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Combatant commander leadership is THE critical factor in ensuring robust, operational planning is done for post-hostilities (Phase IV). This can be seen by looking at the Phase IV failures in both Panama and Iraq. Both these Phase IV planning failures followed successful combat operations in Phase III, but the combatant commanders failed to ensure as much effort was put into Phase IV planning as Phase III. In fact, they failed to ensure there was any real plan at all. They failed to focus their staffs and produce an executable plan due to their decisions to separate the combat planners from the post-hostilities planners and OPSEC concerns that killed effective coordination between Phase III and IV. In addition, replacement of the commander of SOUTHCOM just months before Operation JUST CAUSE and the commander of CENTCOM in the months immediately following the conclusion of Phase III in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM exacerbated an already difficult and complex planning environment. Neither commander prepared an adequate plan for Phase IV and the results speak for themselves.

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HOW TO FAIL AT POST-HOSTILITIES PLANNING AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ____________________________

23 October 2009
Abstract

Combatant commander leadership is THE critical factor in ensuring robust, operational planning is done for post-hostilities (Phase IV). This can be seen by looking at the Phase IV failures in both Panama and Iraq. Both these Phase IV planning failures followed successful combat operations in Phase III, but the combatant commanders failed to ensure as much effort was put into Phase IV planning as Phase III. In fact, they failed to ensure there was any real plan at all. They failed to focus their staffs and produce an executable plan due to their decisions to separate the combat planners from the post-hostilities planners and OPSEC concerns that killed effective coordination between Phase III and IV. In addition, replacement of the commander of SOUTHCOM just months before Operation JUST CAUSE and the commander of CENTCOM in the months immediately following the conclusion of Phase III in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM exacerbated an already difficult and complex planning environment. Neither commander prepared an adequate plan for Phase IV and the results speak for themselves.
By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail.

Benjamin Franklin

Much has already been written about the failures in Iraq, and there is no question that much more will be written. All are seeking to understand the unbelievable turnaround from the relative euphoria after the rapid fall of Saddam to the gloom of the quagmire of roadside bombings and mounting death tolls. That we failed to fully capitalize on the military success is without question—what we seek to understand is why?

Was the effort doomed from the start? Most think not and offer a variety of reasons for the failure including doctrine, training, force structure, military/civilian coordination, or the obvious intelligence failure. One author neatly captured what nearly all think about the situation in Iraq following combat operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), “It never had to be this bad.” If we really hope to avoid the same scenario in the future we must understand the issues that led to the failure.

This paper will explore the U.S. failure to succeed in the post-hostilities phase (Phase IV) in Iraq by focusing on the military leadership at the operational level during planning for Phase IV. By looking at two of our most recent failures at post-hostility operations, we unfortunately see that some lessons have not been learned…or even relearned. In both the post-hostility operations in Panama after Operation JUST CAUSE and in Iraq as part of OIF, the combatant commanders made the same fundamental errors. But again we are left with “why?” How did experienced military officers at the end of long and distinguished careers let the situations get so far out of control? The fundamental problem in both cases was the combatant commander. Due to poor decisions to separate combat planning from post-combat planning and near zealous desire for secrecy, plans for Phase IV were never really completed and the limited planning that
was accomplished did not result in anything actually executable. In addition, the change of combatant commanders immediately before the decisive combat operations phase (Phase III) in JUST CAUSE and just after in OIF only served to exacerbate an already complex and difficult planning arena. To be fair, both combatant commanders did win their wars as the “warfighter” must, but by failing to effectively plan for Phase IV their lasting legacy is not nearly so bright. What we will see is that combatant commander leadership is THE critical factor in ensuring robust, operational planning is done for post-hostilities (Phase IV).

This paper will dissect the operational failure to produce a plan for Phase IV in Panama and Iraq by first studying the planning efforts for Operations JUST CAUSE and IRAQI FREEDOM. With an overview of the basic flow of planning for the operations one can see the interaction of Phase III and Phase IV planning and the influences on the failure to produce viable plans for Phase IV. This examination of flawed planning is followed by a consideration of the combatant commanders’ role in the flawed plan. The factors of time, space and force vary greatly across these two operations, but the operational leaders’ failure to plan for Phase IV is one constant. Recommendations for avoiding similar failures in the future flow from this analysis.

PLANNING FOR PANAMA

The road to JUST CAUSE can be traced back to the death of Panamanian dictator General Omar Torrijos in 1981 in a plane crash. His longtime protégé, Manuel Noriega, rose to power in the mid-80s and due to his increasingly hostile actions towards the United States, became a U.S. target. Public accusations of drug running, money laundering, murder and fixing elections by Noriega’s Chief of Staff, Colonel Roberto Diaz, in June 1987 led to indictments by two American grand juries in February 1988 on drug trafficking charges. On 28 February 1988,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a JCS Planning Order to USSOUTHCOM to begin planning for the possibility that U.S. forces would be used against Noriega in Panama.⁴

The resulting draft OPLANs were initially grouped together under the codename ELABORATE MAZE and included phases that could be executed independently, concurrently, or in sequence.⁵ This first draft of the plans included non-combatant evacuation (NEO), force buildup and combat operations. General Woerner, Commander USSOUTHCOM, directed the addition of a plan for restoration of government and services following combat and that his planners should assume he would be in charge of the government of Panama for a period not to exceed 30 days.⁶ The JCS reviewed the drafts and directed renewed focus on independent execution.⁷

Planning continued on the ELABORATE MAZE series throughout the summer of 1989 with the SOUTHCOM/J3 (SCJ-3) responsible for planning combat operations (BLUE SPOON) and the SCJ-5 responsible for BLIND LOGIC, the Phase IV plan. Due to security concerns, planners for each of these phases rarely met and the planners for BLIND LOGIC had no idea what would result from the combat phase.⁸ Commander focus on the Phase IV plan was limited as General Woerner later indicated, “We never anticipated having to do that plan.”⁹ More accurately he never anticipated executing the plan which would later lead to his undoing as the commander.

The plans were placed on the shelf and remained there through the relative calm of fall 1988 through the spring of 1989. In May 1989 Noriega decided to hold presidential elections to increase his legitimacy and assumed that his chosen candidate would win. In spite of his best efforts to stuff ballot boxes and generally rig the election, the opposition candidate for president
won. Noriega quickly annulled the election and aggressively suppressed opposition which again focused U.S. attention on Panama.

BLUE SPOON and BLIND LOGIC came back off the shelf for review and updating. General Woerner directed a scrub of the plans but the assumptions generally remained; Woerner would be in control of Panama for up to 30 days following combat and the SCJ-5 (a staff officer) would plan and execute Phase IV according to BLIND LOGIC.10 As the situation continued to deteriorate in Panama, several major changes occurred which impacted planning. General Woerner was informed of his “retirement” on 6 July 1989 and he would be replaced by General Maxwell Thurman. General Woerner’s continued resistance to U.S. invasion plans and insistence that other means would work to get rid of Noriega lost favor in Washington, and he was notified that, “the President has decided to make a change.”11 General Thurman used August and September 1989 to prepare for the sudden change of course as he had no experience in the AOR and as of 1 October would be in charge.

General Thurman quickly took charge of BLUE SPOON planning and directed multiple changes to the plan including finally deciding that XVIII Airborne Corps would plan and execute combat operations instead of his ground component, U.S. Army South (USARSO).12 He made the decision to have XVIII Airborne Corps plan and execute based not only on the corps’ planning capacity but also his own belief that his staff and that of his components were incapable of accomplishing the job.13 His focus on BLIND LOGIC, the post-hostilities plan, was nowhere near as clear and he would characterize this as the greatest mistake of his military career.14 BLIND LOGIC still called for SCJ-5 to both plan and execute Phase IV and in November 1989, just one month before the invasion, USARSO and SCJ-5 presented the plan to change the execution agent to USARSO. This proposed change, however, never took root and it would fall
to SCJ-5 to execute the plan in December 1989 following the invasion which would be renamed Operation JUST CAUSE. The Director of Operations on the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Kelly, decided BLIND LOGIC would also be a poor name for the post-hostility operations in Panama and chose Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY as more befitting the skill and purpose required.\(^{15}\)

The result of incomplete planning, limited coordination due to excessive secrecy, poor command and control arrangements, limited force structure and a host of problematic assumptions was not surprising. Looting broke out immediately following the invasion and while damage was extensive, perhaps more importantly, over 200 civilians were killed in the effort to capture Noriega.\(^{16}\) The removal of Noriega was relatively easy compared to running an entire country with limited democratic history, corrupt government officials at all levels, a depleted treasury, and rundown infrastructure. The United States was eventually able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, but not due to the “BLIND LOGIC” resulting after two years of planning.

**PLANNING FOR IRAQ**

On 11 September 2001 the United States was attacked by terrorists resulting in the deaths of over 2,500 Americans. CENTCOM was quickly tasked to plan for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan and the war kicked off the following month. In the midst of this planning and execution effort, on 27 November the Secretary of Defense directed CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks to begin planning for possible action in Iraq.\(^{17}\) The Joint Chiefs of Staff formalized this direction with a JCS Planning Order on 1 December.\(^{18}\) With action possible as soon as spring 2002, CENTCOM immediately began another massive planning effort.
Throughout the next six months CENTCOM would continue planning a successive iteration of Phase III plans that used fewer and fewer forces with less and less time to build up. ENDURING FREEDOM and planning for Iraq consumed the planning staff and the planning iterations generated constant briefings and innumerable PowerPoint slides. Assumptions concerning what would happen in Iraq after combat operations led to little Phase IV planning before July 2002. General Franks assumed CENTCOM would only have to stabilize the situation and turn it over quickly to civilians for the building of Iraq. By July 2002 CENTCOM had already conducted wargames at least five times on their plans for combat, none focused on post-hostilities. In July CENTCOM would, however, also get the unwelcome news that they were going to be responsible for planning Phase IV.

Exhausted after planning two iterations of the plan for Iraq and the invasion in Afghanistan, the CENTCOM staff set about a half-hearted effort to plan for Phase IV. Even in August 2002, General Franks was still telling his staff that State would lead the planning effort. As the months passed, the Joint Staff became concerned with the lack of Phase IV planning and began to take matters into their own hands. The JCS Chairman, General Richard Myers, directed his staff to begin planning a military organization that would secure post-war Iraq. They decided a new organization, JTF-IV, would be stood up under a one-star to plan for Phase IV and provide the core staff for the organization that would go to Iraq. Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, an Army civil engineer, was selected in December 2002 and sent to CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa with little in the way of resources to effectively plan. The end result of his organization’s effort was a 32-slide PowerPoint brief that in no way resembled an executable, Phase IV plan.
The next round of planning commenced with the establishment of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (OHRA) by a National Security Presidential Directive on 20 January 2003. Under the direction of retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, OHRA would be the agency in Iraq that would actually execute Phase IV. One month later, Garner called together all the agencies that should have been planning Phase IV since November 2001. It was not a pretty picture. With less than a month until the start of combat operations in Iraq, “There was no plan,” recalled an attendee.

There really was no time left to develop a robust plan for Phase IV. The wasted months could not be regained and the hope that the situation in Iraq would not get out of control was the only course of action. On 5 March 2003, General Franks went to the White House for his final pre-war presentation to the president. President Bush asked him about Phase IV and Franks replied simply that the concept was to have “mayors” in every major Iraqi town. The war began less than two weeks later on 19 March 2003.

ANALYSIS OF FAILURE

There is plenty of blame for the failures to produce effective plans for Phase IV in Panama and Iraq, but this paper focuses on the operational issues the combatant commanders could control. Certainly the operational-level commander is ultimately responsible and in the case of both Panama and Iraq the combatant commanders’ decisions to bifurcate planning under extreme security were fundamental planning flaws. In addition, while the combatant commanders effectively had Unity of Command for planning purposes, the change of commanders in both SOUTHCOM before the war and CENTCOM immediately after the war, impacted the unity which vests authority with a single commander. Exploring each of these
areas in more detail will more clearly show the direct impact the combatant commander had on the planning failure.

Two Paths to Failure

In planning for Operation JUST CAUSE and OIF the combatant commanders bifurcated the planning process. Planning is a continual process in any combatant command and is a major effort in the commands. Panama is just one country in SOUTHCOM requiring the attention of the commander, but the importance of the Panama Canal clearly adds importance to planning in that country. Iraq is clearly of incredible importance in the CENTCOM AOR and has been so since DESERT STORM, but there are many other areas requiring the attention of the combatant commander, to include Afghanistan when General Franks began planning for OIF. For operations in both Panama and Iraq, the commands had over 18 months to plan before the invasions. What was not so clear at the time, however, was that the plans would be executed.

Without certainty that the Phase IV plans for JUST CAUSE or OIF would even be executed, the combatant commanders focused their attention on the most dangerous scenario facing them if they had to execute—Phase III. If and only if they had to execute Phase III would Phase IV be required. Both commanders bifurcated their planning, but for different reasons. For JUST CAUSE, planning for Phase IV under General Woerner was handed to his SCJ-5 and generally worked on by temporary duty Civil Affairs planners. General Woerner felt comfortable separating the planning for Phase III and IV due to his view of the non-sequential nature of the plans in the ELABORATE MAZE series. Each plan was designed to be executed independently and this allowed, in his words, ―discrete planning for each phase.‖ After replacing him as the commander, General Thurman had just months to work on Phase III and as he himself admits focused precious little attention on Phase IV. General Franks actively
avoided planning for Phase IV as he readily accepted the SECDEF assumption that a lengthy Phase IV would not be required. He focused his staff on producing a steady stream of new plans to satisfy SECDEF requirements and only reluctantly accepted a Joint Staff team to plan Phase IV. This again allowed General Franks to focus his attention almost entirely on Phase III.

The impact of the bifurcation of the planning was to effectively remove the Phase IV planning from the combatant commander’s radar screen. Without their focus, the limited planning staffs were left to essentially plan in the dark for one of the combatant commander’s low priorities. And in both JUST CAUSE and OIF, combat operations commenced with no real plan for Phase IV. This lack of an effective plan resulted in consequences that could not be quickly overcome no matter how much attention was focused on the efforts at the end of hostilities. The operational functions of command and control and logistics help illuminate this point. Failure to plan ahead for both these functions generally results in serious consequences in both war and the post-war. Confusing C2 arrangements and a lack of the resources (manpower and dollars) resulted in chaos when the situations on the ground began to unravel in Panama and Iraq. These shortfalls would eventually be recognized and addressed, but the delays would be costly.

The Secret of Our Success

According to Joint Publication 3-13.3, Operations Security, ‘‘The ultimate goal of OPSEC is increased mission effectiveness.” The combatant commanders planning JUST CAUSE and OIF were so focused on OPSEC that they failed to identify the increased risk to their mission effectiveness. The situation in Panama clearly called for an incredibly high awareness of the impact leaks during planning could have had on the situation. Planning for the invasion of a country while you are a guest of that country is certainly sensitive.
In order to start the Phase IV planning, SOUTHCOM had to recruit Civil Affairs planners from the 361st Civil Affairs Battalion. This was due to the fact that the four SCJ-5 Civil Affairs (CA) planners had little actual CA experience and none of them had Top Secret clearances. These temporary planners were brought in on month-long rotations to work at a completely separate location from those planning combat operations. As these small teams of planners finished their month of planning, they would be “read out” of the plan which meant they could not discuss updates they had made with other planners back at their brigade headquarters. The desire to ensure there were no leaks of the ELABORATE MAZE series of plans also meant no interagency coordination was accomplished. General Woerner stated that planning was kept strictly within Department of Defense circles since it involved the invasion of a friendly country and “the very existence of the plan may have become a self-fulfilling prophecy.” General Thurman identified the shortfall in interagency planning as the point “where the post-conflict problem for Panama originated.”

During the planning for OIF, General Franks was also very focused on potential leaks…and rightly so as his first iteration of the plan to invade Iraq was leaked to the press. Just prior to this leak, General Franks briefed his component commanders on his view of leaks. “This command does not leak,” he stated confidently, and followed up with, “We are military professionals, not a bunch of self-serving assholes.” Investigations and rumors at his CENTCOM headquarters only served to add to the stress the staff was under running a war and planning for another. Following a steady stream of leaks of the warplans to the press, a team of Air Force investigators showed up look for the source(s). The investigation did not reveal any leaks, but embittered the staff as nearly all the leaks cited Pentagon sources and came from reporters in Washington D.C. The loss of two laptops in August 2002 was another blow to the
security environment. The laptops were eventually found and an Air Force sergeant was convicted in a court martial.\textsuperscript{37} The compartmented and highly-charged environment made planning more difficult. Planning teams, if fact, didn’t even know the plan by the same name to minimize leaks.\textsuperscript{38} This was undoubtedly devised to help trace leaks when they occurred as well.

Operations security is clearly of great importance to every commander, but these combatant commanders placed such emphasis on OPSEC that their staffs’ ability to plan was compromised. When an extreme focus on security is paired with a bifurcated planning staff it nearly impossible for the staffs to coordinate their activities. The result in these two operations was a poorly developed and uncoordinated post-hostilities plan.

**Changing Horses in Mid-Stream**

Once again we see tremendous similarities at the operational command level in JUST CAUSE and OIF. Leaders always retain the ability to choose their subordinates, but the impact to the operations in these cases was a major factor in the failures in Phase IV. In Panama, General Woerner had a tremendous amount of experience in not only the region but the country itself. General Woerner began his tour as commander of SOUTHCOM in 1987 and had already been asked to extend his tour an additional year beyond the normal two-year tour. Fluent in Spanish, General Woerner had traveled and lived extensively in the AOR throughout his career and had served as a brigade commander in Panama.\textsuperscript{39} This experience led him to downplay either the need or probability of an invasion. He conducted the planning as directed by the JCS Planning Order, but viewed it as more of “a training experience” for his staff.\textsuperscript{40} His criticism of a lack of a comprehensive strategy for Panama and the region before the House Appropriations defense subcommittee and in a speech to the American Chambers of Congress in early 1989 helped seal his fate.\textsuperscript{41}
General Thurman found out in July 1989 that his retirement was cancelled and he was headed to a region completely foreign to him. While General Woerner may have been seen as having “gone native,” General Thurman said he had something Woerner never had: the trust of senior leaders in Washington.42 He poured himself into preparing for the assignment over the next two months before his change of command. After a crash course at the Defense Language Institute and his own self-studies, General Thurman pronounced that he was “pretty well ingrained into the issues and what needed to have my early attention.”43 What needed his early attention was the plan for the invasion of Panama and his attention would be consumed by Phase III—understandable given his experience and the limited time available, but with predictable impact on his focus on Phase IV. His plan had no interagency coordination, confusing C2 arrangements, and vague plans to bring democracy to Panama.44

In Iraq the situation for planning Phase IV was different in that a single commander took the planning effort through combat operations. Once the decision to go with Franks for the invasion was made, the result was that he would quickly retire after the invasion as the conquering hero. Just one month after commencing the invasion, in May 2003 the Pentagon announced his retirement. General Franks took over at CENTCOM in June 2000 and would normally have been expected to rotate out and either retire or perhaps become the Army Chief of Staff in the summer of 2002. The attacks of 9/11 changed that equation very quickly. After briefing the President on the plan for OIF in December 2001, the SECDEF called him to ask if he would stay for another year as he had passed his — or exams.” As General Franks described in his book American Soldier, “If America went to war in Iraq, it would likely be on my watch.”45 This meant General Franks own plan to retire in the summer of 2002 would have to be placed on hold for exactly one year.46
General Franks planned for the invasion of Iraq for over one year with the knowledge that he would retire at the end of combat operations. One can never know for sure, but this certainly seems to have focused his attention on the war and only reinforced the assumptions that no Phase IV would be necessary, and even if it did become necessary, it would be someone else’s problem. CENTCOM itself never really planned for Phase IV. A group sent by the Joint Staff under a one-star was under-resourced, shoved into a corner at CENTCOM headquarters and ended up producing little of use. As we saw in Panama, the C2 arrangements that were in place at the beginning of the invasion was confusing and completely inadequate for the situation as was the availability of resources (again manpower and dollars) to be of any real impact. The operational functions of command and control and logistics would again be glossed over with the absence of any real planning effort.

RECOMMENDATIONS

*Two Paths to Failure*—Successful planning for post-hostilities (Phase IV) is incredibly complex, and successful execution can only occur with success in the decisive combat phase (Phase III). So what’s a warfighter to do? Should they continue to focus primarily on Phase III since it is so hard to plan for Phase IV? The combatant commander will continue for the foreseeable future to have the ability to lead planning for Phase IV since no other agency currently has the capacity. It is not as simple, however, as just identifying a group of planners to focus on Phase IV as was done in both JUST CAUSE and IRAQI FREEDOM. In both operations, a separate group of planners was directed to develop a Phase IV plan in relative isolation from the planning for Phase III. The combatant commanders also focused their energy and attention on the ‗war‘ and put their ‗A-Team‘ on their priority. The result was that we won the war, but lost the after war.
There is no easy prescription in doctrine for bifurcation malady. In fact, planners for Phase III and Phase IV will almost certainly be separate groups since their plans are complex and, though related, quite different. The combatant commander must focus his energy equally on both phases. What are the warning signs that bifurcation has crept into your planning process and is destroying the ability to succeed in the after war? You wargame Phase III and do not wargame Phase IV. The combatant commander gets a steady stream of briefings on Phase III with no like briefings on Phase IV. Planners from Phase III and Phase IV do not meet constantly to discuss how their plans interact. This list is by no means complete, but outlines some symptoms of illness that will cripple Phase IV before the war even begins.

_The Secret of Our Success—Failure_—There are obviously extremely good reasons to focus on OPSEC during planning for a campaign. That “loose lips sink ships” is not in question. The combatant commander must be aware, however, that an overzealous or misdirected OPSEC effort can also lead to mission failure. Planning by SOUTHCOM for JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY was certainly sensitive and the fact that planning occurred in the country itself made OPSEC an obvious issue. When OPSEC inhibits the flow of information between the very military members that have to complete the planning, however, those decisions must be made with great care and a recognition of the risks. At CENTCOM headquarters, leaks of warplans and lost computers served to heighten the focus on OPSEC and greatly impacted communications between the bifurcated planning staffs. Combatant commander must identify OPSEC procedures and practices that allow not only effective communications in the military planning circles, but also allows sufficient interagency coordination to plan for Phase IV. This must be exercised on a regular basis to ensure the capability is more than just a concept.
Changing Horses in Mid-Stream—Unity of command is a fundamental principle of war, and over time our joint doctrine has evolved to the point where a single combatant commander is responsible for the campaign. Unity of command can also be damaged by changing the single commander invested with the authority to plan. There is always the possibility that a change will have to be made either due to a loss in confidence or even reasons such as health or another overriding leadership concern. What must be recognized, however, is the danger to Phase IV planning. General MacArthur not only fought and won the war in the Pacific during World War II, he also stayed on for years afterward to ensure the success of Phase IV in Japan. Our combatant commanders are on two-year contracts with an option to extend. The geographic combatant commanders command vast regions encompassing extremely complex issues. Is two years enough to have any hope of establishing the relations and the deep level of understanding necessary to succeed in war and the after-war? The continuity a longer stay in the geographic combatant command posts would bring would more than offset the hampering of upward mobility in the general officer ranks. There are just a handful of these positions and given the constant changes in the world today, this one simple change is a prudent move.

CONCLUSION

Planning for war is an incredibly complex and difficult activity. Our “warfighters” as the combatant commanders are often called, have done an extremely effective job of directing the planning efforts for combat. Our failures to effectively plan for the after combat, or Phase IV, in both Panama and Iraq can be traced at the operational level to the combatant commanders. In both cases their decisions to bifurcate the planning for Phase III and Phase IV and their extreme focus on OPSEC led to poorly developed plans for Phase IV which then led to failures in the initial Phase IV efforts. Changing combatant commanders either immediately before or after
combat ops also exacerbated the tendency to focus on Phase III planning at the expense of Phase IV. The military must look to the warning signs of poor Phase IV planning such as bifurcated planning staffs, extreme OPSEC focus which inhibits staff communication and coordination, and a change of command immediately before or after combat operations. These warning signs were evident during the planning efforts in Panama and Iraq and if history is any guide, they will be seen again.
NOTES

3 This book as well as the article by Torrisi are based on extensive interviews conducted with both Gen Woerner and Gen Thurman. The taped interviews were never transcribed, are classified and remain in the possession of the author. John T. Fishel, “The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama”, (research paper, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 1-2.
4 Ibid., 7.
5 Ibid., 7.
6 Fishel, 7.
8 See Schultz, 17-19 and Fishel, 7-10.
9 Fishel, 13.
10 Ibid., 18.
12 Ibid., 25.
13 Ibid., 25.
14 Ibid., 30.
15 Cole, 74.
16 Ibid., 94.
19 Franks, 424.
23 Ibid., 142.
24 Ricks, 79.
25 Woodward, 283.
26 Ibid., 109-110.
27 Franks, 428.
28 Torrisi, 15.
29 Ibid., 30.
31 Fishel, 14.
32 Ibid., 15.
33 Shultz, 18.
34 Ibid., 19.
35 Franks, 383.
36 Hooker, 10-11.
38 Franks, 399.
39 Torrisi, 14.
40 Ibid., 14.
42 Torrisi, 23.
43 Ibid., 24.
44 Shultz, 70-71.
45 Franks, 361.
46 Ibid., 360.
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