

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 23-11-2009		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) Aug-Nov 2009	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Planning for Peace: Rethinking the Combatant Commander's Role in the Post-Conflict				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) LtCol Christopher J. Parkhurst, USMC Paper Advisor: Col. Greg Reilly, USA				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT In light of the significant challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, contemporary discourse has rightly focused on civil-military affairs and is rife with calls for a "whole-of-government" approach that would provide greater capacity to other instruments of national power while better defining the military's role in post-conflict activities. United States Government decisionmakers have resisted the pursuit of sweeping changes to the structure and resourcing of the interagency to effectively plan and execute post-conflict operations, resulting in seams that lie between the rhetoric of cooperation and the reality of capacity. This paper argues that the CCDR should be the principle arbiter for post-conflict planning and that such planning should precede and inform the operational design leading to conflict termination. This thesis is supported through an exploration of the underpinning arguments for and against military primacy in planning for post-conflict operations, and an examination of doctrinal shortfalls that fail to support the CCDR's comprehensive estimates necessary to achieve success during the post-conflict period. Recommendations propose changes to joint doctrine that would include the development of a new Joint Interagency Planning Process.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Joint Interagency Planning Process, Interagency transformation, stability and reconstruction, war termination planning, conflict termination, Combatant commander roles and responsibilities					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			30
					19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

Planning for Peace: Rethinking the Combatant Commander's Role in the Post-Conflict

by

Christopher J. Parkhurst

Lieutenant Colonel, USMC

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

23 October 2009

Contents

INTRODUCTION	1
IMPORTANCE OF THE CCDR’S ROLE IN PLANNING	2
The Combatant Commander’s Moral Imperatives	4
Historical Insights	6
Non-DoD Post-Conflict Planning and Execution Capacity	9
WHY WE DON’T PLAN FOR PEACE, FIRST	11
CONCLUSIONS	14
RECOMMENDATIONS	15
COUNTERARGUMENT	17
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH	18
SUMMARY	18
NOTES	20
BIBLIOGRAPHY	22

Abstract

In light of the significant challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, contemporary discourse has rightly focused on civil-military affairs and is rife with calls for a “whole-of-government” approach that would provide greater capacity to other instruments of national power while better defining the military’s role in post-conflict activities. United States Government decisionmakers have resisted the pursuit of sweeping changes to the structure and resourcing of the interagency to effectively plan and execute post-conflict operations, resulting in seams that lie between the rhetoric of cooperation and the reality of capacity. This paper argues that the CCDR should be the principle arbiter for post-conflict planning and that such planning should precede and inform the operational design leading to conflict termination. This thesis is supported through an exploration of the underpinning arguments for and against military primacy in planning for post-conflict operations, and an examination of doctrinal shortfalls that fail to support the CCDR’s comprehensive estimates necessary to achieve success during the post-conflict period. Recommendations propose changes to joint doctrine that would include the development of a new Joint Interagency Planning Process.

INTRODUCTION

The United States enjoys a rich and enviable tradition of success on the battlefield. Indeed, throughout the nation's history, the military instrument of national power has proven a faithful and reliable servant of policy, often leading the way in transformative ideas to meet the nation's exigencies. However, victory in combat has not always led to victory in establishing peace. Since the successes in Germany and Japan in the aftermath of World War II, U.S. combat actions have repeatedly failed to produce the timely and efficient attainment of policy goals once the military objective is met, if at all. This has been particularly true in the post Cold War period. The fall of the Soviet Union, and the delicate assurances of stability that fell with it, have thrust the United States into greater uncertainty in the execution of policy through military means, and oftentimes, this uncertainty has been greatest when the shooting stops and the quest for "peace" begins.¹

In light of continuing challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, contemporary discourse has rightly focused on civil-military affairs and is rife with calls for a "whole-of-government"² approach that could provide greater capacity to other instruments of national power while better defining the military's role in post-conflict activities. A review of the relevant literature suggests a nearly universal consensus that these called-for changes may necessarily require legislation to amend the *National Security Act of 1947*. Yet, U.S. decisionmakers have resisted the pursuit of sweeping changes to the structure and resourcing of the interagency, despite growing evidence that they should do otherwise.³ Though the fundamental issues of national policy are beyond the scope of this paper, the resulting seams created between the rhetoric of cooperation and the reality of interagency capacity to plan post-conflict operations, leave the military in a gray area bounded by the tenets of the

Weinburger/Powell doctrines and the challenges of “Fourth Generation Warfare;”⁴ a situation that should be of grave concern to the Combatant Commander (CCDR). This begs the question: What planning role *should* the military play in the vast expanse between conflict termination and conflict resolution? More specifically, how should the CCDR obtain comprehensive estimates and design campaigns and major operations that include robust post-conflict plans in the absence of clearly defined political end states, executive direction, and the interagency capacity or cooperation to provide such estimates?

This paper argues that the CCDR should be the principle arbiter for post-conflict planning and that such planning should precede and inform the operational design leading to conflict termination. The method of supporting this paper’s thesis begins with an exploration of the underpinning arguments for and against military primacy in planning post-conflict operations. This exploration will include analysis of the CCDR’s role in planning for post-conflict operations, the post-conflict planning capabilities of non-Department of Defense (DoD) agencies, and an examination of doctrinal shortfalls that fail to support the CCDR’s comprehensive estimates necessary to achieve success in effectively planning for the post-conflict period.⁵ Finally, recommendations propose changes to joint doctrine that include the development of a new interagency planning process.

IMPORTANCE OF THE CCDR’S ROLE IN PLANNING

Everything that has been done in the way of reclaiming the world has been done by inspired soldiery.

—Rev. Charles H. Parkhurst
My Forty Years in New York

The role of conflict in the fabric of American existence is becoming an increasingly prevalent occurrence over time. With periods of conflict increasing from 15 percent in the

twentieth century, to a continuous condition in the first decade of the twenty-first, the role of the military as an instrument of national policy, arguably, is greater now than in any other time in American history.⁶ The CCDR's role in conflict, ultimately, is to bring war to an end under politically "favorable" conditions—to achieve the desired political end state.⁷ Thus, the growing trend of conflict, and the post-conflict planning responsibilities that come with it, should be a fundamental and overriding concern to him. However, CCDRs have a mixed track record in this regard, and the roles and responsibilities of the military regarding the planning and execution of post-conflict operations remains the subject of contemporary debate amidst calls for greater burden sharing among the interagency.

Central to the thesis of this paper is the notion that the CCDR should assume primacy for the planning of post-conflict operations. This argument is not intended to stir undue controversy or challenge the construct of civil-military relations; it is merely a pragmatic position that, in the current environment, the commander on the ground is best placed to assume the *principle* demands of planning for, and supporting, post-conflict challenges. It is not an attempt to debunk calls for interagency reform. In fact, it seems unlikely that the United States will achieve routine success in its foreign policy commitments until all elements of national power can be brought to bear in a consistent and unified manner. However, institutional equivocation in the absence of authority and resources of non-DoD agencies does little to advance workable solutions. Robert Komer, while citing reasons for the failure of the Vietnamese pacification program, noted in his 1970 RAND report that "everybody and nobody was responsible for coping with [the post-conflict] in the round."⁸ Until legislated reforms occur that will transform the interagency, the CCDR should assume the mantle of planning for and supporting that responsibility.

This position is explored through the analysis of three supporting arguments: First, there is a moral imperative that demands that CCDR's extend their duty beyond the functional requirements of the military activities for which they are responsible.⁹ Secondly, history strongly suggests that operations that divorce the military objective from post-conflict planning concerns typically end with unsatisfactory results; and finally, no other government agency currently has the capacity to adequately plan for or sustain post-conflict operations.

The Combatant Commander's Moral Imperatives

Major operations in the Iraq war were declared over by President George W. Bush on 1 May, 2003 during an address to the nation while he was aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln.¹⁰ However, of the total number of U.S. military casualties suffered in the Iraq war, to date, over 95 percent have occurred since the President's speech.¹¹ This statistic, stunning as it may be, would find similar company in other conflicts such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Kosovo. There should be little dispute that the blood and treasure expended in the execution of national policy has been significant, and that much of this cost to the nation has been borne during periods of post-conflict. This fact alone underscores the importance of thoroughly planning for the post-conflict and points to the CCDR's crucial concern in the process.

Anthony Hartle points out that the "[military] must have, in applying force, the moral authority to take those actions necessary to defend American society" if it is to exist as a profession.¹² Though the inclusion of this dimension of thought into the argument for primacy in the CCDR's role during post-conflict planning runs the risk of being perceived as obtuse, it warrants consideration for two reasons. First, the CCDR bears a sacred trust with

the American people to provide good stewardship for the people and resources in which he is entrusted, and to conduct operations in a manner consistent with American values. This does not mean that the CCDR should shrink from risk; however, he does have a responsibility to ensure that lives and materiel (on either side) are not wasted in the achievement of the military objective. Secondly, the CCDR has a responsibility for providing his best military advice to civilian policymakers. The extent that a CCDR may be able to positively influence policy choices is debatable, and this was particularly true in light of the personalities involved in the Iraq War planning; yet, that fact should not dissuade the CCDR from arguing his position or *attempting* to fully account for post-war conditions in his planning prior to the execution of hostilities. Perhaps the worrisome threat to civil-military relations recounted in “The Revolt of the Generals” could have been averted had the CCDR more strongly advocated the need for a comprehensive post-conflict plan prior to starting the war.¹³

For those who remain unconvinced about moral imperatives as they relate to the CCDR’s responsibilities in post-conflict planning, and prefer to view war from a Machiavellian perspective, Major General Charles J. Dunlap, USAF, provides a more pragmatic view of moral and legal issues. In a recent *Joint Force Quarterly* essay, Major General Dunlap opines that the abuse meted out by U.S. military personnel to inmates at the Abu Ghraib prison served as the most significant “defeat” in the Iraq war, fueling a growing insurgency, and having an “effect ... indistinguishable from that imposed by traditional military clashes.”¹⁴ He goes on to remind commanders that their role is to “ensure that troops have been properly trained to understand the law applicable to the operation and are ready to apply it under extreme stress.”¹⁵ Clearly, issues that remain outside the realm of strict military functions can have an enormous operational and strategic impact on the

CCDR's mission and should warrant his focused attention when planning for post-conflict operations.

Historical Insights of the CCDR's Role in Planning

Despite the military's well documented success in the aftermath of World War II, history has indicated its reluctance to pursue non-traditional missions and capabilities in the planning and prosecution of subsequent conflicts out of fear that "mission creep" might impair the ability to meet traditional obligations.¹⁶ Indeed, this quandary over roles and missions remains today, as evidenced by the ongoing debate between the Service Chiefs and the administration over funding choices between non-traditional roles and high value acquisition programs such as the F-22 and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. Nevertheless, this reticence, regardless of the underlying political and social issues, has led to less than desirable results in many of the "eight significant nation-building operations" that were pursued by the United States over the last 60 years.¹⁷ This is not to infer that the military has been solely at fault; in fact, the argument can be made that the expansion of the military role in the execution of national policy is because it was "the only instrument our nation [was] willing to throw at the growing problems of instability."¹⁸

However, finger-pointing does little to advance solutions to the issue. The fact remains, that in nearly every researched instance of post-conflict failure, there was an apparent disconnect between the CCDR's war strategy and any plans extending beyond conflict termination. For example, General Westmoreland's strategy for prosecution of the war in Vietnam was based on attrition, despite the repeated objections of Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, who believed that the conflict should be approached as a counterinsurgency,

and feared that the blunt use of military power would ultimately undermine the political objective.¹⁹ In hindsight, General Westmoreland's estimate of the situation in Vietnam, and his approach to fighting the war, was clearly wrong. His actions on the battlefield did not support the desired political end state. Whether it was the commander's inability to fully comprehend the situation in Vietnam, or simply a dogged determination to adhere to a thought process conditioned by success in two world wars, the military strategy in Vietnam "brought a bitter dénouement to the long search for a restoration of the use of combat in the service of policy."²⁰

In a more recent example, the CCDR's planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom largely neglected the Phase IV, *Stabilize* and Phase V, *Transition to Civil Authority* operations that would commence after conflict termination; simply acknowledging that it would happen, and with the "assumption ... that we would guide the Iraqi interim government in building a military" when the conflict terminated.²¹ This omission illustrates a failure to develop a "comprehensive blueprint to administer and restore Iraq."²² It also indicates that the planning effort failed to adequately account for the post-conflict concerns that should have bridged combat operations to the desired strategic end state. Admittedly, the decision to gloss over essential post-conflict planning tasks can ultimately be blamed on leadership at several levels. Again, the question germane to the argument is not who was ultimately at fault, but rather, could the CCDR have changed the course of events had he properly planned post-conflict operations? Any answer to that question is largely speculative; however, there were two military war game initiatives available to the CCDR, had he chosen to heed their advice. The first was the Desert Crossing war game developed by General Anthony Zinni, USMC, while still serving as the Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command

(CENTCOM). This war game was established to inform the integration of the interagency for reconstruction operations in a post-war Iraq. Yet, evidence suggests that this effort went largely unheeded during the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom.²³ The second was Prominent Hammer II, a classified war game conducted by the Joint Staff in 2002. This initiative proposed the establishment of a separate military headquarters capable of designing and executing a post-conflict plan for Iraq.²⁴ Despite the ensuing debate over the best course of action for planning and supporting post-conflict duties in CENTCOM, key planners of Operation Iraqi Freedom observed that the “shock and awe” promised to achieve the military objective was contradictory to the achievement of stated political aims and had the “potential to undermine U.S. postwar efforts.”²⁵ Nearly seven years later, those observations seem prescient.

The two preceding examples fall short of a comprehensive analysis of all the factors surrounding the lack of effective post-conflict planning in Vietnam and Iraq. However, they are illustrative of the failure to design operations to meet a desired strategic end state and highlight the fact that the failure to plan for the post-conflict may have a detrimental effect on the conflict’s ultimate outcome. Indeed, the current version of Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, warns that “when interagency, IGO, and NGO transition planning does not occur, military involvement may be needlessly protracted.”²⁶ Clearly, it is understood that an integrated and comprehensive approach to planning is required, but analysis thus far suggests the CCDR should be the arbiter of it.

Non-DoD Post-Conflict Planning and Execution Capacity

As indicated in the introduction, there remains significant debate over the role of the various U.S. government agencies in the post-conflict arena, and there are growing calls for greater civilian contributions in the planning and execution of post-conflict operations. Indeed, there have been a number of laudable initiatives to invigorate the whole-of-government concept. For example, in late 2005, the George W. Bush administration issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, which directs the Department of State (DoS) to “prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization”²⁷ missions and to “develop detailed contingency plans ... which are integrated with military contingency plans.”²⁸ This directive also tasks “other executive departments and agencies,” which includes the Department of Defense (DoD), to “identify and *develop* internal capabilities for planning.”²⁹[emphasis added] However, the directive does not specify precise deliverables, and, four years later, there is little evidence that suggests more than an ad hoc integration of the interagency, or that an integrated planning process exists outside of DoD.

In 2004, the DoS established an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) which includes a 250 person, deployable, Civilian Response Corps (CRC) with an additional 1000 standby personnel. Likewise, *Department of Defense Directive 1404.10* established the policy requirements for a DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce that, ostensibly, would function similarly to the CRC.³⁰ The S/CRS, including its CRC component, represent the most significant increase in DoS capacity for post-conflict planning to date. This organization is entrenched with “dedicated professionals that are

committed to solving post-conflict challenges and understand the vital role that DoS and DoD integration plays in achieving unity of effort.”³¹

Still, there remains a significant gap between the resourcing capacity of civilian organizations and the substantial requirements that exist across the spectrum of post-conflict operations. To illustrate, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 DoS budget request was \$11.456 billion and \$249 million of that amount was earmarked for the CRC.³² In addition, the Defense Department’s FY09 budget submission included a \$200 million request in appropriations under “Section 1207” of *The National Defense Authorization Act* to support the State Department’s stabilization activities.³³ Yet, DoS funding *and* manpower remain approximately 2.2 percent of DoD’s base budget and force structure, respectively, leaving an enormous imbalance between planning requirements and capacity that is not likely to change appreciably in the near future.³⁴

The coordinator for the S/CRS, Ambassador John E. Herbst, notes that the biggest external challenge to his organization “is ensuring that everyone understands the [S/CRS] level of capacity and services, which includes coordination and planning.”³⁵ He goes on to state that the obstacles to greater capacity are the lack of resources, the need to continue building capacity with the resources they already have, and institutionalizing the capacity and capability of the CRC.³⁶ The S/CRS is clearly a rising organization, filling a crucial role as an instrument of national policy. Though it is a noteworthy start to addressing non-DoD capacity, and should be strongly supported, Ambassador Herbst’s “vision to have a dozen or so world-class planners in the next five years”³⁷ may be insufficient to meet the substantial demands of assuming a lead role in planning for the post-conflict at this time. The fact that a formal, integrated, planning process, as inferred by NSPD-44, has not been developed,

further hampers non-DoD capacity to plan for, and execute, post-conflict missions in the near term.

WHY WE DON'T PLAN FOR PEACE, FIRST

He who excels at resolving difficulties does so before they arise. He who excels in conquering his enemies triumphs before threats materialize.

—Sun Tzu
The Art of War

There is growing institutional evidence that the U.S. military is beginning to embrace the idea of assuming a more active role in post-conflict planning and tasks. In fact, a number of recent documents or revisions establish policy outlining the CCDR's role in post-conflict operations as a "core competency" while emphasizing the necessity to engage interagency partners, or they provide general guidance for his consideration.³⁸ For example, Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, and the *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept* (JOC) 2.0, direct responsibilities, propose lines of operation, or describe the challenges beyond conflict termination. However, neither of these documents provides the CCDR with the tools or lines of *authority* necessary to lead planning for post-conflict challenges. Additionally, they do not provide the CCDR with a doctrinal template that would standardize his efforts, inform his approach, or require him to lead his planning effort with post-conflict termination that is aimed at achieving the desired strategic end state. Despite the apparent flurry to address shortfalls in interagency integration, the CCDR is still reliant on the vagaries of "Hand Shake Con,"³⁹ and left to his judgment and experience for providing the comprehensive analysis necessary to design post-conflict plans in support of campaigns and major operations.

James Carafano notes that “good doctrine does not tell people what to think, but it guides them in *how* to think, particularly in *how* to address complex, ambiguous, and unanticipated challenges when time and resources are both in short supply.”⁴⁰ [emphasis added] As previously illustrated, the manner in which a conflict is fought is directly correlated to the outcome of follow-on phases of the campaign or operation. Yet, current doctrine is deficient in informing the CCDR *how* he should plan for the post-conflict and *how* that plan should inform his operational design for combat operations. In other words, it seems that the idea of “backward” planning is largely concentrated on the phases leading up to conflict *termination* and does little to help the CCDR achieve the desired strategic end that is inextricably linked to post-conflict operations.⁴¹

A literature review found an exhaustive list of joint and service doctrinal publications that address issues related to post-conflict operations. Though the majority of these documents are well written and useful in describing challenges, they generally fall short of providing a template for how to plan for these challenges.⁴² For example, JP 3-08 provides fundamental principles and guidance to the CCDR and his staff for facilitating coordination with other agencies.⁴³ It offers a coherent, comprehensive discussion on the organizing principles and methodology of non-military organizations that the CCDR may have to coordinate with in the execution of the military plan. However, the recommended method for inclusion of this guidance in the CCDR’s operations plan is limited to Annex V, *Interagency Coordination*, of CJCSM 3122.03C *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System* (JOPES), the tool of the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP). Though JP 3-08 makes great strides in broadly addressing interagency challenges to the CCDR, it does not provide him a planning checklist for completing these tasks, nor does it require that post-

conflict planning inform the operational design prior to termination. Likewise, JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, JP 3-28, *Civil Support*, and JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, for example, provide similar guidance.

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I, *Planning Policies and Procedures*, is “the single system for military operation planning and execution” and provides the CCDR with detailed guidance on how to conduct contingency and crisis action planning.⁴⁴ The latest iteration of JOPES provides an excellent discussion on the importance of planning for conflict termination, reminding commanders and their staffs that they “must plan for conflict termination from the outset of the planning process.”⁴⁵ However, this admonition appears limited to a brief discussion in Enclosure B and is not addressed again except by means of Annex V in the commander’s estimate.⁴⁶ Despite this additional discussion in the manual, JOPES largely remains a sequential planning guide that does little to address the complexity of post-conflict issues that make “the calculus of military operations very different”⁴⁷ from what occurs during the execution of traditional military tasks.

Perhaps the two most enlightened documents examined were JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, and Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-2, *Campaigning*. Both of these documents provide great emphasis on the need to consider conflict termination as front matter to any operational design, and continuously remind the commander of the importance of linking operational plans to the desired strategic end state.⁴⁸ Yet, neither document includes a distinct planning method or phased checklist that would better assist the CCDR and his staff in accounting for these issues in operational plans.

CONCLUSIONS

The research and analysis of this paper strongly suggest that the CCDR should be the principle arbiter for planning and supporting post-conflict challenges. Nothing discovered during the research for this paper indicates that any *robust* national-level unity of effort in the support of post-conflict planning and execution will be achieved under current initiatives absent legislation that forces the integration of all elements of national power. Though the problems surrounding the integration of the interagency have been the focus of increased attention in recent years, the resulting prescriptions, in terms of directives, doctrine, and interagency structure, fail to provide lasting solutions, and do not entirely meet the demands of the post-conflict environment. History continues to show that the military routinely ends up fulfilling the majority of post-conflict tasks, either by design or as an “ad hoc” force when no other viable options exist for the government.⁴⁹ Current initiatives to build capabilities outside the DoD, such as the S/CRS, are laudable and should be expanded to provide more capacity. However, these initiatives also risk gaps in the CCDR’s estimates and operational planning by blurring lines of responsibility, and building the potential for false expectations and assumptions about interagency cooperation, capacity, and capabilities. Ultimately, the success of the CCDR’s plan for conflict is measured in its aftermath. Until the time comes when other elements of national power are able to reliably lead the planning process of post-conflict operations, and fully integrate that process into the plans for combat operations, such duty should remain the principle domain of the CCDR.

A number of joint and service doctrinal publications exist that help the CCDR understand the challenges of the post-conflict environment. However, they generally fall short of telling him how he should develop the comprehensive assessments required to author

a viable operations plan in a non-traditional environment. JOPP/JOPES also falls short in this regard. The current joint planning process risks the development of narrowly focused operational plans that do not force the CCDR to fully consider the comprehensive post-conflict tasks and responsibilities as a precursor to combat operations.

Until the dysfunction of the interagency can be solved by more lasting means, the CCDR should remain the arbiter of post-conflict planning, and changes to the joint planning process should be pursued that provide a reliable and executable vehicle for supporting the CCDR's operational designs in pursuit of the desired strategic end state.

RECOMMENDATIONS

NSPD-44 and DODI 3000.05 should be amended to designate the CCDR as the agency lead for post-conflict planning and direct a requirement for the development, and executive department adoption of, a formal process for interagency planning for post-conflict responsibilities. Additionally, the JOPP/JOPES should be modified to require the CCDR to utilize a National Command Authority approved post-conflict Concept of Operations plan (CONPLAN) as front matter for his Phase I, II, and III planning effort, removing the issue of interagency planning from its current annexed status within JOPES.

To increase the capacity of the S/CRS and other agencies, and to improve interagency unity of effort, the DoD, in concert with DoS, should initiate the development of a *Joint Interagency Planning Process (JIPP)* that would provide the CCDR and other agency partners a seamless approach for the construction of post-conflict plans, as well as the comprehensive estimates necessary to design the Phase I, II, and III plans required by JOPES. JIPP would not replace the current planning methodologies found in JOPP/JOPES,

but would be an integral subset that fully compliments the JOPP/JOPEs process. Such a process could be modeled after the United Nations *Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)* which is the “authoritative basis for the planning of all new integrated missions ... for all UN departments, agencies, funds and [programs].”⁵⁰ Though the IMPP is designed to primarily support UN peacekeeping operations, it provides for a phased planning effort, and clearly defines each required decision point, objective, responsibility, key output, and timeframe constraint for each phase.⁵¹ As written, the guidelines of IMPP cogently articulate complex planning considerations that would be recognizable to most military planners. However, it is not simply a military planning process restated. The IMPP specifically addresses the planning considerations that must be accounted for in a multinational, multi-organizational effort in direct support of operations other than war. A JIPP modeled similarly to IMPP could be used as the basis for the post-conflict phase planning required by JOPEs, as well as provide a method for developing a comprehensive commander’s estimate of the situation in support of his operational design.

A close examination of the IMPP guidelines indicate a striking similarity to the form and content of the *United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan*,⁵² signed by Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal in August of this year and largely attributable to the work done by the S/CRS.⁵³ Current joint doctrine reminds the commander that “close, continuous interagency ... coordination and cooperation are necessary” requirements for achieving the military mission.⁵⁴ It also warns that different interagency perspectives “can complicate policy development and creation of a common approach across all [United States Government] elements.”⁵⁵ Perhaps basing a new planning process on a model developed outside the Pentagon’s hallways would foster greater

participation from interagency partners and provide the CCDR with a new prism with which to view the complexities of the post-conflict.

It should be noted that JOPES will eventually be replaced with the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) process. APEX is designed to “[close] the gap between planning and execution processes, creating valid operational plans that can transition rapidly to execution with little or no modification.”⁵⁶ Supposedly, APEX will be a faster process by integrating the interagency early in the planning cycle and incorporating in process reviews.⁵⁷ However, the CCDR must still be able to link his military objectives to the desired strategic end state, and speed alone may not help him achieve that task. APEX still relegates interagency planning to an Annex V, and there is nothing in the new process that approaches integration of the interagency differently, instructs the CCDR to alter his view of post-conflict design, or requires him to consider that design as a precursor to combat operations.⁵⁸ In fact, it could be argued that many crises would be better handled with less focus on speed and more focus on accuracy and strategic restraint. Regardless, the proposed JIPP could remain an integral subset of APEX, serving in the same capacity as it would under JOPES.

COUNTERARGUMENT

In addition to the counterarguments embedded in the analysis of this paper, a key argument against the recommendations made in this paper would be that the DoS, to include the S/CRS, will resist increasing its capacity for planning and supporting the post-conflict unless it is forced to do so. However, this argument is invalid for two reasons. First, the nation assumes an unacceptable level of risk for failure in the execution of policy waiting for other agencies as they gather the necessary planning capacity to unilaterally lead planning of

post-conflict operations. Secondly, there is no indication that the small corps of professionals in the S/CRS will give anything less than an absolute commitment to resolving planning capacity and interagency integration challenges in the post-conflict arena.⁵⁹ The failure of DoD to actively support the growing capacity of the S/CRS in its infancy by assuming a prime role for post-conflict planning could have a detrimental on its long term viability.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

General James Mattis, USMC, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, rightly points out that “armed conflicts rarely require purely military solutions” and that “it is critical that our military leaders connect with civilian counterparts to leverage the diverse powers of our government before, during, and after times of crisis.”⁶⁰ It is this “connection” that seems elusive, and risks subjugating unity of effort and authority to the vagaries of “Hand Shake Con.” This dilemma could be partially addressed by researching the viability of a new unified combatant command for civil affairs (USCACOM). Such a command could be built on the existing United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) as well as integrate elements of the S/CRS, such as the CRC, as well as other U.S. government agency representatives. Perhaps such an initiative would go a long way toward unifying the interagency until a more comprehensive remedy can be designed and implemented.

SUMMARY

The successful attainment of national policy goals through the use of military power requires the CCDR to inextricably link conditions on the battlefield with the desired political end state, and necessarily requires the integration of all elements of national power. However, absent the political will to make sweeping reforms, “interagency transformation” risks being little more than a bumper sticker slogan. Until reforms can be made, the CCDR has a de facto, if not a moral responsibility, to fight the nation’s wars while providing his best advice to political leaders, regardless of the obstacles he may face or the assignment of specific responsibility. His plan to meet the military objective should be informed by a comprehensive post-conflict plan that is developed through an interagency planning process designed to obtain maximum unity of effort and build greater capacity within limited DoS resources.

NOTES

¹ Fishel, vii.

² Flournoy, 271.

³ Locher III, James R. There is evidence that suggests that the possibility of reforming the interagency during the current administration exists. The *Project on National Security Reform* (PNSR) continues to gain momentum on its goal of transformation and that it is supported at the highest levels of government. Vice President Biden, National Security Advisor Jones, SecState Clinton, SecDef Gates, the CJSCS, the Director of National Intelligence, Deputy SecState Steinberg, Under SecDef (Policy) Flournoy, approximately 30-35 congressmen and 12-15 senators, are either PNSR members or support the initiative. For more information on the PNSR and its recommendations, the author recommends reviewing James R. Locher III's brief titled, "National Security: Imperatives for Interagency Action."

http://www.jhuapl.edu/urw_symposium/Presentations/2009/02_Locher.pdf

⁴ Though the concept of fourth generation warfare has been widely accepted, it is not without its critics. For the reader who wishes to review differing positions on the concept, the author recommends the essays titled "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation" by William S. Lind, et al. and "Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths" by Antulio J. Echevarria II. Both essays are listed in the bibliography.

⁵ There are a number of terms that are associated with post-conflict operations, i.e., "nation building," "peace keeping," "stability operations," "stability and reconstruction operations," and "Phase IV operations," to name a few. For the purposes of this paper, the term "post-conflict" refers to any military activity occurring after conflict termination and prior to achieving the desired political end state.

⁶ Freidman, 40.

⁷ JP 3-0, IV-7

⁸ Komer, "Organization and Management of the "New Model" Pacification Program—1966-1969," 233.

⁹ Hartle, 172.

¹⁰ Bush.

¹¹ Global Security.

¹² Hartle, 169.

¹³ Whalen.

¹⁴ Dunlap, 34. Major General Dunlap is the Deputy Judge Advocate General, Headquarters U.S. Air Force.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 37.

¹⁶ McIvor, 365.

¹⁷ Dobbins, v.

¹⁸ Zinni, 85.

¹⁹ As an Army general, and as the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon, Maxwell Taylor argued vociferously (and presciently) for a limited war strategy in Vietnam. His belief was that the American strategy of massive retaliation would lead to either general nuclear war or "compromise and retreat."

²⁰ Weigley, 467.

²¹ Franks, 419.

²² Gordon, 158.

²³ *Ibid*, 158.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 160.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 166-167.

²⁶ JP 3-08 Vol I, I-12.

²⁷ NSPD-44, 2.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 3.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 4.

³⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce*.

³¹ COL. John E. Malapit, USA, (Senior Military Advisor, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Washington, DC), interview by the author, 21 October 2009.

³² Department of State, 7.

³³ Sarafino, 1.

-
- ³⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request: Summary Justification*. The percentage comparison of DoD and DoS budget figures were calculated by the author using data from both budget submissions.
- ³⁵ Ambassador John E. Herbst. (Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Washington, DC), interview by the author, 29 October 2009.
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ DODI 3000.05.
- ³⁹ U.S. Army, 2-3. “Hand Shake Con” is a facetious term coined by General Zinni used to describe the informal relationships between the CCDR and non-DoD agencies as opposed to established doctrinal terms like “OPCON” or “TACON,” for example.
- ⁴⁰ Carafano, 136.
- ⁴¹ JP 5-0, IV-33. Additionally, Milan Vego refers to backward planning as “regressive” or “reverse” planning. His discussion of regressive planning asserts that “planners should also try to predict or anticipate what possible effect the accomplishment of a given ultimate objective will have on both military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation.” For a more in-depth discussion of regressive planning, see Vego’s *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*, IX-5.
- ⁴² The publications reviewed for this research are listed in the bibliography.
- ⁴³ JP 3-08 is currently being revised and going through the JS-136 (joint staffing/comment) process. The new title to JP3-08 will be *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*.
- ⁴⁴ JOPES Vol I, B-9.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid, B-13.
- ⁴⁶ JOPES Vol II, E-V-1.
- ⁴⁷ McChrystal Special Address, 2. General McChrystal is referring to what he terms “COIN mathematics” which refers to the complex environment of COIN where the killing of an insurgent may have an antithetical effect, resulting in more insurgents joining the fray in an attempt to avenge the death of a friend or family member.
- ⁴⁸ JP 5-00.1, II-4.
- ⁴⁹ Mattis.
- ⁵⁰ United Nations, *Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)*, 2.
- ⁵¹ Ibid, 5.
- ⁵² Eikenberry.
- ⁵³ Ambassador Herbst interview.
- ⁵⁴ JP 3-08 Volume I, I-5.
- ⁵⁵ JP 3-57 IV-6.
- ⁵⁶ Mattis.
- ⁵⁷ Klein, 85.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid, 87.
- ⁵⁹ Ambassador Herbst interview.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bush, George W., President of the United States. Address to the Nation. USS Abraham Lincoln, 1 May 2003. <http://www.espeeches.com/george-bush/george-w-bush-address-to-the-nation-from-the-uss-abraham-lincoln-050103.html> (accessed 12 October 2009).
- Carafano, James J. "Managing Mayhem: The Future of Interagency Reform." *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 49 (2d Quarter 2008): 135-137.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Cole, Ronald H. *Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama February 1988 – January 1990*. Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995.
- . *Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada 12 October – 2 November 1983*. Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997.
- Collins, Joseph J. "Afghanistan: The Path to Victory." *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 54 (3d Quarter 2009): 58-61.
- Dobbins, James, Michele A. Poole, Austin Long, and Benjamin Runkle. *After the War: Nation-Building From FDR to George W. Bush*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2008.
- Dunlap Jr., Charles J. "Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st Century Conflicts?" *Joint Force Quarterly*, no.54 (3d Quarter 2009): 34-39.
- Echevarria II, Antulio J. *Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005.
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub632.pdf> (accessed 6 October 2009).
- Eikenberry, Karl W. and McChrystal, Stanley A. *United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan*. Kabul: Embassy of the United States Afghanistan and U.S. Forces Afghanistan. 10 August 2009.
<http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0908eikenberryandmcchrystal.pdf> (accessed 7 October 2009).
- Fishel, John T. *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.
- Flavin, William. "Planning for Conflict and Post-Conflict Success." *Parameters* 33, no.3 (Autumn 2003): 95-112.
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03autumn/flavin.pdf> (accessed 12 September 2009).
- Flournoy, Michèle A. "Navigating Treacherous Shoals: Establishing a Robust Interagency Process for National Security Strategy, Planning, and Budgeting." In *Defense*

-
- Strategy and Forces: Setting Future Directions*, Newport Papers no. 3, edited by Richmond M. Lloyd, 271-279. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007.
- Franks, Tommy. *American Soldier*. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2004.
- Fratlicelli, Giulio. "Reflections on Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations." *Army Magazine* 55, no. 6 (June 2005): 51-54.
<http://www.ausa.org/pdfdocs/ARMYMag/Fratlicelli.pdf> (accessed 3 September 2009).
- Freidman, George. *The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century*. New York, NY: Doubleday, 2009.
- Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, Switzerland, August 12, 1949.
- Global Security. "Iraq War Casualty Figures."
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_casualties.htm (accessed 12 October 2009).
- Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2006.
- Hamre, John J. and Gordon R. Sullivan. "Toward Postconflict Reconstruction." *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2002): 85-96.
- Hartle, Anthony E. *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*. 2^d ed. rev. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
- Hopkins, Donna L. "The Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative: Meeting a Need." In *Defense Strategy and Forces: Setting Future Directions*, Newport Papers no. 3, edited by Richmond M. Lloyd, 281-285. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007.
- Hutcheson, Kevin C. "U.S. Southern Command in Transition." In *Defense Strategy and Forces: Setting Future Directions*, Newport Papers no. 3, edited by Richmond M. Lloyd, 287-296. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007.
- Joint Advanced Warfighting School. *Operational Art and Campaigning Primer AY 09-10*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009.
- Klein, Robert M. "Adaptive Planning: Not Your Grandfather's Schlieffen Plan." *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 45 (2d Quarter 2007): 84-88.
- Komer, Robert W. *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*. ARPA Report R-957-ARPA. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1972.
- . *Organization and Management of the "New Model" Pacification Program—1966-1969*. ARPA Report 20104-ARPA. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970.
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/documents/2006/D20104.pdf>, (accessed 13 March 2009).
- Kukk, Kadri. "How to Win a Counterinsurgency War? The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US Escalating Stalemate in the Vietnam War." *Baltic Security and Defense Review* 9

-
- (2007): 236-260. http://www.bdcpl.ee/fileadmin/docs/bdrev13/11_Kadri_Kukk-Counterinsurgency-Vietnam.pdf (accessed 3 September 2009).
- Lind, William S., et al. "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." *Marine Corps Gazette* 73 no. 10 (October 1989): 22-26.
- Locher III, James R. "National Security: Imperatives for Interagency Action." Powerpoint. 24 March 2009. http://www.jhuapl.edu/urw_symposium/Presentations/2009/02_Locher.pdf (accessed 21 October 2009).
- Mahnken, Thomas G. "A Grand New Bargain: Implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Defense Planning." *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 55 (4th Quarter 2009): 10-13.
- Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, 7 December 2005. <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html> (accessed 20 October 2009).
- Manwaring, Max G., and Wm. J. Olson, eds. *Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.
- Matloff, Maurice and Edwin M. Snell. *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*. U.S. War Department Study. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1959. <http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/sp1943-44/index.htm> (accessed 29 September 2009).
- Mattis, James N. *Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee*. 24 March 2009. <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/March/Mattis%2003-24-09.pdf> (accessed 17 October 2009).
- McChrystal, Gen Stanley A., Commander, International Security Assistance Force and Commander U.S. Forces Afghanistan. Special Address. International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, UK, 1 October 2009.
- . "ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance." Kabul, AFG. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf (accessed 3 October 2009).
- . "Commander's Initial Assessment." Kabul, AFG. http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf (accessed 3 October 2009).
- McCreedy, Kenneth O. "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany." *The Journal of Military History* 65, no.3 (July 2001): 713-739.
- McIvor, Anthony, ed. *Rethinking the Principles of War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005.
- Organization of the National Security Council System. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-1*, 13 February 2009.
- Rife, Col. Rickey L. "Defense is from Mars State is from Venus." Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998.

-
- Rotermund, Manfred K. *The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999.
- Serafino, Nina M. *Department of Defense –Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009.
- Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*. Translated and introduced by Samuel B. Griffith. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Szayna, Thomas S., Derek Eaton, James E. Barnett II, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Terrance K. Kelly, Zachary Haldeman. *Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009.
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG801.pdf (accessed 13 October 2009).
- Tuck, Christopher. “Conflict Termination in Iraq.” *Royal United Services Institute Journal* 149, no. 5 (October 2004): 17-21.
- United Nations. Secretariat. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. New York: UN, 2008.
- . Secretary General’s Policy Committee. *Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)*. New York: UN, 2006. <http://www.undg.org/docs/9907/IMPP-Revised-Guidelines-130606.pdf> (accessed 10 October 2009).
- U.S. Army. *Counterinsurgency*. Field Manual (FM) 3-24. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 15 December 2006.
- U.S. Department of Defense. *Stability Operations*. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05. Washington, DC: DoD, 16 September 2009.
- . *DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce*. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1404.10. Washington, DC: DoD, 23 January 2009.
- . *Irregular Warfare*. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.07. Washington, DC: DoD, 1 December 2008.
- . *Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request: Summary Justification*. Washington, DC: DoD, 4 February 2008.
- U.S. Congressional Budget Office. *Paying for Iraq’s Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: CBO Paper, 2004.
- U.S. Department of State. *The Budget in Brief: fiscal Year 2009*. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of State, 2009.
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100033.pdf> (accessed 5 October 2009).
- U.S. Marine Corps. *Campaigning*. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1-2. Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1997.

-
- U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. Washington, DC: September 17, 2006.
- . *Peace Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3. Washington, DC: October 17, 2007.
- . *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol. I*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-08. Washington, DC: March 17, 2006.
- . *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol. II*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-08. Washington, DC: March 17, 2006.
- . *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-08. Rev. 1st Draft. Washington, DC: August 28, 2009.
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jel/ddrraaffft_pubs/3_08rfd.pdf (accessed 9 October 2009).
- . *Multinational Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-16. Washington, DC: March 7, 2007.
- . *Civil Support*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-28. Washington, DC: September 14, 2007.
- . *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-29. Washington, DC: March 17, 2009.
- . *Civil-Military Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-57. Washington, DC: July 8, 2008.
- . *Joint Operations Planning*. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, DC: December 26, 2006.
- . *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*. Joint Publication (JP) 5-00.1. Washington, DC: January 25, 2002.
- . *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, Version 2.0. Washington, DC: December 2006.
- . *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, Version 1.0. Washington, DC: September 2007.
- . *Joint Operation Planning and execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*. CJCSM 3122.01. Washington, DC: July 14, 2000.
- . *Joint Operation Planning and execution System (JOPES) Volume II Planning Formats*. CJCSM 3122.03C. Washington, DC: August 17, 2007.
- Vego, Milan N. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 2007. Reprint, Newport: Naval War College Press, 2009.

-
- Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977.
- Weinburger, Hon. Caspar W. "The Uses of Military Power." Address. National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 November 1984.
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/weinberger.html>
(accessed 13 October 2009).
- Whalen, Richard J. "Revolt of the Generals." *The Nation*. 28 September 2006.
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20061016/whalen> (accessed 14 October 2009).
- White, Thomas E., Robert C. Kelly, John M. Cape, and Denise Youngblood Coleman. *Reconstructing Eden: A Comprehensive Plan for the Post-war Political and Economic Development of Iraq*. Houston, TX: CountryWatch, Inc, 2003.
- Zinni, Tony, and Tony Koltz. *The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.