UN Peacekeeping Doctrine and Its Implications for Future US Operations

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The United Nations recently achieved the milestone of 60 years of peacekeeping operations since the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East in 1948. During the past 60 years the UN has seen its peacekeeping missions rise in number and complexity and has witnessed a shift from traditional state-on-state challenges to much more complex internal struggles, often involving non-state actors. Analysis of the 2008 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, reveals an acknowledgement of these complexities and attempts to codify roles and responsibilities for the UN Headquarters, troop contributing countries, police contributing countries and member states that contribute by other means. This paper analyzes and critiques the first doctrine ever published by the UN regarding peacekeeping operations, focusing on peacekeeping lines of effort and UN command and control arrangements. The paper proposes that the security line of effort outlined in the 2008 UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines must be led by a lead nation or a regional organization with established command and control capabilities in order to properly synchronize the functions required for sustainable peace.
UN Peacekeeping Doctrine and Its Implications for Future US Operations

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

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Abstract

The UN Peacekeeping Doctrine and Its Implications for Future US Operations

The United Nations recently achieved the milestone of 60 years of peacekeeping operations since the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East in 1948. During the past 60 years the UN has seen its peacekeeping missions rise in number and complexity and has witnessed a shift from traditional state-on-state challenges to much more complex internal struggles, often involving non-state actors. Analysis of the 2008 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, reveals an acknowledgement of these complexities and attempts to codify roles and responsibilities for the UN Headquarters, troop contributing countries, police contributing countries and member states that contribute by other means. This paper analyzes and critiques the first doctrine ever published by the UN regarding peacekeeping operations, focusing on peacekeeping lines of effort and UN command and control arrangements. The paper proposes that the security line of effort outlined in the 2008 UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines should be led by a lead nation or a regional organization with established command and control capabilities in order to properly synchronize the operational functions required for sustainable peace.
INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) recently achieved the milestone of 60 years of peacekeeping operations since the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948. During the past 60 years, the UN has seen its peacekeeping missions increase in number and complexity and has witnessed a shift from traditional state-on-state challenges to much more complex internal struggles involving non-state actors. Analysis of the 2008 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (hereinafter referred to as the 2008 UN Peacekeeping Doctrine), reveals an acknowledgement of these complexities and attempts to codify roles, responsibilities, and procedures for UN-led peacekeeping operations across political, humanitarian, economic, and security “lines of effort” in order to achieve sustainable peace. While acknowledging that peace operations are being conducted around the globe by regional or state organizations alongside of or instead of the UN, this doctrine specifically is intended to establish the guiding principles for peacekeeping operations, “authorized by the Security Council, conducted under the direction of the United Nations Secretary-General, and planned, managed, directed, and supported by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support.”

In the past two decades, there have been several examples of UN peacekeeping operations in which the security line of effort became increasingly complex over time,

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1 The 2008 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, does not refer to lines of effort. As defined in Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, “a line of effort links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose – cause and effect – to focus toward establishing operational and strategic conditions.” It is a useful way to frame operations in environments where long term security and civil support tasks must complement each other. Additionally, it is “a particularly valuable tool when used to achieve unity of effort in operations involving multinational forces and civilian organizations, where unity of command is elusive, if not impractical.” U.S. Army, Operations, Field Manual (FM) 3-0 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 27 February 2008), 6-13.

resulting in either an unacceptable level of risk to the peacekeepers, stagnation of the other lines of effort or, in some cases, complete collapse of the mission. The UN missions in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s are stark examples of missions in which the failure of the security line of effort led to mission failure and long-term negative effects on the remaining lines of effort. The thesis of this paper argues that in order to achieve sustainable peace, as outlined in the 2008 UN Peacekeeping Doctrine, when conducting robust peacekeeping operations the security line of effort, which is the foundation required to achieve sustainable peace, should be under the command and control of a lead nation or regional organization, working in parallel with the UN.

To understand the nature of this argument, it is necessary to first define key terms. Command and control (C2) is defined as “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces” that is “performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures employed by the commander” in the accomplishment of the mission. Although all aspects of this definition are important, the requirement for adequate procedures stands out during multi-national operations. A lead nation command and control arrangement exists when troop contributing countries place their forces under the control of one nation, which dominates the command and staff arrangement. A regional organization is defined as an intergovernmental organization (IGO) that cooperates on security matters under an agreed upon framework, mandate or treaty, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West

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4 Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Multinational Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 7 March 2007), xii.
African States (ECOWAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), among others.⁵ A lead nation or regional organization C2 presumes a level of training, interoperability, and shared procedures that allow for flexibility and adaptability during complex operations.

Sustainable peace is not succinctly defined in the 2008 UN Peacekeeping Doctrine, but it is said to exist when, “the warring parties are able to move their struggles from the battlefield into an institutional framework where disputes can be settled peacefully.”⁶ Sustainable peace does not mean a complete absence of violence or security threats, but rather the existence of an environment in which the security situation does not preclude consistent (even if very slow) progress along the remaining lines of effort: governance, humanitarian assistance, and social and economic recovery and development. Kosovo, with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO Kosovo Force, provides a good illustration of sustainable peace. Kosovo’s security environment is characterized as generally peaceful, allowing for continued, gradual progress in building government, judicial, economic and social development.⁷

This paper begins by briefly reviewing the changes in the peacekeeping environment over the past 60 years in order to place current doctrine and operations in the proper context. This is followed by an examination of the 2008 UN Peacekeeping Doctrine, including the fundamental lines of effort that apply to all UN peacekeeping missions and standard UN C2

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⁵ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Volume I*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 17 March 2006), GL-10 and II-20-21. US Joint Doctrine further defines sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This paper does not distinguish between regional and sub-regional organizations.

⁶ UN, DPKO, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 87

relationships. Subsequently, this paper examines UN peacekeeping missions that have had a significant security component to them, with particular emphasis on the extent sustainable peace was achieved given the associated C2 relationship. Finally, it will draw conclusions and make recommendations regarding the implication for future US operations.

**PEACEKEEPING THEN AND NOW**

Peacekeeping operations can be broken down and analyzed in two distinct periods whose dividing line is the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The bi-polar nature of global power that existed prior to the fall of the Soviet Union provided an unwritten set of rules that bound interstate conflicts. In the period from 1948 through 1989, the UN Secretary General established 18 missions, most of which were efforts to keep the peace between states in order to prevent the escalation of the crises to the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union.8 During the Cold War, the majority of peacekeeping missions had two fundamental characteristics in common: a peace agreement between two states, and a formal request (or acknowledgement and approval) from those states for an interposing force to monitor the agreement.9 These fundamental characteristics of peacekeeping operations remained relatively constant for over four decades, during which time the US military became conditioned to understand peace operations through this model. It is in this context that the U. S. Army studied peacekeeping operations and, in 1990, published Field Manual (FM) 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*, which “defined all peace operations as peacekeeping

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under Chapter VI of the UN Charter\textsuperscript{10}, whereby units deploy with the full consent of all sides and force cannot be used except for self-defense.”\textsuperscript{11}

The period from 1991 to the present has seen the implementation of 45 peacekeeping missions, most of which were established to address intra-state, complex and volatile challenges, often in states that have weak or non-existent infrastructure and governance prior to the conflict.\textsuperscript{12} As opposed to the pre-1990 era strategy of interposing forces between two sides working towards sustainable peace, the peace operations from the 1990s onward have been marked by imposing forces on two or more sides that had, in many cases, not come willingly to a peace agreement.\textsuperscript{13} This fundamental shift in the nature of peace operations suggests there is an inherent requirement for the application and C2 of a force that is capable of adapting to a fluid mission and executing tasks across the spectrum of peace operations, including peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding.

Recognizing the post-Cold War increase in the complexity of UN peacekeeping operations and in the aftermath of two significant failures of UN peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and Srebrenica, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan convened the Panel on UN Peace

\textsuperscript{10} Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, applies to conflicts in which the parties are capable of settlement by generally peaceful means. Chapter VII, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, is generally invoked when peaceful means do not exist or have failed.


\textsuperscript{12} Johnstone and Corbin discuss two post-Soviet periods, 1989-2001 and 2001 – present, based on US national interests changing after the attacks of September 11, 2001. This paper does not divide the post-Soviet period into two; although US national interest may have changed, this author’s assessment of the complexity and security challenges of the post-Soviet era missions does not reveal a sharp distinction between pre and post 9/11 peacekeeping missions. The tally of operations was derived from UN DPKO website, \url{http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/list.shtml} (accessed 11 September 2009).

Operations to assess the faults and deficiencies of UN peace operations.\textsuperscript{14} One of the panel’s recommendations was the development of a robust peacekeeping doctrine.\textsuperscript{15}

**THE 2008 UN PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINE IN CONTEXT**

The 2008 UN Peacekeeping Doctrine categorizes the operations that were conducted during the Cold War as traditional peacekeeping operations that involved the following:

- “Observation, monitoring and reporting – using static posts, patrols, overflights or other technical means, with the agreement of the parties;
- Supervision of cease-fire and support to verification mechanisms;
- Interposition as a buffer and confidence-building measure.”\textsuperscript{16}

The increasing complexity of war and peace in the post-Cold War era and the recommendations of the Panel on UN Peace Operations report led the UN to reassess its role in peacekeeping. The 2008 UN Peacekeeping Doctrine categorizes these operations as multi-dimensional operations that, in addition to traditional tasks of monitoring and observing cease-fires, involve the following:

- “Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;
- Provide a framework for ensuring that all UN and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.”\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{14} UN General Assembly, *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations*, page iii.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, ix.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 23.
The tasks in both categories above can be considered peacekeeping lines of effort. The lines of effort for traditional peacekeeping operations envision a relatively fixed military force with well defined objectives, and routine reporting requirements under a rigid C2 structure. However, the addition of the security line of effort for multi-dimensional operations adds a level of complexity that calls for the capability to C2 the operational functions of intelligence, maneuver, protection, and information operations. Moreover, the coordination with, and support for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and IGOs, becomes more complex during multi-dimensional operations and may require the rapid, flexible dedication of additional peacekeeping forces in order to uphold the requirements of the UN mandate.

Another significant aspect of the 2008 UN Peacekeeping Doctrine that impacts the security line of effort is the acknowledgement that peacekeepers must be prepared to execute peacemaking and peace enforcement tasks, and that peacekeeping and peacebuilding occur simultaneously and are mutually dependent. According to the 2008 UN Peacekeeping Doctrine, peacekeeping is unlikely to achieve sustainable peace and in the short term, a peacekeeping force, even when not adequately resourced or equipped, is often mandated to set conditions for and/or execute peacebuilding tasks including:

- “Restoring the State’s ability to provide security and maintain public order;
- Strengthening the rule of law;

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18 The 2008 UN Doctrine illustrates that peacekeeping happens completely within the broader effort of peacebuilding, and overlaps peace enforcement and peacemaking. Additionally, The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, page 5 states, “When complex peace operations do go into the field, it is the task of the operation’s peacekeepers to maintain a secure local environment for peacebuilding and the peacebuilders’ task to support the political, social, and economic changes that create a secure environment that is self-sustaining.”
- Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes;

- Promoting social and economic recovery and development, including the safe return or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees uprooted by the conflict.”

Thus, the security line of effort is the foundation to achieve the sustainable peace objectives of the mandate across the peace operations continuum. To execute the security line of effort in a complex environment with an unstable peace, the UN requires a force operating under a headquarters that is well trained, well-led, can effectively communicate throughout the area of operations, and can plan, adapt, provide security guidance and directives, and shift or reinforce efforts across the peace operations continuum. The UN has acknowledged this type of requirement as “robust peacekeeping,” which calls for a professional, trained military force able to respond in fluid situations to use varying degrees of force in defense of a peacekeeping mandate. In fact, the UN has a long history of advocating for a planning staff and a standing force that would be able to rapidly deploy and manage peace operations, but it has not materialized. The driving force behind the concept of robust peacekeeping and the longstanding expressed need for a standing force is the ability to properly C2 robust peacekeeping operations.

According to the 2008 UN Peacekeeping Doctrine and the UN Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, also published in 2008, multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are led at the strategic level by the Under-

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Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and at the operational level by a Head of Mission (HOM). The HOM is a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and may be a force commander or a military observer.\textsuperscript{22} The HOM’s two primary responsibilities are providing political guidance for the execution of established mandates and resolutions, and setting “mission-wide operational direction” for components (such as military, police, logistics, and civilians) that are managed and directed by a Mission Headquarters and Leadership Team (see Figure 1).\textsuperscript{23} Often, the HOM and the members of the Mission Headquarters and Leadership Team area individual deployers from among the various troop contributing countries, without previous combined, joint staff experience synchronizing and executing operational functions.

In practice, at the operational level, the UN has adopted three different types of C2\textsuperscript{24} relationships during its history of peacekeeping operations. First, and most common for traditional peacekeeping operations, are the missions under the command and control of the UN, with contributing countries providing forces and the UN Headquarters establishing a field headquarters composed of individuals from troop contributing countries. This resembles an integrated command structure, characterized by a designated single commander, a staff composed of representatives from all member nations, and subordinate commands and staffs integrated to the lowest echelon.\textsuperscript{25} However, generally the integration


\textsuperscript{23} UN, DPKO, \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping Operations}, 66-68.

\textsuperscript{24} It should be noted that UN doctrine and official documents use terms such as manage, direct, and exercise authority, more often than the term command and control. The 2008 Authority, Command and Control in \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping Operations}, places greater emphasis on command and control, but still does not address C2 as is understood by the US and NATO.

\textsuperscript{25} CJCS, \textit{Multinational Operations}, JP 3-16, II-6.
Figure 1, Levels of Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations

occurs during mission execution, with the headquarters and staff developing procedures as the peacekeeping operation progresses. The second type of C2 relationship is hybrid C2 with the UN and the regional organization headquarters combined. This relationship also resembles an integrated structure, but is weighted by a regional organization providing the majority of the force. The third construct is a parallel, with a lead nation or regional organization operating alongside the UN and within the requirements of the UN mandate, or in some cases separate from the mandate completely. A parallel command organization

26 United Nations, Authority, Command, and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
27 Robert Adams and Dominik Zaum, Selective Security, 42. United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and South African forces in Namibia and United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and
occurs when no single force commander is designated and unity of effort is gained through robust coordination. In the context of UN peacekeeping missions, in a parallel C2 structure, the force commander in charge of executing the security line of effort is parallel to the UN HOM executing the remaining lines of effort.

The following examination of the UN’s application of various C2 relationships supports the argument that a command structure in which the security line of effort is under the C2 of a lead nation or regional organization operating in parallel with the HOM and within the framework of a UN mandate is, perhaps, the most advantageous C2 structure in order to achieve sustainable peace.

**UN COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE SECURITY LINE OF EFFORT**

An examination of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission provides a good illustration of the peril of the traditional C2 model mentioned above. On 21 February 1992, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 743 established the UNPROFOR for an initial period of 12 months in order to, “create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis within the framework of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia.” A complete analysis of the expansion of the UNPROFOR mandate is beyond the scope of this paper, but in general terms, from 1992-1994 the UN adopted 23 UNSCRs (including five resolutions that invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter), expanding the UNPROFOR mandate in terms

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the United Kingdom Task Force in Sierra Leone are two examples of lead nation or regional organizations operating alongside the UN, but outside of a UN Security Council Resolution mandate.


of the size of the force, the area of operations, and the security tasks required.\textsuperscript{30} The increasing complexity of the tasks over time is consistent with the concept of robust peacekeeping. UNPROFOR, as organized and led, was unable to achieve sustainable peace, resulting in the consideration of a different option for C2 of the security line of effort.

The Dayton Agreement signed on November 21, 1995, called for the establishment of the NATO led implementation force (IFOR), operating under a UN Security Council mandate, including authorities under Chapter VII. IFOR’s main distinction from “traditional peacekeeping roles lay in its robust capability, expressed willingness to deter military violations by the parties, and clear signal of strong backing by the U.S., and unified command authority.”\textsuperscript{31} The Dayton Agreement also called for a parallel command structure “loosely coordinated by the Office of High Representative (OHR);” however, the OHR was to have no authority over the day to day operations of the military mission of IFOR.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, at the strategic level, the security line of effort and the remaining lines of effort were unified by Security Council mandates; but at the operational level, the IFOR commander had complete authority to synchronize operational functions of the security line of effort in order to achieve sustainable peace.

The most recent type of C2 structure, hybrid C2, was employed by the UN in Darfur, Sudan. The UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was adopted by UNSCR 1769 on 31 July 2007, after three years of negotiations regarding the inability of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to establish sustainable peace without the accompaniment of a UN

\textsuperscript{30} UN, “Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR,” The tally of the number of UNSCRs came from a review of this UN background document and selected resolutions.
\textsuperscript{32} Elizabeth Cousens and David Harland, “Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 68, 82.
force. This hybrid mission allows for a regional organization with legitimacy in the area of operations, but not capable of its own C2, to have the UN reinforce its efforts. As stated in the June 2007 UNAMID Report to the Secretary General, “the mission shall benefit from the UN backstopping and command and control structures and systems as well as heavy and light support packages to augment shortcomings in AMIS capabilities.” From the UN’s standpoint, the addition of a UN C2 capability would increase the effectiveness and coordination of AMIS operations. However, this C2 relationship lacks unity of command or effort at the operational and strategic levels, as key decisions must be approved by both the United Nations Security Council and the African Union.

Lastly, the parallel C2 model has been employed by the UN and the European Union (EU) in the United Nations Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) mission, and the UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organizations’ International Security and Assistance Force (NATO-ISAF) in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Responding to a request from the Chadian government, the UN Security Council adopted UN Resolution 1778 on 25 September 2007 establishing the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad (MINURCAT) as a ‘multidimensional’ mission in which the UN would operate in parallel with a capable and ready European Union military force (EUFOR) charged with executing the security line of effort. UNSCR 1778 provided the EU broad authority to execute the security line of effort, in coordination with the UN.

The EUFOR proved capable of executing a broad array of security related tasks at the operational level and maintaining appropriate coordination at the strategic level with the UN. The EUFOR was intended to be a bridging capability and thus, after one year of operation, handed its mission over to MINURCAT in March 2009; however, there was no corresponding decrease in the magnitude of the security tasks. The situation on the ground in the CAR and Chad remained a robust peacekeeping operation. Since the official transfer of authority from EUFOR to MINURCAT on 15 March 2009, the security situation in the MINURCAT area of operations has deteriorated. Although shortages of personnel and equipment are primary causes, among the reasons cited for the deterioration is inadequate C2.

Analysis of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan also supports the position that the security line of effort should be led by a lead nation or regional organization in order to attain sustainable peace. The UN, acting under Chapter VII authority, as outlined in UNSCR 1368, December 2001 authorized ISAF to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate to provide security to the Afghan Interim Authority, to work closely with the UN and all IGOs and NGOs, and to provide periodic updates to the UN Secretary General. This parallel C2 arrangement is unique in that UNAMA has taken on a

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decidedly political role. UNSCR 1401 established UNAMA to fulfill the following responsibilities:

- “Fulfilling the tasks and responsibilities, including those related to human rights, the rule of law and gender issues, entrusted to the United Nations in the Bonn Agreement, which were endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 1383 (2001);

- Promoting national reconciliation and rapprochement throughout the country, through the good offices role of my Special Representative;

- Managing all United Nations humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, under the overall authority of my Special Representative and in coordination with the Interim Authority and successor administrations of Afghanistan.43

The UN describes UNAMA as “a political mission administered by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.”44

**CONCLUSIONS**

Analysis of the UN missions above suggests a proportional relationship between the security line of effort and the command and control organization. In essence when security related requirements set forth in UNSCRs exceed traditional peacekeeping and approach the level of robust peacekeeping, or when conditions on the ground significantly deteriorate, the greater the need for a lead nation or regional organization to assume the command and control of the security line of effort in order to achieve sustainable peace. This was evident in the transition from UNPROFOR to NATO-IFOR in the Balkans and anecdotally evident in MINURCAT before and after the departure of EUFOR.

44 UN DPKO current website: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/currentops.shtml. Of note, the operation in Burundi is also a political mission, but it is focused on peacebuilding in the period after the successful fulfillment of a peacekeeping operation. There is no security line of operation that is being executed in Burundi coincident with the ONUB mission.
Second, the security line of effort must enjoy unity of effort and unity of command in order to have the authority and agility to set conditions for sustainable peace. The hybrid mission in Darfur splits both operational and strategic decision making between two IGOs, the UN and the AU. The assessment of the ability of the AU to assume and maintain C2 of the security line of effort mission is beyond the scope of this paper, but from a C2 perspective, the structure would be more effective if the regional organization had complete authority over the tasks associated with the security line of effort.

MAKING THE CASE FOR UN LEADERSHIP OF THE SECURITY LINE OF EFFORT

There are valid counter arguments to having a lead nation or regional organization in charge of the security line of effort. For example, the lead nation or regional organization could always be subject to accusations that it is more inclined to national or regional interests than to the requirements outlined in the UN Security Council mandates. And second, as the mission progresses and, in some cases, becomes more complex, the lead nation or regional organization may evolve its operations and rules of engagement beyond what has been agreed upon by UNSCR. However, the parallel C2 arrangement suggested here is predicated upon the existence of a UN Security Council Resolution that provides the regional organization or lead nation its broad, strategic mandate. A deviation from that mandate would likely result in UN action to rectify the deviation or to withdraw UN support. The latter would deny the mission its legitimacy.

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46 Ibid, 46.
One might point to successful missions in which the UN had the lead for the security line of effort, such as the UN Missions in El Salvador, Mozambique, and Guatemala.\footnote{Coicaud, \textit{Beyond the National Interest}, 25.} However, these operations were characterized by an environment in which there was genuine consent by the parties, both sides had exhausted their means to resume hostilities, there was no requirement for peace enforcement operations, and conditions had been set for peace building.\footnote{Ibid, 25.} However, those missions are atypical of the robust peacekeeping environment of the current era. Thus, the C2 structures that were adequate for those missions will likely fall short in a complex, multi-dimensional operation.

Lastly, it could be asserted that a more appropriate solution is to have the UN develop a capacity to immediately respond with a trained staff and forces capable of exercising command and control under UN leadership. In 2000, the UN Panel on Peace Operations called for the need to development coherent multi-national brigades and an “on-call” list of approximately 100 military planners trained to plan and execute the initial phases of a peacekeeping operation.\footnote{UN General Assembly, \textit{Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations}, 18-20.} However, neither a staff, nor the forces mentioned above, is possible in the current global political, military and economic environment, particularly given ongoing global commitments of the UN and other regional organizations or member nations. In 2005, member states acknowledged the need for a staffing and force capability, but have remained unable to agree on a solution.\footnote{United Nations, “A New Partnership Agenda,” 25.} The aforementioned team of trained planners approximates the C2 capability resident in a lead nation, regional organization or a standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ).
RECOMMENDATIONS

The role of regional organizations in UN operations has grown over the past two
decades and has changed to increasingly focus on the security line of effort. Given this
increasing role and the challenges to the traditional UN C2 model in the current
peacekeeping environment, the United Nations should develop doctrine that addresses a lead
nation or regional organization leading the security line of effort in parallel with the UN in
order to achieve sustainable peace. The UNPROFOR/NATO-IFOR transition in 1995,
EUFOR’s brief experience in Africa, and the NATO-ISAF/UNAMA experiences should be
the foundation for this doctrine development.

Second, US doctrine should be adjusted to reflect the unique requirements and
challenges of this C2 relationship. Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations,
addresses various C2 relationships in a multinational setting and JP 3-07.3, Peace
Operations, briefly addresses C2 during peace operations. However, neither adequately
addresses the C2 relationship between the lead nation or regional organization operational
command leading the security line of effort, and the UN Head of Mission and his staff
leading governance, humanitarian and economic development lines of effort. Close
coordination and continuous reassessment is required to synchronize functions and lines of
effort across the peace operations continuum in order to achieve sustainable peace.

Lastly, given the diversity of capability and capacity of regional organizations, the
U.S. military should increase its emphasis on planning and training for peacekeeping
operations conducted by or with regional organizations. Peacekeeping exercises should be
an integral part of the geographic Combatant Commanders’ Theater Security Cooperation

Plans (TSCP) to understand and enhance the capacity of regional organizations to C2 the security line of effort and adequately coordinate with the UN HOM and staff. Further research is required to determine the level of doctrine, training, and capabilities of regional organizations and the resulting degree of importance within each GCC.
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