A CLASH OF MILITARY TRADITIONS: MERITOCRACY, MODERNIZATION, AND NEO-TRADITIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID) POLICY

by

Derek R. Keller

December 2009

Thesis Co-Advisors: Marcos (Mark T.) Berger Kalev I. Sepp

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A CLASH OF MILITARY TRADITIONS: MERITOCRACY, MODERNIZATION, AND NEO-TRADITIONAL CHALLENGES TO UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID) POLICY

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ABSTRACT

In the decades before, and with greater intensity since 1945, the United States of America engaged in numerous “nation-building” efforts around the world, the focus of which was the creation, or the strengthening, of national military establishments in allied-states. With the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act in 1986, Foreign Internal Defense (FID) became a legislatively directed activity of the Special Operations Forces of the U.S. Army. Since 1986, FID has been formally defined by the U.S. Department of the Army as the “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency” (DA FM 3-05.202, 2007, p. 1). This thesis provides an examination of the effectiveness of the U.S. Army’s FID. It argues that FID, or what can also be characterized as foreign army building, has failed more often than it has succeeded. Furthermore, this failure is primarily a result of a clash of military traditions between the U.S advisors conducting FID and the recipient military establishments. Under these circumstances, the FID model needs to be altered. Applying a revised, more flexible version of FID, would yield greater success in current and future FID operations.
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<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<td>BACNA</td>
<td>Colombian Counter-Narcotics Battalion</td>
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<td>CSAR</td>
<td>Combat Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>IDAD</td>
<td>Internal Defense and Development</td>
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<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance and Advisory Group</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non Commissioned Officer</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Outside of United States military circles, very few people have heard of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) or know what it entails. Since the rise of the United States of America as a global power following World War II, Washington has presided over a large, overlapping set of military-defense security alliances with nation-states around the world. Even before its formal codification in 1986, FID-like operations (or, what more precisely might be described as foreign army building) were a key element in these arrangements. At the same time, numerous governments from Latin America to Africa, and from the Middle East to Asia, have actively sought military defense, security-oriented aid from, and formal alliances with, Washington during and after the Cold War. Meanwhile, the U.S. has attempted to ally itself with the governments concerned, through a variety of types of aid and assistance. Despite its relative obscurity, FID has been central to a large number of these U.S. efforts to build partnerships and support friendly regimes. The U.S. Department of the Army formally defines FID as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency” (DA FM 3-05.202, 2007, p. 1–1).

Both before and after the explicit enunciation of FID, following the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act in 1986, the U.S. military sought, and continues to seek, to bolster foreign military establishments (that is engage in foreign army building) by training and equipping them in order to help the host nation improve its internal defense capabilities. Since 1986, FID has become a legislatively directed activity of SOF. The United States has conducted, and continues to conduct, hundreds of FID programs around the world. Given the now widespread application of FID, in the wider context of the waxing and waning of concerns about nation-building (or state-building), to which FID is a central part. A thorough examination of the effectiveness of FID is not only justified, but overdue. To this end, this introductory chapter discusses the background and history of FID. It then turns to an examination of the still very limited research that focuses explicitly on FID, while also discussing related
works on the theory and practice of nation-building and state-building. This is followed by a more detailed evaluation of some of the key theories of modernization, development, and state-building as they relate to FID. This introductory chapter ends with a brief delineation of the overall content and main themes of the chapters that follow, while also spelling out the overall argument of the thesis. The fundamental concern is to make clear the current shortcomings that characterize FID and focus on how to overcome those shortcomings.

A. A SHORT HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND THE DELINEATION OF FID DOCTRINE

Where FID is being conducted, the U.S. government works with its host nation counterparts, through the embassy teams, in the country concerned. The embassy teams operate an Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) program, and FID is an important part of this strategy. The U.S. National Security Council and State Department are the primary agencies involved in FID program development. The goal of FID is to create a fully functioning military force that is responsive to the particular allied government, and enable it to maintain internal security and stability (DA FM 3-05.202, 2007). As noted at the outset, FID was officially codified in 1986 with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. At that time, the United States Military Special Operations Forces (SOF) was given the primary responsibility for planning and conducting FID in support of the United States of America’s foreign policy objectives. Despite formal responsibility for FID being given to SOF, Foreign Internal Defense has now become a key “competency” within a broad array of overseas operations and programs for which the U.S. military in general is responsible. In order to facilitate the practice of FID, and establish a FID Doctrine, the U.S. Department of Defense has published some (albeit still limited) literature on the subject. For example, Joint Publication 3–07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, outlines what it understands to be the military responsibilities and objectives in
the performance of FID. It states that the goal of FID is to organize, train, and equip foreign militaries to be able to support the security and stability of their governments (DoD JP 3–07.1, 2004, p. 69).

In order to achieve this goal the DoD document states that the U.S. military personnel concerned should “tailor military support of FID programs to the environment and the specific needs of the supported Host Nation” (DoD JP 3–07.1, 2004, p. xi). However, it is increasingly clear that over the course of the actual conduct of FID in a wide range of countries, U.S. military advisers consistently ignore the "tailoring" element of current FID doctrine. What the U.S. military personnel do repeatedly when assigned to carry out FID is attempt to reorganize host nation militaries so that they mirror the organizational structure of the U.S. military. In the vast majority of cases where FID has been conducted—including the decades prior to 1986—the implicit model is the U.S. military itself (generally a somewhat romanticized version of the U.S. military model), and the goal of virtually every FID operation is to turn the military establishment in question into a copy of the U.S. military.

Exacerbating the problem further, is the fact that after host nation militaries are organized according to the U.S. template, the host nation forces are then trained using the same approach that is believed to be effective for U.S. forces: the "crawl-walk-run" method. The U.S. Army refers to this as “the most effective method of training to standard," and it involves "teaching individual student tasks, battle drills, collective tasks, and STXs [Situational Training Exercises]" based on the assumption that this is the only way to develop "well-trained leaders and units” (DA FM 31–20-3, 1994, p. 3–3). In fact, the U.S. military personnel conducting FID invariably use the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-8, Infantry Rifle, Platoon and Squad, to accomplish these goals and teach ground combat tactics to foreign forces. Furthermore, despite the often dubious results, there is a continued unwillingness to address the fact that FM 7–8 was designed to teach U.S. forces and was not designed to instruct forces that have emerged out of what are vastly different organizational backgrounds, social contexts or military traditions.
There is a common chain of events that characterizes FID missions in the countries where they have taken place or are taking place. U.S. forces arrive, reorganize, and train host nation units along similar lines to the U.S. military. This action is done with no consideration for the pre-existing organizational structure of the host nation forces, its military traditions, or the wider social and political context. FID advisers use the U.S. model as the default setting, and train accordingly. In the beginning, while under direct supervision of American personnel, the host nation forces attempt to emulate, or at least engage in the pretence of emulating, the U.S. model. However, as soon as U.S. advisers leave the country, host nation forces revert to the same organizational structure and training methods that they had been using before the U.S.-led FID mission arrived on the scene. As will be demonstrated in the case studies in subsequent chapters, despite concerted effort by FID advisors over the course of their in-country missions, the host nation forces consistently retain and revert to their pre-existing military traditions. Time has shown that despite a huge number of FID-style operations dating back at least to the early decades of the twentieth century, U.S. military organizational structures and practices have failed to take root in the vast majority of cases. This in turn indicates that there is a problem in the United States’ approach to conducting FID.

B. NATION-BUILDING AND THEORIES OF FID

Research on, and studies of, FID specifically are very limited, confined primarily to military manuals produced by the U.S. Department of Defense. However, FID (and foreign army building) is arguably a key component in the theory and practice of nation-building, or state-building. A military’s ability to maintain security and stability are crucial in the conducting of nation-building; it is the foundation for all other means of assistance to a foreign government engaged in the process of nation-building.

The research on FID produced by the U.S. military lacks a holistic understanding of the problem sets that are involved in the execution of FID. Current research on FID by the DOD has focused mainly on the individual as the unit of analysis. There is a preponderance of studies being produced by the U.S. military that attempt to solve the problems associated with the failure of FID operations to effectively create, or strengthen,
foreign military establishments by focusing on cultural awareness and language skills at the individual level. The U.S. military’s main effort to make FID more effective, focuses on the individual U.S. soldier-advisor. It seeks to empower him by providing a better cultural understanding of his counterpart. The wider goal is to conduct a bottom-up approach to creating, reorganizing, and ultimately standing up an allied-military establishment, which can provide a foundation and the framework for nation-building more generally.

History has demonstrated that this approach has not produced much in the way of positive results. There is a need to move beyond current military thought on FID, and utilize other approaches that will benefit the theory and practice of FID specifically, and nation-building (or state-building) more generally. Various disciplines, such as sociology, anthropology, political science, international relations, history, and even business studies, can be brought to highlight the importance of carrying out FID in a fashion that focuses on establishing genuine congruence at the collective, organizational, and institutional levels between the U.S. advisors on one hand, and their host nation counterparts on the other hand.

It is often said that the military is a microcosm of the society of which it is a part (setting aside the question of whether or not some military establishments are in fact ‘connected’ to the society concerned—clearly some are not and therein lies a particularly profound problem worth noting, but beyond the scope of this thesis). If we follow this logic, then the best, and possibly the easiest way, forward is for the military to be organized in a way that acknowledges the societal norms and ‘national’ context from which it has, or will, emerge and within which it operates. If a particular society is defined or self-identified by a strong emphasis on education, or a rigid caste system and a high level of social stratification, then the question becomes whether the military organization should emulate these differences, or at least address them in some fashion. Attempting to stand up a military organization contrary to a society’s traditions and military traditions, has proven time and time again to be a recipe for failure. The U.S. is viewed by many of its citizens as being an egalitarian society. There is a tendency to project a romanticized view of the United States of America, onto ‘America’ but also
onto humanity as a whole. Many of the host nations FID-advisors work in do not share American ideas about equality and meritocracy generally, or the meritocratic structure and practice of the U.S. military more specifically. These structures and practices are themselves often romanticized consciously or unconsciously by members of the American military.

Soldiers and academics have been pointing out these problems for over 40 years. Former WWII Polish Army Officer and later renowned sociologist Stanislav Andreski is one such individual. Stanislav Andreski (1968) argues in Military Organization and Society that many social strata are fixed, and prevent the movement of individuals upward in the power continuum (p. 21). These types of societies are very unlikely to adopt the U.S. military model. In many traditional societies, the military leaders are the key power brokers in politics. Andreski further states that it is not surprising that the military leaders form the supreme stratum of a society (p. 26). Economics are a key factor in stratifying a society; however, “(t)he pure plutocracy, that is to say, the rule of the rich who do not control” the military “can only be a temporary phenomenon” (Andreski, 1968). This theorizing points directly to the military as a stratified element of a society. Working within these confines will help when organizing and equipping a foreign military.

Additionally, political scientist and author, Emily O. Goldman focuses much of her research on the diffusion of military technology throughout different cultures. Military organizational structures can be seen as an example of technology and her research has some important implications for the concerns of this thesis. Goldman (2006) identifies the way elites, institutions and culture affect military innovation. The assimilation of modern ideas and practices is dependent on the society’s power brokers resistance to the modification of the stat quo (p. 69). In this context the military establishment, regardless of its size, is both a reflection of and a key element in the general social structure of any given host nation. When embarking on FID-operations it is important to take into account the relationship between the military traditions and the social structure of the host nation. An awareness of this crucial factor will help when engaging in foreign army building.
Meanwhile, political scientists, Dan Reiter and Allen Stam III (1998) claim that the benefits of democratic institutions empower the individual soldier and have better organizational efficacy, which reaps vast benefits on the battlefield (p. 259). Regime type lends some credence to the effectiveness of a military in a given situation. With this study focusing on the national level as the unit of analysis, it only makes sense that this research may be applicable. It is quite possible that many of the regimes we need to empower have seriously limited the power of their military to prevent a coup. Nepotism and political appointments run rampant in these types of situations. Leaders must protect themselves from the loss of power. “This encourages the civilian leadership to promote military leaders who are politically loyal to the regime rather than leaders who are militarily competent and to frequently rotate officers to prevent them from developing close ties with their troops” (Tullock, 1987, p. 116). In the U.S., we are accustomed to being told that a meritocracy-based system is the cornerstone of social life, an outlook that regularly blinds us to the realities on the ground both at home and overseas. Although the United States of America celebrates its meritocratic social system, it is clear to any informed observer that America has historically and continues to have a well-defined albeit changing social hierarchy. Opportunity is abundant, but social stratification remains. In the case of FID, part of the problem is that the often-praised meritocratic system for which America is famous is more prevalent in theory and in practice in the U.S. military than it is in U.S. society as a whole.

While Henry Mintzberg (the business expert) theorizes mainly about business structures and their effectiveness and synchronization with their environment, his work has major implications for the relationship between military organizations and the societies to which they are connected and important insights for the revised practice of FID. His major contribution to the literature is stated in his article Organizational design: fashion or fit? He argues that in order for an organization to be effective, it must fit with its environment (1981, p. 104). This theory is critical to understanding the way militaries are designed and function. In subsequent chapters, this thesis will demonstrate the relevance of Mintzenberg’s research, by applying his model to military organizations and FID operations in various countries, to help answer the question: does the modern U.S.
military model align with the countries the U.S. military will work with, or is there a better structure that will fit in a given environment?

Also of relevance here is the book *After War* by the reconstruction pundit Christopher J. Coyne, which discusses the problems associated with post war reconstruction. After War, is a recent and important contribution to the burgeoning literature on nation-building and post-war reconstruction. FID, as Coyne and others imply, is involved in a post war reconstruction and the foundation for successful nation-building is a solid military and police force that can provide security and stability. Coyne is concerned that the U.S has had and will continue to have many problems in the various post conflict settings in which it finds itself. Military victories in future conflicts will be relatively easy for the United States of America as the world’s sole remaining superpower. The problems facing the global superpower will come in the post conflict, or nation-building phase of our interventions. FID practitioners who interface with foreign armies in post military operations will find Coyne’s book extremely helpful in negotiating the labyrinth of post-war reconstruction issues.

Coyne’s argument is that “policymakers and occupiers face an array of constraints—both internal and external to the country being reconstructed—that make reconstruction efforts more likely to fail than to succeed” (Coyne, 2008, p. 173). Why then did the U.S. do so well at reconstruction in post WWII Japan and West Germany? Why can’t it be replicated again? Coyne deftly examines the two historical reconstruction success stories of West Germany and Japan. He shows why those cases were successful, and why the lessons learned there are not carried through or applied to present-day nation-building and foreign army building.

According to Coyne, the key problem was solved in West Germany and Japan prior to reconstruction. The unconditional surrender of the government of these countries unified their people and solved a lot of meta-level issues. The governments and militaries concerned had capitulated and they proceeded to allow foreigners to play a crucial role in the reconstruction of their political and social systems and their military establishments. From this point onwards, reconstruction period focused on solving a range of underlying problems related to coordination and cooperation. Iraq and Afghanistan, and many of our
future conflicts will put the U.S. in a position of attempting to solve the meta-level game rather than dealing with the underlying problems associated with ‘national’ coordination and cooperation. In the latter two polities, there are currently no national norms and structures to help frame a unifying FID operation. Developing competent foreign armies in this context is very problematic and takes considerable time, effort and public will. Coyne’s book After War presents a cogent argument and offers a major contribution to the ongoing dialogue surrounding post conflict nation-building and reconstruction. Furthermore, his book shows that FID will play, or will need to play, a key role in any type of intervention and post-war reconstruction the U.S may attempt now and in the future.

More broadly, this thesis argues that post-war reconstruction and foreign army building needs to concentrate on national level structures and culture, while making every effort to develop a better understanding of the particularities of the FID-oriented tasks we are undertaking. A combination of nation-building theory and military-oriented realism can result in the more effective conduct of FID. A broad-based top-down approach that analyzes the nation as a whole and addresses its specific characteristics will provide us with many of the answers to successful FID. While, individual cultural awareness and language skills are a great enabler, they are not enough. We must first look at the larger context before focusing on its individual components, and avoid using notions of ‘culture’, both our own and those of the host nation in a rigid and deterministic fashion. At the same time, one should also avoid assuming that social structures and military and other traditions are easily altered. For example, there is a strong and deeply rooted belief among many Americans (articulated in theory if not in practice) that the principles of democracy will bring about peace and development. While there exists some validity in this thought process, democratization cannot even begin to take effect until a political and social foundation is laid. A central part of this foundation is a strong security apparatus that can provide the stability for a more open political system and social and development programs to take root. Synthesizing the various theoretical insights discussed above could enable the U.S. military to develop the appropriate FID approach for a given host
nation—rather than applying the same approach across a range of countries with different “neo-traditional” political and social arrangements.

C. FID IN ACTION AND THE NEO-TRADITIONAL CHALLENGE

In relation to this point, it is important to note that the U.S. military is invariably deployed to conduct FID in countries that can be said fit the “neo-traditional” model. Generally, we have not and will not be conducting FID in “modern” countries. The interaction of the “modern meritocratic” and the “neo-traditional” models is the critical element in understanding and fashioning the appropriate approach to foreign army building. This thesis will provide an understanding of our “modern” model, the many variations on the neo-traditional model and the problems that can occur when the former encounters one or more of the latter.

This thesis proposes that a combination of military FID structure, military goals, and a calibrated degree of cultural acceptance will generate FID success in a given country. These are three concepts that must all interact simultaneously to produce a successful FID outcome.

![Figure 1. Three Concepts to Successful FID](image)

Successful FID will flow from the use of these three concepts and is comparable to a three-legged stool; if one leg is longer than the others, the stool will not function
properly and may even fall. It is the balance of all three "legs" that produces a military capable of providing security and stability to a foreign government. See Figure 2 for a graphical depiction of this concept.

![Figure 2. Three-Legged Stool Approach to Successful FID](image)

The goals and culture of a foreign military are deeply embedded, and therefore cannot be readily changed by U.S. personnel. The one element that can be easily altered is the FID structural model the United States uses to increase military capabilities. A detailed pre-FID mission analysis of the existing structure, goals, and culture will enable FID practitioners to develop an appropriate FID structural model approach. If this argument is correct, and the model propounded here is applied, U.S. FID could be more effective in developing successful foreign militaries that are consistent with the existing structure, goals, and traditions of the host nation military. This approach should yield a result that is far more preferable to all stakeholders than the current approach. The structure, goals, and traditions of a foreign military are not readily controlled by U.S. personnel. The one element we can alter is the FID model we attempt to employ.

D. SUMMARY

This chapter reviewed the origins of FID and some parallel theories on nation-building and post-war reconstruction, which provide insight into FID policy development and practice. This chapter has argued for a new approach to FID based on an evaluation
of our current FID methods and their repeated failure. Chapter II will look the models mentioned above in more detail. Chapter III and Chapter IV will provide detailed case studies of U.S. foreign army building: Vietnam in Chapter III and Colombia and El Salvador in Chapter IV. Overall, this thesis argues that the U.S. military’s execution of FID is critically flawed in the vast majority of cases. This assertion is supported by the fact that host nation forces consistently return to pre-FID organizational structures and traditions as soon as the U.S. military departs the host nation. Additionally, these forces are generally as ineffective after being subjected to a FID-operation as they were before. Many times the U.S FID forces try to make major structural or cultural changes to a traditional and non-egalitarian military. These changes are not welcomed and actually generate strife and a backlash. Thus, the question remains: Why does the United States insist on forcing the U.S. model on countries who will not readily adopt it? What would be a better method of conducting FID?

To this end, this thesis will determine under what conditions the current United States Foreign Internal Defense model has been, or will be accepted and produce a military force capable of providing security and stability for the allied government concerned. In particular, the thesis seeks to determine whether there are certain preconditions in the host nation that, when analyzed and understood, can facilitate a better FID model being employed and result in a more successful outcome. Chapter V recommends and explicates a new approach to foreign army building. If this argument is correct, and the U.S. military were to embrace the new approach outlined here, we would see the U.S military being more successful at facilitating the building of foreign militaries in the future.
II. THE MERITOCRATIC-MILITARY MODEL VS. THE NEO-TRADITIONAL MILITARY MODEL

As was argued in the introductory chapter, when one observes the high number of countries in which FID operations have been, or are being carried out, the success record thus far is mixed at best. This raises the question as to why success rates are so low. At the outset, it needs to be remembered that FID has, and continues to, focus on specific nation-states. The unit of analysis for this critical evaluation of FID is the national level military force. It is worth noting too, that the focus of conventional nation-building or state-building operations down to the present remain focused on the ‘national’. The U.S. military, as this thesis argues, needs to re-examine the existing military organizational structure and context in any given national case (this might involve months of work by a dedicated ‘fact finding’ mission) prior to deploying a FID operation, In order to explore this question, this chapter contrasts two general models of military organization and the wider context from which these models have emerged. The goal here is to conduct a side-by-side comparison of two idealized types of military organizational structures, and show that the application of the model favored by the United States is doomed to fail if the actual practitioners of FID do not pay careful attention to the particulars of the context in which they are conducting FID—even if their long-term goal is the creation of a military establishment similar to, or the same as, the U.S. model. It will become clear that the U.S. military model (which is the FID model) is at best a poor "fit" in the vast majority of situations where FID operations are conducted, which is why the U.S. model routinely fails to be adopted in the nation-state concerned.

A. MODELS

Two models of military organization will be used to examine and better understand FID and how to move beyond the current problems that afflict the vast majority of FID operations. It should be emphasized at the outset that both models are heuristic and schematic. They represent two ends of a spectrum and attempt to capture the fundamental differences across a range of organized standing armies and the need to
take this into account when conducting FID operations. The models used are the “meritocratic-military model” and the “neo-traditional military model.” Both models encompass considerable variation and both reflect the fact that from the moment a military organization comes into being it establishes and then reproduces its own particular military traditions, structures, doctrines and procedures. It is fair to say that prior to the First World War; all military establishments followed some form of the neo-traditional model. It is only in the twentieth century that we start to see examples of the meritocratic-military model appearing, with the post-World War II U.S. military being the exemplar of this model (Arms, 1989).

B. NEO-TRADITIONAL MILITARY MODEL

The neo-traditional model, as the term is being used here, is characterized by a two-party hierarchy consisting of officers and enlisted soldiers. There is a tendency for a high degree of separation between the two groups based on social status. The span of control, defined as “the number of people directly reporting to the next higher level in the hierarchy” (Glindow, 2007, p. 236) is usually higher in the neo-traditional model than in the meritocratic model resulting in an organization with a flatter structure in the neo-traditional case. This broader span of control may be a result of things such as limited differentiation between the duties of various soldiers (Refer to Table 1). The armies participating in the Napoleonic wars were a perfect example of the neo-traditional model. There was a drastic difference between the officers and enlisted men, a single officer controlled a large number of soldiers, and there was almost no specialization—when the command was given by the officer, the bulk of the participants charged straight ahead with rifles and bayonets as did their opponents, although there were variations in the overall form the charge took. Many developing nations operate under this model and have officer-centric military forces. The masses of the military enlisted are generally comprised of conscripts serving 18 to 24 months. The use of the traditional model being used in the countries of Iraq, Colombia, and Peru, as well as others, has been witnessed by the author.
C. MERITOCRATIC-MILITARY MODEL

In contrast to the two-tiered neo-traditional model, the Meritocratic-Military-Model is characterized by a four-tiered hierarchy involving officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers. This model exhibits a smaller span of control compared to the neo-traditional model. The Meritocratic-Military-Model is centered on a large, professional, tier of middle management and a high degree of specialization. One of the key features of the meritocratic-military-model is an extensive noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. These are the Sergeants and the backbone of the military. The NCO corps allows the span of control at any given level to be reduced to approximately three to five individuals. The effect of this reduced span of control is the increased vertical complexity of the entire military organization. The meritocratic-military-model is often horizontally decentralized, with standardization of operations (Refer to Table 1). Standardization, coupled with competent and motivated forces, allows for decision making to be pushed down to a lower level, thereby reducing the time necessary to make decisions. We have worked hand-in-hand with many allied military establishments that are organized using the meritocratic-military-model very similarly to the United States, including Australia, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, and others.

D. THE ORIGINS OF THE MERITOCRATIC-MILITARY-MODEL

The meritocratic military model can be seen to have emerged from the neo-traditional military model, and its development was and is emblematic of wider historical changes generally, and changes in the technologies of warfare more specifically. The NCO corps was established in the early twentieth century in the modern armies of the world in order, to effectively project leadership to lower ranks and quickly adapt in situations of complex armed conflict. In the vernacular of organizational design, this is referred to as vertical complexity. In addition to adding another layer of management, the NCOs were given authority for making decisions on the battlefield. This is referred to as vertical decentralization. Decentralizing authority down to a level able to quickly see changes in the situation enabled front-line units to make decisions and increase the units
overall ability to rapidly react in a fluid environment. The increased number of empowered small-unit leaders enabled the combatant forces to deal better with the uncertainties of a complex battlefield.

Although the meritocratic military model may be well-suited to modernized militaries and societies, the neo-traditional two-tiered structure may still work well for neo-traditional societies. As Henry Mintzberg observed in “Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit?” in order for an organization to be effective it must fit its environment (1981, p. 104). As such, it would be expected that a meritocratic-military-model would not be readily adopted in a neo-traditional setting. The existing neo-traditional structure is a complex system that is built around many factors (Figure 3). The neo-traditional model may have many merits when analyzed from this perspective. If the United States military is to conduct FID in a country that uses the neo-traditional model, it would be wise to understand the broader implications that accompany the neo-traditional model.

Figure 3. Influences on Structure (Daft, 2001, p. 48)

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1 Model retrieved from Professor Erik Jansen, MN3121 Organizational Design for Special Operations” 2009 class on Open System Models.
E. CONTRASTS

Certain organizational models fit better in a given society or environment. In an effort to determine features that affect the fit, the next sections contrast a range of aspects of the military, environment, and cultures that employ the different models. Several aspects of the two models presented may be salient to future theories. In some of the contrasts that will be discussed below, it is important to remember that the description is relative in relation to the two heuristic models being used. For example, if one compared an adhocracy to the meritocratic model they would see that the meritocratic model is very centralized. Centralization is defined as “the degree to which formal decision authority is held by a small group of people, typically those at the top of the organizational hierarchy” (McShane & Von Glinow, 2007). However, when compared to the neo-traditional model, the meritocratic model is quite decentralized.

F. STRUCTURAL SECTION

Table 1. Structural Contrasts between Neo-traditional and Meritocratic Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Neo-traditional Structure</th>
<th>Meritocratic Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Span of control</td>
<td>10 and higher</td>
<td>3 – 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal structure</td>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure description</td>
<td>Flat</td>
<td>Tall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical military rank distribution</td>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Higher enlisted to leader ratio</em></td>
<td><em>Lower enlisted to leader ratio</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Less Complex</td>
<td>More Complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Neo-traditional Structure</td>
<td>Meritocratic Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formalization</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical decentralization</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority delegated to lower echelons</td>
<td>Lower echelons have almost no authority</td>
<td>Lower echelons have more authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal decentralization</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shift of power from line managers to staff managers, analysts, support specialists, and operators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical differentiation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of stovepipes of hierarchy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal differentiation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of different job specialties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>Divisional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

Table 1 shows differences in the two models; the neo-traditional model differs from the meritocratic model in every category. The U.S. military structure is emblematic of the meritocratic model. The small span of control and higher leader to subordinate ratios allow for more decentralized operations. This structure allows the United States to leverage a meritocratic technologically advanced force to effectively fight in complex environments. Many organizations employing the meritocratic model are divisional in nature and can accomplish an array of elaborate activities. The meritocratic U.S. structure uses both a geographic division (CENTCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM, etc.) and a functional division (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) for orientation.

The neo-traditional model, in contrast, has minimal formalization and is more functional in nature. This organizational design provides little flexibility and lacks autonomous activities. A large span of control is possible in the neo-traditional structure.
due to the lack of specialization required for most tasks. Many of the developing nations of the world are officer-led organizations that employ the neo-traditional model. It was not uncommon in these countries to see a wide rift separating the officers and the enlisted soldiers. Additionally, one officer would typically directly supervise 20–30 men, which is quite high when compared to the typical U.S. officer performing the same job who only directly supervises 3–5 soldiers.

**H. PERSONNEL SECTION**

Table 2. Personnel Contrasts between Neo-traditional and Meritocratic Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Neo-traditional Structure</th>
<th>Meritocratic Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialization</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardization</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of variation between different personnel positions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person vs. position relationship</td>
<td>Close</td>
<td>Separate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority base</td>
<td>Neo-traditional</td>
<td>Rule-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel ratios of support personnel to war fighters</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity of work</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion</td>
<td>Nepotistic/Political</td>
<td>Meritocratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating core</td>
<td>Conscript</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| The personnel doing the actual "work" of the organization |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
|                                                          | Conscript                   | Volunteer              |
I. PERSONNEL ANALYSIS

The most critical resource in the meritocratic model system is the personnel. The human resource component drives the effectiveness of the system. Properly trained and led individuals will propel an organization to success. The meritocratic model attempts to seek out and employ goal-oriented, self-motivated volunteers to accomplish their war-fighting tasks. Additionally, employers of this model usually seek to better their forces through education and technological advancement. The meritocratic model employs highly technical, highly trained specialists who have an egalitarian mindset and work in a system of merit-based rewards for mission accomplishment.

There are a few aspects of the U.S. Army that highlight the personnel aspects of the meritocratic model. To begin with, all soldiers are volunteers. The Army places an emphasis on personal development and education. At least some form of undergraduate-level education is required to progress through the enlisted ranks and a master's degree is required to progress through the officer ranks. Additionally, enlisted members who demonstrate potential to be good officers are regularly placed in programs that allow them to earn a commission and transfer up to the officer ranks.

The most basic difference between the meritocratic model and neo-traditional model is at the level of the basic soldier. In the neo-traditional model, the lowest echelons of warriors are typically conscripts who are given only the most rudimentary training required to perform duties. They fill these jobs due to poor education and lack of opportunities. They are motivated by a meager paycheck and power that comes with their reputation as a soldier. The low cost of these conscripts, as well as the speed with which they can be replicated, makes it very easy for leadership to view them as expendable. The Colombian military uses the conscription process and all adult males are required to serve
a minimum of two years. In Colombia in the mid 1990s, a former Colombian conscript commented about the expendable view of personnel on the part of the officer corp. According to the informant, it was not uncommon to depart on a routine jungle patrol with 35 men and return with 32. These were not combat related casualties. Soldiers would simply get lost in the jungle on training missions. The officers leading the patrol showed no concern for finding the missing men. Conscripts were viewed as low skilled and easily replaceable (Keller, 1998).

Higher up the organizational food chain than the basic soldier, the neo-traditional model is led by appointees designated through political or familial relations. As a result of this appointment, the military leaders often seek to further the goals and objectives of their benefactors.

The neo-traditional model also places little emphasis on the development of soldiers, who are generally poorly trained, low skilled, and have not been given any instruction that provides them with adaptive approach to military operations. The militaries usually work on a patronage system that rewards unquestioning loyalty and adherence to direct control. The Soviet military, during the cold war, was a good example of this; the KGB and the Communist Party put political factors ahead of military competence when selecting their officers (Herbert, 1975, p. 324). This lack of development may be an aspect of the greater cultural environment. Stanislav Andreski argues in Military Organization and Society that many social strata are fixed and prevent the movement of individuals upward in the power continuum (1968, p. 21). If there is no possibility of advancement, what would be the purpose of development? These types of societies are very unlikely to adopt the meritocratic model.

### J. EMPLOYMENT SECTION

Table 3. Employment Contrasts between Neo-traditional and Meritocratic Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Neo-traditional Structure</th>
<th>Meritocratic Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizational goals</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Global</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### K. EMPLOYMENT ANALYSIS

Both models display vast divergence in their employment. The meritocratic model militaries tend to operate globally while the neo-traditional model countries operate locally. Because of the global scope, the meritocratic model needs to be able to perform in varied environments. Therefore, it relies on extremely capable individuals with advanced skills and leverages the employment of modern technology. These forces coordinate through a large number of standard operating procedures, which are refined through frequent interactive exercises to help reduce the uncertainty of the ever-changing battlefield.

The neo-traditional model is typified with a limited or even internal scope. These forces rely heavily upon their leaders for guidance and direction. Few rules and regulations exist to guide them in the situations they encounter. Generally, they are forced to rely on institutional knowledge passed down from their predecessors by word of mouth. Limited technology availability may be a contributor to the continuation of this limited structure. Lack of educational opportunities perpetuates the cycle of ignorance and lack of advancement. Emily Goldman focuses much of her research on the diffusion of military technology throughout different cultures. Military organizational structures can be seen as an example of technology. Goldman identifies the elites, institutions and culture as having an effect on military innovation. The assimilation of ideas and meritocratic practices is dependent on the power broker’s resistance to the modification of the status quo (2006, p. 69).
L. CULTURAL SECTION

Table 4. Cultural Contrasts between Neo-traditional and Meritocratic Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Neo-traditional Structure</th>
<th>Meritocratic Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Typical regime type</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk of government overthrow</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of innovation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion of technology</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M. CULTURAL ANALYSIS

Culturally, both models appear to fit (be in synchronization with) their respective range of environments. The domestic factors of the regime that control the military affect the way the military is trained, organized, and equipped. These factors greatly influence the capability and power of the military, which will affect the achievable goals. For example, modern democratic militaries have little risk of military revolt in their nations. As a result, they do not try to limit access to military education or technological advantages. As previously discussed, these militaries are usually organized using the meritocratic model. Additionally, this combination of factors gives the military many capabilities and a lot of power, which can be projected around the entire globe.

In contrast, governments employing the neo-traditional model are often plagued by a real internal threat of overthrow. Because the military is often a key component of regime change, the government employs safeguards to ensure that the military stays loyal. Gordon Tullock explains that one of the safeguards dictator’s uses is the appointment of politically loyal leaders to key positions of authority (1987). They are placed in position based on loyalty, rather than competence, and then frequently rotated to prevent collusion (1987). Other safeguards are a lack of education for soldiers and lack
of technologically advanced equipment, which could give the military or certain portions of the military a decided advantage over anti-regime forces. This combination of factors leads to a much less capable military that is often more concerned with domestic issues than international affairs. Even if the concern were directed externally, the power of the military to influence external events would be questionable. Thus, the goal with which each military is able to be directed seems to be very closely tied to the cultural factors of the associated nation-state.

One recent example of the cultural nuances shaping militaries differently took place in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In order to fill key government positions with people loyal to him, President Saddam Hussein increasingly depended heavily on members of his family and tribal lineage to run the country. He appointed many members of the Al-Tikriti tribe to key positions in the government in general and the military in particular in order to solidify his control over the country. On the other hand, the United States, with a democratic government and negligible possibility of military coup had government and military leaders hold positions based on merit instead of personal loyalties. The U.S. military was able to project its power to the other side of the globe and topple the Saddam regime with amazing speed.

N. ECONOMIC SECTION

Table 5. Economic Contrasts between Traditional and Modern Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Neo-traditional Structure</th>
<th>Meritocratic Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Few or narrow base</td>
<td>Many or broad base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical national economic</td>
<td><img src="image1.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image2.png" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distribution</td>
<td><em>Large lower class; bulk of population earns only low income</em></td>
<td><em>Large middle class; bulk of population earns comfortable income</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialization</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw material resources</td>
<td>Low or narrow</td>
<td>High or broad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
O. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Economic analyses show the meritocratic military model is able to draw from a much broader middle class. With this comes the benefit of having citizens who are more likely to have been exposed to technology and education. These modern nations usually have more resources, or at least a broader resource base from which to draw. Additionally, human resources usually carry extreme value. Nations that employ the neo-traditional model are relatively poor or have a very narrow resource base, such as oil or diamonds. Perhaps as a result, the population is often viewed as a more expendable resource. Generally, there is less value placed on human life and this resource is relatively replaceable. When other resources are lacking, neo-traditional models are more prone to use mass-type warfare where soldier attrition is higher.

P. ENVIRONMENTAL SECTION

Table 6. Environmental Contrasts between Neo-traditional and Meritocratic Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Neo-traditional Structure</th>
<th>Meritocratic Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complexity</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task environment</td>
<td>Simple</td>
<td>Complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number &amp; dissimilarity of operating environment</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic conditions</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Healthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of country</td>
<td>Local/regional</td>
<td>Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information processing capability</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task dependence in workflow</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q. ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS

The environment is the key component in the employment of the two models. The meritocratic and neo-traditional models fit in their environments. The meritocratic model is designed with the external environment in mind. The need to work on a global scale and adapt to complexity is a driving factor in the meritocratic model. The vibrant, educated middle class, good economic situations, and abundant resources are indicative of an environmental fit with the meritocratic structure. The antithesis of this is a good fit for the neo-traditional model, which is adapted to face an internal struggle and supports that aim well. Societies short on an educated middle class, resources, and a strong economic situation seem to be a good fit with the neo-traditional military model. Both systems maximize their resource potential and seek to support the regimes they represent.

R. CO-RELATIONS

One thing that should be apparent by now is the complex co-relation between many factors pertaining to the military organization and the social and cultural characteristics of the nation-state of which the military is a part. For example, the degree of democracy in a country tends to be positively correlated to the capability of their military. Likewise, the degree of industrialization of a country is related to its vertical complexity. In this context, we can assume that as a country develops more complicated and egalitarian systems of governance the military is more likely to be organized along the lines of the meritocratic model. Because this is probably related to available resources in the form of money, people, industry, etc., resources could probably be swapped out for any of the terms previously discussed in the relationships that demonstrate a strong correlation. It is also worth noting that the causal direction may be difficult to determine. Does the governance structure become more complicated and egalitarian as a result of military capabilities or vice versa? In all likelihood, they are probably endogenously related. However, there may be another causal mechanism, such as resource availability and diversity, which influences both governance structures and military capability. These relationships may be worth more in-depth research in the future.
S. SUMMARY

The meritocratic model is effective in the technology-driven, democratic, egalitarian, resource-rich world in which Americans live. However, a vast majority of the world is not living in conditions resembling those of the United States of America. Additionally, the goals of many foreign militaries are drastically different from those of the U.S. military, which conducts a range of operations from humanitarian aid to nuclear deterrence without omitting anything in between. As such, different organizational structures may be better adapted to the environment and goals of foreign militaries. The neo-traditional model may indeed be a perfect fit for the environment it is employed. A former Soviet strategist, Major General Aleksandr Svechin, summed up the idea of an organizational fit for the military quite well: "In all work related to the war plan, most important is harmony among all measures: even the best ideas, if they are not in harmony with the situation, will only do harm. And the same harmony is required of organizational measures" (Svechin, 1927/1992, p. 188).

If leaders of the U.S. military can learn to understand indicators of an organizational fit in the environment of employment, it would improve FID: less time could be spent attempting to reorganize a military around a model that is unacceptable to
its leaders and members. The United States could accept that the meritocratic model may not be a good fit for foreign militaries. Instead of reorganizing to a structure, the host nation will not accept as soon as United States presence is terminated, the U.S. FID forces could accept and develop the existing organizational model. The time and resources could be used instead to improve FID by other means.

With an organizational model of foreign militaries that remains the same, the United States could focus on improving the capabilities of the existing model. For example, the United States could implement courses to improve management techniques of the upper echelons, motivational techniques of field commanders, and increased core competency training of the average soldier. Any of these actions would be more productive than reorganizing foreign militaries to reflect the same model as the U.S. military only to have them change it back as soon as the United States leaves. Although these changes may not provide the foreign country with the same level of capability that the U.S. military enjoys, they will at least increase capabilities on the margin. Instead of forcing the meritocratic model from the top down, perhaps eventually other factors will change that will create a bottom up desire for the foreign military to reorganize to the meritocratic model.

Initially, the goal of U.S. military FID should be to work within the confines of the organizational model present at the time of arrival. An analysis of the environment in which the foreign military exists as well as the goals of the government should determine if this model is indeed a good fit. If it is, then a plan of using the existing model is deemed appropriate. Modifying the model as the environment and goals change is the key goal. A long-term approach to FID will allow the United States to continue to get a dynamic assessment of the fit and modify the organizational model as appropriate. The idea is to keep all factors in a harmonious balance. U.S. military leaders would be wise to capture this lesson prior to employment of a FID force.

The next chapter will show how the past two chapters are relevant to the case of Vietnam. Vietnam was the crucible of FID employment and demonstrates the argument as laid out, and analyzes the actions of our FID engagement.
III. FOREIGN ARMY BUILDING FAILURE

A. INTRODUCTION

The Vietnam War remains, to this day, a crucial conflict in the history of the modern U.S. military and it continues to shape strategic and tactical thinking. In fact, the term “nation-building” became synonymous with the United States effort to support the government of South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam) and more specifically its veritable creation and partnership with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The United States failure to facilitate the building of an effective ARVN in the wider context of consolidating a stable South Vietnam, indirectly between 1954 and 1964 and more directly between 1964 and 1975, served to give nation-building a bad name.

While the Vietnam War ended over 30 years ago, the specter of that protracted conflict in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and early 1970s is evident in U.S. military policies and doctrines that affect its performance today. Since 9/11, the American military has been fighting various conflicts that fall under the umbrella of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in ways that reflect the fact that the shadow of the Vietnam War still hangs over day-to-day operations around the world. In the context of ongoing debate, major differences of opinion remain with regard to what lessons can, or should, be drawn from the Vietnam War. Many scholars and military historians search for any and all parallels to the Vietnam War and our current conflicts. Vast debate surrounds the mission in Afghanistan and its similarities and differences to Vietnam. The debate over Vietnam ranges across the years and arrives at various, and often divergent conclusions as reflected in books such as Stanley Karnow’s in Vietnam: A History, Neil Sheehan’s, A Bright Shining Lie, Andrew F. Krepinevich’s, The Army and Vietnam, John Nagl’s, Eating Soup with a Knife and Lewis Sorley’s, A Better War. In the context of this ongoing debate, it needs to be emphasized that this chapter, is not concerned with the Vietnam War as a whole (and whether it could have been won or not), although it does attempt to extract lessons from the United States’ experience in Southeast Asia. More specifically, it looks at the history of United States’ foreign army building in South
Vietnam in an effort to clarify what lessons, if any, were learned and what lessons were lost in relation to what would later become known as FID.

**B. FRENCH INDOCHINA, MILITARY TRADITION AND THE ORIGINS OF ARVN 1850–1954**

During the mid to late nineteenth century, the French colonized and subjugated the people of what became known as French Indochina (comprised of contemporary Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). One of the main goals of the French conquest was to exploit the rubber and rice in a fashion that complemented the economic needs of France. However, the French never fully consolidated their hold on the region. There were peasant revolts from the outset, and the rise of a potent mix of communism and nationalism by the 1930s encouraged the French colonizers to engage in repression using primarily French forces. Despite numerous revolts and the development of a major nationalist-communist movement during the period of Japanese occupation (1940–1945), it was not until 1948 that the French began in earnest to build a colonial military force comprised of Vietnamese soldiers (Tucker, 1998, p. 135). This force was initially called the Vietnamese National Army (VNA) and was established to complement the wider French war against the Viet Minh from 1946 to 1954. While nationalist in name only, the French used these disjointed forces to support their colonial aims. The VNA provided the initial foundations for what would later become the ARVN.

In hindsight, the French set the VNA up for failure from the outset by building an Army in their own image. This reinforces the overall argument of the thesis and the points it brings out. The French, with growing financial support from the U.S, built up a sizable force throughout the 1950s. The focus of their efforts, however, was erroneously placed on the Big Three: Armor, Artillery and Infantry. The Big Three are intended to fight state on state actors with regimented uniformed combatants, and fight according to agreed upon norms in combat. By 1954, the VNA was comprised of 167,700 regular soldiers organized into 101 battalions (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 21). However, the French never allowed the Vietnamese to occupy command or leadership positions. All Officers and Non Commissioned Officers were French. Not surprisingly, when the French left in
1954, there was a complete lack of leadership experience in the ranks of the VNA. Additionally, the French had created a serious dependency on the material support they provided and it would detrimental consequences on the ARVN in the future. With the rise of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime (1955–1963) there was an attempt to formalize and professionalize the Vietnamese military. The emphasis was placed on legitimizing the military and training them to a higher standard. This appeared to “brief” well, but lacked any real practical application and saw little realization in the way of effective changes. The Army was re-titled the ARVN and that was really the only change that occurred.

C. THE FRENCH COLONIAL LEGACY, MILITARY TRADITION AND ARVN UNDER UNITED STATES TUTELAGE 1954–1964

With the crushing defeat of the French by the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and the former’s subsequent decision to withdrawal the United States took the fateful decision to step in and take on a more active role. No longer would financial support to the French be enough. Military advisors to the ARVN soon began to arrive in South Vietnam from the United States of America. In the global game of Capitalism vs. Communism, Vietnam would be the next location of a hot war between these two competing ideologies. The goal was conquest or abatement of these two ideologies in the region.

The problem from the outset was that the U.S advisors did not really understand the flawed Vietnamese Army the French had built. In fact, there was no desire on the part of the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) to understand the colonial legacy and military traditions embodied by the VNA/ARVN that they were now positioning themselves to advise and assist. We mirror images ourselves onto the Vietnamese forces and saw what we wanted to see, not what was really there. Few attempted to learn about the Vietnamese Army and culture, and those that did were astonished at what they found.

Initially, U.S. advisors found a regionally oriented and disjointed force structure. The primary advisor of the United States in the early years was COL Edward Geary Lansdale, of Philippine fame. Lansdale was “struck by the medieval warlord image,”
emphasizing how every ‘warlord’ faction “had its own armed forces complete with generals and battalions, its own political parties, and definite territories which it dominated” (Lansdale, 1971, p. 146). Solidifying this disjointed rabble would be a necessity if Prime Minister Diem were to have any control over the Armed forces. However, there were many obstacles in the way of the creation of a National Army.

Adding to the problems, was the fact that the French stuck around in Vietnam and had competing agendas and goals from those of the U.S. military and its advisors. The French also remained very possessive over the Vietnamese, and became angry when the Americans would interfere with “their Vietnamese” (Lansdale, 1972, p. 150). Additionally, during this time period, independence was granted to Vietnam by the French, and Ngo Dinh Diem became the Prime Minister of the newly created Vietnam. This independence created a societal realignment and power grab by the newly independent peoples of Vietnam. Without the imposed societal structure of the French, many sought to make better lives for themselves and their families. Corruption, bribery, and influence became the new norm.

Understandably, developing a viable security apparatus is a foundation from which to build upon and move forward. The French had handed off an indigenous military force, more or less completely devoid of leadership (a position the French had preserved for themselves), with no Officers and no Non-Commissioned Officers—and they had just changed the official military language from French to Vietnamese (Nagl, 2002, p. 119). However, even after independence, the French High command maintained control over the military, its pay, promotions, and deployment unit as late as 1955 (Lansdale, 1972, p. 172). Prime Minister Diem was in a tough spot when it came to a competent capable military. He needed it to provide security and stability; however, this also increased the likelihood of a coup by his military leaders. This became a balancing act for Diem.

The initial goal of the MAAG was to provide advisors to high-level staff and leadership personnel in key positions. Cooperation finally occurred and the United States and French established a combined multi-national training group entitled the Training Relations Instruction Mission (TRIM). They were to advise and assist with the new
military establishment (Lansdale, 1972, p. 181). The focus became building a much-needed national level Army. Problems were abundant in the development of these forces, and soon the United States began to send many troops to Vietnam to help stabilize the situation.

However, mission creep began to occur, advisors were pushed to lower echelons, and then into direct combat roles by 1964 (Tucker, 1998, p. 267). As the U.S presence increased, the relatively small MAAG would morph into the larger, more powerful Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).

During this time period, the U.S. advisors began the developmental approach that they continue to do to this day. The goals were very similar in nature to the French. The United States sought to build a large conventional military organized to fight set piece battles. If the goals and objectives were studied and understood in advance, it may have precluded a large-scale U.S. deployment to South East Asia. A strong cadre of competent U.S. advisors, with the resources of the United States government, may have limited the loss of U.S. Soldiers.


A lack of understanding on the part of the U.S. military, led to a flawed FID approach in relation to ARVN, and eventually made the latter marginalized in the fight. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was predominantly mediocre, lacked leadership, and needed training and equipment. However, the U.S. military chose to place its main focus on unilateral fighting and, starting in late 1964 and 1965, began to deploy even more U.S. combat troops. The training and equipping of the ARVN was relegated to an afterthought. The ARVN atrophied as the United States placed its emphasis on other areas like combat operations.

1. The United States Contributes to Failure

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. (1986) captures the essence of the FID problem in The Army and Vietnam. His main point is that the Vietnam War was a small war that we
fought as a big war. The Army was so focused on fire and maneuver warfare, that it never realized it was fighting an insurgency and not a conventional conflict. As Krepinevich notes, “The Army Concept of war is, basically, the Army’s perception of how wars ought to be waged and,” this was in turn “reflected in the way the Army organizes and trains its troops for battle” in Vietnam and elsewhere (Krepinevich, 1986, p. 5). This logic was transferred to the ARVN, and ironically inhibited their effectiveness and relevance. The U.S. military developed the ARVN as a direct reflection of themselves. This approach was not well thought out and was ignorant of the actual ARVN requirements.

The U.S. military never took the time to analyze the existing force structure and their history with the French. Stereotypically, the conventional U.S. Army motto is: In the absence of knowing what to do, do what you know. The U.S. forces began to build an Army in their image. Kalev Sepp (2005), in “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” accurately spelled out that creating indigenous forces in the image of the intervening military is a largely unsuccessful practice. Additionally, The United States’ clear lack of understanding of the conflict they sent the U.S. military to resolve led to a flawed approach in their support of the ARVN.

2. U.S. Army

Additionally, John Nagl (2002) talks about the U.S. organizational culture and the reasons for the lack of focus on developing and employing host nation forces. The mentality of the conventional Army in Vietnam was completely focused on measurable offensive operations and the metrics they produced. The goal was to bring the enemy to the fight and get the enemy body count as high as possible. Body count equaled success to the U.S. military leaders in Vietnam. The U.S. military never understood that this was a Vietnamese fight. Selfishly and ignorantly, U.S. commanders wanted the combat tours to help with their own promotion potential. Combat performance and body counts got officers promoted. The system provided little reward for developing and employing ARVN forces.
With no incentive in place by the U.S. Army to become trainers, no one wanted the jobs that involved the ARVN. Even the highly qualified trainers in the Special Forces community were redirected to conduct search and destroy operations. Theoretically, the ARVN forces could actually inhibit promotions by taking missions away from conventional Army commanders. Understandably, the ARVN was relegated to a distant priority.

3. ARVN

The organizational design of the ARVN also had its drawbacks and flaws. Inept leaders occupied many command positions due to who they knew rather than what they knew. The system they operated under appeared to punish those who took risks. The famous advisor John Paul Vann states, there was a strong sense of risk aversion and an unwillingness to take casualties in the ARVN. “A deplorable condition… exists” Vann wrote, “because commanders at all levels who do nothing can still retain their command, and even advance, while those who are aggressive may be relieved if they suffer a setback or sustain heavy losses”(Sheehan, 1988, p. 91). This system was flawed by design, and would perpetuate an ARVN that had no will to fight.

4. United States Errors in Vietnam

The meritocratic U.S. military lacked a detailed understanding of the societal makeup of the South Vietnamese people. A critical look at the societal composition would have shown that there was a clear lack of a middle class and education was not widely held. These are two main factors that dictate a military structure. Additionally, an evaluation of the French organization and education of the ARVN would have shown the complete and appalling lack of leadership. The ARVN was a neo-traditional military with a clear separation between Officers and Soldiers. These factors should have indicated to the U.S. advisors that a 4-party modern meritocratic military model was not the correct approach. A viable NCO Corps and Warrant Officer Corps were not going to be feasible
due to the strict bifurcation in the society based on class, status, education, and economics. Structurally the approach the French and U.S. advisors utilized was doomed to fail.

5. Objectives

The structural mismatch was not the only flaw in the United States’ plan to build an army in their image. The objective and purpose of these forces were never clearly articulated. The United States built a military force based on their world outlook. The United States built a force to fight a state on state war and equipped the ARVN to fight a set piece battle. We helped build a force to conduct conventional warfare against a uniformed opponent following the laws of war. This demonstrated a clear lack of understanding for the type of conflict the ARVN was facing. The focus was on preparing and equipping the ARVN for a conventional battle with the North Vietnamese. The United States never really understood they were in a counterinsurgency fight with an irregular force. Therefore, this lack of understanding would be transferred to the ARVN. The ARVN were set up for failure from the beginning.

The ARVN was ineffectually structured, incorrectly equipped, and ill-trained to fight the asymmetric enemy they were to encounter. This is reinforced by John Nagl (2002) in *Eating Soup with a Knife*, when he quoted a study by the Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN). The PROVN study stated that the American policy in its entirety was flawed. Furthermore, the PROVN study stated that the creation of an Army in our image, the way we equipped the ARVN, and the way they were employed was critically flawed (Nagl, 2002, p. 160). While preparing for the big future war from the North, they lost the current fight.

E. SUMMARY

The U.S. military started in Vietnam in the 1950s with a small footprint of soldiers and equipment, and then expanded to over 500,000 before the war ended. The U.S. failure to develop a competent host nation military and security forces, led to the need for the United States to increasingly do all the heavy lifting; there were over 50,000
American fatalities as a result of poor use of indigenous forces. Vietnam taught the United States some incredible lessons in foreign army building. Robert McNamara (1995) in his book *In Retrospect* explains that if certain people do not want to win themselves, there is nothing anyone can do to make them want to win. Recognizing what motivates a people, and then leveraging that into the building of an Army, is the way to create an effective force.

The United States used the wrong model in Vietnam. We had some help from the French in model selection and should have changed course. The modern meritocratic model did not work. The neo-traditional model would have been a better fit. The previously mentioned factors of structure, personnel, culture, economics, and the overall context, all support the relevance of the neo-traditional model discussed in detail in Chapter II. The U.S. military could benefit from this historical account and apply more relevant FID models in the future. The chapters that follow will clarify why and where some elements of the U.S. Armed Forces grasped these lessons, and why and where other elements have continued to do what they do, despite the experience of the Vietnam War.
IV. COLOMBIA: A FOREIGN ARMY BUILDING SUCCESS

A. INTRODUCTION

Since its exit from Vietnam, the U.S. Army has been aware of the need for capable American forces that can train, advise, and assist our allies to make their militaries more effective. In the wake of Vietnam, the Special Operation Forces (which were created in the years prior to the dramatic escalation of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia) were singled out to become the force of the future in foreign army building. The U.S. Congress codified this responsibility with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act in 1986. From that day forward, FID became a legislatively directed activity of the Special Operation Forces. However, not everyone thought the Special Operation Forces (or Special Forces as they are often called) were the most effective use of Army resources. The Army, in part because of Vietnam, was still primarily concerned with preparing for conventional warfare in the context of the Cold War with the U.S.S.R. The main goal of the Army was to be prepared to fight a full-scale set-piece battle in Europe, or elsewhere, and win.

Reeling from the loss in Vietnam, U.S. military leaders vowed never again to fight a limited war where it vital national interests were not at stake. Then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger put forth a doctrine he believed would keep the United States from entering another Vietnam scenario. The Military thinking of the time was governed by the following guidelines put forth in Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s speech to the National Press club in November 28, 1984, entitled “The Uses of Military Power.”

(1) “First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.”

(2) “Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning.”
(3) “Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives.”

(4) “Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition, and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.”

(5) “Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.”

(6) “Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.” (Weinberger. 1984).

This doctrine would condition the minds of Military and Political leaders for years following his speech. These leaders would never allow another Vietnam. The 1991 Gulf War was the culmination of this strategy and seemed to prove its theory correct. The United States was overwhelmingly successful and further reinforced the efficacy of this doctrine. However, limited war was a reality and we needed focus on building this capacity and the forces to conduct this type of warfare.

Reluctantly, the U.S. military admitted its need for the Special Forces and their capabilities. However, the Special Forces would need to prove their worth to the U.S. military. It can be argued that the Special Forces earned their stripes in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. Engaged throughout the continent, they trained, advised and assisted foreign armies to carry out counterinsurgency operations. The Special Forces would hone their skills while working in conjunction with conventional Army leaders in the region. This chapter will begin by discussing the United States of America’s first post-Vietnam conflict in Latin America—El Salvador. It will lay out the lessons learned by the Special Forces in reference to foreign army building. It will then show how these lessons learned enabled the Special Forces to help the El Salvadorian government and military defeat a powerful guerrilla insurgency. Then, it will look at the way that the knowledge of the El Salvadorian experience was transferred to Colombia in the 1990s, and how the Special Forces and the U.S. Army assisted the Colombian government in
defeating a particularly long-standing and territorially wide-spread insurgency led by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombia (FARC—Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia).

**B. EL SALVADOR**

To begin, it is clear that the El Salvador experience was a great FID success for the United States. The limited scope and military commitment to the cause forced the Army to adapt and overcome the 55-man limitation placed on the mission. The Army leadership employed Special Forces assets to support army building and training. Robert Kaplan (2005) notes in Imperial Grunts that “fifty-five Special Forces trainers in El Salvador accomplished more than did 550,000 soldiers in Vietnam” (p. 45). Meanwhile, Max Boot (2005) also acknowledges that “Flooding a country with U.S. troops is often a mistake, because they are ignorant about local conditions,” and “they often wind up doing more harm than good; better for a small number of highly specialized soldiers to work behind the scenes in cooperation with indigenous security forces” (p. 6). The U.S forces had also learned the lesson that not every nation is organized along the four-tiered modern model of the U.S. military. The system in El Salvador was a two-tiered, neo-traditional structure much like the rest of the Latin Americas. The Officers felt themselves to be very much members of a military and social elite and had difficulty when working with Non-Commissioned American officers who had been promoted on the basis of merit.

The El Salvadorian Officers were commissioned together as a cohort called a tanda. These officers would advance through the military together as time progressed. Officers that participated in this training, stated “Whatever an officer’s personal failings—stupidity, cowardice in battle, or moral profligacy—his career is secure through the rank of colonel, after which he may depart, with his tanda, into honorable retirement” (Bacevich, 1988, p. 26). Once you were in, you were in until retirement, regardless of competence.
The 2 tiered-neo traditional structure was further reinforced by the lack of an NCO corps. The concept of an NCO corps was totally lacking and difficult to explain to the El Salvadorian forces. The structure of the military was stratified with elite somewhat competent officers and poor conscripts just doing their service reluctantly (Bacevich, 1988, p. 27). The U.S. forces established NCO academies and pushed the NCO concept on the El Salvadorian forces. The regime in charge was reluctant to embrace this change at all, but the younger generation of military saw the merits and somewhat hesitantly conformed. The system continued to resist the American attempts to force a structural change. The lesson learned should have been clear.

Salvadorian military culture neither accommodated nor welcomed NCOs. In retrospect, the American attempt to create an NCO corps appears naïve and presumptuous. The lesson is clear: In choosing targets for institutional change, American military policy must concentrate on issues that are not only relevant to a counterinsurgency—as NCOs indisputably are—but also reasonably attainable given the war’s specific context (Bacevich, 1988, p. 28). The American military tended to be an all or nothing force during these conflicts. There are shades of grey in foreign army building, and both short term and long term goals.

NCOs are a very important part of the military structure, and provide vast benefits when accepted and employed correctly. The mode of implementation would need to be changed to an indirect strategy over the long haul that didn’t terrify the existing elite’s fear of change. The excellence portrayed by U.S. NCOs and their engagement with Latin American Officers over the long haul demonstrated the advantages of their existence. Other Latin American nations would adopt our concept of the NCO on their own terms, and not at the orders of their American counterparts. The merit of this system would be realized over time and persistent engagement with competent U.S. NCOs. The lessons learned in El Salvador, would enable Americans to conduct FID with greater success in countries like Peru and Colombia. In fact, Colombia is becoming, or has already become, the ultimate FID success story of the post-Cold War era.
C. COLOMBIA

The government of Colombia has undergone vast reforms that culminated with a new constitution in 1991. This constitution made a strong move toward democratization and created an overall improvement in the governmental system. In order for the nation to move forward security and stability must be present. Colombia turned to the United States for help with these issues. The U.S. government responded to requests from the Colombian government with “Plan Colombia” in 1999. This plan was primarily aimed at eradication of narcotics trafficking in and from Colombia, in order to lay the foundations for a stable and secure state. This initially narcotics based program was expanded after the horrific events on September 11, 2001 to include counter-terrorism. The U.S. provided millions of dollars and committed advisors to help the legitimate Colombian government solve its problems. Since 2002, President Uribe has increased his capacity to fight the FARC and build a safer, stronger Government.

The cornerstone of any nation-building must be the establishment of security and stability. With the funds in place, and a commitment made by the U.S. military, they would set out to develop the Colombian Armed Forces. U.S. Southern Command would direct the military based programs in Colombia. The 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) would do the majority of the heavy lifting.

With the advent of Plan Colombia in the late 1990s, the Special Forces began to build Counter Narcotics units in the troubled regions of Colombia. “In April 1999, the 7th SFG (A) deployed to Tolomaica, Colombia, to start training the 1st Colombian Counter-Narcotics Battalion (BACNA). It was a 950-man battalion with a number of separate platoons to support CN Operations. This took nine months to complete, and the first BACNA became operational in December 1999 at Tres Esquinas” (Waddell, 2003, p. 14).

With the success of the new counter-narcotics units in the Colombian military the Special Forces would be tasked to support larger FID operations in support of changing
objectives. Adam Isacson and Eric Stoner from the Center for International Policy point out the new goals in their article: Highlights of the Bush Administration’s 2005 Latin America aid request.

1. We will provide operational support (training, supplies, repair parts maintenance and infrastructure) and specialized equipment, including weapons, night vision goggles and communications, to the Army. The focus of this support will be on the elite mobile brigades, the Rapid Reaction brigade (known by the Spanish acronym FUDRA) and the Commando and Lancero Battalions.

2. The 5th and 18th Colombian Army Brigades, trained in 2003 to provide protection to the Cano Limon-Covenas pipeline, a key element of Colombia’s economic infrastructure, will receive additional munitions, equipment and training.

3. Support will also include establishing a national training center and developing an automated logistical system.

4. FMF funding will also support the Colombian Navy and Air Force and include the provision of interdiction boats, additional combat aircraft, training and infrastructure improvements, maintenance and operational support for Colombia’s C-130 transportation fleet.

5. Our request includes funds to purchase battlefield medical treatment, CSAR [combat search and rescue] and medevac-related equipment and training for Army and Air Force units.

6. FMF also supports naval interdiction programs by providing secure communications equipment, spare parts, and assistance to establish an operations center.

7. Riverine forces will benefit from spare parts and other logistic support.

8. The AKI [Anti-Kidnapping Initiative] provides tactical and investigative training and equipment to the Colombian Government's military and police anti-kidnapping units (Unified Action Groups for Personal Liberty -Spanish acronym “GAULA”.) It is also assisting in the establishment of an interagency anti-kidnapping Joint Task Force, developing an interagency database to collect, analyze and disseminate information on kidnappings and assist in upgrading Colombian facilities. Three GAULA units have completed training (Isacson, 2004).
This increase in force size and capability would help to create the much-needed capacity the Colombian government needed to bring security and stability to the country. The government buildup would begin and the era of the FARC would diminish.

1. **Success Begets Success**

Capitalizing on the successes of Plan Colombia, the government is vastly improving its military and its capabilities. President Uribe is strengthening the once fledgling national Government of Colombia. Former Ambassador to Colombia, Anna W. Patterson, in her testimony to congress in 2007, actively supports the notion the Plan Colombia has put the government on the right footing. Ms. Patterson states that: “The Colombian strategy also gives high priority to job creation and economic opportunities, and focuses on building the capacity of the Colombian government so it can sustain programs begun with U.S. support” (Patterson, 2007). Bruce Porter (1994) in his book *War and the Rise of the State*, shows all the advantages that can come to the government in a time of crisis. The central theme of this book is that states make wars, and wars make states. In the case of Colombia, we can extrapolate this down to: strong governments create security and stability, and security and stability create strong governments. It is a self-reinforcing cycle.

The professionalization and training of the Colombian armed forces has provided Uribe with the aforementioned foundation of security and stability from which to build.. The rapid expansion of the Colombian armed forces since 2002 (see Figure 5), has helped to provide resources, reform, and modernization. Additionally, this rapid increase in forces has led to some surprising structural changes in the Colombian military structure.
2. NCO Growth

The United States has had a good military relationship with the Colombian Army for decades. U.S. Army Special forces teams have been rotating to the country and conducting FID almost continuously. A gradual, long-term army building program was in place. The 4 Tiered modern modeled structure was taking root in some areas, albeit slowly. A warrant Officer program was attempted with Colombian aviators, and NCOs could be found in the Special Operations units. The established NCO academy in Tolemeida, was seen as appeasement to the United States for their aid and support for years. The goal was incremental change in building the capacity of the Colombian military. Post, 9/11 the focus on troubled spots around the world led to the United States reinforcing its commitment to its partners.
The rapid growth in the Colombian Armed forces has forced the use of NCO as small unit leaders. As Figure 5 has shown, the rapid expansion of the army has led to a shortfall of officer to lead units. The Officer Academies can simply not produce officers at a rate sufficient enough to keep up with the growth of the forces. NCOs are taking jobs once held by junior officers. The two-tiered Neo-traditional modeled structures are being eroded and the four-tiered modern modeled structures are appearing. Meritocracy seems to be taking hold incrementally due to necessity. Lack of resources in the officer corps has forced the hands of the Army leadership. The officers are forced to promote NCOs to positions of greater responsibility due to competence (Meritocracy).

Since the advent of all of the reforms, and rise of the NCO corps in Colombia, the NCO academies are taking root. Recently, the Colombians opened a Command Sergeant Major (CSM) academy in Bogota. This is the senior enlisted person in the military’s rank structure. Kevin Sielig, a U.S. Army South Public Affairs officer, wrote an article entitled “Joint U .S. Colombian effort produces thriving CSM Academy.” In this article, he demonstrates the vibrant and competent rise of the NCOs in the Colombian Armed forces. The Academy’s commandant, Lt. Col. Arturo Herrera Castano, stated: “Change in our military due to the new rank of command sergeants major is evident.” Castano continues by saying:

In the past, the sergeant major was viewed in their battalions and brigades as simply the senior enlisted, waiting for orders. This has now changed with an invigorated command for respect and responsibility for leading, preparing, and motivating enlisted troops. Instead of approaching commanders with problems, we are approached with solutions. (Sielig, 2005, p. 4)

3. Middle Class Growth

As explained earlier in Chapter II, a lack of an NCO corps should be observed when no middle class is present, and vice versa. I believe that education and economic standing are indicators of a middle class. The data in Figure 6 shows a drastic decrease in Poverty, Unemployment and an increase in Economic growth and GDP per capita. With
the data presented, it also makes sense that in the future there will be a positive relationship between the rise of the middle class and the use of NCOs in the military.

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/93761.pdf

Figure 6. Growth of Middle Class

D. SUMMARY

The lessons learned in El Salvador and Colombia have served the Special Forces and the Army well. Success has come through patience and maturity. Rapid changes in societal norms cannot be expected overnight. A long-term protracted solution with vast dedication will bring about incremental change. It is important to continually evaluate the state of the society in which one works. A periodic reevaluation is necessary to maintain focus and modify the plan. It is a long-term solution to development with frequent near term adaptation.

However, when a drastic change occurs in a society, it may act as a catalyst for change in the military structure. For example, armed conflict, lawlessness, or a rapid
influx of resources may act as enablers to transform a military structure. As was seen in the case of Colombia, rapid growth in the military led to a drastic shortage of Officers to lead units. The shortcoming of Officers led to the acceptance and use of the NCO corps. Sometimes, necessity is the mother of invention (or adaptation).
V. CONCLUSION

This thesis shows that the United States FID policy and its conduct are flawed. History continues to repeat itself. Seemingly, the answers to our problems are known, but in spite of this knowledge, the United States continues to do other things. Decades of small wars gave us the forces necessary to develop foreign armies. Post Vietnam solutions to our combat advisory roles became evident, and the Special Forces became the predominate FID force. The solutions to the problems of the Vietnam era are presented below. We fixed the shortcomings of foreign army building, and then, as you will see in the future of FID section below, we are back to the norm.

The Vietnam experience forced the U.S. Army to further develop forces capable of conducting FID operations. The U.S. Special Forces greatly expanded after Vietnam, and was assigned the task of FID. Learning from the mistakes of Vietnam, the Army enabled these individuals to develop a system that rewarded performance in these areas. The U.S. Special Forces engaged nations throughout the world post Vietnam. Specifically in Latin America, success would come to the Special Forces trainers who learned rapidly the lesson from the past.

These talented warriors became a strategic tool for the U.S. Government, and have conducted successful FID throughout the world in support of U.S. national objectives. Some of the specific lessons learned were.

**Lesson 1:** Effective FID forces cannot be created overnight.

**Solution 1:** The U.S. military built five permanent regionally oriented Special Forces groups in the decades that followed the Vietnam experience. These FID warriors were further enabled by congress mandating their roles and responsibilities. Special Forces were the experts in the arena of foreign army development.

**Lesson 2:** A clearly defined role and mission for the indigenous forces is a must. It provides direction for the advisors and trainers.
Solution 2: Understanding the enemy you fight helps to focus the development of the correct force with the correct skill set. When the United States continually trains armies in our image it fails to analyze the current fight. The Vietnam experience is a classic example. The United States continually sought to build an army to fight a conventional war against an external enemy. The army was trained, advised, and equipped to perform these functions.

Unfortunately, they were fighting an internal threat and not an external threat. The lack of correct force structure and development, led to a significant loss for the South Vietnamese and a huge black eye to the United States. The military learned slowly and began to analyze the enemy first and develop a capable force to combat them. Many times the enemy was an internal threat and required a vastly different approach than mirror imaging the military. The goal could be to conduct FID to prevent subversion, lawlessness, and terrorism to bring about internal security and stability.

Lesson 3: U.S. advisors must work within the accepted social and cultural norms when building foreign armies.

Solution 3: Understanding the culture begins long before the deployment. The U.S. military developed an extensive training program for the Special Forces. A grueling course that would inculcate the sensitivities of cultural differences aided in FID. Mandated language training and regional studies programs coupled with real world regional experience led to great FID success. Semiannual area studies were conducted and briefed to superior officers to ensure regional and cultural expertise. The Special Forces soldiers deployed throughout Latin America and worked hand in hand with their counterparts ensuring to not offend them or gloss over cultural differences.

Lesson 4: The United States must develop an incentive program to reward officers for building competent host nation forces.

Solution 4: Reluctantly, the Department of the Army allowed the Special Forces to become its own branch during the 1980s. The Special Forces branch was able to regulate and control assignments and promotions of their personnel. This enabled the Special Forces to reward those who were competent at FID. Military advising was
rewarded inside the community and spawned great success by promoting those who could successfully build foreign militaries.

This thesis shows that the culture and goals of foreign militaries are deeply embedded, and therefore cannot be readily changed by U.S. personnel. The critical element that can be easily altered is the cultural understanding and the FID structural model the United States uses to increase military capabilities. A detailed pre-FID mission analysis of the existing structure, culture, and goals will enable FID executioners to develop an appropriate FID structural model approach. As evident with the Colombia case study, the Special Forces have made U.S. FID more effective in developing successful foreign militaries. The proper FID model was applied and was consistent with the existing structure, culture, and goals of the host nation military. The take away for this thesis is that: The culture and structure are resident to a foreign military are not controllable by U.S. personnel. The one element we can alter is the FID model we attempt to employ. Cultural understanding brings success in FID with a lot less effort and resources on the part of the United States Government.

A. THE FUTURE OF FID

As history has shown, the U.S. military continually forgets the lessons of the past. The United States is currently fighting a determined insurgency in the country of Afghanistan. Erie similarities to the Vietnam experiences have appeared. The Special Forces are mostly employed as direct action assets that attempt to kill and capture insurgents. The military is dragging the bottom of the barrel to find FID trainers. Frequently, Army National Guard soldiers with little real world experience train the Afghani National Army. It is also common to find Navy or Air Force personnel involved in FID training.

Currently in Afghanistan, there is a huge shortage of trained Afghani National Army forces. The foundation for security and stability is missing. So we are trying to rush them into a meritocratic model force with none of the factors that will support this type of model—Structural, Personnel, Employment, Cultural, Economic, and the Environment. The NY Times recently published an article entitled “Reviews Raise Doubt
on Training of Afghan Forces,” which reinforces the ideas provided in this thesis. Journalists in Afghanistan, Thom Shanker and John Cushman (2009), note that there is a lack of competent and capable leadership present in the Afghan military. Additionally, approximately 25% of the Afghani forces quit each year. In a neo-traditional society, leadership will be harder to come by. Some traits are just not rewarded by certain societies that are not based on meritocracy.

Lessons just don’t seem to be getting learned. “In both countries, the United States sought to create an indigenous army modeled in its own image, based on U.S. army organization charts. With the ARVN in South Vietnam and the ANA in today's Afghanistan, assignment of personnel as combat advisors and mentors was the absolute lowest priority. (Johnson, 2009)

The Military seems to be building a force in its image, as it has done so many times in the past. The National Army is being trained an equipped as though they were preparing to fight an external threat. They continue to misjudge and misunderstand the enemy. This has striking similarities to the Vietnam experience. The creation of a National Government and a National Military force are none other than mirror imaging on the part of the United States. A more regional orientation may be in order.

The United States consistently and profoundly misunderstood the nature of the enemy it was fighting in each circumstance. In Vietnam, the United States insisted on fighting a war against communism, while the enemy was fighting a war of national reunification. In Afghanistan, the United States of America still insists on fighting a secular counterinsurgency, while the enemy is fighting a jihad. The intersection of how insurgencies end and how jihads end is nil. It's hard to defeat an enemy you don't understand, and in Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, this fight is being played out in a different war. (Johnson, 2009)

The United States needs to stop focusing on the similarities and remember the lessons of history. The U.S. military has a force capable and competent of conducting these FID missions. The U.S military is just using the wrong tool to do the job. Special Forces teams partnered with Afghani units will lead to success. Special Forces Soldiers
can train, advise, and lead these men into combat. They will be responsible for a unit’s
development from start to finish. FID success in a given nation is, after all, the ultimate
form of counterinsurgency.
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