BATTLE OF WILLS: ACCEPTING STALEMATE IN INTERNAL WARS

by

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December 2009

Thesis Advisor: Heather S. Gregg
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# Battle of Wills: Accepting Stalemate in Internal Wars

**Abstract**

This thesis examines contributing causes of protracted internal conflicts and recommends ways of overcoming the cycle of war that seems to perpetuate in some countries. Through an analysis of three cases of prolonged internal wars, in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Colombia, I test two hypotheses and attempt to gain a better understanding of how internal wars become stagnated, protracted, or stuck in a cycle of conflict that does not seem likely to end. A central government’s proximity to the violence in an internal war and, to a lesser degree, desensitization to violence over the course of decades of conflict both contribute to protraction in some internal wars. Political will and the motivations behind political will become deciding factors in the outcome of internal conflicts. Effectively managing the resolve to end a conflict, enhancing government legitimacy, and proportionately employing all of a government’s resources are necessary conditions for a state to overcome the protracted war problem.

**Subject Terms**

Internal war, Civil War, Insurgency, Revolution, Counterinsurgency, Conflict duration, Stalemate, Conflict resolution, Negotiated settlement, Political will, Philippines, New People’s Army (NPA), Sri Lanka, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

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BATTLE OF WILLS: ACCEPTING STALEMATE IN INTERNAL WARS

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This thesis examines contributing causes of protracted internal conflicts and recommends ways of overcoming the cycle of war that seems to perpetuate in some countries. Through an analysis of three cases of prolonged internal wars, in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Colombia, I test two hypotheses and attempt to gain a better understanding of how internal wars become stagnated, protracted, or stuck in a cycle of conflict that does not seem likely to end. A central government’s proximity to the violence in an internal war and, to a lesser degree, desensitization to violence over the course of decades of conflict, both contribute to protraction in some internal wars. Political will and the motivations behind political will become deciding factors in the outcome of internal conflicts. Effectively managing the resolve to end a conflict, enhancing government legitimacy, and proportionately employing all of a government’s resources are necessary conditions for a state to overcome the protracted war problem.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. STAGNATION AND COSTS OF WAR

Money and other resources are usually running short and his moral impulse is not sufficient for a greater effort. In such a case he does the best he can; he hopes that the outlook will improve although he may have no ground for such hopes. Meanwhile, the war drags slowly on, like a faint and starving man. Thus interaction, the effort to outdo the enemy, the violent and compulsive course of war, all stagnate for lack of real incentive.

Carl von Clausewitz as cited in Darley.¹

Clausewitz’s notion of the interaction in war becoming stagnated for lack of real incentive is one of the underlying themes of this thesis, more specifically, this thesis examines the conditions that affect the belligerents’ incentive or will to fight in war. To take it a step further, I examine contributing causes of protracted internal conflicts and recommend ways of overcoming the cycle of war that seems to perpetuate in some countries. Political will and the motivations behind political will become deciding factors in the outcome of internal wars. Effectively managing the resolve to end a conflict, enhancing government legitimacy, and proportionately employing all of a government’s resources are necessary conditions for a state to overcome the protracted war problem.

Few people have not felt the effects of war in one way or another. The indirect impact of war for the majority of the world’s population is not readily identifiable; however, for many, war and the violence directly associated with it is an unpleasant fact that they can do little about other than to adapt to it and continue living. By some estimates, over 160 million people died because of wars fought in the 20th century.² Increasingly, since the end of the Cold War, interstate wars, or wars between states, are


becoming less and less common, and intrastate wars, or wars within a state, are becoming more prevalent. Numerous internal wars that began several decades ago continue unabated, stuck in a type of war stagnation.

The U.S. decisively won two of the most recent major interstate wars: the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S.’s Second Iraq War, in direct conventional engagements. However, these wars morphed into wars between the new state (bolstered by a U.S.-led coalition) and belligerent non-state actors, becoming predominately internal conflicts with no clear lines of battle, an obscurely defined end-state, and high potential for stagnation—making no significant progress one way or another. The problem then, is to understand how internal wars become stagnated, protracted, or stuck in a cycle of conflict that does not seem likely to end.

The costs of conflict in terms of human loss of life, education, development, and economics is incalculable, but what can be done to reduce the costs, to make the burden of war more bearable or to successfully resolve certain conflicts altogether on more amenable terms than current trends in warfare demonstrate? The search for a better understanding of wars between state and non-state actors, how some of these wars proceed for seemingly indefinite periods, and how the costs associated with this kind of war can be reduced or eliminated on terms that are more realistic is the purpose of this thesis. By gaining a better understanding of internal conflicts and protracted internal conflicts more specifically, and by examining successes and failures in these wars, I have developed some recommendations, which could help those involved in the war (internally or externally) achieve a better outcome than if they continue fighting indefinitely.

B. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is composed of four chapters, with Chapters II and III comprising the bulk of the project. Chapter I establishes the relevance of this study in terms of the costs of internal wars and provides an overview of the thesis in general terms.

3 Piero Scaruffi, “Wars and Genocides of the 20th century.”
Chapter II establishes the thesis question, defines the types of internal wars important for this study, and provides a review of relevant literature used to develop two hypotheses, a central government’s proximity to violence and a gradual desensitization to violence by those involved, which attempt to explain how some internal wars can proceed for indeterminate amounts of time. Chapter II also explains, in detail, the two hypotheses used during the analysis of three cases of prolonged internal war, offers alternative hypotheses for conflict analysis, and provides a brief outline of the case study methodology.

Chapter III consists of three internal war case studies, each providing analysis of the case as it relates to the proposed hypotheses. The duration of each conflict was at least 30 years and has yet to reach a clear outcome. Each case study analyzes the level and location of violence to determine potential relationships to the conflict duration. Lastly, Chapter IV restates the proposed hypotheses, summarizes the results of each case study and if the results support or refute the hypotheses, and outlines recommendations that may help to bring about better outcomes in the sphere of resolving internal conflicts.

C. LIMITATIONS OF THIS THESIS

No two conflicts are the same; parallels can be drawn among wars fought in different times, in different places, and for different reasons, but each case should be understood for what it is and only in a limited context for its similarities to a separate war. I use only three cases in this thesis, which is sufficient for gaining a better understanding of prolonged internal wars, but is not conclusive for the analysis of the hypotheses. Further research in the study of prolonged internal wars could use key findings from the case studies used here to analyze other cases or a larger sample of internal wars. Other studies of internal wars could account for variance in variables such

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4 Outcomes here are defined as winner/loser or negotiated settlement and a third possible outcome of stalemate with continued participation by the opposing sides discussed throughout this thesis. The Sri Lankan Civil War has ostensibly ended by military defeat of the LTTE, but history has shown the resilience and ability of the LTTE to bounce back.
as: type of government, type of insurgency, role of external support to either side, strategies employed, and results of attempted negotiations, to see if some of the same conclusions apply to more internal conflicts.

Too often, war strategists and policymakers think that what worked in one situation will work in a similar situation without understanding the nuances of the specific situation in which they find themselves. The study of historical lessons learned is no doubt useful; however, policy makers and war practitioners should exercise caution when preconceiving solutions for situations outside of its respective context. The reader of this thesis should take the general observations and conclusions outlined here with the understanding of these limitations.

Although the studies of the three cases in this thesis are limited in depth, I attempt to provide as much relevant detail as necessary to understand the context of each conflict and its relationship to the proposed hypotheses. Quantifiable statistics for each of the cases are not uniform and not of the scope preferential for this type of analysis; therefore, I have attempted objective analysis based on the narrative of each conflict when actual data was not available.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF PROLONGED INTERNAL WARS

A. INTERNAL WARS WITHOUT END

*The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.*

Henry Kissinger, as cited in Mack.⁵

War has, for as long as recorded history, existed as a means of resolving differences in the values of divergent groups when the groups cannot otherwise obtain peaceful solutions. In modern times, when nation states engaged in war against other nation states, the conflict usually took a course of large-scale, direct engagements in an attempt to win the war as expeditiously as possible. Though state verses state wars have not always ended quickly, no major interstate wars from the 20th century on have lasted more than 10 years.⁶

When groups within a state engage in war to promote a particular agenda against the state, the group that opposes the state pursues either a more protracted approach than state verses state war or pursues a quick overthrow of the state when conditions exist for the expeditious achievement of counter state goals. Wars within a state, internal wars, revolutions, civil wars, etc., can and often times do last for prolonged periods. A number of scholars (McCormick, Arreguin-Toft, Galula, Mack) have explained how weak adversaries defeat imperial powers in asymmetric wars or how the authority or rebellion achieves victory in an internal conflict; however, the causes of prolonged internal conflicts lasting decades, where neither side defeats the other, requires further analysis.

In this chapter, I examine several theories concerning the outcome of internal wars, propose two hypotheses to explain the conditions under which some internal wars

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⁶ Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century, “Wars of the Twentieth Century,” [http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-list.htm](http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-list.htm) (accessed August 4, 2009). This atlas lists the largest military casualty producing wars of the twentieth century, of which only the First Sudanese Civil War lasted more than ten years. The First Sudanese Civil War falls into the category of internal wars discussed later in this chapter.
proceed indefinitely, and provide an overview of three cases of prolonged internal wars that I use to look for evidence to support my hypotheses.

B. INTERNAL WARS AND EXPECTED OUTCOMES

This study uses a definition of internal war as, “the full range of activities considered to be political violence provided that they challenge the ability of a government to maintain order within its borders.”\(^7\) Internal wars encompass the gamut of armed conflict used to achieve political goals within a given country. With or without external influence and support, these wars can range from revolutionary wars, coup d’états and insurgencies to wars of secession and civil wars. David Galula discusses the duration of insurgencies in *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice*. “It is not like an ordinary war – a ‘continuation of the policy by other means’ – because an insurgency can start long before the insurgent resorts to the use of force,”\(^8\) and can continue as long as the insurgent has a cause and the will to fight for his cause. Galula’s point about the timeline of insurgencies is not necessarily limited to revolutionary forms of insurgency, as separatists movements can also employ insurgent tactics to expand their cause before they resort to force.

Galula classifies two types of insurgency doctrine that a counter-state can employ to achieve its objective vis-à-vis the state. The first strategy, which Galula describes as “The Orthodox Pattern (Communist),” follows Mao Tse-tung’s method of protracted peoples’ war, beginning at the threshold of legality, creating a party and united front, moving through guerrilla warfare, and finally escalating to a mass based war of movement. An insurgent can move fluidly back and forth between phases of Mao’s concept of protracted warfare depending on his ability to expand his mass base or the state’s ability to contain him. When an insurgent adheres strictly to Mao’s protracted warfare ideology, the war is likely to have a long duration due to the insurgent’s ideological foundation, political will, and his ability to dictate the terms of his


engagement against the state. According to Galula, counter-state groups can alternatively apply a different approach to insurgency as a means of rapidly achieving their goals.

Galula’s second strategy, “The Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern: Shortcut,” employs blind terrorism, gaining publicity and latent support for the cause, followed by selective terrorism, destroying the links between the population and the counterinsurgent, and finally mobilizing the population to rapidly seize power from the state.\(^9\) The Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern: Shortcut, as Galula implies with its name, enables the insurgent to achieve a relatively quick victory when compared to Mao’s form of protracted warfare. Although the shortcut strategy can achieve positive results quickly, problems arise during the insurgent’s assumption of power, as he is not likely to possess the capacity or resources needed to control the state adequately. Though Galula does not discuss it in detail in his *Counterinsurgency Warfare* book,\(^10\) a third type of internal war of interest for this study is war of secession.

A war of secession does not intend to overthrow the state; rather, it seeks to create a new state from territory within an existing state. Wars of secession can take on the form of insurgencies as well as traditional conventional warfare or a combination of both. Secessionist movements can end quickly or last for several decades depending on the will, capabilities, and resources of the breakaway group.

No matter what form an internal war takes, under certain conditions many of these wars continue beyond a generation of human life, lasting 30 years or more.\(^11\) Wars lasting beyond 30 years are phenomena that neither the state nor the counter-state would likely accept if one of the sides could have ended it decisively at an earlier point.

In, “Things Fall Apart: the endgame dynamics of internal wars,” Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A. Harrison explore the dynamics of the

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\(^9\) For further discussion of the Orthodox Pattern (Communist) and the Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern: Shortcut see Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 29–42.

\(^10\) David Galula discusses the difference between the form of warfare used in an insurgency and the form of warfare used in civil wars, which he says can take on the form of an ordinary international war. *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 2–3.

\(^11\) Many internal wars, of exceptionally long duration, experience “cease-fire periods” or periods of negotiated settlement that often fail to last, leading to a return to armed conflict.
endgame struggle in internal wars. McCormick et al. focus their research on internal wars in an effort to explain the observed pattern of state and insurgent defeat in internal conflicts, finding that the endgame is different for each side of an internal war. The state typically loses decisively (quickly, when it does lose) and wins by pushing the insurgent below its breakpoint slower and slower over time. The insurgents usually win decisively by pushing the state below its breakpoint at an increasing rate over time (when it does win) and lose gradually over time (when it loses). Simply stated, when a state wins an internal war, it usually takes a long time and occurs at a slow rate due to McCormick’s proposition that as a state attempts to suppress or counter an insurgency, it becomes harder to defeat the smaller it becomes. When an insurgent wins, their overthrow of the state usually happens rapidly, though the time required for the insurgent to reach the point at which they can overthrow the state can be long. The two graphs in Figure 1 demonstrate an example of the rates of decline for (A) the state endgame and (B) the insurgent endgame, as a measure of strength verses time.

![Figure 1. A) State endgame; B) insurgent endgame.](image)

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13 JG Taylor as cited by McCormick on p. 325. Following the standard literature on combat modeling, the breakpoint is the point at which a combatant is no longer combat effective. This occurs when one side either “breaks” or “breaks off the engagement.” (Taylor 1983).

McCormick et al. demonstrate that the data on modern internal wars (post 1945) show that the majority of internal conflicts end on the battlefield with the insurgent losing and a small majority ending in some type of negotiated settlement. The remaining internal wars, over 15 percent of the total observed since 1945, have no clear winners. The authors describe the consequence of an “equilibrium trap” when considering an outcome of a stalemate in an internal war. The term “equilibrium trap” captures the idea of how,

The state is able to suppress the insurgency at a decreasing rate up to a point, but is not able to mobilize the marginal advantage necessary to push it below its breakpoint. The insurgents, for their part, retain sufficient room for maneuver to stay in the game, but are unable to expand their presence given the state’s prevailing level of effectiveness.15

The equilibrium trap term theoretically explains, in terms of a force ratio and level of effectiveness analysis, how an internal war can proceed indefinitely; however, it only accounts for the relative strengths of the state and insurgent and excludes other variables necessary to analyze the stalemate concept. In the conduct of insurgency and counterinsurgency, force ratios and their effectiveness are not the sole decider of conflict outcome, respective strategies also matter and can help explain which side will win or lose the war.

Ivan Arreguin-Toft poses a theory/model of strategic interaction when considering the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts. Arreguin-Toft uses his strategic interaction theory to account for victory and defeat of strong and weak actors in asymmetric conflicts, which include some internal wars with and without external actor support and exclusive state verses state wars. He defines an asymmetric conflict as one in which, “the halved product of one actor’s armed forces and population exceeded the simple product of its adversary’s armed forces and population by 5:1 or more.”16 The strategic interaction model put forth by Arreguin-Toft narrowly defines the strategies available to strong and weak actors as either direct or indirect:


Direct strategic approaches – e.g., conventional attack and defense – target an adversary’s armed forces with the aim of destroying or capturing that adversary’s physical capacity [sic] to fight, thus making will irrelevant… Indirect strategic approaches – e.g., barbarism and guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS) – most often aim to destroy an adversary’s will [sic] to resist, thus making physical capacity irrelevant. Barbarism targets an adversary’s will by murdering, torturing, or incarcerating noncombatants. GWS attacks an adversary’s will by targeting enemy soldiers, though noncombatants may be targets as well.  

Arreguin-Toft argues that when strong and weak actors employ like-minded strategic approaches (direct verses direct or indirect verses indirect) then the strong actor is likely to win. When strong and weak actors employ opposite-minded strategic approaches (direct verses indirect or indirect verses direct) then the weak actor is likely to win. Figure 2 shows a matrix summary of Arreguin-Toft’s strategic interaction thesis.

![Figure 2. Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes, expected winners in cells.](image)

Arreguin-Toft tested his hypothesis using the predictions of his model compared against a large sample of asymmetric conflict outcomes taken from the years 1800-2003;

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17 Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars*, 34.
he found that strong actors won 76.8 percent of all same-approach interactions, and weak actors won 63.6 percent of all opposite-approach interactions.19

While Arreguin-Toft’s model is useful, his thesis has several shortcomings.20 His model discounts the importance of combined or mixed direct and indirect strategies by focusing on absolute direct or indirect strategies.21 His definition of an indirect strategy looks only at destroying an adversary’s will through coercive means without considering the possibility of changing the will of an adversary’s support base, through non-coercive means, thereby inhibiting the adversary’s ability to continue the fight. Lastly, his model does not explain the outcome of a stalemate for wars that fail to reach a decisive conclusion. In an internal war, force ratios and state and counter-state strategic approaches are important in analyzing patterns of victory and defeat; however, each side’s will to sustain the conflict also contributes to the duration of the war.

In considering “asymmetric conflicts” that reach a decisive conclusion, Andrew Mack proposed a hypothesis of a “pre-theoretical perspective” to explain the outcome of asymmetric wars.22 While Mack focuses almost entirely on post World War II “industrial powers which become embroiled in long drawn-out wars in the Third World,”23 his analysis with regard to how and why big nations lose small wars is also useful for the study of strictly internal wars. Mack argues that in asymmetric wars, if the insurgent destroys the will of the external power to continue the fight, then the external power’s military capability is irrelevant. For the insurgent, the war is a total struggle to survive. For the external power, the resources the nation is willing to commit to win, limits the war; its constraints are political, not material. All the insurgent needs to do to


20 Arreguin-Toft, in *How the Weak Win Wars*, describes several alternative hypotheses to his own strategic interaction model and provides a concise review of existing theories relating to asymmetric war outcomes.

21 Arreguin-Toft does analyze strategy shifts during different periods of war, but not the potential of the belligerents using multiple strategies simultaneously, which I would argue limits the potential for this type of analysis.


23 Ibid.
win is, “to impose a steady accumulation of ‘costs’ on their opponents,” or in other words, “to not lose.” As the external power incurs more and more costs, both economic and political, it loses the political capability to continue the fight, thereby delivering success to the insurgent. In the revolutionary case, the idea of political will becomes even more apparent than in the asymmetric case of an industrial power at war in a developing nation; for the actors in internal wars, both sides are in a struggle to survive.

When applying Mack’s argument in the context of an exclusively internal war, the interaction of state and counter-state determination or political will to win changes dramatically. The state does not choose the conditions of a war against the counter-state. If a counter-state challenges a state’s survival, then the state’s will to fight and avoid concessions to the counter-state becomes like the will of an industrial power to maintain a war in a developing country, only with its survival at stake. Both sides have their survival at stake; however, their respective survival is a matter of degree when neither side can mobilize the resources to achieve a clear victory. If both sides do not lose, neither side wins. If neither side wins the war and both sides maintain their political will to fight, then it could be possible for both sides to accept the conflict as a new status quo. It is difficult to measure political will in the context of conflict outcome until the conflict is over, at which point, and in certain contexts, an observer can argue that the prevailing actor possessed more political will than the loser did. Although it is an abstract concept, political will can ultimately be the deciding factor in internal war outcomes.

In *Revolutionary Change*, Chalmers Johnson proposes a theory of social equilibrium, which helps explain another variable important in the study of internal wars. Johnson demonstrates a concept of how disequilibrium within a society can lead to revolution. Johnson argues that when the values of a group or groups in a given social structure fall out of line with the central authority, then one side or the other must change in order to maintain equilibrium in the society. If the differences in the two sides’ respective values become too disparate, then a revolutionary situation may occur forcing a period of conflict until either side wins or the opposing sides reach a compromise.

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If Johnson’s theory of social equilibrium and societal values is correct, then it might be possible for a shift to occur in the social values during a state/counter-state conflict such that all involved come to accept a level of violent social equilibrium or a higher threshold for violence in general. A higher threshold for violence would consequently make it easier to sustain the political will necessary to continue the conflict.

This thesis goes beyond the idea of McCormick’s equilibrium trap, which conceptually explains an outcome of stalemate in an internal war in terms of force ratios and levels of effectiveness, and Arreguin-Toft’s strategic interaction model of asymmetric conflict, which explains how strong and weak actor strategic approaches account for victory or defeat in an asymmetric conflict. In formulating my hypotheses, I draw theoretically from Mack’s study of political will and Johnson’s theory of social equilibrium to focus on two factors, which lead to a stalemate or an acceptance of, what I call, a violent social equilibrium among a state, counter-state, and population.

C. VIOLENT SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM/PROLONGED INTERNAL WAR HYPOTHESES

This thesis proposes two hypotheses for the conditions under which internal wars become prolonged. The first is that a central government’s distance from the violence in an internal war directly affects its will to end the war. The second is that desensitization to violence among the participants in an internal war (a change in values within society), can lead to a violent social equilibrium (stalemate) among a state, counter-state, and the population of the state.

The first part of the hypothesis contends that there is a direct correlation between the proximity of violence to the central government involved in an internal war and the state’s desire to quickly conclude the war. In a classic protracted guerrilla warfare strategy, the insurgent purposefully avoids provoking the central government with large-scale violence until the insurgent leader thinks he can directly defeat the central government’s security forces. As an insurgent group’s attacks come physically closer to the seat of a central government, the more incentive the government has to quell the insurgency. As the number of insurgent attacks increase in proximity to the central
government (i.e., within the capital city), then the government is more likely to divert the resources required to suppress the insurgency to an acceptable state. If insurgent attacks are not in close proximity to the central government (i.e., attacks are more prevalent against rural authorities), then the central government is less likely to pool more resources to suppress the insurgency.

When an insurgency challenges the government’s survival, the government must direct all of its resources to defeat the insurgency or delegitimize the insurgent’s cause, which it might not have done previously. Related to the proximity variable is the government’s ability to function or maintain control of the state. If a rebelling force does not physically threaten the central government’s ability to function, then the incentive for the state to conclude the war diminishes proportionately up to a point. This is not to say that the state will not continue to prosecute the war against a rebelling organization, only that the state may subordinate their war effort to more pressing concerns when the central government is not significantly threatened.

The second part of my hypothesis contends that the longer opposing sides fight in an internal war, the more participants in the war will become desensitized to the violence and more likely to continue the fight indefinitely. As an internal war proceeds over the course of decades, the government and the rebellion begin to accept a life marred by conflict and are less inclined to end the fighting without an acceptable compromise or view fighting as the only means to accomplish respective goals. The perceived costs for the rebelling group to continue fighting become lower over time. Once a rebelling group crosses the line of employing violence against the state, it becomes inherently easier for the rebelling group to continue the use of violence to achieve their goals. The government balances the costs to continue suppressing an insurgency with other priorities of the state up until the point when an insurgent is on the verge of overthrowing the state.

In a protracted war, the insurgent can lull the state into a sense of false security by using a limited amount of violence, making it more acceptable for the state to continue with the status quo. All sides in the conflict still experience the negative effects of the war; however, the participants experience a gradual normalization to the negative effects as the war continues.
In the absence of an acceptable negotiated settlement, the political will necessary to sustain the conflict increases as a function of time for both the state and the counter-state. The state and counter-state accept the war as a new social equilibrium or way of life over a period of decades. The level of violence acceptable to the actors increases steadily throughout the war, reinforcing each sides will to sustain the conflict. Only when the counter-state exceeds the state’s acceptable level of violence will the state divert the resources required to suppress it to a more acceptable level. As long as an internal war continues, then the likelihood that the war will continue indefinitely increases gradually over time unless one side does something to undermine the will of the other. The desensitization to violence variable is also a product of a given country’s pre-conflict history, culture, and other social factors, which ultimately affect the attitude and will of the public to accept the conditions of the war.

D OVERVIEW OF CASE STUDIES AND APPROACH

This thesis uses a case study analysis of three current and prolonged conflicts to test the two proposed hypotheses: the New People’s Army (NPA) in the Philippines, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. The NPA is the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), a communist grounded insurgency that began in 1969 adhering strictly to the Maoist doctrine of protracted people’s war in an attempt to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP).26 The LTTE began in 1976 as a spawn of the Tamil New Tigers, consolidating numerous separatist factions of ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka, seeking the creation of a separate Tamil state through the employment of insurgency, terrorism, and conventional warfare.27 The FARC began in 1964 as the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party seeking to overthrow the Colombian government.28 The FARC is rooted in a Marxist-Leninist


ideology following a similar path of armed struggle as that of the NPA. The case studies will each provide a brief history of the country, previous conflicts, causes of the current conflict, evolution of the current conflict, and an account of location and level of violence throughout the conflict.

In conducting the case study analysis, I attempt to answer the following questions: How does a state come to accept a violent state of social equilibrium with an armed resistance (counter-state)? Why do some internal wars proceed indefinitely and others reach a logical conclusion? Under what conditions is an internal war likely to end or not end? Can a prolonged internal war reach an acceptable conclusion? If so, what are the likely outcomes and how do the participants in these wars achieve these outcomes? What historical, cultural, and sociological factors affect the outcome of internal wars? Do the organizational cultures of the state and counter-state evolve to accept prolonged conflict? How can the US effectively administer aid and assistance to either side of an internal war when US interests are at stake?

This project builds upon the current academic study of conflict settlement, which deals predominately with asymmetric wars, and provides another perspective for students of internal wars to use in analyzing internal wars. Additionally, this project can assist US policy makers in making decisions concerning if and how the US administers foreign aid and assistance in countries faced with prolonged internal wars. The actors involved in internal wars can use this research to assist in altering their respective strategies to obtain results that are more desirable.
III. PROLONGED INTERNAL WAR CASE STUDIES

A. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY

Figure 3. Map of Philippines (From: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency)
Under your concept of my duties as Secretary of National Defense, my job is to just go on killing Huk. But you must realize that we cannot solve the problem of dissidence simply by military measures. It would be futile to go on killing Huk, while the Administration continues to breed dissidence by neglecting the problems of our masses.

—excerpt from Ramon Magsaysay’s letter of resignation from his post as the Philippine’s Secretary of National Defense prior to announcing his candidacy for president in 1951, as cited in Aprey.29

1. Living with Internal War

For much of the 20th century, the Republic of the Philippines has suffered from prolonged periods of armed conflict. In its most recent history, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) has struggled for nearly 40 years to suppress both a communist revolutionary insurgency with influence throughout the country and an Islamic separatist insurgency concentrated in the southern part of the country. The relative strengths (political, economic, and military) of the GRP and their opponents have ebbed and flowed over the course of both insurgencies with no clear winners in either conflict. Although the people of the Philippines have experienced seemingly continuous cycles of armed struggles, their daily lives persist in the midst of internal wars. Armed conflict in the Philippines has achieved a level of systemic embeddedness that is almost taken for granted, but also takes on a life of its own and is grounded in both the deeper structural dynamics of the country’s historical political economy and in the socio-cultural order. This case study traces the history of rebellion in the Philippines to the current threat of the New People’s Army (NPA), the armed branch of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), and attempts to explain how and why the GRP has lived with, fought against, and come to accept the prolonged period of conflict with the NPA, with little or no expectation of completely defeating the NPA at any time in the foreseeable future.

2. Revolutionary History of the Philippines

Western historians credit Spain with discovering the Philippine islands when Ferdinand Magellan landed at Samar and subsequently Cebu in 1521. Magellan, after

proselytizing several hundred Cebuano natives in the Christian faith, died at the hands of Rajah Lapulapu, a rival of the Cebuanos, in the Battle of Mactan on April 27, 1521. It was not until more than 40 years later, in 1565, that Spain established its first permanent settlement in Cebu and continued what Magellan had started, converting the indigenous people to Roman Catholicism. At least two centuries prior to the Spanish settlement of the Philippine islands, Muslim traders brought Islam to what is now Mindanao, the southernmost island group in the Philippines. For the next 300 years, Spain developed the Philippines as a colony, using religion as a bond of cohesion between them and the indigenous peoples of the Philippines, for the most part leaving the already Muslim southern island group of Mindanao alone.

Toward the later part of Spain’s rule, a relatively wealthy class of mixed half Chinese-half Filipino began to emerge and more importantly began to seek education at foreign (predominately European) universities. This educated class of Chinese-Filipinos, known as Ilustrados, or enlightened ones, employed their liberal Western education to challenge “the more despotic aspects of Spanish colonial rule.” Toward the later part of the 19th century, Spain began experiencing a serious threat to its rule of the Philippines. The Ilustrados, most notably Jose Rizal, challenged Spain’s subjugation of the Philippines with his writing on the most serious issues of his time, nationalism and political reform. Spain took a heavy-handed approach to Rizal’s dissension by promptly arresting and executing him. In the aftermath of Rizal’s death, Andres Bonifacio and

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others continued what Rizal helped establish in the Association of the Sons of the People (Katipunan) and commenced a revolutionary uprising against Spanish colonialism in August 1896.\(^{35}\)

Bonifacio’s leadership of the Katipunan was short-lived. Another rebel leader named Emilio Aguinaldo challenged Bonifacio’s ability to fight the Spaniards and discredited Bonifacio because of his familial ties as a provincial landowner (essentially, a higher class Filipino than Bonifacio). Spain eventually succeeded in routing the Katipunan rebellion, and Aguinaldo agreed to end his operations in exchange for “exile in Hong Kong and a financial settlement.”\(^{36}\) While Aguinaldo accepted exile in Hong Kong, other elements of the rebellion continued their fight against Spanish imperialism.

In 1898, the United States and Spain went to war over Cuban independence, beginning the Spanish-American War. The U.S. continued the war against Spain in the Philippines and employed Aguinaldo to assist in routing the Spaniards from the islands. Spain sold the Philippines to the U.S. at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War and afterward, Aguinaldo brought his nationalist rebellion against the U.S. occupation.\(^{37}\) From 1899–1902, the U.S. successfully suppressed Aguinaldo’s guerrilla forces, employing a “coherent pacification policy that balanced conciliation with repression, winning over the Filipino population and punishing those who resisted.”\(^{38}\)

The U.S. occupation of the Philippines in the early 20th century brought with it numerous benefits and some lasting negative consequences. During the war, the U.S., as part of its conciliation and appeasement of the Filipinos, began an unprecedented period of development in the country via civic action and social reform. Brian M. Linn, in his comprehensive narrative of the war, states, “even while engaged in combat operations,

\(^{36}\) Ibid.
soldiers built schools and sanitation systems, roads and bridges, and brought to many a village the first law and the first peace it had known in years.”

In the post-war period, however, the *Ilustrados* were able to maintain their disproportionate land holdings as the U.S. relied increasingly on them for administration of the islands. As U.S. consumption of Philippine agrarian exports increased, partly due to the U.S. not taxing imports from the Philippines, Filipino landowners reaped great financial benefits. The financial upsurge brought with it further development of the Philippines and simultaneously increased the economic cleavage between the landowners and the peasants. Out of this economic/class disparity, peasant uprisings became increasingly more prevalent under the influence of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), or Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Minor social reforms, though not significant enough to compose a lasting solution to peasant grievances, came about in the 1930s, after the Sakdal uprising in protest of the Catholic Church’s massive landholdings and its relationship with Filipino landlords.

In the wake of the Great Depression, “U.S. domestic opinion was moving against a formal colonial relationship with the Philippines.” The U.S. established the date for Filipino independence as July 4, 1946, under the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act of 1933 and the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934. While an end to a combined four centuries of colonialism under Spain and the U.S. was in sight for the Philippines, the deeper issues of solving the internal social crisis among the Filipinos themselves would be put on hold to resist yet a third major foreign occupier, Japan, during World War II.

A few hours after the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese invaded the Philippines. Just three months later, in March of 1942, General Douglass McArthur, overwhelmed by the Japanese invasion, escaped the Philippines, leaving a significant number of his forces behind, some falling into the hands of the Japanese. During their takeover, the Japanese co-opted many Filipinos to help with the civil

41 Ibid., 186.
administration of the islands, while others, in the spirit of the Filipino’s heritage of resistance to occupation, readily and ably began guerrilla operations to harass and destroy Japanese forces. Robert B. Asprey, in *War in the Shadows, The Guerrilla in History Volume I*, explains that, “about fifty guerrilla groups emerged in the islands before the Japanese even consolidated their conquest, and a surprising number of these survived and prospered.”

U.S. soldiers, who stayed behind to build resistance organizations, assisted many of the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups throughout the Japanese occupation and proved essential in creating the conditions necessary for the eventual return of U.S. conventional forces and defeat of the Japanese. One of the guerrilla groups, with sparse support from the U.S., had the CPP as its center and formed the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People’s Army Against the Japanese, Hukbalahap or simply Huks). The Huks proved a formidable enemy to the Japanese and would later prove to be a formidable opponent of the GRP after the Philippines gained independence in 1946. Asprey argues that the Japanese occupation and liberation by the U.S. during World War II left the Philippines in appalling condition, with over a million Filipinos killed, hundreds of thousands wounded, and millions homeless and hungry.

World War II left the Philippines in disarray, not just from the point of view of physical war damage, but also with the splintered political framework left behind by the Japanese occupation and wartime collaborators. U.S. reconstruction efforts led by General McArthur were widely popular, and coupled with the pending independence of the Philippines from the U.S., ensured a temporary respite from Filipino revolutionaries. The Communist Huks maintained the semblance of a guerrilla organization, while the CPP sought resolution to its social reform grievances through political means. True democratic independence did not solve the root problem of the exploitation of Filipino peasants by wealthy landholders; wealthy landholders simply took over control in the model of 400 years of Spanish and U.S. rule. The inability of the GRP to adapt to the

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44 Ibid.
demands of a disgruntled peasant population spurned the rise of the post-war Huks. Initially the GRP dealt inefficiently with the growing communist insurgency.

The Philippine government was still in the process of building and reorganizing its security forces while the politicians failed to adopt effective legislation to undermine the communist cause. Government security forces took a heavy-handed approach toward the insurgents with little regard for collateral damage or human rights, effectively driving the Huks’ recruiting effort. After four years of ineffective counters to the Huks and the Huks continuing to gain strength, President Elpidio Quirino appointed former Congressman Ramon Magsaysay as the Secretary of National Defense in 1950.45

Magsaysay, a guerrilla commander during World War II, who rose to the highest levels of government from humble beginnings, understood the plight of the Filipino masses.46 With modest support from U.S. military advisors, Magsaysay used his influence in the Philippine government and military to turn the tide of popular support for the Huk Rebellion. Magsaysay stomped out corruption and human rights abuses within the military ranks and produced the climate that the government existed to protect the people, not exploit citizens for personal gain. The combined threat of the Huk Rebellion and Magsaysay’s reform of the security forces approach to countering the Huks paved the way for government reform.

One of Magsaysay’s most notable coups against the Huks was his implementation of the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR). At the heart of the EDCOR program was the opportunity for training and resettlement of surrendered Huks to undeveloped regions in Mindanao, essentially defeating the Huks rallying cry of “Land for the Landless.” Many Huks cited EDCOR as their main reason for surrender: “Of the overall total of 25,000 Filipinos who fought in Huk ranks in the 1950-55 period [sic], Philippine Army records show that 6,875 Huks were killed and 4,702 were captured, while in the same period 9,458 Huks surrendered! [sic] The remainder stayed at large.”47

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45 Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History Volume II, 757.
47 Ibid., 50–51.
Lansdale, who was Magsaysay’s principal U.S. advisor at the time, claims that the popularity of the EDCOR program quickly spread to Malaya, where the British were fighting another communist insurgency. Lansdale says that, “the back of the Huks’ ‘armed struggle’ was broken in November 1951,” when the armed forces and the people truly came together and a free and fair congressional election took place. Two years later, Ramon Magsaysay won the Philippine Presidential election in another honest, democratic and fair vote, effectively ending support for the Huks.

3. Birth and Growth of the New People’s Army

For nearly a decade after the Huk Rebellion, the Philippines prospered in relative peace and economic development. Toward the end of the 1960s, during the first presidential term of Ferdinand Marcos, the time came for the Philippines to begin repayment of their foreign debt, which caused a decline in the Philippine economy. It was also during this time that the U.S. was fighting their war in Vietnam, the civil rights movement was in full swing in the U.S., and Marxist-socialist movements were spreading throughout many developing countries. These conditions, arguably, contributed to the appeal among many Filipinos for a popular mass-based political movement.

The New People’s Army rose as the guerrilla arm of a new Philippine communist party in 1969, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Disgruntled with the inadequate political gains of the original communist party in the Philippines, the PKP, Jose Maria Sison organized an insurgency based almost entirely on Mao’s doctrine of peasant-based mass revolution. The insurgency sought to take control of the government through a three phase strategy: beginning with the “strategic defensive” stage in which the CPP/NPA would build a rural mass base of support engaging the AFP on a

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48 Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 57.
49 Ibid., 85.
limited scale, progressing to the “strategic stalemate” stage in which the CPP/NPA would be able to directly challenge the AFP for control of the country, and finally moving to the “strategic offensive” stage in which the CPP/NPA would possess the strength to seize control of the government. With a strong strategic framework for protracted warfare, the CPP/NPA capitalized on the political situation in the Philippines to build their movement.

Sison, who at the time was a professor at the University of the Philippines, used growing peasant unrest, Philippine nationalism (stoked by the presence of U.S. military bases in the Philippines), and growing political activism to form the base of his revolution. Ideologically, Sison adhered strictly to Maoist principals, first radicalizing his cadres in the urban center of Manila before sending them into the rural provinces to link up with and organize peasant rebels. Political activism came to a head after Marcos won his re-election bid in 1969, which many viewed as a corrupt and fraudulent election.

4. The Marcos Era and the CPP’s Adherence to Protracted Warfare

A series of violent protests, riots, and civil unrest, known as the “First Quarter Storm,” occurred in Manila from January to March 1970 after Marcos’ state of the nation address. The “First Quarter Storm” provided fuel to Sison’s ideological fire; open discontent with the Marcos regime increased the pool of recruits available to form cadres for the CPP and NPA. In 1971, the NPA continued its drive of increasing opposition to the Marcos government by bombing a Liberal party political rally in Manila, which was held in preparation for upcoming congressional elections. Marcos blamed the “Plaza Miranda Bombing,” on the communists, while many opponents of the president believed he was the one who ordered the attack. Regardless of who ordered the bombing, the result was increased skepticism in the Philippine political system in general and President Marcos in particular. Despite the relatively small number of armed NPA fighting in the

55 Ibid., 39.
countryside during the early 1970s, the CPP’s role in the “First Quarter Storm” and the “Plaza Miranda Bombing” laid a solid strategic foundation for the CPP/NPA, with an ever-increasing dissension of the Philippine lower and middle classes from the political elite. Sison fulfilled his strategic coup when Marcos declared martial law in 1972. Greg Jones asserts in Red Revolution:

The bombing considerably widened the gap separating Marcos from his moderate opponents, thus pushing the president further to the authoritarian Right and his opponents to the Left. The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the accompanying repression that followed the bombing also pushed many liberals into alliances with the communist underground and at the same time opened the door to systematic military abuses against citizenry, particularly in the countryside. Martial law brought wholesale state repression and forced into the communist movement many young Filipinos who otherwise might never have joined.57

As Sison solidified the base of the CPP/NPA, he began expanding the revolutionary movement to other agriculturally based islands throughout the Philippines and founded the CPP/NPA’s overt political arm, the National Democratic Front (NDF), in 1972. Sison implemented his strategy through a centralized committee leadership of the CPP with decentralized operations conducted by the NPA throughout the Philippines and the NDF providing political cover operating with various front organizations in Manila. Through much of the 1970s, the NPA’s strength grew slowly, while from 1967-1977, Marcos more than tripled the strength of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from 45,000 to 167,000 members.58

One of the main problems for the Philippine government, indirectly related to martial law, was the level of corruption and human rights abuses conducted by AFP units as they fought against the NPA. Government forces reverted to the heavy-handed types of activities unsuccessfully used in fighting the Huk communists in the early years of that rebellion.59 The Marcos regime failed to address the root problems of the communist insurgency, the same problems plaguing the Philippines since colonial times: widespread

57 Jones, Red Revolution, 60–61.
58 Ibid., 124.
land and social inequalities and repression by the government. With Marcos and the AFP continuing to drive a wedge between the government and the average Filipino, the CPP/NPA rapidly gained support in the early to mid-1980s. The NPA focused predominately on using small unit, guerrilla tactics against vulnerable AFP outposts to increase its arms supply and move into rural communities where government influence was non-existent.  

Urban terrorism was an afterthought to the CPP/NPA, as Sison believed in the ultimate effectiveness of building massive popular support in rural areas first, surrounding the urban centers, and then seizing control of the government when they possessed the strength to directly engage and defeat the AFP. The NPA drove recruitment by offering basic services, helping organize communities to become more efficient socially, and lecturing on the abundance of government corruption and social inequality. Following Maoist principles, the NPA adhered to the protracted approach of insurgency, with only two major events (the First Quarter Storm and the Plaza Miranda Bombing) taking place in the Philippines’ capital city until 1983.

5. Fall of Marcos: Peak and Decline of the CPP/NPA

In 1983, military conspirators assassinated Benigno Aquino Jr., a liberal political opponent of Marcos who had ties to the ideological Left, as he returned from exile in the U.S. As in the case of the “Plaza Miranda” bombing of 1971, Marcos blamed the communists for killing Aquino, while the communists blamed the Marcos regime. Though an independent commission indicted several high-ranking members of the AFP for the Aquino assassination, it is still uncertain who ordered the killing. Aquino’s death led to further political unrest in the Philippines as CPP/NPA strength continued to rise. In an attempt to ease the political turmoil, Marcos called for a “snap election” in 1986 after 14 years of martial law. The political opposition to Marcos chose Corazon Aquino, Benigno’s widow who had no prior political experience, to run against President

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60 Jones, Red Revolution, 96–97.


62 Fernandes, “The Philippines,” Marcos officially lifted martial law in January 1981, though this was largely viewed as only a political maneuver and made little difference in the amount of social control the government maintained. 189.
Marcos. Both parties declared themselves winner in the election, effectively dividing the country and the military in half with the incumbent Marcos maintaining control. Aquino supporters, including the Minister for Defense and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the AFP, took to the streets shortly after the contested election, sparking the EDSA People’s Power Revolution of 1986. The revolution forced the removal of Marcos from office on the day of his inauguration and thrust Corazon Aquino into the presidency.63

Prior to the ousting of Marcos in 1986, dissension developed within the CPP/NPA over the proper strategy to employ to achieve the group’s revolutionary goals. The “Rejectionists” argued for creating a revolutionary situation by staging strikes and conducting urban terrorism.64 The “Reaffirmists” wanted to maintain the protracted approach to the communist insurgency that served as the model for the movement from the beginning.65 The results of the strategic debate between the Rejectionists and the Reaffirmists was a brief increase in urban terrorism and violence in general in Manila and the eventual creation of splinter communist groups; however, the preponderance of NPA terror remained in the rural areas during the rift and remains rural-based to this day. NPA guerrilla fronts, the politico-military geographical unit of the NPA, continue to conduct “people’s courts” to administer revolutionary justice for various crimes that Philippine Security Forces (PSF) cannot affect or are slow to prosecute through the Philippine justice system. The NPA also collect “taxes” from individuals, businesses, and political candidates, often resorting to sabotage, arson, and execution when taxes are not paid.66 The level of communist insurgent violence (armed incidents) throughout the Philippines corresponds directly with the strength of the NPA, as indicated by Table 1, and remains predominately in areas where PSF have little or no control. Table 1 also shows the consistency of the NPA’s protracted approach to revolution, making slow gains against

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65 Ibid., 54.

66 Ibid., 59–61.
the government as the social-political environment permits and building their popular support base before attempting to openly challenge the AFP.

Table 1. AFP and NPA Statistics, 1970–2004. 67

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By 1987 and 1988, at their peak strength, the NPA felt that it was on the verge of being able to progress from the strategic defensive phase, in which it built its mass bases, of the insurgency to the strategic stalemate phase, in which it would expand guerrilla warfare on a scale capable of directly challenging government forces. 68 Justus Van Der Kroef explains:


For example, after a wave of NPA ambushes of military units and assassinations of officials and civilians by NPA death squads (usually dubbed ‘Sparrows’) in various cities, particularly Manila, a spokesman for the ‘Christians for National Liberation,’ a front group identified with the NPA, declared that the communist insurgency was ‘entering the threshold of the strategic stalemate’ with the government.69

Estimates of CPP/NPA operational control in the Philippines during this period reach as high as 20 percent of barangays (the lowest level of governance in the Philippines) with some degree of influence in all 73 provinces.70 As the strength of the CPP/NPA grew to the point of posing a serious challenge for control of the Philippines, the GRP responded to the threat with fundamental changes within the government.

Several factors prevented the CPP/NPA from expanding their movement beyond the strategic defensive at the peak of the insurgency in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The CPP boycotted Marcos’ snap election in 1986, not anticipating Aquino’s victory and resulting popularity, leading many CPP/NPA members to desert the movement. President Aquino was instrumental in implementing numerous government reforms, beginning a lengthy process of strategically and indirectly undermining support for the CPP and NPA and rebuilding the Republic of the Philippines. President Aquino restored habeas corpus, established a Constitutional Commission to draft a new constitution, and established a commission to investigate Marcos-era human rights violations, all while facing six attempted military coups by Marcos supporters. The new constitution prohibited foreign military bases on Filipino territory, undermining the CPP’s nationalist-based sovereignty grievance when the U.S. turned over its last bases in 1991.71 The GRP passed the marginally effective Comprehensive Land Reform Law to help address peasant-equality grievances.72 President Aquino released political prisoners and attempted to negotiate with the CPP for peace, causing further dissension within the


70 Ibid., 119.


CPP/NPA. The general collapse of communism internationally served to partially erode the ideological base of the CPP/NPA.73 Finally, the rift in the CPP that began in the early 1980s between the Rejectionists and Reaffirmists came to a head with the Revolutionary Proletarian Army and the Alex Boncayao Brigade splintering from the CPP/NPA and weakening the overall unity of the communist movement.74 As quickly as the CPP/NPA’s strength grew in the 1980s, it shrank due to a number of factors relating to government reform and the removal of the Marcos dictatorship.

6. Continued Protration of the CPP/NPA Fight

President Aquino’s successor, President Fidel Ramos, continued the rebuilding process, restoring a semblance of confidence and legitimacy in the GRP while attempting to negotiate with the CPP/NPA. In 1994, the GRP declared the CPP a legal entity; however, in 1999 the peace talks with the CPP were called off.75 Through the late 1990s and into the 21st century, the GRP suffered a number of setbacks in its fight against the NPA. In 1998, under newly elected President Joseph Estrada, the Asian financial crisis struck a blow to the already struggling Philippine economy, hindering development and contributing to a resurgence of the CPP/NPA.76 The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, a splinter of the Moro National Liberation Front, MNLF separatist movement) and the NPA entered into an alliance, while the AFP focused its efforts almost entirely on defeating the MILF, creating the physical space necessary for the NPA to expand.77


In 2000, President Estrada, “was impeached on charges of bribery, corruption, betrayal of public trust, and constitutional violations.”\textsuperscript{78} Estrada’s successor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, has subsequently faced a series of coup attempts and election scandals, all of which have underscored the perception of a legitimate central government and taken focus off the continued fight against the CPP/NPA.

In 2002, the U.S. Department of State placed the CPP/NPA on its list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTO). The CPP/NPA’s designation as an FTO has had a negative impact on their external funding, forcing the NPA to rely more heavily on terrorism, extortion, and revolutionary taxes to continue financing their fight.\textsuperscript{79} The CPP/NPA continues their revolutionary struggle stuck in Mao’s concept of the strategic defensive phase of protracted warfare, not quite able to progress into the strategic stalemate phase. The GRP and AFP continue attempting to suppress both the communist revolution and the Islamic separatist movement in Mindanao while simultaneously attempting to marginalize support for the communists through economic development and legitimizing perceptions of the government.

7. Summary of Philippine and CPP/NPA Conflict and Analysis of Conflict Duration

The CPP and its guerrilla arm the NPA have posed a viable threat to GRP security for more than 40 years. Motivated by the success of Mao in China and growing concern over the legitimacy of the Marcos government, the CPP/NPA began small by design and carefully grew their insurgency outside the reach of the GRP and Manila. The CPP/NPA’s strategic approach of protracted people’s war, maintaining a relatively quiet urban political struggle while slowly building a mass peasant base, has given them the physical and political space necessary to maintain their fight for so long. When the CPP/NPA did conduct operations in Manila, they always planned their activities to achieve maximum second- and third-order effects, provoking harsh government


responses and increasing mass dissension from the government. The CPP/NPA achieved significant support from dissatisfied rural peasant farmers, who have demonstrated their willingness throughout history to revolt against repressive governments and large, exploitative landholders. The GRP, under the reign of Ferdinand Marcos, played into the long-term strategy of the CPP/NPA when Marcos declared martial law and increased the size of the AFP by more than 200 percent in the 1970s. The CPP/NPA’s strategic patience vis-a-vis the GRP/AFP led to the peak of NPA strength in the mid 1980s until Marcos’ moderate opposition forcibly removed him from power in 1986, thereby removing a substantial portion of the CPP/NPA’s political base. The GRP shifted to a more indirect approach of dealing with the CPP/NPA after the fall of Marcos, incorporating government reforms in congruence with military enforced security, leading initially to a decline in the support and strength of the CPP/NPA. Unable to achieve consistent economic development for the past two decades, fighting two insurgencies simultaneously, and facing a reaffirmed CPP/NPA protracted strategy, the GRP has struggled to push the staunch members of the CPP/NPA beyond their breaking point.

Chapter II proposed two hypotheses for the conditions under which internal wars become prolonged: the central government’s distance from the violence in an internal war directly affects its will to end the war, and desensitization to violence among the participants in an internal war (a change in values within society), can lead to a violent social equilibrium (stalemate) among a state, counter-state, and the population of the state.

The location of violence throughout this conflict has remained predominately-rural based and relatively low due to the protracted strategy employed by the CPP/NPA. This level of protraction by the CPP/NPA supports the hypothesis that a central government’s distance from the violence in an internal war directly affects its will to end the war. The CPP/NPA initially operated in geographic areas of the Philippine archipelago that had little or no government influence, out of sight and out of mind for the GRP. Following Maoist doctrine, the CPP/NPA slowly expanded, capitalizing on their ability to organize and motivate peasants in ungoverned spaces and at the same time leaving symbols of the central government largely untouched. Occasionally, the
CPP/NPA spurned progressive and repressive action from the GRP to meet their operational needs, but remained largely a nuisance only to the rural authorities.

Only when the CPP/NPA reached its peak strength in the mid to late 1980s and was on the verge of directly and openly challenging the AFP did the GRP go through the political changes required to begin to undermine the CPP/NPA. This change occurred, not as a deliberate decision by the GRP in response to CPP/NPA growth, but as a popular movement in Manila expressing an overall dissatisfaction with the corruption and ineptitude of the Marcos regime, which had inadvertently contributed to the growth of the CPP/NPA. The EDSA revolution effectively swept away much of the CPP/NPA’s political framework and the Aquino administration kept debasing it with wide government reforms. Prior to the EDSA revolution, the general Filipino population had no middle ground for choice between Marcos and the CPP/NPA. Under the popular President Aquino, the GRP’s negotiating position strengthened vis-à-vis the hardcore CPP/NPA, allowing demobilization and subsequent fractionalization of some CPP/NPA members. Essentially, the citizens of Manila chose the middle ground, Aquino, from the radical left in the CPP/NPA or the radical right in Marcos. When the CPP/NPA’s strength receded, the GRP gradually shifted resources toward handling other pressing issues, notably the MILF and the Asian financial crisis, thereby relieving pressure from the CPP/NPA and enabling them to slowly expand again. The CPP/NPA appears to have learned from past mistakes to control their use of violence, maintain their viability as an organization, and still not cause enough concern for the GRP to direct a whole of government approach to ending the insurgency.

Desensitization to violence among the participants in this war should be viewed in the context of the Philippines’ revolutionary history, which has numerous examples of weak actors vying to overthrow the central government in order to improve their lives. One possible argument is that the violent history of challenging authority in the Philippines has made it consciously easier for the CPP/NPA, or potentially any insurgent minded group, to continue their struggle over time and easier for disenfranchised sections of the population to support the movement. The political will of the CPP/NPA has been strengthened over time because of their protracted use of violence to challenge the GRP.
The history of rebellion in general and communist rebellion in particular in the Philippines has also made the CPP/NPA less willing to make concessions within their strategic goal of overthrowing the government. This combination of factors has created a level of acceptable violence among the actors of the conflict. Purely in terms of a cost/benefit rational, with violence as the cost and political gain as the benefit, both the GRP and the CPP/NPA have gradually accepted higher costs over time without yielding much in the way of benefits. As long as the CPP/NPA remains within the threshold of acceptable violence, then they should be able to maintain their movement indefinitely; their only limiting factor is patience, which they have demonstrated they possess over the past 40 years.

Fighting two insurgencies (along with various factional offshoots) simultaneously, the GRP has adapted to maintain military pressure on the rebel groups while attempting to provide for the needs of its people, seemingly accepting the conflicts, unable to achieve a complete victory in either case. In the absence of official government security, a rural population has little choice but to accept the presence and control of an armed and cohesive group that provides some semblance of government services such as the CPP/NPA, leaving the GRP to either physically and politically displace the CPP/NPA or hope that the CPP/NPA self-destructs.

Both the GRP and the CPP/NPA appear to have accepted the terms of their war against each other with neither side willing to make significant concessions. The CPP/NPA, through 40 years of armed struggle, and the GRP, with their suppression of the CPP/NPA, have established a balance of control in the Philippines with neither side able to achieve their objectives using their available resources. With respect to the myriad issues facing the GRP, it has ultimately demonstrated through its actions/inactions that the state of the conflict with the CPP/NPA is acceptable. If the CPP/NPA ever grow to the point or pose the same level of threat that they did in the late 1980s, then the GRP will likely adapt to overcome the threat, diverting resources from other pressing problems, and once again suppressing the insurgency to an acceptable level. The NPA’s designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization has hurt its external resource base and
arguably their movement as a whole, giving the GRP an advantage if it can obtain the outside resources necessary to help increase the government’s legitimacy and assist with effective internal development and security.
B. SRI LANKA AND THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM

Figure 4. Map of Sri Lanka (From: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency)
I understand the dignity of a life, but our right is much more dignified than life, our freedom, and our self-respect.

– Velupillai Prabhakaran, founder of the LTTE.80

1. Significance of the Sri Lankan Civil War

Embattled in an ethnically based civil war since the 1970s, the story of Sri Lanka, an island nation of approximately 20 million people off the southeast coast of India, serves as an excellent case for the study of prolonged internal wars. The Sri Lankan Civil War has caused at least 70,000 deaths and several hundred thousand displaced civilians in more than 25 years of conflict.81 Rooted in ethnic divisions encouraged by their colonial rulers, the conflict between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils has demonstrated ruthless tactics employed by both sides and a will to employ violence to defend their respective interests so strong that neither side would accept a negotiated settlement to end the war. The determined struggle of the Tamils to achieve a Tamil state within Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese to counter the Tamils for fear of their own marginalization by India has led to a humanitarian crisis of yet unknown proportions.82 What are the underlying conditions that led the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to sustain their civil war for so long?

2. Roots of the Conflict

Prior to colonization by European imperialists, Sri Lanka dates its Sinhalese Buddhist tradition to 500 B.C., while the Tamils trace their Sri Lankan heritage to 300 B.C.83 Objective historians attribute early conflict on the island of Sri Lanka to dynastic


81 W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto, “A war of attrition: Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no. 4 (December, 2008): 573–587. Exactly when the war between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam began is up to some debate. Jane’s Information Group cites attacks carried out by the Tamil New Tigers (precursor to the LTTE) as far back as 1972, while most historians claim the war began in 1983 with the famous anti-Tamil riots.

82 At the time of this writing, the GoSL has declared victory over the LTTE; however, due to GoSL restrictions on media covering the war, only limited information is available regarding the human costs of the war in terms of civilians killed, wounded, and displaced due to the fighting.

rather than ethnocentric causes; however, centuries of sporadic fighting, interference from India, and a suspected outbreak of disease eventually led to an ethnic, religious, and geographic division between the Hindu Tamils in the north and the Buddhist Sinhalese in the south.\textsuperscript{84} In the 1500s, Portuguese sailors landed on what was then called Ceylon (Ceylon changed its name to Sri Lanka in 1972)\textsuperscript{85} and after several hundred years of colonial rule by Portugal, the Netherlands, and finally the British Empire, Ceylon peacefully gained independence in 1948.\textsuperscript{86}

While under British rule, the Tamils occupied various administrative positions and received preferential status from their colonial bosses.\textsuperscript{87} According to Imtiyaz and Stavis, colonial rulers often favored particular minority groups to help with administrative functions, as a minority group could be more trusted by an outside power and in general easier for the occupier to control. In granting Ceylon its independence in 1948, Britain established it as a unitary state vice a federation, ignoring the island’s separate ethnic compositions, effectively leaving the political fate of Ceylon to the Sinhalese majority.\textsuperscript{88} With independence from Britain, the Tamils found themselves in a political battle against displacement at the hands of the majority Sinhalese (Tamils make up approximately 18 percent of the Sri Lankan population while Sinhalese comprise approximately 70 percent).\textsuperscript{89} Of further significance to the ethnic divide is the state of

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Tamil Nadu in India. Comprising more than 50 million Indian Tamils a few miles across the Palk Straight from northern Sri Lanka, Tamil Nadu creates a persistent threat to Sinhalese sovereignty.90

In 1956, the pro-Buddhist and pro-Sinhalese Sri Lankan Freedom Party won the national elections and passed the Sinhala Only Language Act, replacing English as the official language used in state and public affairs.91 This act discriminated against Tamil speakers and favored the Sinhalese majority. After rioting, the act was rescinded in 1958. Further policies in favor of Sinhalese were passed in 1972, including policies that lowered education standards for Sinhalese students entering Science and Medicine schools and the Constitution of 1972, which gave a special status to Buddhism in state and public sectors.92 Imtiyaz and Stavis argue that the policies preferential to Sinhalese were designed to satisfy Sinhalese voters, “creating an environment of distrust between the Sinhalese and Tamils.”93 Imtiyaz and Stavis proceed to point out that, “Scholarly works on the Sri Lanka ethnic conflict suggest that communal riots in 1958, 1961, 1974, 1977, and 1983 in which Tamils were killed, maimed, robbed, and rendered homeless were carefully designed by the Sinhala elites. This persistent pattern of violence set the stage for violent Tamil retaliation and efforts to secede.”94

As Sinhalese policy continued to discriminate against ethnic Tamils in politics, education, and government employment opportunities, Tamils began calling for their autonomy. Throughout the 1970s, numerous Tamil organizations emerged to campaign for equality. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) sought to create a separate Tamil state through constitutional means while other Tamil moderates sought only their

90 W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto, “A war of attrition: Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 19, no. 4 (December 2008): 573–587. Whether real or perceived, the threat that Indian Tamils present to the Sinhalese of Sri Lanka has no doubt played a large role in how Sinhalese view their own sovereignty and survival within Sri Lanka.


93 Ibid., 139.

94 Ibid., 139.
autonomy within the state of Sri Lanka and their basic rights under the government. The Tamils never took a completely unified stance with respect to their goals. Political means proved ineffective at breaking the Sinhalese monopoly in Sri Lankan politics leading to a rise in militant Tamil groups. These Tamil groups viewed violence as necessary to defend Tamil rights and interests in Sri Lanka.95

In 1976, Velupillai Prabhakaran took over the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) when GoSL authorities arrested the TNT’s former leader. Prabhakaran renamed the TNT the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and consolidated several Tamil groups into the LTTE.96 Militant Tamil groups gradually demonstrated their opposition to Sinhalese hegemony through violent acts against the state, culminating in 1983, when the LTTE killed 13 Sri Lankan Army (SLA) soldiers, sparking major anti-Tamil riots.97

The LTTE attack on the SLA soldiers and the subsequent anti-Tamil riots marks the official start of the Sri Lankan Civil War,98 though the violent Tamil insurgency began several years earlier.


During the 1983 riots, Sinhalese rioters killed an estimated 2,000–3,000 Tamils and displaced many tens of thousands more. Imtiyaz and Stavis cite Human Rights Watch as claiming the GoSL sponsored the anti-Tamil riots and accused Sinhala politicians of “institutionalized anti-Tamil violence and atrocities.”99 At this point in the war, after escalation by militant Tamil groups and indiscriminate reprisals from the

96 Ibid., 231.
Sinhalese majority, both sides viewed violence as the only solution to settle the ethnic divide. The Tamils also began receiving international sympathy due to apparent human rights abuses by the SLA.\footnote{Robert J. Connor, Jr., \textit{Defeating the Modern Asymmetric Threat} (Unpublished master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2002): 30.}

Apart from a brief attempt at peace negotiations in 1985 in which the LTTE forced all Tamil parties to walk out of the talks, the LTTE took a hard line stance against moderate Tamil groups, murdering many Tamil politicians who did not subscribe to their agenda.\footnote{Ibid., 34.} From 1983–1987, the LTTE ruthlessly demonstrated its resolve to obtain a Tamil state by attacking Sri Lankan military, police, and civilians, targeting military leadership and civilian transportation infrastructure.\footnote{Ibid., 30–37.}

Throughout the period 1983–1987, in addition to growing their insurgency, the LTTE made significant gains in its strength and external base of support. India and the Tamil Nadu state government helped the LTTE expand (equipment and capabilities)\footnote{Ibid., 30–the Research and Analysis Wing of the Indian Intelligence Agency sponsored training of Tamil militant groups within Tamil Nadu.} with additional financial support provided by a Tamil Diaspora of 500,000 who fled Sri Lanka seeking political asylum in India and the West.\footnote{Jane’s Information Group, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” \textit{Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism}, (July 23, 2009), \url{http://search.janes.com}, (accessed August 10, 2009).}

In 1986, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi reversed India’s national stance of support to the Tamils by expelling 1,000 members of the LTTE from Tamil Nadu and banning the local government from providing further sanctuary for the LTTE. In 1987, as LTTE terror continued to rise, the resolve of the GoSL to defeat the LTTE peaked as demonstrated by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) mounting a full scale, direct attack against the LTTE to root them from the Tamil occupied provinces in the north and east of Sri Lanka.\footnote{Robert J. Connor, Jr., \textit{Defeating the Modern Asymmetric Threat} (Unpublished master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2002): 37.} The SLAF gained control of most of the LTTE strongholds through heavy bombing and direct assaults, leading to further accusations (and LTTE
propaganda) of state-sponsored terror conducted by the SLAF and some degree of international sympathy for the Tamils. In another reversal of the Indian stance toward the LTTE, India, with pressure from Tamil Nadu, sent humanitarian relief supplies in a show of support for the Sri Lankan Tamils and a sign of contempt with the GoSL. Shortly after the arrival of humanitarian relief from India, the LTTE executed its first two successful suicide bomb attacks against the SLAF, leading to the SLAF planning to launch a final offensive into the LTTE’s traditional stronghold, the Jaffna peninsula. Prior to the final SLAF offensive, India intervened by brokering a deal with the GoSL to end the conflict.\textsuperscript{106} At this early stage in the war, LTTE violence definitely increased, but it was an increase of violence in general and not in proximity to Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka, that led to the major offensives taken by the SLAF.


From late 1987 through 1990, an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), which eventually reached 80,000 troops, deployed to Sri Lanka to help end the conflict.\textsuperscript{107} Despite efforts by all three sides to honor the peace deal, it broke down as mutual trust in each of the three parties disintegrated. The SLAF captured and imprisoned 17 LTTE soldiers, the LTTE tortured and killed eight SLAF personnel in retaliation, and the IPKF increased its forces after discovering the LTTE was conducting ethnic cleansing operations in the northern and eastern provinces.\textsuperscript{108} The LTTE soon began fighting the IPKF, while the GoSL redirected its efforts towards suppressing a left-wing insurgency.

\textsuperscript{106}Robert J. Connor, Jr., \textit{Defeating the Modern Asymmetric Threat}, (Unpublished master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, June 2002): 39. Connor cites several possible reasons for India’s intervention: pressure from the state of Tamil Nadu, purely humanitarian reasons to end atrocities on both sides, India might lose influence in Sri Lanka if the SLAF destroyed the LTTE, to keep the Cold War superpowers from intervening and affecting Indian national security, or that intervention would silence Tamil separatist inclinations within Tamil Nadu itself. No matter the reason for India’s intervention, the LTTE escaped a final major offensive by the SLAF.

\textsuperscript{107}W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto, “A war of attrition: Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers,” \textit{Small Wars 

conducted by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in the south. At least two sources reported that the GoSL provided some support to the LTTE in the LTTE’s fighting against the IPKF.\textsuperscript{109}

As the SLAF battled and eventually suppressed the JVP, the LTTE continued their fight against the IPKF. Prabhakaran negotiated for support from the GoSL playing on GoSL fears of too much Indian influence in Sri Lanka. The LTTE received the support from the GoSL President Premdasa despite objections from senior SLAF officers. Having stood their ground against the IPKF for three years, the LTTE negotiated a cease-fire with the IPKF, leading to their withdrawal from Sri Lanka in 1990. The LTTE quickly re-established itself in its home provinces as the IPKF departed.\textsuperscript{110}

\section{5. The Second Eelam War, 1990–1995}

During the second round of the LTTE’s war for autonomy, they continued to grow and increased the stakes with more violence, beginning with the execution of more than 600 police officers captured by the LTTE. The LTTE alienated sympathizers within Tamil Nadu through their violent targeting of rival Tamil groups and eventually began direct attacks against SLAF camps inflicting heavy casualties.\textsuperscript{111} As reciprocating atrocities increased between the LTTE and the SLAF, Prabhakaran again resorted to the employment of suicide bombers to terrorize the GoSL.

In Colombo, the capital city of Sri Lanka, LTTE commandos killed the SLAF Defense Minister with a remote detonated mine. In 1991, an LTTE suicide bomber was responsible for killing former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in part to retaliate for damage done by the IPKF and India’s previous withdrawal of support to the LTTE. The assassination of Gandhi led to further alienation of Tamil Nadu from the LTTE, straining the LTTE’s covert support network inside of India.\textsuperscript{112} In 1992, another LTTE suicide

\begin{footnotes}
\item[111] Ibid., 49.
\item[112] Ibid., 52.
\end{footnotes}
attack killed the commander of the SLAF Navy in Colombo\(^{113}\) and yet another LTTE suicide bomber killed Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993.\(^{114}\) These suicide assassinations and the LTTE’s increasing level of direct attacks against SLAF bases, led to a corresponding increase of the GoSL’s resolve to eliminate the LTTE and end the conflict. By the middle of 1994, both the LTTE and SLAF were suffering from heavy losses, leading to a decline in offensive operations by both sides. As attrition took its toll on both the SLAF and LTTE, Sri Lanka elected a new president in late 1994. President Chandrika Kumaratunga signed a “Cessation of Hostilities Agreement” with Prabhakaran in January of 1995.\(^{115}\) After four months of a peaceful cease-fire, unknown assailants shot and killed two SLAF soldiers (the LTTE denied involvement) and a few weeks later, two LTTE suicide scuba diver bombers destroyed two SLAF Navy gunboats.\(^{116}\)


In the third round of major hostilities between the LTTE and the SLAF, the LTTE increased the stakes even more by employing surface to air missiles against the SLAF Air Force. The LTTE’s escalation prompted a corresponding increase in defense spending by the GoSL. In heavy fighting, the SLAF attempted to capture the traditional stronghold of the LTTE, the Jaffna Peninsula, but the LTTE was able to repulse the SLAF assault. Prabhakaran continued the escalation of violence ordering more suicide attacks against the SLAF Navy and a government building in Colombo. Later in 1995, President Kumaratunga made another attempt to end the conflict by offering a provision for a unified northeastern region of Sri Lanka, under control of Tamils, if the LTTE laid down their arms. Prabhakaran rejected the offer and increased LTTE suicide attacks.\(^{117}\)

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\(^{113}\) Connor, Jr., *Defeating the Modern Asymmetric Threat*, 56.


\(^{116}\) Ibid., 59.

\(^{117}\) Ibid., 60–61.
The LTTE hijacked a civilian cruise ship in August of 1995 and from the end of 1995 to the beginning of 1996, the SLAF forced their way into the Jaffna Peninsula, displacing all civilians from the cities and into the jungle. The third Eelam War saw a continuous escalation of violence by both sides with the LTTE bringing the fight closer to Colombo and overrunning SLAF Army camps and police stations, an unsuccessful assassination attempt against President Kumaratunga, and a truck bomb attack against the Buddhist Sacred Temple of the Tooth (said to house a tooth from the Buddha). In 1997, the US placed the LTTE on its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations and finally, at the end of 2000, after six years of brutal fighting both sides broke down and agreed to another ceasefire agreement, this time brokered by a Norwegian delegation.\textsuperscript{118}

A short time later, both sides broke the ceasefire agreement, again leading to increased hostilities. The LTTE conducted an attack at the Colombo International Airport, destroying eight SLAF Air Force planes, three civilian planes, and damaging five others, crippling Sri Lanka’s tourism industry.\textsuperscript{119} The war continued until elections in December of 2001 helped the GoSL and LTTE return to their ceasefire agreement. This time, Prabhakaran compromised on his goal of complete Tamil autonomy and offered to settle on a regional autonomy granting the Tamils control over their politics and economy. A few months later on February 22, 2002, the GoSL and LTTE signed the Norwegian Peace Accords, withdrawing combat forces behind technical control lines monitored by the Norwegian-led Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission.\textsuperscript{120}

7. The Tamil State, 2002–2005

As the Norwegian Peace Accord went into effect, the GoSL and LTTE technical control lines morphed into borders and the LTTE gradually built a Tamil state. From 2002 until 2005, the LTTE maintained control of a Tamil autonomous zone, complete with police, a functioning judicial system, social welfare services and economic development (in close conjunction with numerous non-governmental organizations), and

\textsuperscript{118} Connor, Jr., \textit{Defeating the Modern Asymmetric Threat}, 64–77.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 78–79.

an external security apparatus in the form of the LTTE, which provided a check against
the traditional threat imposed by the GoSL and SLAF. Kristian Stokke argues in a
2006 journal article that, “The dominant form of governance embedded in the LTTE state
institutions is that of a strong and centralized state with few formal institutions for
democratic representation, but there are also elements of partnership arrangements and
institutional experiments that may serve as a basis for more democratic forms of
representation and governance.” Despite the potential for a lasting peace in Sri Lanka,
several factors led to the breakdown of the Norway brokered ceasefire agreement.

Notably, the question of authorities for development and humanitarian relief in
Tamil held areas created fear among some Sinhalese politicians of the possible
institutionalization of power-sharing arrangements between the GoSL and Tamils that
would undermine the sovereignty of the Sri Lankan unitary state. This issue came to a
head in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, which killed some 30,000 Sri Lankans, when
disputes erupted over the allocation and flow of relief aid in the Tamil state. The
LTTE used this issue to call for a boycott of the 2005 presidential elections, which
“assisted in the defeat of the pro-peace candidate and the election of the more belligerent
Mahinda Rajapaksa.”

In March of 2004, the LTTE split. Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, known as
Colonel Karuna, the eastern commander broke away from Prabhakaran, taking more than
5,000 troops and formed the Tamileela Peoples’ Liberation Tigers (TMVP). It is likely
that an internal dispute over finances and Karuna’s perceptions of exploitation of Tamils

121 Kristian Stokke, “Building the Tamil Eelam State: emerging state institutions and forms of
122 Ibid., 1037.
123 Ibid., 1032.
125 Ibid., 235.
by the LTTE as a whole led to the split. The split turned into open hostilities, with the LTTE attacking and disbanding the TMVP, leading many TMVP members into the arms of the SLAF, acting as a Tamil militia.

Chris Smith, in “The Eelam Endgame?” argues that, “Despite a longstanding failure to exercise a monopoly of force across the entire island, the government has consistently refused to acknowledge the political realities that follow as a consequence and has adopted positions that are increasingly and obviously unacceptable to the LTTE.” Ultimately, a lack of trust between the LTTE and the GoSL and “politicization of the state institution by the Sinhalese leaders” led to the final breakdown of the ceasefire agreement and a return to full-scale combat between the LTTE and the SLAF.

8. The Fourth Eelam War, 2006–009

Both the LTTE and the GoSL blamed each other for violations of the ceasefire agreement and the consequential return to war. In August 2005, the LTTE allegedly assassinated Sri Lankan foreign minister, Laxman Kadirgamar, an ethnic Tamil who had a reputation of lobbying the international community for proscription of the LTTE. On the GoSL side, Smith cites the “introduction of new emergency regulations,” as leading to widespread unlawful detentions and disappearances of Tamils, adding to the long-standing animosity felt between the two sides. In the early part of 2006, bilateral talks in Geneva broke down over accusations of ceasefire violations by both sides and by the middle of 2006, approximately 1,000 lives were lost in conflict-related incidents.

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131 Ibid., 73.
132 Ibid., 73.
The LTTE returned to suicide bombings, killing the third highest-ranking SLAF army officer and bringing more violence to Colombo.\textsuperscript{133} For the GoSL and the SLAF, the failure of the ceasefire agreement to last delivered their final opportunity to destroy the LTTE. From 2006–2009, the SLAF brought the full power of the military to bear against the LTTE. Combined with help from Karuna’s breakaway Tamil group and the GoSL emergency regulations, which restricted open media coverage and led to countless unwarranted detentions, the SLAF militarily defeated the LTTE in 2009, killing as many as 20,000 civilians in the final months of the conflict.\textsuperscript{134} On May 18, 2009, the SLA killed Velupillai Prabhakaran and other key LTTE leaders, dealing a crippling blow to the LTTE and landing a major coup for the GoSL.\textsuperscript{135}

It is unclear what the future holds for the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The SLAF did defeat the LTTE on the battlefield; however, in the process they displaced several hundred thousand Tamils, holding them in government internment camps, ostensibly looking for remaining members of the LTTE.\textsuperscript{136} As the humanitarian crisis resulting from the war unfolds, only time will tell what sort of backlash Sri Lanka will feel from the international community and within its borders from the Sri Lankan Tamils.

9. Summary of Sri Lankan and LTTE Wars and Analysis of Conflict Duration

For more than three decades, the LTTE battled against the GoSL for Tamil autonomy. The LTTE’s insurgency was protracted in the sense that their determination to fight never wavered; however, the level of violence the LTTE employed against the GoSL quickly escalated during each phase of the conflict. With each side battling for their survival as a group and varying degrees of external support affecting the conflict,


neither side was willing to concede their values or goals to the other. The Sri Lankan civil war demonstrates a galvanization of political wills that ultimately brought over 30 years of violence to Sri Lanka.

Several factors led to a temporary respite from the ethnic conflict during the First Eelam War. A rise in the JVP insurgency in southern Sri Lanka forced the GoSL to focus more attention in the south, intervention from India on behalf of ethnic Tamils put political pressure on the GoSL to negotiate with the Tamils, and increased violence brought against the GoSL and SLAF by the LTTE all contributed to the temporary ceasefire. After a return to conflict in the Second Eelam War, the LTTE raised the stakes of the war with increasing amounts of suicide bombings, assassinations of high-ranking political and military figures, and a high level of success when battling the SLAF. The new president of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumaratunga, sought a ceasefire with the LTTE in order to end the violence. The president offered the LTTE a unified Tamil region if they would lay down their arms, but a fundamental lack of trust by the LTTE for the GoSL led Prabhakaran to reject the offer. After another return to war, the LTTE again escalated the level of violence and demonstrated their capacity to wage war against the GoSL to the point that they lost credibility within much of the international community, leading many countries, including the U.S., to list the LTTE as a terrorist organization. This time, Norway intervened to negotiate a settlement, bringing the longest period of peace to Sri Lanka in more than 20 years.

As the LTTE built an autonomous Tamil state, disagreements over development, sovereignty issues, and accusations of ceasefire violations by both sides led to the fourth round of the Sri Lankan civil war. A new and bellicose Sri Lankan president, a split in the LTTE, increased capacity of the SLAF, and a decrease in external support to the LTTE led to the declared victory of the GoSL over the LTTE in May 2009.

Chapter II proposed two hypotheses for the conditions under which internal wars become prolonged: the central government’s distance from the violence in an internal war directly affects its will to end the war; and desensitization to violence among the
participants in an internal war (a change in values within society), can lead to a violent social equilibrium (stalemate) among a state, counter-state, and the population of the state.

When observing the level of violence in each phase of the LTTE war against the GoSL, as violence increased in intensity and proximity to Colombo, the GoSL was more determined to end the conflict. The fact that as violence increased in general in Sri Lanka, the GoSL took actions to suppress it can also be attributed to the relatively small physical size of Sri Lanka. A violent attack anywhere on the island could cumulatively contribute to the political effect of increased will to end the violence. As LTTE attacks increased in general throughout the island and against the SLAF, GoSL resolve to defeat the LTTE also increased. The causal relationship of level of violence to resolve to end the conflict was not isolated to the proximity of violence to Colombo, but an increase in violence in general compounded the relationship.

The interaction between the overall level of violence employed by the LTTE and the GoSL’s determination to end the conflict shows that during each phase of the war, except the last, the LTTE employed more and more violence before the GoSL either negotiated a ceasefire or attempted to destroy the LTTE. In the last phase of the war, it appeared that both sides resolved to fight to the end. Intensity and proximity of violence to the center of government directly contributed to the GoSL’s desire to end the fighting, again supporting the hypothesis that a central government’s distance from the violence in an internal war directly affects its will to end the war.

As the duration of the war increased, the overall amount of violence between the GoSL and LTTE also increased, giving some weight to the idea that levels of socially acceptable violence can change over time, but this is apparent only to the degree of popular support for both sides to continue fighting. It is not apparent that either side became desensitized to violence in this conflict; however, the fact that it took more violence on behalf of the LTTE to bring the GoSL to the point of negotiation or full destruction of the LTTE does indicate that the level of acceptable violence increased throughout the conflict. As the war progressed through each cease-fire, the LTTE was willing to bear more and more costs in terms of violence to break the will of the GoSL,
and it seems that the GoSL viewed the conflict with the same rational. In order for either side to have had legitimate bargaining power to achieve their respective goals, they each had to demonstrate an increase in both their willingness to employ more violence and the amount of violence they would accept before a ceasefire or surrender. Although the level of acceptable violence for those involved in the Sri Lankan Civil War did increase over time, a violent social equilibrium was never reached as demonstrated by the will of both sides to continue fighting to the end for their respective interests. The GoSL and the LTTE essentially drove each other into a position of political will dictating a fight to the end. A violent social equilibrium was never achieved in this conflict, the war became an all or nothing endeavor.

In essence, the LTTE never sought a protracted war to achieve their goal of secession. The protraction of the Sri Lankan Civil War appears to be a function of the political will of both sides combined with their respective military capacities to continue fighting and a progressive increase in the level of acceptable violence throughout each phase of the war.
Figure 5. Map of Colombia. (From: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency)
For there were and are two Colombias. One, roughly 33 percent of the country, is west of the Cordillera Oriental. Much of this area is high country. It is there that the country’s productive forces are concentrated. The other, east of the mountains, the llanos, is savannah, vast plains, and amazon, the jungle. More than 95 percent of the populace lives in the first area. The other 5 percent-minus and key insurgent formations are in the second zone. As long as the guerrillas were revolutionary homesteaders in areas no one else wanted, the government bothered with them only when their actions forced a response. It was the job of the police and the military, went the logic, to keep an eye on them.

— Thomas Marks

1. Systemic Armed Conflict in Colombia

Violence has plagued Colombia throughout its history. The War of a Thousand Days (1899–902), a period of armed rebellion that erupted over a dispute concerning the scope of presidential powers, had approximately 100,000 deaths attributed to it.138 La Violencia (1948–1958), another period of violence characterized by polarization within Colombia’s political system, led to an estimated 200,000 deaths.139 Recent Colombian internal conflicts have brought with them a toll of violence that has perforated virtually every aspect of Colombian life.

Over the past four decades a number of armed groups have entrenched themselves in the Colombian countryside employing a variety of strategies to promote their political agendas with varying degrees of success. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberation Nacional – ELN), the Popular Liberation Army (Ejercito Popular de Liberation – EPL), and other smaller guerrilla groups all presented a challenge to Colombia’s internal security and government stability until the 1990s. After a series of negotiated settlements between the Colombian government and some of the prominent guerrilla groups, the FARC emerged as the primary threat to security in

In addition to the traditional guerrilla based armed political challengers, since the 1980s, Colombia has dealt increasingly with violence posed by drug cartels. Some of these illicit organizations come mingle with revolutionary groups, and illegal paramilitary groups, notably the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), which initially emerged as self-defense organizations in response to the threat posed to large landowners by the FARC, ELN, and EPL. How did Colombia sink into a state of affairs where it became the norm, not the exception, for groups to challenge state authority through violent means? This case study examines the FARC specifically and other armed non-state actors within Colombia in general to explain how armed conflict has persisted, almost without stop, for over 40 years in Colombia. The Colombian Government’s response to violent armed challenges to the state has been proportional to the proximity of the violence to the capital city, Bogota. As long as the violence perpetrated by non-state groups remained predominately outside of Colombia’s major urban centers and the longer it remained outside, Colombia’s resolve to defeat or negotiate with these groups remained low.

2. Origins of the FARC and Its War in Colombia

The FARC dates its founding to 1964; however, the roots of the FARC’s opposition to the Colombian state are intertwined in Colombia’s democratic history. With independence from Spain in the early 19th century, Colombia became one of the strongest democracies in Latin America. The two dominant political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, have served as the impetus of conflict in Colombia from

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142 Jane’s Information Group states that FARC was founded in 1964 while the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress states the FARC was founded in 1966.

the 1860s onward. Extremists from both political parties have clashed over issues ranging from the scope of executive powers to the position of the Roman Catholic Church in state affairs.\textsuperscript{144} Violent local conflicts raged on and off until the War of a Thousand Days forced moderates from both parties to agree that cooperation would best serve the interests of Colombia. In 1930, liberal reformists instituted the “Revolution of March,” which included agrarian reform, support for labor unions, and the enactment of public assistance.\textsuperscript{145} These reforms gradually drove the two political parties further apart culminating with the assassination of a Liberal party politician named Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in April 1948. Gaitan’s assassination sparked a riot in Bogota that eventually spread throughout much of rural Colombia beginning the period in Colombia’s history known as La Violencia. In 1958, the Liberals and Conservatives began cooperating once again, establishing a power sharing arrangement under the National Front agreement, which amended Colombia’s constitution to make only the Liberal and Conservative Parties legal. The National Front was an attempt at enhancing government legitimacy, curbing the level of confrontation between the two parties and their supporters, and putting an end to La Violencia.\textsuperscript{146} Colombia passed a controversial agrarian reform law in 1961 and, coupled with a slowing economy, this contributed to growing civil unrest and the rise of several politically disenfranchised groups. Thomas Marks summarized the origins of the FARC in response to La Violencia and the political situation in Colombia at that time.

As a simple matter of protection, local populations banded together in self-defense. FARC, now the major Colombian insurgent movement, had its origins in one such area, a cluster of “independent republics”\textsuperscript{147} in the central Magdalena River valley. The republics were led by communists and taken over again by the government in 1964-65 after order had been restored through a power-sharing arrangement, the National Front (Frente

\textsuperscript{144} Library of Congress, Colombia: A Country Stud., xxiv.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., xxiv-xxv.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 41-42.

In 1966, the FARC began operating as a named group and was officially designated a branch of the Partido Comunista de Colombia, (PCC or Communist Party of Colombia).149

3. FARC’s Humble Beginnings, Strategic Goal, and Pseudo-peace

In the early years of the FARC’s existence, they adhered to a Soviet-style Marxist-Leninist ideological framework with financial support provided by the PCC. The FARC sought to overthrow the Colombian government, drive U.S. “imperialist” interests out of Latin America, and establish a socialist regime.150 Although confined to rural Colombia, the FARC met early success operating against weak military targets. Despite some initial tactical victories, a military counterinsurgency campaign and Colombia’s opening of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1968 kept the FARC’s strength in check.151

The Colombian government also passed a law in 1968 authorizing the army to organize and arm civilians in the fight against subversion.152 Later, as the threat from the FARC and other groups increased, private businesses and drug traffickers created private armies to defend their interests. These civilian defense groups, both government


sanctioned and private groups, would eventually yield another problem for the
government in the form of offensive oriented paramilitary organizations conducting their

Even with setbacks in the early 1970s, the FARC grew to approximately 3,000
guerrillas by 1982, slowly building their organizational and armed capacity.\footnote{154}{Alfredo Molano, “The Evolution of the FARC: A guerrilla group’s long history,” NACLA Report on the Americas 34, no. 2 (New York: Sep/Oct 2000): 23–31, \url{http://www.proquest.com/} (accessed October 16, 2009).} In 1982, the FARC held their seventh party conference and decided that their primary task was to create a revolutionary army capable of fighting head to head with the Colombian security forces. It was also at this meeting that the FARC concluded that they would need to tax the growing drug trade and directly control production areas to resource their long-range goal.\footnote{155}{Thomas, Marks, “Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency,” Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, Monograph (January 2002): 6.}

During this stage of FARC growth, they concentrated their activities on relatively
small actions: recruitment, small raids, occupying villages and townships, and occasional
kidnappings for ransom.\footnote{156}{Jane’s Information Group, “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC),” Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, July 29, 2009 (Chronology of Major Events), \url{http://search.janes.com} (accessed August 18, 2009).} By the early 1980s, many officials considered the FARC the strongest guerrilla group in Colombia and the FARC even attempted joint operations with the ELN.\footnote{157}{According to Jane’s the FARC and ELN almost merged and their relationship resulted in the FARC concentrating on the rural campaign.} The parallel growth of several other guerrilla organizations and the sharp increase in illicit drug production and associated criminal activity during the late 1970s and into the 1980s caused growing concern in Colombia’s capital city, Bogota.\footnote{158}{Geraldine, McDonald, “Columbia’s long search for peace,” notes that through the 1970s and 1980s violence was on the increase. Marxist guerrilla movements, most notably M-19, waged campaigns of terror and insurgency. The Medellin and Cali drug cartels became immensely powerful and murdered judges, generals, and ministers.}
FARC’s strength and influence in Colombia’s countryside, together with other domestic threats during this period, was enough to make the Colombian government consider negotiations.

The FARC turned down newly elected President Betancur’s offer of amnesty in 1982; however, in 1984 the FARC, the April 19th Movement (M-19), and the EPL agreed to a ceasefire with the government. The National Dialogue outlined the terms for reintegrating the guerrillas and the government permitted the formation of the Patriotic Union (UP), a legal political party affiliated with the FARC and supported by the PCC. The UP would go on to gain significant parliamentary representation in the 1986 elections. Much of the FARC reportedly abided by the ceasefire, but various FARC fronts violated the terms of the truce by continuing kidnappings and blackmail activities.

While President Betancur attempted to induce the FARC into formal participation in the government, the M-19 group undermined the general desire for peace by violating the 1984 ceasefire, alleging that the Colombian government systematically violated provisions of the truce. The M-19 group seized the Palace of Justice in 1985, killing over 100 people, including several Supreme Court justices. President Betancur’s successor, President Barco attempted to renew negotiations in 1986 to end the violence caused by the guerrilla groups, trying to enhance the legitimacy of the state in rural Colombia. With elements of the FARC continuing operations and other leftist guerrilla groups still targeting the government, the UP (the FARC’s legal political party) went on the defensive, asserting that 550 of its members and supporters had been murdered by right-wing terrorist groups and death squads. Marks explains that, “Having suffered through previous bloodshed in which leftists had played a prominent role, Colombian society

159 McDonald, “Columbia’s long search for peace.”
162 Ibid., 305.
abounded in those more than willing to go after those who still dreamed of Marxist liberation.” Essentially, the government was willing to integrate former guerrilla groups into the political system, but right wing militants violently opposed the policy, leading to increased violence between the groups.

After a few more years of determined efforts to achieve a solution to the violence, by 1989, prospects for peace and demobilization of the guerrilla groups were again hopeful. Representatives of all of the major guerrilla groups, except the ELN, formed the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB) to negotiate on behalf of the guerrillas with the government. At the same time, the ELN had carried out over 100 attacks on the nation’s largest oil pipeline in less than 18 months, causing over an estimated US$400 million in loss and damage. Paramilitary groups and narcotics traffickers were responsible for the most extreme acts of terror in the late 1980s, massacring leftist sympathizers and assassinating government officials. The M-19 group and most of the EPL finally gave in to the political process, accepting demobilization in 1989 and 1991, respectively. After peace negotiations between the government and the CGSB stalled and restarted several times, divisions within the CGSB began to emerge. The Colombian government spent the first half of the 1990s in failed negotiations with the CGSB and guerrilla violence continued unabated. Eventually, the peace talks were called off altogether and the FARC escalated their attacks on the Colombian military.

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165 Ibid., xxx–xxxi.


4. **Rise of the FARC and Another Failed Attempt at Peace**

By 1998, with financing provided through extensive narcotics taxation and kidnap ransoms, the FARC had proven it could directly engage company sized elements of the Colombian Army. The FARC cleared entire areas of government presence, targeting mayors and policemen, focusing on areas that would serve to isolate Bogota. In August of 1998, coinciding with the Colombian Presidential election campaign, the FARC launched a series of attacks nationwide; in one such attack an estimated 1,200 insurgents overran an army company and counternarcotics police base.168 A 2001 Congressional Research Service Report acknowledged that the FARC had convinced many that they were stronger than the Colombian military.169

The FARC, who had modeled their approach to insurgency on the Vietnamese style of “people’s war,” relied heavily on the rural population for support, either voluntary or coerced. Paramilitary organizations, on the other hand, targeted insurgent groups, their supporters, as well as sympathizers.170 Corresponding to the escalation of FARC violence was an increase in paramilitary terror with the average citizen withstanding the worst of the effects from the war. The results of the increased violence was that the FARC had actually began losing their rural support base; polls indicated that the FARC had little popular support or sympathy during this time.171

Tables 2, 3, and 4 indicate the substantial escalation of guerrilla, paramilitary, and military activity throughout Colombia from 1995–2003.


170 Ibid., 12-13.

Table 2. Displaced people in the Colombian conflict, 1995–2003.  

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In 1998, amidst the rising tide of insurgent and paramilitary violence throughout the country, Colombia’s newly elected president, Andres Pastrana Arango, made another attempt toward negotiating a settlement with the FARC. As a precondition to the talks, Pastrana granted the FARC a 51,000 square-kilometer demilitarized zone (DMZ) in 1998.  

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173 Ibid., 706.  
174 Ibid., 708.
south-central Colombia. Over the next four years, the FARC used the DMZ as a “safe haven” to continue profiting from illicit drug crops, kidnappings, and extortion in addition to building up their stores of military hardware. Marks described the DMZ, also called the “Zona,” as, “an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which to launch repeated strikes against government targets.” The FARC’s blatant disregard for the negotiations peaked in 1999 when they launched a massive offensive from the DMZ, including attacks in Bogota, which previously only the ELN, M-19, and various drug cartels had targeted.

By early 2000, the FARC had become such a threat to Colombian security that the armed forces initiated a dramatic transformation of the military, with a reorganization of force structure, revamped training, and an overall increase in professionalization. During the same period of the military’s self-imposed transformation, the U.S. approved legislation supporting President Pastrana’s “Plan Colombia,” which was aimed at ending armed conflict, eliminating drug trafficking, and promoting development. Marks’ primary point concerning U.S. policy in Colombia contends, “U.S. diplomats and military officials tended to embrace the flawed logic that Colombia’s problem was one of narcotics, with the security battle a consequence.” Initially, and despite the significant financial support provided by the U.S. to Plan Colombia, Marks maintains that the money was used primarily to neutralize narcotics and did little to assist the Colombian military’s

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178 Ibid., 9.

179 Ibid., 13–18. Marks also points out that the Colombian government historically sought the military solution of fighting insurgents as opposed to addressing the wider social and developmental problems that plagued Colombia.


efforts at reform. Gradually though, continued U.S. support to Plan Colombia assisted Colombia in bridging the gap between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency, finally acknowledging that the two problems were intertwined.

Even with U.S. support to Plan Colombia, under Pastrana’s administration, the FARC continued to gain strength while Colombia’s leverage for negotiations deteriorated. By the end of Pastrana’s term in 2002, the FARC had hijacked a domestic flight, kidnapped a presidential candidate, and mortared a church, killing 117 people in addition to other violent acts, increasing their direct challenge to Colombian security. After the FARC hijacked the plane, Pastrana ended the peace talks and ordered the military to retake the DMZ, setting the tone for the hard-lined Ivaro Uribe who would succeed him in the presidency later that year.

5. FARC Pressure forces National Response from Colombian Government

In 2002, the FARC mortared the presidential palace in Bogota as newly elected President Uribe was being sworn in to the presidency. Uribe, wasted no time in directly challenging the perpetrators of violence in Colombia, taking a slightly different approach to Colombia’s problems than that of Pastrana’s attempt at negotiating peace. Uribe ran for the Colombian presidency on a platform that called for a national approach to Colombian security, vowing to defeat leftist guerrilla insurgents, address the paramilitary problem, and combat narcotics trafficking.

As the FARC attempted to transition to mobile warfare, the recently reformed Colombian Army met the FARC head on and forced the FARC into a defensive

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185 Ibid.

President Uribe’s administration complimented the Colombian military’s recent changes with the release of the new *Democratic Security and Defense Policy* in early 2003. Uribe’s new policy holistically changed Colombia’s approach to their internal security problems from one that previously leaned almost solely on the military to one that employed all of the elements of Colombia’s national power. Under President Uribe, Colombia began a restoration of state presence and institutional authority by first establishing control with the military and national police then transitioning security to a combination of military, police, and local forces, enabling effective state institutions to take hold. The government directed the plan to begin in the most strategically important areas and gradually expanded state control through a policy of territorial consolidation.

The FARC continued reaching toward their revolutionary goals through guerrilla action and main force attacks when possible; however, their level of popular support had dwindled as a result of terrorizing those who opposed the FARC. According to a 2008 US Department of State report, terrorist attacks declined by 76 percent, homicides by 40 percent, and kidnappings by 83 percent since Uribe took office in 2002. The government has also demobilized over 40,000 terrorists under Uribe’s presidency and restored mayoral presence within all of Colombia’s municipalities. Most indicators point to a more stable and secure Colombia, but the FARC and other violent organizations still pose a threat to state control.

Marks argues, that while Colombia’s current approach to counterinsurgency is both correct and sustainable; the danger lies in the potential for distraction from this approach due to the democratic political situation in Colombia. The protracted

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189 Ibid., 8.
190 Ibid., 10.
strategy of the FARC has lasted for over four decades and can certainly outlast the administration of an overall effective president in Uribe. This leads, in Marks’ view, to the difficulty for democracies to sustain counterinsurgency campaigns, especially when there is little agreement on strategic ends and means.\textsuperscript{193}

6. \textbf{Summary of Colombia and FARC Conflict and Analysis of Conflict Duration}

Colombia attempted a number of strategies to counter the FARC and other violent non-state actors. Initially, the FARC’s relatively low level of insurgency brought only a limited military response from the Colombian government. Confined almost exclusively to regions of Colombia that had little impact on the capital city or other major urban centers, the FARC grew slowly and steadily by capitalizing on their influence over the drug trade. The concurrent growth of other insurgent movements and the rapid escalation of the illicit narcotics industry in the early 1980s prompted the government to initiate negotiations, the least costly solution for the government. Attempting to end the insurgency peacefully, Colombia and the FARC agreed to a cease-fire and opened the government to a new political party, the UP. Although negotiations were effective at demobilizing many guerrillas and some insurgent groups, other factions continued their revolutionary fight.

The FARC came out of the negotiations and grew to the point of engaging the Colombian military in major combat operations; this led to Colombia’s final attempt at negotiating a settlement, which the government undertook from a position of weakness, and led to the creation of the DMZ. With the FARC blatantly ignoring attempts at peace and using the DMZ as a safe-haven, the Colombian government called off the cease-fire and revamped their approach to a full-fledged, entire government effort of countering the FARC insurgency, having at least some indications of moderate success.

Chapter II proposed two hypotheses for the conditions under which internal wars become prolonged: the central government’s distance from the violence in an internal war directly affects its will to end the war; and desensitization to violence among the

\textsuperscript{193} Marks, “Sustainability of Colombian Military,” 15.
participants in an internal war (a change in values within society), can lead to a violent social equilibrium (stalemate) among a state, counter-state, and the population of the state.

The example of FARC growth and escalation of violence in proximity to or within Bogota supports the first hypothesis. While the Colombian government continuously sought solutions to the FARC insurgency since its inception, it was not until the 2000–2002 timeframe and the peak of FARC insurgent violence that the government coordinated a proper allocation of effort and resources toward addressing and undermining the insurgency. The level of violence and insurgent activity became so great that it challenged the government’s survival and therefore solidified their will to effectively deal with the FARC. Colombia undertook most of their early counterinsurgency approaches in response to several smaller threats and not a single direct threat. Colombia did not employ the necessary amount of resources for success, because the insurgent threat did not warrant it. Colombia sought peace without addressing the root motivations of the insurgents; it was either a military approach or a negotiation approach, not a full spectrum governmental approach.

Numerous other variables can account for Colombia’s recent massing of resources against the FARC, (dynamic leadership, correct application of lessons learned, external actors’ support, economic conditions, etc.); however, the evidence suggests that it was not until the FARC began conducting operations at their will and against practically any target they chose, to include targets within Bogota, that the Colombian government began a counterinsurgency campaign using every element of national power available. The FARC grew to a point of posing a serious challenge to the Colombian government before the government resourced a productive counterinsurgency effort. Had the FARC confined their activities to the countryside as they did throughout much of their history, then the Colombian government would have likely continued their status quo response, without military reform or full participation from the government.

The case of the FARC insurgency in Colombia only partially supports the hypothesis concerning desensitization to violence. The case study shows general observations concerning the level of violence and can neither confirm nor deny a
quantitative level or range of violence that could be considered a violent social equilibrium, especially due to the numerous violent non-state actors operating in Colombia over the past 40 years. It is possible that until the late 1990s and through 2000–2002 that the level of violence in Colombia had achieved a level of status quo or an equilibrium point and that the FARC’s continued growth upset this point. In line with the first hypothesis, only when the FARC directly threatened Bogota and the Colombian military was the equilibrium level of violence disrupted. Had the FARC continued their growth but not threatened the state, then it is possible that they would have remained within the limits of a violent social equilibrium and could have eventually grown strong enough to overwhelm Colombia’s security forces.

In general, the Colombian society appears to have accepted periods of political violence as something that happens and not as a single shift in values that could be termed a violent social equilibrium. The FARC escalation throughout the 1990s, along with the activities of other violent non-state actors, appears to have exceeded the limit of acceptable violence to the people of Colombia. It is difficult to conclude whether this limit increased over the course of decades of violence or if the cumulative effects of violence finally reached a break point within the population in general. As with the War of 1000 Days and La Violencia, the level of violence in Colombia during the 1990s finally reached a point that was no longer tolerable.

It took over 30 years for the FARC, other guerrilla groups, and paramilitaries to reach a point that was no longer acceptable to Colombian society. This point is proven at least partially by President Uribe’s initial success against the FARC and his re-election, which demonstrates popular support for his progress against the insurgents. It is possible that as violence in Colombia is brought to an acceptable level, then space/opportunity will open, allowing the FARC or another group to re-emerge and again threaten the government.
IV. CONCLUSION

I hoped that we wouldn’t forget the political basis of such conflicts and mistakenly place our main reliance on military, police, and economic actions without recognizing that they are merely instruments of political will...the only salvation is to switch defense priorities back to what they should have been all along—the building and strengthening of a national political structure that was at one with the people—and insist that all other actions contribute to this goal. Even as a wartime priority, such sensitive work takes time.

— Ed Lansdale on countering future people’s wars.194

A. RESULTS OF HYPOTHESES ANALYSIS

Though this section discusses the results of this study in some detail, the analysis of the hypotheses serve more as a means to the end of a better understanding of protracted internal conflicts and as a basis to develop recommendations for achieving positive ends to internal wars.

The three cases studied in this thesis clearly support the hypothesis that the central government’s distance from the violence in an internal war directly affects its will to end the war. For both the CPP/NPA in the Philippines and the FARC in Colombia, the protraction of the wars is closely tied to the location of insurgent activity. The CPP/NPA and the FARC purposely employed a strategy based on the concept of Maoist people’s war, building support for their rebellion outside of the cities until they were strong enough to directly oppose the central government and their security forces. To this end, the CPP/NPA and the FARC both maintained a strong rural presence and have only been critically challenged by the government when they became strong enough to target the central government at will. This point is more evident in the case of the FARC, especially from 2000–2002, when they began conducting an increasing number of operations in Bogota, spurning a full-scale governmental counterinsurgency campaign. In both cases though, the will of the central government to defeat the insurgents,

illustrated by the redirection of internal resources to counter the insurgencies, increased as the insurgents came closer to directly challenging the governments’ central control of the state.

The case of Sri Lanka and the LTTE also supports the first hypothesis in that during each period of conflict LTTE attacks became more prevalent and on a larger scale before the GoSL launched a full-scale military effort to defeat the LTTE or attempt negotiations. The GoSL maintained military pressure on the LTTE throughout each period of war, but as LTTE violence increased, so, too, did the GoSL increase its efforts to defeat the LTTE. The relatively small physical size of Sri Lanka also had an effect on its will to defeat the LTTE. Because Sri Lanka is a small island nation, Colombo felt, in some way, almost all of the violence associated with the LTTE. The central government of Sri Lanka in Colombo was never far from the violence in that conflict, making almost every action conducted by the LTTE a threat to GoSL control.

Support for the hypothesis that desensitization to violence among the participants in an internal war (a change in values within society) leads to a violent social equilibrium (stalemate) among a state, counter-state, and the population of the state is not as strong as the first hypothesis. Normalization to the effects of protracted violence is an easy concept to grasp, yet difficult to substantiate. The cases of the LTTE and the FARC show an escalation of violence that exceeded the threshold of a violent social equilibrium in Sri Lanka and Colombia respectively. The will of the opposing sides to continue fighting in those conflicts certainly grew over the course of decades of fighting, shown by the continuation of the insurgencies after multiple failed peace negotiations. Each side was (or still is) fighting for their survival as a group seeking to achieve their goals through violent means. The protraction of the conflicts theoretically made it easier to continue fighting without substantive gains; otherwise, the insurgent groups would have given up or accepted a settlement instead of continuing their fight for decades. Both the LTTE and the FARC could have likely maintained their organizations had they not upset the equilibrium by increasing attacks against the state, which forced a comprehensive government response.
The case of the CPP/NPA in the Philippines demonstrates a violent social equilibrium more than the other cases. The GRP continues their fight against the CPP/NPA, but faced with other internal challenges have not yet pooled the national resources required to undertake a campaign that will defeat the CPP/NPA. Ultimately, the political and military actions of the GRP and the CPP/NPA represent a possible equilibrium of violence in the Philippines with neither side yielding to the other.

B. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL/ MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

1. GRP and CPP/NPA

   The CPP/NPA failed to capitalize on their most viable political opportunity after the 1986 election. With the fall of Marcos, the CPP/NPA were at their greatest numerical strength and consequently were in an excellent bargaining position; this coupled with President Aquino’s popularity and desire to negotiate with the CPP/NPA could have brought about a substantive change to the dynamics of the conflict and positive gains for the communist party. The strategy employed by the CPP/NPA was proven by Mao and was working for them under the Marcos dictatorship; however, when Marcos left the presidency, they should have reduced their expectations of complete victory and settled with taking advantage of the evolving political situation to achieve realistic change by compromising and negotiating with the GRP.

   The GRP should have done more to reduce the CPP/NPA’s expectations of achieving victory in the 1986–1987 period in order to influence them into realistic negotiations. The GRP could have also launched a robust information campaign aimed at reducing the CPP/NPA’s popular support base given the rapidly changing political situation during that time, making a broad appeal to support the new government brought about by a popular non-violent revolution. It would have taken a unified front from both the GRP and the AFP to make the CPP/NPA believe their chances of complete success were extremely low, but dissension within both the military and the government after the removal of Marcos prevented the GRP from bringing the CPP/NPA into a realistic negotiated settlement. The GRP did make significant gains in reducing the CPP/NPA threat after 1986, but systemic corruption (real or perceived) in government has
continued to feed the CPP/NPA ideology and ultimately the GRP has been unsuccessful at increasing its legitimacy. By curbing government corruption and increasing the perceived legitimacy of the government while at the same time maintaining military pressure and making positive developmental progress in the country as a whole, the GRP can slowly erode the base of the CPP/NPA.

2. Sri Lankan and LTTE

The GoSL, as the official state actor, could have taken more substantive actions earlier in the conflict to relieve some of the grievances of the ethnic Tamils and increase their (GoSL) legitimacy to rule in the eyes of more moderate Tamils. By the time the GoSL was willing to make worthwhile concessions to the Tamils, the LTTE had increased their support base, both internal and external, giving them more bargaining power with respect to their autonomy in Sri Lanka, leading to the cycle of conflict and ceasefire described throughout the case study.

As the conflict continued, the GoSL should have recognized the strength of the LTTE’s position, within the region and internationally, and resolved to a more protracted approach to ending the conflict. The GoSL should have simultaneously increased their capacity to counter high profile LTTE operations, addressed the legitimate concerns of moderate Tamils, thereby undermining the LTTE’s position in Tamil affairs, and launched an information campaign aimed at reducing the expectations for both the Sinhalese and the Tamils with respect to each side’s expected outcome for the conflict.

Ideally, regional powerbrokers (or even a more robust international intervention by nations similar to Norway), not just India, could have played a more active role in enforcing ceasefires and negotiations during the Sri Lankan Civil War, possibly incorporating some sort of strategic bargaining/ negotiation framework to achieve the best results for each side.

The LTTE, as the source of power and influence for the ethnic Tamils, should have recognized and taken full advantage of their relative strengths compared to the GoSL during the first parts (1983–1990) of the war. The LTTE initially had a great deal of international sympathy; however, as the conflict continued and they increased their
employment of terror against the GoSL, the LTTE lost legitimacy, credibility, and sympathy from their supporters. The LTTE could have scaled back their level of violence in a more protracted approach to achieving their goal of autonomy and they would have likely maintained a fair amount of international support, forcing the GoSL to make a more earnest attempt toward honest negotiations. By trying to take on the GoSL too quickly during each phase of the conflict, the LTTE unnecessarily exposed themselves to high casualties and an escalating war against the numerically superior SLAF, which ultimately led to their defeat on the battlefield.

Both sides of the Sri Lankan Civil War had a lot to gain by concluding the fight sooner rather than later. Well over 70,000 people lost their lives in the conflict, several hundred thousands more lost their homes and livelihoods, and both sides wasted incalculable amounts of resources, production, time, and money because a lasting settlement was never reached. The essential element missing from resolving the Sri Lankan Civil War sooner was not the capacity of either side’s military or their will to win, it was the absence of a legitimate, multi-national, nonpartisan coalition to broker and enforce a long term resolution that both the GoSL and the LTTE (or a majority of ethnic Tamils who could have undercut the LTTE) would have viewed as a better option than war.

3. Colombia and the FARC

While the evidence suggests that Colombia has made substantial progress toward improving their internal security and overall domestic stability, the recent advances against the FARC and other domestic threats could have been achieved far sooner.

The exclusionary two party political system established in the agreement to legitimize the Colombian government and bring an end to La Violencia, actually disenfranchised rural portions of Colombia’s population, leading to the growth of several armed revolutionary groups. Colombia should have recognized that their political system left no alternative for certain groups to be heard other than by mobilizing a violent opposition to the government. Rather than attempting to end the insurgencies primarily through military means, a government structure that was more inclusive and therefore
perceived as more legitimate would have likelyunderscored the logic of armed
opposition to the central government. With a representative and legitimate central
government, Colombia could have sought to methodically improve the image of the state
in the areas where Colombia had historically little or no government influence. A
protracted approach taken by the government to enhance its legitimacy and build genuine
influence among the rural population would have likely reduced the motivations of
insurgency to negligible levels.

When the Colombian government did open the political system to a third party,
the UP, and negotiated with some insurgent groups, breakaway guerrilla factions and
violent political rivalries erupted and destabilized the potential for lasting peace. Without
the ability to monopolize security and maintain control within its own political system,
the Colombian government could do little more than continue pursuing integration of
violent non-state actors from a weak position. Colombia required effective security
forces to retake the balance of power from the multiple insurgencies, paramilitaries, and
drug cartels before a sustainable attempt toward a negotiated settlement could take hold.
The military reform that began during President Pastrana’s term finally enabled
Colombia to begin a long term and effective approach to defeating the insurgents under
the whole of government counterinsurgency strategy put into effect under President
Uribe.

C. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING PROTRACTED INTERNAL WARS

1. Distractions Affecting the Counterinsurgent’s Will

The governments of each case studied in this thesis had at least two major
insurgencies threatening the governments’ control. Unable to mass efforts against any
one group individually, each government initially attempted to attend to their internal
problems directly through military means, depleting valuable government resources.

The Philippines had to contend with the CPP/NPA, the MNLF, the MILF, and
multiple breakaway groups; Sri Lanka faced threats not only from the LTTE, but also
from the JVP and interference from India with the IPKF; and Colombia had to deal with
the FARC, ELN, EPL, M-19, various paramilitaries including the AUC, and large drug cartels. The governments of these countries all had to make tough decisions regarding how best to address their respective problems. Ultimately, it is the government’s responsibility to meet fundamental requirements for their citizens and a government that cannot effectively provide for the basic needs of their population risks losing control to a group that will.

Though this thesis does not directly address this point, each case demonstrated that the central governments could not militarily defeat multiple insurgencies simultaneously. The Philippines is still fighting against the CPP/NPA, the MILF, and various factions of each. Sri Lanka had to negotiate peace with the LTTE while they suppressed the JVP. Only after addressing the JVP insurgency was Sri Lanka able to defeat the LTTE by direct military action and this was after a major split within the LTTE. Colombia is still battling the FARC, the ELN, and various paramilitary groups, yet is making slow progress against these threats.

The distraction of a government’s focus from effectively dealing with an armed challenger is implicit in the finding that a government’s will to defeat an insurgency increases with the proximity of violence to the central government. The government has to prioritize its allocation of resources, which became clear in each case study. As an insurgent group increased their challenge to the state, either by sheer growth or by increased violence near the seat of government, the state redirected its focus to meet the challenge. Because governments possess finite resources and there will always be competing demands for those resources, it should become clear to a government that they should not waste assets trying to quickly defeat an emerging threat, especially one that is recognized as protracted. Rather, governments should counter emerging threats with their own protracted strategy, strategically balancing their resources to reduce support to insurgent groups while improving security. If a country’s population perceives the central government to be legitimate and the government provides for the basic needs of its citizenry (including security), then support for an insurgency will erode; therefore, governments should focus the preponderance of their resources not on directly engaging insurgents, but on enhancing their own legitimacy and meeting the expectations of the
Managing public perceptions, enhancing the government’s legitimacy and countering the insurgent’s legitimacy, is crucial to an effective government response to insurgency. The government that faces serious threats to its internal security needs to prepare itself and its citizens psychologically for a long fight and recognize that a quick resolution to an internal war is unrealistic. Strategic patience is paramount to a sustainable peace. The counterinsurgency practitioner must approach the conflict with the mindset that he can outlast the insurgent and then work toward that end by denying the appeal of a quick solution and the inherent waste of vital resources that comes with the quest for an expedient end.

2. Failed Negotiations

Each of the cases studied in this thesis experienced at least some failure to achieve an effective settlement through negotiating. While academics have written entire books on how to be effective at strategic negotiating, a few simple lessons come out of this thesis with respect to negotiating solutions to internal conflicts.

- Insurgents will take advantage of negotiations to rest, refit, and reorganize; the counterinsurgent should seek ways to verify the veracity of the insurgent’s intentions for negotiating.

- Effective settlements cannot be achieved from a position of weakness, unless a significant third party or coalition can influence, monitor, and control the situation.

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• Lack of trust seems to be the deciding factor in negotiating a settlement to an internal war. The legitimacy of both sides’ actions in a negotiation corresponds directly with trust. Each side should pursue every effort to enhance their own trustworthiness; third party intervention may help broker a lasting settlement.

• Information operations or psychological operations might help to strengthen the perceived negotiating position of one side or the other and can do the same to reduce the expectations of the opponent; this could help set the conditions to maximize the settlement.

Failed negotiations are a common characteristic from the internal war cases studied in this thesis. The most peaceful solution to conflict, a negotiated settlement, also appears to be the least likely outcome in prolonged internal wars. Future studies of internal conflicts could provide explicit analysis into the causes of failures in conflict negotiation and find ways to increase the probability of successfully negotiating settlements between belligerents.

3. Strategic Failures

The strategic interaction of opponents in the cases studied in this thesis could add to the explanation of prolonged conflict. Both the CPP/NPA and the FARC employed a deliberate protracted strategy to achieve their revolutionary goals; the governments of the Philippines and Colombia countered these revolutions predominately through direct military means. As long as the state actor attempted a direct military solution to the protracted insurgent strategy, the insurgent’s strength grew steadily. It could be that the state actors involved in these protracted insurgencies became so attached to their respective strategies that they could not recognize their own strategic failures. This shortcoming of not wanting to change from a certain way of doing things is a psychological phenomena referred to by Ephraim Kam as “judgmental biases.”

Alternatively, if the state’s response to the insurgent becomes institutionalized, then it

also becomes unresponsive to necessary change. Over the course of the war, the strategies did not change until some major event altered the way the actors perceived the conflict; the EDSA People’s Power Revolution in the Philippines and President Pastrana’s failed negotiations with the FARC in Colombia. The most effective way to overcome a judgmental bias is to recognize that a bias may exist and to seek another perspective, preferably from an outside actor.

In Sri Lanka, the strategies only changed from those of direct military engagement to attempted negotiations with the negotiations appearing as a way for both sides to refit in preparation for another round of conflict. Sri Lanka and the LTTE seem to have accepted their war as a war to the very end, with their respective will to win emboldened throughout each escalation of hostilities.

4. Assistance to Countries Trapped in Cycles of Conflict

This thesis did not look specifically into the function that external actors played in each of the conflicts studied. To some degree, third-party intervention on behalf of the state or the insurgent can affect the duration of the war. The case of Sri Lanka and the LTTE demonstrates some of the possible roles of external influence on an internal war, as shown with the Tamil Diaspora’s financial support to the LTTE, India’s intervention first with covert support of the LTTE and later as peacekeepers, and finally, Norway’s attempt to induce peace between the two groups. Future research into the field of conflict resolution could isolate the variable of external actors’ support to internal wars, determine the conditions in which external support positively or negatively influenced the outcome of the conflict, and present recommendations for providing effective support. This thesis did bring forward some implicit findings for providing external support to the state actor of an internal war.

Prior to providing assistance to countries experiencing prolonged periods of violence, the benefactor of aid should gain a clear understanding of the intricacies of the conflict. The external supporter needs to conduct his own assessment of the war and determine how his intervention will affect not only the war’s belligerents but also the effects on regional actors as well.
The outside backer should take care to enhance the legitimacy of the beneficiary and ensure that all instruments of assistance are coordinated in a unified and mutually supporting manner. All support, be it financial, military, developmental, etc., should contribute to a clearly defined strategy that enhances the beneficiary’s ability to achieve a long-term unilateral effort. The sponsor should avoid activities that could detract from the recipient’s legitimacy; understanding the second- and third-order effects and the context in which the participants and regional actors will judge the support.

D. THE WAY AHEAD

The study of conflict resolution and internal wars has the potential to influence positive change in many of the world’s war zones. This thesis has demonstrated that to some degree, a government’s determination to defeat an insurgency is closely tied to the physical location that an insurgent threatens the government; insurgents can maintain their organization as long as it does not exceed the government’s tolerance for violence, especially as it occurs in the capital city. To a lesser extent, this thesis shows that as a conflict continues over the course of decades, both sides’ resolve to continue fighting is emboldened and therefore, the likelihood of continued fighting increases; they view war as the only way to attain a resolution. In a war of survival, for both sides it becomes a battle of wills.

The case studies in this thesis demonstrate that the most effective strategy in resolving an internal war is one that involves a whole of government approach and as Colombia has shown recently, implemented with the understanding that the state cannot achieve a quick military victory. Each case showed the futility of attempting an exclusively military end to insurgency. Sri Lanka, the exception to the whole of government approach, viewed the military solution as the only way to achieve success. The Sri Lankan strategy led to four distinct outbreaks of hostilities and caused an unseemly humanitarian crisis as the SLAF employed every means available to destroy the LTTE. The Philippines has yet to coordinate an effective allocation of government resources toward ending their war with the CPP/NPA and without a consistently legitimate government is not likely to successfully resolve this conflict in the near future.
A combination of strategic patience, enhanced public confidence in government, and a protracted whole of government approach to countering insurgency are fundamental to successfully bringing internal conflicts under control. These three conditions are necessary to end cycles of prolonged war in which some countries find themselves and cannot seem to arrest the solution.
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