



AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE ALLARD COMMISSION...

AND THAT'S THE WAY IT WAS



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In July 2008, a congressionally directed Independent Assessment Panel, also known as the Allard Commission, presented to Congress their report on the Organization and Management of National Security Space. Retired Army LTG Ed Anderson served as a member of the panel and agreed to sit down with Army Space Journal's Sharon Hartman and Director, Directorate for Combat Development, COL Bruce Smith to discuss the role he played in the commission, as well as key points of the report. The following transcription of the interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.

ASJ – Can you briefly explain the background to the Allard Commission - who convened it, why was it convened and what was its specific mission?

Anderson – It was really done at congressional direction. Congress directed the Department of Defense to conduct an independent review of the management and organization of National Security Space. Our task was look at the management and organization of National Security Space, but it was also to take a look at how important Space is to the Security of the United States. We were then tasked to take a look at the Space Acquisition Corps within the Department of Defense and whether or not that was adequate, and then make any recommenda-

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■ Retired Army LTG Ed Anderson

tions on interagency coordination as to whether there was a need to improve it and, if so, how it could be improved. We were also tasked with providing recommendations on a number of different issues and we made recommendations on each and every issue.

ASJ – How did you approach it?

Anderson – We basically broke the report down into observations, findings and recommendations. These observations were for the most part in many cases statements of the obvious, but they were more than just statements, and they were based on what we heard. We did not go into this with any kind of a preconceived idea as to what the situation was and what the answers were going to be. We tried to be very open-minded about this, and we tried very hard to go across the spectrum of stakeholders that were out there in terms of gathering this information, as well as looking at earlier reports to include the Rumsfeld report and others. We talked to folks who had been in the key positions or who are currently in the key positions. We talked to folks who operated at the strategic level, as well as down to the tactical level. We talked to a Brigade executive officer from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team out of the 4th Infantry Division, who had just come back from Iraq because we wanted

to get the warfighter's view on this thing.

ASJ – What did you consider was the most important issue facing the National Security Space community?

Anderson – After everything we had looked at and everybody that we had listened to, the commission uniformly felt as though the leadership of the United States and Space is in very serious jeopardy, and something needs to be done.

ASJ – That's a pretty sobering statement.

Anderson – It is. Obviously we hoped to get some ideas on what needs to be done. The important thing we realized was it can be fixed, but it is going to have to be from the top down. It just can't be done from the bottom up. Just as important, it needs a sense of urgency. We've got to address it now, and somebody needs to be put in charge of doing it. We weren't really trying to say that the sky is falling ... yet. But, it could be if we don't do something.

I think everybody knows the truth about what I'm about to say, but it bears repeating or emphasis: Space makes our joint warfighters, and consequently our Army, the best in the world. It is an enabler. It's not just Space, but



Space definitely makes us one of the best warfighting organizations in the world. All of us on the commission recognized we need to protect that. We need to stay as the best warfighting force in the world, whatever it takes. That in itself is what kind of underpinned this as we looked at things.

There should be no doubt in anybody's mind that in the context of what I just got done saying about the warfighter, that Space underpins U.S. leadership in not only the military world, but in the technological world and in the economic world.

ASJ – So can you get into more detail about the observations the commission made?

Anderson – The first observation was that there had been significant developments that have occurred in the organization and management of Space and the National Security Space in total since Sept. 11. Sept. 11 was kind of our benchmark because that was when the last Rumsfeld Commission was published.

ASJ – When exactly was the Rumsfeld Commission published?

Anderson – It published the day after Sept. 11. The hearings for it had all gone on prior to that obviously,

but the actual report came out the day after the attack. We used that as the start point to try to look at what has changed since then.

ASJ – And what did you all discover has changed?

Anderson – Probably the most obvious thing since then has been the warfighter's use of Space. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom are just tremendous examples of how our military has really become quite comfortable with using those capabilities, as well as dependent on using those capabilities. It's a different world. We got a taste of things in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm as to what Space could do for you, but it wasn't until the current wars that we fully saw how the military and the Army in particular really grasped those capabilities.

There have been a lot of changes in the organization of this country with regard to not just Space but a number of things; the formation of U.S. Northern Command, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, the mission shift to U.S. Strategic Command, changes in responsibilities in the executive agent for Space. The list goes on and on.

The fact is that as much as the environment we were operating in had changed tremendously, the Space

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management process and the organizations have not changed. They are basically the same organization, and in many cases, the same processes that we had back before the cold war. That in and of itself tells you something isn't right here. Something needs to be done.

Another was the fact that National Security Space leadership is absolutely vital to this country.

We were asked to comment on this specifically. National Security Space, not just Space. In other words, the role of National Security Space extends beyond the military and into the rest of the Nation.

ASJ – Can you give an example of how it extends beyond the military?

Anderson – This is only one of many, but GPS was developed as a National Security Space system and it is a National Security Space system, but look at how extensive the use of it is by this country in everything we do. When you get your gas, when you go the bank, go to the ATM, whatever ... Space is there, and if it weren't there you wouldn't be able to do what you were doing.

There are a multitude of other examples, but underlying both of those observations is one very important point. A major change has occurred since Sept. 11, and that is that we are now doing everything in a contested environment. It's not that it's going to be a contested environment. It is one today, and it is only going to get worse. So, if we as a nation, and we as a military, are so dependent upon those capabilities, and yet we are so vulnerable, that's not a good equation. Something again has to be done.

So, those were the observations that we had and the most obvious statement there was with regard to the vulnerability. We have grown quite accustomed in the Space community to operate with relative impunity, feeling as though we control it and nobody is going to really challenge us. We feel very comfortable that we can continue to go along the way we are and develop those dependencies.

ASJ – That seems to be a bit dangerous to assume we will not be challenged by our enemies. Would you recommend any changes to Army Space force structure in order to implement the Allard Commission's recommendations?

Anderson – Well, after listening to everybody and making the observations, one of the things that all of us in the commission concluded was the fact that to fix this was going to take bold steps. You just simply could not do it by tweaking at the margin. That is basically what the process is and what we have done or tried to do in the past. We've tried to do just a little bit of shaping here and there, but we've never made major change, and the commission feels as though the time has come for that to happen.

Now some people see that as good news, some people see that as bad news depending on where you sit obviously. One thing that makes it difficult is the fact that when you start talking about bold change, the institution will resist that. Bold change does not come easy in the Department of Defense. You know it, we all know it. Unfortunately if you were to go back and look where we have made bold changes, say the formation of U.S. Northern Command, it is generally driven by some catastrophic event. Part of our message is hopefully we don't wait for that to happen again before we take action. When you consider the vulnerabilities and the possibilities of "Space Pearl Harbor," which was a phrase that was coined by the Rumsfeld Commission, hopefully it won't take something like that to awaken us and cause us to make change. That's how it's been in the past, but we shall see.

ASJ – So, what did the commission discuss next?

Anderson – The commission had four recommendations. The first was we felt as though we needed to have a National Space Strategy. Notice that I said National Space Strategy, not National Security Space Strategy. That's not to say we don't need a National Security Space Strategy. We do and we don't have one, but it should be nested within a National Space Strategy, just like the National

“... the only way we see it is to form a Space Corps — like the Marine Corps — or form a Department of Space — like the Department of Transportation, Department of Defense — a separate Department of Space.”

Military Strategy is basically nested within the nation’s National Security Strategy. So there are sub-elements that have to come about as a result of that.

There are folks out there, and we listened to them, who will say, “well, we’ve got National Space policy and those kinds of National Space regulations and this and that ...” Yes we do, and the commission knew that, but in our mind, that does not replace the National Space Strategy.

ASJ – Can you elaborate a bit more?

Anderson – It’s the National Space Strategy where you would be bringing together all of the elements of Space, so it’d be civil, it’d be commercial, it’d be National Security. We would have all of those together where somebody could have the responsibility for determining priorities, eliminating redundancies and giving the way ahead as to where we need to go.

Associated with that, if you’re going to have a National Space Strategy, you obviously must put in place some sort of a mechanism that makes it come to realization. After a lot of difficult thought and discussion, we felt that it should reside with the National Security Advisor.

ASJ – Why there?

Anderson – There is a thing in the legislation that I believe is called the National Space Council. The law says that the Vice President should chair the council. It’s been in place for a long time. As we have looked at it over the years, the reality has been that it has gone up and down as to the actual implementation and the actual seriousness the administration has placed against this. So in our mind, it just doesn’t seem as though it’s going to work. You need somebody who has direct access to the President, and the only other person we could think of was the National Security Advisor.

Clearly, we recognize one of the criticisms out there has been the fact that the National Security Advisor has a lot on his or her plate. Yes they do, but they should be able to organize around it and if you’re going to be able to

do the interagency piece, that’s where you have to do it. I was there as a part of the National Security Council when I was the J5. That is the vehicle where everything that is done is done with interagency cooperation. With all of the players represented.

ASJ – Did the commission make any recommendations regarding changes to Space force structure?

Anderson – Yes. That was the second recommendation and it dealt directly with leadership. What we found was that no one’s in charge. This is not an idea we went in with, it’s what we found. Well, when no one’s in charge, everyone thinks they’re in charge. What that creates is a situation where you get an awful lot of diffused direction from a multitude of sources and there is no focus. We recognized this was a tremendously ineffective and inefficient way of doing business. In addition to that, the stewardship of National Security Space in the Department of Defense was lacking. This, although unfortunate, was a direct reference to the Air Force because they are the executive agent for Space.

The other thing is the cultural divide that exists between the Intel community and the military Space community read black and white. It’s been there for a long time. There has been a lot of effort to try to reconcile that in some way but it has not been very successful. Currently the mechanism is for the Secretary of Defense and the Director for National Intelligence to personally get together and reconcile differences, but as we all know, they’re very busy and this is not hot on their plate. Especially not when you’ve got a couple of wars going on, so this did not work and that situation is still there.

ASJ – Was there anything else in regards to structure?

Anderson – Yes. Another one was the commercial capability. We spoke to some commercial providers as well and the bottom line they came in with was the fact they felt as though they were not part of the team. They were basically a spot commodity out there. When we need additional commercial capability we just buy it



from them as opposed to having them be a part of the process. They want to know what the problems are so they can say, "Here's what we can do to offer solutions." Clearly that's been part of the difficulty. There are a multitude of other things, and obviously as you know, we can get into much greater depth than this if you get into the report itself. What we essentially recommended was the creation of what we called the National Security Space Authority (NSSA). In essence, we believe that would be an Undersecretary of Defense for Space

ASJ – An Undersecretary of Defense for Space?

Anderson – Yes, and for Space only. It would be that undersecretary's total responsibility. They would be dual-hatted as an Undersecretary of Defense as well as a Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Space. That's part of how you get to the black and white integration piece, but a lot more has to happen than that. Nonetheless, it is a way. It's very hard for somebody who was in uniform to recommend giving increased authority to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

ASJ – Did the commission consider any other organizational alternatives?

Anderson – The only way we could see it is to form a Space Corps — like the Marine Corps — or form a Department of Space — like the Department of Transportation, Department of Defense — a separate Department of Space. Civil or commercial or military Space all together in a single element.

The first option, the Space Corps, we looked at very carefully. We were very close to including that in our report, and the Rumsfeld Commission looked at it too. You may recall there were references made in their report to that.

In the end, just like the Rumsfeld Commission did, we concluded that it was not right for this particular time. But, again, looking at the Marine Corps model, it would be a separate Corps that would be under a secretary and in our view if you were to do it, it would have been under the Secretary of the Air Force. Those were the wiring diagrams that we had. But, there's a huge cost associated with doing that in terms of not just dollar cost but in infrastructure cost, people cost and so on. You've got to make sure you've got good justification for doing that, and if you look at the Marine Corps, over 100,000 personnel now, it's pretty substantial, and the Space Corps is currently about 12,000.

ASJ – Would we need that many? 100,000?

Anderson – No, I'm not trying to say that the trigger for moving to a Space Corps or something like that should be in numbers. That's not necessarily so. If you really look at our Space folks, Army, Navy, Air Force, everybody, and you look at what they contribute to the warfight, it's pretty significant, but they can do it with far fewer people than the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps makes a significant contribution too, but it's because of the nature of what they do that takes a lot of folks. There could be other things that would trigger it as well.

The other thing that I would mention as a person who was in uniform is that we generally find the leadership and management construct of dual-hatting ineffective. We are wedded to the unity of command. We tried to see if there was some other way by which we might be able to structure this and in our view there was not. It was primarily for bringing this black white Space thing together.

The other part of it is that congress had mandated that there would be what they call Major Force Program 12.

If you're familiar with the major force program, it's just like SOCOM's major force program. In other words, they have the authority to develop, buy and field everything. Congress has directed the Department of Defense to do that for Space. They also specified in the language that it had to be the Office of the Secretary of Defense that had control of it — not a service, meaning not the Air Force. The combination of all of that led us to this National Security Space Authority that would have the responsibility for developing all the priorities, adjudicating arguments about resources, holding organizations and industry accountable for fulfilling the requirements that had been developed by the warfighters, and most importantly, it's a single element. There is one person in charge, so that was the issue with regard to leadership.

ASJ – Shifting gears to the broader issues facing the Space community, were there any major shortfalls the Allard Commission identified with how the U.S. government develops, procures and utilizes Space systems and capabilities?

Anderson – Well that had to do with organization and management, which was our third recommendation. Basically we felt that we needed to consolidate or merge the Space capability providers – NRO and SMC - within the Department of Defense into a single organization. There was a need for separation when the Cold War was still going on before the wall came down. NRO performed some tremendous things that were very important in terms of successfully concluding the Cold War, but that's all behind us. Right now, what you have is a limited amount of talent out there with regard to developing Space capability, and you've got two organizations that are competing for that same limited pool of talent, with the same limited amount of resources, but at the same time they're providing very similar capabilities.


ASJ – As you participated in the commission were there new issues that you were not previously familiar with that you became aware of?

Anderson – Well there was a major finding that was a bit of a surprise to me when we got in there. When looking back at the NRO's performance during the period around Sept. 11, they did not provide a single capability that fulfilled its full potential. It was either failed, shot down or shut down. One particular NRO asset took an extended time to get out there and was way over cost. The track record was just not there.

There was an awful lot of discussion about what we should do about it and how to correct the situation. We do feel as though innovation is really what has made us successful in Space. We wanted to make sure that we were able to try and capture that. We felt the merging of those two organizations should be headed by a service three-star or an equivalent civilian who would answer to Air Force Space Command for organization, training and equipment, but it would be a joint organization, and it would be an interagency organization. We would want to have CIA in there and the other members of the Intel community as well.

ASJ – I imagine that doesn't set well with the NRO or with the SMC for that matter.

Anderson – I haven't heard too much out of SMC, but certainly out of NRO because they felt as though we were attacking them and trying to say we need to get rid of NRO when we're not really trying to say that. What we were saying is merge the two organizations, and we think that can easily be done. But the devil's in the details and certainly we weren't there long enough nor did we have the expertise to be able to get into the how. All we really talked about was the what. The how will have to be left up to the experts to figure out the elements of that.



"I would suggest to our FA40s and our Space folks out there what they really need to do is think out of the box."

ASJ – How about within the Department of Defense?

Anderson – That brings me to our fourth recommendation. The commission felt that both the DoD and the intelligence community human relations folks need to change some of their policies and that's particularly with regard to training the Space Acquisition Corps. We felt as though it was unique enough that it required a special consideration and so one of the recommendations was that they need to form a career field for Space Acquisition folks. The model, although I don't believe we included it in the report, would be just like the Air Force and Army does with their doctors. Their doctors have separate educational requirements, they go to separate promotion boards, and they're in their positions for long periods of time. Continuity was key in terms of successful Space Acquisition Programs that we looked at and yet the Air Force in particular with their Space Acquisition folks tried to make them be part of the Air Force, so they would change positions every two years or so and would have to go to CGSC, the War College and so on. Whether that's all necessary, somebody would have to take a look at it and conclude that.

We also felt as though they needed some sort of an entry level program where you could train people to be Space Acquisition folks as opposed to just sending them to a position and letting them do on the job training to figure things out. The Defense Acquisition University and similar places have programs like that.

Those were our recommendations. They started at the National level. Consolidate leadership and provide an efficient and effective capability provider. We saw a lot of good things out there. Generally where we saw the good things was outside the beltway. Inside the beltway was largely where the problem was as we all know if you've ever lived in or served in Washington, D.C. I'm being a little flippant there but nonetheless that's kind of the situation. We didn't just focus on that as I said. We went out to USASMDC and SMC and U.S. Strategic Command and all kinds of different places to try to get our information.

ASJ – Has Congress or the administration taken any steps to enact any of the Allard commission's recommendations?

Anderson – No. Not that I'm aware of. That doesn't mean it won't. We continue to try to maintain visibility on it, but I think what you have to recognize is the nation has much bigger problems they're working on right now. Most obvious is the economy. Space isn't up to that level yet where it commands that kind of attention. Ultimately it will, and in essence as you look at these recommendations, they are relatively inexpensive. We're not talking about huge bills that would be associated with this. The way we see it is if these things were to be implemented,

we would see savings, but at the same time, we would see more capability because we would have somebody there who has the responsibility for leveling the requirements and staying on top of folks to produce. They will have a lot of responsibility. Some would tell you that part of the difficulty too is the fact that for you to have an Undersecretary of Defense, you'd have to get congressional approval. That is true, but we don't think it would be that much of a problem.

We were looking at this from a National Security perspective not a service perspective. Having the benefit of that now and looking at it, for me the tendency is to take a look at the Army and see how we are doing. Ask ourselves is this an opportunity, and in my mind it's a huge opportunity. I would submit to you that it would be inappropriate for the Army to wait for something to happen before they took action. In my mind, because everything is so dynamic right now, this is an opportunity that the Army just simply should not pass up. It's not just the reports that create some of those dynamics, but it's the fact that you have a new administration in there that has come in under the mantle of change. All of those things I think play to that fact. More importantly, I think we owe it to our warfighters. We owe it to those Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guard out there because they have become very dependent upon these capabilities.

ASJ – Again we come back to change. What would you say to FA40s regarding that?

Anderson – With regard to change by the Army is the fact that in the Space area, we have this tendency to think, "let's see what we get and we'll figure out how we're going to use it," as opposed to being on the front end and saying, "this is what we need." I must confess I was a part of this process myself a decade or so ago, but the focus really needs to be, "let's get it now so that it enhances our warfighting capability." I would suggest to our FA40s and our Space folks out there what they really need to do is think out of the box. Think about what it is that Space can do for the warfighter and help the warfighter understand that and take off with it.

If you were to look at the beginning of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and where we are now, using the metric of how they are using Space, you would see a tremendous difference. The problem is that it had to be iterated from conflict. That's not the way we should want to do business. We should try to figure out what Space can do for those warfighters and get it in place now so that when they need it, they have it, they know what to do with it and how it can help them be the best warfighters in the world. If these particular recommendations were undertaken, this would help the Army because it's now taken out of a service arena and it's into the Office of the Secretary

of Defense arena. It places a much greater responsibility on the Army. They're going to have to be much more engaged and much more active in the development of requirements and such. That would have to come from the Army and the Army Leadership. It requires a bit of a different mind set for the Army and from the Army leadership on down.

ASJ – What kind of mind set is that?

Anderson – You've heard this said before but I do think it's important: Space used to be basically a strategic tool. It's now a tactical tool. Individual Soldiers are using Space capabilities down on the ground right now. This creates a tension between demands for strategic capability, strategic use and tactical use. That's where the Army has got to get involved in helping to resolve that tension. I think that's one of the reasons why these changes would help is that it takes it up a level. If you are trying to resolve that tension, and we're trying to do it through the Air Force, it won't work. At least experience has shown it'd be very hard to get there. The other thing is that traditionally Space has been viewed in the Army as primarily a J2, G2 and a J6, G6 tool. It's not just that. It's a J3, G3, S3 tool now. We've got to change our mind set and the FA40s are the ones that can lead that charge to change it. These are capabilities that can be employed. USASMDC is moving in that direction. The problem is that it's hard, but they recognize what they need to do, and they're trying to make steps to move in that direction as well. I compliment them for that. There is one major thing folks should keep in the back of their mind. The vulnerability of these systems has to be addressed because we have grown so dependent upon them. When they're not there, we're going to be in really tough times. We've got to do something to make sure they are always there.

USASMDC has just concluded the development of a nanosat. That's a step. That's a movement in the right direction. It's recognition of things that have to be done.

ASJ – Did the Allard Commission examine USSTRATCOM's efforts to make Space acquisitions and operations more responsive to the warfighter through its Operationally Responsive Space initiative?

Anderson – You may have heard me say in the past I just can't figure out why we need to have a separate mechanism, a separate method to provide responsive Space capability. Why can't we take the existing method and change it so that it becomes responsive. If we were to undertake these kinds of changes that we recommended in the report, we can do that. We can build that and we can do away with any of the parochial viewpoints and parochial positions and be much more responsive to the

warfighter. That's what it's all about.

People are starting to think differently, not just in the Army but across the board, but it's awfully hard to make large changes in an institution such as the Department of Defense.

ASJ Smith – Before I came to USASMDC, I sat on the Army Staff when we had the virtual MFP 12. It was amazing the fighting that took place within the Army cause we'd sit there and just say virtual MFP 12 and you'd immediately have the G6 go "oh no! This is a communications system. This is a terminal and it's part of my Comms enterprise, so don't you dare pull this over." What does the Army need to do to break down those separate proponents or branch stovepipes to get an enterprise view because obviously the Space enterprise view could break the Comms enterprise if we're not smart on that kind of stuff?

Anderson – Well, you said it and you said it exactly right. We need to be smart with it. In my mind I fully agree with you. Those are the sensitivities and those are the parochialisms that come forward when you start talking about those things because you're talking about resources. The Comms people and the Intel people will say "you're going to take away people out of my branch and make them something else" or something like that. That definitely could be a way, but it's not the only way. In my mind, the only thing they are really telling me is that it will be hard. They're not saying it shouldn't be done. None of the arguments that I've seen say that. The Army has to bite the bullet and take a look at how it can be done. Don't focus on how it cannot be done. Again, it will be hard, and somebody has to take the lead for that. I think USASMDC is moving in that direction. I think it can be done to accommodate the concerns out of all of the branches. But, the basic bottom line has to be what is best for the warfighter. If it doesn't pass that test, then it shouldn't be done. But somebody has to look at it. People are reacting to those kinds of suggestions on the basis of emotion not on the basis of careful thought.

What the Army may want to do is convene some sort of an Army Space Commission much along the lines of the National Security Space Commission of independent folks. I'm not talking about me, I'm talking about anybody. They would come before the Army leadership, and the leadership would be very specific about what is it they want this group to take a look at. Part of it can be that. One of the things that we saw when we first started reviewing things was the fractured nature of Space within the Department of Defense. As I said before, no one's in charge or everyone's in charge. It was all over the place. You had offices who all thought that they were the lead. The Army's much the same.



"The Army and USASMDC in particular have matured that concept in such a way that our FA40s can and do make a difference."

You just described it. The communications, the Intel folks, USASMDC, and so on. Again, the question is whether or not this is the right construct? Maybe, but I'd rather have somebody who has gone through an informed process say if it's right or not, and what it should be or could be, especially in the context of what we've just said here. It almost seems natural that if you've looked at something from a National Security perspective, then the next step should be look at it from an Army perspective. What are the consequences of what has been said and what is this window of opportunity and what can we do to try to improve the way we do business? If you look at the construct that we have for National Security Space and the DoD today, it is the same one we had in the Cold War. It's about the same thing for the Army. Maybe not all the way back to the Cold War but close. Change has happened. Have we changed with it and do we need to change? Change is hard and disruptive, especially when you're in a war. It's a tough time for change.

ASJ Smith – Just to follow up to what you just said, if you take a look at this at the National level, the Army can take a look too, is there anybody that you're aware of at a senior level within the Army who's started to look at this and can say you know we really do need to take a look at how the Army's postured, either organizationally or acquisition wise to further push this capability across and down to the warfighter?

Anderson – Not that I've seen, but we're trying to kick start that process a bit. As I said, USASMDC is number one in getting their own act together. I think then as a result, they will be in a position to carry it up, but there's nothing I've seen at the higher levels of the Army. In other words our staff is not doing anything. One thing that could

be a catalyst for this, but I haven't seen a movement in that direction yet, is the enterprise approach that GEN Casey is taking for the Army where he's trying to shed the Army Staff of some responsibilities and push those out to the four-stars for various functional areas. Space would be a very good element of the enterprise that should be pushed down to USASMDC. It's obvious I have a bit of a bias here, but nonetheless I do think that there is a good strong argument for doing that just because of what has happened over the last seven, eight, ten years or so.

In terms of closing, the Army crossed a major threshold when we established the FA40 Corps. We made a major statement for the Army as well as for the Joint community. That was not easy. The Army and USASMDC in particular have matured that concept in such a way that our FA40s can and do make a difference.

I have talked to some of the young folks that are out there who are really enthusiastic about what they're doing and just encourage the Army to be open-minded, be creative. Don't just think in the box, think out of the box. The future of Army Space is really in their hands simply because of what is going on in the world and in the Army. This is both in terms of not just the conflict but transformation within the Army and those kinds of things. This is a tremendous opportunity to be able to make change for the better. I'm not just trying to say make change for change's sake. Make it better. They can do it. We've just got to listen to them. Don't get discouraged if the first time they say it nothing happens. Keep saying it. Keep saying it over and over again and it'll come.

I'm very proud of USASMDC and our Soldiers and all of the folks who are involved in this. I think they are just doing a tremendous job. 🇺🇸