union’s security and defense project has advanced, the willingness of these two countries to take unilateral action may decline.

This thesis hypothesizes that Germany plays a pivotal role in the ESDP. Militarily weak in relation to its economic and demographic potential, Germany will for historical reasons not play a leading role in the ESDP—at least not as a single country. However, for structural reasons—with policy positions often near the consensual center of most EU member states’ positions,\(^4\) considerable military might, and great political and diplomatic weight—Germany is a pivotal player in ESDP.

This thesis investigates the cases of Britain, France and Germany because these countries are the most influential EU member states in all aspects of policy-making, including the ESDP. Examining the history of each country’s security and defense policies, from the end of World War II to the December 1998 St. Malo declaration, may help to explain subsequent national policy preferences. There follows an analysis of the security and defense policy priorities of each country, differentiating between the national and the European Union dimension, in the period since the St. Malo declaration. The thesis identifies situations in which a specific country was not able to gain support from the EU as a whole for its preferred agenda.

\(^4\) Denmark does not participate in ESDP.
Finally, the findings of the three case studies are analyzed with a focus on areas of consensus and distinctiveness in security and defense policies.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The most comprehensive work on ESDP is perhaps that by Jolyon Howorth. He has defined ESDP as "a political and strategic project, with a common body of instruments [that is, civilian and military elements] which all member states—except Denmark—agree to implement collectively, and which has acquired its own distinct profile and footprint."\(^5\) The EU formally launched the ESDP in June 1999, but further integration in the communitarian sense appears to be unlikely at present since EU member states generally prefer to maintain the intergovernmental structure of decision-making in ESDP. Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza differentiate here between political and institutional integration on the one hand and military integration on the other. They argue, as do Lutz Holländer and Peter Schmidt, that further institutional integration is currently improbable due to British and French preferences for intergovernmental structures in ESDP. Holländer and Schmidt suggest that the EU members advance military integration—especially the interoperability of their armed forces—in order to facilitate the formation of ad hoc coalitions, but without duplicating existing NATO efforts.\(^6\) They do not discuss the fact that similar integration efforts (for instance, with police forces) are necessary to improve the European Union’s civilian crisis management capabilities.

The recent work of Christoph O. Meyer investigates whether a strategic culture is emerging in the European Union. On the basis of a thorough analysis of the behavior of Britain, France, Germany and Poland he identified some areas of convergence—such as threat perception, attitudes regarding the use of force, and acceptance of the EU’s ESDP

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role. However, he also found that major areas of disparity remain, especially concerning issues such as collateral damage, high-risk operations and preemption.7

Lutz Holländer and Peter Schmidt discuss the leadership challenges facing the ESDP. In their view, Germany plays a subordinate role due to domestic constraints. For example, the national parliament’s approval is required before the executive can send troops abroad, and the German public has regularly expressed an aversion to the use of force. Britain has greater military capabilities than does Germany, but still tends to balance between America and Europe and lacks the political will to assume leadership of a project that might challenge NATO’s primacy in European security. Finally, France sees itself as the natural leader of the EU but has to concede that Britain’s military and political weight is required for the EU to have an effective ESDP. This circumstance leads some other EU member states to see Britain in the leadership role.8

There is a vast body of historical literature concerning the foreign and security policies of Britain, France, and Germany during the period from the end of World War II until the December 1998 St. Malo declaration. In the wake of the fall of the Iron Curtain—the most significant geopolitical event in this era—the Soviet empire collapsed, Germany was reunited, and the international security environment changed considerably. The disappearance of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat had a major impact on the security considerations of Britain, France, and Germany.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

It is impractical in this thesis to examine the security and defense policies of all 27 member states of the EU. Instead, the thesis investigates the question by focusing on the three most influential members of the EU: Britain, France, and Germany.

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8 Holländer and Schmidt, Möglichkeiten der ESVP angesichts nationaler Europäischer Politik, 6–8.
In other words, this is a comparative study investigating the priorities for ESDP of Britain, France and Germany. James N. Rosenau differentiated in his conception of foreign policy between orientations, plans and behavior. While acknowledging the importance of the first, this thesis concentrates on the latter two categories. The investigation focuses on specific parameters of these three countries’ security and defense policies such as the main threats identified, security objectives, and strategies and concepts of operations for civilian and military forces. The end of the Cold War, the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the 2005 terrorist attacks in London had (among other events) significant effects on European threat perceptions. This thesis identifies what Britain, France and Germany perceived as the main threats in the period after the December 1998 St. Malo declaration, followed by the security objectives that policy-makers in these three countries derived from their threat assessments. Furthermore, it presents the corresponding strategies of these countries to attain the desired aims and the doctrines dealing with the implications for civilian and military forces. The thesis emphasizes the security and defense policy priorities that gained approval by the relevant EU decision-making bodies and that are now reflected in the ESDP. Policy outcomes are measured by taking the actual implementation of policies and operations into account. The comparison of the three cases assesses which country has been the most influential and has left the most significant footprint on ESDP.

The investigation is based on scholarly literature, national security documents, mission and capability analyses, official EU documents and statements, and published interviews.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter I introduces the topic and discusses the hypothesis and research plan. Chapters II, III, and IV analyze the national and ESDP policies of Britain, France and Germany. Chapter V presents the comparative analysis and offers conclusions.

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II. BRITAIN

A. BRITISH SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY BEFORE ST. MALO

Britain is one of the three major powers in the European Union (EU), along with France and Germany. The “special relationship” with the United States (U.S.) has been one of the most significant characteristics of British security and defense policy in the decades since World War II. Strong ties to NATO, the United States, and the Commonwealth secured British influence in world politics during and after the decline of the world’s greatest colonial empire. Moreover, Britain joined the European Economic Community in 1973. In the changed security environment of the post-Cold War era, Britain had difficulties in defining its international role, and not only in Europe. Furthermore, the European Union’s inability to take decisive action regarding the events in the Balkans in the 1990s made London rethink its role in European security affairs.

Britain’s attitude towards security and defense has differed in several ways from the attitude of its continental neighbors. The United Kingdom was undefeated in World War II and the Royal Navy has been the country’s guardian for centuries. The British history of war and battle is one about triumphant expansion, with wars usually fought for territory, raw materials and trade routes instead of to defend the homeland. Without a natural connection to continental Europe and a comfortable distance from the Iron Curtain, the British developed small, highly trained professional forces and substantial experience in expeditionary operations in foreign countries after 1945. Conscription ended entirely by 1963, when the British Army had all regular forces for the first time since 1939.

In the aftermath of World War II, Winston Churchill’s “three circles” formula determined Britain’s position in world politics: an active British role in Europe, privileged ties with the Commonwealth countries, and the special relationship with the
United States to maintain influence and status.\textsuperscript{10} Two further aspects have been traditional British interests. First, open international trade routes have for centuries been of major importance for an industrialized country such as Britain.\textsuperscript{11} Second, London has for centuries sought to prevent the emergence of a predominant power in Europe that could act without taking its interests into account.\textsuperscript{12}

The British are inherently skeptical about large, centralized, integrated structures since such structures may undermine their freedom of action and their national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{13} However, in 1973, Britain joined the European Economic Community “because of force majeure”—that is, economic reasons—but it was “ready to leave at the first opportune time,”\textsuperscript{14} wrote Luigi Barzini, a famous Italian-American journalist.

In December 1998, the joint French-British declaration at St. Malo caught many by surprise, because it was a major shift in British foreign and security policy. Although Tony Blair’s move “was primarily motivated by a sense that unless European members of NATO made a concerted effort to improve their military capacity, the Alliance would begin to unravel,”\textsuperscript{15} it indicated a significant step towards deeper cooperation in the European Union and Britain’s willingness to actively participate in what became known as the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Adrian Hyde-Price, "New Labour und die Britische Aussenpolitik" In \textit{Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Großbritannien}, ed. Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (Bonn: 2005), 9.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Luigi Barzini, \textit{The Europeans}, 61.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Jolyon Howorth, \textit{Security and Defence Policy in the European Union}, 103.
\end{itemize}
Since 1998, Britain has been one of the major drivers behind ESDP and views it primarily as a vehicle to increase European and transatlantic military capabilities without duplicating NATO instruments.\textsuperscript{16} The pragmatic and short-term oriented British, with their suspicion towards French long term visions,\textsuperscript{17} have also focused more on improving the EU’s capabilities than on institutional reforms.\textsuperscript{18} With a clear emphasis on NATO, London has served as a bridge between Washington and European capitals for the past five decades.\textsuperscript{19}

Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent capability, together with its desire for prestige and its commitment to provide security for its 13 Overseas Territories and the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus,\textsuperscript{20} is a British security and defense priority that is not reflected in ESDP. Although Britain emphasizes the NATO and EU frameworks for crisis management operations, it has also shown that it is willing to employ troops in a “coalition of the willing and on a national basis.”\textsuperscript{21} Britain can be described as a nuclear weapon state “that clings to its permanent seat on the UN Security Council; however, it has neither the political nor the economic clout that it used to.”\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 729.


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 18.

\end{flushleft}
B. SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY PRIORITIES AFTER ST. MALO

Britain and France are the only EU countries with substantial power projection capabilities. From this viewpoint it makes sense that the ESDP initiative was launched by London and Paris. Howorth has called attention to one of the British rationales behind the December 1998 St. Malo initiative: “Blair’s gamble was primarily motivated by a sense that unless European members of NATO made a concerted effort to improve their military capacity, the Alliance would begin to unravel.”23 Enhancing the EU’s military capabilities continues to be one of the major driving objectives—if not the most important one—behind London’s plans to further develop the ESDP. But Britain has recognized that military might alone is insufficient to deal with today’s complex security environment. In 2008, for the first time, the British government published the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, “bringing together the objectives and plans of all departments, agencies, and forces involved in protecting our national security.”24 This document and the European Security Strategy (ESS) are primarily used in the following section for an assessment of threats, security objectives, and strategies and concepts of operation.

1. Threats Identified

According to the 2008 National Security Strategy (NSS), “for the foreseeable future, no state or alliance will have both the intent and capability to threaten the United Kingdom militarily, either with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, or with conventional forces.”25 Nevertheless, Britain has identified a variety of interconnected threats which could affect the country or undermine wider international stability. They include international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states, pandemics and trans-national crime. These and other “threats and risks are driven by a diverse and interconnected set of underlying factors, including climate

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25 Ibid., 15.
change, competition for energy, poverty and poor governance, demographic changes and globalisation.”26 The NSS highlights the fact that Russia and China “are already making control of energy supply a foreign policy priority.”27 In other respects, it must be noted that the NSS and ESS have identified the same key threats.

2. Security Objectives

The British core values outlined in the NSS—“human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all”28—are consistent with those of the EU. According to the NSS, promoting such values is “the best way to spread . . . security.”29 The NSS also states that the chief objective is the protection of “the United Kingdom and its interests, enabling its people to go about their daily lives freely and with confidence, in a more secure, stable, just and prosperous world.”30 One of London’s interests, as mentioned previously, is the responsibility to provide security for the United Kingdom’s 13 overseas territories and the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus—an objective not reflected in the security strategy of the EU.

Due to limited resources and capabilities, Britain focuses currently on four national security priorities.

- Pakistan and Afghanistan: key priorities for regional conflict prevention as well as domestic counter-terrorism;
- Those parts of Africa suffering from conflict including Darfur, or extremism, including North Africa;
- The Middle East, including Iraq, because of its key role in global security and stability, and its totemic status among violent extremists; and
- Eastern Europe, where we support enlarged European structures.31

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27 Ibid., 19.
28 Ibid., 6.
29 Ibid., 6.
30 Ibid., 5.
31 Ibid., 40.
The same areas find recognition in a similar manner in the December 2003 ESS and the December 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS, with the exception of Pakistan.

Together with Germany, Britain was an important advocate of the EU’s Eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007. In 2006, during his visit in Berlin, Geoff Hoon, a Member of the British Parliament, underlined the importance of EU enlargement:

The prospect of potential membership alone stimulates democratic change and political transformation. Enlargement has been about transforming countries blighted by totalitarianism, by Soviet occupation or by war; it is about democracy and the rule of law; about creating decent living standards; and about completing the unfinished business of bringing Europe back together again.

In sum, enlargement is one way to promote the values of the United Kingdom and the EU which fosters security and stability on the EU’s periphery.


Britain has a broad view of security. The NSS suggests that tackling today’s problems requires the use of a variety of instruments such as diplomacy, development aid and defense. The ESS emphasizes the utility of the “full spectrum of instruments,” such as political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities, “for crisis management and conflict prevention.” Britain not only supports the call expressed in the ESS for greater civilian capacities such as judges, lawyers and police, to avoid the


chaos usually following a military intervention, but expresses the intention to further develop its own post-conflict stabilization capabilities with an integrated civilian-military approach. 36

Early conflict and threat prevention before a crisis or threat fully develops is the favored approach outlined in both documents. The ESS uses vague wording when it comes to the use of military force. In dealing with terrorism, failed states and regional conflict military means, among others, “may” be needed, indicates the ESS. 37 The British approach is somewhat more explicit: “we will support a rules-based approach to international affairs, under which issues are resolved wherever possible through discussion and due process, with the use of force as a last resort.” 38

With a multipolar worldview, London emphasizes that a multilateral approach through international institutions, such as the UN, leads to greater effectiveness and legitimacy. On the other hand, Britain supports the reform of the UN Security Council and other international institutions because they need “to become more ambitious, effective and representative.” 39 The ESS takes a similar stance, although more cautiously. 40 Furthermore, Britain refuses—together with France—to give up its national sovereignty by representing the EU’s position in the UN Security Council.

While the British recognize that the multilateral approach offers the greatest advantages in terms of political legitimacy, they are also willing to use their forces in a bilateral coalition (with, for example, the United States) or, if necessary, unilaterally. The British maintain strong, balanced and flexible national armed forces with the capability to cooperate with U.S. forces, as well as the forces of other allies and security partners. 41 Furthermore, Britain decided in 2006 to maintain its independent nuclear deterrent

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37 Ibid., 9.
38 Ibid., 6.
39 Ibid., 7.
40 Ibid., 11.
41 Ibid., 8–9.
capability. The British armed forces are considered to be among the best in the European Union with the highest annual budget.\(^\text{42}\) For post-conflict stabilization operations Britain prefers to work through the UN, NATO and the EU.

Table 1. Selected Civilian and Military ESDP Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>British Contribution</th>
<th>French Contribution</th>
<th>German Contribution</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea since 2004</td>
<td>Military: 10</td>
<td>Military: 130</td>
<td>Military: 135</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan 2003</td>
<td>Civilians: 15</td>
<td>Civilians: 6</td>
<td>Civilians: 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Tchad/RCA 2008</td>
<td>Military: 4</td>
<td>Military: 1655</td>
<td>Military: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM Georgia 2008</td>
<td>Civilians: 19</td>
<td>Civilians: 36</td>
<td>Civilians: 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAFOR Atalanta 2008 (see note 1)</td>
<td>Military: 200 (estimated)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Military: 230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Official EU websites.
Note: 1) The operation EUNAFOR Atalanta is led by a British Commander from the Operational Headquarters in Northwood/United Kingdom. The exact number of British military personnel involved in the operation is unknown.

The British preferences for a multilateral approach through international institutions and the early use of all available crisis management instruments, including military means, are consistent with the preferences articulated in the ESS. But, diverging from the common EU stance, Britain makes clear that it will engage also in bilateral coalitions or even act unilaterally when necessary; and it is much more willing to use force than several other EU member states, as its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq show. Other British missions worth mentioning include the participation in NATO’s Operation Allied Force in 1999 and the intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000. Probably owing in part to its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, Britain has contributed fewer troops to military ESDP missions than has France (see Table 1).

4. Contemporary Politics

Of the three circles identified by Churchill, Britain has traditionally profited the most from the transatlantic relationship with the United States. Joining the U.S.-led coalition in the Iraq invasion in 2003 with little evidence of WMD demonstrated the importance of this relationship, although William Wallace and Tim Oliver argue that “Prime Minister Blair’s firm support came more from his personal conviction that Saddam Hussein’s regime was a threat to global security.” However, this key element of British foreign policy since World War II is also highlighted in the ESS: “The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA.” In times of tension, the British objective has been to serve as a bridge between European capitals and Washington. Last but not least, London has used its special standing in Washington to explain ESDP to the U.S. administration.

One of London’s priorities for ESDP has been to increase the EU’s military capability in general but also to enable the EU to cooperate more effectively with the United States. In 1999, Britain proposed the Helsinki Headline Goal, which called for the EU to develop the capability to deploy 60,000 troops within 60 days. The British-French initiative in 2003—supported by Germany—to create the EU battlegroups and the European Defence Agency can be considered a success. Battlegroups are mobile units of 1,500 troops that can be deployed in the range of 6,000 kilometers around Brussels, within ten days after an EU decision. The concept was adopted by the European Council, and in 2007, the first two battlegroups reached fully operational capability.

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45 Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 103.

46 Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza, Drei Zylinder für einen Neuen Integrationsmotor? Vorraussetzungen und Herausforderungen für eine Britisch-Deutsch-Französische Führungsrolle in der ESVP, 49, 26–46.
On the other hand, Britain, among others, disapproved the suggestion made by Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxemburg in 2003 to create a European headquarters and a European defense union.\textsuperscript{47} Both were seen as a duplication of existing NATO structures. Undermining NATO was not in the interest of Britain. London has always held that ESDP should be complementary to NATO. Nevertheless, since January 2007 the EU has had the option of activating the EU Operations Centre, which is not a permanent headquarters. The EU Operations Centre can be staffed with personnel from the EU military staff and other ESDP bodies, and it is able to plan and conduct autonomous ESDP operations—especially civilian-military operations. Finally, the emergence of the EU Operations Centre can also be interpreted as a sign “of an interest in the EU in greater autonomy and less dependence on NATO.”\textsuperscript{48}

As the United States has shifted its focus further away from Europe, “London is also as committed as Paris to the project of ensuring genuine autonomy for ESDP in the event of crises demanding the EU’s attention in which the U.S. did not wish to be involved.”\textsuperscript{49} Further objectives of the United Kingdom during its EU presidency in 2005 were to convince the United States that a strong European Union is actually in the interest of Washington, and to give new impulses to security-related issues such as climate change and development aid for Africa.

London agrees on several security issues with Paris. At the British-French Summit in 2008 both countries expressed their “continuing common determination to play a leading role in defence and security, both in Europe and within the Atlantic Alliance.“ Additionally both countries called on the other members of the EU to “take decisive steps to strengthen European military and civilian crisis management capabilities.”\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{47} Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza, Drei Zylinder für einen Neuen Integrationsmotor? Vorraussetzungen und Herausforderungen für eine Britisch-Deutsch-Französische Führungsrolle in der ESVP, 49, 18.

\textsuperscript{48} David Yost, NATO and International Organizations, 90.

\textsuperscript{49} Jolyon Howorth, Prospects for the UK Presidency of the European Union (Paris: Institut francais des relations internationales, 2005), 7, 7; emphasis in the original.

C. ANALYSIS

1. Threats Identified

As the comparison of the ESS and the British NSS shows, Britain identifies the same major threats as the EU.

2. Security Objectives

Britain’s interests are not fully reflected in the ESDP, and this is unlikely to change in the near future. Although Britain and the EU identified the same threats and the same hot spots that require attention, Britain has unique overseas obligations that cannot be fully reconciled with the EU’s objectives. The United Kingdom is committed to provide security for its overseas territories, and its commitments to these territories helped to justify an advanced military force with global reach. As the heir of a colonial empire, Britain has accepted its responsibility to tackle global instability with a multilateral approach while relying on national capabilities. With an emphasis on national capabilities Britain is unlikely to deepen EU integration that would restrict the country’s freedom of action. In particular, London will continue to insist on its veto in ESDP decision-making bodies, and it will avoid the pooling and sharing of assets if such arrangements undermine Britain’s overall national capability.


Despite its great military might Britain has also recognized the need for civilian crisis management capabilities supporting the EU’s comprehensive approach to tackle today’s security problems. Nevertheless, the British Armed Forces play in a league of their own when it comes to cooperation with their European neighbors. The British intend to continue close cooperation with the “high-end” equipped U.S. forces in a coalition of

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the willing or in a NATO context. Being able to conduct operations with United States forces means that the United Kingdom has at least in theory the possibility to influence U.S. decisions. However, Tony Blair found during the Iraq crisis in 2003 that his country had little influence over Washington’s strategic decisions. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that seeking influence regarding U.S. military operations overseas is a continuing rationale for British policy-makers to maintain interoperability with U.S. forces.

While London has the capability to engage unilaterally, the question remains, does Britain have the will to employ its troops unilaterally? The NSS stressed the “rules-based approach” through international institutions, but left the option open for the collective and unilateral use of force in self-defense. ESDP might offer at least an alternative to unilateral considerations by providing some collective legitimacy. It must nonetheless be recognized that, in the end, when the interests of the great power Britain are at stake, the country will do what is necessary to secure its interests. London will maintain its freedom of action regarding the employment of its forces.

Part of Britain’s military might is the nuclear deterrent capability. London decided in 2006 to retain a nuclear deterrent. Although Britain could have opted for complete reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the British chose to continue with a supplement to the U.S. umbrella based on their own means. This capability has been committed to the security of Britain’s NATO allies since 1962, in that the British have assigned it to NATO since that year. Moreover, the British have made their forces available for consideration in the deliberations of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group since it was founded in 1966–1967. The nuclear deterrent will remain a British national priority for the foreseeable future.


4. Contemporary Politics

In the decade since the December 1998, St. Malo declaration the British government has made considerable efforts to strengthen ESDP despite a euroskeptic domestic media. Britain has advocated primarily the improvement of the EU’s capabilities instead of building institutions. To that extent British interests are reflected in the ESS while the creation of the battlegroups can be considered to be a joint success.

The Helsinki Headline Goal 2010 is another mechanism which will eventually increase the EU’s military capability. Because most EU member states are also members of NATO, Britain may be successful with its ambitions to strengthen the alliance and the European Union.

D. CONCLUSION

British interests are to some extent reflected in ESDP. For a broad community such as the EU, it is impossible to consider all the exceptional interests of each member state. Instead the EU focuses first and foremost on its own continent. As a consequence the United Kingdom has to maintain independent forces to provide security for its overseas territories—relics of the country’s colonial past. Since Britain does not share these interests with the EU, the United Kingdom has to rely on its own capabilities. The military might with global reach, the special relationship with the United States, the privileged ties with the Commonwealth countries, the nuclear deterrent, and the permanent UN Security Council seat are sources of Britain’s self-perception as a great power. To preserve this status and to defend its security interests the United Kingdom may in the future use force unilaterally. This possibility seems at variance with the “effective multilateralism” ESDP approach outlined in the ESS; but the ESS endorses the UN Charter, which allows for “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” in Article 51.55 Additionally, Britain’s nuclear deterrent and its permanent seat in the UN Security Council will remain exclusively national priorities.

Nevertheless, Britain has made a difference in ESDP. Despite the distrust among Central and Eastern European states regarding French-German ESDP leadership, Britain’s expertise and capabilities are essential for the EU’s security and defense policy. A decade after St. Malo it is clear that—thanks in part to British influence—the EU is on its way to become a more capable actor. While this can be considered a major British priority, another is the desire for political influence in ESDP. Participating in ESDP is the logical consequence of the United Kingdom’s longstanding foreign policy to prevent the emergence of a predominant power in Europe that does not take its interests into account. The intergovernmental character of ESDP decision-making bodies favors Britain’s preferences. Any development that is not in Britain’s interest can be vetoed. In that sense, playing an active role in ESDP has been a positive sum game, and not only for the United Kingdom.

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56 Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza, Drei Zylinder für einen neuen Integrationsmotor? Vorraussetzungen und Herausforderungen für eine Britisch-Deutsch-Französische Führungsrolle in der ESVP, 21.
III. FRANCE

A. FRENCH SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY BEFORE ST. MALO

After the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1958, and the end of the Algerian War in 1962, Charles de Gaulle launched a defense and security policy based on “diplomatic and military independence through national nuclear deterrence means, a special status in NATO, and an exceptionally high level of national self-reliance in the development and acquisition of weapons and other types of military equipment.” With a pride rooted in its history, France has claimed great power status for several reasons, including its permanent seat in the UN Security Council and its nuclear deterrent. France, with a colonial history similar to that of Britain, feels especially responsible for its former colonies in Africa—including Algeria—and the Middle East; and this is reflected in economic ties and security commitments.58 With a certain suspicion towards the United States throughout the Cold War and beyond, France has sought to balance American economic, military and political power in a multipolar world order with a strong European pole.59 In order to minimize Anglo-Saxon influence in Europe, France twice vetoed London’s membership application before Britain finally joined the European Economic Community in 1973. The European integration project, once initiated largely to promote reconciliation between France and Germany, is seen as the best way for France to exert its power and serves now to tie the reunited Germany to its closest


partners in Europe. In 1994, David S. Yost pointed out that “enhanced West European political cohesion and defense cooperation . . . [are] the solution to France’s frustrations about its limited resources in relation to its ambitions and the way for France to gain greater influence in international politics.”

With regard to military capabilities France relied heavily on nuclear weapons according to General de Gaulle’s doctrine that “nuclear weapons mean the absence of battle,” and the country spent up to 40 percent of the defense budget on the force de frappe. As a consequence, when the French forces were deployed in the 1990–1991 Gulf War, they “were shocked to discover that very few were actually deployable: just 15,000 out of a total armed force of 289,000.” Furthermore, fighting side by side with American troops also exposed technological shortcomings in the French armed forces. The experience of the 1991 Gulf War, the 1992 Petersberg meeting of the Western European Union (WEU) and the outbreak of the Balkan Wars were factors contributing to the abolishment of conscription in 1996 in order to transform the French military “into a deployable force for overseas crisis management.”

In the mid-1990s, Paris introduced the broad concept of “security” as the foundation for stability. It assumed that the new emerging conflicts in the world would be rooted in the imbalance between poor and rich regions, and that the resulting threats would affect all the countries of the European Union. Accordingly, in 1997 Jolyon Howorth observed a pattern of “Europeanization” in several defense aspects and soon anticipated that “France’s entire approach to questions of defence and security will be properly integrated with that of her European neighbours.” A March 1997 French-German proposal to merge the EU and the WEU, “effectively bringing the mutual

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assistance commitment under the aegis of the EU,” was vetoed by the incoming British Prime Minister Tony Blair. This is just one example of many illustrating how France has sought to develop an EU security structure independent of NATO in which Paris would assume a leading role instead of Washington and London. In addition to frequently antagonizing Washington, France has not been afraid of diplomatic isolation when the national interests of the country have been at stake.

During the Balkan wars, about three decades after France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military structure, Paris became aware of the EU’s lack of military strength to deal with major crises; and it became more often involved in NATO operations. Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza argue that France finally accepted NATO’s primacy in European security at St. Malo in December 1998. After the emergence of the EU’s ESDP, “France moved rapidly from a defence policy of rigorous national autonomy towards one geared towards integrated European operations.”

B. SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY PRIORITIES AFTER ST. MALO

During the 1990s, there was some convergence in the views of Paris and London with respect to security. France followed the example of Britain to transform its military into all-professional, deployable armed forces and both countries realized that the EU needed for crisis management capabilities to tackle situations that the United States did not want to become involved in. While France had been already at the forefront in promoting a European defense arm, it was primarily the shift in London’s attitude that

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64 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 120.
69 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 98.
permitted the 1998 St. Malo declaration which was followed by the emergence of ESDP. Using ESDP as an additional vehicle in the broader context of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to counterbalance the United States with the purpose of creating a more stable multipolar world order must be considered one rationale among others behind French thinking in the years before and after the turn of the millennium.  

Fourteen years after the preceding 1994 Livre Blanc, France in 2008 took a new approach in drafting The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, owing in part to the challenges arising from globalization. Because “the traditional distinction between domestic security and foreign security has blurred,” the 2008 Livre Blanc has a broader understanding of security than its 1994 predecessor, which addressed exclusively the defense realm. The White Paper Commission included representatives of the Civil Service, the armed forces, the Parliament, defense and other industries and the academic community; and it forged a national security strategy taking not only defense policy into account, but also foreign, domestic, and economic policy. Quite similar in their approaches to security, the 2008 Livre Blanc and the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) are the primary sources for the following analysis of France’s identified threats, security objectives, and strategies and concepts of operations.

1. Threats Identified

Globalization is “shaping international security” and as a consequence the world has become more unstable and more unpredictable, argues the 2008 Livre Blanc. Certainly, the chance of an all-out war as prior to 1989 has vanished but the situation of France and Europe “has grown more vulnerable than it was at the end of the Cold War.” The Livre Blanc identifies an extensive list of threats to France and Europe. The threats listed are similar to those described in the 2003 ESS, such as terrorism, the

70 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 3rd ed. (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 559.
72 Ibid., 19–301.
73 Ibid., 41.
proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. According to an evaluation, terrorist attacks, cyber attacks, organized crime, and natural disasters in the French overseas territories are the most probable risks and threats to France, whereas terrorist attacks, ballistic missile attacks, pandemics, and natural as well as industrial disasters could be potentially of severe scale.\textsuperscript{74} While addressing further threats such as global warming, energy shortage and espionage, the \textit{Livre Blanc} emphasizes in particular the risks of major cyber attacks with a high potential “for the destabilisation of everyday life, paralysis of critical networks for the life of the nation, or denial of access to certain military capabilities.”\textsuperscript{75} Although the \textit{Livre Blanc} provides a comprehensive threat assessment, it acknowledges the possibility that unforeseen threats could cause strategic upheavals. According to the paper, “we [the French people] must be prepared for strategic upsets resulting from the scale of violence of attempts to thwart the normal functioning of our societies, in places not normally expected by our military and security means.”\textsuperscript{76}

The fact that 1.5 million French people live abroad poses a special challenge that needs to be addressed by the national security strategy. These people might be exposed to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, hostage-taking or regional conflicts. For the French living on the national territory in Europe, there is in the foreseeable future no likelihood of a conventional military attack.\textsuperscript{77}

Regarding the geographical scope of France’s new strategy, the \textit{Livre Blanc} prioritizes a strategic arc of crisis from the Atlantic, via the Mediterranean, to the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa, and on to South Asia.\textsuperscript{78} Finally, the \textit{Livre Blanc} highlights

\textsuperscript{74} The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 54.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 64–121.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 41–47.
Moscow’s return to Realpolitik. Russia has taken “an offensive line in dealing with certain European countries, notably those in its immediate vicinity,” in an attempt to restore its status as a major power.\footnote{\textit{The French White Paper on Defence and National Security}, 37.}

\section{Security Objectives}

Nicolas Sarkozy, the President of the French Republic since 2007, set out two goals in the 2008 \textit{Livre Blanc}. One goal reflects the first and foremost responsibility of any state—that is, to guarantee the sovereignty of the state and to protect its citizens. The second objective is to “ensure that France remains a major military and diplomatic power,” a longstanding ambition deeply rooted in French culture. The President advocated far-reaching reforms in the security sector that address the challenges of the twenty-first century in order “to guarantee France’s freedom of action and its independent capacity to decide for itself.”\footnote{Ibid., 9–10.} In addition to the already mentioned objectives of territorial defense and the protection of citizens, the \textit{Livre Blanc} notes two further overall objectives of the national security strategy. Those goals are:

- To enable France to contribute to European and international security: this corresponds both to its own security needs, which also extend beyond its frontiers, and to the responsibility shouldered by France within the framework of the United Nations and the alliances and treaties which it has signed.

- To defend the values of the “republican compact” that binds all French people to the State, namely the principles of democracy, and in particular individual and collective freedoms, respect for human dignity, solidarity and justice.\footnote{Ibid., 58.}

Similar objectives can be identified in the strategic documents of the EU. Defending the EU and promoting its values go to the roots of the 2003 ESS as they constitute the basis...
for the formulation of the EU’s strategic objectives. The ESS acknowledges also the need to strengthen the United Nations as a European priority and emphasizes the necessity for international cooperation.\footnote{A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 12 December 2003), 8–15.}

In the face of limited resources and in light of France’s strategic interests the country has continuously reduced the number of its pre-positioned forces on the African continent since the 1960s. Currently, France operates seven bases in Africa involving about 10,000 personnel.\footnote{“French forces are currently deployed at seven bases: four staging bases, in Djibouti, Senegal, Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire, one long-standing deployment in Chad and three operations in progress, in Côte d’Ivoire, the Central African Republic and on the Chadian border of Darfur.” The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 148.} While Paris wants to gradually restructure the country’s presence in Africa—only two bases will eventually remain—it seeks to strengthen its position in the Persian Gulf. According to the 2008 \textit{Livre Blanc}, “This new policy will result in deployment of the most modern capabilities in the region, as in the case of Abu Dhabi, and a stronger French presence aimed at crisis prevention.”\footnote{Ibid., 149.} The reduction of its bases in Africa goes hand in hand with a renegotiation of long-standing legal arrangements with certain African countries—a relict of France’s colonial era. For example, “clauses relating to possible French intervention to maintain internal order in certain countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon or Togo, will be abrogated.” New agreements must be based on defense and security partnership rather than on military assistance. France invites the EU to become involved when it wishes to do so.\footnote{Ibid., 146–147.}

Although Africa remains a French priority, the focus of French national security strategy has clearly shifted eastward to regions where the strategic interests of France and Europe coincide with potential or already existing major crisis centers. While Northern Africa continues to be of special importance for France for historical, economic and
cultural reasons, the *Livre Blanc* calls for more attention to the Balkans, a balanced relationship with Russia and the prevention of a major conflict in Asia that could possibly involve Pakistan, India and China.\textsuperscript{86}

Resulting from its colonial legacy, France has special security responsibilities in the French overseas departments and territories which are reflected in the presence of about 17,700 military personnel—not counting the troops in Africa. Of exceptional importance is the security of the Kourou space centre in French Guiana, which is considered to be vital to France and Europe.\textsuperscript{87}

Although Paris supported the enlargement of the EU to ten additional countries in 2004, it views enlargement rather critically. It has not only shifted the center of political gravity away from France; it also has threatened to slow down the EU’s political processes and to undermine the EU’s ability to act efficiently. France does not oppose the future integration of the Balkan states but it argues that further EU enlargement must consider the EU’s ability to absorb new member states.\textsuperscript{88} Due to its special responsibilities concerning the southern neighbors of the EU, Paris favors a balanced approach—especially with regard to financial assistance—between the EU’s policies addressing the Union’s eastern neighbors and its policies concerning its southern neighbors. Finally, France opposes the integration of Turkey into the EU and suggests instead, as does Germany, a privileged relationship with the EU.

\textsuperscript{86} The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 45–47.

\textsuperscript{87} “The four départements d’outre-mer are La Réunion (in the Indian Ocean), French Guiana (in South America), La Martinique and La Guadeloupe (both in the Carribean). They are fully-fledged départements with the peculiarity of also assuming the administrative level of région. The collectivités territoriales each have a specific status. They are French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Mayotte (in the Indian Ocean), St-Pierre-et-Miquelon (off Newfoundland), St Martin and St Barthélemy (both in the Caribbean), Wallis-et-Futuna (in the Southern Pacific). Other French possessions devoid of local administration are Terres australes et antarctiques françaises (TAAF) and Iles Éparses (in the Mozambique channel).” 188, 314.

\textsuperscript{88} Daniela Schwarzer, *Deutschland und Frankreich: Nie so nah, und doch so fern?* (Berlin: Foundation Robert Schumann, 2008), 24–26.

The *Livre Blanc* takes a comprehensive approach to security which acknowledges that the lines between external and internal security have become blurred. According to the *Livre Blanc*, “National Security should be founded upon a strategy of prevention, itself based on diplomatic, economic, financial, military, legal and cultural means.”\(^89\) This strategy is consistent with the one outlined in the 2003 ESS and the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS: “preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach.”\(^90\)

But prevention is only one of five broad functions that are considered to be crucial to national security: knowledge and anticipation, deterrence, protection, and intervention. Knowledge and anticipation include, inter alia, intelligence and diplomacy and have been clearly emphasized as key priorities. “[K]nowledge represents our first line of defence. Knowledge guarantees our autonomy in decision-making and enables France to preserve its capacity for strategic initiative,” states the *Livre Blanc*.\(^91\)

To address today’s security threats, France prefers to work through multilateral institutions for legitimacy and efficacy reasons. Moreover, as Thierry Tardy of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy put it, “multilateralism is for France simultaneously a framework of action, a way to promote French interests, and a tool to constrain others.” Lately, the EU has been the institution favored by France for crisis management operations due to historic distrust towards NATO and frustration with UN operations in Bosnia and Somalia in the 1990s.\(^92\) This preference is not necessarily reflected in the numbers of French personnel involved in various crisis management operations (see Table 2), but France is committed to increasing the EU’s profile as an international actor.

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by using it as a primary vehicle for crisis management. However, recent developments in French thinking regarding NATO-EU relations must be considered and are addressed later in this chapter.

Table 2. French Personnel Involved in International Operations under Various Auspices in August 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU (with UN mandate)</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>NATO (with UN mandate)</th>
<th>French National Forces supporting UN Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>About 2,000</td>
<td>1,879</td>
<td>4,570</td>
<td>1,900</td>
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France is also a strong proponent of reforming the UN Security Council to transform it into a more effective and more representative body reflecting developments in the international system since the end of World War II. 93 This view is shared by the other EU member states as it is expressed in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS. 94

Although France favors working through multilateral institutions such as the EU, NATO, the UN and the OSCE, it does not rule out unilateral action under national or multilateral auspices (e.g., the 2004 intervention in Côte d’Ivoire under a UNSC mandate). Three eventualities are outlined in the Livre Blanc that could justify a French unilateral action: (a) “the protection of our citizens abroad;” (b) “the application of bilateral defence arrangements with certain States;” and (c) “a possible national response to one-off actions against our interests.” 95

With a policy similar to that of Britain, France considers the use of force to be the last resort once all other measures have been actively exploited. While legitimacy under international law is a prerequisite for the use of force, it appears that the approval of the

French Parliament is also desired. A 2008 constitutional change requires the approval of the Parliament before the French President can deploy troops for more than four months. While this regulation limits the power of the President, it also increases the legitimacy of the military action, as exemplified by Germany since 1994.

Together with Britain, France is more prepared than Germany to use force. In the view of Tardy, “France has a preference for persuasive rather than coercive instruments in meeting security threats, but does not rule out the use of force in principle or practice; the use of force is part of France’s political-military culture.”

NATO and the EU remain the bedrock of security for Europe and France. Nevertheless, Paris emphasizes the country’s freedom of action, including the capacity for independent strategic decision-making. A process that began with the end of conscription in 1996 has received a new impulse with the publication of the 2008 Livre Blanc. As part of a comprehensive transformation program France seeks to improve the capabilities of its armed forces, while maintaining balanced forces—including a nuclear deterrent. The reform of the French armed forces, which requires the elimination of up to 46,000 civilian and military positions within the next seven years, is intended to result in smaller but better equipped armed forces that can be quickly deployed in various theatres. France and Britain are the only countries in the EU with substantial power projection capabilities. While considerable resources are devoted to improving intelligence

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96 “This legitimacy [of military intervention] will be all the greater if, for each engagement, the objectives are transparent and if it has the explicit support of the national community, as notably expressed through its representatives in Parliament.” Ibid., 69.


99 Tardy, France: Between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy, 25–45, 37.
capabilities, the *Livre Blanc* addresses also the funding of the reforms. Beginning in 2012, the military budget will rise every year by one percent above inflation to ensure the financing of the planned projects.\(^{100}\)

France maintains its independent nuclear deterrent. It contributes (together with its permanent seat in the UN Security Council) to the French self-perception as a great power despite the lack of political and economic clout in comparison with the United States. While nuclear deterrence remains the ultimate guarantee for national security and French independence, a role in the European context in the future cannot be ruled out. The *Livre Blanc* provides the following hints: “Together with the other European nuclear power, the United Kingdom, France notes that there is no situation in which the vital interests of one may be threatened without the interests of the other being threatened also.” Additionally, Paris offers interested European partners a dialogue about the role of deterrence in European security.\(^{101}\)

France has participated in several civilian ESDP missions, and has currently assigned 147 civilian personnel to the EU’s largest “rule of law” mission—EULEX Kosovo. The geographical focal point of the EU’s military operations appears to be Africa, coinciding partially with long-standing French priorities (e.g., the French presence in Chad since 1986).\(^{102}\) Out of the six military ESDP operations four have been deployed to Africa and two to the Balkans. As one of the major initiators of military EU operations (e.g., Artemis RD Congo in 2003, EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, and EUFOR Chad RCA in 2008),\(^{103}\) the country has made significant contributions to all military ESDP operations (e.g., 1,655 personnel for EUFOR Chad/RCA).

\(^{100}\) *The French White Paper on Defence and National Security*, 278.


4. Contemporary Politics

As one of the major contributors to ESDP operations France has recognized the numerous shortcomings of the EU as a crisis manager and has made several proposals to overcome those weaknesses. Already in 2003, at the bilateral summit in Le Touquet, France and Britain laid the foundation for the EU battlegroups and the European Defence Agency (EDA)—both key milestones in the evolution of ESDP. With the creation of the EDA Paris intended to foster the coordination of major procurement projects among EU member states and to strengthen the European defense industry vis-à-vis that of the United States. Increasing the EU’s capabilities in order to limit Washington’s influence in NATO and Europe was one of the major French rationales in 2003.104

Improving the planning capabilities for ESDP operations has long been a French priority, whereas such moves were seen by London as duplicating NATO capabilities. Together with Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg, France proposed in April 2003 the establishment of a military headquarters in the vicinity of Brussels. But the proposal was destined to failure without the support of the EU’s leading military power—Britain.105 However, it can be assumed that the initiative created some momentum to further the ESDP project. In December 2003, the European Council adopted the first European Security Strategy. Although the headquarters issue cannot be considered to be resolved, an intermediate step is the Brussels-based EU Operations Centre—a non-permanent body able to plan and conduct autonomous ESDP operations since January 2007.

At least since General de Gaulle, France and the United States have had frequently diverging views, with the most recent major one being the bitter dispute about the 2003 Iraq crisis. With a multipolar worldview France has sought to reduce American power, which it has considered to be excessive and unbalanced, Georges-Henri Soutou wrote in 2004. He described further the French perception: the United States “has become


105 Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, 603.
unilateralist if not outright imperialistic, and it is no longer interested in, and has even
turned against, the UN, NATO, and a unified Europe.”106

However, France’s approach to NATO has become more realistic lately in the
face of today’s overwhelming security challenges. Consequently, the 2008 Livre Blanc
rejects any competition between NATO and the EU, and emphasizes that the two
institutions are complementary—in fact, both are needed to “come to grips with the
threats and crises.” In the hope for a “new balance between Americans and Europeans
within NATO,” France returned to NATO’s integrated command structure in April 2009,
holding on to the following three principles set out by General de Gaulle decades earlier:

1. Complete independence of our nuclear forces;
2. French authorities must retain full freedom of assessment, which
   implies the absence of automatic military commitment and the
   maintenance of assets allowing for strategic autonomy in particular
   by increasing our intelligence capabilities; and lastly,
3. Permanent freedom of decision, which means that no French forces
   will be permanently placed under NATO command in
   peacetime.107

While the Livre Blanc outlines the intended renewed relationship between France
and NATO, it also highlights long-standing French objectives with regard to ESDP. One
of the priorities addressed in the Livre Blanc is France’s ambition to elevate further the
EU’s role in international crisis management. In order to enhance the EU’s military and
civilian capabilities, the paper outlines several specific goals:

- Setting up an effective intervention force of 60,000 soldiers,
  deployable for one year in a distant theatre with the necessary air
  and naval forces;
- Achieving the capability to deploy for a significant duration two or
  three peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operations and several
  civilian operations of lesser scope in separate theatres;

106 Georges-Henri Soutou, “Three Rifts, Two Reconciliations: Franco-American Relations during the
Fifth Republic” In The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress - US-European Relations After Iraq, ed. David M.
- Increasing the European planning and operational capability both military and civilian, in parallel to the development of interventions outside the European Union;
- Creating an impetus for and restructuring of the European defence industry.\(^{108}\)

Unexpected events such as the Lisbon treaty deadlock, the economic and financial crisis and the Russian-Georgian conflict distracted France from pursuing its European ambitions during its EU presidency in the second half of 2008. In the view of Daniel Keohane, a research fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies, two objectives have dominated the French ESDP agenda: improving the EU’s planning capacities and enhancing the military capabilities of EU members. With regard to the latter, Keohane has written, “the French argue that EU governments have little choice: they must reform their armies and share more of the costs of developing, buying and using equipment,” due to expensive operations and rising equipment prices. As discussed earlier, the French hope that their military reform will serve as an example and convince France’s EU partners to follow its course.\(^{109}\) Among the achievements of the 2008 French presidency are the following:

- A declaration of intent on optimizing the use of airlift aircraft . . . ;
- A statement of intent on cooperation on space intelligence [involving six EU member states] . . . ;
- A statement on better-developed exchanges of young officers, modeled on the Erasmus system in higher education.\(^{110}\)

Further accomplishments include an initiative increasing interoperability among European air forces and navies, an agreement to strengthen the capacities of the European Defense Agency, and a long-term initiative enhancing the EU’s capacity to deploy...


As the latter initiative is a result of British-French cooperation, many proposals were made in cooperation with other EU partners.

During its EU presidency in 2008, France promoted the drafting of an updated ESS which was opposed by some other EU members—inter alia, Germany. However, with the authorization of the European Council, the Report on the Implementation of the ESS was published in December 2008 discussing common interests, new threats and means in response to those threats. Moreover, France advocates the drafting of a European White Paper on defense and security which could include the following: “a common European analysis of threats and of the international system . . . ; the definition of the European Union’s common security interests; and, a doctrinal framework for external intervention and the use of force.”

C. ANALYSIS

The French proposal for the drafting of a European White Paper is not likely to be adopted by the European Council any time soon, as the rejection of the composition of a new ESS in 2008 has shown. Other EU member states probably have reservations about such a project due to diverging national priorities. As one of the most influential EU member states, France finds most of its priorities reflected in the 2003 ESS, although some national priorities remain neglected (e.g., nuclear deterrence and France’s overseas territories). Of particular interest are also major developments in French security policy with the publication of the 2008 Livre Blanc. Claudia Major has identified three innovative elements in the Livre Blanc:

The first is a shift of focus away from France’s historic spheres of influence towards a “strategic arc” of instability that stretches from the Atlantic via the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa and

111 Schwarzer, Deutschland und Frankreich: Nie so nah, und doch so fern?, 33. Ronja Kempin and Marco Overhaus, Kein großer Sprung in der Entwicklung der ESVP: Lehren aus der Französischen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2009), 2.

112 Schwarzer, Deutschland und Frankreich: Nie so nah, und doch so fern? 33.

on to south Asia. Second, greater emphasis is put on intelligence. Third, the White Paper approves France’s reintegration into NATO’s integrated military command structure.114

1. Threats Identified

It must be noted that the threat assessment outlined in the 2008 *Livre Blanc* is consistent with the one depicted in the 2003 ESS, and the December 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS. As the June 2008 *Livre Blanc* has highlighted cyber attacks ranging from small to large scale as a threat with a high probability of materialization, it appears that Paris advocated the incorporation of this threat into the December 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS. An agreement among the EU member states, accepting cyber attacks as a new threat to the EU as a whole, has been fairly easy to reach due to the following factors. First, cyber attacks could potentially affect every EU member state. Second, the stigmatization of a specific “enemy” is neither necessary nor possible. Third, no EU member state finds its national interests challenged by listing this new threat in the EU’s strategic document.

On the other hand, the language used in the December 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS addressing Russia is much more moderate than the tone taken in the *Livre Blanc*. While Paris does not mince words and speaks out directly (see above), the European Union document is much more cautious, evidently out of concern not to upset Moscow; and it is apparent that it reflects the position of EU member states that do not want to confront Russia openly. Germany is certainly one of those countries.

2. Security Objectives

Despite many similarities, a few interests of France are not reflected in the 2003 ESS and the December 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS. Particularly striking in the 2008 *Livre Blanc* is the emphasis on “France’s freedom of action and its independent capacity to decide for itself,” as this appears to contradict EU integration

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efforts in the defense realm. On the other hand, this position is the logical consequence of France’s overseas commitments. Paris has to rely on its own armed forces because the security of the country’s overseas territories in South America, the Pacific and elsewhere is not addressed in the ESS.

Although France has reduced its military presence in Africa and is about to transform certain security arrangements with African states, it shares the EU’s support for building up African crisis management capacities. France’s planned reduction of bases in Africa symbolizes also a shift of the country’s strategic focus further to the East. An interesting development is the opening of a French naval base, an air base and a training camp hosting about 500 troops in May 2009 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—a country France has no colonial ties with. This step has been primarily motivated by French national interests: it increases the French military presence in a “geopolitical strategic location on a key oil supply route,” it improves France’s position in the competition for “lucrative defense and nuclear energy contracts in the oil-rich nation,” it sends signals to Teheran suggesting that the UAE are under French protection, and it underlines President Sarkozy’s goal of ensuring that France remains a major military and diplomatic power. From a different perspective the opening of the French base in Abu Dhabi can be also seen in the light of supporting the EU’s policies regarding energy security, piracy prevention, and cooperation with the Gulf States to build regional security. However, the bilateral approach suggests that advancing French national interests and the country’s freedom of action were the dominating factors in that process.

The 2003 ESS identified the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a strategic priority for Europe.\footnote{A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 10.} The 2008 Livre Blanc addressed this conflict only by describing it as one of the major unsolved crises without elevating its resolution to a French security objective.\footnote{The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 32.} Russia and the Balkans are highlighted in the Livre Blanc and the ESS as priorities, whereas the prevention of a major crisis in Asia remains a French concern not assumed by the European Union as a whole.

### 3. Strategies and Concepts of Operation

Crisis prevention using a broad variety of instruments is a theme that can be found in the ESS as well as in the Livre Blanc. Similar parallels can be identified in both documents regarding the importance of multilateral organizations such as the UN, NATO and the EU. France is committed to addressing international crises through international institutions—preferably through the EU—not only for reasons of legitimacy, but also because this approach amplifies French influence. Operation ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of the Congo—the EU’s first autonomous mission—could have been also an exclusively French mission in support of the UN. France not only proposed the mission in 2003, backed by Britain, but it also deployed 1,785 out of a total of 2,200 troops and provided the operational headquarters in Paris as well as the operational commander, General Bruno Neveux.\footnote{Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 211–235.} But using ESDP as a vehicle to launch the operation demonstrated France’s will to work through the EU, and it also elevated the significance of the mission by representing almost 382 million Europeans (EU 15 in 2003) instead of 60 million Frenchmen. According to the Livre Blanc,

promoting the European Union as a global security actor on the one hand, and the construction of a legitimate and effective system of global governance on the other, are the necessary fulcrums for the defence of the major security interests of France.\footnote{The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 39.}
Reforming the UN Security Council is high on the French agenda to preserve it from becoming more irrelevant. Only an effective UN Security Council can be used to channel French interests.

Despite France’s commitment to multilateralism the country does not rule out unilateral troop employment under reasonable conditions. The willingness to undertake unilateral action—if necessary—and the recent enormous emphasis on intelligence underline the importance of the long-standing French doctrine of freedom of action which contradicts to some extent France’s efforts to promote further institutional integration in ESDP. The profound reform ambitions outlined in the 2008 *Livre Blanc* also aim for increased capabilities to guarantee the country’s freedom of action. But seen from a different perspective, one could argue that France wants to live up to the demands for increased European capabilities made in the ESS. In other words, France leads by example by strengthening its national armed forces, and this ultimately increases the EU’s capabilities. Unfortunately, smaller EU member states cannot easily follow this example, as they face hard choices between maintaining balanced armed forces and pursuing specialization for the European defense project.124

Despite the high financial burden it appears that there is a broad consensus among the French about the continuing utility of nuclear deterrence. It will remain a French national priority for the foreseeable future, although a role in the European context in the long term cannot be ruled out.

Finally, the deployment of several thousand troops and civilian personnel around the globe under the aegis of the UN, NATO, and the EU underscores France’s determination to play an active role in international crisis management and reflects one aspect of French national identity—the notion that France has a special role in the world.125 France’s vision of an active and capable EU is echoed in the ESS and can be considered a projection of French national interests to the EU level. With major


contributions to ESDP missions as one powerful source of influence—among others—Paris secures its leading position in ESDP, besides the two other key players: Britain and Germany.

4. Contemporary Politics

The country’s change in attitude towards the transatlantic relationship probably constitutes the most significant development in recent French thinking. Claudia Major, a research fellow at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, provides likely rationales behind the French policy shift:

Given the modified international environment, the development of the Alliance and the French commitment in NATO operations, the argument goes, a further insistence upon a special case for France is neither coherent nor logical.126

In the face of some serious domestic criticism the French President emphasized that the White Paper Commission had concluded that there were no obstacles for French full participation in NATO. But still, the role of Nicolas Sarkozy cannot be underestimated. When he took office in 2007, he was much more Atlanticist than his predecessor, with views similar to those of German chancellor Angela Merkel, who revived the U.S.-German transatlantic relationship beginning in 2005. While President Sarkozy wants to Europeanize the alliance, some positive implications for ESDP are also likely. The complete integration of France into the military structure of NATO might reduce the suspicion among the other European alliance members that thought that Paris intended to undermine the alliance.127 Further development in ESDP, and enhanced cooperation between NATO and the EU could be the consequences.

The central themes of the French ESDP agenda since its emergence have been increased European military capabilities—intended to balance the United States in a multipolar world by fostering the EU’s international role—and enhanced European

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planning capabilities. In pursuing the former objective, France has chosen a pragmatic approach based on projects that willing EU partners could agree on (e.g., only six EU member states intend to cooperate on space intelligence). In the absence of a European Union strategic vision—the French proposal for a new ESS was rejected—those small steps may eventually make the EU a more capable international actor.128

D. CONCLUSION

Despite the country’s enthusiasm for ESDP and its willingness to offer leadership, France’s sheer size in economic and demographic terms as well as its powerful military and its participation in most ESDP missions have been the major sources of French influence in ESDP. This significant influence helps to explain why French interests are to a great extent reflected in the ESS. However, French national priorities remain. The nuclear deterrent and the permanent seat in the UN Security Council support France’s self-image as a great power and underline the nation’s freedom of action. Additionally, France has certain security commitments vis-à-vis its overseas departments and territories, besides some long-standing bilateral security arrangements in Africa that are currently undergoing review. As a consequence of the shift in strategic focus, Paris intends to reduce the number of permanent bases in Africa while France has opened simultaneously a new base in the United Arab Emirates—a clear expression of Paris pursuing the national interest. Furthermore, the emphasis on improved intelligence capabilities and the proposed far-reaching military reforms are intended to guarantee France’s independent capacity in decision-making and the country’s freedom of action.129 To be sure, France is committed to multilateralism and ESDP, but Paris wants—as London does—to retain its freedom of action where the country’s national interest is at stake. Reconciling further integration in ESDP with France’s desire to maintain national independence will remain one of the major challenges for the foreseeable future.

128 Kempin and Overhaus, Kein großer Sprung in der Entwicklung der ESVP: Lehren aus der Französischen EU-Ratspräsidencieschaft, 4.
Increasing France’s own capabilities through profound military reforms must be also seen as consistent with long-standing French ambitions to enhance the EU’s capabilities in order to raise the European Union’s international profile—as expressed in the ESS.\textsuperscript{130} France’s recent rapprochement with NATO can be also interpreted as another building-block in furthering the European Union’s defense project. Rejoining NATO’s military command structure is likely to improve France’s image among its European allies, and this could have positive implications for European security cooperation. Moreover, with France back in NATO, the transatlantic cycle of suspicion could come to an end; and the United States—with its focus shifting away from Europe anyway—might finally endorse the EU’s security and defense project without reservations.

Although the creation of the EU operations centre can be considered only a partial success in improving the EU’s operation planning capabilities, and the rejection of the proposed preparation of a new ESS in 2008 by the other EU member states constituted a setback in an attempt to forge a strategic vision for ESDP, most other French measures (e.g., the proposal for the EU battlegroups and the EDA, and the initiation of several ESDP operations) were successfully geared towards ESDP progress in small steps. Thus, France has pursued the goal of strengthening the EU’s international position with Paris in a leading role. Charles de Gaulle once said that “France is the light of the world . . . its destiny is to illuminate the Universe.”\textsuperscript{131} As France lacks the economic, political and military clout of a great power, French leaders have sought to restore French influence in the world and to sustain the quest for \textit{grandeur} through a leading role in the European Union. Here, besides strong French influence in many other policy domains of the EU, ESDP has been especially well suited due to its impact well beyond the European Union’s borders.

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy}, 14–16.

\textsuperscript{131} De Gaulle quoted in Luigi Barzini, \textit{The Europeans} (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 221.
IV. GERMANY

A. SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY BEFORE ST. MALO

Germany’s unique experiences in the two world wars of the twentieth century have shaped the country’s post-1945 security culture as well as its security and defense policy. These experiences had a particularly dynamic impact on German foreign policy in the period from 1945–1998.

The immediate priorities of West German policy-makers in the aftermath of World War II were security and reconciliation. The security goal was satisfied by the Western occupation forces. Once the main concern for safety was assured, the process of advancing Adenauer’s “Westbindung” could begin. This was the name given to West Germany’s strategy of reconciliation with wartime enemies and integration in Western Europe. These goals were seen as critical to the survival of West Germany. Once these priorities were solidified, West German leaders began to address their wish for German reunification.132

In the 1950s, West Germany developed a foreign policy designed to reduce the restraints on the country and increase its political influence. NATO and the European integration movement provided the perfect platform. Helga Haftendorn, professor emeritus of political science and international relations at the Free University Berlin, has described the policies of the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany as follows: “By integrating their interests into those of the greater whole they learned to present their own aims and goals in a manner which Germany’s partners could accept as theirs.”133 West Germany’s foreign policy behavior in the 1950s “involved a constant search for partners and allies, and the strict avoidance of nationale Alleingänge, or national

133 Helga Haftendorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 6.
initiatives, without careful previous consultation.” 134 The multilateral approach with its predictability and continuity became and still is one of the distinct characteristics of German foreign policy.135

After the 1990 reunification, Poland and France were uncomfortable with the presence of a potentially powerful and ambitious sovereign Germany. The Kohl administration addressed these concerns and “promised continuity” and this “meant, above all, a foreign policy working towards freedom and peace and based on the rule of law and the welfare of humanity,” 136 writes Haftendorn. In her view, “Its [Germany’s] foreign policy credo was the antithesis of classic power politics.” 137

In 1996, Gunther Hellmann, professor of political science at the University of Frankfurt am Main, indicated that Germany would probably pursue the “Wider West” strategy. This strategy focused on stability in Central and Eastern Europe. Germany pursued this policy throughout the 1990s, seeking a further “deepening” and “widening” of multilateral institutions.138 This trend seems to have reversed recently as German policy-makers have moved closer to the French-British position. Both London and Paris currently reject any supranational integration in ESDP that would limit their freedom of action.139

Haftendorn describes the European integration policy of the era in which Helmut Kohl served as Chancellor (1982–1998) as follows: “The Federal Republic first accepted its partners’ priorities and then modeled their implementation according to its own

134 Helga Haftendorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945, 6.
136 Haftendorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945, 353.
137 Ibid., 353.
139 Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza, Drei Zylinder für einen neuen Integrationsmotor? Vorrausetzungen und Herausforderungen für eine Britisch-Deutsch-Französische Führungsrolle in der ESDP (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2007), 49, 41.
preferences. It practiced self-assertion through self-restraint.”140 Gebhard Schweigler, a German political scientist, argued in 1996 that “the ‘culture of restraint’ . . . inhibited a wider debate about German national interests much beyond European integration and alliance solidarity.”141 Dealing with the “culture of restraint” was and still is one of the major challenges for the matured trading state.142 Germany is still trying to find the right balance between assertiveness and restraint, between becoming too dominant in international affairs and being too reluctant to accept responsibility.143 This tension and Germany’s aversion to the use of force are the root causes of a substantial gap between the ambitions of German policy-makers—a permanent United Nations Security Council seat, the transformation of the Bundewehr (the federal armed forces), and a more proactive role in world politics—and their actual capabilities.144

Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Germany’s—and Europe’s—security environment changed fundamentally. The former existential, communist threat was gone; and the reunited Germany was suddenly surrounded by partners and allies for the first time in history. Soon it became evident that the newly gained security in Europe could not be taken for granted and that new security challenges on the periphery of Europe and beyond required attention. Although Germany was heavily preoccupied with domestic politics in the aftermath of reunification, the country’s allies and partners called upon Berlin to accept greater responsibilities in meeting new international security challenges. While Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher sent only checks to Germany’s allies during the first Gulf War in 1990–1991, the Constitutional Court ruling in 1994 cleared the path for the employment of German armed forces abroad under the following conditions: a) authorization by the German parliament; b) compliance with

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140 Haftendorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945, 408.
141 Gebhard Schweigler, The Legacy of History and Germany’s Future Role in International Politics (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 1996), 16.
142 Hellmann, Goodbye Bismarck? Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany, 26.
144 Marco Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," SAIS Review 25, no. 2 (Summer 2005), 27–41, 35.
international law; c) use of force for primarily humanitarian reasons;\textsuperscript{145} and d) participation in a multinational coalition. After decades of importing security under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, German security and defense policy shifted to exporting security on the lower end of the Petersberg tasks spectrum.\textsuperscript{146}

B. SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY PRIORITIES AFTER ST. MALO

Britain and France, in December 1998, released the St. Malo declaration, and Germany held the EU presidency during the first six months of 1999. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer took the leading role and used the momentum from St. Malo to bundle together key proposals for a European Security and Defense Policy. The diplomatic advances during the Kosovo conflict and the genesis of ESDP in Cologne in June 1999 made the German EU presidency in the first semester of 1999 a success.\textsuperscript{147} The emergence of ESDP can be considered a milestone in European integration history. ESDP provided the member nations of the European Union with new foreign policy options, and this was especially true for Germany.

With no permanent presence in the UN Security Council and NATO primarily designed for collective defense and non-Article 5 operations in the upper spectrum of the Petersberg tasks, Germany’s options were limited. The ESDP offered the possibility for German politicians to actively participate in the European Union’s decision-making process before presenting a proposal for the employment of German troops to the Bundestag. The ESDP approach of effective multilateralism, with “the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention” to tackle security threats, fits well with German preferences.\textsuperscript{148} This raises an interesting question: With Germany as


\textsuperscript{146} The Petersberg tasks are an integral part of ESDP and include humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

\textsuperscript{147} Wolfram Hilz, \textit{Deutschlands EU-Präsidentschaft 2007 - Integrationspolitische Akzente in schwierigen Zeiten} (Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 2006), 7.

one of the main drivers behind the European integration process, does the country, nevertheless, have a national security and defense policy agenda? If so, to what extent are Germany’s national objectives visible in its ESDP agenda?

1. Threats Identified

Germany’s 2003 Defense Policy Guidelines (DPG) basically identify the same major threats (terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime) as the 2003 ESS. Despite these new security challenges, Germany’s security situation has improved dramatically since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. For the foreseeable future, the German paper concludes, there are no signs that Germany will be threatened by conventional forces. In the White Paper 2006, additional threats are highlighted, such as migration, energy security, epidemics and pandemics, and increasing piracy. Most of these threats are now reflected in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS. The ESS identifies primarily the Middle East, Asia and Africa as the most likely origins of crises and threats.

2. Security Objectives

The German White Paper 2006 identifies a variety of broad interests and security goals in terms similar to those employed in the ESS and the preamble of the Treaty on European Union:

- Preserving justice and freedom, democracy, security and prosperity for the citizens of our country and protecting them from dangers;
- Ensuring the sovereignty and integrity of German territory;
- Preventing regional crises and conflicts that may affect Germany’s security, wherever possible, and helping to control crises;
- Confronting global challenges, above all the threat posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD;

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• Helping to uphold human rights and strengthen the international order on the basis of international law.150

Additionally, the White Paper 2006 highlights a few specific objectives:

• A close and trusting relationship with the United States
• A European area of stability
• A proactive EU neighborhood policy with states of Eastern Europe, southern Caucasus, Central Asia and the Mediterranean region
• A lasting and durable partnership with Russia151

The document also addresses the importance of stability in other regions, such as the Balkans and the Middle East. All of the above mentioned security objectives can be also found in the ESS, although the ESS stresses clearly the solution of the Arab/Israeli conflict as a strategic priority for Europe and the key to tackling other problems in the Middle East. The three overarching strategic objectives as outlined in the ESS are:

• Addressing the threats
• Building security in our neighborhood
• An international order based on effective multilateralism152

Under these broad aims, the ESS defines several specific goals that are mostly reflected in the German White Paper 2006, although sometimes with the main focus on different issues. This short comparison suggests that Germany’s national interests have been reflected in the EU’s objectives. This is a sign of the indivisibility of German and European security.

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151 Ibid.

In contrast, the definition of distinctively German national priorities in security and defense policy is difficult as the current debate about German national interests shows.\textsuperscript{153} Germany’s foreign policy of self-restraint and its preference to work through multilateral institutions since World War II have certainly contributed to the fact that the country now has difficulties in defining its national interests. Christian Hacke, a professor at the Institute for Political Science and Sociology in Bonn, has argued that Berlin needs to ultimately develop a foreign policy strategy with a security and defense component that reflects German interests and simultaneously contributes to stability in the world.\textsuperscript{154} Adding to this challenge, Stefan Fröhlich, a professor of international politics at the university in Erlangen, has observed that German interests get their bearings from security objectives. In his view, in today’s security environment of asymmetrical threats and failing states it has become more difficult to define national priorities and shape the international world order according to one’s own preferences.\textsuperscript{155}

As one of the major industrialized trading powers in the world, Germany depends heavily on the import of raw materials and sources of energy and on the benefits of free trade. These issues are just as central to its national interests as security for its citizens. The challenge for Germany is that it is incapable of pursuing such goals unilaterally. As Helga Haftendorn has pointed out:

Germany has become a big power and is no longer just a consumer, but a producer of international order. However, Germany cannot provide order by itself. Its enlightened self-interest demands that it cooperate with partners and allies, espousing a “never alone” policy and a continuing wariness of solitary courses. There is no central German interest that can be realized without joining force with other states.\textsuperscript{156}


\textsuperscript{154} Hacke, Nationales Interesse als Handlungsmaxime für die Außenpolitik Deutschlands, 3–13, 5.

\textsuperscript{155} Stefan Fröhlich, "Deutsche Außen und Sicherheitspolitik im Rahmen der EU," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 43 (20 October 2008), 15–21, 16.

\textsuperscript{156} Haftendorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945, 412.
Europe’s need for energy security and the dependence of global trade on free sea
routes was further highlighted by the December 2008 Report on the Implementation of
the European Security Strategy. In support of the goals laid out in the ESS, the EU
launched its first maritime ESDP mission to tackle the piracy problem off the Somali
coast. With respect to the EU’s energy dependence, scholars emphasize the need for more
cooperation among EU member states to increase their bargaining power, and suggest
that it is time to rethink Germany’s abandonment of nuclear energy.\textsuperscript{157} There should not
be any major obstacles preventing the formulation of a common energy policy when most
other German security and defense interests, and even values and principles, are already
embedded within the European Union’s policies. With respect to Germany’s economic
interests in the mid 1990s, Schweigler wrote that, “should Germany impinge severely on
the security interests or human rights concerns of its major allies (such as in its politics
towards China or Iran), Germany is more than likely to pull back. Alliance values and
solidarity will count more than commercial gains.”\textsuperscript{158} Although it must be acknowledged
that Germany today is much more self-assertive than the “infant” reunified Germany of
the mid 1990s, the core of Schweigler’s argument remains valid.


Germany’s approach to the use of force within a multinational framework and in
accordance with a UN Security Council authorization is consistent with the EU approach.
The White Paper 2006 and the ESS stress that emerging threats abroad often must be
dealt with by early preventive measures involving a broad range of instruments, before a
crisis can fully develop.\textsuperscript{159} Even Germany is aware that sometimes military action is

\textsuperscript{157} Hilz, Deutschlands EU-Präsidentschaft 2007 - Integrationspolitische Akzente in schwierigen
Zeitgeschichte, no. 43 (2006), 5.

\textsuperscript{158} Schweigler, The Legacy of History and Germany’s Future Role in International Politics, 18.

\textsuperscript{159} A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 8–9. White Paper 2006 - on
required to tackle a security problem abroad before it reaches Europe’s borders.\textsuperscript{160} For this reason Berlin has been transforming the \textit{Bundeswehr} from a Cold War force into a twenty-first century expeditionary force.

The German White Paper 2006 states:

German security policy is based on a comprehensive concept of security; it is forward-looking and multilateral. Security cannot be guaranteed by the efforts of any one nation or by armed forces alone. Instead, it requires an all-encompassing approach that can only be developed in networked security structures and within the context of a comprehensive national and global security philosophy. One of its components is the Federal Government’s overall concept of Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-Conflict Peace Building.\textsuperscript{161}

Like the ESS, the German White Paper 2006 also emphasizes the use of all available instruments—diplomatic, economic, development policy, policing measures, and military—when addressing a threat. Before German soldiers participate in an armed operation, the German government examines “in each individual case what German values and interests require the operational involvement of the \textit{Bundeswehr}.”\textsuperscript{162} The approval of the Bundestag is required before the government can employ German troops abroad. This increases public acceptance of such operations.

The German people have been especially sensitive regarding the use of force by German troops. In the words of Christoph O. Meyer, the author of a recent study on strategic culture in Europe:

German public opinion is very concerned not to cause foreign casualties, be they military or civilian, and thus shies away from all kinds of military missions, which would involve the high end of using force. Interestingly, in German strategic culture, foreign casualties can be as difficult to digest as own casualties since they raise the trauma of guilt and self-induced downfall.\textsuperscript{163}

German decision-makers often face the dilemma of respecting those domestic constraints and responding to the call of allies to accept greater responsibilities. This results in compromise policies. For example, German troops have been deployed under certain caveats—often to the dismay of coalition partners. Despite deploying its forces with restrictions in some operations, Germany has come a long way from the first NATO peacekeeping missions in the 1990s to participating in several operations in 2009 involving 7,400 servicemen.\textsuperscript{164} It remains unclear to what extent German domestic constraints have had an impact on the EU’s objective to enhance the EU’s overall military capability.

Aside from caveats, Germany’s ability to provide desired military capabilities in support of EU objectives is also constrained by another factor. For historical reasons, and with strong support from the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Federal Republic of Germany has retained conscription.\textsuperscript{165} According to Paul Belkin,

> critics call for a voluntary, fully professional force, arguing that the [operational] constraints placed on conscripts—they can only be deployed abroad on a volunteer basis—lead to significant operational deficiencies in the armed services. While conscription is suited for defense of national territory, they argue, it impedes Germany’s ability to meet its peacekeeping and stabilization obligations abroad by wasting scarce financial resources to fulfill outdated security goals.\textsuperscript{166}

These disadvantages constrain the \textit{Bundeswehr} from becoming more capable, flexible and mobile, as requested by the ESS.

Despite Germany’s commitment to carry European integration forward, the relatively small defense budget of the \textit{Bundeswehr} (in relation to Germany’s GDP) slows down the transformation process of the German armed forces. This in turn could have a negative impact on the country’s contribution to the enhancement of the EU’s military

\textsuperscript{164}\url{http://www.bundeswehr.de/} (accessed 15 March 2009).
\textsuperscript{165}\url{http://www.welt.de/politik/article1206712/CSU_will_Wehrdienst_bei_Polizei_und_Feuerwehr.html} (accessed 11 October 2009).
\textsuperscript{166} Paul Belkin, \textit{German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications}, 16.
capability. Since the beginning of the new millennium, German defense spending has averaged around 1.4 percent of the country’s GDP. With defense spending of 1.3 percent of GDP in 2007, the German investment is 0.4 percent below the EU’s average (see Table 3).

Table 3. Defense Expenditure in Relation to GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007 (2004) Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP</td>
<td>1.69 (1.51)</td>
<td>2.49 (2.3)</td>
<td>2.34 (2.5)</td>
<td>1.28 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 GDP per Capita in US$</td>
<td>33,400</td>
<td>36,500</td>
<td>33,300</td>
<td>34,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Author’s compilation.167

According to Belkin, “Observers generally commend Germany’s stated intention to transform its military to meet EU, NATO and UN commitments, but point to substantial gaps between stated goals and actions taken.”168 Although public opinion about the Bundeswehr is positive, policy-makers cannot justify an increase in defense spending during times of welfare state and pension system reforms, and economic downturns.169 According to a survey conducted by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Science, in the years from 1998 to 2008 an average of 27.4 percent of German citizens supported an increase in the Bundeswehr budget, while 21 percent opposed any budget increase and 51.6 percent wanted to maintain the defense expenditure at the then-current level.170 The same survey reported relatively strong support for the Bundeswehr’s main overseas operations (see Table 4).


168 Belkin, German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications, 15.

169 Between 1998 and 2008 an average of 82.7% answered to the question, “What is your personal attitude towards the Bundeswehr?” with “very positive,” “positive” and “rather positive.” Thomas Bulmahn, Bevölkerungsumfrage: Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsklima in Deutschland. (Strausberg: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institute der Bundeswehr, 14 November 2008). 19.

170 Ibid., 35.
Table 4. Approval Rates for Bundeswehr Overseas Mission 2005 to 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping troops under UN mandate in Afghanistan (ISAF)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO peacekeeping troops in Kosovo (KFOR)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU peacekeeping troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thomas Buhlmann, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institute der Bundeswehr.\(^{171}\)

Note: The question asked for the survey was: “Please, tell me whether you approve or disapprove the Bundeswehr’s participation on the following missions.” The values (in percent) displayed here are the sum of the votes responding to the question with “totally agree,” “predominantly agree” and “rather agree.”

In contrast, other sources paint a different picture when it comes to approval rates for German military participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The magazine *Stern* reported in July 2009 that 61 percent (59 percent in 2008) of the German people want the *Bundeswehr* to leave Afghanistan. According to the 3 July 2009 *Focus*, 55 percent (52 percent in 2008) did not approve of the *Bundeswehr* mission in Afghanistan. Although the approval rates for *Bundeswehr* participation in the ISAF mission show a significant discrepancy depending on the source, the bottom line is that a majority of German citizens do not want to spend more money on defense, despite the increasing pressure on German policy-makers by the country’s allies.

It is noteworthy that most German troops deployed abroad participate in operations outside the ESDP framework such as KFOR and ISAF, under NATO’s lead, or UNIFIL, a UN mission (see Table 5).\(^{172}\) Despite UNFIL, where German naval vessels have enforced an arms embargo, Marco Overhaus, a research fellow at the German

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Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, notes that “the German priority is still clearly placed on peacekeeping and peacemaking (post-conflict reconstruction) missions,” such as KFOR and ISAF.\footnote{Marco Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," Abstract. SAIS Review 25, no. 2 (2005), 27–41, 35.}

Table 5. Military Personnel Participating in Selected Operations under UN, NATO and EU Auspices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leading Organization</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN:</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO:</td>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>3,238</td>
<td>3,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>2,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU:</td>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUFOR Tchad/RCA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,655</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUNAFOR Atalanta</td>
<td>(see note 1)</td>
<td>200*</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: 1) The operation EUNAFOR Atalanta is led by a British Commander from the Operational Headquarters in Northwoods/United Kingdom. Exact number of British military personnel involved in the operation is unknown. * estimated number.

Although in smaller numbers than those provided by some other EU nations, Germany has contributed troops to all six military ESDP missions so far, including EUFOR RD Congo, which was under the lead of German General Karl-Heinz Viereck and headquartered in Potsdam. An analysis of the data in Table 6 shows, on the one hand, Germany’s general willingness to contribute troops to military ESDP operations. On the other hand, German troops were deployed in a relatively safe environment in both Congo missions while mainly French troops played the chief part. Although Germany’s lack of
national interest in Central Africa limited its role in the operations, certainly concerns about the use of force and German casualties helped to shape its deployment policy.

Table 6. Military ESDP Operations and German Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>German contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARTEMIS RD Congo</td>
<td>Stabilization of security and improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia.</td>
<td>Strategic Lift via C-160 and MEDEVAC Airbus in alert.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCORDIA Macedonia</td>
<td>Provide security for international observers in Macedonia (FYROM). Total troops: 350</td>
<td>40 German soldiers on the ground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>Stabilizing of security in Bosnia Herzegovina. Total troops 2500</td>
<td>235 German soldiers on the ground (in 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>since 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>Support MONUC in stabilizing the country. Total troops: 2300</td>
<td>100 German soldiers in Kinshasa. 680 standing by in Gabon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Tchad/RCA</td>
<td>Contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons.</td>
<td>4 (assumed to be observers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU NAFOR Atlanta</td>
<td>To contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.</td>
<td>German naval vessels with 230 German military personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Author’s compilation from official EU and Bundeswehr websites.

Berlin has seconded civilian personnel to 11 out of the 13 civilian ESDP missions. The overall size of Germany’s civilian contributions to ESDP operations has in general been small (that is, from two to 180 personnel) in accordance with the limited magnitude of these operations (from ten to 1,800 personnel from EU nations). In 2008, the largest civilian EU mission was launched. The EULEX police mission in Kosovo consists of about 1,800 EU experts, including judges, public prosecutors, and police and customs officers. Germany contributes about 180 officials.
4. Contemporary Politics

Certain decisions by policy-makers in the German government provide evidence of their views regarding national interests. In 1998, Gerhard Schröder became chancellor and Germany soon assumed a more self-assertive role in world politics. The new government obviously sought closer cooperation with Moscow, as with the Russian-German gas pipeline project through the Baltic Sea. This project has certainly had an economic motivation, but at the same time it is related to energy security. In 2003, Schröder sided with French President Jacques Chirac and some other European heads of government, and together they refused to provide troops to support the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Besides the well known domestic policy rationale, the main rationale for the chancellor not to send the Bundeswehr was simply that German troops were not allowed to participate in what he considered an aggressive war. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the Bundestag would have approved a proposal to send German troops to participate in combat operations in Iraq.

When Angela Merkel came to office in 2005, one of her highest priorities was to revive the traditionally good U.S.-German relationship. The Merkel government has also sought to shape EU policy and offer leadership with a strategic purpose in mind—the European Union’s self-assertion.175 Chancellor Merkel successfully averted the creation of a Mediterranean Union excluding northern European EU members by mobilizing other non-Mediterranean EU member states. When the Russia-Georgia crisis broke out in 2008, she carried through a diplomacy that prevented the imposition of harsh sanctions on Russia.176 Stability in Central and Eastern Europe as well as good relations with Russia are in the interest of Germany and the EU. According to the 2006 White Paper, “Without Russia, security, stability, integration, and prosperity in Europe cannot be

176 Ibid., 7.
guaranteed.” Germany also participates in the “P5 plus 1” negotiations with Iran. This elevates Berlin’s status by sending the indirect message that Britain and France alone cannot represent the EU’s interests.

The German position with respect to Atlanticist Britain and Europeanist France has usually been a pivotal one somewhere in between, depending on the issue. Since Germany assumed a more proactive international role beginning in the 1990s, German-American relations have been shifting “from a relationship based on the acceptance of American leadership towards one of a collaboration among equal partners.” Regarding the NATO-EU relationship, Germany has always favored close ties with NATO and the current German administration has emphasized the importance of the Alliance for Europe’s security in the 2006 White Paper. Simultaneously, Berlin wants to strengthen the European Union’s security capabilities through cooperation among Europeans—especially the civilian instruments of crisis management—without jeopardizing the trans-Atlantic alliance.

Traditionally, the EU member states have had high expectations when Germany has held the EU presidency. As one of the main drivers behind the integration process, Berlin is usually expected to build compromises, find solutions and launch new initiatives. Important achievements of the German EU presidency in 2007 include:

- The adoption of a Central Asia strategy with the focus on security, environment and energy cooperation, as well as the promotion of rule of law, democracy, and human rights;

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177 White Paper 2006 - on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 47.

178 The “P5 plus 1” consist of the five countries holding permanent UN Security Council seats and Germany. The negotiations deal with the Iranian nuclear program.

179 Hellmann, Fordernder Multilateralismus, 7–7, 7.


183 Hilz, Deutschlands EU-Präsidentschaft 2007 - Integrationspolitische Akzente in schwierigen Zeiten, 29, 8.
C. ANALYSIS

Germany’s security and defense policy priorities are almost entirely reflected in the ESS. What factors may explain this similarity in priorities?

1. Threats Identified

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union the EU has ruled out the possibility of large-scale aggression against one of its member states. Instead the European Union of the post-Cold War era faces a new set of threats “which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.”185 The terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, the Iranian nuclear program and failing states in Africa lead to further convergence of European threat perceptions. With Germany at the heart of Europe, its security is indivisibly linked to the EU’s security and vice versa.

2. Security Objectives

Germany’s security objectives are similar to those of the EU as a whole. Berlin certainly has security preferences. These preferences include stability in Central and Eastern Europe, good relations with Russia, free trade routes, and reliable energy

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supplies. However, those are goals of the EU as a whole. When other European Union countries have unique interests such as those of Greece in the Aegean Sea and France in Djibouti, why does Germany lack exclusively national interests?

According to Hans-Peter Schwarz, a German historian and political scientist well known for his biography of Adenauer, the reunified Germany is a postmodern nation, “purged of the most virulent characteristics of nineteenth and early twentieth-century nationalism: cultivation of historical myths and old hatreds, folk ideology, a tribal mentality, and religious intolerance.” In his view, “this reunified Germany bases its idea of nationhood primarily on popular sovereignty and a sense of shared history, language, and culture.”186 Throughout the Cold War the Federal Republic of Germany developed a culture of restraint regarding the threat or use of force. In 1990, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, inter alia, settled the Oder-Neisse line as the final border between Germany and Poland, preventing any future discussion about the boundaries of German territory. After the reunification the Kohl government changed Article 23 of the German Basic Law and thereby expressed Germany’s commitment to the development of the EU and the realization of a united Europe.187 This was a symbolic act undertaken in the light of German aggression twice in the first half of the twentieth century, and intended to “limit its [Germany’s] own autonomy and to function as a unit of the EU.”188 Schwarz cites an advisor of Helmut Kohl: “The Staatsträson [raison d'État] of a united Germany is its integration in Europe.” Schwarz concludes, “by this step the

186 Hans-Peter Schwarz and Deborah Lucas Schneider, "Germany's National and European Interests," Daedalus 123, no. 2, Europe through a Glass Darkly (Spring 1994), 81–105, 103.

187 In the 1949 Basic Law, Article 23 was called the Beitrittsartikel, that is the article of accession. The original Article 23 read as follows: For now, this Basic Law is legal in the territory of the federal states of Baden, Bayern, Bremen, Groß-Berlin, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern. It shall become legal in other German territories following their accession. After Germany’s reunification in 1990 this wording in the article was deleted, and in 1992 the Kohl administration introduced new language in Article 23 recognizing Germany’s role in Europe. Today, Article 23 of the Basic Law reads as follows: “With a view to establishing a united Europe the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union, which is committed to democratic, rule-of-law, social and federal principles as well as the principle of subsidiarity, and ensures protection of basic rights comparable in substance to that afforded by this Basic Law.” Translation of the 1949 Article 23 by the author based on the following source: http://www.chronikderwende.de/lexikon/glossar/glossar.jsp/key=art23.html (accessed 14 October 2009). Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, January 2007), 24.

188 Schwarz, "Germany's National and European Interests," 81–105, 84.
virtual equation of German and European interests . . . was anchored in the constitution.”189 This discussion goes to the roots in explaining why Germany is short of distinctively national interests.


Germany’s preference to employ all available civilian crisis management instruments before using force is reflected in the ESS. One of the policy implications of the ESS is the requirement for more capable forces and more resources for defense. Here German national interests become visible in the sense that the goals of the EU member states expressed in the ESS are inconsistent with policy-makers’ actions. Relatively low defense spending and armed forces based on conscription are not consistent with the goal of a capable and flexible expeditionary Bundeswehr. The budgetary constraints on the Ministry of Defense are unlikely to be relaxed due to the government’s spending priorities in other policy domains. Moreover, conscription is still broadly supported, despite increasing criticism.

The White Paper 2006 emphasizes that Germany “safeguards its security interests primarily in international and supranational institutions and plays an active role in shaping their policies.”190 In a complementary observation, Hacke points out that Germany, with its geographical position, depends on functioning multilateral structures.191 In the end, is the preservation of effective multilateral institutions Germany’s genuine national interest? One incentive for the European integration movement has always been to contain German might. Germans, out of a possible sentiment of guilt, agreed. By intertwining German power in a multidimensional net (political, economic, and military) with other European countries, German policy-makers wanted to rule out any further aggression towards their country’s neighbors. For this

189 Schwarz, "Germany's National and European Interests," 84–85.
191 Hacke, Nationales Interesse als Handlungsmaxime für die Außenpolitik Deutschlands, 3–13, 4.
reason and many others, Germany’s interest is to keep European, Euro-Atlantic and
global international institutions strong and the member states committed to working
through them, instead of pursuing exclusively national objectives.

4. Contemporary Politics

Two central interests of German security and defense policy are also vital for the
EU’s security as well: stability in Central and Eastern Europe with good relations with
Russia as a core element, and a strong and committed transatlantic relationship. The
European Security Strategy takes these objectives into account because the EU as a
whole has recognized that stability in the East and maintaining the alliance with the
United States are important for the EU’s security. The Russian-Georgian crisis in 2008
may have convinced the last skeptics in the EU.

Additionally, Germany became more self-assertive during the last decade—an
attitude which was projected to the EU level. Chancellor Schröder’s “no” during the Iraq
crisis in 2003, the desire for a permanent UN Security Council seat, the participation in
the Iran negotiations along with the five permanent UN Security Council members, and
the call for a more balanced partnership with the United States, typify Berlin’s matured
self-assertiveness. Germany’s participation in most of the 22 ESDP missions underlines
the country’s willingness and capability—although limited—to take responsibility in
international security issues.

D. CONCLUSION

Germany’s interests are to a great extent reflected in ESDP because the EU’s
security and Germany’s security are indivisible. One EU member cannot be insecure
without the others being insecure. German national interests beyond the desire for peace
and stability have been washed away by history. Instead, the European integration project
has become a genuine priority as grounded in the revision of the German Basic Law after
reunification in 1990. Intertwining the European states economically, politically and
militarily has meant the end of the era of violent rivalry in Europe. Understandably,
Germany has significant influence in ESDP.
Germany has the biggest economy, the second largest military, and significant political weight in the EU, providing for a good amount of bargaining power in ESDP decision-making bodies. This is highlighted by the fact that Britain, France, and Germany occasionally pre-negotiate initiatives before they are discussed at the EU level. Britain and France, with their colonial backgrounds, military capabilities and lower thresholds when it comes to the use of force, do not necessarily represent the views of all EU member states. In the trilateral discussions, Germany serves as a representative of EU member states that are less willing to send troops abroad. The pre-negotiated proposal thus becomes more balanced and is more likely to be adopted by the EU member states. If this trilateral cooperation were institutionalized, London, Paris, and Berlin could provide effective leadership for ESDP.

Although the rhetoric of German policy-makers suggests that they are committed to the goals set out in the ESS, their action falls short of the expectations created by some policy statements. Primarily due to domestic constraints, the government cannot support Germany’s political, diplomatic and economic weight in international affairs with a corresponding military weight. While the ESS has called for more capable forces and increased defense budgets, Germany has retained conscription and has remained reluctant to increase the defense budget significantly. In other words, although Germany’s security and defense agenda parallels that of the EU, the implementation of the changes required to fully support the ESS has been limited by national politics.

Finally, there is no security and defense policy agenda that Germany pursues on a unilateral basis. In addition to constitutional restrictions on military operations, there are at least two reasons that explain this outcome. First, from a historical perspective the Federal Republic of Germany is known for its restrained foreign policy. With only limited sovereignty throughout the Cold War, the country worked skillfully through international institutions and thereby achieved its desired goals indirectly. To a great extent Germany has been the epitome of multilateral policy-making, although Berlin

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became much more self-assertive when Gerhard Schröder served as chancellor between 1998 and 2005. Second, in the post 9/11 security environment, “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own,” as emphasized in the ESS. This circumstance—combined with Germany’s domestic conditions (the pacifist attitude of the German people and constitutional requirements for troop deployments within a multinational coalition)—means that there are no incentives left for policy-makers to pursue a unilateral security and defense policy.

V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

A. ANALYSIS

Since its emergence following the historic December 1998 British-French St. Malo declaration, the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy has evolved. Individual EU member states often have formed small “coalitions” based on common interests before they have launched major initiatives—such as the EU battle groups, the European Defence Agency or the EU Operations Centre—intended to improve ESDP. The key players in that process have often been Britain, France and Germany. Although numerous national priorities of London, Paris and Berlin are reflected in the ESS, some distinct national priorities remain. What follows is an analysis of commonalities and differences among British, French and German security preferences. What national interests are reflected in ESDP and which national priorities cannot be reconciled with the EU’s agenda?

1. Threats Identified

The threat assessments of London, Paris, and Berlin show a broad consensus regarding the major security threats to their countries and the European Union. As already outlined in the 2003 ESS, terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime remain the major concerns of Britain, France, and Germany in their recently published security documents. Frequently mentioned are also migration, competition for energy, epidemics and pandemics, climate change, poverty and globalization as factors with implications for global security. All three countries also rule out a large-scale conventional attack by individual countries or a coalition directed against their country or the European Union in the foreseeable future. Despite this wide agreement on the key threats, at least one major example must be highlighted where the emphasis of the British NSS, the French *Livre Blanc* and the German White Paper are at variance.
While the NSS notes only briefly the power politics of Russia and China as they use energy supply as a foreign policy tool, the *Livre Blanc* addresses Moscow’s return to *Realpolitik* more frankly. Paris expresses openly its concerns about Russia’s attempts to restore its status as a major power via increased military spending and other measures. With Russia playing a traditional key role in European security, Russia-EU relations are addressed in the 2003 ESS and the December 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS. But the view expressed in the ESS is much more moderate as it takes the more cautious stance of countries such as Germany into account. The German White Paper makes no reference to Russia in its threat assessment but rather emphasizes the need for lasting security cooperation with Russia. This can be, in part, explained by Germany’s foreign policy culture of restraint and its determination not to alienate or antagonize other countries but also by its more exposed geopolitical position compared to Britain and France.

The bottom line, however, is that the general threat perception of Britain, France and Germany is quite similar; and this provides an essential foundation for further integration in ESDP. According to Andrew Shearer, former Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Australia: “Shared perceptions of external risks are fundamental to the development of group identities and of political and security communities.”\(^{195}\) While a shared threat perception certainly helps to formulate European Union security policies, the individual security priorities of London, Paris, and Berlin become more obvious once the countries’ security objectives are compared.

2. **Security Objectives**

In addition to defending their common values, territorial defense and the protection of their citizens are the paramount common goals of Britain, France and Germany. But, unlike Germany with its coherent territory at the heart of *Mitteleuropa*, Britain and France still have continuing security responsibilities in numerous overseas territories due to their colonial legacies. Germany was deprived of its overseas colonies

as a consequence of the outcome of World War I.\textsuperscript{196} This discrepancy between Germany on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other has had important implications. First, throughout the Cold War and to the present day the British and French armed forces have had a global presence requiring expeditionary capabilities, whereas Germany began the transformation of the \textit{Bundeswehr} with a view to power projection only in the 1990s. Until then the \textit{Bundeswehr} was almost exclusively trained and equipped for territorial defense. Second, in part due to their overseas territories but also due to security arrangements with certain former colonies, London and Paris developed a security culture distinct from that of Berlin with regard to military intervention and the use of force. In the end, the British and French continuing overseas commitments provide a comprehensible rationale explaining the countries’ emphasis on freedom of action and the capacity to act independently. These will remain national priorities for the foreseeable future as they are not reflected in the ESS. It is unlikely that the two countries would agree on any EU integration steps that could undermine their freedom of action.

In contrast, the German position is the opposite due to constitutional requirements, limited capabilities and the belief in multilateralism. As the German armed forces will be deployed only in multilateral frameworks (e.g., NATO, the UN, and the EU), Berlin has no desire to retain a capacity to act independently in this regard. Despite the fact already pointed out earlier by Helga Haftendorn that “[t]here is no central German interest that can be realized without joining forces with other states,” German foreign policy is geared towards multilateral institutions.\textsuperscript{197} NATO and the EU have not only provided security for their member nations, but Germany has successfully promoted its interests through these institutions. Keeping European, Euro-Atlantic and global international institutions strong and the member states committed to working through them is a genuine German security objective which is reflected in the emphasis on effective multilateralism in the ESS. Functional multilateral institutions are a supreme

\textsuperscript{196} The Treaty of Versailles assigned Germany’s colonies to Belgium, France, Japan, Portugal, the Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom (and the British Dominions of Australia and New Zealand).

\textsuperscript{197} Helga Haftendorn, \textit{Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945} (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 412.
German priority qualitatively distinct from the British and the French declared commitment to multilateralism as both countries keep a backdoor open by maintaining their independent capacity to act whenever their national interest is at stake. Finally, Germany’s security is inseparably linked to the EU’s security with apparently no security objectives left that the country pursues unilaterally.

Stability in Central and Eastern Europe has been a major security objective of London, Paris and Berlin, but Britain and Germany supported the EU’s enlargement to improve stability in this region in 2004 and 2007 more actively than France did. Germany’s geostrategic position has in particular improved dramatically owing to the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and other neighbors. France in contrast has been concerned about its diminishing power in the EU as the center of gravity has shifted eastward. In the view of France, in the future the accession of new members (e.g., Balkan states) must be guided by the EU’s capacity to absorb new countries in order to maintain the EU’s ability to act efficiently. Additionally, Paris emphasizes the need for a more balanced approach regarding the EU’s neighborhood policies towards the Union’s eastern neighbors and the southern Mediterranean countries.

In addition to Central and Eastern Europe, other regions identified by London, Paris, and Berlin as crucial for European and global security include Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans and Russia, the Middle East, and parts of Asia. The importance of all of these regions is recognized in the ESS. Within these parts of the world, London has narrowed its focus down to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Darfur, and Iraq due to limited resources.

France’s strategic shift in emphasis from Africa to the Middle East is remarkable. The country intends to renegotiate longstanding security arrangements with certain African countries and to cut down the number of its military bases on the African continent. Additionally, the French permanent military presence in Abu Dhabi since May 2009 does not necessarily conflict with EU policies but the bilateral character of those arrangements underlines how France pursues its national interests in the Gulf region. Preventing a major crisis in Asia that could possibly involve China, India and Pakistan is a concern explicitly outlined in the Livre Blanc, without being echoed in the ESS.
Two common security-related objectives of Britain, France and Germany that have become increasingly important over the last decade are energy security and the safety of sea routes ensuring global trade. These issues were not only raised in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS; the EU has also taken concrete measures. With British, French and German participation the EU has launched an anti-piracy mission named ATALANTA off the coast of Somalia to improve maritime security in this area.

3. **Strategies and Concepts of Operation**

Britain, France and Germany agree on a broad definition of security that recognizes the interconnectedness between external and internal security. In line with the ESS, the three countries acknowledge the value of an integrated approach involving diplomatic, economic, financial, developmental and military measures, as the first choice for dealing with today’s security challenges. Using those instruments in a preventive manner to tackle an emerging crisis early on before it becomes fully developed goes not only to the heart of the British, French and Germany strategies, but also to the heart of the ESS.

At first glance, the above mentioned commonalities as declared in the countries’ respective security documents are striking. However, London, Paris and Berlin have used the available instruments (diplomatic, economic, developmental and military) with diverging emphases. As pointed out earlier, since World War II, Britain and France have sustained a long tradition of military interventions involving the use of force, whereas Germany practiced checkbook diplomacy for decades before it began to send the Bundeswehr abroad in the 1990s. On the other hand, British Official Development Assistance (ODA) between the mid-1970s and 1999 was substantially lower than contributions of France and Germany (see Figure 1).\(^{198}\) While the ODA of London, Paris

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\(^{198}\) “Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including states and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests: i) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and ii) it is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 percent.” Official website of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/ (accessed 7 October 2009).
and Berlin increased sharply after 2001 and the amounts spent are now quite similar, an analysis of the ODA recipient regions shows significant differences in spending priorities. In 2002, France spent half of its bilateral ODA in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 17 percent in the Middle East and Northern Africa. Britain has followed a similar pattern in that its spending priorities appear to be guided by its ties with former colonies: 35 percent of London’s bilateral ODA was spent in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 18 percent in South and Central Asia with India being the single largest recipient of ODA. In contrast, Germany has spread its bilateral ODA almost evenly throughout the regions of the world requiring development assistance. The bottom line is that, despite a consensus among Britain, France and Germany regarding the utility of an integrated approach to crisis management employing civilian and military instruments, each country has its own unique preferences for certain instruments and how to use them.

Different institutional preferences in response to today’s threats exemplify further national distinctions despite Britain’s, France’s and Germany’s declared commitment to multilateralism and the importance of international institutions. Effective multilateralism is one of the key concepts expressed in the ESS, and it has been acknowledged by all three states. Nevertheless, according to Emil J. Kirchner’s study published in 2007, NATO is Britain’s first choice to tackle an emerging crisis, followed by the UN and the EU. In contrast, France and Germany clearly prioritize the EU followed by NATO, the UN and the OSCE. Where necessary, London favors also a bilateral coalition with the United States. Together with France, Britain does not rule out unilateral troop

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deployment where the country’s interests are at stake—an action which is not even an option in Berlin. In fact (as discussed earlier), Germany discourages pursuing national interests unilaterally as the country seeks to keep its partners committed to working through multilateral institutions where Berlin can exercise its influence.

Germany’s quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council reflects the country’s ambition to take more responsibility in world affairs. A reform of the UN is supported by the EU as a whole, and it can be assumed that a third European voice in the UN Security Council would be in the broader interest of all EU member states. The current “P5 plus 1” negotiations with Iran serve as an example of Germany’s elevated role and demonstrate the fact that the voices of Britain and France alone are insufficient to speak for the entire EU. As Britain and France are reluctant to give up their national sovereignty by representing the EU’s position in the UN Security Council both countries strongly support a reform of the UN Security Council which underlines the British and French commitment to the UN. In the view of London and Paris, the UN Security Council needs to become a more representative, ambitious and effective body. To this end both countries actively support a permanent German presence in the UN Security Council.201

Due to radically different historical experiences, Britain, France, and Germany do not share the same view regarding the use of force. A consensus in principle among Britain, France, and Germany that the use of force should be a last resort and legitimized by international law, does not translate automatically into an equal willingness to use military force. Within the EU, Britain, and France basically occupy one end of the spectrum as the countries that have demonstrated their willingness to use force repeatedly since World War II, and Germany occupies the opposite end with a deep-rooted reluctance to use military force. Despite this obvious divergence in security culture that will certainly remain for a while, it is important to notice recent trends that point towards a convergence of views in London, Paris, and Berlin. While each German troop

deployment abroad requires the authorization of the Bundestag, German soldiers have participated in numerous multinational operations since the mid-1990s. Some of these missions required the use of military force—e.g., Operation Allied Force in 1999. On the other hand, France has moved closer to the German position regarding the need to ensure the domestic legitimacy of troop deployments. Owing to a 2008 constitutional change the French Parliament has now a greater say when it comes to military operations abroad. Although parliamentary authority is not institutionalized in the same fashion in the United Kingdom, the British can also be expected to be more critical of future military operations outside the framework of existing international institutions after the domestic and international debate in 2003 concerning Iraq.

Another example of the diverging security and defense priorities of Britain, France and Germany has had a direct impact on the EU’s military capabilities: the substantial capability gap between the British and the French armed forces on the one hand and the Bundeswehr on the other. German policymakers cannot overcome domestic policy constraints that would allow them to dedicate more resources to the Bundeswehr in order to live up to the country’s ambitions as declared together with all other EU members in the 2003 ESS. The ESS emphasized the need for increased defense budgets to transform the European militaries into more flexible, mobile forces.\textsuperscript{202} Instead German expenditures for defense have been substantially lower than the investments of Britain and France.

While the British and the French armed forces have been the most capable militaries in the EU, with considerable power projection potential, “the quality of the Bundeswehr’s equipment and readiness for major CRO [crisis response operations ‘out of area’] score[d] 0.39 relative to 1.0 for the British forces,” concluded R.K Huber and B. Schmidt drawing on a study on German defense reform conducted in 1999–2000.\textsuperscript{203} According to the authors, only a combination of structural reforms de-emphasizing


conscription and an increase in defense expenditures might improve the Bundeswehr’s capabilities in the long-term. With a continuously declining defense budget since 1990 (see Figure 2), a continuation of conscription, and increasingly expensive procurement projects, the transformation of the Bundeswehr has been a cumbersome process. Personnel for key crisis management capabilities such as strategic air lift and helicopter operations are overstretched and their equipment is out of date. Considering Britain’s ambitions to remain interoperable with the high-tech forces of the United States and France’s proposed defense reform, including funding mechanisms, a comparison with the developments in Germany suggests that increasing the EU’s military capabilities is not high on Berlin’s ESDP agenda.

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Figure 2. Military Expenditures of Britain, France and Germany between 1988 and 2008

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204 Conscription was restructured and the number of conscripts reduced significantly. As of August 2006, 21,600 extended-service conscripts and 37,300 basic-service conscripts served in the Bundeswehr. White Paper 2006 - on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, ed. Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006), 112.
For Britain and France, strengthening the EU’s military arm (e.g., the 2003 battlegroup and EDA initiatives) has been a priority ever since the emergence of ESDP. This priority could be easily reconciled with the necessity for capable national armed forces ensuring the freedom of action of London and Paris. The independent nuclear deterrents that will remain national priorities for the foreseeable future underline further the value that the British and the French place on their sovereign capability to act. Additionally, the nuclear capacities and the permanent seats in the UN Security Council contribute to Britain’s and France’s self-perception as great powers. Although France has offered to participate with interested EU member states in a dialogue about the role of nuclear deterrence in European security, an integration of the French or the British nuclear deterrent in ESDP is presently not likely.

An analysis of British, French and German military contributions within and outside the ESDP framework reveals at least four findings. First, the majority of forces involved in out of area operations are deployed under NATO command and participate mainly in ISAF and KFOR. The fact that the EU’s military operations have been much smaller in scope and less ambitious than the operations of the transatlantic Alliance should be no surprise as the maturing ESDP has emphasized the integrated civil-military approach in crisis management.

Second, Britain’s participation in military ESDP missions has been limited due to its preoccupation with Iraq and its institutional preference to work through NATO in response to crises. With its focus elsewhere, it must be concluded that London has not yet pursued the full potential of the ESDP.

Third, Germany appears to have minimized the risk for its soldiers involved in the two RD Congo missions—probably the two “hottest” ESDP missions with German participation (see Table 6 in Chapter IV). French troops were the key players in both Congo operations, while Germany’s role was limited to strategic lift in 2003, and to one hundred troops in Kinshasa as well as a significant reserve force in neighboring Gabon (a

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comparatively stable and secure country) three years later. Berlin’s enthusiasm for the EU’s military operations in RD Congo and Chad following French initiatives has been primarily limited by a lack of direct national interest in these countries and indeed this region.

Fourth, France has played the dominant role in the EU’s military operations. Paris is not only one of the major initiators of military ESDP missions but France has also offered repeatedly leadership and contributed considerable numbers of troops. The regional focus of the EU’s military operations on Africa is also remarkably compatible with long standing French interests and commitments in this continent. In sum, embarking the EU on military operations could be interpreted as a French attempt to raise the EU’s international profile in crisis management and to improve the capabilities of its EU partners while not losing sight of French national interests.

With regard to the civilian aspects of ESDP (operations and institutions) it appears that Germany’s role is slightly elevated in comparison with the contributions by Britain and France. Several achievements in the realm of civilian ESDP during the German EU presidency in 2007 support this claim (see Chapter IV in this thesis). A strong Nordic influence on civilian ESDP helps to explain why a clear leading role by Britain, France, and Germany has not been observed. However, all three countries have seconded civilian personnel to several ESDP missions, and it appears that Britain’s commitment to civilian ESDP operations is more distinct than its support for the EU’s military operations.

4. Contemporary Politics

The relationship between NATO and the EU regarding ESDP has been among the most important and controversial issues in the short history of the latter. The individual links between London, Paris and Berlin on the one side of the Atlantic, and Washington on the other have influenced NATO-EU relations concerning ESDP to a great extent. The importance of effective cooperation between the European Union and the United States

was already highlighted in the 2003 ESS.\(^\text{207}\) At this point in time the French attitude towards Washington was one of suspicion that the United States exerted excessive influence in NATO, Europe and the world. Still promoting a multipolar world order, France’s approach to transatlantic relations has become more pragmatic lately. The country rejoined NATO’s integrated military structure in April 2009 in the expectation of a more balanced partnership between the European allies and the United States, and possibly in the hope of Washington’s blessing for ESDP. Thus, France has shifted its position on a spectrum from an extreme Europeanist position opposing Atlanticist Britain to a position somewhat closer to the center occupied by Germany. To be sure, France is committed as before to the European security and defense project but its attitude towards transatlantic relations has improved dramatically; and this might have also positive implications for ESDP. A positive sum game for France in several aspects, its *rapprochement* with NATO has the potential to improve French standing in the EU in the sense that it might reduce suspicion among some EU member states—especially in Eastern Europe—that Paris intends to undermine the alliance. A better standing in turn improves France’s chances to implement its ESDP agenda and to consolidate its leading role in ESDP vis-à-vis Britain and Germany.

Britain has traditionally been the United States’ closest European ally since World War II. As such, London has used its influence at times to reduce the tension between European capitals and Washington, and to explain ESDP to the U.S. administration. Additionally, an influential British role in ESDP helps Washington to channel U.S. interests in Europe.

Germany, like Britain, has valued the transatlantic relationship for decades. Berlin’s and London’s views are not only expressed in their own security documents but also in the ESS, which highlights the transatlantic relationship as irreplaceable.\(^\text{208}\) Strong transatlantic ties have long been at the heart of German and British foreign policies, and these national priorities have been successfully projected to the EU level.


\(^{208}\) Ibid., 15.
While the British ESDP agenda is compatible with the German agenda in one aspect, Britain’s view parallels in part France’s vision with regard to the need to build up the EU’s military strength. However, the British and the French rationales for enhanced EU military capabilities were quite distinct in the years following the 1998 St. Malo declaration. Britain has sought to strengthen the transatlantic alliance and improve the interoperability of the EU and NATO militaries with the armed forces of the United States. In the view of London, ESDP has been a vehicle to reinforce NATO by increasing the military capabilities of the European allies, since most EU member states are also NATO allies. With this NATO-centric attitude (demonstrated by London’s preference to address emerging crises through the transatlantic alliance), and Britain’s unobtrusive participation in military ESDP operations, it must be concluded that the British are much less committed to ESDP than are France and Germany.

France has promoted enhanced European military capabilities for the sake of an elevated European role in international crisis management and European autonomy in security—the latter to the dismay of Britain and the United States. But even France’s rationale had an external dimension: strengthening NATO’s European arm would eventually weaken Washington’s influence in the alliance and Europe. France’s attitude towards NATO has shifted since 2007, and the conciliatory language used in the 2008 Livre Blanc made this clear.

The bottom line, however, is that improving the military capabilities of the EU, a goal expressed in the ESS, has been high on the British and French ESDP agenda despite diverging rationales for most of the past decade. Germany has also supported enhanced EU capabilities—especially better civilian capacities—through cooperation among European Union members, without jeopardizing the transatlantic alliance.

The April 2003 proposal made by Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg for a standing European Union military headquarters, was heavily opposed by the British, who saw such a body as a duplication of NATO structures. Without British support, the proposal was rejected. Nevertheless, the need for European Union planning capabilities, especially for civilian-military operations, led to the creation of the EU Operations Centre in 2007. In order to accommodate the British and American skeptics, the EU Operations
Centre is not a permanent headquarters but a body that can be activated on demand to plan and conduct autonomous ESDP operations. This intermediate solution must be considered a compromise recognizing French and German interests as well as British interests, although it must be admitted that Paris and Berlin have taken a significant step towards an independent European planning capacity proposed already at the “Pralinengipfel” in 2003. The headquarters issue is also well suited to demonstrate France’s ESDP priority to transform the EU into a more capable actor as opposed to Britain’s national priority not to undermine NATO’s standing in the European security architecture.

In addition to the progress made regarding the EU’s planning capabilities, France has expressed ambitions that would foster European integration in the realm of security and defense. During the French EU presidency in 2008, France advocated the drafting of an updated ESS, but this proposal was rejected—inter alia by Germany. A common European White Paper, as proposed in the 2008 Livre Blanc, appears even less likely at present since all EU member states would have to agree on a broad variety of security questions such as threats, security interests and doctrines regulating the use of force. Despite the lack of collective EU approval so far, these proposals illustrate the French vision of a more ambitious and more capable EU that would play an even greater role in the European security architecture and an increasingly important role in international crisis management. Paris would not hesitate one moment to take the lead if it was mandated by all member states to pilot the EU during that journey.

B. CONCLUSION

Owing, in part, to divergent historical experiences in the twentieth century and before, Britain, France, and Germany have retained distinct national interests. These interests, in combination with the countries’ individual security cultures, have determined British, French and German priorities for the ESDP. Despite numerous commonalities in British, French and German security and defense priorities, certain national preferences persist. Britain’s view often parallels that of France. Both countries have the political, economic and military clout necessary to lead the EU in the ESDP realm, but it appears
that only the country that shares the historical defeat and devastation of World War II with most other continental European countries is fully committed to the European security and defense project: France.

France’s attempts to enhance ESDP through various proposals—sometimes together with Britain (e.g., battlegroups, EDA), and sometimes with Germany (e.g., standing headquarters), as well as France’s initiation of (and participation in) most ESDP operations—justify the conclusion that France plays the predominant role in ESDP vis-à-vis Britain and Germany. In other words, the answer to the question raised at the outset of this study—which country has been the most influential, with the most significant impact on the ESDP?—is clear. This nonetheless has not translated automatically into French leadership, since other EU members have been reluctant to accept any European Union country as the natural leader in security issues and favor the United States still playing an important role in European security. But sooner or later, if the United States’ strategic focus shifts further away from Europe, all EU member states may have to realize that European security requires leadership from within the EU. It remains to be seen what impact the EU president might have once the post has been created following the implementation of the Lisbon treaty. However, the ESDP’s inter-governmental character means that nation states play the key roles—with France at the forefront.

The French commitment to the European defense project is certainly rooted in a desire to bring peace to Europe, but France’s need for glory and for recognition of the special role in the world of French civilization must not be neglected. French leadership in ESDP would allow Paris to pursue French interests on a much larger scale due to the EU’s vast resources in contrast to the limited French resources. Therefore, it can be argued that France’s commitment to ESDP is largely motivated by the French national interest to have a greater say in European and international affairs in the long run.


210 The Irish voted in favor of the Lisbon treaty in October 2009.
One British rationale to participate in ESDP parallels to some extent the French motivation. Britain does not share the Europeanist view of the French because London is committed to its special relationship with the United States and judges that it has helped the United Kingdom to preserve its great power status for decades. In order to maintain its voice and influence in Washington, Britain must have a say in Brussels regarding high politics. The preservation of London’s bridge function between Washington and European capitals continues to be a powerful source of political influence on both sides of the Atlantic elevating the United Kingdom’s status in international affairs—which is, after all, a British national interest.

Because it cannot change the European security architecture in the short term, France pursues a dual track strategy: enhancing ESDP under French guidance as much as possible, while simultaneously retaining the country’s freedom of action in security and defense matters. France, unlike most EU member states, has the resources to maintain its strong balanced armed forces that ensure the country’s capability to act independently while they simultaneously strengthen the EU’s overall capability. Improving French military capabilities is consistent with the EU’s agenda but other French priorities are not easily reconciled with ESDP: the overseas territories, the nuclear deterrent, and French sovereignty regarding the permanent UNSC seat, as well as France’s standing security arrangements in Africa. Those remaining French priorities, together with the national priorities of many other EU member states, are contributing factors that slow down further integration in ESDP. In sum, it must be concluded that France—like Britain—continues to have two security and defense policy agendas: one that is pursued at the national level and another at the EU level. ESDP has only been able to cover policy areas where there has been a consensus among EU member states; unique national priorities and interests are pursued at the individual national level.

The country holding the six-month EU presidency certainly has the advantage of being able to set the ESDP agenda; but it appears that the big three EU member states—especially when acting in concert—are able to push through proposals regardless of which country is holding the EU presidency. Due to the unanimity rule in ESDP decision-making, consensus on the proposed decision itself is still more important than
the status of the agenda setter. The 2003 proposal by Belgium, France, Germany and Luxemburg for a European Union operational headquarters was rejected as well as the 2008 French suggestion to draft an updated ESS. While France held the EU presidency in the latter case, none of the countries in the former case was the EU’s nominal agenda setter at the time.

Contradictions between the British and the French national agendas and the ESDP agenda are unlikely because all EU member countries have a veto power in ESDP decision-making. Furthermore, individual national security priorities lead to the diversion of resources away from the EU’s common security and defense policies. While Britain and France can afford to maintain their freedom of action and simultaneously satisfy the EU’s demands for enhanced military capabilities, most smaller EU member states cannot. With regard to Russia, the Baltic states, for example, have a different threat perception than Britain and France. It remains to be seen whether London and Paris can accept other EU member states’ decisions to maintain their freedom of action concerning for example, territorial defense instead of specializing, pooling and sharing forces to improve the EU’s military capabilities for international crisis management.

Whether Britain and France’s willingness to act unilaterally has declined since the emergence of ESDP is still too early to evaluate in an objective and satisfactory fashion. London and Paris have emphasized recently in their respective security documents the multilateral approach for legitimacy reasons. The high concentration of military ESDP operations in Africa, mostly in response to French advocacy, could be interpreted as a departure from French unilateralism. As an alternative to unilateral action, ESDP offers another multilateral option for Britain and France that might restrict their freedom of action to some extent but gives potential access to the vast resources of the EU; and it increases the legitimacy of a military operation. However, in the end, both countries leave no doubt that they are willing to act unilaterally if their national interest is at stake.

In comparison with the national objectives of Britain and France, Germany’s agenda is exceptional in that there is apparently no national interest Berlin pursues in the realm of security and defense policy unilaterally. ESDP basically covers Germany’s security and defense policy objectives beyond the country’s commitment to NATO and
the UN. That helps to explain why it is such a high priority in Berlin to keep multilateral institutions—including the EU—functional in order to support German interests. Germany’s commitment to the EU (as grounded in the Basic Law’s Article 23), the absence of national interests incompatible with those of the EU as a whole, the country’s political and economic power, and its cautious attitude towards military deployments abroad all make Germany a pivotal player in ESDP. Are Germany’s attributes the ideal preconditions for a leadership position in ESDP? The answer is more yes than no, but the fact is that a single-headed ESDP leadership by Germany is unacceptable to most EU member states for historical reasons—including Britain, France and Poland.

A leading role in ESDP side by side with London and Paris is a realistic option for Berlin and certainly finds broad support among most EU member states. Germany’s distinctive security priorities and attitudes in comparison with those of the British and the French contribute to more balanced positions that are more representative of the EU as a whole. In general, as France seeks to push ESDP forward—especially by enhancing the EU’s military capabilities—Germany advocates the concept of the civilian power Europe.²¹¹ This may be attributed to Germany’s traditional focus on civilian instruments (e.g., diplomacy and development aid), its pattern of troop deployments avoiding high-risk situations, and the country’s reluctance to dedicate more resources to the Bundeswehr.

In other words, Britain and France occupy in many aspects the extreme ends of several spectrums vis-à-vis the other EU member states, whereas Germany takes often a more central or even the opposite position. This position is frequently much closer to the EU median and helps to explain Berlin’s influence in ESDP despite its lack of military might comparable to that of Britain and France. Several key factors in this regard should be noted. (a) Germany—like most other EU member states—has no standing responsibilities in overseas territories and no security arrangements with former colonies. (b) On the Atlanticist-Europeanist spectrum Germany’s position is closer to the center than to the extreme ends occupied by Britain and France. (c) Germany’s armed forces are

²¹¹ Daniela Schwarzer, Deutschland und Frankreich: Nie so nah, und doch so fern? (Berlin: Foundation Robert Schumann, 2008), 34.
a hybrid version seeking the balance between power projection and conscription, whereas the British and the French armed forces are all-professional forces—the mightiest in the EU. (d) Britain and France are much more willing to use military force than Germany is, which Berlin emphasizes civilian crisis management instruments—an approach strongly supported by the neutral and nonaligned EU member states.212 (e) In contrast to Germany and all other EU member states, Britain and France hold permanent seats in the UN Security Council and maintain their nuclear deterrents. These factors, together with Germany’s economic, political and (considerable) military power, help to explain Berlin’s leading role collectively with London and Paris in ESDP.

While leadership in ESDP by a single European country appears unlikely, preeminent roles for Britain, France and Germany are unavoidable for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the three countries provide almost two thirds of the 27 EU member states’ total defense expenditures.213 Whether London, Paris and Berlin can lead the EU in security and defense matters effectively in a concerted effort remains to be seen. Observers of the maturing ESDP must be patient since centuries of frequently antagonistic foreign policies among European nations cannot easily be overcome within a few decades. To be sure, there are signs of convergence in the views of Britain, France and Germany in some respects. Examples include the general consensus on threat perceptions, the more compatible policies toward NATO, the limited progress in the European Union headquarters debate, the conduct of several civilian and military ESDP operations, and last but not least the very existence of the December 2003 European Security Strategy.

As has become clear throughout this thesis, the comparison of Britain’s, France’s and Germany’s security and defense priorities still shows fundamental differences resulting in diverging preferences for ESDP. However, exactly this mixture of distinct

212 Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza, Drei Zylinder für einen neuen Integrationsmotor? Vorraussetzungen und Herausforderungen für eine Britisch-Deutsch-Französische Führungsrolle in der ESVG (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2007), 34.

priorities has shaped inter alia the civilian-military character of ESDP. As a unique security provider the EU has begun to fill a gap in international crisis management. In an era of global security challenges that are profoundly different from the traditional warfare and territorial defense of the past, the pioneering approach of the EU appears to be a reasonable choice to address not only the symptoms but ultimately the root causes of emerging crises on the periphery of Europe and beyond.
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