Even as the NATO Secretary General alluded to the possible withdrawal of forces from Kosovo, critics are clamoring that no clear exit strategy exists. The unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008 puts this new nation at the crossroads and is a game changer for NATO. For the past ten years NATO, through KFOR, established a safe and secure environment within the country. Kosovo must evolve as a nation capable of sustaining itself without the dependency on international donors or a peacekeeping force to guarantee security. An objective analysis of the latest progress reports from Kosovo is warranted. This paper examines the impact PRTs would have in Kosovo, where no PRTs are operating. It demonstrates the viability of PRTs in Kosovo by comparing current developmental needs against demonstrated PRT civil-military capabilities. Finally, this paper draws conclusions concerning the current KFOR capabilities and recommends that PRTs deploy in-lieu of the Multination Task Forces currently operating in Kosovo as an exit strategy.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Kosovo: An Exit Strategy

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

23 October 2009
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Abstract

*Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Kosovo: An Exit Strategy?*

Even as the NATO Secretary General alluded to the possible withdrawal of forces from Kosovo, critics are clamoring that no clear exit strategy exists. The unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008 puts this new nation at the crossroads and is a game changer for NATO. For the past ten years NATO, through KFOR, established a safe and secure environment within the country. Kosovo must evolve as a nation capable of sustaining itself without the dependency on international donors or a peacekeeping force to guarantee security. An objective analysis of the latest progress reports from Kosovo is warranted. This paper examines the impact PRTs would have in Kosovo, where no PRTs are operating. It demonstrates the viability of PRTs in Kosovo by comparing current developmental needs against demonstrated PRT civil-military capabilities. Finally, this paper draws conclusions concerning the current KFOR capabilities and recommends that PRTs deploy in-lieu of the Multination Task Forces currently operating in Kosovo as an exit strategy.
INTRODUCTION

With over 12,000 multinational troops from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - led Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployed to Kosovo under the auspices of United Nations Security Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, no end to this deployment appears in sight. More than a year has passed since the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo on 17 February 2008 and the security situation remains calm and uneventful across the country. NATO’s Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently alluded to troop reductions in Kosovo by January 2010. ¹ Although the security environment in Kosovo has vastly improved, progression of stability and reconstruction in the new country are granular at best. The gradual withdrawal of KFOR troops and the development of indigenous security forces are but one line of effort in a larger campaign to a desired end state. Security without progression along all lines of operation addresses only a symptom and not the problem. Any exit strategy based on security conditions alone is tantamount to failure and status quo. The deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams would address the multiple lines of operations required of stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) in Kosovo. The deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will enhance military support for SSTR operations and progress along all lines of effort and facilitate the ultimate withdrawal of the KFOR from Kosovo. PRTs are essential to any exit strategy in Kosovo.

BACKGROUND

The Serbian province of Kosovo has a long history of autonomy and sectarian disputes. At the conclusion of World War II, the 1945 Yugoslav constitution granted formal autonomy to Kosovo. Josip Broz Tito envisioned autonomy as a means to suppress localized nationalism.

Within Kosovo, tensions between ethnic Albanians and Serbs have been ever present. The Serbian perspective promulgates the fear of a desire for a “greater Albania” and the relentless persecution of Serbs in Kosovo. Kosovo claimed that Serbs leaving the province elected to do so because of economic reasons, not because of persecution or discrimination. The death of Tito in 1980 ushered in a new period of instability within Yugoslavia, complicated by a growing economic crisis and the rise of Slobodan Milosevic to political power.

President Milosevic moved to curb autonomy in Kosovo by replacing ethnic Albanians with sympathetic Serbs in an outright process of Serbianization of the province. Kosovo Albanians responded in kind by creating parallel political and governing structures. Serbian repression would give birth to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and mark the beginning of a separatist movement in Kosovo. The political environment in Kosovo would deteriorate to “open conflict between Serbian military and police forces and Kosovar Albanian forces,” resulting in the deaths of 1,500 Kosovars and the displacement of some 400,000 people from their homes.²

President Milosevic responded to the threat of NATO airstrikes and agreed to withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo. Planned airstrikes into Serbia were called off on 13 October 1998. Additionally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would establish, man, and deploy a Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM).³ Despite the prospect of a peaceful solution, the crisis flared up again in early 1999 and in March Serbia launched an all out invasion of Kosovo. Facing the threat of NATO airstrikes again Milosevic refused to back down.

After seventy-seven days of continuous airstrikes of Operation ALLIED FORCE, Serbian leadership agreed to a complete withdrawal. The United Nations Security Council passed

³ Ibid.
UNSCR 1244 with the force of Chapter VII of the UN Charter in effect and the mandate for the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). NATO forces executed Operation JOINT GUARDIAN to stop the violence in Kosovo and encourage the return of refugees and displaced persons. The first elements of the KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999 as Serbian forces began their withdrawal from the province. During its operational peak, KFOR’s NATO troop strength, including forces provided by the Russian Federation, reached 50,000 multinational personnel.

For the past ten years, NATO forces have stood at the forefront of peacekeeping and SSTR operations in Kosovo. On 17 February 2008, determined to solve the issue of final status, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia and establishes the Republic of Kosovo. In Pristina, Kosovo the government called for a constitution to be drafted. The Republic of Kosovo ratified its new constitution with an effective date of 15 June 2008. After Kosovo’s unilateral declaration, reasonable security remained in force across the country. Sixty-two countries have announced formal recognition of the Republic of Kosova, while Serbia conspicuously failed to accept or acknowledge the independence of its former province.

**KOSOVO TODAY: ISSUES AND ENVIRONMENT**

With the final status seemingly determined and independence secured, KFOR remains tethered to Kosovo with no certain end in sight. This was evident by the latest Kosovo 2008 Progress Report submitted by Commission of the European Communities under the auspices of UNSCR 1244, which paints an improving but bleak picture of the overall environment in Kosovo. The security situation remains relatively calm, even after the unilateral declaration of independence. Only two incidents of note have challenged the relative calm: the destruction of

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two border outposts in the north along the border with Serbia and the storming of the courthouse in Mitrovica that resulted in the death of an UNMIK police officer. The Kosovo 2008 Progress Report characterizes every other vital demographic in Kosovo as weak, fledgling, hampered by poor infrastructure, manned but untrained staffs, and suffering from budget shortfalls.

Parallel governance, power generation, unemployment, and the rule of law are four areas of concern that exasperate progress in Kosovo. Continued weak performance and failure in these efforts will marginalize any recovery and reconstruction efforts. While security has increased within Kosovo, the underlying reasons for insecurity still exist and obstruct progress. If Kosovo is to stand on its own in the community of nations, corresponding efforts in these critical areas must be an adjunct to security sector reforms. The UN and NATO must address each corresponding line of effort, cognizant of the relationship each line of effort has with the tenuous security situation. KFOR must recognize its role and develop an exit strategy based on force design and capabilities that currently do not exist. An exit strategy can be formulated by tying the transition of SSTR operations to a force capability.

Serbs within Kosovo remain aloof of the Kosovo government, instead relying on parallel locally elected Serb governance structures. In May of 2008, Serbs within Kosovo participated in a general election of Serbian national leaders and local governments, parallel governance within Kosovo. UNMIK’s reaction was to void the elections within Kosovo. Driving the wedge further between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, the unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 sparked numerous job walk-offs as a means of protest by Serbs in Kosovo.

Kosovo is sensitive to its requirements for inclusion and has reached out to “reassure Kosovo

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Serb citizens.” Even within the safe environment of Kosovo today, parallel Serb structures threaten and weaken legitimacy of the government.

Unemployment is widespread and employment growth stagnant in Kosovo; the current estimate of unemployment is 43%. Of those unemployed, 93% have been so for the past year. Women continue to be impoverished and make up 55% of the unemployed numbers. Compounding the unemployment issue is the number of young adults who enter the work force each year, approximately 30,000. Kosovo’s weak production base cannot support an infusion of this size.

The lack of a reliable power supply continues to hold back any real improvement in Kosovo. The primary energy supplier in Kosovo is Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK). Electrical operations are problematic and unpredictable. KEK is only able to continue operations because of subsidies it receives from international donors. The primary threat to Kosovo’s power supply is theft and non-payment for services provided. Approximately 60% of all KEK customers do not pay for their power; a direct connection to KEK’s ability to supply energy to the country. Power outages are frequent and last for long periods of time. Contributing to the power condition is the antiquated grid system that is susceptible to unmitigated power theft. Parallel Serbian government structures complicate and contribute to the demise of the power company. A common Serbian contention is that the Belgrade government is responsible for all utility payments in the Serbian enclaves.

Recently, UNMIK began the transfer of mission assets and responsibility to European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) for all law functions. Even with the transition to EULEX, the Kosovo 2008 Progress Report identifies the judicial system as weak and immature.

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6 Ibid., 6.
7 Ibid., 29.
8 Ibid.
The backlog of cases pending number in the tens of thousands and impedes any forward progression by the judiciary. Land disputes plagued the courts, a direct result of the see-saw refugee movements that have plagued the region. A Bar Association has formed, but its “existence is little known by the people or the judges.” The judiciary is a fledgling existence on its best days.

Despite all of this, the sum of all KFOR efforts in Kosovo has created a safe and secure environment. KFOR can argue considerable success over the past ten years to maintain peace and relative calm in Kosovo. However, the underlying issues have yet to be addressed. Undermining the effectiveness of the Kosovo government are rampant unemployment, limited access to justice, corruption, smuggling, and the prevalence of organized crime. Although the environment is safe and secure, the underlying issues remain. If KFOR desires to maintain status quo, it need change nothing. If KFOR desires to disengage from Kosovo with the realization that it can stand on its own, it requires a comprehensive exit strategy. Critics such as Gerhard Spörl contend that Kosovo is “an artificial construct dependent on international organizations” with “no end in sight for this foreign rule and seems to have little in the way of an exit strategy.”

Steven Schwartz put it plainly in *The Weekly Standard*, “there is no U.N. exit strategy for Kosovo.”

**NATION-BUILDING**

Nation Building has various definitions and can mean different things to different people. Many believe that only the indigenous population of a country can build a nation; therefore, the term state-building is appropriate. Francis Fukuyama contends that state-building is “creating or

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9 Ibid., 18.
strengthening such government institutions as armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-collection agencies, health and education systems, and the like.”

Further, Fukuyama asserts that the nation- or state-building process has two distinct phases: stabilization of the country followed by the creation of “self-sustaining political and economic institutions” that promulgate democratic governance and growth. The transition to Fukuyama’s second phase of nation-building is essential for Kosovo’s long-term success.

The Kosovo 2008 Progress Report is clear in its assessment and observations; Kosovo is stable and secure, meeting Fukuyama’s first requirement for nation-building. Analysis of the Kosovo 2008 Progress Report reveals that the country is ready for transition to Fukuyama’s second phase of nation-building, although the country remains hampered by weak and unreliable systems. Any exit strategy within Kosovo must be predicated on the creation of a “self-sustaining” government. Further, failing to transition to Fukuyama’s second phase is paramount to status quo and leave no viable exit strategy for KFOR. Any exit strategy in Kosovo must be predicated on security, stability, and the existence of a self-sustaining and legitimate government.

KOSOVO FORCE (KFOR)

KFOR’s original mandate was to deter hostilities between Kosovo separatists and Serbian military forces, create a safe and secure environment, demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), support the international humanitarian effort, and coordinate international civil relief effort. After the declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, NATO determined that it would remain in Kosovo under the auspices of UNSCR 1244. Kosovo’s independence

13 Ibid.
declaration and NATO’s decision to remain in the region forced NATO to reexamine its mission and develop new tasks as appropriate. NATO’s new tasks include support for a “professional, democratic and multiethnic security structure,” the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). The KSF is the indigenous security capability that will eventually relieve KFOR of its security responsibilities. KFOR’s change in mission is not a complete paradigm shift from the original mandate but the beginning of an exit strategy for NATO. KFOR will continue to assist the UN, EULEX, and other international agencies in order to maintain a secure, stable, and multiethnic Kosovo.

KFOR’s current configuration consists of five multinational task forces (MNTF). These five task forces are: MNTF North based in Selo, MNTF South based in Prizren, and MNTF West based in Pec, and MNTF East based in Urosevac. MNTF units are typically manned by conventional forces designed to maintain a safe and security environment. On 8 September 2008, Lieutenant General Markus J. Bentler assumed command of the Kosovo Force. KFOR reports directly to the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples, Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, United States Navy located in Naples, Italy.

One of the tools currently available to KFOR is the Liaison Monitoring Teams (LMTs). KFOR established LMTs to overtly “feel the pulse of the population” as a direct result of the March 2004 ethnic riots. The onset of violence caught KFOR utterly off guard when a drive by shooting injured an 18 year old Serbian boy. Events quickly spiraled out of control, and riots broke out across Kosovo over the following days in the worst violence seen in Kosovo since the war ended in 1999. Casualty estimates ran from 28 to 600 injured during the riots.

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15 Ibid.
The 2004 riots caught KFOR flat footed and unprepared. As a direct result of the rapid escalation of violence, the commander of KFOR (COMKFOR) wanted to establish an organization that would work closely with the population. Designed and built to gain the trust of the people, LMTs work among the population to identify flashpoints and provide early warning to prevent future violence. LMTs work overtly in an unclassified role gathering information and making daily contact with the population in order to develop a sense of the concerns and issues affecting the population. LMTs move openly in all municipalities of Kosovo, particularly the minority enclaves. LMTs formulate and compile all of their observations, comments, and characterizations into a daily unclassified report. LMT reports contain a wide variety of observations and information that require culling. The COMKFOR frequently tasks LMTs to conduct surveys of interest to KFOR. Once compiled, LMT report distribution is unlimited, unclassified, and ready available to each of the MNTFs. See Appendix C – Sample LMT Daily Report.

While acting as a “trip flare” for a safe and secure environment, the LMT focus is at the local level. Their observations are primarily of local political activities and those issues pertinent to locals. LMTs also conduct unscientific polling as a way to gather information. Until recently, the central issue of concern of a majority of the citizens was the issue of final status. LMT reporting does highlight several developmental needs at the local level. Although LMTs have no capacity to affect development, they act as a messenger from the local populace directly to the COMKFOR.

LMTs operate under a dual chain of command. MNTFs are responsible to man, train, and equip each of their LMTs, but LMTs report directly to the COMKFOR through their

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17 Multinational Task Force (East). To commanding general, Kosovo Force, daily report 061801ANOV07 TO 071800ANOV07, 7 November 2007.
respective MNTFs. A Regional Liaison Monitoring Team Chief serves as the commander for LMTs assigned to each of the MNTFs. The number of personnel assigned to an LMT depends on the size of the geographic area and the population density. Teams average in size from five to twenty-five personnel and range in rank from E4 through O3. Each LMT is responsible for a geographic area and population. An LMT area of responsibility is of concern and requires constant deconfliction within the battle space. LMT operational areas overlap tactical maneuver units areas of responsibility. Each team operates from non-tactical vehicles and carries only side arm. Specialized training is not required to be a member of a LMT, and no doctrinal unit exists to fill the role of a LMT. MNTF East, with United States as the lead nation, organizes its LMTs from the National Guard. The LMTs are normally ad hoc organizations created from volunteers who wish to serve as part of a KFOR rotation. See Figure 1. Appendix A.

LMTs look similar to that of a PRT from a distance, but any similarities are cursory. Differences in organization, communications, function, and capability are dramatic. LMTs are overt observers and information collectors by mission requirements. In order to gather information, teams must establish and maintain close contact with local individuals and organization. LMTs excel at overt reporting by identifying potential issues that are developmental in nature.

**THE EXIT STRATEGY REQUIREMENT**

Progress in Kosovo has produced a safe and secure environment, less the riots of 2004. However, the indicators of violence are still present within the country. Kosovo’s declaration of independence and adoption of a constitution that protects the rights of minorities serves as a point of debarkation. KFOR must transition from post-conflict reconstruction to a self-sustaining government. It is time to put the “training wheels on” and push Kosovo in the right
direction. With a new mission set, NATO and KFOR are poorly organized and equipped for the next phase of required nation-building in Kosovo. A safe and secure environment only exists in Kosovo today because of KFOR’s presence in the country. Kosovo lacks the ability to secure itself and its population. KFOR’s critical role in the development of the KSF is to relieve KFOR’s responsibility of a safe and secure environment. Addressing only the security issues of Kosovo is not a viable solution or exit strategy. Kosovo must develop a means to secure itself and address those developmental issues at the root of its problems. Any successful exit strategy in Kosovo will address both security and development simultaneously. Failing to address the issues that underpin the security problems in Kosovo will only achieve status quo.

**PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS**

The importance of post-conflict reconstruction has not gone unnoticed by the U.S. military. Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, dated 28 November 2005, identifies responsibilities, provides guidance for SSTR operations, and emphasizes the use of military-civilian teams for stability, security, developing local governance, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity.\(^\text{18}\) One tool readily available to and accepted by the members of KFOR, but not utilized currently in KFOR, are Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

The driving force behind the development of PRTs came about in Afghanistan to address humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Afghanistan. The need to engage local government officials, coordinate local development, and establish security became intuitive for U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan.\(^\text{19}\) The first PRT stood up in Gardez, Afghanistan in January 2003. The PRT concept expanded quickly and eventually the U.S. solicited support from allies in order

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to meet the growing needs of the government and population in Afghanistan. When the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - Afghanistan assumed control of operations in April 2003, the PRT program remained intact.

Currently deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, PRTs bring together military and civilian expertise into one organization. PRTs are the epitome and essence of what DoD 3000.05 wants to achieve; recognizing and understanding the value of “integrated civilian and military efforts” when conducting or supporting stability operations. PRTs combine high demand critical development skills held by civilians in many of the development agencies, such as USAID and US State Department, along with military expertise in civil affairs and security. This combination of personnel would “streamline communications and cost-effectiveness.”

The mission of a PRT is to assist and extend the authority of the supported government, facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified areas of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts. PRTs can differ from one to another and differ from Afghanistan to Iraq. Differences between PRTs are usually in composition, size, leadership, and primary objectives of the team. Security considerations and team objectives determine the size and composition of a PRT. International PRTs are normally larger than a typical U.S. PRT. Because a PRT is an integrated, interagency organization, the PRT can be civilian or military led. The State Department assumes the lead role for PRTs in Iraq. See Figure 2. Appendix B.

Doctrinal references for PRTs are currently under development. PRTs rely almost entirely on Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), handbooks, lessons learned, and best

\[20\] Ibid.

\[21\] Ibid., 18.

practices developed by PRTs in the field. The Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) is responsible for all doctrinal considerations regarding PRTs. PRTs can be constructed to meet a specific set of requirements demanded of it. “PRTs vary in size, scope, and mission focus, and they are tailored to local security, political, and socio-economic dynamics in their area of operation.”

At this point, PRTs are not subject to dogmatic tables of organization that many conventional military units are.

PRT operations in Kosovo could bring all of the essential tools together to preside over multinational, civil-military operations along the security, governance, and infrastructure lines of operations (LOOs). A comparison of PRT capabilities along LOOs contrasted against known weaknesses outlined in the Kosovo 2008 Progress Report reveals that PRTs are well designed to meet the demands of Kosovo.

The security environment within Kosovo remains stable and secure, but this does not relieve the requirement to provide for a secure environment. Underlying tensions remain in Kosovo while the possibility of sectarian violence is ever present. Of interest to the security and stabilization in Kosovo are the rule of law; specifically judiciary, policing, and access to justice. PRTs are uniquely equipped to enhance the security environment. A PRT can be designed and organized to maintain the stability within Kosovo.

Rule of law presents an additional dimension of concern within Kosovo. By agreement, UNMIK mission assets are shifting to EULEX for rule of law concerns but weakness persists within the judiciary. As in many other weak and failed states, corruption in Kosovo is

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considerable and prevalent. Challenges within the rule of law area are significant and potentially undermine stabilization efforts and validity of the new government.

Kosovo’s constitution provides for the protection of human rights, democratic principles, and local governance. As noted by the Kosovo 2008 Progress report, minorities claimed a lack of participation in the constitutional process, specifically the Kosovo Serbs and Romas. Further, the report noted that the new government has failed to penetrate into minority controlled areas. The government has little influence over police, customs, courts, transportation, and boundaries where these parallel governance systems are functioning.

PRTs, in support of EULEX and based on their roles and functions in Afghanistan and Iraq, can assist in the development, mentoring, and advising of local police forces. PRTs enhance the security LOO by extending the government’s reach and authority concerning the rule of law. PRTs, by operating close to the people, can extend the rule of law into those minority areas where the central government has little or no reach. Addressing the issue of security, Michael Dziedzic and Michael Seidl make it clear that PRTs “should shift from brick and mortar reconstruction efforts to governmental capacity building and focus on such tasks as …police mentoring.” One of the inherent capabilities of a PRT is the ability to coordinate needed resources and subject-matter expertise down to the local level.

The unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 by Kosovo has been the focus of the government. The myopic attention final status received allowed Serbian parallel structures to thrive in the Serb majority municipalities. In spite of UN objections, Serbia sponsored and conducted local and parliamentary election on 11 May 2008. The UN upheld the right of Kosovo Serbs to vote in Serbian parliamentary elections, but UNMIK chief Joachim

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25 Ibid., 8.
26 Ibid., 11.
27 Dziedic and Seidl, PRTs Military Relations, 8.
Ruecker ruled that local elections would violate UNSCR 1244 and are illegal.\textsuperscript{28} The effectiveness and reach of the Kosovo government is limited, particularly to the Serb minority. Clear progress exists along the governance line of effort, “the basic working tools for an efficient government are in place,”\textsuperscript{29} but it requires enhancement and application to down to the local levels of Kosovo.

Extending governance and authority to the local level is an explicit capability of a PRT. PRTs can penetrate the provincial and local levels of government in the societies in which they operate. PRTs, leveraging expertise, engage local officials in order to build their capacity to maintain security and facilitate community participation. PRT operations could penetrate all levels of government and reach out to the isolated Serb minorities. Inclusion of the Kosovo Serb minorities is critical to the success of any political process in Kosovo. Critical to PRT effectiveness is location. Positioning a PRT is designed to stabilize the area and extend the reach and access to the government.\textsuperscript{30}

Kosovo struggles with a weak economy that is dependent on donor support. The current unemployment rate stands at 43.6% and grew at a rate of 2.6% over the past year. Contributing to steady growth of unemployment is the arrival of some 30,000 young people each year.\textsuperscript{31} An informal economy continues to operate and deny the government much needed revenue. Kosovo requires employment opportunities if it is to wean itself from international donor assistance and promote a KFOR exit.

\textsuperscript{29}Commission of the European Communities, Kosovo 2008 Progress Report, 11.
\textsuperscript{30}Dziedic and Seidl, PRTs Military Relations, 9.
\textsuperscript{31}Commission of the European Communities, Kosovo 2008 Progress Report, 29.
Compounding economic weakness are the issues of an immature and unreliable infrastructure. Transportation networks require an extensive maintenance and rehabilitation program. The energy sector within Kosovo survives on governmental and donor subsidies. Unreliable power generation and distribution systems, especially to remote areas, plague the people of Kosovo.\textsuperscript{32} Energy revenue and billing are virtually non-existent and complicate an already unstable power situation. Electrical theft is prevalent across the country and one of the primary reasons for utility insolvency.\textsuperscript{33} Many residential residents do not pay for the three to six hours of power they receive daily. Parallel Serb structures refuse to pay for power, claiming that the Serbian government in Belgrade has promised to pay their power bill.

PRTs have the ability to impact through immediate response projects such as schools, clinics, and wells. A second capability is to support vital infrastructure development projects such as power distribution stations, power grids, road networks, and dams. PRT subject-matter experts have specialized skills not readily available to the local community. PRTs capabilities also include the ability to coordinate with the national, regional, and local government representatives concerning development projects. By design, PRTs can leverage developmental support from interagency sources, international organizations (IO), and non-governmental organizations. PRTs are uniquely suited for development synchronization of Kosovo as outlined by Fukuyama’s second phase of nation building.

PRTs blend of military expertise and civilian subject-matter experts make them a potent force with unmatched capabilities that provide and enhance security, promulgate governance to the local level, and synchronize developments extending legitimacy of the government. PRTs are an essential tool for post-conflict reconstruction and nation building. The ability to extend

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 46.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
government legitimacy into the local, remote and minority municipalities of Kosovo is a critical skill embedded within every PRT.

CONCLUSION

The safe and secure environment that Kosovo enjoys today is a product of KFOR’s herculean efforts over the past ten years, but Kosovo is at the crossroads. If progress is to continue, further investment and development must be oriented toward the creation of a self-sufficient political and economic nation. NATO and KFOR must recognize their role in this process and develop solutions that effectively and efficiently address the issues. Failure to address all of Kosovo’s developmental issues invites status quo, prevents forward progress and forestalls any viable exit strategy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The development and deployment of PRTs in Kosovo in place of the MNTFs is a feasible course of action. NATO supports the conceptual framework of the PRT. Several NATO countries have PRTs deployed in support of the NATO mission in support of Afghanistan. PRTs are universally accepted in the countries in which they operate. PRTs can be built for specific requirements, exceeding the requirements of Kosovo’s security and developmental needs. Building on the connections that LMTs have with the local populace, PRTs can leverage the conglomeration of civilian subject-matter experts, interagency representatives, and international actors they work with for the benefit of Kosovo. While KFOR and its LMTs focus on a portion of the problem, PRTs can address a broad spectrum of the problems facing Kosovo. Any exit strategy must be predicated on Kosovo’s ability to secure itself and continue to develop. PRTs in place of the currently deployed MNTFs represent the best possible means of achieving a successful exit from Kosovo.


APPENDIX A – LIAISON MONITORING TEAM COMMAND STRUCTURE

Figure 1. KFOR Liaison Monitoring Team Command Structure. Source. Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany
APPENDIX B – PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM ORGANIZATION

**Figure 2.** Provincial Reconstruction Team Organization. Source. U.S. Army Center for Lesson Learned, PRT Handbook
1. SUMMARY OF OVERT INFORMATION:

**Reporting Team:** E1  
**Location:** RANILUG/RANILLUG  
**Grid:** EN4904  
**DTG:** 071345ANOV07  
**Event Headline:** Pulse Patrol  
**Topic(s):** Health, Crime  
**Contact(s)/Source(s):** Mrs. Milka VIDIC (KOS, female, Age 53, Pharmacy Manager)  

**Description:** LMT 1 spoke with Mrs. VIDIC at the pharmacy, which is state owned by the SERBIAN Health Department. She stated there has been trouble with the medical supplies being delivered to the pharmacy because of the strict customs enforcement at Gate 5. She said the customs agents tax all medicine, whether it is free or donated from other countries. She stated the authorized route, to cross into KOSOVO/KOSOVA is located at Gate 1, which causes a delay in the amount of time it takes the medical van to arrive in RANILUG/RANILLUG. She stated it takes longer to receive medical supplies to the SERBIAN pharmacies in the KOS areas. Mrs. VIDIC said there is a SERBIAN pharmacy in KAMENICA/KAMENICE which receives their medical supplies, in a timelier manner because the pharmacy in KAMENICA/KAMENICE serves predominately KOA. Mrs. VIDIC said the customs agents at Gate 5 allow all trucks delivering supplies to the pharmacy in KAMENICA/KAMENICE to pass through without any restrictions. She stated she is angry about corruption in all of the pharmacies in the municipality. Mrs. VIDIC believes the corruption is a result of negligence of both KOS and KOA government officials, which hurts the people on both sides. She said before 1999 there used to be two pharmacies in GNJILANE/GJILAN that were owned by the SERBIAN Health Department. She said after 1999 the pharmacies were sold to KOA and the profits were supposed to go to the Health Department, but they have not seen any funds. She said the case is currently being reviewed by the judicial system in GNJILANE/GJILAN. Mrs. VIDIC is afraid the KOA will try to take possession of all SERBIAN pharmacies in the municipality. She stated they have documents proving the pharmacies are owned by the SERBIAN Health Department. Mrs. VIDIC stated the pharmacy will not turn away anyone needing medicine.