**Hybrid Orgs for Hybrid Wars: The Story of AFRICOM's New Hybrid and Why Other CCDRs Should Want One, Too**

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When U.S. Africa Command was established in 2008, its manning and organizational structure looked very different from that of most other geographic combatant commands. USAFRICOM's key staff structure contained numerous interagency manpower positions, to include a State Department Ambassador as one of two Deputy Commanders. This was due to the advent of hybrid security challenges, for which the U.S. Government had found itself inadequately prepared. A host of alternative recommendations for how best to organize the government to handle such hybrid threats has arisen from the defense literature and war colleges. An evaluation of these various proposals falls into two categories: those which are outside the scope of the Department of Defense and those which fall within it. This paper examines the arguments and counterarguments for both sets of approaches and concludes by offering a recommendation for the model judged most feasible. The conclusion is that the USAFRICOM model, adjusted to include a reciprocal investment of liaison officers in select Washington-area government agencies, and creation of a Joint Task Force Deputy Commander position for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction, provides the best course of action in terms of near-term fiscal and political constraints.
HYBRID ORGS FOR HYBRID WARS: THE STORY OF AFRICOM'S NEW HYBRID AND WHY OTHER CCDRs SHOULD WANT ONE, TOO.

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

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Abstract

*Hybrid Orgs for Hybrid Wars: The Story of AFRICOM's New Hybrid and Why Other CCDRs Should Want One, Too*

When U.S. Africa Command was established in 2008, its manning and organizational structure looked very different from that of most other geographic combatant commands. USAFRICOM's key staff structure contained numerous interagency manpower positions, to include a State Department Ambassador as one of two Deputy Commanders. This was due to the advent of hybrid security challenges, for which the U.S. Government had found itself inadequately prepared. A host of alternative recommendations for how best to organize the government to handle such hybrid threats has arisen from defense literature and the war colleges. An evaluation of these various proposals falls into two categories: those which are outside the scope of the Department of Defense and those which fall within it. This paper examines the arguments and counterarguments for both sets of approaches and concludes by offering a recommendation for the model judged most feasible. The conclusion is that the USAFRICOM model, adjusted to include a reciprocal investment of liaison officers in select Washington-area government agencies, and the creation of a Joint Task Force Deputy Commander position for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction, provides the best course of action in terms of near-term fiscal and political constraints.
INTRODUCTION

The headlines tell the short version story . . . Hybrid war has just begun. —Sebastian Blanco, AutoblogGreen Editor-in-Chief

Hybrid threats—diverse, dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities—will make pursuit of singular approaches difficult, necessitating innovative, hybrid solutions involving new combinations of all elements of national power. —General George W. Casey, Jr., U.S. Army Chief of Staff

If one googles "hybrid war," one will get hits on automakers from Detroit to Tokyo trying to corner the market on the latest fuel efficiency vehicle craze, as cited by AutoblogGreen Editor-in-Chief, Mr. Sebastian Blanco. However, the majority of hits will return on this phrase as one of the latest references to modern warfare, as observed by Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey. According to Mr. Frank G. Hoffman, widely credited with making the phrase a term of art in modern defense literature, hybrid threats are defined as "any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their [sic] political agenda".¹ Like Hoffman, the Department of Defense (DOD) predicts "future conflicts will appear as hybrids comprising diverse, dynamic, and simultaneous combinations of organizations, technologies, and techniques that defy categorization."² Furthermore, there is a widely held belief within the defense community that the U.S. Government (USG), like the governments of most other nations, is not adequately organized to address these hybrid security challenges. David Kilcullen, noted counterterrorism and counterinsurgency expert, expressed this sentiment when he candidly stated:

¹ Hoffman, "Hybrid vs. Compound War," 1.
² U.S. Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, 8.
We seem to be on the threshold of a new era of warfare, one that demands an adaptive response. Like dinosaurs . . . nation-states are more powerful but less agile and flexible than non-state opponents. As in all conflict, success will depend on our ability to adapt, evolve new responses, and get ahead of a rapidly changing threat environment.\(^3\)

Therefore, to meet these hybrid security challenges, combatant commanders have begun adjusting their command organizational and operational approaches. At the activation of the newest geographic combatant command (GCC), U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), the commander, General William “Kip” Ward, unveiled a new "hybrid" organizational vehicle intended to navigate Africa's complex security roadmap. In place of the standard DOD organizational structure found in other GCCs, General Ward presented a more robust interagency, civilian cadre integrated into his command as shown in figure 1, to include a State Department Ambassador as one of his two deputies. USAFRICOM's new structure raises some interesting and important questions for the USG and DOD, in particular, with respect to how they should organize to address these hybrid challenges. The first "macro" question is focused on whether or not this change should occur within DOD or outside of it and the second question is whether the USAFRICOM model has hit upon the right organizational structure to integrate the elements of national power. Several assumptions will be made to frame the scope of this investigation. First, it is assumed there is consensus that more hybrid security problems will occur in the near-future. Second, it is assumed there is consensus that we are not currently organized properly to meet such challenges and that some form of USG organizational change is warranted. Third, it is assumed that because we are currently involved in two major hybrid security situations, the sooner we can make these organizational changes, the better.

Based upon these assumptions, this paper will examine the organizational approach taken by USAFRICOM amidst the range of options available, which will be analyzed through the lenses of our two linked questions: the first, a "macro" focus on where in the USG organizational change should take place and the second, a "micro" focus on how such an organization should look. This paper will argue that, in response to both questions, change within DOD is most appropriate and that only moderate modifications are required to improve the USAFRICOM model and provide a template for other combatant commanders (CCDRs) to permit more effective handling of hybrid security challenges.

If defense practitioners and policy makers are correct in predicting that future conflicts will be "increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and non-state actors," then the following charge by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to DOD in January 2009 reflects this topic's importance:

> We must improve our soft power: our national ability to promote economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, internal reconciliation, good governance, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more. Doing so requires exploring whole-of-government approaches for meeting complex security challenges.  

**MACROANALYSIS ARGUMENTS & COUNTERARGUMENTS**

The range of options available to achieve this "whole-of-government" approach to hybrid security challenges spans a wide spectrum in terms of cost and effort. An analysis of the current dialogue concerning this issue within the national security and defense arenas reveals a range of approaches. From this analysis, a short list of proposals worthy of evaluation emerges. This paper will examine each of them, along with their key arguments or benefits.

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derived. Following this will be a critical review of the counterarguments and identification of the best candidate from the list.

The first approach calls for the creation of another USG Department that would have as its prescribed role the integration of all the elements of U.S. national power in order to carry out the sort of nation-building and development work that accompanies these hybrid security challenges. One example proposes a "Department of International Development" that would incorporate the current U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), work with DOD to address hybrid security challenges, and relieve much of the burden of planning and execution which has fallen to DOD in recent years. This proposal calls for a full series of regional components that would dovetail nicely with the geographic commands in DOD's unified command plan structure. Such an organization's full-time focus on interagency and non-governmental organization (NGO) coordination while serving as a single, cabinet-level advocate focused on stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) efforts would arguably yield an enormous return on investment and help mitigate hybrid security problems.

The next couple of proposals have similar approaches, but different recommendations. Each suggests the need for changes to the National Security Council (NSC). The first, calls for turning the NSC into an operational Interagency (IA) Staff, organized along the lines of the Chairman's Joint Staff, but with each staff director's position being held by a three or four-star equivalent civilian or military officer, depending on the role. Furthermore, positions would alternate between those agencies with the lead in that respective functional area. For instance, the IA-3 Director would alternate between a DOD and State Department (DOS) four-star equivalent with one serving for a year while the other serves as deputy, then as the director rotates out, the deputy serves his or her second year as director, and the

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6 Douville, "Designing Excellence into America's SSTR Efforts," 10-11.
succession rotates accordingly. In this way, there is a balance of leadership and direction between the most invested departments or agencies. This proposal combines the policy-making and operational roles into one organization and should generate much greater USG agility and responsiveness to hybrid challenges and the adaptations that constantly occur with them. The other proposal also calls for a change, though less dramatic, to the NSC. It calls for the creation of Regional Security Councils (RSCs), which would essentially be formed from the interagency regional policy coordination committees, but aligned to geographic combatant commands. Through authorities delegated from the President, these RSCs would take on operational control of assigned military forces in operations short of war. The director of each RSC would report to the President through the National Security Advisor (NSA), just as his or her counterpart GCC commander reports to the President via the Secretary of Defense. This approach would align the NSC and GCCs more directly and potentially generate better dialogue in the policy-making, planning, and execution arenas.

The next proposal calls for changes to the Department of State. It recommends DOS adjust its geographical boundaries to match the military GCC boundaries and establish regional, operational-level offices forward in its respective regions in order to "promote effective regional engagement, stability and security." According to the author, these regional offices would lead and coordinate the civilian interagency community, as well as work to develop multinational cooperation. Given that DOS has been designated the lead for SSTR operations, this proposal has merit as a logical next step to develop the DOS capacity necessary to carry out this responsibility. Additionally, this approach would relieve DOD of a substantial part of its nation-building burden in order to focus more on security tasks.

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Like the last proposal, the next recommendation focuses on DOS, but calls for no organizational change whatsoever. It simply calls for fully funding an organization that has already been established. The DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has as its mission to "lead, coordinate and institutionalize [USG] civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife."\(^{10}\) More specifically, a three-tiered Civilian Response Corps (CRC) was created within S/CRS to provide a pool of trained, ready-to-deploy civilians to support overseas reconstruction and stabilization operations in countries at risk of, transitioning out of, or still in conflict. The plan calls for 250 Active members who are ready to deploy within 48-72 hours to a crisis location. The second tier is designed to have 2,000 Standby members who have primary USG jobs day-to-day, but are available to augment the Active corps within 45-60 days of notification. Finally, the third Reserve tier would consist of another 2,000 volunteers from the private sector, state, or local governments with skills that are in short supply within the CRC.\(^{11}\) According to the S/CRS director, the annual funding requirement for this corps would come in at approximately $250 million initially and then at least $130 million per year in sustainment costs, depending on operational involvement.\(^{12}\)

Another interesting proposal calls for the creation of "Joint Interagency Commands (JIACOMs)" in place of the GCCs. These hybrid commands would be led by civilians while retaining their Title 10 military capabilities under a four-star deputy. JIACOMs would integrate at a theater-strategic level all elements of national power for their given region.\(^{13}\)

\(^{11}\) Herbst, "Civilian Stabilization Initiative." 1-2.
\(^{12}\) Ibid., 5-7.
\(^{13}\) Buchanan et al., "Death of the Combatant Command," 95.
This approach certainly breaks glass organizationally and would require changes to existing law; but it produces an appealing blend of capability and authority that could resolve the current SSTR disconnect between responsibility and capacity. It would also correlate operational-level unity of effort and unity of command on a scale heretofore unseen.

Finally, the last approach calls for changes within DOD. This approach includes a host of potential implementation strategies ranging from creation of an entirely new Functional Combatant Command (FCC) to adjustment of the GCC staff structure to simply increasing funding and manpower for existing coordination bodies. The call for establishment of a new FCC is rooted in the idea that if a single combatant command is exclusively focused on SSTR operations, it will develop the expertise that can be grafted into a GCC as needed to address a hybrid security challenge. The idea of adjusting GCC staffs has already been implemented by USAFRICOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USNORTHCOM, though not in the same way by each. This approach comes from the perspective that the GCC is best suited to address its regional hybrid challenges and simply needs the interagency partners and tools to plan and implement. Finally, the notion that the best DOD approach to hybrid challenges is to increase funding and manpower follows the logic that suggests the right tools already exist, but simply need to be sharpened and expanded. The increasing propensity for DOD to incur nation-building missions in connection with complex, irregular warfare makes this approach particularly relevant today. Additionally, the raw numbers of personnel, planning, and execution capacity within DOD adds to the appeal of this model.

14 Sherrod, "Putting the Operational in Stability Operations," 2-21; Cantwell, "Nation Building," 8-10; Significant adjustments to GCC staffs have occurred in at least three different organizations: USAFRICOM (DOS Deputy for Civil-Military Activities and interagency personnel embedded in the staff), USSOUTHCOM (J9 Directorate to oversee interagency coordination) and USNORTHCOM (Interagency Coordination Directorate headed by Senior Executive Service officer).
Given this competition of ideas, a logical examination of the counterarguments helps to refine the options into three groups: those least likely to be implemented for various reasons, most desirable given sufficient time and resources, and most appropriate based on time and resource constraints. The least likely course of action is the creation of another USG Department due to the sheer cost, political and legal hurdles which would have to be overcome. The establishment of JIACOMs in place of GCCs is one of the boldest proposals submitted and deserves serious scrutiny as a potential long-term solution; but in the short term, it faces an uphill struggle in terms of required changes in law, funding authorities, and political consensus necessary to gain approval. Likewise, the first option to convert the NSC into an Interagency Staff modeled on the Joint Staff, while also very interesting and potentially worthy as a long-term option, is nonetheless unlikely due to the tremendous interagency politics that would come into play and the potential legal factors involved in integrating these staffs and funding streams. All of the changes to the Department of State involve gaining additional Congressional funding which has thus far proven elusive. Therefore, the initiatives to make the S/CRS or CRC more robust or expand the Department's regional presences are on the right track and worthy of long-term pursuit; however, due to inadequate political will and fiscal constraints, these options appear unlikely to gain the political or financial backing to become viable in the near-term. The second NSC proposal, which involves transforming the policy coordination committees into RSCs appears to be primarily a matter of executive decision and worth additional consideration. This approach, however, falls short of providing the muscle needed to increase planning and execution capacity and remains primarily a tool to improve policy creation and coordination.
Due to the high cost, effort and adjustment required to pursue the non-DOD options, and
the fact that the military instrument, rightly or wrongly, is frequently selected, the DOD
model emerges as the best near-term option. While the counterargument that the DOD
approach is not comprehensive enough has validity, the truth also remains that a full
interdepartmental approach would require a political effort akin to, but more expansive than,
the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. This effort
required nearly five years to complete and even longer to implement. At the other extreme is
opposition based on the view that current interagency cooperation is adequate, making
further investment of scarce non-DOD personnel resources counterproductive. While also
containing elements of truth, it is a stretch to argue that recent and ongoing U.S. military
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq contain sufficient interagency involvement. A Rand
Corporation review of DOD's planning for Iraq concluded:

Planning for the post-invasion period [in Iraq] occurred primarily within
DoD . . . failure to plan for potential resistance made it more likely to
arise, since U.S. forces were not prepared to contain it. The planners
should have at least envisioned how the United States would help Iraqis
establish a democracy, since they had virtually no experience in
democratic practice. Planning of that sort would have required an effort
by all relevant departments of the U.S. government, not just DoD.
Instead, DoD planners tended to assume that support would be
forthcoming despite a dearth of planning.15

Therefore, this DOD model balances the pragmatic reality of what is currently politically
feasible with the more idealistic notion that DOD can and must improve its approach to
complex, irregular problems, especially in the area of interagency planning.

**MICROANALYSIS ARGUMENTS & COUNTERARGUMENTS**

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Having concluded that the macro solution to address hybrid security challenges in the near term is best suited to the DOD, it is now appropriate to determine what form that organization should take in the micro view. A review of ongoing discussion within the defense community again reveals a variety of approaches that cover the spectrum. As before, each proposal and its key arguments or benefits will be examined, followed by a critical review of the counterarguments and identification of the best candidate from the list.

The first approach calls for creation of a functional combatant command. This approach suggests that the lack of operational-level interagency coordination is best resolved through the creation of a functional combatant command, which would be responsible to bridge this capability gap. This argument further contends the existing DOS initiatives, like S/CRS, are flawed and hollow. Likewise, it is argued the approach of DOD, as evidenced by USAFRICOM's new organizational structure, is "piecemeal" and insufficient. In making his case, the author correctly frames the strategic importance of this organizational challenge to the United States and makes a cogent argument for why an FCC could provide DOD its best course of action.

As if on cue, the second proposal follows this same line of logic and through review of relevant historical cases, argues for creation of an Army-centric "Strategic Expeditionary Command" to "perform post-conflict governance roles, missions and functions." This approach would build upon the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) model created in 2005 to provide a standing command and control (C2) element for use within joint task forces (JTFs). It also presents a good case for leveraging this existing SJFHQ structure to build a flexible, modular organization with interagency representation that could be easily

implanted into a JTF and plan for and provide the unity of command and effort between the military and its interagency counterparts vital to SSTR operations.

The next proposal offers as one possible solution the establishment of "joint nation-building organizations" to be created and implanted into each GCC. These embedded units, potentially up to brigade-size, would be organized and equipped to conduct SSTR-type operations for the combatant commander. This proposal would certainly provide the muscle needed at each GCC to plan, oversee, and in many cases execute Phase IV and V operations.

Another proposal offers a more expedient, low-cost option to increase GCC capacity for hybrid security operations. It recommends establishment of a JTF Deputy Commander position for SSTR. Taking note of the already established, or underway development, of interagency capacity via means like Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) and GCC staff adjustments, it is argued that similar changes must occur at the JTF level to integrate and synchronize the spectrum of relevant factors ranging from the U.S. interagency community to intergovernmental agencies (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The SSTR Deputy would oversee planning for SSTR operations prior to Phase IV, then be the JTF CDR's focal point for Phase IV and V implementation. This approach focuses on the critical role played by the JTF and rightly highlights that any breakdown in this link could result in mission failure. There is no implication this position would remove the necessity for any of the existing coordination structures, like JIACGs or adjusted GCC staffs, but instead depicts them as complementary to a JTF Deputy Commander for SSTR.

The next approach is a GCC staff adjustment to include an interagency component. This model calls for integration of interagency personnel and staff capacity into the GCC at more

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20 Ibid., 6.
than a liaison officer (LNO) level. In this proposal, interagency personnel would fill core staff functions and be fully integrated into the staff with the ability to represent their home department or agency, but equally plugged into the GCC structure. There are several forms this model can take. The U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) model consists of a J9 Partnering Directorate with LNOs and nineteen interagency partners represented.21 Likewise, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) has a similar Interagency Coordination (IC) Directorate, which is headed by a Senior Executive Service officer.22 Finally, the most advanced GCC-interagency construction is in U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), which has integrated into its headquarters staff interagency partners from nearly two-dozen departments and agencies. The Directorate for Outreach is the lead directorate for promoting cooperation and engagement; however, 52 interagency positions are spread across the entire staff from Director to action officer levels and one of the two deputies is an Ambassador with the title, Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Activities.23

Another GCC-centric proposal offers a relatively low-cost option, but takes a very different tact. It recommends a USAFRICOM Washington Office (WO) model resembling the USSOCOM WO, wherein a cadre of USSOCOM liaison officers (LNOs) operates out of Washington, D.C. as a forward link to the interagency community.24 This represents a very compelling case for why USAFRICOM, like USSOCOM, needs to be engaged within the Washington-based interagency arena for purposes of planning, coordination, NGO/IGO integration, and the social networking that accompanies personal interaction.25

22 Whittaker et al., The National Security Policy Process, 46-47.
23 House, Force Structure, 9-12.
25 Ibid., 13-16.
also proposes a WO structure with the USAFRICOM/J-5 or Deputy for Military Operations acting as Director and using the military's advantage in personnel strength to man its various elements. According to this approach, the USAFRICOM WO would have six senior officers (O-6 to O-8/9) and approximately thirty military LNOs/planners spread across four functional areas: strategic planning, government organization liaison, IGO/NGO liaison, and legislative affairs.⁴⁶

Finally, the last proposal to be examined involves no organizational change whatsoever. It is a straight-forward call to provide additional funding and manpower to two existing coordination structures: JIACGs and SJFHQ Core Elements or SJFHQ(CE)s, which are teams of operational planners and C2 specialists assigned to the GCC day-to-day, but available to become the core of a JTF HQ staff in a crisis. This option recommends that SJFHQ(CE)s and JIACGs be more fully funded and made available at the GCC component headquarters level.²⁷ The author accurately describes the benefit these HQ staffs would derive from the added expertise each of their coordination bodies brings. He also notes that the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) already suggested provision of SJFHQ(CE)s down to the component HQ level.²⁸ Furthermore, this proposal capitalizes on the strong reputation JIACGs have earned as an effective coordination tool throughout most of DOD.²⁹

As before, a logical examination of the microanalysis counterarguments helps refine the options into those least likely to be implemented, most desirable given ample time and resources, and most appropriate based on limited time and resources. Within the DOD set of options, the least likely are those calling for establishment of another unified combatant

⁴⁶ Ibid., 32.
⁷ Cantwell, "Nation Building," 8-10.
⁸ Ibid.
⁹ Gill, "SOF," 45.
command. Therefore, the first option calling for an FCC would require a major funding effort and manpower investment, not to mention all the political factors involved with siting and staffing a major military command. As a result, it remains highly unlikely, despite its merits as a potential solution. Likewise, the creation of a "Strategic Expeditionary Command," would require a sizeable investment of soldiers that the Army can ill afford. Furthermore, this approach calls for interagency LNOs (versus an embedded interagency staff) and, therefore, does not appear to add any measurable degree of planning coordination or execution capacity beyond what currently exists. Hovering between the boundaries of "least likely" and "most desirable" lies the proposal to establish joint nation-building organizations and place them within each GCC. This approach would meet most of the needs of the GCCs in terms of additional planning and execution capacity for SSTR operations, but remains practically out of reach due to its fiscal and manpower costs. The recommendation that incurred no organizational change, but proposed funding and manning increases for SJFHQ(CE)s and JIACGs in order to integrate these coordination elements further down to the GCC component level is definitely worth pursuing further. This proposal would strengthen the GCC capacity to deal with hybrid security challenges. However, as before, the fiscal and manpower costs, especially to the interagency community, make this approach hard to achieve without sufficient funding and time. Furthermore, without additional interagency presence, the JIACG would be unable to provide the "engine room" of action officers necessary to work all the plans and issues that a GCC must address. Due to the typical staffing of only one representative per major agency, JIACGs are not manned to provide a robust bank of action officers, able to work planning issues onsite via a creative competition of ideas. Instead, the structures provide what is primarily a core of liaisons, able
to share their unitary perspectives and act as a conduit back to their agency.\textsuperscript{30} The proposal to establish a JTF Deputy for SSTR is an excellent proposal and, though it provides little impact above the JTF level or prior to its formation, is low-cost and could provide better operational/tactical planning and implementation oversight than exists currently. Additionally, the USAFRICOM WO initiative falls into the realm of most appropriate, given its costs in terms of funding and manpower, as well as potential impacts. The size and scope of the WO staff could be reevaluated to determine if a 36-person staff is really required or could be scaled back based on the degree of interagency presence in the GCC HQ. Finally, the last and most appropriate option consists of the adjusted staff GCC, with USAFRICOM representing the best model. Given its extensive manning, resource, and planning capacity, along with the fact that seven of the top ten "failed states" are located in Africa, USAFRICOM may be best positioned from among the GCCs to maximize the benefit from interagency personnel and positively affect the outcome of some of the world's most perplexing hybrid security challenges.\textsuperscript{31}

Among the options available, ranging from the status quo to standing up another functional combatant command, the best cases can be made for incorporating the Washington Office construct and JTF Deputy for SSTR into an adjusted staff GCC solution. Over the long haul, there are more expensive and manpower-intensive options that should be considered, but in a resource-constrained period, these must await the right alignment of fiscal and political conditions.

\textsuperscript{31} Fund for Peace. \textit{Failed States Index - 2009}, i.
RECOMMENDATION

Combining the macro- and microanalyses, the result is a set of options that can be pursued over both the long and short term. Of greatest relevance is the short term, because it represents a type of DOD "immediate action plan" to implement now in order to respond to near-term hybrid security challenges. Therefore, this recommendation will include both long-term and short-term elements, but will focus primarily on the latter in order to generate positive near-term impacts.

While the best long-term approach to addressing hybrid security challenges lies within the non-DOD instruments of power, there is currently a lack of political will and funding availability to transform some of our best options into fielded solutions. Included in this category are several elements of DOS. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and Civil Response Corps, once fully funded and sourced, will provide a significantly greater national capacity to address SSTR operations. These instruments probably remain our best long-term solutions. The possibility of creating an entire Department for International Development may be appropriate at some point in the future; however, it should not be pursued before these other DOS options are fully implemented and evaluated.

The best near-term approach falls squarely into DOD's portfolio. Based on the assessed costs and benefits of the DOD options, a three-part implementation strategy based on the USAFRICOM model is the most appropriate option. First, the 52 interagency positions on the USAFRICOM staff should be maximized, with emphasis on ensuring that top-caliber personnel are drawn from the other departments and agencies. The initial cadre will have disproportionate impact in establishing the processes and procedures which successors will
use and build upon. Second, USAFRICOM should establish a Washington Office as recommended. This office will allow DOD to exploit its quantitative and qualitative strengths in terms of personnel and planning capacity. Further, by embedding military personnel in other government agencies and departments, as well as in key IGO/NGO forums, DOD can establish a reciprocal benefit for these organizations, which have invested personnel into the GCC staff. Over time, the professional relationships and experiences gained by these officers and civilian officials will create a stronger network of senior practitioners and policy-makers who don't just "think joint" or "multiagency," but "think interagency" and are able to arrive at hybrid solutions to hybrid security problems. Third, establishment of a JTF Deputy for SSTR should be written into doctrine and practice for those scenarios where it is deemed appropriate. These actions can be accomplished in the near-term in order to bring decisive intellectual capacity to bear against our most challenging hybrid security problems.

As we learn from the application of this USAFRICOM model, lessons can be applied to other GCCs' hybrid security challenges. Furthermore, there may be advantages or economies to be gained by the judicious design of the Washington Office and careful placement there of complementary LNOs who can address interagency coordination and planning issues from a DOD (vice GCC) perspective. However long it takes to realize these benefits, one thing is clear: if we delay implementation of these hybrid organizational improvements, we risk future failures when facing hybrid security challenges.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX A

Figure 1: USAFRICOM's Key Staff (Source: USAFRICOM Command Brief, slide #6. http://www.africom.mil/)

USAFRICOM Organizational Chart

KEY STAFF

USAFRICOM Commander

Special Staff
- Foreign Policy Advisor
- Sr Development Advisor

Outreach
- Director
- Dep Dir

Strategy, Plans & Programs
- Director
- Director of Plans

Intelligence & Knowledge Development
- Director

C4 Systems
- Director

Resources
- Director
- Dep Dir

Operations & Logistics
- Director
- Dep Dir

Green Box = Interagency position

Seniors

USAFRICOM Commander

Dep Cdr for Civ-Mil Activities

Dep Cdr for Military Ops

Director of Programs

Treasury Rep

OFDA Rep

DHS Rep