EVOLUTION OF SECURITY IDENTITY OF DOMESTIC
ANTIMILITARISM AND ROLES OF POLITICAL
PARTIES: CASE STUDIES OF JAPAN AND GERMANY

by

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### Title and Subtitle
Evolution of Security Identity of Domestic Antimilitarism and Roles of Political Parties: Case Studies of Japan and Germany

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### Abstract
Both Japan and Germany have presented security identities of domestic antimilitarism throughout their postwar political histories. Remnants of war memories made peoples of both nations strongly antipathetic to waging a war as a way of pursuing national security. They institutionalized such means as constitutions, laws, and civilian control of military means. Among several tenets of security identities, the most basic and core tenet was no use of force in foreign war. Up until the Cold War period, the bans remained intact. However, as changes in the security environment appeared along with the end of the Cold War, Japan and Germany relied on the circumstances to consider modifying their long-standing antimilitarist approaches to security policies.

This thesis examines how Japan’s and Germany’s political parties contributed to developing new security identities of domestic antimilitarism under the changing security environment and foreign expectations. The main focus of this thesis is finding out the answers to how the political parties’ role as representatives of the public, policy makers based on their inherent security policy stances, and competitors over the preferred policies exerted influence on the evolution of the Japan’s and Germany’s security identity of domestic antimilitarism.

Both nations faced international criticism in the Gulf War due mainly to their failures to properly meet the new expectations of the international community. In consideration of lessons learned from the Gulf War, the Afghanistan war (Japan), and the Bosnian war (Germany) were the landmark tests for both nations of their abilities to rewrite security identities of no use of force in foreign war. In the end, the expected findings of the thesis are that the political parties’ identical positions in view of national security and interactions on the political stages played critical roles in preventing profound changes in the previous security identities of domestic antimilitarism.
EVOLUTION OF SECURITY IDENTITY OF DOMESTIC ANTIMILITARISM AND ROLES OF POLITICAL PARTIES: CASE STUDIES OF JAPAN AND GERMANY

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE OF STUDY

Japan and Germany have developed similar patterns of antimilitarist identities in practicing security policies (security identity of domestic antimilitarism). Following their disastrous defeats in the Second World War, Japan and Germany endured comparable experiences as vanquished nations, and subsequently developed a similar antimilitaristic ethos that persists today. Japan and Germany faced post-war occupation periods, although their respective occupation experiences differed greatly, particularly in terms of the way in which occupation authority was exercised. Most important, they each took initiatives with reference to antimilitarism, not only by their own wills, but also as a result of foreign pressures. This antimilitaristic sentiment is now deeply embedded in the psyche of the Japanese and German people. Both citizens and politicians in Japan and Germany have a strong antipathy against a “use of force.” In addition to a psychological feeling of antimilitarism, the way of carrying out security policies are also underlying benchmarks standing for the security identities of the domestic antimilitarism of Japan and Germany. For both nations, their security identities of antimilitarism are so firmly institutionalized in their constitutions and several resolutions that those identities have continued up until the present day and have become the major issues around which the security policies of these nations revolve. Therefore, for both Japan and Germany, employment of military forces is a last resort to consider as a state activity, except for self-defense purposes, when it comes to designing security policies.

Indeed, no use of force in foreign wars is one of the central tenets underpinning the security identity of antimilitarism. Yet, nowadays, several recent signs displayed by Japan and Germany imply that one tenet of security identity of domestic antimilitarism is changing. For example, Japan dispatched its Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) outside its territory for the Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq Wars (2003) under United Nations (UN) auspices. Meanwhile, Germany provided logistical support and air cover

This thesis begins with descriptions of the security identity of Japan and Germany and descriptions of the conditions that call for changes in their existing security identities. It will focus on the role of politicians in renewing the security identity of antimilitarism through examination of Japanese and German cases of the use of force in foreign areas. The cases will be the Afghanistan War for Japan, and the Bosnian War for Germany. Its main question “how do political parties matter in reproducing security identity of domestic antimilitarism?” “What shapes parties’ security policy stance?” and “how does contestation over preferred security policy among political parties take place?” In seeking answers to the questions, the author will develop the conceptual lens by which each party’s security policy choices are understandable, as well as focus on the process through which the debate among political parties takes place. The author expects to find from the case studies is that the security identity of domestic antimilitarism adjusts in response to environmental changes. Ultimately, what is emphasized is the overall political process and the role of partisan intervention to produce the outcome.

Finding answers to such questions is of significance for various reasons. First, in security policy, Japan and Germany took cautious steps to change long-held antimilitaristic policy stances that were established from the foundation of their nations because of their memories of war. Japan’s and Germany’s decisions on the “use of force abroad” are landmark changes that reflects a shift (or at least a modification) of Japan’s and Germany’s basic principles guiding security policies. A change in the principles underlying the basic direction of policies rarely happens and thus more deserves particular attention. Second, Japan and Germany are both under the parliamentary system. Unlike a presidential system, where leaders have a fixed tenure and the executive branch has strong independent power in decision making, a parliamentary system calls on pronounced partisan roles as a center of decision making to be able to remove the executive from power. Third, it is significant to compare and contrast Japanese and German cases given that the two cases have similarities as well as
differences in various contexts. In terms of the motivations of war-participation, the experiences of the Gulf War played a catalytic role in moving policies toward military intervention in foreign areas. In addition, from a geographical aspect, in the German case, the war took place in the vicinity of its own territory, while in the Japanese case the war took place far from Japanese territory. Comparing and contrasting both cases will provide suggestions to predict the two nations’ policy courses with various variables when put into different situations in the future.

The thesis puts emphasis on examining Japan’s and Germany’s parties’ national identity preferences and security policy preferences established in the parties’ new or re-organizing periods which made direct contributions to building up the security identity of domestic antimilitarism down through their postwar histories. Understanding the parties’ respective logic behind “use of force abroad” debates, in view of party ideology and security policy preferences, helps to judge how party ideologies and policy preferences matter in the making of security policy. Additionally, it helps to predict their course of security activities in the future. This thesis offers outlines of political parties’ ideologies and policy preferences in the security realm, and takes a cautious look at negotiations for adoptions of new sets of security identities.

B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

The populations of Japan and Germany both maintain strong antimilitaristic sentiments. Since the end of WWII, the foundation of both countries has been an aversion toward the use of military force. With hideous memories of the carnage and ruin caused by nuclear attacks, and the feeling of having been victimized by the imperial military, the Japanese people developed intense antimilitaristic sentiments. New post-WWII leaders had to formulate a new state identity which enshrined a sense of antimilitarism. The Yoshida doctrine was representative of these strategic calculations. The Yoshida doctrine provided guidance and a strategic trajectory for the formulation of foreign, defense, security, and economic policy. It articulated overall policy planning which mainly focused on the economic recovery program and allowed for reduced
defense expenditures. This focus was made possible because of the U.S.-Japan alliance.¹ Similarly, the first Chancellor of post-war Germany, Konrad Adenauer, pursued the integration of Germany into the international, multilateral security structure, attainment of legitimate status in the international community while rectifying Germany’s Nazi legacy and reconstruction of the economy based on U.S. financial aid.² Shortly after their catastrophic defeats in the war, both nations framed their constitutions—the Peace Constitution in Japan, the Basic Law in Germany—with provisions of constraints on the use of armed force circumscribing military roles in line with defensive purposes in the case of Germany and with a provision of renunciation of war in the case of Japan. As discussed above, postwar Japanese and German policy makers adopted, implemented and consolidated the idea of antimilitarism and institutionalized it in the process of security policy making. Accordingly, they could develop security identities of domestic antimilitarism.

Japan and Germany share central tenets of their security identities of domestic antimilitarism—“no use of force except in self-defense,” “no participation in foreign war.”³ Up to the early 1990s, the original antimilitaristic approaches to the security policies of Japan and Germany continued to be maintained, but after the Cold War, several indicators demonstrated that the Japanese and German security identities were moving toward a different course in the form of the revision of security objectives and adoption of a new military paradigm. Recent examples of this change are the foreign deployment of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2004) in the case of Japan; and the Bundeswehr’s participation in the Kosovo war (1999)

¹ Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 11–12.
and Afghan War (2001) in the case of Germany. Several schools of thought presented reasons for these unexpected courses of action on which Japan and Germany embarked since the end of the Cold War.

First, rationalists placed focus on the fact that domestic politics of security policy making were influenced by international relations. From the rationalist standpoint, the two states’ behaviors were driven by the undifferentiated consideration of national interests. They were also driven by taking the other’s intentions into account under the structure of the international system. By international-level explanation, given the rise of Japan and Germany during the Cold War period as giant economic powers, the change in security identity of domestic antimilitarism is attributed the motivation to play a greater military role in international politics commensurate with their enhanced economic capabilities. Rationalists expected “normalization” of Japan’s and Germany’s restricted security practices that dominantly appeared between the post-World War and post-Cold War period. These arguments cannot explain political parties’ roles and influences on security policy making since they focused only on domestic politics based on an international context. Furthermore, rationalists’ explanation cannot explain why Japan’s and Germany’s security identity of domestic antimilitarism has not changed completely and why restrictions on security policy areas still remain.

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4 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); For example, representative rationalists (John Mearsheimer), believe that a unified Germany would struggle to obtain nuclear weapons and heighten its military status by virtue of its economic prosperity (John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security* 15, no. 1 [Summer 1990]: 35–36). In the same sense, Kenneth Waltz argues that Japan and Germany try to enhance their military capabilities and military roles in response to their growing economic wealth, and that they will ultimately have nuclear weapons. In addition, he mentions that the incremental international contributions of Japan and Germany will conclude in changes in international structure (Kenneth N. Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, *International Security* 18, no. 2 [Autumn 1993]: 55-61). Richard Betts claims that as long as China continues to grow economically, Japan will become a balancer in East Asia, with its large economy and advanced technology (Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War,” *International Security* 18, no. 3 [Winter 1993/4]: 61). Michael J. Green also claims that if the international status quo surrounding Japan were to break down, it might try to either balance against or challenge the United States (Michael J. Green, “State of the Field Report: Research on Japanese Security Policy,” *Access Asia Review*, [September 1998]). Green reiterates in another volume that in the process of pursuing normal security policies, Japan will sooner or later expand participation in peacekeeping operations, and will try to revise its Constitution (Michael J. Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Area of Uncertain Power*, [New York: Palgrave, 2001], 272–273).
Second, constructivists take a normative or cultural approach to an explanation of domestic policy making. From the constructivists’ point of view, norms or cultures function in shaping specific types of security practices over time. In dealing with the specific cases of Japan and Germany, they emphasize the role of norms or cultures of antimilitarism deeply rooted in both nations. The constructivists’ explanation sheds light on the question of why certain kinds of restrictions were newly imposed when the overseas deployment of military forces was determined. However, this argument is not enough to account for who makes and institutionalizes a particular security identity and who puts that security identity into practice. As well, constructivists are inclined to coin political parties’ positions in undifferentiated manners because of their assumptions that widely perceived norms, dominant cultures, and common historical experiences exert constraining influences on every party equally. With such an argument, processes of adoption, negotiation, implementation and revision of security identity among parties are not accountable.

A focal point of what both rationalists and constructivists take into account is the outcome of a state’s behavior. For them, each party uniformly behaves as a unitary actor in the international system or each party’s behaviors and perspectives are uniformly constrained by imposed norms and cultures. With such approaches, when it comes to making behavioral predictions in the security realm, a party itself is less driven for attention because its respective positions are assumed to be constant across time as well.

5 Constructivists, like Peter J. Katzenstein and Berger, link norms and culture with security policies. Berger points out that Japan’s and Germany’s constitutions and collective security settings reinforce their antimilitaristic character and endow momentum to maintain it over the long haul (Thomas U. Berger, Culture of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, [Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998], 30–32). Similarly, Katzenstein argues that institutionalized norms will prevent Japan from becoming a nuclear power, and will constrain infinite military buildup and aggressive military roles (Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996]), 2–18). John S. Duffield, in particular, emphasizes the role of security culture in implementing German security policies. He indicates that in spite of considerable changes in the security environment after unification, German security policies continue to be constrained along existing policy lines, and Germany has not become aggressive as realists predicted due to its “international institutions” (such as European Union and NATO) and “postwar security culture” (culture of antimilitarism) (John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, Security Policy after Unification, [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998], 233–241).
as across government change. By contrast, the thesis will show how each party’s security policy stance is formulated and diverges, one from another, and shows how parties’ respective alternatives are negotiated on the political stage.

Two main points here are the role of the party as a policy seeker and typology of diverged parties’ positions in line with their security policy preferences. By the examination of partisan activities in security policy making, ultimately, it proves that the parties make a greater contribution to reproducing the security identity of domestic antimilitarism facing multiple, dramatic changes in the country’s security environment over time. Also deserving attention is the differing security environment challenges’ consistent ways of applying the security identity of domestic antimilitarism in Japan and Germany. Subsequently, the new security environment sets a condition under which parties’ interactions over security issues are begun. In the end, the thesis’ primary approach to party politics will combine the rationalists’ argument about the linkage between domestic politics and international relations with the constructivists’ argument about the impact of norms and cultures.

This thesis argues that political parties in Japan and Germany play a leading role in the evolution of the security identity of domestic antimilitarism. An examination of the cases with respect to the JSDF’s and Bundeswehr’s participation in war entails not only political negotiations but also divergence in parties’ positions as policy seekers based on their security policy preferences. In particular, the Afghanistan and Bosnian Wars were excellent cases to test parties’ role in the changing security identity of domestic militarism for the following significant reasons. First of all, no party had yet stood by identical positions in which they responded to the question of the military intervention. The two wars ordered parties to shape positions on the topic. In this regard, it is useful to test what factors influenced parties’ own positions on security matters. Second, as no case had existed to challenge Japanese and German security identities of use of force in foreign war by that time, no set of criteria existed about conditions under which parties might as well reach consensus over international military contributions. All parties’ positions on the issue had greater influence on shaping new sets of criteria with regard to military interventions. Also, parties’ interactions at the cabinet level as
well as at the parliamentary level prohibited one dominant party’s position from representing the new criteria. Thus, the cases of the Afghanistan and Bosnian Wars are useful to test what role parties played when security identities were challenged and revised. The respective parties’ positions will be classified by tracing their prioritized national identities and by tracing the parties’ particular framework within which security policies are constrained or considered (security policy stance). This thesis expects to find that political negotiations on security issues are based on the parties’ own preferred positions and are a key to keeping their security identity consistent despite confronting various challenges.

C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION

This thesis tests parties’ roles as policy seekers as well as key players in keeping or renewing security identity while examining partisan contests over the security issue of the use of force abroad in Afghanistan (Japan) and Bosnian (Germany) Wars. The first step is to build a theoretical framework within which each party’s security policy preferences can be explained in order to conceptualize rationales with which parties make security policy. This step involves examinations of parties’ national identity preferences and suggestions of key variables by which parties are identified with reference to their security policy stance - examples of key variables are party’s position on the security institution, or a party’s position on the use of forces. The next step is to apply the suggested framework to each party. The third step is to examine the negotiation processes among parties with different positions in the security realm. This step involves cabinet-level debates between senior and junior coalition parties and parliamentary-level debates between ruling and opposition parties. This step will show the process through which parties’ preferred policies are negotiated and compromised, and show whether the outcome of the policy remains consistent with the existing security identity of domestic antimilitarism.

In order to test parties’ role more effectively, the two cases are assumed to consist of similar conditions—first, changes in external security environments, e.g., end of the
Cold War, reunification of West-East Germany; second, foreign pressures to put both nations to take action; third, a shift in public opinion from blind opposition to the use of force to conditional support for it.

The thesis will consist of five chapters including the introductory chapter. Chapter II will describe the analytical framework. This chapter will discuss the concepts of antimilitarism, security identity, and security identity of domestic antimilitarism. It will also discuss the institutionalized security identity of domestic antimilitarism in Japan and Germany by examining the constitutions and several resolutions articulating restrictions on security practices. Subsequently, Chapter II will cover the role of political parties as policy seekers and will discuss what national identity preferences mean and what kinds of fundamental variables exist when it comes to building security policy preferences. Finally, this chapter will analyze Japanese and German parties’ respective party national identity preferences and security policy preferences. Chapters III and IV will deliver how parties matter in the face of fundamental challenges as opposed to their security identity of domestic antimilitarism with the case studies of Japan and Germany. Each case study will include external conditions that call for adopting a different way of exercising the security identity of domestic antimilitarism. Subsequently, it will deal with how parties made their policies based on their security policy preferences and how they debated the final decision at the cabinet-level and at the parliamentary-level. Chapter V will conclude. It will compare and contrast findings from the two case studies and offer implications for future policy predictions.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

A. SECURITY IDENTITY OF DOMESTIC ANTIMILITARISM

1. What is Security Identity of Domestic Antimilitarism?

This section articulates concepts of security identity, antimilitarism, and security identity of domestic antimilitarism. The explanations of these concepts are based on Oros’ volume and his definitions.

As Oros defined, security identity is a “set of collectively held principles that have attracted broad political support regarding the appropriate role of state action in the security arena and are institutionalized into the policy-making process.”6 When a certain security identity gains dominant support from a wide range of political actors and major societal actors, it becomes a hegemonic security identity that represents one state’s security identity. Once a security identity becomes hegemonic, it provides an overarching framework under which a state shapes its security policy practices.7

Oros differentiated the concept of security identity from that of norms, ideas, ideology, and culture.8 Ideology is a more general concept than security identity in that it refers to universally shared beliefs that individuals perceive, but security identity consists of shared principles that are adopted, implemented, and institutionalized in a state system. Security identity is also different from ideas. In addition, whereas ideas give a certain “road map” for policy decisions on a case by case basis, security identity gives a “sense of coherence to policies by making certain policy options more desirable than others.”9 As well, security identity and norms have differences, in terms of the fact that norms propose a set of goals to be accomplished by policies, but security identity proposes a way by which goals are accomplished given the framework. In this regard, security

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7 Ibid., 9–10.
8 Ibid., 10–11.
9 Ibid., 10.
identity is also discernable from culture as it sets boundaries for appropriate political actions rather than setting norms and goals as culture normally provides.

Before further discussion on the security identity of domestic antimilitarism, the concept of antimilitarism warrants discussing. Antimilitarism is an anti-war sentiment which is embedded in one’s psyche. Antimilitarism represents a distinct characteristic of antipathy that individuals, organizations, and states have against war.¹⁰ Theoretically, a concept of antimilitarism has a connotation of opposition to war itself, but practically, it is broadly used to mean opposition to all military-related matters, i.e., having military capabilities or undertaking military activities.¹¹ When it comes to taking state-level analysis into account, antimilitarism exclusively denies accepting any military means as a part of state activities.¹²

Security identity of domestic antimilitarism is a forged term for describing a modified identity of antimilitarism in order to garner openly accepted military activity as opposed to a pure sense of antimilitarism, which is not open to employing any military means as national security policy options. The concept of security identity of domestic antimilitarism focuses on “limits to the reemergence of militarist elements at home, yet still accepting as legitimate a defensive role for a military.”¹³ As security identity provides a set of boundaries under which states shape security policy practices, security identity of domestic antimilitarism provides a framework for appropriate actions in the security policy arena based on antimilitarist aspects of security policy.¹⁴ It is not a final goal that political actors have to achieve, but rather it is an overarching framework that gives directions based on antimilitarism.

¹³ Ibid., 6.
¹⁴ Ibid., 12.
2. Security Identity of Domestic Antimilitarism in Japan and Germany

Antimilitarism emerged in Japan and Germany followed by their defeats in WWII. Both nations had experiences in common of mass destruction of their territory in the wake of the war. Germany was attacked by aerial bombardments from the allied forces resulting in six and a half million casualties; in the case of Japan, two major cities were attacked by atomic bombs, and the country suffered approximately eight million casualties on all battlefields. Moreover, many of the established economic-social infrastructures were destroyed, and as a result of unconditional surrenders, both countries lost considerable territory. These factors all contributed to the emergence of antimilitarism in the German and the Japanese psyche. The antimilitarism of Japan and Germany spread, not only through individual mindsets, but through organizations such as pacifist political parties whose degrees of acceptance of the antimilitarist ethos were different from one another.

Based on common military-historical backgrounds, Japan and Germany adopted and maintained security identities of domestic antimilitarism after the end of WWII. There are three central tenets to Japan’s and Germany’s postwar security identities of domestic antimilitarism. Their respective tenets differ slightly from each other.

Table 1. Central tenets of Japan’s and Germany’s security identity of domestic antimilitarism (After: Oros, 2008, 45; Duffield, 1998, 43)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. No traditional armed forces involved in domestic policymaking</td>
<td>1. Civilian control and Innere Fuhrung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No use of force by Japan to resolve international disputes, except in self-defense</td>
<td>2. Exclusively use force for self-defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No Japanese participation in foreign wars</td>
<td>3. Little interest in out-of-area strategic involvements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first tenet of Japan and Germany is designated by complete obedience to ‘civilian control.’\(^{15}\) In the case of Japan, up until 2007 when the Ministry of Defense

\(^{15}\) Thomas U. Berger, op. cit., 50.
(MOD) was established, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was not granted full ministerial stature under the administrative supervision of the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{16} The JDA positions were filled with officials from other institutions such as Ministry of Foreign Affair (MOFA), Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and Ministry of Finance (MOF). The Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) was under the supervision of the Internal Bureau (IB). Even after the creation of the MOD, the seconded officials, as compared to other ministries, were still in most high positions. In the case of Germany, senior positions in the MOD were assigned by a defense minister and two secretaries who were all civilians. Among four branches in the MOD, only one branch was headed by a professional military officer; an independent office of the parliamentary commissioner took responsibility to monitor the military.\textsuperscript{17} Apart from institutionalized methods, Germany introduced a concept of “Innere Fuhrung (internal leadership).”\textsuperscript{18} The concept of Innere Fuhrung was launched by the democratic civil-military reform of the Basic Law (1954-1957) which intended to distance the military institution from the Nazi legacy. It ordered new soldiers to “no longer fight on the basis of zombie-like obedience but out of an inner conviction and belief in the values of freedom and democracy.”\textsuperscript{19} Innere Fuhrung became the moral principle of German soldiers afterward and it was the principal tool used to legitimize the creation of armed forces in Germany.

The second tenet of both Japan and Germany accounted for the use of military forces for the purpose of self-defense. This tenet is institutionalized in the Japanese and German constitutions. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution renounced the state’s right to use military force to solve conflicts with foreign nations. In a similar vein, the German Basic Law stipulated that the armed forces would be used only for national defense. The detailed content of both nations’ constitutions will be introduced in the next part of this discussion.

\textsuperscript{17} Thomas U. Berger, op. cit., 50.
\textsuperscript{18} Donald Abenheim, \textit{Soldier and Politics Transformed}, (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles, 2007), 88.
\textsuperscript{19} Thomas U. Berger, op. cit., 52.
The third tenet circumscribes a possible range for employing military forces. A ban on the overseas dispatch of SDF was institutionalized by the self defense law written when the SDF was created by Japan in 1954.20 In addition, based on Article 9 of the Constitution, the Japanese government officially announced that the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) was constitutionally prohibited from joining in the exercise of the right of collective self defense.21 By interpretation, Japan relinquished the right to engage in third-party disputes. In the case of Germany, Article 24 of the Basic Law allowed the integration of German security into a “system of mutual collective security.” Thus, Germany was given greater room for maneuvering when it comes to use forces in foreign countries. The Basic Law contained Article 87a which stated that the use of armed forces was strictly prohibited other than for defense purposes. Thus, official German interpretation of the constitution up until the 1990s saw that external use of the armed forces except for defense purposes within the NATO area was prohibited.22 The third tenet has been tested, in particular in the aftermath of the Cold War. German participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, in the Bosnian, Kosovo, and Afghanistan Wars, and Japanese participation in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars exemplifies the breach of the tenet. This thesis focuses on the challenges of exercising the third tenet – no use of force in foreign war - from an international context. Japan and Germany were placed in situations where maintenance of the third tenet was difficult for various reasons, due to external structural changes and increases in foreign expectations. The process through which the third tenet of “no use of military forces in foreign war” is revised is the main focus of the thesis.


22 George Nolte, “Germany: Ensuring Political Legitimacy for the Use of Military Forces by Requiring Constitutional Accountability,” in Ibid., 236.
3. The Institutionalized Security Identity of Domestic Antimilitarism in Japan and Germany

A key method of the institutionalization of the security identity of domestic antimilitarism is the constitution, law, and resolutions. Japan and Germany had constitutions which had been rewritten in the immediate postwar period. Each of the constitutions had specific contents that prohibited the two nations from reemerging as military powers in the international community.

a. Japan

The Peace Constitution was chiefly drafted under the guardianship of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Power, General MacArthur, and the main work was charged to the Government Section’s committee of twenty-four U.S. military and civilians led by Major General Courtney Whitney. It was presented to the Japanese government for review and accepted within ten days of its delivery to the Japanese. 23

One of the cardinal principles grounded in the Constitution was the abolishment of waging war for the sake of national interests. It clearly stated that “Japan would renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation.”24

Article 9 of the constitution, ‘The Renunciation of War’, reads as follows:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

To interpret its meaning, Japan would relinquish the right to build or maintain a military (Army, Navy, and Air Force) as well as the right to use military force as a sovereign means for any reasons including defense purposes. After its promulgation, Japanese governments since the 1950s have revised the interpretation of Article 9 from


its original meaning, by permitting the government’s right to seek self-defense and to maintain the JSDF for exercising self-defense actions under the U.N. Charter. Although the Constitutional interpretation still raises debates among Diet members, it is still a cornerstone that bolsters Japan’s security identity of domestic antimilitarism.

Moreover, there are several institutionalized resolutions other than the Constitution that consolidate the practice of security policies based on the security identity of domestic antimilitarism. The first resolution is the “ban on overseas dispatch” which was established in 1954. This law banned engagement in international disputes and third party conflicts by Japanese military forces. Also, it is inferred that Japanese troops would not be dispatched outside Japanese territory in support of the United States.

The second resolution is the ban on arms exports. Prime Minister Sato announced (1967) that Japan would not export arms to communist states, countries under U.N. sanctions, and parties to international disputes. Prime Minister Miki Takeo (1976) further applied this restriction to all nations, and additionally announced prohibiting all weapons-related technology as well as dual-use (civil-military) technologies from export.

The third institutionalized resolution concerns the three non-nuclear principles: no production, possession, or introduction of nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Sato introduced this constraint in his Diet speech in 1967. The principles of “no production” and “no possession” were consolidated by ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NTP) in 1976. The third principle was arguably violated by the Japanese government’s permission to U.S. naval vessels with nuclear weapons to enter Japanese ports or to transit through Japanese ports.

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25 Christopher W. Hughes, Ibid., 32.
28 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Postwar Security Trajectory and Policy System, (London: Routledge, 2009), 34.
The fourth institutionalized resolution is the one percent of Gross National Product (GNP) limit on defense expenditure. The Miki administration introduced this restriction in 1974. From 1976 onward, defense expenditure was not allowed to exceed 1 percent of Japan’s GNP. Except for one year when Nakasone Yasuhiro spent slightly above 1 percent of the GNP in 1986, this rule has been strictly kept.

The fifth institutionalized resolution is the peaceful use of space. This resolution was passed by the Diet in May 1969. It declared outer space would be used for peaceful purposes and any data would be interpreted and used for non-military activities. It constrained collection of military intelligence by satellite and possession of technology in space industries related to the area of arms manufacturing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defense Constraint</th>
<th>Month / Year</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Related issue</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ban on oversea dispatch</td>
<td>July 1954</td>
<td>Shigeru Yoshida</td>
<td>Passing the Defense Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban on arms export</td>
<td>April 1967</td>
<td>Eisaku Sato</td>
<td>Passing the Third Defense Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three non-nuclear principles</td>
<td>December 1967</td>
<td>Eisaku Sato</td>
<td>Debate over the nuclear weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One percent of GNP limit</td>
<td>October 1976</td>
<td>Takeo Miki</td>
<td>Détente, oil crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful use of space</td>
<td>May 1969</td>
<td>Eisaku Sato</td>
<td>U.S.-USSR space competition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Germany

Following Germany’s defeat in WWII, the German constitution, the Basic Law, was newly drafted. Four allied powers agreed to rebuild Germany and guaranteed that the German people would live on a peaceful basis in order not to repeat the same mistakes made during the interwar period. Unlike the case of Japan, elected German assemblies lived in the U.S. occupation zone and drafted the democratic constitution by themselves. The Basic Law is firmly anchored in antimilitarism judging from several

29 Christopher W. Hughes, Ibid., 35.
30 Christopher W. Hughes, Ibid., 35.
articles. Overall, Article 87a (2) of the German Basic Law, restrains the use of the Bundeswehr for “national defense”; Article 24(1–2) leaves room for transferring sovereign rights to collective security institutions; and Article 26 forbids acts intended to disturb international peace.

Article 24 reads as follows:31

(1) The Federation may by a law transfer sovereign powers to international organizations.

(1 a) Insofar as the Länder are competent to exercise state powers and to perform state functions, they may, with the consent of the Federal Government, transfer sovereign powers to transfrontier institutions in neighboring regions.

(2) With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world.

(3) For the settlement of disputes between states, the Federation shall accede to agreements providing for general, comprehensive and compulsory international arbitration.

Article 26 reads as follows:

(1) Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be made a criminal offence.

(2) Weapons designed for warfare may be manufactured, transported or marketed only with the permission of the Federal Government. Details shall be regulated by a federal law.

Article 87a (1), (2), (3), (4) reads as follows:

(1) The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defense. Their numerical strength and general organizational structure must be shown in the budget. (newly added in 1950s)

(2) Apart from defense, the Armed Forces may be employed only to the extent expressly permitted by this Basic Law.

(3) During a state of defense or a state of tension the Armed Forces shall have the power to protect civilian property and to perform traffic control functions to the extent necessary to accomplish their defense mission. Moreover, during a state of defense or a state of tension, the Armed Forces may also be authorized to support police measures for the protection of civilian property; in this event the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent authorities.

(4) In order to avert an imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, the Federal Government, if the conditions referred to in paragraph (2) of Article 91 obtain and the police forces and the Federal Border Police prove inadequate, may employ the Armed Forces to support the police and the Federal Border Police in protecting civilian property and in combating organized armed insurgents. Any such employment of the Armed Forces shall be discontinued if the Bundestag or the Bundesrat so demands.

In practicing security policies, Germany has imposed limits on the use of military forces based on the interpretation of the clauses above. The interpretation of the Basic Law became far clearer since the Constitutional Court granted legal basis to the German Bundeswehr when participating in international military operations outside the NATO area once the majority of support in the Bundestag was given.\textsuperscript{32} Unlike Japan,

Germany had no additional resolutions that were institutionalized in the form of law. Instead, it granted the Constitution the superior right to undertake a substantial role in coordinating and controlling the German military.

4. Conclusion

One of main themes that this thesis intends to deal with is the shifting security identity of domestic antimilitarism in Japan and Germany. In the first place, when Japanese and German policy makers design security policies, the security identity of domestic antimilitarism provides a framework that circumscribes the scope of military roles and missions on the part of state activities. Up to now, the security identity of domestic antimilitarism that emerged in the aftermath of WWII has been firmly institutionalized and implemented into Japan’s and Germany’s security policy making processes. As well, consensus has existed; if policies deviated from the range of the public’s acceptance in line with the given framework, the public would challenge the policy.\(^{33}\) Also, the implemented security identity of domestic antimilitarism exerts significant influences on security policymaking.

However, there has come a time when the existing security identity of domestic antimilitarism has had to be modified or changed. For research purposes, this thesis redefines the term of shifting security identity of domestic antimilitarism to an evolution of the interpretation of the existing security identity of domestic antimilitarism and which represents a departure from the existing guidance from the central tenets. Oros presented three factors that contribute to changes in security policies:\(^{34}\) (1) “Ideas about appropriate action change, perhaps even so far as an identity shift;” (2) “Political power distribution or the party in power changes;” (3) “The context or environment in which policy is made or to which it is targeted changes.” With the help of these three propositions, it can be stated that identity shift took place when “major policy change took place through the adoption of a new security identity.”\(^{35}\) Besides, the wholesale adoption of changes in

\(^{33}\) Oros, op. cit., 32.

\(^{34}\) Oros, op. cit., 25.

\(^{35}\) Oros, op. cit., 26.
security policies leads to identity shift and vice versa. It is important to note that changes in the security environment (the security policy change case - 3) provide politicians with great motivation to shift or modify security policies. If the change is enormous - e.g., an entire international system changes at the end of the two World Wars or the end of the Cold War, this could lead changes in security identity. Moreover it was a role of party politics to translate external environmental changes into changes in security policy, then to changes in security identity; and then to adopt different sets of ideas in devising security policies to the extent of bringing a change in security identity. In this sense, when it comes to discussing the topic of shifting security identity, not only the international security environment but also party politics and the public should be taken into account.

The third tenet of Japan and Germany which found common context is concerned with reluctance to engage in wars taking place outside of their own territory. In the case of Germany, even though its defense forces were under the command of a multinational security organization, practically, security policies in Germany had little interest with reference to calling collective security into effect. In the case of Japan, at the outset of bilateral security, mutual military cooperation was out of bounds so long as the contents of the security treaty were concerned. In spite of being under the bilateral security framework, Japanese assistance for the alliance partner was not put into practice. Moreover, both Japan and Germany barely resorted to the use of military forces unless there were direct threats or attacks on their own territory.

However, from the beginning of the 1990s, the tenet was challenged to remain consistent with the past pattern of security practice. As the hostile international security environment began to thaw, as the West-East German states unified, foreign nations as well as domestic politics reinterpreted the role of the military in foreign war. The course of change in the third tenet was not simple but complex and demanding. As security identity, defined by the third tenet, guided Japan’s and Germany’s security practices for long decades, the change came to the fore in difficulties. From this standpoint, this thesis will focus on political parties’ positions and interactions when the long held tenet of security identity was challenged.
B. PARTY POLITICS

1. Role of Political Parties

Political parties are most significant figurehead of advanced democracy. They represent interests of various social groups, run candidates for elections, and formulate public policies. This chapter will explain what parties’ general roles are. This examination will provide an understanding of parties’ interactions when security identity was challenged to be rewritten.

a. Represents Public and Social Groups

First of all, the main function of political parties in a democracy is to connect the people’s opinion with political platforms. The role is revealed in various ways. Parties represent social groups and the people. Most all democratic countries’ parties’ cleavages represent social cleavages. By looking at social groups’ and the public’s needs they integrate various opinions into the national agenda. However, political parties cannot represent all parts of social groups, electorates or constituents.36 Thus, in modern society, sometimes parties have been created or dissolved by the will of the electorate who want their special interests to be reflected in a national agenda.

Second, political parties fulfill the function of opinion formation. As societies become more complex, the representation of a single public opinion or one group’s interests becomes far more difficult. In return, political parties play a more important role in contemporary society. That is because they have to form opinions and produce policies that can garner support from the electorates. Special groups which have influential power in the society, with a lot of resources of money or manpower, are not able to represent a party’s agendas alone. Political parties have to listen to the voices of isolated classes in the society and reflect their opinions in national policies as well.

Third, political parties are mediators that reconcile different interests. In the process of opinion forming, parties collect different opinions from different individuals and put those diverse opinions into a compromised agenda. This function

balances different interests and leads to the final decision not to take extreme positions.\textsuperscript{37} This function also has a negative aspect. In the process of reconciling different interests, political parties can lean toward majority opinions, so opinions from minorities can become buried. Thus, sometimes minorities create their own parties to convey their opinions to the public agenda.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{Fourth}, political parties function as a route to allow individuals to become part of political platforms. In a democracy, every individual has the right to have access to political parties. A political party itself is an excellent pathway for people to express their own opinions and interests in a direct way. In converse, political parties select party members who can gain support from a large number of people. Likewise, parties provide individuals with opportunities to enter into a formal organizational apparatus and facilitate individuals’ participations.

Nowadays political parties also take responsibility for forming opinions in a certain direction. As more diverse opinions exist in a society, parties’ roles of reconciling different interests and incorporating opinions into compromise policy packages becomes more important. In security policy making in Japan and Germany, public opinion was more important than in any other country, since parties were not free from the public’s deep sense of aversion to the military and to war. Thus, when it comes to studying the evolution of security identities of domestic antimilitarism in Japan and Germany, political parties’ roles in representing public opinion is an important factor to consider.

\textbf{b. Policy Makers}

Parties are groups of individuals who have shared ideologies and prioritized values and whose role is to create policies which enable the promotion of national interests. Parties’ specific policy ideas originated from the parties’ ideologies.


As Lipset and Rokkan noted, policy is “packaged by ideology.”\(^{39}\) At most, party platforms, manifestoes, and programs carry parties’ ideologies, policy goals and proposals.\(^{40}\) Parties’ ideologies are a core means to ensure parties’ policy to be cohesive. The cohesiveness of policies makes electorates give constant support or opposition to the parties. In return, parties can have an opportunity to attract more voters by appealing to their responsibilities and reliability to behave based on their principles in a cohesive manner.\(^{41}\) It is true that parties’ respective policies are changed over time.\(^{42}\) Parties have to respond to changing situations in a society. Moreover, responses to changing situations and reforms are one important source of parties’ appeal to voters. However, when it comes to considering core principles inside policy packages, the principles tend to be consistent. Even if parties change their names and organizational structures, most party manifestoes continue to have the same general ideological principles over time.\(^{43}\) That is because parties making policies under changing circumstances are not free from ideological identity. Variation of policies is also circumscribed through the parties’ ideological principles that have been maintained over time. If this is not the case, then parties have to rewrite their identities and would lose party reliability.

On the contrary, there is another argument to explain parties’ motivation to make policies. This view highlights the fact that parties are primarily motivated to make policies to win elections.\(^{44}\) This argument depicts parties’ role as an office seeker who bases behavior on electoral appeal. For this school of thought, political ideologies are tools to gain more supporters than opponents and ideas and ideologies are chosen for


\(^{43}\) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, Western European communist parties adopted new names but made few changes in their general ideological stances; Francesca Vassallo and Clyde Wilcox, *Ibid.*, 416.

a maximum share of the popular vote. Considering parties’ roles in democracy to represent public opinion, to be a way to express public opinion in political institutions, and to form and reconcile different opinions and interests, office seeking is an important motivation. However, even if the parties’ ideology functions only as a means to attract voters’ attention, it is an undeniable fact that a constant set of policy ideas and ideology is one of the important factors for parties to win elections. As discussed above, consistent party behaviors before and after election campaigns convince voters of the parties’ reliability and responsibility. Moreover, in a complex society, diverse interests exist. In order to respond to shifts in the voters preferences, parties have to adjust policy stances frequently, which might lead to losing credibility and losing electorates’ support. In this regard, parties’ ideologies and constant implementation of policy ideas should not be underestimated.

For research purposes, it is important to measure parties’ motivations in security policy making whether primarily moved by policy seekers’ arguments or office seekers’ arguments. This thesis will follow the policy seekers’ arguments that put much importance on ideology and principles when security policy making is concerned. That is because public opinion on security matters is not built on the public’s core interests in their individual lives. Rather, public opinion about security policies is constructed throughout a culture and history. This view comes from ideologies and preferred views on international relations rather than directly related day-to-day-basis interests. Unless people feel threatened by external enemies when public opinion is shaped by top priorities, public opinion on security matters is resilient to change. Thus it is important to focus on parties’ basic principles and ideologies rather their intentions to win elections when appealing to voters in parties’ security policy making process.

Given that parties’ ideological principles make the parties’ policy platforms consistent for significant periods of time, parties’ influence on making policies in the parliamentary system is another important subject. Before further discussion, note that this thesis assumes that parties are unitary actors. It does not see party members’ personal differences over the party’s policy platform and assumes that every party member votes the party line in parliament.
Parties play an important role in policy choice in the parliament once a government bill is handed down to the legislative body. At this stage, minor parties can leverage their policy stances. A debate of this kind is important for a well-functioning and advanced democracy.  

Parties are the central component of the debate process through which final decisions are made. Parties suggest and promote feedback between parliamentary activity and public opinion. In security policy areas, debate heightens when the disagreement between governing parties and opposition parties is great. In general debate in the parliament scarcely leads to a direct change in government policy; nevertheless, it can exert pressure which at times calls for referenda on a government’s security policy.  

Sometimes, one point of leverage is the so-called delay tactic. Opposition parties reject passing a bill during the parliamentary sessions by boycotting. In addition, they propose amended bills and then insist on voting on them. A series of opposition parties’ actions can be time-consuming and prevent quick and effective decision making. However, there is no doubt that the delaying tactic is one method to exert influence on policy choices in the parliament.

c. Competitors over the Preferred Policy

Another important role of a political party is to compete with opponents in the decision making process. Party competition is a core part of a well-developed democracy. There are two explanations about political competition. The first interprets the parties’ competition as they compete with each other for alignment with more supporters’ interests and opinions. Party competition facilitates a party’s credibility by satisfying the citizens’ interests in politics. Voters vote for candidates who are willing to listen to their ideas and interests and transfer them through the decision making system. The other explanation argues that parties compete with each other for policy outcomes. According to this point of view, the power of a party is measured by policy outcomes that

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47 Andrew Karch and Benjamin Deufel, op. cit.
follow a party’s beliefs and principles. Moreover, parties try to win elections in order to accomplish policy goals rather than make policies to win elections. This perspective sees that parties’ fulfillment of policy goals is the best way to attract voters.

Parties’ competition can be examined without consideration of voters’ tendencies when voting and parties respond to voting behavior. In this regard, parties’ competition is typically described by a theory of “vote-maximizing behavior.” Some voters have non-policy considerations in their decision making in elections. By contrast, some voters have more ability to discern parties’ or candidates’ willingness concerning policy impositions throughout the policy making process. Some citizens do not want to vote at all. In order to garner as much support as possible, parties have to analyze voters’ behavior patterns. One thing worthwhile focusing on is the fact that the parties’ credibility is derived from the party’s ability to bow to the voters’ expectations and align with them regardless of the voters behavior patterns. Thus, one critical condition for parties to have power and influence in politics is to design appealing policy packages and to redeem pledges in real politics and to accumulate accountability to voters.

However, there are other ways to gain power in politics having few votes, in particular in a parliamentary system. One possible way is to make coalitions to form a government. Where votes are distributed too widely to have one dominant major party, this coalition forming is a prevalent method to make a government more stabilized and powerful. This method also enables small parties to influence national-level politics and the decision making process. Another way to exert power in politics on minor parties’ side is to make a use of systemic advantages. Minor parties can be united to boycott to voting for policies in parliament or to encourage greater public opinion to oppose major parties’ policies. The minor parties could gain more power when major
parties increasingly fail to deal appropriately with the wide range of views and interests that political dynamic at national, regional and local levels consists of.\textsuperscript{50}

Likewise, political parties’ important roles are to compete with each other for power. This is the basic motivation to make efforts to gain support from voters. Political parties’ power facilitates implementation of policies as well. In the realm of security policy making, parties compete with each other to accomplish their policy goals. In a situation when public opinion is centrist, parties’ competition is revealed. They compete to impose their own values and ideologies on the final policy outcomes. When discussing the agenda of forming a different security identity in a parliament, party competition plays a crucial role in maintaining consistency with the previous scope of domestic antimilitarism.

2. Determinants of a Security Policy Stance

This thesis assumes three things. \textbf{First}, in security policy making, parties are primarily guided by their ideology rather than electoral motivations. \textbf{Second}, it assumes that the parties’ principal ideology remains unchanged from the time of foundation. \textbf{Third}, it assumes a party is one entity rather than group of independent individuals aiming to win competition with opponents. But, measuring party positions with specific variables remains a difficult exercise. Most well-known ideological classification methods place parties on the left-right dimension. In general, left of the ideological spectrum stands for progressive politics, whereas right of the ideological spectrum stands for conservative politics. In particular, left parties advocate for communist or socialist development models, whereas right parties advocate for capitalist developmental models.\textsuperscript{51} Additionally, “individual freedom,” “human liberties,” and “free enterprise” belong to the right parties’ positions, whereas “social warfare,” “reformed capitalism for


disposed group” belong to the left parties’ positions. Yet, not only domestic issues, but also abstract values and beliefs are involved in the left-right typology. Thus, this characterization does not directly translate into a party’s classification according to security policy preference. In this regard, this thesis puts forward three variables to measure parties’ differences in security policy positions. One is the parties’ preferences with respect to national identities, another is the parties’ positions on favored international relations, and the last is the parties’ positions on military roles.

Each party’s preference in security policy areas is related to the party’s preferred view on national identity. In the period of national foundation, the parties of Japan and Germany had different views about what national identity would be plausible to follow in the future. Also, parties which were created far after the national building period also have views they prioritize of the desirable character of the nation. By definition, a nation is a “named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duty for all members.” Since the definition of nation is complex and abstract, the definition of national identity is certainly multi-dimensional. Hence, the concept of national identity entails not only how a national identity can be combined with other kinds of identity—class, religious or ethnic—but also how ideologies exert influence on shaping national identity. This thesis only focuses on one dimension of national identity, to define the character of a nation as a whole. Specifically, national identities of Japan and Germany are defined as what kinds of counties Japan and Germany are and what roles they are playing in an international context.

It is true that national identity is not formulated within a small span of time, but for Japan and Germany, the postwar period was a special time to rewrite their nations’ constitutions, rooted in antimilitaristic approaches. Japan’s and Germany’s politicians raised questions about what future Japanese and German national identities were


54 Anthony D. Smith, op. cit., 15.
plausible to formulate in the immediate postwar period. The national identity each party presented was different from one party to another. The differences and rationales give an opportunity to trace fundamental values and principles each party perceived and primary ground for guiding selecting security policy options.

Each party’s preferred view on security policies is also measured by its positions on a diverse realm of issues related to national security. Among various issues, parties’ approaches to international relations shaped the fundamental grounds of parties’ security policy stances. In the case of Japan, some parties prefer aligning with the United States whereas some parties preferred aligning with regional nations or preferred remaining neutral in international politics. In the case of Germany, some parties preferred integrating with western European nations whereas some parties preferred rapprochement with Eastern European nations. The different views of international relations resulted in parties’ different approaches to secure the nation against external threats.

In addition, parties have their own positions related to military roles. The discussion of military roles earnestly emerged in the post-Cold War period, when Japan and Germany were able to gain economic power and good reputations from international communities. Exercising a full array of military roles was a major source when it came to normalization of their national stature. However, parties’ views diverged on the issues. There were also parties in Japan and Germany which took cautious positions on active military interventions in international security affairs. Rather, they preferred integrating their military into multilateral security organizations. Different positions with respect to military roles caused parties to take different security policy paths. In this regard, military roles can be a variable to measure the parties’ security stances.

An examination of security policy stance is of significance since it makes one nation’s security policy predictable and accountable to some extent. In the use of force in foreign war discussion, this security policy stance made a great impact on writing the security policy package for each party. When parties choose their policies on some issues, the principles the parties followed influenced choosing the next step as well as the
rationale to oppose or suppose the security policy agenda originated from their own security policy preferences. This argument will be proved by analyzing Japan’s and Germany’s war participation discussions.

3. The Role of Political Parties in the Evolution of the Security Identity of Domestic Antimilitarism

Codification of security identity has much to do with political negotiations. When tracing back the process of the emergence of security identity of domestic antimilitarism in postwar Japan and Germany, it is worth noting that there were contestations among those who supplied different sets of ideas for new security identities. In the process of political negotiations for a new security identity, political parties played the main roles in furnishing coherent and unique views based on their preferred principles. Another point is that there was no total winner or no total loser in the security identity-seeking contestation. In other words, Japanese and German security identity of domestic antimilitarism was not forged by a single dominant party’s voice. Instead it was a final result of political negotiations with several political parties which reorganized after the end of WWII.\(^{55}\) Compromises created the hegemonic security identity of postwar Japan and Germany known as the security identity of domestic antimilitarism.

Then, how did parties bring about changes in the security identity of domestic antimilitarism? As mentioned earlier, political parties are identified based on their ideological stance. Namely, each party has a tendency to cling to its original policy stance. Both Japan and Germany shared a common fundamental value of antimilitarism when designing security policies. However, political parties’ policy positions are difficult to be retained constantly. There are two main reasons. First of all, a new security environment requires each party to adjust its identity on security agendas in response to circumstantial alterations. Reunification of the two German states and the end of the Cold War were representative cases calling for adjustment of the future national identity of each party as well as the way to pursue national interests. Second, external pressures either on bilateral dimensions or on multilateral dimensions require

\(^{55}\) Oros, op. cit., 42.
parties to make changes in their policy line that deviate substantially from the original ideological foundations. For example, the memories in the first Gulf War let Japan and Germany “do something” to keep international peace. On facing the transition of the environment, as well as the imposition of foreign pressures, political parties of Japan and Germany were forced out, as Hinich suggested, relying on issue-based pledges or manifestos rather than ideological-based ones for winning elections.\(^{56}\)

However, although a tendency of issue-based policy making prevails over time, in the cases of Japanese and German policy, choices on “use of forces” were contained within a frame of the existing security identity. That was because a “bottom line” that upheld Japan’s and Germany’s antimilitarism was the reluctance to use military forces. However, considering a definition of militarism as a use of military means in order to achieve national purpose, the use of forces in foreign territory aroused war trauma which still remained in the Japanese and German people’s minds.\(^{57}\) For this reason, political parties in Japan and Germany had to make new paradigms to deal both with external challenges (or requests) and internal antimilitaristic identities.

Political parties’ role in policy making about “use of force” manifests in three dimensions. First, considering the nature of the parliamentary system in both countries, political parties’ policy preferences had impacts on drafting and designing new sets of policies. Namely, facing needs to respond to security environment alteration, political parties took leading roles in lawmaking and passing bills in both parliaments. Second, political parties accommodate public opinion. It is a main function of political parties to represent the people in a democratic political system.\(^{58}\) Therefore, before putting an issue of deployment of military force in foreign areas on the negotiation table, political parties of Japan and Germany, at first, had to consider the antimilitaristic sentiments of the people.


\(^{58}\) A discussion about political parties’ role in representing the people was detailed in Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond’s work, “Types and Functions of Parties,” *Political Parties and Democracy*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). They stress that critical functions of political parties as a representative body of the people are (1) to communicate the people or a certain group in society, (2) to compromise and reconcile diverse social interests possessed by a variety of groups.
population since the war ended. **Third,** another noteworthy role of political parties is to provide checks and balances of different preferences and ways of approaching the “use of force” agenda. Japan and Germany both are under the parliamentary system which has two main competing parties with different ideas and values. Thus, political parties, in parliament, debated the draft bill which articulated how to deploy military forces and the legitimacy of the military operation.

How, then, does the security identity of domestic antimilitarism have an effect on the process of political parties’ policy making? In every dimension stated above, the sources of antimilitarism intervene. **Above all,** the constitutions of both countries provide a legal base for special bills in the legislative process. Japan’s and Germany’s constitutions articulate restrictions in that use of force is not excusable for any reason (in the case of Japan); or in that use of force is justifiable only under the command of mutual collective security in order to maintain peace (in the case of Germany). **Next,** public opinions in Japan and Germany are core sources of restriction against use of force in foreign areas. The antimilitaristic ethos that has grown up in the minds of the German population since the war ended was still strong enough to put the agenda through harsh debate. It is true that public opinions has been changing over time and diverging over different acceptable levels (about environmental changes) and different views on how to interpret new government policies. In addition, political parties’ policies can obtain more legitimacy when representing as many peoples’ opinions as possible. Thus, when political parties discuss the “use of force” agenda in the parliament, public opinion is an important theme of concern. **Lastly,** political parties’ policy stances exerted significant influence on the decision making as well as the debate process. As shown, from the beginning of their organizations, Japanese and German parties have been bound to antimilitarism. Although each specific policy package, such as alliance politics,


constitutional revision, and priorities between integration and reunification differed substantially from each other, all parties had been very cautious about the decision making process on the subject of the use of force.
III. CASE STUDY OF GERMANY: THE BOSNIAN WAR AND EVOLUTION OF GERMAN SECURITY IDENTITY

A. SHAPING CONDITIONS FOR NEW SECURITY PRACTICES

1. New Security Environment

Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the two German states and four occupying states finally concluded the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany,” the so called “two plus four agreement,” on September 12, 1990. Through consensus across the East-West blocs, East and West Germany unified under the existing constitution of West Germany (on October 3, 1990); at the same time, a united Germany gained full sovereignty over its domestic and foreign affairs. By virtue of the reunification, Germany was distanced from direct territorial threat. Indeed, during the Cold War, West Germany had feared that its use of military forces for any reason could motivate East Germany or the Soviet Union to take military action in response. Regardless of type of international military operation (from peacekeeping operations to full-scale war), the German Bundeswehr was excluded from participating militarily in operations in non-NATO foreign areas. However, in the absence of direct threat, German politicians could afford to pay attentions to diverse policy variants in security areas.

Just as German unification had been realized, the Soviet Union disintegrated into several successor nation states and subsequently, the Cold War ended. Also, the end of the Cold War gave rise to dramatic increases in the use of military forces in conflicts

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61 U.S. embassy, “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany,” U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany, http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/2plusfour8994e.htm (accessed September 11, 2009); The key elements were “(1) a continuation of the basic framework of post-war security policies, including continued self-imposed limitations of Germany’s military options and firm integration into the Western alliance system so as to reassure its neighbors, (2) a merger of East and West German armed forces, (3) a very substantial overall reduction of those forces in the context of accelerated and enhanced conventional arms control agreements in Europe, (4) the restructuring of the armed forces with the objective to create a flexible, mobile and rapidly deployable crisis reaction force, while retaining the capability for territorial defense, (5) the strengthening of co-operative security ties with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and (6) the re-orientation of German security policies and military planning towards the management of new risks, uncertainties and crises beyond Western Europe.” Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and the Use of Forces: Still a Civilian Power?” Survival 42, no.2 (2002): 9.

under international auspices such as the U.N. or NATO. The Gulf War of 1990-1991 was a momentous test of the U.N.’s collective security system. The test presented by the Gulf War had considerable implications for a shift in the way in which international peace and stability had been maintained. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent war in the Persian Gulf (1990–1991) were important to proving the effectiveness of multinational coalition forces under the international security organization’s mandate. These led to a watershed in shifting people’s focus regarding the use of force to different dimension. In the Cold War period, arms races or arms controls were used to deter war and to preserve peace and stability, but afterward, military cooperation was used to carry out the same functions. Therefore, German politicians began to reconsider their security identity of “no use of force in foreign war.” The unexpected international burden sharing criticism against German financial contributions without troop commitment in the Gulf War further stimulated shaping the conditions to reframe for Germany’s security identity.

Germany was exposed to a new security environment through peaceful reunification, and the end of the Cold War. Thanks to reunification, Germany was emancipated from direct territorial threats. Thus, it could afford to pay attention to broader ranges of military contribution without worrying about its enemies’ responses. Moreover, the end of the Cold War laid down basic ground rules where multinational coalition operations were taken for granted to preserve peace and stability. With lessons learned from the Gulf War, Germany realized the important fact that standing aside from international conflict was no longer a best decision in the changed security environment.

63 For instance, from 1946 to 1990, twenty cases used military force under the auspices of the U.N., but from 1990 to 2000, the number was fifty-six (Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson, Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law, [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 17).

64 The two former adversaries put their efforts together in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The operation entailed 40 days of air campaigns and 100 hours of ground operations. Ku and Harold, Ibid., 91.

65 Germany provided 6.5 billion dollars in cash, 12 percent of the total war expense; 300 million dollars of subsidies for civilian aircraft in charge of troop-deployment missions; and 500 million dollars and 300 million dollars went respectively to England and France in the form of war support expenses. German-made vehicles for transportation as well as reconnaissance and ammunition were donated for multinational force operations (Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification, [Connecticut: Praeger Publisher, 2002], 37).
Henceforth, Germany showed greater acceptance of taking more international responsibility with military forces. It decided to deploy the first large Bundeswehr field unit to Somalia for peacekeeping operations (UNOSOM II) in 1993–1994.\(^{66}\)

2. **The Rise of Tension in the Balkans**

In the absence of Soviet leadership, the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was disposed to widespread nationalism and the rise of authoritarianism in Serbia.\(^{67}\) The final dissolution of Yugoslavia formally occurred when independence of the Catholic contingent, Croatia and Slovenia, was recognized by the European Union on January 15, 1992.\(^{68}\) A serious conflict arose when the multi-ethnic contingent, Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia), declared independence on March 5, 1992 as a result of the referendum on independence which accounted for 99.7 % of voters in the Bosnian constituent agreement.\(^{69}\) From the beginning of the independence declaration by Croatia and Bosnia, rising tension in Balkans erupted into military clashes that swept across Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 until the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement ended the civil war. The rise of Serbian nationalism had great effects on Europe’s entire security topography where, until then, European nations had remained stable after the long bipolar peace of the Cold War.\(^{70}\) European nations had tragic memories of nationalism, in

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\(^{68}\) There were many places where nationalistic separation movements took place: Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia and Macedonia were exemplary. Craig R. Nation, *War in the Balkans, 1991–2002*, (Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2003).

\(^{69}\) The population of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia) was “44 percent Muslim, 31 percent Serb, 17 percent Croat, and 5 percent other (generally citizens who had chosen the designation Yugoslav in lieu of affiliation with a particular ethnic community),” Craig R. Nation, Ibid., 149. Among the eligible voting population, 63.4 % participated in the referendum (The Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: *The Referendum on Independence Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 102\(^{nd}\) Cong., 1\(^{st}\) sess., 1991. http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.Download&FileStore_id=331 [accessed September 13, 2009]).

retrospect of the Holocaust during WWII. Moreover, Sarajevo, now the capital of Bosnia, was the place where a roar of gunfire had announced that WWI was beginning.

The Balkans’ unrest aroused concerns of German leaders, since the Balkans were so close to Germany. The southern part of Germany had strong ties with the Dalmatian coast of Croatia in aspects of culture, history, and religion. Many Germans enjoyed vacations along the Croatian coast. The geographic proximity created a hostile environment under which Germany probably underwent an indirect or, even, a direct impact of war. Above all, German politicians perceived an unpleasant entrapment situations considering the numbers of Croatian guest workers at over 400,000 who worked in German companies. Furthermore, according to a 1992 report of a U.N. agency, Germany was the largest recipient of war refugees from the former Yugoslavia with 200,000. Also, the occurrence of human rights violations in the form of indiscriminate attacks and genocide either on armed forces or on civilians drew German peace activists’ attention. Consequently, a likelihood of the reoccurrence of war on the European continent, as well as human rights violations, paved the way for German politicians to consider a wider range of Bundeswehr operation beyond traditional Article VI NATO territory.

German security practice before the Bosnian War demonstrated that all war participation, regardless of territorial boundaries, was inconceivable, although based on Article 24 of the German Basic Law, German participation in collective security under the U.N. mandate was permissible as far as constitutionality was concerned. However, the political crisis engendered by the collapse of the Yugoslav Republic shaped conditions calling for revision of the German security identity concerning the ban on “out of area

military operations.” The rise of tension in the vicinity of German territory and human rights violations encouraged the Germans to consider contributing to the war in Bosnia to preserve peace and stability on European soil. Eventually, the situation offered catalytic momentum for a challenge to Germany’s basic tenet of security identity of domestic antimilitarism, “no use of force in foreign war.”

3. Foreign Expectations

The international response at the outset of war showed reluctance to engage. Contrary to the case of the Gulf War, it was not easy to mobilize multinational military forces mandated by the U.N. because of Russia’s ethnic affiliation with Slavs. Instead, engagements of international security organizations were designed on a case-by-case basis. As well, in the absence of a U.N. mandate, NATO carried out limited missions which were under U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) authorization.

The U.N. raised sanctions and deployed United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for war-monitoring, provided humanitarian aid to refugees, and protected refugees and civilians against indiscriminate attacks. The U.N. did not take sides, but supervised the war so that it would not encroach on non-military personnel. In May 1992, the U.N. imposed economic sanctions on the former Yugoslavia. Along with the economic sanctions, a naval blockade of Serbia and Montenegro was launched as another form of U.N. sanctions in November 1992. As well, beginning in May 1992, UNPROFOR was deployed to Sarajevo to take on the responsibility of keeping the airport open. Despite its second-hand assistance, away from the front lines, UNPROFOR was victimized by war as Serbian forces held them hostage and attacks swept across all regions indiscriminately.75

Under the auspices of UNSCR, NATO’s engagement in the Bosnian War began.76 At the same time, a high degree of foreign expectations of NATO and the allies came out


officially. The following table demonstrates the European nations’ operations during the four years of the Bosnian War which at the same time called for German solidarity.\textsuperscript{77}

Table 3. European Nations’ Contributions to the Bosnian War (After: Dayson, 2007, 195)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Size of force</th>
<th>Mandate/auspice</th>
<th>Partner nations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Sharp Guard, Adriatic Sea 1992-96</td>
<td>22 Ships</td>
<td>U.N. mandate/joint NATO/WEU operation</td>
<td>12 nations including U.S., U.K., Greece, Turkey, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Deny fly 1993-95</td>
<td>4,500 air personnel</td>
<td>U.N. mandate, NATO -ed operation</td>
<td>U.S., U.K., France, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Deliberate Force 1995</td>
<td>400 aircraft 5000 personnel</td>
<td>NATO-led air campaign</td>
<td>All NATO members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR, Bosnia Herzegovina 1993-1995</td>
<td>60,000 troops</td>
<td>U.N. mandate, NATO led operation</td>
<td>All NATO members and 22 non-NATO members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR, Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
<td>32,000 troops</td>
<td>U.N. mandate, NATO-led operation</td>
<td>All NATO members and 22 non-NATO members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NATO carried out essential roles in the Bosnia War with various forms of operations from monitoring the no-fly zone to air strikes and peace enforcement. Repercussions to Germany from those NATO participations were substantial. During the entire period of the war in Bosnia, Germany faced high expectations from NATO’s allies to take on more responsibility in the international conflict. At every moment of launching NATO operations, Germany was not an exception as a participant. For UNPROFOR operations, Germany was required by U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to give logistical support on July 6, 1992.\textsuperscript{78} Subsequently, on July 15, 1992, Germany was ordered to send naval forces to monitor the naval embargo in the Adriatic

\textsuperscript{77} Tom Dayson, op. cit., 195.

Sea as ordered by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner.\textsuperscript{79} When NATO officials needed to enforce the flight ban over Bosnian air space, special attention turned toward Germany’s air combat potential which consisted of one fourth of the surveillance planes suitable for reconnaissance, radar suppression, and optimal low-level attack.\textsuperscript{80} NATO made it clear that “in the absence of the German help, there would be a significant impact on the operational capability of the AWACS,” which could afford to take on critical tasks from detecting violations to guiding NATO combat aircraft to their targets.\textsuperscript{81}

Moreover, in the winter of 1994, when the NATO air strike plan was drawn up, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR), General George Joulwan, called on German assistance of ECR-Tornado aircraft in support of the NATO operations because of Germany’s high-level air-combat capabilities. Germany also was required to show solidarity by making military contributions. Finally, in the IFOR and SFOR cases, foreign expectations were not as intense as the previous times since Germany had committed to support peace enforcement operations in the summer of 1995.

In sum, down through the years of the war of Yugoslav succession, Germany met with high expectations from foreign nations, in particular from NATO allies. Allies’ demands became more vocal as time passed. German politicians rushed into harsh debate, not just because the war occurred outside of NATO territory, but because in the absence of prior experience, there were no criteria to bring consensus across parties. Demands for German participation evolved from limited requests for logistical help with peacekeeping operations or monitoring the embargo to directing air strikes and rapid reaction forces. As long as a matter of “no precedents” was concerned, it is important to know how consensus was reached across party lines without a new framework on the issues.

\textsuperscript{79} Jeffrey S. Lantis, op. cit., 89.
\textsuperscript{80} John S. Duffield, op. cit., 196.
B. **PARTY AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PUBLIC**

One of the important roles of a political party is to represent the people and integrate the people’s opinions with a national agenda. Thus, an examination of public opinion on the Bundeswehr’s out of area missions is warranted when discussing the evolving process of the German security identity.

In the context of public support for out-of-area missions, respondents were asked two questions concerning Bundeswehr engagement and NATO engagement in out-of-area missions on a general level. In the context of public opinion concerning the Bosnian War, three questions were raised—(1) military enforcement of the U.N.-imposed no-fly zone over Bosnia, (2) the RRF plan, and (3) the bombing of Serb troops. 82

Table 4. **Support for out-of-area missions and the Bosnian War (After: Juhasz, 2001, 74)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Out-of-area mission by</th>
<th>Bosnian War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No-fly zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>East</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results revealed different overall patterns of attitudes between East-West citizens. Those with Eastern origins were less inclined to give support for military interventions. For the subject of deployment of military forces outside NATO territory, a low rate of approval was detected from both East and West respondents in comparison with the specific case of the Bosnian War questions. The results also suggest that a skeptical attitude toward out-of-area missions appeared toward both the Bundeswehr and NATO engagements. The majority of Germans still thought that not only the Bundeswehr, but also NATO, should be kept from out-of-area missions. Meanwhile, faced with questions about specific operations in the Bosnian War, a trend was found that relatively limited and less harmful operations received higher degrees of acceptance. In the “no-fly zone” question, over half of the Germans polled agreed to join. By contrast, the numbers in favor of the RRF and bombardments decreased.

Two other focal points were the Germans’ awareness of the shifting paradigm of military operations and their adoption of more international responsibility on the basis of that awareness. As mentioned before, from the early 1990s, military operations began to be perceived as a core way of preserving peace and stability in Europe. The Gulf War consolidated the conviction more. The following survey described the trend of the German public’s attitude toward military and non-military missions from 1991 to 1993.83

Table 5. German Attitudes Toward Military and Nonmilitary Missions (After: Asmus, 1994, 63)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Humanitarian support</th>
<th>Economic sanctions</th>
<th>Peacekeeping operation</th>
<th>Financial support</th>
<th>NATO-led military intervention</th>
<th>U.N.-led military intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For three years, it was clear that an overwhelming majority came to be in favor of humanitarian-aid missions. Economic sanctions and peacekeeping operations were also favorable ways of taking international responsibilities for over the half of German public. A trend of opinion on military intervention through NATO and the U.N. had a similar pattern to the earlier survey, (see Table 5) in that questions about military interventions received a high level of opposition. This trend was further confirmed by a different poll asking the respondents’ views on specific types of Bundeswehr participation between U.N. humanitarian missions and combat operations when German interests were at stake. While only one third of total respondents supported participation in combat operations when German interests were at stake, one half of the total supported the Bundeswehr’s intervention for humanitarian purposes. 84 The findings implied that whereas humanitarian aid had attracted much of the public’s attentions, humanitarian aid with military forces were still considered cautiously by the German public.

In sum, during the time when the Bosnian War swept south Eastern Europe, it was evident that Germans were still reluctant to have German military forces engage in the war. The key findings from the surveys were the public’s attitude toward humanitarian aid. Although Germans in the early 1990s had inherited an aversion to the use of military forces from past history, the shifting paradigm of military operations for the purpose of humanitarian aid was a catalyst for turning the German people’s focus to military intervention of a different kind. In fact, during the war, a trend of public opinion started changing due to large-scale genocide and human right violations. Human rights violations were one of the most essential accelerators for shaping favorable conditions for Germans to accept military contributions beyond NATO’s territorial border. For German politicians, being well aware of this public attitude was important to making policy for a new security identity and presenting acceptable criteria for military participation to a majority of the German people. In the early 1990s, public support for military intervention and humanitarian aid collided to some degree. However, considering the nature of the war in Bosnia, which had generated many indiscriminate attacks on civilians

84 Ronald D. Asmus, Ibid., 65.
and U.N. peacekeepers, genocides, and rapes, German politicians were allowed more room to persuade the public to accept their changed security practice.

C. PARTY AS POLICY MAKER: POLICY ORIENTATIONS AND PARTIES’ BASIC SECURITY POLICY STANCES

1. Brief Explanation

Federal German parties, except for recently founded parties such as the Greens, reorganized after the war ended in 1945. Most of the West German parties in the immediate postwar period had been forced to dissolve by the Nazis’ “Enabling Act” in 1933. Thus, the parties that emerged in 1946 in the western zones had a strong sense of anti-Nazism due to their memory of purges; as a result, they had actively tried to liquidate their wartime legacy of militarism.85 Divided Germany also experienced occupation authority during the interim period while the nation was stabilized from wartime memory that more or less lasted until 1955. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) stood as two main opposed parties as smaller parties grouped around them in what after 1949 was West Germany.

Basically, federal German parties’ divisions on security issues were formed over European integration and reunification.86 As well, disagreement on the Bundeswehr’s size and scope of missions (out of area missions) constituted an important pillar in defining a party’s stance on security issues.87 As Prime Minister Yoshida contributed to constructing a new Japanese national identity including U.S.-Japan security relations in the postwar years, it was Konrad Adenauer (1949–1963) who took the same responsibility in terms of reconstructing national identity via integration in the West

through a policy of military contribution through NATO. This section will begin with reviewing Adenauer’s initiatives, focusing on national security issues, and assumes that his initiatives reflect the CDU’s ideology and security policy stance. Next, it will deal with a counterpart’s (SPD) ideas and critics of Adenauer which reflect a different stance in the realm of security policy. In particular, this section discusses continuity and transformation of party ideology and security policy preferences before and after the reunification in 1990.

2. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU)

Germany’s defeat in WWII laid the ground for favoring regional or internationally based integration in the minds of certain West German politicians. Adenauer intended to translate deep regret for wartime misdeeds into the willingness to accept the idea of transnational idealism of western integration. He envisioned “civilian powers integrated into west Europe” as a basic idea for national initiatives. The approach of “civilian powers” stood for a strong will not to return to previous militarism. The main feature of “civilian power” was to “contribute to building an international order that rests on norms and values rather than military might.” Besides, “integration into west Europe” stood for institutionalized means to prevent European countries from going to war. The following will present the CDU’s basic stance on security policy.

The first notable stance of the CDU’s security policy was to open a path to rearmament for West Germany for the purpose of military contributions to consolidating peace on European soil. In Adenauer’s views, rearmament had three advantages for

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88 The first elected Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, was a key player in rebuilding postwar West Germany from the ashes of wartime ruins. As a former member of the Catholic Centre Party in the Weimar Republic, he had been purged and imprisoned twice since the Nazis came to power, but after the war ended he devoted himself to creating the CDU with both Roman Catholic and Protestant members. He was appointed as chairman of the Parliamentary Council of Germany, whose mission was to draft a new German constitution. With this wide range of careers, he became one of the most influential figures in postwar German politics; Charles Williams and Brown Little, Konrad Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000).


national security. First, rearmament was a basis for equal partnership with members of the West European community. Second, it had implications for West Germany regaining authority to control domestic and foreign affairs. Third and most importantly, rearmament showed political will toward solidarity with West European integration programs and their alliance system.

The second stance to note was the NATO-centric security policy focus. After West Germany was accepted in NATO, it was officially given military alliance status in 1955. Joining NATO was a critical way of improving national security against a Soviet threat and a rearmed East Germany. The organization was a way to guarantee West German security by means of integration and cooperation. As well, it functioned as a good institutional barrier to deter a breakout of war in West German territory. West Germany’s entry into NATO symbolically showed German solidarity with the alliance. However, there were disadvantages to entering the NATO system, since West Germany had to yield a part of its national sovereignty to a supra-national institution. It is true that West German rearmament was not linked to a restoration of its right to use military for national sovereignty or expansionary strategies. But the West German entry into NATO was accepted under limited conditions that conceded national sovereignty to some degree. First and foremost, West Germany renounced any right to produce atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. Second, Germany admitted the U.S. military presence and bore some of the direct costs of same from the 1960s onward. Third, the use of the Bundeswehr was only permissible under NATO military command or for self-defense purposes.

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The **third** stance was that the CDU preferred maintaining security ties with the United States, including its military presence on West German soil.\(^{95}\) Beginning in the 1950s, further American troops and weapons were sent to Germany, including nuclear weapons. For the 45 years in which Germany was divided, U.S. military troops and weapons were added or reduced along with the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The U.S. military troops stationed in Germany were the backbone of the U.S. commitment to military engagements for protecting Europe and laying down peace and security in Europe during the Cold War. For the German position, the U.S. presence also had symbolically showed the German intention to maintain a friendly relationship with the United States.

Adenauer’s views and his achievements from the immediate postwar period shaped what the CDU thought appropriate courses of action of the nation, where the wounds of war still existed in the population. The CDU put more emphasis on integration than reunification, in contrast to the SPD and other small parties of the 1950s. For them, European integration was the first step to build a basis for reunification.\(^{96}\) This result was derived from the CDU’s distinctive analysis of the causes of war. They assumed that what had earlier led Germany to choose war was Germany’s “geographical and spiritual position between East and West.”\(^{97}\) Given this proposition, sharp ideological division between West and East might lead to another war; moreover, in light of its territorial division, Germany was a significant front line. In this sense, the integration strategy was a reflection of an extended sense of aversion to war as well as West Germany’s strong will not to repeat a path to militarism.

After West and East Germany reunited and the Cold War ended, a united Federal Republic of Germany was positioned under a new security environment. Germany was virtually liberated from the perception of threat from the Soviet Union. Moreover, the

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issues of rearmament and European integration no longer were parties’ security policy concerns. Under this circumstance, the CDU began to consider expanding its degree of German defense integration into the European Community in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, down through the Cold War period, Germany developed a specific security identity with regard to the use of military forces. Despite acquisition of substantial military capacities, the use of military force was not considered as a security practice. Moreover, participation in military operations outside the NATO territory was regarded as unconstitutional military activities. The Bosnian War was the first test that led German parties to reconsider the role of the German military. The CDU favored expanded military roles for the following reasons:

First of all, it was necessary for Germany to meet alliance requirements in order to show solidarity and pursue national interests in a multilateral context as was the custom in German statecraft. From the beginning the CDU had developed a keen sense of affinity with western European nations including the United States. From the CDU’s perspective, western allies were indispensable partners since their national interests in economic and security were intertwined together. Moreover, in the face of international criticism of “checkbook diplomacy,” the Kohl government became aware of alliance partners’ and the international community’s changing needs and burden sharing expectations. For them, taking responsibility for international peace missions was not out of the realm of consideration. In consideration of a broader picture of national interests, maintaining a reputation as a reliable alliance partner was of critical elements.

100 Ronald J. Granieri, “Politics in C Minor: The CDU/CSU between Germany and Europe since the Secular Sixties,” Central European History 42, no. 2 (March 2009): 1–32.
102 John J. Duffield, op. cit., 195.
Second, meeting the needs of NATO and U.N. officials was a good opportunity to normalize German foreign policy in a way that linked to gaining military sovereignty. In 1990s, politicians from the CDU turned their attention to normalization. The Kohl government appealed to the people that “Germany must accept the normalization of its situation as a reunified, sovereign nation and deduce from this its international role.” This view was reiterated by the CDU foreign policy spokesman Karl Lammers with his statement that “German… must… acknowledge its power… without forgetting its history; Germany must become as normal as possible.” One important dimension of normalization was being capable of using military force in international security affairs. Moreover, it was natural to take responsibility commensurate with Germany’s economic and military capability. In this context, they agreed to not just U.N.-mandated peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions but also to out-of-area missions under NATO command regardless of U.N. recognition.

Third, the CDU translated Article 24 of the Basic Law into a German right to exercise collective security for alliance. For that reason, they did not much care about constitutional amendment in the Bosnian War discussion. One CDU member expressed officially that “the CDU’s outright opposition to any constitutional amendment which requires a U.N. mandate for the use of force.” In this way, the CDU recognized the existing constitution could give authority to accede to international military intervention in Bosnian War.

In sum, with respect to security matters, the CDU’s underground stance was as an advocate of European security integration. During the immediate post-Cold War period, the CDU developed a West German security identity under the framework of NATO. Its


106 Brian C. Rathbun, op. cit., 88.


108 Brian C. Rathbun. *op. cit.*, 89.
stance on the Euro-centric preference had guided the CDU’s security policy even after the end of the Cold War. It constantly pursued security policies in the context of multinational institutions. In particular, it further called on expanded security institutions not only NATO but also the European Security Defense Identity (ESDI), and the West European Union (WEU).\textsuperscript{109} It also stressed bilateral relations, with European nations as well as the U.S. The Franco-German proposal for the creation of Eurocorps was a reflection of the Kohl government’s pursuit of the integration of Western European security policy.\textsuperscript{110} Moreover, it attempted a German security identity with a continued transatlantic security link without undermining U.S.-Germany bilateral relations including the presence of U.S. troops on German soil. “The presence of the U.S. troops in Europe was indispensable for European security and stability.”\textsuperscript{111} Likewise, the CDU in the aftermath of the reunification continued to adhere to previous security policy stances. It not only preferred integration into the European community, but also the maintenance of transatlantic alliance relations with the U.S. This stance was evidently detected when Germany confronted allies’ expectations for burden sharing in the Bosnian War, which occurred shortly after reunification. Second, it pursued normalization of German stature in the international community. With those stances on security issues, the CDU was the leading advocate of German participation in the war in Bosnia. After unification, the CDU relied upon a similar set of boundaries to design security policies as it did at the foundation. The CDU’s role in the evolution of German security identity will be discussed in the next section.

\textsuperscript{109} Kohl had been a strong supporter of all of western European security integrations. Kohl and the CDU were the driving force behind Franco-German security cooperation and the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Moreover, Kohl’s initiative in conjunction with French President Mitterand concluded in Eurocorps. He also stressed the Western European Union as the “channel” through which the political union and NATO would cooperate and the mutual strengthening of the European and transatlantic security structures would obtain (John S. Duffield, op. cit., 140–141).

\textsuperscript{110} However, this trial faced criticism centered on the U.S. U.S. officials openly criticized the Franco-German initiative with unusual vigor, accusing France and Germany of driving a wedge between the transatlantic partners (Wolfgang F. Schlor, \textit{German Security Policy: An Examination of the Trends in German Security Policy in a New European and Global Context}, [London: Brassey’s for the IISS, 1993], 36–39).

\textsuperscript{111} John S. Duffield, op. cit., 138.
3. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)

The revised SPD of the 1950s was heir to the largest and most tradition laden party in German history, with its heritage of anti-military practice. Socialists thought reunification was of the highest priority as a security policy objective granted the party’s legacy in Saxony, now in the Soviet Zone as of 1948/9. Kurt Schumacher, the first leader of the reorganized SPD, assumed that without complete reunification, no method, including European integration, would ensure national security or peace and stability on the European continent. What he embraced as national identity for a future Germany was a peaceful united independent nation with full sovereignty. Reunification was the prerequisite for rewriting the German future vision in the postwar years. Therefore, he definitely did not convince himself of the strategy for “integration-first, step-by-step for reunification,” advocated by Adenauer, since it could hamper successful reunification and acquisition of full national sovereignty. In the SPD’s view, it was only reunification that ensured that there would be no repetition of past misbehaviors. Moreover, the reunification was another indispensible source for defending national interests toward equal status with surrounding nations.

In this sense, the SPD embraced two security policy stances in the 1950s. First of all, they opposed Adenauer’s path of rearmament and entry into NATO in the early years of German’s national foundation. The SPD perceived joining NATO as part of a rearmament process. For the SPD, it had the implication of showing West Germany’s lesser concerns about a deep sense of guilt about Nazism. Instead, the SPD preferred

112 Gordon D. Drummond, op. cit., 61.
115 From the SPD’s point of view, the rise of the Nazis and their extreme nationalism was ascribed fundamentally to ill management by the winners of WWI. The victorious countries of WWI imposed too many penalties to be handled by one nation, and to some extent violated national sovereignty. With this harsh memory, SPD leader Schumacher succinctly warned the allied occupying nations by stressing that they must not try “to overcome the mistakes of Versailles by repeating them in the most exaggerated fashion.” (Gordon D. Drummond, op. cit., 19).
116 According to Berger, “the SPD as well as the central Europeanists attributed Nazism to particular features of German politics and society. . . . This sense of guilt added a powerful moral dimension to the Left’s opposition to rearmament and NATO nuclear strategy.” (Thomas U. Berger op. cit., 61).
eradicating the fundamental root to drive war. For them, the four powers’ grant of a peaceful East-West German reunification was the only way to prevent a recurrence of waging war among surrounding super-powers as well as nationalists—though the possibility of war from the latter was very low. Indeed, the SPD thought that the rearmament and entry into NATO were attainable only after the four occupying countries allowed a united Germany. The end state that the SPD admired at the onset of the postwar years was “the creation of a united, neutral Germany under the umbrella of some type of collective security arrangement involving all major European powers, including the United States, and the Soviet Union.”

Second, the SPD, in the early postwar era, continued to advocate for distancing itself from the U.S. bloc including the West European Community, which was a mainstream tenet of the CDU’s security policy stance. Instead, after the construction of the wall in 1961, the SPD valued Ostpolitik in view of rapprochement with the Soviet bloc including East Germany, East Europe and the Soviet Union. Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-1974), the first chancellor from the SPD, was a symbolic figure of this Ostpolitik as it unfolded in the 1960s. He tried to lay a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe for a better relationship aiming at escaping the antagonistic front lines drawn in their territory during the Cold War. Ostpolitik was a de facto modified line toward reunification, considering the fact that the final goal of this reconciliation approach was the unifying of East-West Germany in the form of “two states in one

117 “Kurt Schumacher ... rejected the armed expansion legacy of Kaiser Wilhelm, Weimar Germany, and the Nazis. Instead, he offered a conceptual orientation different from Adenauer’s. Schumacher argued that Germany’s security would be best served by neutrality between East and West and by an emphasis on reunification;” Jeffrey Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order,* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 112.

118 Thomas U. Berger, op. cit., 61-62. “The final resolution that the SPD made called for “energetic efforts by the Western Powers to promote negotiations with the Soviet Union to reunite Germany and establish a collective security system in which a reunited Germany could contribute to the maintenance of peace;” Gordon D. Drummond, op. cit., 126.


120 He was well known for his personal expression of repentance for wartime guilt by kneeling down in front of the monument for victims of WWII (Samuel P. Oliner and Piotr O. Zylicz, *Altruism, Intergroup Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation,* [Minnesota: Paragon House Publishers, 2008], 82).
nation.”121 This Ostpolitik was boosted by the international mood for détente in the 1970s. Yet, confronting a crisis of détente in the late 1970s that arose out of U.S./USSR frictions, the SPD recalculated how to pave the way toward reunification or at least sustaining contact with East Germany. On the question of constant relations with the East, the SPD raised an anti-American and anti-ideological sentiment centered on the idea of “Europeanization of Europe.”122 At the same time, the SPD was well aware that the preservation of peace and unification between two German states was unattainable without shared views with the super powers, so the second SPD Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, attempted to bring the superpowers to the negotiation table for a peaceful solution in the face of reemerging confrontation between the two blocs.123

After the unification of the two German states, the SPD made a strong effort to normalize foreign relations with Eastern European nations.124 It proposed to expand the effective range of the European community system to the East to bring peace and stability across the Europe centered on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).125 After unification, the SPD criticized the Kohl government’s efforts to broaden the operational mandates of its security institutions, viewing them as inappropriate attempts to use military integration as an engine of European integration and as increasing the probability of German involvement in military operations outside of the NATO area.126

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121 Advocates of Ostpolitik consistently sought “German unification by lowering the barriers between East and West and by pursuing a European peace order by way of full recognition of the sovereignty and frontiers of existing East European states.” (Gordon A. Craig, “Did Ostpolitik Work? A Path to German Reunification,” *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 1 [January-February, 1994]: 164).

122 Gordon A. Craig, op. cit., 166.


125 The SPD opposed the government policy of remaining a member of the NATO alliance shortly after reunification. It insisted that “NATO had to be dismantled and the CSCE had to become the new institutional instrument for security relations in Europe” (Giovanna Bono, *NATO’s Peace-enforcement Tasks and Policy Communities*: 1990–1999, [Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003], 18).

126 1992 marked the beginning of the Eurocorps agreement and Petersberg Declaration by the Kohl government. Faced with the government decision, the SPD criticized it harshly by that logic (John S. Duffield, op. cit., 140).
This position certainly resulted from their new security perception after unification. The SPD regarded Eastern European countries’ heavy weaponry, including nuclear weapon, as a core element of threat under the new security environment. Thus, to ensure peace and stability in Europe, it was necessary that the collective security system (NATO) should attract east European nations. The SPD deputy leader Oskar Lafontaine’s claim shed light on this position: “NATO security guarantees should be extended to Eastern Europe and successor states of the former Soviet Union in order to discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{127} Moreover, as shown earlier, the SPD’s shared deep sense of repentance over the past history underpinned one tenet of security policy stance, i.e., reticence to use force.\textsuperscript{128} Historically, for the 45 years in which Germany was divided, this policy stance of the SPD laid the cornerstone of German security identity of domestic antimilitarism. Seen from the perspective of security stances framed through postwar years, it was no surprise to see the SPD’s opposition to military engagement in the Bosnian War.

Based on this background of security policy stances, the SPD called for restrictive positions on participation in the Bosnian War. In contrast to the CDU’s position, the SPD saw that the Basic Law legally banned the use of military force other than self-defense and defense of its allies. The SPD proposed to amend the constitution as a prerequisite for participation in the Bosnian War.\textsuperscript{129} The original stance of the SPD excluded U.N. peacekeeping operations on the basis of the Basic Law. They posed questions on the humanitarian attributes of peacekeeping operations by condemning them: “military interventions are not humanitarian actions, so peace enforcement means fighting wars.”\textsuperscript{130} Moreover, the ultimate aim of the SPD on the use of force discussion was to find effective solutions to unravel the conflicts. For them, military engagement


\textsuperscript{128} Thomas U. Berger, op. cit., 62.

\textsuperscript{129} John S. Duffield., op. cit., 185.

\textsuperscript{130} Brian C. Rathbun. op. cit., 95.
would be very likely to worsen the situation rather than deter or stop the conflict. In this regard the SPD preferred finding diplomatic or political solutions for crisis in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{131}

However, over time, the SPD began to share the view that the increasing catastrophe in Bosnia could not be resolved unless military force was involved under the command of the international security organization.\textsuperscript{132} The primary reason the SPD defected from the original SPD’s policy stance was the occurrence of a large number of human rights violations in the Bosnian War. This made the SPD think that the coherent design of security policies that excluded military options could lead to outdated and inappropriate responses in international security matters. But the SPD differentiated their rationale for the support of military intervention outside NATO territory from that of the CDU by drawing an explicit line between two positions.\textsuperscript{133} \textbf{First of all}, it clearly emphasized that its support had nothing to do with the CDU’s rationale with regard to alliance solidarity. \textbf{Second}, it emphasized that participation in a foreign war would be possible only under a U.N. mandate. By this definition, without a U.N. mandate, military intervention through NATO was strictly prohibited. \textbf{Third}, they called for a constitutional amendment to establish a new role for the Bundeswehr so as to give legitimacy to the mission.\textsuperscript{134} \textbf{Fourth}, they insisted the engagement in combat missions be prohibited even if the missions were recognized by the U.N. Their support was derived from the mission’s humanitarian purposes and their sense of responsibility to establish peace and stability throughout the world, motivated by their past history.

\textsuperscript{131} Brian C. Rathbun, Ibid., 96.

\textsuperscript{132} SPD defense spokesperson Kolbow stressed on the necessity of military intervention: “The events in Bosnia changed the quality of opposing further military involvement. It became increasingly difficult to stand by and watch murders take place. It placed those opposed to German involvement in an inhumane situation. We came increasingly to the realization that if we did not intervene, we would bear the guilt for failing to protect people. We learned that there are situations even today after the experience of two world wars in which prevention and diplomatic and political efforts do not suffice. The military option has to be available as a last resort to prevent genocide and mass expulsions and also to show dictators that this will be done with determination in the future (Brian C. Rathbun, Ibid., 97–98).

\textsuperscript{133} Brian C. Rathbun, Ibid., 99.

\textsuperscript{134} Kerry Longhurst, op. cit., 62–63.
In sum, the SPD had developed a strong sense of antimilitarism and continued to apply this norm to real security practice. During the Cold War, it saw its role as an East-West reconciler and after the Cold War it placed its emphasis on bringing Eastern European countries to European society in order to shape peaceful conditions across Europe. It displayed strong aversion to the use of military force for any reason, and as compared to the CDU, it embraced less allegiance to the Western European nations, including NATO. The Bosnian War challenged the SPD to sustain its position on “no engagement in foreign wars outside NATO territory.” In principle, its strict interpretation of the Basic Law did not grant military intervention in Bosnia. Its stance began to change in the face of human rights violations, but its original reluctance still remained and caused friction. As a major opposition party, the SPD’s opposition exerted great impact on the development of a new framework that guided new German security practice.

4. The Free Democratic Party (FDP)

Disbanded in 1933 under the Nazis’ reign, the FDP was reorganized in 1948 as an heir to the oldest German political party. The FDP embraced European liberal ideals as core principles of national identity. West German liberals joined the FDP party membership upon its reorganization, and consequently the FDP represented liberal economic policies including minimum government engagement in the marketplace. 135 No other party has been positioned as long in government office as the FDP. From 1949 on, when the first vote for Bundestag members took place, the FDP variously formed a coalition government with the SPD and with the CDU. Only in the years 1998–2005 was the FDP in opposition. It is important to note the FDP’s contribution to government stability and continuity in terms of policy execution. 136 The FDP drew less attention to establishing a fixed security policy stance based on its own ideology, but rather paid more attention to consolidating a liberal economic order. The FDP also embraced a western orientation with its NATO focus, but perhaps with less energy than had the

CDU/CSU in former times especially in the 1980s. By adhering to a pragmatic stance within which security policies were designed, the FDP made itself able to form a coalition with either of the leading parties.

Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that the FDP made use of its leverage in security affairs by changing its coalition partner when it thought the current government was following the wrong path of security policy for broad national interests. One example was the FDP’s defection in 1969 from the CDU-FDP coalition when it saw that it “had become evident that in foreign affairs and internal politics, the CDU was not capable of giving up its outdated positions.”\(^\text{137}\) In its many years as a junior coalition partner, the FDP made several contributions to the national security concerning Ostpolitik and détente: (1) “by supporting membership in NATO, (2) advocating for cooperation with eastern European countries after 1969, and (3) supporting for the détente policy of the 1970s.”\(^\text{138}\) Thus, they sometimes adhered to the CDU’s security policy preference (in case of 1), and once to the SPD’s preferences (in case of 2 and 3). After leaving the coalition with the SPD in 1982, the party made an effort to guarantee the continuation of the security policy that the SPD followed so as to damper the ideological pendulum in the security realm.\(^\text{139}\)

As a coalition partner to the CDU, the FDP played a critical role in the cabinet-level discussion over war participation in Bosnia. Their security policy stances were flexible. The behavior of the FDP in security was centered on checking and balancing government decisions in order to prevent policy outcomes from leaning too far toward one side. This pattern of behavior applied to the Bosnia War participation discussion, as well.

The FDP position had two sides.\(^\text{140}\) On the one hand, like the CDU, it supported the U.N. peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, like the SPD intervention supporters, the FDP insisted that the missions should be under the auspices of UNSCR.

\(^{137}\) Robert Gerald Livingston, Ibid., 45.
\(^{138}\) Robert Gerald Livingston, Ibid., 45.
\(^{139}\) Robert Gerald Livingston, Ibid., 45.
\(^{140}\) John S. Duffield, op. cit., 183–185.
They also strongly advocated a constitutional amendment by which the military interventions would be legitimized. The FDP differed from the SPD’s in that the FDP called for participation in combat missions once these were mandated by U.N. authority. Additionally, the FDP took a distinctive position on the decision making system under which the military intervention discussion took place. In order to check government decision at the legislative level, the FDP demanded giving the parliament core leverage to pass the final bill stipulating military intervention when brought up for discussion in the parliament.

5. The Greens

The Greens was a union of politically organized intellectuals and activists such as environmentalists and peace activists constructed along with the grassroots democratic movement.\textsuperscript{141} It was officially created in southwestern Germany as a political party in January 1980 and enlarged its political influence to the extent to become a coalition partner of the SPD in 1998. In contrast to the FDP, the Greens was an ideals-based party from the beginning. The Greens focused on the issue of human rights, ecology, and peace when drawing policy initiatives. They proposed a national initiative based on grassroots democracy where the individual right to self-determination and dynamism of social movements such as the environmental movement and peace movement were massively mobilized.\textsuperscript{142} It embraced pacifism with the rhetoric of “freedom from force, freedom from blocs.”\textsuperscript{143} Examination of the Greens is of significance since the party centered all its efforts to change the way of framing the security matters.

First, the Greens strongly opposed engagement with either Western or Eastern Cold War blocs. Second, it put forth an earnest voice for removing nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons of mass destruction in line with the peace movement. Similarly, it demanded greatly reduced defense expenditure. For them, one salient mission was to expand the peace movement with the aim of bringing in a universal

\textsuperscript{142} Robert Gerald Livingston, op. cit., 74.
\textsuperscript{143} Robert Gerald Livingston, Ibid., 72.
disarmament. **Third**, it embraced the concept of “social defense” through non violent and intense social contacts across the world.\(^{144}\) In this vein, it opposed the presence of U.S. military forces on its territory as well as rearmament. Also, they hardly welcomed membership in the NATO system. Instead, the Greens envisaged a new security paradigm under which individuals and social groups could guarantee their individual security themselves.\(^{145}\)

Based on the security policy stances formulated by peace activists, the Green opposed military intervention. They were the most symbolic figure standing for antimilitarism in German politics. Like the SPD, the Greens adhered to strong opposition to military intervention in the Bosnian War.\(^{146}\) In particular, the Greens were afraid of dynamic situations generated in the battle field. They saw no clear cut distinction between peacekeepers and worryers in a combat zone. The Greens feared that military engagement could not but lead to escalation of the crisis. From this perspective, they proposed economic sanctions to bring peace in the Bosnian territory instead. However, their firm opposition was ironic in the face of long-lasting war followed by massive human right violations, including genocide and ongoing attacks on civilians and peacekeepers. Leading figures and experts including a leader of the Greens, Joschka Fisher, a foreign policy expert, Helmut Lippet, and a foreign policy spokesperson, Gerd Poppe, favored German participation, though their support was limited as with the SPD.\(^{147}\) Aligned with an SPD that demanded conditions for military interventions—i.e., a U.N. mandate, no combat operations, and a constitutional amendment—the Greens contributed to marginalizing radical changes in developing a new security parameter on the use of force.

\(^{144}\) Robert Gerald Livingston, Ibid., 72.


\(^{146}\) One of the parliamentary members of the Green, Gila Altmann, said that “Whoever claims that military engagement is a precondition for humanitarian aid and describes NATO battle missions as peace missions has learned nothing from all of the wars of this world” (Brian C. Rathbun, op. cit., 95).

\(^{147}\) Brian C. Rathbun, Ibid., 96–97.
D. PARTIES AS POLICY COMPETITORS

May 1992 marked the first Bundeswehr participation in the U.N. peacekeeping missions in Cambodia—that is, the first operation outside of continental Europe in the era since unification and in the wake of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Germany’s 2,420 troops and 150 medical staff were deployed in the out-of-area peacekeeping mission. December 1992 saw Bundeswehr’ participation in Somalia with 1640 men deployed for logistics, transport and engineering missions. According to RAND surveys, 56 percent of respondents agreed to military intervention where violation of international law and human rights took place.

However, in the case of the Bosnian War, German participation was a path to a more serious contingency. That was the first time that the Germans had considered non-peacekeeping operations outside NATO’s area. As indicated above, NATO allies and U.N. officials both called on the German Bundeswehr’s eager participation. This ultimately led to political debates in search of a new security identity. The German war-participation discussion could be divided into two stages: before and after the decision of the German constitutional court on Article 87a and Article 24. July 1994 marked the conclusion of the debate on the constitutionality of the Bundeswehr’s participation alongside their allies outside the NATO area. The first stage included the debates over naval-air deployment in the Adriatic Sea (AWACS crew deployment). The second stage included the debates on the deployment of ECR Tornadoes and the Rapid Response Force connected with UNPROFOR. Of those four cases, the debate on the AWACS crew deployment was the most severe. The debate lasted for two years from NATO’s initial request in 1992, and ended with the Constitutional Court ruling in 1994 that Germany was allowed to take part in future peace missions outside NATO’s area. A case of AWACS deployment appeared to be an engagement in peace-enforcement operations


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rather than a rear-area monitoring operation as in the case of an Adriatic Sea naval-air deployment, which helped implement an arms and trade embargo.\textsuperscript{151} It eventually served as a turning point in the evolution of Germany’s security identity. This thesis mainly addresses the case of the AWACS crew deployment focusing on the implications of political parties’ basic stances and the evolution of Germany’s security identity.

1. The Debate within the Ruling Party

The CDU was an ardent supporter for participation in international military operations either of peacekeeping operations or for peace-enforcement operations. The CDU thought that the military contribution was an imperative task under the new security environment and due to the expectations of the allies. The CDU held the Bundestag: the CDU/CSU—FDP coalition held 398 of 662 seats.\textsuperscript{152} Yet the government’s majority did not reach the two-thirds level required to pass the needed resolution. Moreover, the FDP’s 79 seats were crucial to the government’s majority. Thus, at the cabinet level, negotiation and persuasion of the directed at the CDU’s coalition partner and at and opposition parties was necessary to implement the use of force plans.

Indeed, the AWACS debate was an extension of the debate on the deployment in the Adriatic Sea. When NATO took charge of monitoring the embargo in the Adriatic Sea, AWACSSs were one of the assets involved. In the face of NATO’s requests for solidarity with embargo monitoring, the Kohl government announced its intention to offer naval vessels and German AWACSs crews in support of the monitoring mission.\textsuperscript{153} The government asserted that the deployment was necessary for improvement of alliance reliability and credibility.\textsuperscript{154} The presented rationale indicated that the government’s decision was affected by the CDU’s pro-NATO policy stance. In addition, the government saw that the Basic Law allowed the deployment since its intention was not to

\textsuperscript{151} “Germany Ends Naval Role in Adriatic,” \textit{Central European Time}, July 21, 1996.

\textsuperscript{152} “Germany Parliamentary Chamber: Deutscher Bundestag,” Deutscher Bundestag, \url{http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2121_90.htm} (accessed September 18, 2009).


use force, but to monitor and gather intelligence. The SPD, filed a suit against the government decision in the Constitutional Court, but the court decided the mission was not against the Basic Law. In November 1992, Germany sent two destroyers in rotation to the Adriatic Sea and deployed AWACSs personnel to help monitor the arms and trade embargo.

However, confronting repeated violations of the no-fly-zone (almost 465 cases), the U.N. Security Council considered expanding the monitoring operation into an enforcing operation. The AWACSs were expected to assume the enforcement of the sanctions. From that moment on, the debate on the German AWACs crews’ involvement in the enforcement was heated. NATO requested German assistance and U.N. officials urged Germany’s full participation in U.N. measures. The Kohl government was in favor of solidarity with allies’ will to enforce the ban on the no-fly-zone. The CDU also contended that based on Article 24 of the Basic Law, which stated a right to participate in collective security for keeping peace, the AWACSs participation was not contradictory to the constitution. However, the SPD and FDP insisted that the military engagement be limited to “blue helmet” operations and the Constitutional Court’s official judgment to grant legitimacy to the participation beforehand. Since the enforcement was closely related to combat operations, the constitutional debate was much fiercer than the previous debate on the monitoring of the sanction.

The FDP demanded the amendment of the Basic Law. They continued to hold the view that under the current Basic Law, the German crews should be pulled out of the

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155 Karin Johnston, Ibid.
NATO AWACS aircraft patrolling the area. In response to the coalition party’s willingness, the CDU’s special party conference produced a revised Article 87a (nature of national defense) of the Basic Law.162

The FDP was satisfied with the CDU’s efforts to respond to its demand to amend the Basic Law. At most, the presented prerequisite for “prior Bundestag approval” was a crucial device for ensuring civilian control. Nevertheless, the FDP’s demands to constrain the AWACS mission did not end at that point. Their basic concerns turned toward the type of missions the crews took charge of when deployed.163 The FDP drew a distinct line between peacekeeping operations and peace-enforcement operations.164 Throughout the whole debate period, there was discord between the CDU and the FDP and it was hard to come to an agreement. The FDP threatened to break up the coalition if the government forced them to implement the AWACS deployment.165 Amidst gridlock,

162 It stipulated, “Federal Armed Forces, notwithstanding Article 87a, may be deployed. 1) For peacekeeping measures, in accordance with a Security Council resolution or within the framework of the regional agreement, as defined in the U.N. Charter, as far as the Federal Republic of Germany is party to them: 2) For peacemaking measures, based on Charter 7 and 8 of the U.N. Charter, in accordance with a Security Council Resolution: 3) For the assistance of states allied to the Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with alliance treaties: 4) For the assistance of other states in the execution of the right to collective self-defense, in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, in conjunction with partners within the framework of alliances or regional agreements as defined in the U.N. Charter, to which the FRG is party; In the case of items 1 and 2, these deployments require the agreement of the majority of members, and in the case of number 4, the agreement of two thirds of the members of the Bundestag; “Government Offers Proposal on Bundeswehr NATO Operations,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service–Western Europe 41, (1993).


164 The FDP’s generous attitude toward peacekeeping operations was shown by their agreement to support the U.S.-led airlift operation for humanitarian relief without questioning constitutionality, in March 25, 1993 (“Germany to Let Air force Help in Bosnia Airlift;” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 1993). Foreign Minister Kinkel, the leader of the FDP, reiterated that “AWACS could be in a position to give firing commands to jet fighters, which would cross the line from monitoring into actual engagement. The Constitution forbids active engagement other than for the defense of NATO territory. Until that point, the tendency towards lifting the embargo and delivering weapons has been more negative than positive. Francine Kiefer, “Germans at Odds Over NATO Role in Enforcing Bosnia No-Fly Zone,” The Christian Science Monitor, January 26, 1993; Steve Doughty, “Let Weapons Flow to Bosnia say Germans; Lord Owen: Peace Plan,” Daily Mail (London), February 2, 1993.

the Kohl government faced more pressure from the NATO allies, in particular from the United States. The summit meeting between U.S. and German leaders played a pivotal role in galvanizing the government’s decision.\footnote{“Bonn Decides Bosnia Role As Kohl and Clinton Meet,” \textit{Christian Science Monitor}, March 26, 1993.}

Enforcing the no-fly-zone was agreed to by NATO in April 1993 and NATO forces were obliged to shoot down violators that refused to keep the flight ban over Bosnia.\footnote{It initially involved some 50 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft (later increased to over 100) from various Alliance nations, flying from airbases in Italy and from aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. By the end of December 1994, over 47,000 sorties had been flown by fighter and supporting aircraft. (Operation Deny Flight, “NATO Will Enforce No-Fly-Zone Ordered by U.N. Over Bosnia,” \textit{Austin American Statesman}, April 3, 1993).} Despite a split in coalition parties, the Kohl government announced German crews would remain on board AWACS aircraft to help the NATO enforcement plan. The government’s response provoked strong indignation from opposition parties, as well as the coalition party.\footnote{“Judges Back German Combat Role,” \textit{The Times}, April 9, 1993.} The FDP unprecedentedly allied with opposition parties in order to challenge the government’s decision before the Constitutional Court.\footnote{Jonathan Kaufman and Globe Staff, “NATO to Help Enforce Bosnia Air Ban,” \textit{The Boston Globe}, April 3, 1993.} It was very unusual to see the coalition partners suing their own government, but at the same time this demonstrated the FDP’s role in the evolution of the German security identity. Due to the FDP’s commitment to filing suit, the government had risked possible collapse of the coalition.

As shown above, through coalition partners’ efforts to impose limits to peace-enforcement missions and amendment of the Basic Law, the government’s quick response to the NATO allies’ requests were substantially delayed. During four months of discussion, since the government’s initial intention was publicized in December, 1992, the FDP constantly constrained the senior coalition partner from implementing the deployment based on two basic positions—no use of force in peace-enforcement operations and demands for a constitutional amendment. The FDP’s demands and responses during the AWACS mission debate period reflected the political party’s role, in particular, as a mediator, to check the government’s decision. During the process of the
AWACS discussion, it showed that the German security identity was challenged in earnest and how the parties’ positions influenced constructing the new framework to guide security policy making.

2. Discussion with the Opposition Parties

The roles of the main opposition parties, in particular the SPD and the Greens, in obstructing government decisions were based on a rationale similar to that of the FDP. As the FDP argued, the SPD and the Greens asserted that the use of German armed troops was not allowable within the context of the existing Basic Law. But the two parties held to a narrower interpretation of the constitution than the FDP. Whereas the FDP sought a constitutional amendment that would enable German troop’s contributions in blue helmet missions, the two parties initially did not agree with the internationalized roles of the German military. However, 1991 marked the agreement of three parties—the CDU, the FDP, and the SPD—upon the necessity of an amendment to the Basic Law. The situation by which the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) declared its intention to enforce the no-fly-zone over Bosnia further precipitated the parties’ movement on the constitutional amendment. The SPD drafted a bill that amended the Basic Law to only accept non-combat blue helmet roles for German troops. Additionally, it called for the Constitutional Court’s clarification before every blue helmet mission was executed. Dissimilarities between the CDU’s and SPD’s ways of changing the constitution were substantial. Whereas the CDU tried to permit any form of military contribution, if the mission aimed to preserve peace and prosperity, the SPD only accepted the non-combat blue helmet missions regardless of the purpose of the missions. Thus, the government proposal laid out in January 1993 for a constitutional amendment was not accepted by the SPD.


171 “German Left Steps Out with Radical Chic,” The Times, June 1, 1991.


Without a consensus on how to legalize the use of armed forces abroad, the government’s pronounced will not to withdraw German AWAC crews outraged the SPD and the Greens. They continued to think that the AWACS operations meant sending German combat troops outside the NATO area. In addition, the SPD raged against the government’s unilateral decision making.\(^{174}\) Thereafter, the SPD, supported by the FDP, filed a complaint against the government decision in the Constitutional Court on April 3, 2009.\(^{175}\) From the Court’s standpoint, it was not a simple legal matter, considering German crews made up one-third of the entire AWACS personnel who were essential to that operation. Besides, on the one hand, the constitution could be interpreted as granting only a defensive military role on the grounds of Article 24, but on the other hand, it could be interpreted as acknowledging participation in collective security activities on the grounds of Article 87a.

Taking those facts into account, the Court’s judgment on the AWACS missions gave more weight to political damage than jurisdiction factors.\(^{176}\) In the end, the Constitutional Court, as in the case of the Adriatic mission, ruled in favor of the government’s position. It made a judgment that German aircrews could participate in a U.N.-authorized mission to enforce the no-fly zone.\(^{177}\) Subsequently, the Constitutional Court added that “a continuation of Germany’s self-imposed restrictions on its military role would endanger the trust for Germany within the NATO alliance.”\(^{178}\) Likewise, the Court’s decision generated little effort to clarify the constitutionality of German military roles on international ground. Instead, it highlighted the political damage when Germany continued to refuse the allies’ expectations to share the burdens of keeping international order and peace. As a result, German aircrews took responsibilities for identifying


\(^{175}\) “Germans Ask Court To Decide on Combat Role,” *Daily Press*, April 8, 1993.


\(^{178}\) Ibid.
targets by flying in U.N. endorsed AWACS reconnaissance planes over Bosnia. That became the first time that German military personnel engaged in a limited form of combat operations in the country’s postwar history.\(^{179}\)

Although the Constitutional Court had ruled in favor of the government’s decision, German participation in out-of-area missions still remained controversial. Right after the Court’s approval of the German crews’ participation in AWACS mission was announced, one FDP Bundestag member criticized that “it did not mean that additional Bundeswehr deployment could continue to be unchecked.”\(^{180}\) Furthermore, the SPD parliamentary leader, Verheugen, warned the government by saying that “the government ought not to use the court’s ruling as a ‘free ticket’ to flex its military might in the future.”\(^{181}\) Outside politics, there were protest movements from citizens. Some civilian protesters gathered in front of the NATO AWACS air base in order to demonstrate against the German soldiers’ flights in support of the U.N.-sanctioned enforcement operations.\(^{182}\)

In the course of the AWACS discussion, the opposition parties contributed to imposing considerable limitations on the government decisions. Their most conspicuous roles were to raise consistent questions about the legality of the widened military roles under the Basic Law. They filed suits against the government’s decision to participate in the naval blockade in Adriatic Sea and the AWACS air surveillance operations. Based on their basic policy stance of reluctance to carry out armed missions, they preferred peacekeeping operations. In opposition to the government’s unilateral decision making, they constantly insisted on the importance of civilian control over military deployments. The political gridlock that arose between the CDU and the opposition parties was not solved until the Constitutional Court ruling was issued in July 1994. As the Court judgment in the AWACS case was based more on politics, the issue of the constitutionality of German military participation abroad was left open to debate. The

\(^{179}\) Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification, (Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 92.

\(^{180}\) “Bundestag to Keep Crews in NATO AWACS over Bosnia,” FBIS-WEU 93, no.76 (April 1993): 13.

\(^{181}\) “Germany Back In War Zone After 48 Years of Pacifism,” Daily Mail, April 10, 1993.

SPD and Greens did not give up their policy stance on the issue of military participation in foreign areas. They continued to ask whether German military participation in support of collective security activities was constitutional. They also emphasized civilian control and required a constitutional amendment that included two thirds of parliamentarian approval when the German military took on missions outside the NATO area.\textsuperscript{183} Still, they favored using German armed troops only within the NATO area.

\textbf{E. CONCLUSION}

The AWACS discussion of the early to mid 1990s presented severe political deadlock formed by each party’s long-held basic positions on security issues. The FDP was skeptical about sending troops into foreign areas. Basically, the FDP supported the use of force under the U.N. mandate, but they believed that a constitutional amendment was necessary to permit the mission. The FDP threatened to split the coalition when the Kohl government tried to approve German aircrews’ participation in the enforcement of the no-fly-zone over Bosnia. The FDP considered the German aircrews’ flight in the AWACS planes as a combat mission, so it perceived the mission to violate the constitutional ban. The SPD and the Greens also voiced their opinions against the government positions. They barely recognized the necessity of German participation in peacekeeping operations. However, they did not approve German troops’ participation in combat missions. Therefore, the conflict with the CDU was hard to unravel. The SPD’s and the Greens’ means of restraining the government decision was to clarify the constitutional justice of the mission. They filed suits against the government before the Constitutional Court. Owing to objections from the coalition party and opposition parties, the government’s decision making was considerably delayed. The government had risked both relations with allies and the survival of the coalition government. Although the Constitutional Court eventually sided with the government, the political battle over military deployment was not clearly concluded.

The evolution of German security identity was finally concluded by the Constitutional Court’s ruling on July 12, 1994. The court stated that German troops

could be deployed in all kinds of crises, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions out of the NATO area, as long as the bill obtained a simple majority of support in the Bundestag.184 It clarified that Article 24 of the Basic Law (collective security) provided the appropriate guidance on the question of out-of-area missions, and thus, German participation in military operations outside NATO territory would not violate the constitution.185 The Court’s ruling marked a turning point of German security practice. It eventually expanded the scope of the German military into “outside NATO’s area,” and ended the long-running debates on the constitutionality of German participation in collective security activities. The ruling also installed a clear-cut device to ensure civilian control by insisting on prior Bundestag approval.

The Court’s ruling bolstered the Kohl government's efforts to broaden Germany’s military role over the world. But, it was important to keep an eye on the war situation in Bosnia when the Court decided on the constitutionality of out-of-area missions. On February 7, 1994, Serbian forces attacked Bosnian Muslim civilians who were shopping in a central marketplace in Sarajevo, and as a result, dozens of civilians were killed. Increasing numbers of attacks on U.N. peacekeepers and even genocide were committed by Serbian troops. Those situations led German political parties to shift attitudes toward the use of military force. For instance, right after the Sarajevo marketplace attack, the SPD leader mourned the humanitarian tragedies and stated his willingness to support government efforts to stand up to such “terrible human rights violations.”186 Before the Bosnian War, political parties, as well as the German people, were still very aware of their past history. However, the Bosnian War was a landmark case that cultivated an opposite impression of military forces which could make positive contributions to preservation of peace. A wide consensus of German political parties as well as the public over the roles of military force ultimately produced the Constitutional Court decision.

185 Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Ibid., 39.
From 1994 onwards, German military participation became a feature of routine in a world unsettled by growing conflict. In June 1995, German troops and eight Tornado fighter planes supported a new NATO Rapid Reaction force and some German airmen joined air strikes on Serbian military forces. However, one important thing to note about German troop participation in collective security coalitions was that it was determined on a case-by-case basis. Throughout the political process, in particular during harsh political debate, Germany established a new security identity that guided new security practices concerning the use of force abroad. The newly formed identity included four significant factors. **First**, there must be a consensus in German society that the German military deployment would make contributions to the preservation of international peace and stability. Widespread moral responsibilities for keeping world order in peace were an essential motivation to determine German participation. **Second**, the deployment would be considered when the combat missions were conducted within a multilateral context. At most, there must be a consensus among alliance partners. The acceptance of the military deployment would be increased when the U.N. mandated the mission. **Third**, the military deployments were determined by civilian control which was represented by the approval of the Bundestag. Those three factors indicate the evolution of German security identity in the new era. This renewed identity guided new security practices with regard to military deployment in foreign areas. It was constructed in the wake of

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187 Germany found itself on the battlefield four years later in Kosovo, and six years later in Afghanistan, but German participation was not seen in the Iraq war in 2003. The conditions on which German parties agreed upon full participation in NATO’s air-strike operations in Kosovo were the rise of instability in Europe and the images of massacres. But German participation in the war was limited to a large extent. It provided 14 Tornado aircraft only for electronic-optic reconnaissance. Instead, German troops played a major role in humanitarian actions to allay the plight of Albanian refugees. Also, Germany sent troops in Afghanistan integrated into “Operation Enduring Freedom,” for the purpose of a consistent pursuit of multilateralism and the establishment of peaceful regime in Afghanistan which had disturbed international peace and stability by terrorism. German participation was driven largely by concern about solidarity. But as the war lasted longer, the SPD-Greens coalition government sought to promote a political settlement and devoted its efforts to stabilizing the situation through peacekeeping forces and reconstruction assistance. But in the case of the Iraq War, which was seen as a pre-emptive strike rather than an operation for the preservation of peace, the war received a low rate of political support and public support. In the 2002 Federal election campaign, Chancellor Gerhard Schroder (SPD) responded to domestic skepticism toward U.S. policies and pledged not to participate in the expected war in Iraq. In the end, Germany rejected military contributions in Iraq and reaffirmed its opposition to a mandate in the UNSC (Hans W. Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?” in *Global Governance: Germany and Japan in the International System*, eds. Saori N. Katada, Hans W. Maull and Takashi Inoguchi, [Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004], 99–106; Kerry Longhurst, op. cit., 61).
Bosnian War, but as seen in the case study, political parties’ debates, based on their principles, were critical in producing the new consensual security identity. Germany’s new security identity reflected a composite of each political party’s positions and was a result of compromise.
IV. CASE STUDY OF JAPAN: THE WAR ON TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN AND EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE SECURITY IDENTITY

A. SHAPING CONDITIONS FOR NEW SECURITY PRACTICES

1. New Security Environment

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the security environment was starkly reversed from the previous four decades when Japan secured itself by virtue of its bi-polar stability.188 Several actors affected the shape of the new security environment in Japan. First, a major key player, North Korea, upset the regional security environment most significantly when the country fired the Taepodong missile in 1998. Since then, Japan’s perception of the threat of North Korea has increased dramatically. Moreover, North Korea was at the center of no fewer than three nuclear crises within a decade.189 As a result, Japan redefined the instability and uncertainty of the situation on the Korean Peninsula as its major security concern from 1995 onward.190

Second, China was another key actor that changed the security environment surrounding Japan. Challenges originated from China’s modernizing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), upgrading its nuclear strike forces (1993), and launching its ballistic missile test across the Taiwan Strait (1996).191 Furthermore, the China-Japan territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands was seriously escalated when Chinese navy vessels were detached for exercises inside the Japanese EEZ in the vicinity of the

191 These data were extracted from CRS Report for Congress, “The Rise of China and its Effects on Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea: U.S. Policy Choices,” (January 2006) and reorganized by the author.
Senkaku Islands.\textsuperscript{192} A lack of transparency about the data China presented created concern about an unsecured regional security environment. Japanese defense documents reflected a concern about the potential of Chinese capabilities from 1996 onward, mostly affected by the 1996 Taiwan Crisis.\textsuperscript{193}

The changing circumstances of regional security galvanized Japan to take on active roles on the international stage in line with U.S. strategy in East Asia. As Hughes, one of the foremost experts on Japanese security policy, notes, revised guidelines declared in 1996 paved the way for Japan to “expand its potential role in supporting the U.S. to cope with regional contingencies.”\textsuperscript{194} In terms of security cooperation, Japan expanded its scope of alliance commitment. For example, while its 1978 guidelines articulated the appropriate response to an armed attack against Japan, the 1996 guidelines expanded this to surrounding areas for the purpose of “contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.”\textsuperscript{195} Under the new guidelines, Japan was obliged to exercise its active military roles, such as “rear area support” and “ship inspections” in the event of a military contingency.\textsuperscript{196} Moreover, the North Korean missile test-fire in 1998 and the nuclear crisis caused by North Korea’s unpredictable actions yielded milestones such as breaking long-sustained bans on arms exports (since 1967) and peaceful use of space (since 1969). They also led to the establishment of a new legal framework, “Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law” in 1999, which gave Japan permission to provide “non-combat logistical support to U.S. forces” for contingency areas surrounded by Japan.\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{192}Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Contemporary Military Security Policy,” op. cit., 166.
\textsuperscript{194}Christopher W. Hughes, op. cit., 166.
\textsuperscript{197}Andrew L. Oros, op. cit., 180.
As shown, the formation of a new security environment resulted in the reinforcement of the bilateral security relationship between Japan and the U.S. The situation further called on the SDF to assume broadened military roles on the international security stage. The SDF dispatch in support of U.S.-led coalition forces in 2001 reflected one aspect of strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance ties. Despite its long-held security identity of restrictions on overseas deployments, Japan’s decision to take part in the U.S.-led coalition was thoroughly considered.

2. **Foreign Expectations**

In the wake of 9/11, Japan faced high expectations from the U.S. that called for Japanese military support for the U.S.-led coalition forces. The U.S. military campaign against terrorists unfolded in the form of coalition building. For Washington policymakers, it was significant that the war was not viewed as simply blind revenge by the international community.\(^{198}\) Thus, the war against terrorism within a multilateral framework (rather than unilateral) was an important apparatus to legitimatize operations. In preparation for the retaliatory attacks following 9/11, the Bush administration called for “everyone to join them in a great coalition to conduct a campaign against terrorists who make war against civilized people,” and requested U.N. to support in all aspects.\(^{199}\) The U.S. hoped that all allies would assume active roles in its military campaign.

Confronting U.S. intentions to build a coalition, multilateral security organizations such as the U.N., NATO, and ANZUS, as well as individual countries, showed a strong willingness to keep solidarity with the U.S.-led military campaign for a retaliatory strike against terrorists. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1368 to condemn the “horrifying terrorist attack,” and urged all states to take steps to respond


Moreover, NATO allies officially invoked Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which justified collective military responses against terrorist attacks. NATO also announced that it would cooperate to push forward with a package of anti-terrorism measures by opening airspace for U.S. military operations and provide military troops, including a maritime presence. Australia and New Zealand invoked Article 4 of the ANZUS treaty to commit 1000 Australian troops to coalition forces.

The Bush administration called for Japanese participation in the war using rhetoric such as “show the [Japanese] flag in Afghanistan” and “put boots on the ground.” The U.S. requests were launched in various areas including political, diplomatic, and economic. The Bush administration wanted Japan to encourage Persian Gulf countries, including Iran and predominantly Muslim nations in Southeast Asia, to support the fight against terrorists using diplomatic measures. In terms of economics, during the summit meeting in Washington, President Bush asked Prime Minister Koizumi to “offer support in a wide range of areas, such as cutting off fund sources for terrorist organizations, helping to stabilize Afghanistan’s neighbors and giving aid to refugees, to wipe out terrorist forces worldwide.” Politically, the U.S. expected Japan to help with all measures, including military force. Bush mentioned that “although Japan has restrictions on its use of force it should not lower the worth of the country as a U.S. ally.”

The U.S. hoped that Japan would assume a specific role as a significant U.S. ally as well as contribute to preserving peace and stability. National security advisor Condoleezza Rice stressed this point by remarking that “Japan’s logistic support would

202 Chin Kin Wah, op. cit.
206 Ibid.
strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance politically and also would contribute to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific in the long run.”

In the middle of the Japanese discussion on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Bill, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage urged Japan to quickly enact the legislation, and he mentioned: “I think that there are enough combat forces. But certainly, there is a role for the Self Defense Forces in territorial defense. Certainly there is a role in logistic support in the counterterrorist effort.”

Indeed, the U.S. anticipated more support than the Koizumi government had prepared for, calling for the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) to protect the sea lane through the South China Sea and transport goods between Australia and Diego Garcia and other points.

This U.S. expectation was a critical motivation for Japan to consider SDF dispatch for the U.S.-led military attack in Afghanistan. Additionally, the broad international solidarity following 9/11 made Japanese policy-makers revisit their Gulf War experiences. What mattered mostly for Tokyo was to respond as quickly as possible, to show its willingness to help, and to distance itself from the attitude it was perceived to have in the Gulf War, which ended in failure to meet international expectations, generating widespread criticism. Shortly after the 9/11 catastrophe, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi made initial efforts to provide assistance by quickly instructing cabinet officials to devise measures to assist the U.S. military campaign, including SDF dispatch. In the economic arena, Japan froze assets and restricted the money flow of groups related to the Taliban, and provided U.S.$300 million for bilateral financial assistance to Pakistan and U.S.$18 million for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In addition, it offered U.S.$102 million via the U.N. and other agencies to Afghan refugees and U.S.$500

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209 “Japan, USA Divided over Forces Dispatch,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, September 26, 2001.

210 Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Security Policy, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the ‘War on Terror: in Confirmed or Radical Leap,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 4 (December 2004): 436.
million to rebuild the government and infrastructure of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{211} On the diplomatic front, Japan was an energetic intermediary between the West and the Middle East: it continued to keep good relations with the Middle East, including Iran, who in particular were hesitant to support the U.S. military campaign occurring in the vicinity of their region.\textsuperscript{212}

In sum, foreign expectations at the time of the war against terrorism in 2001 were exerted on Japanese policy-makers in various ways. The international situation surrounding Japan upon 9/11 was considerably similar to that of the Gulf War. Many international states shared the objectives of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, as was the case in the Gulf War. Japan was confronted with U.S. expectations to take diverse responsibilities on economic, diplomatic, and political fronts. The situation precipitated Japanese responses with military means, although the country had developed an identity of no participation in foreign wars.

\section*{B. PARTY AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PUBLIC}

Political parties function as representatives of public opinion. This section focuses on how public opinion was shaped in the aftermath of 9/11, and how it motivated Japanese political parties to dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean. Public opinion formed in favor of the U.S. helped facilitate Japanese support for the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan.

Immediately after 9/11, the Japanese public was united in criticizing the barbarous attack of terrorists. Although the Japanese public had a long-held pacifist stance on security issues and was reluctant to support the use of force, public opinion moved toward acceptance of Japan as a contributor to the international community. The following opinion polls conducted at the end of September 2001 show the trend of public

\textsuperscript{211} Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Security Policy, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the ‘War on Terror: in Confirmed or Radical Leap,” Ibid., 437.

\textsuperscript{212} Christopher W. Hughes, Ibid., 437–438.
In each opinion poll, public support of the government decision is marked in bold, and public opinion in opposition to the government decision is marked in italic.

- **Yomiuri Shinbun**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Support (%)</th>
<th>Oppose (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concerted international action is necessary to rid the world of terrorism</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am worried that a terrorist attack might happen here</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree with the contents of the bill to enable the SDF to guard important domestic facilities</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I oppose the above-mentioned bill</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I support a build-up for the U.S. military action</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I oppose it</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan should co-operate &quot;actively&quot;</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan should do so &quot;to some extent&quot;</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
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</table>

- **Asahi Shinbun**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Support (%)</th>
<th>Oppose (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I agree with Japan's support of the U.S.</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I oppose it</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am in favor of dispatching the SDF for rear-area support</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am against it</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am against allowing the SDF to carry weapons</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I support the U.S. preparations for military action</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I oppose it</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
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</tbody>
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- **Manichi Shinbun**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Support (%)</th>
<th>Oppose (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan should definitely extend help to the U.S.</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am in favor of helping the U.S., depending on what Japan is asked to do</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would support the transportation of supplies such as food in terms of logistical support for the U.S.</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The SDF should provide weapons and ammunition to the U.S.</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan should join the U.S. in battle</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I support the U.S. retaliatory strikes against those responsible for the terrorist attacks and those who harbor the terrorists</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not want the U.S. to use force</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would describe the Sept. 11 attacks as &quot;atrocious crimes&quot;</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I understand that the terrorists committed the attacks &quot;in defiance of a world order centering on the U.S.&quot;</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
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The trend of public opinion influenced policy outcomes. With the exception of the results of Asahi’s survey (which shows that 42 percent support the SDF dispatch and 62 percent wanted to support the U.S.), the four polls demonstrate that almost over 60 percent of respondents supported the government-led anti-terrorism measure plans. However, in the face of such specific questions as direct involvement in combat operations or transportation of combat weapons and ammunitions, the rate of support dropped steeply. The polls showed that the Japanese were willing to support U.S. activities in the Afghanistan on the whole, but they still wanted to be cautious in terms of using the SDF in foreign territories. However, the overall pattern of public opinion that condemned the terrorist attack and supported assistance for an ally remained high. It was an important factor in participating the government’s quick reactions.

It was true that public opinion affected the government’s choice of actions; in particular, the traditional pattern of security practices was significantly altered. Japanese decision-makers have to consider public opinion when they design policies, and, in this sense, it can be argued that the decision regarding the 2001 SDF dispatch was, in large part, determined by public opinion. However, an important role of political parties and the government is to shape public opinion by providing policies. Namely, it has to be recognized that government plans come first and public opinion follows. Thus, the actual decision-makers’ ideas and basic positions are important to note when the 2001 SDF dispatch in Indian Ocean is discussed.

C. PARTY AS POLICY MAKER: POLICY ORIENTATIONS AND PARTIES’ BASIC SECURITY POLICY STANCES

1. Brief Explanations

Given that political party systems and organizations are reflections of parties’ diverse values and ideas about nation’s future, the occupation period which followed
defeat in WWII was a watershed in reshaping the Japanese party system. When it came to interparty-cleavage in the postwar political setting, differing views on alliances and rearmament helped to shape Japan’s party alignment. The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and Japanese Communist Party (JCP) strongly disagreed with rearmament, constitutional revision, and the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which was an amalgam of what the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had produced down through the occupation period and the early years of independence. Immediately, right after the postwar period, the LDP itself was divided into two groups of factions: pragmatist, whose beliefs and ideals sided with the Yoshida Sigeru’s emphasis on economic development rather than military buildup and revisionists, whose beliefs and ideals deviated from those of the pragmatists, in that they stressed normal military status. The two groups represented divergent views how to forge U.S.-Japan relations given agreement to the U.S. security treaty and rearmament. Moreover, their views diverged on how to define future characteristics of national identity. Later, upon the end of the Cold War, when the LDP’s one-party dominant formation disintegrated and resulted in the creation of several small parties, these divergences persisted. Ozawa Ichiro departed from the LDP and formed his own party Shinseito, and later formed the Liberal Party in 1993. Another important party was the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), born in 1996, with party members originally from the New Frontier Party (NFP), Sakigake, and the JSP. The DPJ conceived a new approach to future characteristics of national identity. Further discussion about the differences among parties will be presented in the next section.


2. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

a. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Factions

The LDP is composed of several factions. The factions are, in essence, another form of party within the LDP. In brief, three main functions of factions are electoral support, fund raising, and distribution of a portfolio in the cabinet. By nature, factions have little relation to policy making. Faction identity was not defined by differences with respect to policy approaches or ideological divisions. Rather, individuals’ pragmatic electoral alignment with each faction and the strong bond among members are the key to understanding the identity of the LDP factions. Nevertheless, on security issues, factions’ identities are more distinct. When tracing back the origin of the LDP factions and outlining different factions’ policy priorities in national security areas over several generations it is reasonable to group factions according to security policy positions. According to Bouissou’s argument, some faction leaders ardently advocate particular policies. Bouissou proposed two ways of grouping factions—“rightist,” represented by Kishi Nobusuke and Nakasone, and “leftist,” represented by Miki Takeo—in accordance with divergent national security outlooks. This thesis proposes a different division into two mainstream groups—Yoshida followers (pragmatists) and Kishi followers (revisionists)—on the basis of the author’s own analysis on security policies and future vision for national identity.

Factions were formed when the former Democratic Party and the Liberal Party agreed upon the creation of the LDP and ushered in the so-called 1955 system. At the time of the LDP’s launch, six major factions existed. However, they have repeatedly split and reformed through the years. Factions from the former Democratic Party were

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219 Before formation of the 1955 system, Miki had somewhat of an inclination toward the leftists’ position. Moreover, in 1972, he proposed a pro-Beijing foreign policy allied with JSP, and in 1976 he agreed to the right to strike for public servants (Jean M. Bouissou, Ibid., 596).

the Hatoyama Ichiro, Kishi Nobusuka, and Miki Bukichi (succeeded by Kono Ichiro) factions; those from the former Liberal Party were Yoshida Shigeru, and Ono Bamboku factions; and the independent with a small number of faction members was the Miki Takeo faction. Among the factions, in terms of national security positions, two groups tended to collide: those who followed Yoshida, and those who preferred more hawkish perspectives like Hatoyama, Kishi, and Miki Bukichi. As a whole, factions composed of revisionists were generally from the former Democratic Party led by Hatoyama Ichiro; meanwhile, factions composed of pragmatists were from the former Liberal Party led by Yoshida Shigeru. The genealogy of the LDP factions through 2002 is illustrated in Figure 1. The two groups differed on security issues and related preferences for national identity, as related to such issues as relations with the U.S. and other Asian nations, Japan’s military role, and constitutional interpretation and revision.

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Figure 1. Genealogy of Factions (1955–2000) (From: Neary, 2002)
b. The Pragmatists

Japan in its early postwar period was reconstructed based on the Yoshida doctrine, which emphasized economic development over the pursuit of military power with dependence on the U.S. security umbrella.222 Yoshida’s successors, called pragmatists, played a leading role in reconstructing modern Japan during the Cold War era. Their preferences for national security during the early postwar years passed down through the Yoshida’s successors’ reign, though his faction members divided into two groups—the Ikeda and Sato factions. However, those two Yoshida inheritors shared similar views on national security and national identity. Ikeda presented an income-doubling plan in the 1960s, and Sato proactively adopted defense constraints such as non-nuclear principles (1967), ban on arms exports (1967), and peaceful use of space (1969), and institutionalized the security policy making process.223 The pragmatists’ view on national identity now became Japan’s identity. Economy-first policies made Japan the world’s second largest economy.

Yoshida’s view of Japan’s future national identity was a “small maritime trading nation” in alignment with the United States not only for economic recovery but also for national security.224 This national identity as a “small maritime trading nation” put much more importance on economic recovery and development into a modern, democratic, and progressive industrial society than other possible national agendas. Economy-first policies sacrificed a part of national sovereignty in that they imposed limitations on national defense in line with the constitution. Instead, this strategy proposed another way to work around the constitutional ban on acquisition of military forces: to depend on U.S. troops in Japanese territory. Thereafter, Japan could save defense expenditures in return for firm solidarity with its alliance partner; and with the unused monies, it could accelerate rapid economic recovery. This was the reward for becoming a “small maritime trading nation” without much exercise of national influence.

The core elements of the early pragmatists’ security policy position were connected to the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty (1952). On account of the security treaty, Japan could be shielded from neighboring countries’ worries about the specter of the restoration of Japanese militarism. In addition, the Japanese felt safe despite a deficiency in their military abilities because of the stationed U.S. troops.

Pragmatists were attracted to Yoshida’s belief in the usefulness of Article 9, which has primarily guided Japanese security practices through the years since the mid-1940s. The constitution provided clear provisions regarding renouncement of war, forever. But spite of the peace clause forbidding possession of military forces, Japan established the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954. Since the creation of the SDF, the pragmatists accepted modifications in constitutional interpretation but were cautious about revising it outright. They proposed an orthodox constitutional interpretation: Japan was excluded from exercising collective security and the use of forces was only legitimized for the purpose of self defense. In terms of collective self defense, the official interpretation of pragmatists was dual: on the one hand, Japan had the right of collective self-defense under international law but, on the other, was prohibited from exercising it under Article 9. When the Peacekeeping Law was adopted, the constitutional ban on SDF’s engagement in international security affairs was arguably

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227 In 1969, the Cabinet legislative bureau (CLB) stated that “the right of collective self defense is not admissible for Japan under Article 9 of the Constitution, in the sense that Article 9 does not allow dispatch our forces for the security of other states (Akiho Shibata, “Japan: Moderate Commitment Within Legal Structures,” in Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law, eds. Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 212). In May 1981, the CLB formally interpreted Article 9: “It is recognized under international law that a state has the right of collective self-defense, which is the right to use actual force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations, even when the state itself is not under direct attack. It is therefore self-evident that since it is a sovereign state, Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law. The Japanese government nevertheless takes the view that the exercise of the right of self defense as authorized under Article Nine of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country. The government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds that limit and is not, therefore, permissible under the Constitution.” (Hitoshi Nasu, “Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution Revisited in the Light of International Law,” Journal of Japanese Law, no. 18 (2004): 55–56, http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/anjel/documents/ZJapanR/ZJapanR18_08_Nasu.pdf.) (accessed October 19, 2009).
marginalized, but pragmatists did not want to revise Article 9 of the Constitution. 228 They preferred a broader interpretation of the Constitution and believed that the SDF and U.S.-Japan security alliance did not contradict the Constitution. Given the constitutional context, the SDF was employed only for the purpose of self-defense.

The Yoshida Doctrine served as the basis of Japanese security practices through the years of the Cold War. As security environments have vividly changed since then, the pragmatists have added new principles of basic security policy guidance, but without departing from the original stance of priorities of economic growth and low defense spending and firm reliance on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

One significant change in terms of security policy principles is an introduction of a concept of comprehensive security. Throughout complicated international situations from oil shock to the new Cold War, one pragmatist-successor prime minister, Ohira put forward the idea of comprehensive security in the early 1980s. The concept of comprehensive security was rooted in a new way of framing national security policies by emphasizing that national security was guaranteed not by only military means but also by various policy instruments. 229 It certainly saw a military approach as an important pillar of enhancing national security, but this was not the only way. Comprehensive security incorporated economic, diplomatic, environment, energy, and military issues into security policy-making. 230 Comprehensive security called for mutual cooperation with the international community on various issues. This approach extended to call for maintaining peaceful relations with Asian nations including China and for working together with them to construct economic cooperation institutions. More


recent LDP leaders who stress pro-Asian economic relations from the comprehensive security standpoint have been Kato Koichi, Yamasaki Taku, Koga Makoto, and Kono Yohei.231

The other principle pragmatists adopted in the 1990s was an expanded military role. The Yoshida Doctrine set forth principles of national policies inclined toward the primacy of the economy and a limited military. However, since the 1990s, and faced with a new situation with respect to security matters, the pragmatists adopted new security policy packages, which were exemplified by the pragmatists’ Miyazawa Kiichi’s endorsement of the Peacekeeping Law in 1992.232 The pragmatists had acknowledged Japan’s responsibility for making international military contributions to international peace and stability. In that regard, they approved using the SDF for U.N. peacekeeping operations.

From then on, pragmatists saw the value of military forces’ contributions to the preservation of peace and stability. However, their core beliefs about security policy, such as the value of the U.S.-Japan alliance system and limited emphasis on the military power, still remained. They favored making non-military contributions by offering economic assistance to underdeveloped countries and believed that the U.S.-Japan alliance was indispensable in the pursuit of Japan’s national security. To be sure, their preferences were restrained to non-combat contributions like peacekeeping operations under U.N. mandates. They reinterpreted the constitution so that it granted the right to an SDF to take part in international security affairs with the aim of international peace and stability. These pragmatists were opposed to the amendment of Article 9 of the constitution in order to explicate the SDF’s role that departed from the traditional pattern.233 Rather, they preferred changing the interpretation of the constitution to accommodate a larger role for the SDF. Miyazawa Kiichi was the representative

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protector to the constitution’s peace clause. Contemporary LDP pragmatists include former Ikeda-factional-lineage faction members like Kato, Koga, Kono, Miyazawa, and current LDP president Tanigaki Sadakazu; some members of the Tanaka-Takeshita-Hashimoto factional lineage such as Nonaka Hiromu; and the Yamasaki faction (the Near Future Political Research Group).^234^ In discussing the SDF dispatch in 2001, the pragmatists played a significant role in reviewing government decisions and debating policy outcomes.

c. The Revisionists

In the early period of the LDP’s creation, Hatoyama Ichiro, Miki Bukichi, Kono Ichiro, and Kishi Nobosuke were influential leaders in the LDP. Later, Hatoyama’s followers were merged into the Kono faction following the two faction leaders’ deaths (Hatoyama and Miki). Both Hatoyama and Kishi were passionate of a high security profile. Hatoyama was more of a “right autonomists” in that he earnestly supported equal diplomatic standing with the United States and other countries including the Soviet Union. Kishi, however, emphasized U.S.-leaning equal relations while remaining alienated from Communist countries.^235^ Revisionists argued Japan should be a normal nation. In the early postwar period, LDP revisionists developed the national identity of “normal nationhood” in opposition to Yoshida. They criticized the Yoshida Doctrine’s de-emphasis of national

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^234^ Keiko Hirata, Ibid., 138.

^235^ This thesis distinguishes Hatoyama’s approach to national identity from that of Kishi’s as well as Kono’s by calling the former “right autonomist” (the term “right autonomist” is borrowed from Richard J. Samuels, though he did not classify Hatoyama as a right autonomist [Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan, Ibid., 128]). Hatoyama’s attitudes toward national security and future national identity could be found in Hatoyama’s letter to John Foster Dulles, a special envoy of U.S. President Truman when his purge was in progress. In the letter, Hatoyama argued that “Japan should be equipped with enough defense capability to deter invasions by the communist countries; and democratic nations should form a strong unified front against them; and a militarily stronger Japan would be a good ally for the United States and other democratic nations” (Mayumi Itoh, The Hatoyama dynasty: Japanese Political Leadership through the Generations, [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003], 114). In fact, Hatoyama was a eager proponent of regaining full sovereignty. During his tenure as a prime minister, he tried to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, and made substantial efforts to conclude a peace treaty which eventually ended in failure. However, his policy line of seeking autonomy through military strength and reorganizing Japan as a normal nation did not extend into the form of a faction. Therefore, this thesis will not label right revisionist factions as the Hatoyama line.
security matters.\textsuperscript{236} Revisionists aimed to restore sovereignty in security affairs similar to that of other independent counties through Japan’s own military capabilities.\textsuperscript{237} Their positions were not opposed to the U.S.-Japan alliance system, but emphasized being a more independent state in the context of reliable relations with its ally. In this regard, they favored rearmament, more equal alliance relationships, and revision of the constitution.

In the early postwar period, revisionists in the LDP tried to realize the idea of a normal state through the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Revisionists’ ideas of the revision were not derived from anti-U.S. sentiment. Rather they devised a sovereign right of national defense.\textsuperscript{238} Under revisionist Prime Minister Kishi’s reign, the new security pact was forcefully passed despite the huge anti-revision campaign of some members of the LDP,\textsuperscript{239} progressive intellectuals, leftist activists, and students on 19 May 1960.\textsuperscript{240}

Once Prime Minister Kishi resigned due to repercussions of this aggressive legislating, the LDP revisionists were forced out of power until ardent revisionist leader Nakasone became Prime Minister in the mid-1980s. During this period, revisionists were positioned in the non-mainstream factions in the LDP, and Japan had grown into a major economic power. In the early 1980s, revisionist groups in the LDP returned to power. The “normal nation” rhetoric had significantly progressed by that time. The United States’ calls for burden sharing in the realm of Japanese national

\textsuperscript{236} Antony Best and Jussi Hanhimaki, Joseph A. Maiolo and Kirsten E. Schulze, \textit{International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond}, (London: Taylor & Francis Group Corporate Website, 2009), 338.

\textsuperscript{237} Richard J. Samuels, op. cit., 32.


\textsuperscript{239} LDP politicians Miki and Matsumura criticized the revision while former prime ministers Yoshida, Hatoyama, and Ishihara admitted the necessity for revision; but later when confronting Kishi’s forceful action in the Diet, even right revisionists Ishibashi and Kono declined to vote for approval (Richard L. Sims, \textit{Japanese Political History Since the Meiji Renovation, 1868-2000.}, [New York: Palgrave, 2001], 282–286).

\textsuperscript{240} The new treaty inserted the following clauses; “(1) a famous “prior consultation” clause for U.S. troop and weapon movement; (2) the “limits of constitution” clauses as a restriction to Japan’s defense obligations; (3) the definition of Japan’s defense perimeter as Japanese territory proper; (4) the duration of the treaty as ten years, with one year’s notice thereafter it either party should want to abrogate; (5) and a guarantee of mutual consultation in any major policy changes.” (Teruo Kobayashi, “A Great Debate in Japan,” \textit{Journal of Politics} 30, no. 3 [August 1968]: 750–751).
defense met with the revisionists’ favor. The revisionists supported a strong military buildup, and provided bountiful host-nation support in response to Japan’s ally’s request for burden sharing.

In the early post-Cold War period, the revisionists’ idea of “normal nation” turned to a new front. There is no doubt that the failure to join international coalition forces in the Gulf War led to incremental consideration by the Japanese for military contributions in international security affairs. Revisionists, meanwhile, saw “normal nation” within the parameters of having the right to defend the nation by its own capabilities. Security cooperation with the international community was not their concern. But in the aftermath of the Cold War, revisionists translated “normal nation” into Japan’s assuming Japan’s role in the world in order to keep world order from being disrupted. Ozawa Ichiro was an ardent provocateur who urged taking greater international responsibilities, not only by economic means, but also by military ones. Through the present, this revisionist view of “normal nation” has laid the foundation of their positions on security issues.

Contemporary revisionists in the LDP came to value two security principles. First, they favored taking on a more active military role in international security affairs. Yet their rationale to take the expanded military role did not originate from the goal of becoming a military hegemonic power.\textsuperscript{241} They gave much emphasis to their obligation to shaping international order as a member of the international community. Second, LDP revisionists perceived the U.S.-Japan alliance system as the core shield of national security. In this sense, LDP revisionists were seen to share the same principle as the pragmatists, with a U.S.-leaning disposition and emphasis on international military contributions. However, the two groups differed over the degree of military involvement in world security affairs. Whereas the pragmatists’ position agreed to take on military engagements within the parameters of U.N. sanctioned non-military

peacekeeping operations, revisionists further argued for an entrance into the collective defense system through the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty or the United Nations regardless of the mission type.242

In addition, the two groups differed in their views of constitutional revision. Revisionists are long-standing advocates of constitutional revisions, the primary target of which is Article 9. Pragmatists interpreted Article 9 as permitting the right to maintain self defense forces as well as become involved in foreign military tasks; in their view, there was no need for a revision of Article 9.243 But revisionists assert that the section calling for “relinquishing armed forces” should be rewritten as “maintaining armed forces for Japan’s independence and peace.” 244 In addition, since the exercise of collective self defense was prohibited in accordance with the orthodox interpretation of Article 9, revisionists constantly called for the insertion of an additional phrase that manifests Japan’s right to exercise the right of the collective self-defense in Article 9. In terms of collective self-defense, revisionists favor defense cooperation within the parameters of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Nakasone accentuated this point when proposing constitutional revisions. He stressed that the right of collective self-defense should be limited to relations with the U.S. when Japan’s independence and peace were involved, and that the decision to exercise that right should be determined by Japan’s own will.245

The revisionists dominated leadership of the LDP in the 2000s. In particular, Koizumi laid the groundwork to make their vision of “normal nation” a reality. He built up strong military capabilities and reconfirmed strong alliance ties with the United States. Also, as a result of his order to draft a revised constitution, in October 2005, the “draft of a new constitution” was published.246 According to the draft, the first

clause of Article 9 remained intact. The second clause of Article 9 was revised to allow military forces under the command of the prime minister.\textsuperscript{247} The draft additionally inserted a third clause stipulating that defense forces could cooperate in international security affairs as well as have responsibility to maintain social order at home.\textsuperscript{248} In addition, Koizumi played a leading role in Japan’s military involvement in the war against terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. Subsequently, Abe took over the prime ministership and pursued many policies in security areas. Abe upgraded the JDA to the Ministry of Defense and tried to launch a National Security Council which, however, ended in failure.

Contemporary representative LDP revisionists have included the Machimura faction (Seiwa Policy Research Group) members such as Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, Yuriko Koike, Ichita Yamamoto; now-Tsushima faction members, including Shigeru Ishiba; Aso faction members; and other independent LDP members such as Yasuhiro Nakasone and Shingo Nishimura.\textsuperscript{249} As a key revisionists figure, Koizumi played a leading role in deciding to dispatch the SDF in 2001. The revisionist government, key policy-makers at the time of 2001 dispatch discussion, actively launched Japan’s basic plans in response to 9/11. The Japanese government’s decisive reactions and quick dispatch of the SDF reflected the LDP revisionists’ approach toward security policy.

3. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ): From Creation to Now

The DPJ emerged as the major opposition party of the post–1955 system era by amassing members whose past affiliations ranged from socialist parties (the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) which later evolved into the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ)) to the centrist parties (the New Frontier Party (NFP) and the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan, (DSPJ)), and conservative parties (the Liberal Party, Sakigake


\textsuperscript{248} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{249} Keiko Hirata, op. cit., 142.
and the LDP). It finally won control of Japan’s government as a result of the 2009 Lower House election. The origin of the DPJ can be traced back to a politically tumultuous period around the end of the Cold War and the economic recession. Neither the long-time-ruling government, the LDP, nor the newly formed coalition government, led by Hosokawa (1993) and Murayama (1994), were empowered to launch necessary reform projects. While the opposition parties were initially ill-positioned against the LDP, the DPJ, initially formed by four parties’ merger, expanded its political scope by absorbing dispersed opposition parties with repeated mergers during that period. The DPJ’s in incorporating the Liberal Party—led by Ozawa Ichiro—250—in 2003 completed the formation of the party as it stands now.

Given its mixed membership, it is hard to define the DPJ’s policy stance on national security. It has pre-socialists who once denied the legitimacy of the SDF and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. It also has former-LDP party members with roots in both LDP pragmatist groups and revisionist groups. Moreover, the creation of the DPJ was not a result of a stark reversal with regard to security policy ideas in comparison with the LDP, but rather of an anti-LDP movement whose members were weary of the LDP’s stagnated political bureaucracy and long-lasting corruption. When the party’s leaders announced its creation on September 28, 1996, they offered three party objectives: (1) to break up and rebuild the nation’s administrative system, (2) to transform politics from bureaucracy-centered to citizen-centered, and (3) to create welfare society that would care for increasing numbers of elderly people.251 This implied the DPJ distinguished

250 As a one of the most influential Japanese political figures, Ozawa Ichiro took command of the DPJ from 2006 until to the day he stepped down over a funding scandal in 2009. Ozawa was a former member of the Tanaka-Takeshita faction, and was a vigorous reform advocate in political, military and judiciary affairs. He made his debut on the political stage in 1969 as a House of Representatives member. He was successfully reelected thirteen times. He served as parliamentary vice minister for the science and technology agency in the late 1970s in Suzuki’s tenure, minister of construction, minister of home affairs, parliamentary steering committee chair, chairman of the National Security Commission, and LDP Secretary General from 1989 to 1991. He resigned his membership in the LDP in the early 1990s when social, political and economic reform requests were denied by the government led by Miyazawa Kiichi. He created the Japan Renewal Party (JRP) with former members of the LDP and opposition parties, and in 1993 had a major voice in shaping the coalition government. He led the Liberal Party founded in 1998 until it merged into the DPJ in 2003 (Fumiko Halloran, “Ozawa Ichiro’s Strong Arm Restoration,” NBR’s Japan Forum, September 15, 2008 http://nbrforums.nbr.org/forau/i/message.aspx?LID=5&MID=32856) (accessed August 28, 2009).

itself from LDP on domestic issues rather than security issues. Besides, amid uncertain international circumstances, as Green has pointed out, there was no doubt that political parties’ views on the security agenda were more likely to be “a bell curve” than “two opposing poles.”

However, despite an uncertain line and a trend of overlapping positions on national security issues among parties, the DPJ surely embraced different views from the LDP on national security issues as well as national identity. Though the party contains several ideological strands, from leftist to conservative, the party has not been fully tested as to whether former party affiliations will create interparty disruption of party dissolution when making decisions on the critical security issues. Thus, discussion of the DPJ’s basic principles on security issues mainly relies on the party’s manifesto and key leaders’ views on national identity and security policy.

As a recently formed party, the DPJ developed a different vision of future national identity than other Japanese parties. The new idea might be labeled a “globalized, pacifist normal” nation. This national identity is similar in many ways to the revisionists’ “normal nation.” What notably differed was that the DPJ’s positions were more globally-oriented than U.S.-oriented, which was mainly due to the party’s mixed-membership. The party’s security policy principles can be summarized in three dimensions. First, the DPJ officially assented to the U.S.-Japan alliance system, calling it a major pillar of Japanese security as well as regional stability. The DPJ evaluated the U.S.-Japan alliance from two viewpoints. On one hand, its rationale was similar to that of the pragmatists of the LDP, given its support of defense-oriented military cooperation with the U.S. On the other hand, it found itself in a vein similar to the pacifists given its stance of hoping for a more autonomous position in relations with the

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U.S.\textsuperscript{255} The party platform before 1997 even had a phrase calling for “the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty without permanent stationing of U.S. forces.”\textsuperscript{256} Although the phrase was marginalized through more positive terms from 1997 onward rewritten as “Japan will maintain Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement...while managing these arrangements effectively and in a balanced manner through closer consultation with the United States,”\textsuperscript{257} the DPJ still gave weight to a self-reliant security policy.\textsuperscript{258} The leading left-leaning figure, Yokomichi Takahiro, opposed any form of overseas activities and constitutional revision, in contrast to the conservative-leaning members’ support for the revision.\textsuperscript{259} The existence of the former socialist group made the DPJ’s security policy stance reflect a pacifist orientation.

Second, influenced by the former right-leaning party members, the DPJ sought to find Japan’s role in international politics. This approach was favored by the largest group within the DPJ, made up of those who supported Ozawa and Hatoyama. Ozawa Ichiro pictured Japan as a globally influential nation contributing to international politics as much as to its own economic capacity. Ozawa held that Japan’s national security objectives should leap to the “peace-building strategy” from its long-held stagnated “exclusive defense strategy.”\textsuperscript{260} Hence, he proposed enhanced defense capabilities toward taking a larger scope in military roles. Also, he proposed the appointment of a chief cabinet secretary as a senior advisor similar to the National Security Advisor in the United States. However, in his view, the defense buildup was not for becoming a world military power, but for sharing responsibilities of keeping global peace and freedom.\textsuperscript{261} In this regard, Ozawa’s view on Japan’s overseas military role is very similar to those of

\textsuperscript{255} The Democratic Party of Japan, \textit{The Democratic Party of Japan’s Basic Policies on Security}.


\textsuperscript{258} The leading left-leaning figure, Yokomichi Takahiro, insisted on making the U.S-Japan security alliance more equal. He further argued Japan should remove the commitment to permanent stationing of U.S. forces, and reduce the number of the U.S. troops by stages. Mayumi Itoh, op. cit., 201.


\textsuperscript{260} Ozawa Ichiro, op. cit., 107.

\textsuperscript{261} Ozawa Ichiro, Ibid.
two groups within the LDP. On the one hand, he called on Japan to take responsibilities in peacekeeping operations as did the pragmatist group. On the other hand, he wanted to enhance military capabilities as the revisionist group did. As a former LDP Secretary General during the first Gulf War period, he was an initiator in laying out these policy proposals. Ozawa then transferred these views into the DPJ and made them the main pillar of the DPJ policy. He then took them one step further by making efforts to institutionalize a responsibility for international peacekeeping. He openly suggested permanent legislation enabling overseas military missions and creation of a military force separate from the SDF in order to take on regular U.N. peacekeeping duties.262

Third, the DPJ differentiated itself from the LDP by giving more weight to Asian neighbors than to the United States. In 2005, Hatoyama gave a speech to the congress of the Liberal International held in Sofia and stated that “the DPJ is more concerned with striking the right balance in Japan’s relations with the U.S. and Asian neighbors than with putting slightly more emphasis on the latter.”263 Instead, it stressed a U.N.-centered multilateral approach in security matters and regional cooperation with East Asian neighboring countries including China and South Korea.264 The DPJ offered a proposal to build a cooperative mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region. When it came to presenting a detailed initiative for establishment of an East Asia community, the DPJ followed the pragmatist group’s comprehensive security approach. Namely, it delineated an East Asia cooperative mechanism focused on non-military measurement such as “trade, finance, energy, the environment, disaster relief and measures to control infectious diseases.”265 However, prioritizing improved relations with Asian nations was not necessarily coupled with deemphasizing U.S.-Japan alliance ties. The DPJ considered the U.S.-Japan alliance

265 Ibid.
a foundation of national security, as did the LDP. It further saw the U.S.-Japan alliance as a significant contributor to keeping regional order in East Asia.266

The DPJ, led by Hatoyama and Ozawa, favored constitutional revision. In October 2005, the DPJ compiled “a proposal for a constitution.”267 As with the LDP’s proposal, it retained the first clause of “renouncing war as a sovereign right” untouched, but removed the second clause of “renouncing war potential.” But the DPJ’s views differed from those of the LDP to some degree. The DPJ paid more attention to a U.N.-centered use of force as compared to the LDP, which only stipulated the right to take part in international security affairs. The DPJ emphasized that the revision of the constitution aimed to legitimize the use of force abroad on the basis of UNSC resolutions.268 It held that a reason for the revision was to establish a legal standard to permit the exercise of collective defense in order to eliminate the vagueness of constitutional interpretation. Without having legal parameters defining conditions for the use of force abroad, they argued, decisions on collective defense might be drawn from an arbitrary interpretation of the existing constitution.269 The constitutional revision was one important plank in the party manifesto.

As indicated in the national identity of “peaceful-globalized-normal” nation (the author’s coinage) the DPJ’s security policy stance is difficult to reduce one dominant rationale. Some factions put more focus on a pacifist approach, whereas other factions focus more on a realistic approach similar to that of the revisionists. In such specific areas as military roles, some factions held similar view to the LDP pragmatists. The DPJ was saddled with remarkable divisions over the U.S.-Japan relationship because of ideological divisions among party members. However, in principle, the party would not likely defect from the alliance ties given its manifesto and key leaders’ reluctance to bow to the old pacifist rhetoric of neutral autonomy. Given this complex and contradicting

266 The Democratic Party of Japan, “Manifesto 2009.”
269 Ibid.
stance on security issues, the DPJ in the near future is likely to take multi-directional approaches that avoid leaning toward one side of the policy spectrum.

When the SDF discussion occurred in 2001, party formation had not been completed; the Liberal Party, led by Ichiro Ozawa, merged with the DPJ in 2003. Thus, Ozawa’s position preferring U.N.-centered military contributions was not as strong as influence on party’s position. He starkly opposed the government decision to dispatch the SDF without a U.N. Resolution. The DPJ position was constructed by its basic 1999 principle valuing the U.S.-Japan alliance. Party leader Hatoyama as well as the conservative and center-right majority of the party, favored the overseas dispatch. However, DPJ positions were divided, since the former socialist group opposed the decision. Hatoyama indeed had difficulty in creating party unity.

4. Pacifist Parties

The policy stances of the JSP, which later evolved into the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and the JCP were the most important pillars of their identities. In the immediate postwar years, they advocated “unarmed neutrality.” Neutrality for them was full independence from U.S. occupation. It also meant establishing normal state which maintained equal relations with foreign countries other than the United States. Their conception of national identity was centered on three points: (1) protection of the constitution, (2) opposition to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and (3) opposition to rearmament. After rearmament was concluded, their efforts concentrated on resisting defense buildup and use of the SDF.

Since their foundation, the JSP and JCP had embraced those three points as core principles of their policy. Throughout the Cold War years, the JSP was the largest opposition party, although their seats were not close to a majority in the Diet. The JCP had an ideological connection with the Soviet Union, but it pursued independent paths of communism rather than following Moscow’s and even criticized the Soviet Union in the

face of the Sino-Soviet War.\textsuperscript{272} The JCP had the strongest ideological supporters and even further argued for nationalistic pacifism which included not only the three points of the pacifists’ principles but also claims of returning the Northern Territories.\textsuperscript{273} Another opposition party, Komeito, founded in 1964 as the political arm of the new Buddhist religion of Souka Gakkai, followed the pacifist ideas in terms of security policy. Their security policy stance stood by protection of the constitution and opposition to rearmament and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.\textsuperscript{274}

The pacifist parties’ achievements of their security policy goals peaked in the 1960s when they made Kishi step down as prime minister. But overly strong adherence to ideology left these parties unable to challenge the LDP. Throughout their history, they argued for opposite paths of security policy compared to the LDP. They favored improved relations with the Soviet Union and Asian countries.\textsuperscript{275} However, the LDP’s accomplishment of rapid economic growth placed the opposition parties into a downward spiral throughout most of the Cold War period. Not only that, ideological divisions within the opposition parties contributed to the declining fortune of the pacifist parties in Japan. Moderate socialist members left the JSP and created the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) in 1960. They acknowledged the existence of the SDF and advocated a different model of socialism.\textsuperscript{276} Although pacifist parties had low electoral appeal and struggled with ideological divisions, they represented Japanese pacifist ideas and played key roles in keeping Japanese pacifist paths in security policies, along with the LDP pragmatists.

The 1990s saw the JSP radically depart from pacifist ideology. Prime Minister Murayama Toimiichi abandoned the party’s long-time beliefs - objection to the

\begin{small}
\begin{itemize}
\item Gerald L. Curtis, op. cit., 28–29.
\item Louis D. Hayes, op. cit., 93.
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constitution and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty—upon forming a governing coalition with the party’s former rival the LDP. He acknowledged that the presence of SDF was not contradictory to the constitution. He also admitted that the U.S.-Japan alliance played a vital role in maintaining peace and stability under the current regional security environment. He officially announced that he would no longer follow the value of “unarmed neutrality” any more.\textsuperscript{277} In addition, once Komeito formed a coalition government with the LDP, it also changed its original objection to the U.S.-Japan security alliance and rearmament. It became a generous supporter of U.S-Japan relations and the SDF.\textsuperscript{278} Now, the SDPJ is a small minority party, having been eclipsed by the DPJ, and has returned to its original security stance of denouncing the SDF and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.\textsuperscript{279} Komeito, however, found it difficult to apply their principles in real politics.

However, pacifist parties are key players in preserving the pacifist element of security policy in Japanese politics. Their ideas still exert a great impact on various types of Socialist-influence members of the Diet, including former-Socialist members of the DPJ. The principle of “neutrality” was modified into an objection to U.S.-Japan military cooperation. The principle of “unarmed” turned itself into objections to the strength of military capabilities. Pacifist parties inherited two modified principles and led the Diet’s opposition against pro-U.S. and pro-armament policy. Also, they strongly opposed the revision of Article 9 of the constitution. With these basic stances in the discussion about the SDF dispatch in 2001, they stood firmly in opposition to the government decision to dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean.

5. The Komeito

Since its foundation, the Komeito had held onto pacifist ideas, though its primary founding objective and policy goals reflected religious purposes. The Komeito was closely associated with the religious organization Soka Gakkai, which developed a new

\textsuperscript{277} Akitoshi Miyashita, op. cit., 114.


\textsuperscript{279} Keiko Hirata, op. cit., 132.
religious, as well as social, movement based on Buddhist dogma. In line with the Soka Gakkai’s prioritized values of pacifism and the protection of human dignity, the Komeito functioned as a mediator to transform the social movement into a political one by forging a specific political agenda based on these values. On the ideological front, it opposed the idea of constitutional revision, as did the pacifist parties. However, unlike the two pacifist parties, the Komeito acknowledged the existence of the SDF. In this sense, from the outset and in principle, the Komeito could be categorized as a moderate pacifist party. However, in practice, the Komeito was much more interested in general social welfare and religious freedom than security matters, so its position was less resilient than that of other pacifist parties. In a pure sense, it was more of a centrist-pacifist rather than a pacifist party. Based on its positions regarding security policy, it would appear that it would be opposed to participating in the SDF dispatch, but in practice it compromised its basic stance on security with the LDP by supporting the LDP’s plan for the SDF dispatch as a junior partner of the coalition government. However, Komeito played a significant role in shaping specific plans for participating in the war, as discussed in the next section.

D. PARTIES AS POLICY COMPETITORS

In terms of the Japanese security identity of domestic antimilitarism, the decision to dispatch the SDF to Afghanistan could be viewed as a radical break from traditional Japanese security policy. However, it should be noted that the 2001 dispatch was limited to rear-area logistic support. Limitations on the decision were imposed by the government and reflected various political discussions with the cabinet and Diet members. As a result of this decision, a new paradigm with regard to using force outside Japanese territory was implemented. The next section focuses on the results of the political debate, examines how political parties’ respective positions influenced the process of political

283 Another junior coalition partner, the New Conservative Party (NCP), was small and politically inconsequential.
debate, and discusses how the final decision was modified from the government’s original initiatives. Subsequently, it concludes that through the landmark experiences of the overseas military dispatch of 2001, Japanese security identity evolved, but an antimilitaristic aspect remains thanks to political parties’ interactions.

1. **Discussion within the Ruling Parties**

In facing the national security tragedy of its alliance partner, Tokyo had a sense of obligation to respond promptly to define the crisis as a “significant emergency,” one needed to be coped with using all possible means, including those other than diplomatic.284 In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Prime Minister Koizumi completely aligned with the reprisals of the U.S. and condemned the terrorists’ attack, as did most countries’ leaders. On September 25, 2001, Koizumi visited New York and Washington to show his deep sympathy and express his eagerness to support Japan’s ally as a responsible member of the international community; he said that Japan would “provide cooperation that suits its national power.”285

The day after the attacks, Koizumi confidentially ordered Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda to consider dispatching the SDF.286 Inside the cabinet office, Deputy Cabinet Chief Secretary (DCCS) Furukawa Teijiro organized a task force to identify possible Japanese responses. They outlined the SDF’s logistical support on September 15. Koizumi, one of the leading revisionists, was the most fervent advocate of the plan. In his Diet speech, he reiterated that Japan should be “ready to take drastic and flexible measures depending on the economic situation.”287 Government officials were highly motivated to support Koizumi’s initiatives, and publicly announced: “if a new law is sought and then attacks or other events happen before the law is passed, the SDF may be

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dispatched without legal grounds.” When designing initial plans, the cabinet policy makers appeared to follow the LDP revisionists’ positions. On September 19, 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi officially announced a “seven-point plan” to assist the U.S.-led “war on terror.” The specific plans were to:

- Take steps to enable the SDF to provide logistical support to the U.S. military in the event of a retaliatory strike in areas such as medical services, transportation and logistics;
- Dispatch SDF ships to gather information;
- Further strengthen international co-operation over immigration control;
- Provide humanitarian and economic aid to neighboring and involved countries, including the provision of emergency economic assistance to Pakistan and India;
- Take steps to help refugees, who might flee areas affected by the potential U.S.-military action, possibly as part of humanitarian aid by the SDF;
- Cooperate with other countries and take “appropriate steps” so that there would be no disorder in the economic system of Japan or the rest of the world.

They also planned a detailed military profile for the dispatch. The initial plan included the MSDF fleet and P-3Cs and Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) C-130Hs and Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACSSs). The fleet would consist of the amphibious vessel Osumi, Aegis destroyers, and tankers to support the shipment of water, food, and medical supplies including the refueling of U.S. fleets in the Indian Ocean. The MSDF P-3Cs and ASDF AWACSSs would watch over the surrounding waters for intelligence gathering. The ASDF C-130H would be expected to support humanitarian aid and transportation.

Although, the government plan departed from the traditional pattern of Japanese security practice, there was no doubt that the devised SDF missions were confined to the context of noncombat rear-area logistic support for the U.S.-led military campaign,

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288 “Diet Session Forum for Twin Crises.”


primarily in intelligence gathering and humanitarian aid (medical services and transportation). In the initial plan, the government imposed limits on the mission type and scope when the SDF was to be conducting logistic support. In terms of type of missions, the SDF mission was rear-area logistical support rather than a combat mission, and the SDF was charged with refueling and medical and maintenance support only for U.S. allies in Indian Ocean. In terms of scope of action, the SDF was allowed to operate only in non-combat areas; the bill explicitly stipulated that these measures would be applied only to non-combat areas. However, pragmatist groups in the LDP and its coalition party, the Komeito, found the plan problematic.

Pragmatist groups in the LDP, with their different security policy principles, criticized the government’s decisions. Faced with the government plan, one powerful Hashimoto faction member, Hiromu Nonaka, warned, “While I am well aware of the importance of cooperating with Japan’s ally, I can’t help but think that the government shouldn’t jeopardize the foreign policy it has worked long and hard to formulate.” LDP Secretary General Taku Yamansaki, a leading pragmatist, reiterated that “Japan’s role in preventing a global economic slide is as important as dispatching the SDF overseas.” This statement made clear one aspect of the pragmatists’ security policy stance, which favored economic assistance over military cooperation. In particular, the LDP pragmatists brought the mission type and capabilities that the SDF would expect to engage into question. The Koizumi government announced that AWACS and P-3C units were prepared to dispatch along with Aegis destroyers for monitoring outside combat areas and to take on information-gathering missions in surrounding areas. However, pragmatist groups objected. Koichi Kato, a leader of the former Miyazawa faction and

head of the Lower House Counterterrorism Committee, expressed his concern that “dispatch of an Aegis destroyer would lead Arab nations to believe that Japan has provided over-bearing military assistance.”

In response to the pragmatists’ opposition, the government dropped the AWACS and P-3C options, but the Aegis option was still maintained. At the LDP General Council meeting (members included former secretary generals of the LDP) held on September 26, pragmatist Nonaka publicly objected to the Aegis dispatch: “If the dispatch of an Aegis ship becomes too controversial and Diet debate becomes heated, the government should postpone the dispatch for the time being.” But the issue of an Aegis dispatch remained unsettled more than one year later. Due to strong opposition from pragmatists, the government did not dispatch an Aegis destroyer; however, the issue again came to the forefront in December 2002, and eventually resulted in sending two Aegis destroyers in rotation for eight months. Aegis destroyers were equipped with the Aegis war-fighting system capable of a high level of combat operations. Thus, in the pragmatists’ view, dispatching the Aegis was not allowable as the ship might be easily entrapped to engage in combat. By this logic, the pragmatist group disliked the government’s decision to dispatch Aegis destroyers. In the end, the Japanese government could afford to dispatch them when the hostile combat phase had cooled and thus the risk to engage in combat remained low.

The junior party, Komeito, also took a cautious approach. Komeito, with its pacifist security policy stance in principle, was concerned about the broader interpretation of the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance. Komeito’s Secretary General Tetsuzo Fuyushiba

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296 Paul Midford and Paul D. Scott, Ibid.


stated, “We cannot accept the idea that the SDF will be allowed to offer support to U.S. forces anywhere they go.”\textsuperscript{301} After the government plan was promulgated, the leader of Komeito, Takenori Kanzaki, announced the conditions the Komeito could agree to in the government plan: \textsuperscript{302}

- Providing logistic support, such as transportation and supplies, based on a U.N. resolution.
- Creating a law that is effective for a limited period of time and pertains only to the current military action.

Komeito’s interpretation was that no U.N. resolution clearly had authorized U.S. military operations; therefore, by suggesting certain conditions, Komeito pushed the government to present a clear means of legitimizing SDF participation. Moreover, the demand for a limited period of time limited the SDF dispatch to a case-by-case basis. Additionally, Komeito noted that the bill did not prohibit the SDF from transporting weapons and ammunition in support of U.S. forces preparing for combat missions.\textsuperscript{303}

As a result of political debates among the revisionist government, pragmatist groups, and the coalition party, on September 25, a consensus was reached about the revised bill to permit rear-area logistic support for U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean and humanitarian aid to refugees. In response to concerns from the pragmatist groups and its coalition partner, the Koizumi government committed to three items. \textbf{First}, it imposed a “two-year time limit” on the deployment plan.\textsuperscript{304} Two years after the start of the operation, the law would need to be endorsed again by Diet members to continue as long as the missions were not terminated.

\textbf{Second}, the phrase “Nonetheless, weapons and ammunition shall not be provided. Direct refueling to and repairing of U.S. aircraft which is preparing for departure for combat operations shall not be conducted” was newly inserted.\textsuperscript{305} It promised that SDF

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{302} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{303} “Coalition Leaders Split on SDF Bill,” \textit{The Daily Yomiuri}, September 23, 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{304} Paul Midford and Paul D. Scott, op. cit., 136.
\end{itemize}
forces would not assist U.S. aircraft or other weapon systems ready for combat missions.\(^{306}\) Also limited was the type of military platform: specifically, due to the pragmatist groups’ opposition, AWACSs for intelligence-gathering and P-3Cs for maritime patrol were forbidden. In the case of the Aegis destroyer dispatch, agreement by the pragmatist groups and the revisionist government was hard to come by. In the end, one year later, with MSDF being the most capable asset, the Aegis destroyers were dispatched in the Indian Ocean. However, the Aegis dispatch was suspended during the combat phase, and was allowed to continue only after the dangers of engaging in combat operations were marginalized.

Third, the discussion about the SDF dispatch was not linked with constitutional revision. As Article 9 of the Constitution was interpreted as “no right of exercising collective self-defense,” the SDF dispatch might have represented a violation.\(^{307}\) In this context, Komeito posed critical questions about the legitimacy of the missions. In response, the Koizumi government made it clear that the SDF dispatch did not challenge the constitutional prohibition that had confined the role of Japanese military forces, because it was based on U.N. Resolution 1368, which defined a terrorist attack as a threat to international peace and stability.\(^ {308}\) In addition, the government tried to turn the focus of the Constitution from Article 9 to the Preamble, which stipulated that the Japanese people should cooperate with international nations for peace.\(^ {309}\) Based on U.N. resolutions and the Preamble of the Constitution, it was argued that the legitimacy of the SDF dispatch had been established.

In the end, LDP Secretaries General and the policy committee chairmen of the ruling parties approved the bill and reached a consensus on October 1. The discussion implied that the government’s initial plan and the bill were constrained by restrictions

\(^{306}\) Paul Midford and Paul D. Scott, op. cit., 136.

\(^{307}\) Akiho Shibata, “Japan: Moderate Commitment within Legal Strictures,” in Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law, op. cit., 207.


imposed by the pragmatist groups of the LDP and the coalition party. The imposed restrictions reflected the antimilitaristic approach to security matters of the Japanese government as well as that of the Japanese parties.

2. Discussion with Opposition Parties

On October 5, the Anti-terrorism Special Measure bill was delivered to the Diet. In terms of degree of opposition, the strongest opposition parties were the SDPJ and the JCP, which wanted no compromise on the issue of the SDF dispatch under any conditions. The JCP asserted that any form of military assistance, regardless of U.N. guidance or internationally built consensus, was unconstitutional. The SDPJ also firmly opposed all forms of military retaliatory engagement whether or not the objectives of the missions were limited to humanitarian aid in a non-combat area. Their positions were symbolic in that they represented the antimilitarism embedded in Japanese politics, but their political power was too weak to produce all the changes they wanted.

Unlike the SDPJ’s and the JCP’s extreme oppositions, the Liberal Party and the DPJ, in principle, welcomed the SDF’s expanded roles. However, their rationales and conditions for agreeing to widened military roles differed. The Liberal Party’s positions were less flexible than those of the DPJ. According to the Liberal Party’s basic stance on the use of force abroad, SDF participation in international security affairs should take precedence over U.N. sanctions. Unlike the Gulf War case, the U.S.-led military operation in Afghanistan was not a U.N.-commanded multinational military operation, and no specific U.N. resolution mandated the U.S.-led military campaign. The Liberal Party leader, Ozawa, pointed to this fact, and boycotted the party leaders’ meeting on September 20. He constantly argued that: “in order to enact the bill, a fresh U.N. resolution that would enable the exercise of forces is needed. If this is not possible, the

310 Paul Midford and Paul D. Scott, op. cit., 136.

311 A member of the SDF, Yoko Tajima, warned that “SDF personnel never though they would be assigned to lend logistic support to other forces in Afghanistan when they joined the SDF. It would constitute a violation of a contact, because they were assured that they would not have to die while serving their country;” Paul Midford and Paul D. Scott, Ibid., 136.

government should amend its current interpretation of the Constitution that denies exercising the right of collective self-defense to allow the SDF to join U.S. and multinational forces with no restrictions on their activities.”313 In the face of the government’s prompt reaction and the bill presented to the Diet, offered held that this was an “ad hoc, spur of the moment half measure.”314 However, the Liberal Party did not directly influence modification of the government’s decision, primarily because, as a minor party in terms of seat numbers in the Diet (22 of 480), Liberal Party concerns were a low priority.

DPJ members split into two factions with different positions. Those who were former socialists opposed the bill, whereas the leading group, including party leader Hatoyama, accepted the need to join international efforts to fight terrorism. This did not mean that the positions of the DPJ, which favored the bill, had no influence on government measures. In the meeting between the ruling parties and the DPJ, the DPJ demanded conditions required to obtain the party’s support.

The first thing the DPJ demanded was to amend the bill to limit the scope of the SDF to non-combat areas for humanitarian aid activities.315 The DPJ was concerned about the “dispatch of SDF personnel.”316 The bill granted authority to SDF personnel to operate in a foreign territory where enemies were not easily discernable, even though the mission areas were restricted to non-combat areas. Far more importantly, SDF personnel were allowed to carry weapons for self-protection and to protect those whom they were charged with protecting, such as refugees and the wounded. The DPJ wanted the bill to add certain limitations to protect SDF personnel. It proposed forbidding them from transporting weapons and ammunitions for coalition forces by land.

314 Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, Ibid., 96
316 Paul Midford and Paul D. Scott, op. cit., 136.
The second point that the DPJ highlighted was prior Diet approval in any SDF dispatch cases to ensure “strong civilian control.” The proposed bill did not require a prior Diet approval for enforcement, but only a post-Diet report. As a majority opposition party in the Diet, the DPJ called for strong Diet control. DPJ’s preference for prior Diet approval contradicted that of the junior coalition party, Komeito, which firmly asserted that no further compromise with the DPJ related to Diet approval would be granted. In the end, a Lower House Committee approved the government bill without accepting the DPJ’s demand.

Although the government draft bill followed a fairly antimilitaristic approach by compromising with pragmatist groups and the coalition party, there was room for opposition parties with different viewpoints to contribute. Their basic stances on military roles in international security affairs guided their positions on government decisions to dispatch the SDF. In addition to the parties’ behavior based on policy-seeking patterns, the debate in the Diet seemed to become more complicated because of the opposition party’s struggle to exert more influence in the Diet in the name of “civilian control.”

In response to the opposition parties’ requests, the governing parties agreed to amend the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure bill. First, the bill drew an explicit line between land and sea-airspace missions. Transporting weapons and ammunition on land was clearly prohibited in the amended bill. Thanks to the DPJ’s direction, the probability of SDF members being in a dangerous situation that would call for the use of weapons was lowered. Second, Koizumi pledged to implement the provision that

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319 Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, Ibid., 97.


stipulated post-Diet approval within twenty days.\textsuperscript{322} In addition, this provision decreed that “if the Diet disapproved the SDF activities which had already been executed, of SDF mission would be terminated immediately.”\textsuperscript{323} As a result of the insertion of the Diet’s right to approve or disapprove the mission in the bill, civilian control over the military engagement was further reinforced.

Despite the government’s concessions to the demands of the main opposition party, efforts to reach an agreement between the ruling parties and the DPJ ended in failure, due mainly to the unsatisfactory compromise over Diet approval.\textsuperscript{324} DPJ leader Hatoyama constantly called for prior Diet approval in conducting SDF missions abroad. This call was rebuffed Hatoyama finally altered his party’s line. Although originally supporting the government, the DPJ stood against the bill at the last minute.\textsuperscript{325}

Nevertheless, the Koizumi government rushed to vote with support from ruling party members.\textsuperscript{326} In the Lower and Upper Houses, the LDP and its coalition held a majority and public support of the anti-terrorism legislation remained high. According to an Asahi Shimbun poll on October 13–14, over half of respondents (51 percent) supported the bill, while 29 percent opposed it.\textsuperscript{327} The high rate of public support and that U.S. retaliatory actions had already begun ultimately convinced the Koizumi government to quickly pass the bill in spite of the unsuccessful compromise with the DPJ. Meanwhile, Hatoyama’s call for prior Diet approval failed to gain full support from even

\textsuperscript{322} The law also stipulated that “the Prime Minister shall put Cooperation Support Activities, Search and Rescue Activities or Assistance to Affected People implemented by the Self-Defense Forces specified in the Basic Plan, within twenty days after their initiation, on the agenda in the Diet for its approval. When the Diet is in recess or when the House of Representatives is dissolved, however, the Prime Minister shall promptly seek its approval upon convening of the first Diet session thereafter. If the Diet disapproves, Cooperation and Support Activities, Search and Rescue Activities or Assistance to Affected People must be promptly terminated.” Kantei, \url{http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html} (accessed October 29, 2009).


\textsuperscript{324} “Koizumi, DPJ Failed to Strike a Deal on SDF Bill,” \textit{The Japan Times}, October 16, 2001.


\textsuperscript{327} Tomohito Shinoda, \textit{Koizumi Diplomacy}, op. cit., 97.
his own party members. The DPJ was composed of several factions whose origins varied, and thus at the time of the SDF discussion, Hatoyama found it difficult to create party unity. In the end, Hatoyama failed to persuade members who agreed with the SDF’s dispatch abroad; as a result, twenty members of the DPJ voted to pass the bill. The bill passed in the Lower House on October 18 and in the Upper House on October 29. Subsequent to enacting the law on November 2, the MSDF flotilla left its home port for the Indian Ocean on November 9, 2001.

E. CONCLUSION

Substantial changes after the Cold War in the regional security environment caused by North Korea and China resulted in a shift of Japanese threat perception ultimately resulting in more consolidated relations between the U.S. and Japan in the 1990s. A stronger alliance was the starting point that motivated the U.S. to anticipate a more active role for Japan, which, at the same time, motivated Japan to take on greater responsibilities. Following the 9/11 disaster, the Koizumi government decisively and promptly took action as an alliance partner and as a responsible member of the international community. An increased number of public supporters galvanized the government’s prompt decision-making.

Koizumi played a critical role in Japan’s quick reaction. He initiated the plan and instructed cabinet officials to draft the basic plan and anti-terrorism legislation. From the revisionists’ view, the U.S.-Japan alliance was an institutional framework to make military contributions over the world. As a key proponent of revisionism in the LDP, Koizumi certainly advocated for SDF’s expanded roles in international security affairs and insisted on constructing a sound relationship with the U.S. as a responsible ally. He and his cabinet officials’ basic plan was a more radical departure from what Japan finally decided upon, in that they planned to dispatch Aegis destroyers along with P-3Cs and AWACS. Pragmatist groups in the LDP warned against taking too radical a step toward

328 For instance, from the beginning, when the DPJ agreed to the bill, former socialists led by Yokomichi criticized the leading groups’ support and opposed the bill (Michael J. Green, “U.S.-Japan Ties Under the DPJ: Reluctant Realism Redux,” Oriental Economist, [August 2009]).
329 Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, op. cit., 98.
military operations alongside U.S.-led multinational forces and opposed the use of Aegis destroyers, AWACS, and P-3Cs. Komeito’s security stance opposed ammunition and called for weapons and its will to establish legal barriers against automatic long-lasting support for U.S. military operations. The DPJ’s positions coincided with the revisionists’ in principle as far as expanded military roles were concerned. Furthermore, they wanted to reduce the possibility that SDF personnel were to be placed in dangerous situations. In addition, the DPJ wanted more institutionalized tools to ensure civilian control. The Liberal Party’s opposition also showed that their basic principles on security policy influenced the deciding party’s official positions on the security matters. For the Liberal Party, despite its favor of international military contributions in any form of operations, the U.N. mandate was the biggest leverage to draw the party’s approval. Pacifist parties, the SDPJ, and the JCP completely opposed the legislation.

Throughout postwar history, “no Japanese participation in foreign wars” was one of the underpinning tenets of the Japanese security identity of domestic antimilitarism. In this respect, the SDF dispatch in support of U.S.-led coalition forces in 2001 reflected Japanese departure from the previous antimilitaristic approach to security policy practice. However, the security identity of no use of force in foreign wars evolved with a set of constraints imposed throughout the political process through which decision-makers devised initial plans and political parties interact. Political parties’ respective positions offered basic principles by which the parties’ support might be secured to pass the bill. In its series of political negotiations with the coalition and opposition parties, the government’s original initiatives were repeatedly imbued with different aspects of restrictions deriving from the different origins of parties’ antimilitaristic identities. As a result, in many ways, their previous identity with the ban on participation in foreign wars remained consistent with the imposition of constraints by decision-makers as well as opposition parties. Although the situation in the wake of 9/11 challenged antimilitaristic aspects of Japan’s security identity, Japan eventually preserved influences of antimilitarism in its security policy. As long as the democratic political system operates well enough to ensure dynamic political negotiations, Japanese dependence on antimilitarism in security areas will likely endure without radical changes.
As noted in the prior chapter, one function of security identity is to provide a set of boundaries under which states shape security policies. The Japanese decision on the SDF dispatch was a turning point for Japan. It broke the old boundaries and produced new principles to guide security practice in a new era. The new principles can be summarized as follows. **First**, foreign deployment would be implemented within bi- or multilateral framework. **Second**, there must be a strong enough reason for legitimizing the use of force abroad to build a consensus. **Third**, the decision to deploy the SDF would be made on a case-by-case-basis, and thus the decision would need the support of the Diet. **Fourth**, foreign deployment of the SDF would be limited to non-combat missions. In this manner, one tenet of the Japanese security identity—no Japanese participation in foreign wars—has evolved. The new security identity guides Japanese new way of security practice.\(^{330}\) But, there is no doubt that to a considerable extent, the past pattern of security practices will remain consistent despite this evolved security identity because of a new set of principles that constrain Japanese decision making.

The politics of Japan can be described as a politics of trade-offs. As long as the representative government is functioning well, no dominant party’s positions entirely determine the outcome of government policy. Japanese parties are sharply divided over issues of national security and have different views on the U.S.-Japan alliance system, the role of the SDF, and the legitimacy of international military contributions. The dispatch of the SDF in support of U.S.-led coalition forces in the war against terrorism explicitly demonstrates how parties’ basic positions and principles meld into security policy outcomes. In addition, this case study indicates how parties interact in the face of critical security matters and search for common ground. As policy-seekers argued, parties’ basic

\(^{330}\) However, in July 2003, the Koizumi government sent 600 ground troops to Iraq under the Special Measures Law on Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction. Japan only succeeded in dispatching the SDF to Iraq after the combat phase was ended and national reconstruction had commenced. Despite the U.S. expectation for direct Japanese logistic support as in the case of the Afghanistan War, Japan refused any direct involvement in the war in Iraq, instead, when the Bush administration declared war, Japan only announced political support without any direct involvement to military contributions. The case of the Iraq war made it clear that in the absence of a U.N. mandate and widespread consensus of the public and opposition parties, the Koizumi government, in spite of its pro-U.S. stance, found it hard to drive forward the policies concerning use of forces. Michael J. Green, “The Iraq War and Asia: Assessing the Legacy,” *Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 181–200; Chijiwa Yasuaki, “Insights into Japan-U.S. Relations on the Eve of the Iraq War: Dilemmas over “Showing the Flag,”” *Asian Survey* 45, no. 6 (November–December 2005): 834–864.
principles on security matters guided the government’s course of action with respect to the SDF dispatch, and each party voiced its stance on the government plan based on their own principles on security policy.
V. CONCLUSIONS

Japan and Germany developed security identities of domestic antimilitarism in the postwar era. One of the important tenets of their security identities was not to use their militaries other than for defense purposes. However, those security identities of “no use of forces in foreign war” were challenged under the new security environments created by the end of the Cold War and the reunification of the two German states. Political parties in Japan and Germany took leading roles in all processes of responding to the challenges and built new security identities modifying “no use of forces in foreign war.” Before Japan and Germany participated in their two “modern” wars, they had had no framework to guide the direction of their decision making. The two wars provided opportunities for politicians from both countries to reconstruct their security identities of domestic antimilitarism in the post-Cold War era.

The two cases examined above illustrate what role Japanese and German political parties played in the evolution of their security identities. The case studies showed that understanding parties’ behaviors in the legislative arena is a key to figuring out how new security practices were adopted, implemented, and institutionalized. In addition, there were similarities as well as dissimilarities between the two cases of Japan and Germany in terms of political parties’ views and behavior patterns in policy competition.

First of all, this thesis finds that as a representative of the public, the ruling party, as well as opposition parties, chose to take action concerning the use of forces abroad in accordance with public opinion. Public opinion influenced each party’s decision whether to take an action or not (rather than how to take an action in the face of challenges). Public opinion made political parties drew a broad picture with regard to the nations’ responses rather than give such directions as specific policies. Since their defeats in WWII, the Japanese and Germans adhered to a strong sense of aversion to the military, and that exerted political influence in security decision-making related to military options. But public opinion was seen to shift according to the specific situation—e.g., critical violations of human rights in the form of massacres, attacks on U.N. peacekeepers, and terrorist attacks. Also, public opinion appeared to move toward a conditional acceptance
of the use of force for the maintenance of international peace and stability. Although public opinion was shaped in favor of the use of military force at the point of time when two wars occurred, as shown in polls, the gap between approval and disapproval of military deployment was small. Therefore, it was the role of political parties to elicit public support by crafting acceptable policy packages and presenting them to the public. In that regard, when it came to detailing policies, public opinion does not fully explain why one party favored a certain policy while others did not.

Second, the thesis finds that as policy makers, political parties set their own lenses for discerning desirable national identities and favorable ways of dealing with security issues. When it came to delineating specific reactions and military deployments under the given circumstances, parties’ established stances on security matters played a big part. Parties keep consistent policy stances over time, and these were created mostly when the parties were founded. The two nations’ parties had this in common. From their foundations (mostly in the early postwar years), each party established conditions under which it had to embrace a sense of antimilitarism and write new national identities that directed their future as vanquished nations. Those parties’ stances were the main pillars of the two nations’ security identities, and these were formulated and consolidated down through the years since the end of WWII.

These antimilitaristic policy stances of political parties exerted substantial impact parties’ discussions on positions on the use of force in foreign wars. The ruling parties’ positions derived from their willingness to fulfill allegiance obligations. This was not motivated by national interests in international relations or by demonstrating military power to neighbor nations. Also, opposition parties’ concession to war participation was centered on humanitarian purposes and preservation of peace and stability. This shows that although they were pushed to rewrite their new security identities of domestic antimilitarism, political parties’ respective positions did not depart from the existing boundaries of antimilitarism. It is wise to think that as long as parties’ positions are confined within boundaries imbued with antimilitarism, war participation will not result in a complete overturn of existing security identity or radical decline of postwar reluctance to become involved in foreign war.
Moreover, as seen in the case studies, the governments’ initiatives entailed self-imposed restrictions on military support. The governments of Japan and Germany were cautious when choosing the capabilities to be used in military interventions. The German government did not discuss ground force participation in the UNPROFOR operation, even though the operation was under the guardianship of the U.N. In the case of Japan, SDF support was limited to non-combat roles and non-substitution roles for U.S. forces. The government gave up dispatching a Kongo class Aegis destroyer equipped with war fighting systems, and dropped dispatching P-3Cs and AWACSs which were expected to conduct patrol missions for war surveillance. This trend formed the backbone of the new security practice guided by the new security identity of “use of force in foreign war.”

Third, the thesis finds that as policy competitors, political parties created their preferred policy through negotiations and compromises. These processes made the final decision-making on war participation constrained as well as delayed. In the case of Japan, participation in the Afghanistan war was limited to only two years, and ships were not allowed to engage in combat missions. In the case of Germany, in the early stage of the Bosnian War period, German participation was limited to peacekeeping operations for humanitarian relief, and decision-making was substantially delayed due to opposition parties’ filing of legal suits. The most salient accomplishment of both nations’ opposition parties in policy competition was to place decision-making on military intervention under civilian control on a case-by-case-basis. Japan imposed post hoc Diet approval as a way to ensure civilian control. The law included a provision stipulating that unless this approval was obtained, troops had to be withdrawn. The ruling from the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 endowed German politicians with official authority to decide on military intervention in each case. The two nations’ political balances of power led policy competition to take place. If the political environment had involved overwhelming dominance of a monolithic ruling party, the institutionalization of civilian control or institutionalization of the role of parliament would have been substantially reduced.

The case studies of Japan and Germany reveal both similarities and dissimilarities in the politics of military deployment. First of all, the two nations had similar patterns of
party alignments of views on national identities and major security issues. Dominant political parties in the early postwar period, the CDU and the pragmatist LDP, both conceived that new types of nations should be established based on the concept of non-military regimes. During the Cold War, they completely distanced themselves from military power politics and pursued civilian politics focusing on economic development. In addition to this, their security activities were taken within multi- or bilateral security frameworks. By contrast, the major opposition parties, the SPD and JSP, favored neutralized socialist national identities. They both criticized the governing parties’ alliance-leaning strategies in the pursuit of national security and envisioned more autonomous status as a plausible way to ensure national security. The two main opposition parties’ preferences for national identities and policy stances represented the embodiment of antimilitarism in realpolitik.

Second, political parties in Japan and Germany aligned similarly in their view on the major security-policy issue of widened military roles. In discussing participation in foreign wars, the ruling parties, the CDU and the revisionist LDP, emphasized alliance solidarity including military interventions on a preferential basis; and the opposition parties, the SPD and the DPJ, were skeptical about alliance solidarity through military means. Rather, opposition parties sought legitimacy to use military force abroad in the name of preserving peace and stability. Dissimilar was the fact that in the case of Germany, the long-time anti-militarist party, the SPD, which was reorganized in the immediate postwar period, still kept its position as a major party; whereas in the case of Japan, the postwar major opposition party, the JSP, had grown almost defunct. Instead, a newly founded party, the DPJ, whose members fell across the wide range of the ideological spectrum, newly functioned as a main opposition party at the time when the SDF dispatch debate took place. Thus, SPD’s opposition was based on its well-developed traditional stance on the use of force, but that of the DPJ was based on its nascent stance on the matter. Additionally, the main leadership posts of the DPJ were taken by former conservatives as of 2001, and thus the DPJ’s stance was more favorable to internationalized military activities. In this sense, the degree of opposition of Japanese parties was far less strong than that of Germany’s.
Third, the two nations displayed unique patterns of policy competition. German parties delegated authority to the Federal Constitutional Court when they could not resolve political controversy. This behavior gave the Federal Constitutional Court a considerable political role in German politics. Thanks to the opposition parties’ inquiries regarding the constitutionality of the mission, the Federal Court finally concluded, in July 1994, that the military deployment in out-of-area missions was constitutional. From then on, though political dispute about military deployments was not confined within the constitutional context. Decisions on military deployment depended much on politicians’ interactions on a case-by-case-basis. After the court ruling, German politicians officially formulated clear criteria that guide future German military engagements. Meanwhile, Japanese opposition parties’ boycotted or directly voted against the bill in the legislative arena. The main opposition party paid little attention to the constitutional justice of the mission, unlike Germany’s major opposition party. Therefore, in Japanese politics, the Supreme Court had a smaller political role. In contrast to the German case where the constitutional dispute was settled by court ruling in 1994, constitutional ambiguity with regard to Japanese military engagements in collective security was still unsettled. This result made Japanese political parties’ roles as policy makers and policy competitors more significant.

Fourth, the two cases differed in terms of distance of mission. German participation occurred in nearby European regions, ones it had occupied in the WWII period. German military engagement in these European areas was possible because of a consensus by alliance nations to allow Germany military access. This was a radical change given European nations’ high level of resentment against Germany in the immediate postwar period. On the contrary, Japanese participation occurred hundreds of miles away. If Japan had been faced with the German situation and the war had taken place in the Japanese occupied areas of WWII, Japan would have been less likely to participate in such a war, as Germany did, even given U.N. sanctioned security activities. The Japanese relationship with neighbor nations, especially with China and Korea, is still entangled with history textbook controversies, high political figures’ visit to the
controversial Shrine, and the absence of clear apologies for Japanese deeds during WWII. These problems would a large strain on a Japanese military role in its own region.

In conclusion, through their “modern” wars, Japan’s and Germany’s security identities of “no use of force in foreign war” evolved. In the evolution process, political parties developed a new framework to guide future military interventions in foreign wars. The new framework can be summarized as follows. First, there must be a consensus among the people that the military deployment would contribute to the preservation of international peace and stability. Second, foreign deployment would be implemented only when missions were conducted within a bilateral or multilateral context. Acceptance of the military deployment would be increased when the U.N. mandated the mission. Third, the decision to deploy military troops would be made through civilian control in the form parliamentary approval on a case-by-case-basis. New security identities have guided decision-making over Japan’s and Germany’s expanded multilateral security roles.
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