**Who Should Have the Hammer?**  Leadership of SSTR Planning and Operations

**Abstract**

"Who Should Have the Hammer? Leadership of SSTR Planning and Operations." It is easy to point fingers when it comes to our collective shortfalls in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) planning and execution. Recent attempts at refining direction and organization have gone a long way towards developing constructs to achieve better unity of effort across USG entities, specifically the Departments of State and Defense. However, shortfalls remain in U.S. ability to plan and execute SSTR operations as dictated. This paper argues that DoD should lead planning and execution of SSTR operations as it is the only department with the planning expertise and capacity to set conditions for executing key tasks in order to achieve national strategic objectives. Data on defining the key tasks associated with SSTR and current guidance from executive and departmental branches is provided. Additionally, a brief examination of key historical operations is discussed, and capacity, capability, and expertise to execute the common key tasks is addressed. Finally, conclusions on these topics and U.S. ability to execute as written across the USG departments and agencies are suggested, and recommendations to maximize capacity and synergy to better set conditions to achieve national strategic objectives in SSTR operations are provided.
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WHO SHOULD HAVE THE HAMMER? LEADERSHIP OF SSTR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

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Abstract

*Who Should Have the Hammer? Leadership of SSTR Planning and Operations.* It is easy to point fingers when it comes to U.S. collective shortfalls in Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) planning and execution. Recent attempts at refining direction and organization have gone a long way towards developing constructs to achieve better unity of effort across USG entities, specifically the Departments of State and Defense. However, shortfalls remain in U.S. ability to plan and execute SSTR operations as dictated. This paper argues that DoD should lead planning and execution of SSTR operations as it is the only department with the planning expertise and capacity to set conditions for executing key tasks in order to achieve national strategic objectives. Data on defining the key tasks associated with SSTR and current guidance from executive and departmental branches is provided. Additionally, a brief examination of key historical operations is discussed, and capacity, capability and expertise to execute the common key tasks is addressed. Finally, conclusions on these topics and U.S. ability to execute as written across the USG departments and agencies are suggested, and recommendations to maximize capacity and synergy to better set conditions to achieve national strategic objectives in SSTR operations are provided.
INTRODUCTION

Recent experience in Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations has been less than perfect. Many books have been written, with more sure to follow, on U.S. successes and failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. Much discussion on the topic is related to “ownership” and the ultimate responsibility of the stabilization and reconstruction effort. Some of the discussion involves in-depth analysis of what went wrong while others look to place blame on the responsible “entity.”

It is easy to point fingers when it comes to U.S. collective shortfalls in SSTR planning and execution, but in this case a “look in the mirror” is more appropriate for all involved. The U.S. did not get it right in Afghanistan, and unfortunately many of the same planning and execution errors were repeated in Iraq. The errors span across the collective US Government, but particularly involve DoD, DoS and many of the defense related interagency players.

In 2005, likely as a result of interagency coordination issues with respect to ineffective Phase IV operations conducted in OPERATION Iraqi Freedom, National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 was produced which clarified governmental management of reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Additionally, DoD Directive 3000.05 was developed which clearly delineated DoD roles and responsibilities in SSTR operations. Additionally, a Joint Operating Concept (JOC) for “Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations” was authored which further expanded on these roles and responsibilities. On the Department of State side of the equation, the

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1 U.S. President, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, pp. 1
2 U.S. Department of Defense, DoDD 3000.05, pp.1
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was chartered to improve the coordination and transition to the post-hostilities phase. In April 2005, S/CRS drafted “Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Essential Tasks.” This document outlined the Department of State approach to defining the key tasks for US transitions beyond combat operations.

These new organizational efforts and documents moved some of the ambiguity associated with roles and responsibilities into more clearly defined lanes; however, it can be argued that many “holes” remain in U. S. ability to effectively plan and execute SSTR operations as dictated in NSPD-44 and associated DoS/DoD instructions. The transition to SSTR operations in any campaign is absolutely crucial to the effective and timely regeneration of long-term regional stability. In addition to the obvious benefit of returning a nation to self-sufficiency, effective transitions also enable quicker withdrawal of forces and allow much needed reconstitution and preparation time for follow-on requirements.

Although SSTR is a single “phase” in the much larger campaign plan, the interdepartmental and interagency coordination required for success in this phase is crucial. It is important to understand the successes and failures of previous operations and the tasks associated with planning and executing all phases of major operations. As with any objective, a synergistic effort that matches capability and capacity toward the objective should be the goal. As tasks for SSTR operations are dissected, it becomes apparent the current guidance for planning and executing phase IV operations does not account for limited capacity within organizations that have responsibility for operations and tasks within this phase. This paper argues that DoD should lead the planning and execution of SSTR

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4 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
5 U.S Department of State, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” pp.1
operations as it is the only department with the planning expertise and capacity to set
conditions for executing key tasks in order to achieve national strategic objectives.

This paper begins with a discussion on how SSTR operations are dissected into key
tasks, primarily as defined by the Departments of State and Defense. Additionally, current
guidance and history as it relates to both planning for and executing post-hostilities
operations will be presented with an additional focus on the capability, capacity and expertise
within the Departments of State and Defense. Conclusions are drawn as to the executability
or potential “mismatches” in guidance. Finally, recommendations are proposed to maximize
synergy within the USG departments and agencies. This paper will not address command
and control arrangements or organizational structures. Although many historical examples
could be used for case study purposes to highlight both positive or negative attributes, only a
few examples are briefly discussed as they relate to the thesis.

**DISCUSSION**

*Termination* is discussed first among the elements of operational design
because effective planning cannot occur without a clear understanding of the end
state and the conditions that must exist to end military operations. Knowing when
to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is key
to achieving the national strategic end state. To plan effectively for termination,
the supported JFC must know how the President and SecDef intend to terminate
the joint operation and ensure its outcomes endure. “6

Within the context of major operations, what is the objective? This is a very short but
vitally important question. Knowing the strategic and operational objective is essential to
effectively plan and execute all operations. As stated very well in JP 5-0 above, termination
criteria set the conditions and drive the operation to ensure the planning and execution
produce enduring outcomes. The objective guides all government organizations and agencies

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through the phases of conflict and enables unity of effort. Defining clear objectives is especially important for SSTR operations, which invariably employ a much wider spectrum of government and civilian agencies. The DoD’s Joint Operating Concept on the subject addresses this well: “During SSTR operations, the primary focus of U.S. policy carried out by U.S. military forces, civilian government agencies, and, in many cases, multinational partners, will be on helping a severely stressed government avoid failure or recover from a devastating natural disaster, or on assisting an emerging host nation government in building a „new domestic order” following internal collapse or defeat in war.”

Unity of effort across all U.S. government agencies is important and should continue through all phases until the indigenous civil authority regains control and sovereignty. Any transition of leadership during execution should be completely understood, fully agreed and “all-encompassing”. Leadership transitions should ensure contiguous unity of effort in order to continue proper sequencing and synchronization of key tasks toward the operational objective.

**KEY TASKS**

To determine key leadership considerations for planning and execution of SSTR operations, it is very important to understand phase IV and associated tasks. As with any discussion involving more than one governmental department or agency, many definitions exist and many methodologies surface on how phase IV should be executed. Between 1992 and 2008, there are at least ten references that attempt to quantify and qualify the key components of stabilization operations.

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8 U.S Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Operation Planning,” pp IV-34

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The Department of Defense breaks down Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction in the Joint Operating Concept. Key areas, called Major Mission Elements (MME’s) are:

- Establish and maintain a safe, secure environment
- Deliver humanitarian assistance
- Reconstruct critical infrastructure and restore essential services
- Support economic development
- Establish representative, effective governance and the rule of law
- Conduct strategic communication

The State Department defines the sub-phases slightly differently. First, the methodology includes three time-based sub-phases: Initial Response (short-term), Transformation (mid-term), and Fostering Sustainability (long-term). Within each phase, five separate technical sectors are identified to build a composite task-based matrix which covers approximately fifty pages of text. These sectors are:

- Security
- Governance and Participation
- Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being
- Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure
- Justice and Reconciliation

In addition to the State and Defense department attempts to define the key tasks, many additional agencies and think-tanks have conducted analysis aimed at defining the key components. A few key institutions who have defined stability operations requirements include: United Nations (UN), Rand Corporation, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and the US Army. Figure 2 below

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9 Ibid., pp. iii.
10 U.S Department of State, “Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks,” pp i-ii.
breaks down these various attempts to define and categorize the key tasks for SSTR operations.

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Figure I. SSTR Key Tasks. (Schmoer, SSTR Operations, slide 19)

Upon examination, the common key tasks between the State and Defense departments are: Security, Humanitarian Assistance, Governance, Economic Development, and Reconstruction. The importance of security is noted in all studies and is paramount to enable accomplishment of the remaining key tasks. As such, military presence is important in most stability efforts to set conditions for effective SSTR operations. The remaining key tasks
definitely involve essential players from the entire spectrum of USG departments and agencies.

A final consideration when analyzing key tasks for the operation is the fact that transition from phase III (Conflict) to phase IV (Stability) is generally not a clearly defined or “black and white” instance in time. Generally, although the majority of SSTR operations occur during the initial post-hostilities phase, some SSTR tasks occur in varying degrees through all phases of an operation. The operational factor of time should be addressed both in planning and execution specifically as it relates to the extent security is attained within any given area and the ability of the government and civilian agencies to support the overall SSTR tasks.

Although the transition may extend over some time increment, the criticality of the initial efforts to set conditions favorable to stability is paramount to success. According to Stephenson, these initial efforts are akin to the “golden hour” in trauma care. In medicine, the “golden hour” is the first hour after injury when survivability is exponentially increased with proper treatment. Stephenson follows that in SSTR operations, the “golden hour” falls inside the first year post-hostilities where popular support and successful transformation require steadily improving conditions. In order to remain ahead of the enemy, take first advantage of this “golden hour,” and achieve pre-conditions for reconstruction efforts, this suggests the U. S. military should be directly involved in the planning and initial execution of SSTR operations to establish stability as the nation’s “first responders.”

CURRENT GUIDANCE

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12 Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour, pp. i.
Current guidance for SSTR operations is amazingly clear…from the President down through the departments. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 directly addresses “coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states…in transition from conflict or civil strife.”\(^\text{13}\) The directive covers in detail the overall policy and designates specific responsibilities to the Secretary of State which include “lead integrated United States Government efforts…to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”\(^\text{14}\) Specific responsibilities are defined for other executive departments as well as coordination guidelines.

Internal State Department guidance as outlined in the S/CRS mission statement is clear yet more narrowly focused on coordination and civilian capacity. The S/CRS mission is “to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition…”\(^\text{15}\) Direction for execution involves both crisis response planning and long-term scenario based planning and revolves around committee “triggers”, concurrence from regional and local State personnel, and conditional stand up of teams within the Interagency Management System.\(^\text{16}\)

Defense Department guidance is detailed in DoD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for SSTR Operations.” This document fully complies with higher guidance and clearly delineates specific responsibilities of the department through specific guidance to service secretaries, under-secretaries, and commanders. Of note, DoD policy retains stability

\(^\text{13}\) U.S. President, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, pp. 1
\(^\text{14}\) Ibid., pp. 1
\(^\text{15}\) U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
operations as a core military mission, and also states the following caveat: “Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or US civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians can not do so.” This caveat may suggest that DoS is expected to be in the lead in an area where historically they could not feasibly execute, had no desire, or lacked proper direction. A brief look back at previous stability operations provides additional insight into the need for military forces to be prepared for this potential eventuality.

HISTORY

History points to multiple examples of military leadership in planning and executing post-hostility reconstruction efforts. Even within the last half-century, it is difficult to find an effort not led by the military. There are instances where State department lead was desired, but few found during research where State truly led the planning or execution of stability operations. As an example, in the World War II European theater, President Roosevelt desired civil rather than military leadership of the reconstruction efforts in Germany.

“President Roosevelt still remained convinced that civil administration, as opposed to Military government, was the proper course. In June 1943, he directed Secretary of State Cordell Hull to establish the Office for Economic Coordination (OFEC), an inter-departmental organization charged with setting U.S. international economic policies. FDR suggested to Hull that an OFEC director might be assigned to each liberated country and act as the single point of contact between the military theater commander and civilian agencies. Eventually, the OFEC director and his staff could assume postconflict administrative duties from the military. The idea failed to progress when Secretary Hull successfully argued that the State Department „could not support the radical reorganization that would be required before assuming such broad administrative responsibilities.” No other civilian agency stepped forward to claim it

17 U.S. Department of Defense, DoDD 3000.05, pp.2
could assemble the requisite number of people, supply them, and deploy them to assigned areas. In September 1943, OFEC quietly was dissolved. In November 1943, the President reluctantly directed the War Department to take charge of planning civilian relief and administration, noting, “it is quite apparent that if prompt results are to be obtained the Army will have to assume the initial burden.”  

In many military operations over the last 50 years, the Department of Defense has led both the planning and execution efforts in the post combat operations phase. The U.S. military is normally “first on the scene” when combat operations cease; therefore, initial execution of SSTR operations invariably falls into the scope of DoD responsibility. More importantly, a brief examination of successful reconstruction efforts point to an “early” beginning to planning and a focused, but broadly synchronized and coordinated execution effort, almost always led by the U.S. military.

Some would argue that history reveals bad examples of Defense leadership and therefore points to other leadership options. U.S. troubles in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan are recent examples of these. However, it is arguable that troubles in Vietnam trace directly back to the Johnson administration’s micromanagement, while Iraq’s misfortunes can be traced to issues revolving around DoD’s selection of civilian leadership without the resident expertise in the full spectrum of SSTR operations. While it is agreed there are both good and bad examples of leadership in reconstruction efforts, it is easy to find good examples of DoD leadership. World War II, both in Germany and Japan, are examples of thoroughly planned and well executed efforts led by the military. Regardless of which successful reconstruction is studied, the common theme among them is the fact that planning efforts started well in advance of execution. In every successful case studied, SSTR was NOT an afterthought and responsibility for planning and execution was clearly stated early in process. Additionally,

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18 McCreedy, Planning the Peace, pp. 717-718.
all successful efforts employed unity of effort as a basic principle and involved in-depth coordination across the international community of military, diplomatic, economic and informational players.

Looking at “near-term” history, DoD leadership is evident in all U.S. current stability and reconstruction operations. A brief “hop” through the television channels or a brief skim of any major newspaper reveals discussions on strategy and execution from leading military commanders. Names like Petraeus and McChrystal are well known for their involvement in the current efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq; however, the name of the current Director of S/CRS seems to be missing from current discussions on the issue. It is ignorance, or irony, that the S/CRS Director seems to be an unknown entity in today’s SSTR efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq? This point in no way undermines the massive efforts which are presumably ongoing throughout DOS, yet it seemingly points to actual leadership of the effort. An analysis of the capacity, capability and expertise within DoD and DoS may shed additional light on the question.

**CAPACITY, CAPABILITY AND EXPERTISE**

“Integrating the interagency community effectively can be vital to successful military operations, especially during theater shaping and during the stability and enable civil authority phases of an operation when JFCs may also operate in support of other United States Government agencies. JFCs and their staffs must consider how the capabilities of the agencies or other nongovernmental organizations can be leveraged to assist in accomplishing military missions and the broader national strategic objectives. JFCs should coordinate directly with interagency representatives within their operational areas during planning to ensure appropriate agreements exist that support their plans.  

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19 U.S Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Operation Planning,” pp. xii
Words are important. As such, it is always good to start with definitions. Capacity, according to Merriam-Webster, is the “facility or power to produce, perform or deploy.” Capability is the “quality or state of being capable [having the attributes required for performance or accomplishment].” Expertise is “skill of an expert [having, involving, or displaying special skill or knowledge derived from training or experience].”

Within the Department of State, primary responsibility for SSTR operations lies within the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). S/CRS, which is “charged with leading the coordination of SSTR efforts” is comprised of 113 personnel, of which 33 make up the planning division. The planning division is tasked with leading planning efforts of U.S. stability operations and reconstruction in countries emerging from conflict. Of note, the S/CRS team is staffed from multiple departments and agencies. Team members come from DoS, DoD, USAID, CIA and Treasury. This suggests there is minimal intrinsic capacity within DoS to lead the planning and execution of major operational stability operations. How does this compare to DoD?

Within Department of Defense, responsibility for SSTR involves multiple organizations to include policy, intelligence, and public affairs. However, the primary responsibility flows down through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to one of five Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and eventually resides with a Joint Force Commander (JFC). Each GCC commander is responsible for maintaining and executing a Theater Security Cooperation plan within their respective geographic-assigned area. This plan in effect encompasses Phase 0 (Shape) of the overall campaign plan and “wraps around”

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20 Merriam-Webster Online, *Dictionary*
21 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
22 U.S. Department of Defense, *DoDD 3000.05*, pp.4-7
23 Ibid., pp. 8-9
to support efforts during and following Phase 4 (Stabilize). Within each GCC, planning efforts are primarily handled in the J-5 (Policy and Plans) directorate but are supported by other directorates to include the J-2 (Intelligence) and J-3 (Operations). As an example looking at FY06 numbers, the CENTCOM GCC alone employs over 2,100 personnel with a significant number supporting the planning function. The PACOM GCC employs upwards of 4000 personnel. Although most are uniformed military, the GCC’s also employ permanent members from other areas to include the State department and the Central Intelligence Agency. Additionally, each GCC maintains a ready capability to easily increase capacity with trained augmentees supplied by the uniformed services. Finally, the JFC will normally have an indigenous planning staff to further compliment overall capacity.

Capability, capacity and expertise undoubtedly reside within both the State and Defense Departments. It is arguable, however, these exist at different and widely varying degrees of depth and scope within each department. Sheer numbers of personnel support a much larger planning capacity in Defense, and capability is arguably derived in S/CRS only due to its “interagency” staffing and stand-up of interagency teams within the IMS construct. Expertise is significant in both departments, although it can be argued that expertise in “planning” resides continuously in the GCC while “nation-building” expertise resides in the State Department.

Opposing viewpoints challenge that key tasks for SSTR operations are outside the military’s core “job description” and more accurately reside in the State Department lane. Although certain key task expertise definitely resides in State, it can be argued that expertise in each task also lies within Defense with the potential exception of economic development.

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Security and initial governance fall within DoD purview, and DoD maintains great capacity and expertise in certain reconstruction tasks through its fielded combat engineer teams. With respect to humanitarian assistance, there can be no argument against the military expertise and capacity as proven over dozens of relief efforts through the last few decades. It can also be argued that State’s capacity is truly realized only through heavy assistance from other departments and agencies.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The analysis of this paper found many guiding documents to define key tasks associated with conducting stability operations. It is evident that disagreement exists in departmental efforts to define the key tasks involved in SSTR operations. Differences in methodology only serve to complicate U. S. ability to fully integrate and deliver unity of effort towards achieving operational objectives.

Current guidance directing DoS to lead the planning and execution of SSTR operations is clear. Although the guidance is clear, it is debatable whether it is fully executable as written. With current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq both centered on CENTCOM military commanders and planners, it can be concluded that if not executable as written, the current guidance is at least not the desired approach for some reason.

Analysis strongly suggests successful historical SSTR operations were planned well in advance of execution. Additionally, these successful efforts include early decision on leadership as well as a full-spectrum approach and interagency coordination. Effective SSTR operations are multi-dimensional and require sufficient time to adequately plan and coordinate.

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25 U.S. President, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, pp. 1
Additionally, the Department of Defense has historically been the only department with the true capacity to lead the planning effort as well as a majority of the key task execution. “Current” history also shows military in leadership of SSTR operations. As such, history supports the Defense Department as the choice for leading SSTR planning and execution. However, current ability must be applied to historical analysis in order to draw accurate conclusions.

With respect to today’s ability, it can be concluded that capability and expertise to lead planning efforts for SSTR operations reside in both the State and Defense Departments. However, as the common key tasks are analyzed it becomes apparent that the overall capacity and expertise in planning strongly supports the GCC staff(s) for leading the effort. The transition from planning to execution also favors the capacity in Defense as the military will almost always be the only department with enough personnel to ensure coverage of all key locations and thereby set conditions for remaining tasks.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Both departments contain capability and expertise, albeit in different areas and to varying degrees. However, only the Department of Defense truly has the capacity to lead the complicated planning and execution of SSTR operations, especially in the early transition to post-combat operations where security is being ensured at different intervals. As such, DoD should retain the lead for planning and execution of SSTR operations. Executive direction should be changed to delineate DoD lead until such time as stability can be ensured for an effective transition of leadership to the State Department for reconstruction. Guidance should mandate key State involvement to properly incorporate the expertise that resides in our State professionals.
Identifying common key tasks is critical to ensure unity of effort and to ensure maximum synergy and efficiency in execution of SSTR operations. Although many efforts from various organizations have produced very thoughtful tasklists, efforts should be taken to combine the “best of the best” for a common set of SSTR planning and execution across the USG. Identification for leadership in SSTR operations should take into account the requirement for resident knowledge of the full spectrum of tasks associated with the phase.

Additionally, current guidance which dictates exercises and war-gaming to test leadership options and force interdepartmental and interagency coordination needs continual focus and support across the departments. The first time personnel from different SSTR planning organizations meet should not be when the armistice or cease-fire agreement is signed.

The most defining recommendation gained from history is the need to determine leadership for SSTR operations well in advance of execution. Early determination allows planning efforts to properly coordinate across organizations and ensures a full-spectrum approach to solutions. All successful stability and reconstruction efforts maintain this common theme.

Leadership does not imply dictatorship. Much to the contrary, it implies responsibility. Although conclusions point to the intrinsic DoD capacity, it must be understood that true expertise in rebuilding the instruments of governance and civil society inherently reside in our State Department professionals. As such, a fully coordinated effort of all USG departments and agencies to maximize the capability, capacity and expertise of each is recommended. All organizations with interest or expertise in the operations should be involved at an appropriate level to ensure proper ability to influence.
Much like the factors that drove the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, the “jointness” of our collective national security team needs improvement, especially in the areas of planning and execution. Although “joint” is arguably not the correct term, the important implications include the lack of a common language, a common approach to problem-solving, and unity of effort in execution through true leadership of interdepartmental cooperation and coordination. A “joint” State/Defense document outlining “doctrinal” guidelines for key principles and language would go a long way towards synergizing Phase IV operations.

Although beyond the scope of this paper, the proper organizational integration of Defense and State personnel into a cohesive team is key. The recently formed AFRICOM geographic combatant command shows promise in its effort to combine the synergistic capabilities, capacity and expertise of its respective personnel. SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM also offer different but viable options for integration. These models should be closely monitored and evaluated as potential organizational solutions to many of the issues discussed in this paper relative to SSTR operations.
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