U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians

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**U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians**

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Summary

Since the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993 and the establishment of limited Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1994, the U.S. government has committed over $3.5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians. Since the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, U.S. assistance to the Palestinians has been averaging about $400 million a year. During the 1990s, U.S. foreign aid to the Palestinians averaged approximately $75 million per year. Despite more robust levels of assistance this decade, Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Hamas’s heightened role in Palestinian politics have made it more difficult to implement effective and lasting aid projects that serve U.S. interests.

U.S. aid to the Palestinians has fluctuated considerably over the past five years, largely due to Hamas’s changing role within the Palestinian Authority (PA). After Hamas led the PA government for over a year, its forcible takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 led to the creation of a non-Hamas government in the West Bank—resulting in different models of governance for the two Palestinian territories. Since then, the United States has dramatically boosted aid levels to bolster the PA in the West Bank and President Mahmoud Abbas vis-à-vis Hamas. The United States has appropriated or reprogrammed nearly $2 billion since 2007 in support of PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s security, governance, development, and reform programs, including $650 million for direct budgetary assistance to the PA and nearly $400 million (toward training, non-lethal equipment, facilities, strategic planning, and administration) for strengthening and reforming PA security forces and criminal justice systems in the West Bank. The remainder is for programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development and implemented by non-governmental organizations in humanitarian assistance, economic development, democratic reform, improving water access and other infrastructure, health care, education, and vocational training. In December 2009, Congress approved $500 million in total FY2010 assistance pursuant to P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010.

Because of congressional concerns that, among other things, U.S. funds might be diverted to Palestinian terrorist groups, much of this aid is subject to a host of vetting and oversight requirements and legislative restrictions. Experts advise that PA stability appears to hinge on improved security, economic development, Israeli cooperation, and the continuation of high levels of foreign assistance. The possibility of a consensus or unity government to address the problem of divided rule among Palestinians could lead to a full or partial U.S. aid cutoff if Hamas is included in the government and does not change its stance toward Israel. Even if the immediate objectives of U.S. assistance programs for the Palestinians are met, lack of progress toward a politically legitimate and peaceful two-state solution could undermine the utility of U.S. aid in helping the Palestinians become more cohesive, stable, and self-reliant over the long term.
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Introduction

Since the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993 and the establishment of limited Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the mid-1990s, the U.S. government has committed over $3.5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians. This assistance, which includes $500 million appropriated in December 2009 pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117), has focused on the further development of the Palestinian economic, social services, and civil society sectors; and on strengthening the processes, governance, and security-providing capacities of Palestinian Authority (PA) institutions, through partnerships with U.S. and Palestinian organizations. Nevertheless, significant legislative conditions, limitations, and restrictions remain attached to certain aid given to Palestinians.1

Since the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, U.S. assistance to the Palestinians has been averaging close to $400 million a year, with funding levels spiking to more than double the average for FY2009 to address (1) humanitarian needs in Gaza during and after the December 2008-January 2009 Israel-Hamas Gaza conflict; and (2) reform, security, and development priorities in the West Bank. Since 2007, the United States has appropriated or reprogrammed nearly $2 billion in support of PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s security, governance, development, and reform programs, including $650 million for direct budgetary assistance to the PA and nearly $400 million in security and criminal justice sector assistance for the PA in the West Bank. The remainder is for project assistance administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development. During the 1990s, U.S. foreign aid to the Palestinians averaged approximately $75 million per year. Despite more robust levels of assistance in the past decade, Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Hamas’s heightened role in Palestinian politics have made it more difficult to implement effective and lasting aid projects that serve U.S. interests. Contributions from the United States to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (which have been made since the time of UNRWA’s inception in 1950) have continued.

Overview and Recent Developments

The level of U.S. assistance to the Palestinians—among the largest per capita recipients of foreign aid worldwide2—has fluctuated considerably since it was initiated following the establishment of limited Palestinian self-rule in the mid-1990s. Fluctuations have been particularly significant over the past three years—due mainly to the on-again, off-again role of Hamas within the Palestinian Authority (PA). Hamas is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the U.S. State Department. After the 2006 Hamas victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections, U.S. assistance to the Palestinians was restructured and reduced. The United States halted direct foreign aid to the PA but continued providing humanitarian and project assistance to the Palestinian people through international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The ban on direct assistance continued during the brief tenure of a Hamas-led unity government (February

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1 See P.L. 111-117, Secs. 7034-7040. These conditions include a restriction on aid to Hamas (including Hamas affiliates and any government of which Hamas is a member) or to a Palestinian state unless commitments toward peaceful coexistence with Israel are made and other requirements met by certain Palestinian parties.

to June 2007). During that time, the United States and the other members of the international Quartet (the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia) unsuccessfully demanded that Hamas accept the “Quartet principles”—recognition of Israel’s right to exist, renunciation of violence, and acceptance of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements.

Subsequent events, however, altered the situation dramatically. In June 2007, Hamas forcibly took control of the Gaza Strip. PA President Mahmoud Abbas (head of the Fatah party), calling the move a “coup,” dissolved the unity government and tasked the politically independent technocrat Salam Fayyad to serve as prime minister and organize a new PA “caretaker” government in the West Bank. Within days, the United States lifted its economic and political embargo on the PA.

The Bush Administration and Congress then boosted U.S. aid levels in hopes of fostering an economic and security climate conducive to Palestinian statehood. The revival of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations for a final-status agreement in conjunction with the Annapolis Conference of November 2007 provided further impetus for U.S. economic support of the institutional and societal building blocks deemed crucial for Palestinian self-governance. The Obama Administration has thus far advocated a similar approach.

In March 2009, the Obama Administration pledged $900 million in U.S. assistance to the Palestinians to address both post-conflict humanitarian needs in Gaza and reform and development priorities in the West Bank. The pledge was exceeded by appropriations made in the Omnibus Appropriation Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) and the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32). P.L. 111-32 also included a provision that applies different conditions than those applied by previous FY2008 and FY2009 appropriations legislation to possible U.S. assistance to a Palestinian power-sharing government that includes Hamas. P.L. 111-117, which provides $500 million in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians for FY2010, applies the same conditions as P.L. 111-32 did for FY2009 supplemental funding.

In the past year, the United States and others within the international community have publicized their efforts to facilitate post-conflict recovery in Gaza. However, Hamas’s control of Gaza presents a conundrum. No one, including Israel and the PA, has figured out how to assist Gaza’s population without bolstering Hamas, and thus aside from humanitarian assistance, the issue has been largely ignored, despite aspirational pledges otherwise. Many observers believe that either Hamas’s positions on the Quartet principles or its control over Gaza would have to change before the United States might consider dedicating substantial resources toward the reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure in Gaza, with the possible exception of U.N. facilities and other special cases such as the American International School (if necessary construction materials can be brought through Gaza’s border crossings).

Types of U.S. Bilateral Aid to the Palestinians

Table 1. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to the Palestinians, FY2004-FY2010
(regular and supplemental appropriations; current year $ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>224.4</td>
<td>148.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>389.5</td>
<td>776.0</td>
<td>400.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.L. 480 Title II (Food Aid)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>19.488</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLEa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>184.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADRb</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition Aid</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>230.4</td>
<td>153.243</td>
<td>69.488</td>
<td>414.5</td>
<td>960.0</td>
<td>502.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: U.S. Department of State, USAID.

Notes: All amounts are approximate; for purposes of this table and this report, “bilateral assistance” does not include U.S. contributions to UNRWA or other international organizations from the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) or Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) accounts, regardless of how the term is defined in legislation.

a. INCLE stands for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement. INCLE figures do not include $86.362 million reprogrammed into the INCLE account by President Bush in January 2007 (see “Direct Assistance to the Palestinian Authority” below).

b. NADR stands for Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs.

c. According to the State Department, the counterterrorism training program for which this funding was contemplated is no longer slated to take place during FY2010.

Table 2. Proposed Spending Plan for FY2010 Bilateral Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
<td>Direct budgetary assistance to Palestinian Authority (PA) in West Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($400.4 million total)</td>
<td>(helping to discharge PA debt obligations, which are primarily incurred in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$150 million</td>
<td>order to pay the salaries of PA employees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$250.4 million</td>
<td>Assistance for the West Bank and Gaza (through USAID)a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• $38 million – governance, rule of law, civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• $93.5 million – health, education, social services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• $95 million – economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• $23.9 million – humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Narcotics</td>
<td>Training, non-lethal equipment, and garrisoning assistance to PA security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Law Enforcement</td>
<td>forces in the West Bank, supporting efforts by the U.S. Security Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($100 million total)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$96 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Project Assistance Through USAID

#### Types of Funding Programs

Most aid to the Palestinians is appropriated through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account and provided by USAID to U.S.-based non-governmental organizations operating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Funds are allocated in this program for projects in sectors such as humanitarian assistance, economic development, democratic reform, improving water access and other infrastructure, health care, education, and vocational training (currently most, if not all, funds for the Gaza Strip are dedicated to humanitarian assistance and economic recovery needs). See Table 2 above for the Obama Administration’s proposed spending plan for FY2010 ESF West Bank/Gaza assistance.

#### Vetting Requirements and Procedures

USAID’s West Bank and Gaza program is subject to a vetting process (for non-U.S. organizations) and to yearly audits intended to ensure that funds are not diverted to Hamas or other organizations classified as terrorist groups by the U.S. government. This vetting process has become more rigorous in recent years in response to allegations that U.S. economic assistance was indirectly supporting Palestinian terrorist groups, and following an internal audit in which

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4 The FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Department of State (Book II), p. 459, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/124072.pdf, stated that “All assistance programs for Gaza funded under this request will, consistent with legislative requirements, work through vetted non-governmental or international organizations to meet U.S. Government objectives in Gaza. Beyond immediate humanitarian relief, successful implementation of programs in Gaza is dependent on the establishment of a durable ceasefire, the creation of an operating environment in which Hamas does not interfere with U.S.-funded programs and activities and greater access for essential materials and commodities to Gaza. The U.S. Government will work with the PA and implementing partners to follow established safeguards that will ensure funding is only used where and by whom it is intended. It will similarly work with the Government of Israel to develop an effective crossings regime that enables the flow of humanitarian and commercial goods without compromising Israeli security concerns.”

5 P.L. 111-117, Sec. 7039(b) sets forth the legal requirements for vetting: “Prior to the obligation of funds appropriated by this Act under the heading ‘Economic Support Fund’ for assistance for the West Bank and Gaza, the Secretary of State shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that such assistance is not provided to or through any individual, private or government entity, or educational institution that the Secretary knows or has reason to believe advocates, plans, sponsors, engages in, or has engaged in, terrorist activity nor, with respect to private entities or educational institutions, those that have as a principal officer of the entity’s governing board or governing board of trustees any individual that has been determined to be involved in, or advocating terrorist activity or determined to be a member of a designated foreign terrorist organization: Provided, That the Secretary of State shall, as appropriate, establish procedures specifying the steps to be taken in carrying out this subsection and shall terminate assistance to any individual, entity, or educational institution which the Secretary has determined to be involved in or advocating terrorist activity.”
USAID concluded it could not “reasonably ensure” that its money would not wind up in terrorist hands.\(^6\)

A February 2009 statement from USAID described its revamped vetting procedures as follows:

All NGOs applying for grants from USAID are required to certify, before award of the grant will be made, that they do not provide material support to terrorists.... Before making an award of either a contract or a grant to a local NGO, the USAID West Bank/Gaza Mission checks the organization and its principal officers, directors and other key personnel against lists maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) within the U.S. Department of Treasury. The Mission also checks these organizations and individuals through law enforcement and intelligence community systems accessed by USAID’s Office of Security. At present, the Mission collects additional information up front in addition to the individual’s full [four-part] name, such as a government issued photo-ID number and the individual’s date and place of birth.... [USAID’s] West Bank/Gaza program possess[es] the most comprehensive partner vetting system for foreign assistance throughout the U.S. Government.\(^7\)

Other sources corroborate the assertion made in USAID’s statement that its West Bank and Gaza program is one of the most, if not the most, rigorously vetted USAID programs worldwide.\(^8\) A May 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that USAID had strengthened its antiterrorism politics and procedures in response to recommendations GAO had made in a 2006 report.\(^9\)

**Direct Assistance to the Palestinian Authority**

According to annual foreign operations appropriations laws, congressionally approved funds for the West Bank and Gaza Strip cannot be given directly to the PA unless the President submits a waiver to Congress stating that doing so is in the interest of national security, and the Secretary of

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\(^6\) “Audit: Terrorists Got U.S. Aid; Agency’s Screening Called Inadequate,” *Chicago Tribune*, November 16, 2007. In February 2008, then-USAID Administrator and Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance Henrietta Fore said, in testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, that Congress’s “strong support and vigilance” was encouraging the adoption of more rigorous vetting measures. Testimony of Henrietta Fore, USAID Administrator and Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Holds Hearing on the Fiscal 2009 Budget for the U.S. Agency for International Development, February 27, 2008.


\(^8\) See Walter Pincus, “Plan for Terror Screening of Aid Groups Cut Drastically,” *Washington Post*, August 30, 2007; *Federal Register*, vol. 2, no. 36, pp. 39042-39044. The statement issued by USAID to CRS on February 5, 2009 directly challenged a recent article’s allegation that USAID had not yet implemented its new “partner vetting system” (PVS) in West Bank/Gaza. See Matthew Levitt, “How Not to Fund Hamas: Scrutinize Those Who Receive U.S. Aid,” *New York Daily News*, February 4, 2009. The USAID statement asserted that the article’s author was probably confusing the already rolled-out West Bank/Gaza pilot PVS with the PVS that was awaiting final approval to be rolled out for USAID’s other worldwide programs.

\(^9\) See GAO, op. cit. A schematic detailing USAID’s vetting process is found on page 42 of the report. GAO did recommend in the report that USAID take steps to ensure that it and its primary contractors use the same rigor at the subcontractor level that they employed in requiring antiterrorism clauses and certifications during their contracting process.
State certifies that there is a single PA treasury account, civil service roster, and payroll. Current law also places conditions on aid to any power-sharing PA government “of which Hamas is a member” (for further discussion, see “Hamas and a “Unity Government”?” and Appendix A below). Even after money is transferred to the PA’s treasury account, the United States retains prior approval of any transactions from that account, along with a three-year power of audit over those funds.

Recent instances in which the United States has provided direct assistance to or for the benefit of the PA as a result of special presidential action include the following:

- In January 2007, President Bush reprogrammed $86.362 million in prior-year funding into the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account to support PA civil security forces loyal to President Abbas (see “U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority” below). Chairwoman Nita M. Lowey of the House Appropriations Subcommittee for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs put a hold on the funds in February 2007, reportedly seeking assurances that they would only be used for non-lethal assistance. Obligation of the funds for non-lethal purposes eventually began in June 2007, the month that the Hamas-led unity government was dissolved and the new Fayyad PA government was formed.

- In June 2007, President Bush issued a waiver to provide an additional $18 million in direct assistance to the PA to be used for a variety of purposes, including democracy assistance and security assistance.

- In February 2008, President Bush issued a waiver to provide $150 million in budgetary assistance to the PA from the ESF account to “avert a serious and immediate financial crisis.” Chairwoman Lowey again declared a hold, requesting greater details about the funds’ allocation. The funds were disbursed to the PA after the State Department delivered a certification (dated March 14, 2008) directly to Chairwoman Lowey stating that the PA had established a single treasury account and a single civil service payroll roster.

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10 See P.L. 111-117, Sec. 7040 (“Limitation on Assistance for the Palestinian Authority”). In the event of a presidential waiver, Sec. 7040 requires the President to submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations “detailing the justification for the waiver, the purposes for which the funds will be spent, and the accounting procedures in place to ensure that the funds are properly disbursed. The report shall also detail the steps the Palestinian Authority has taken to arrest terrorists, confiscate weapons and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure.”

11 Congressional briefing with State Department and USAID officials, July 9, 2009.

12 See Presidential Determination No. 2007-11. Under Chapter 8 of Part I (Section 481) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (as amended): “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized to furnish assistance to any country or international organization, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for the control of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances, or for other anticrime purposes.”


15 See Presidential Determination No. 2007-20.

16 See Presidential Determination No. 2008-12.


18 The certification was required by the 2008 foreign operations appropriations bill. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), Division J, Title III, Economic Support Fund.
In October 2008, another $150 million in budgetary assistance from the ESF account was provided to the PA via presidential waiver.\(^{19}\)

In July 2009, $200 million in ESF money was transferred to the PA in the wake of a waiver issued by President Obama.\(^{20}\)

In November 2009, $75 million in budgetary assistance was provided to the PA under the July presidential waiver as an advance on FY2010 ESF funds, pursuant to a continuing resolution (later appropriated pursuant to P.L. 111-117).

**U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority**\(^{21}\)

As mentioned above, aid has been given to train, reform, advise, house, and provide non-lethal equipment for PA civil security forces in the West Bank loyal to President Abbas in an effort both to counter militants from organizations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and to establish the rule of law for an expected Palestinian state. A small amount of training assistance also has been provided to strengthen and reform the PA criminal justice sector. This assistance has come from the INCLE account—to which a total of $395.4 million (including $100 million in FY2010 funding—see Table 2 above for a description) has been appropriated or reprogrammed for use in the West Bank since 2007.

Since Hamas gained control of the Gaza Strip, Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority, has worked in coordination with the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to help train roughly 400 Presidential Guardsmen and 2,200 National Security Forces troops at the International Police Training Center near Amman, Jordan. The USSC reportedly plans to help organize and train six additional 500-man NSF battalions. Most reports agree that law and order have improved where these PA forces have been deployed. Yet, uncertainty remains over the durability of these improvements and their connection with broader Palestinian economic and civil society development and with progress on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, as well as over the willingness and ability of the forces to incapacitate militants. The USSC/INL program exists alongside a European Union police and justice sector train-and-equip program (known as EUPOL COPPS—the EU Police Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support), and alongside other assistance and training programs reportedly provided to Palestinian security forces and intelligence organizations by various countries, including probable covert U.S. assistance programs.\(^{22}\) The aspiration to fully coordinate international security assistance efforts and to fully consolidate the various PA security forces under unified civilian control that is accountable to rule of law and to human rights norms remains unfulfilled.

Some Palestinians and outside observers assert that the effectiveness and credibility of PA operations are undermined by Israeli restrictions—including curfews, checkpoints, no-go zones,

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\(^{19}\) See Presidential Determination No. 2009-02.

\(^{20}\) See Presidential Determination No. 2009-23.

\(^{21}\) For further information on this subject, see CRS Report R40664, *U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority*, by Jim Zanotti.

and limitations on international arms and equipment transfers—as well as by Israel’s own security operations in the West Bank and its December 2008-January 2009 military campaign in Gaza. Israel claims that its continuing operations are necessary in order to reduce the threat of terrorism emanating from the West Bank. These operations underscore the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian agreements that authorized the creation of Palestinian security forces in the 1990s in areas of limited Palestinian self-rule contained clauses that preserved Israel’s prerogative to conduct operations in those areas for purposes of its own security.

## U.S. Contributions to UNRWA

### Overview

The United States is the largest single-state donor to UNRWA, which provides food, shelter, medical care, and education for many of the original refugees from the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and their descendants—now comprising approximately 4.6 million Palestinians in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza. U.S. contributions to UNRWA—separate from U.S. bilateral aid to the West Bank and Gaza—come from the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account and the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account. Since UNRWA’s inception in 1950, the United States has provided the agency with over $3.5 billion in contributions (see Table 3 below).

The budget for UNRWA’s core activities (general fund) in 2008 was $541.8 million, although the contributions it receives from mostly Western governments, international organizations, and private donors routinely come in under budget (the 2008 funding gap was $87.4 million), forcing the organization to reduce some planned services. UNRWA is concerned that the global economic downturn might worsen its shortfalls. It also creates special emergency funds for pressing humanitarian needs, such as in the wake of the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict. U.S. contributions (which are made from the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) accounts managed by the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)) totaled $268 million for FY2009 ($116 million for the general fund, $152 million for emergency funds) and $185 million for FY2008 ($100 and $85 million, respectively).

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24 For further information on UNRWA, see CRS Report RS21668, *United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)*, by Rhoda Margesson.

25 According to UNRWA’s website ([http://www.un.org/unrwa/donors/docs/Total_Contributions_to_UNRWA_2008_%20All_Categories_of_Funding.pdf](http://www.un.org/unrwa/donors/docs/Total_Contributions_to_UNRWA_2008_%20All_Categories_of_Funding.pdf)), U.S. contributions in 2008 constituted approximately 18.4% of the UNRWA General Fund budget and 23.4% of the total budget. Aggregate contributions from the European Commission and European states (including both EU members and non-members) and regions constituted approximately 60% of the total budget.
Table 3. Historical U.S. Government Contributions to UNRWA
(in $ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year(s)</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Fiscal Year(s)</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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</tr>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>123.0</td>
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<td>69.0</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>134.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>127.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>108.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>137.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>154.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>184.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>268.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,661.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* U.S. Department of State

*Notes:* All amounts are approximate.

Until the 1990s, Arab governments refrained from contributing to UNRWA’s budget in an effort to keep the Palestinian refugee issue on the international agenda and to press Israel to accept responsibility for their plight. Since then, most Arab states have made relatively small annual contributions.

In Gaza, most observers acknowledge that the role of UNRWA in providing basic services (i.e., food, health care, education) takes much of the governing burden off Hamas. As a result, some complain that this amounts to UNRWA’s enabling of Hamas and is an argument militating for its activities to be discontinued or scaled back. However, many others, U.S. and Israeli officials included, believe that UNRWA plays a valuable role by providing stability and serving as the eyes and ears of the international community in Gaza. They generally prefer UNRWA to the uncertain alternative that might emerge if UNRWA were removed from the picture. It is not clear whether the tensions that arose between Israel and UNRWA during the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict over casualties among UNRWA staff and Palestinian civilians and damage to U.N.-marked property that resulted from Israeli military operations will have a significant and/or lasting effect on UNRWA’s future operations in Gaza.

26 See FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Department of State (Book I), p. 73, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123415.pdf: “The FY 2010 request also includes continuing strong support to UNRWA as the sole UN agency providing education, health, and other assistance to over 4.6 million Palestinian refugees, funding that is critical to meeting basic humanitarian needs that otherwise would likely be met by extremist groups, particularly in Gaza and Lebanon. The ongoing crisis in Gaza highlighted UNRWA’s critical role in meeting the humanitarian needs of Palestinian refugees and fostering regional stability.”

Issues for Congress—Vetting and Oversight

Some observers, including a former general counsel for UNRWA, have criticized UNRWA for, among other things, insufficient or flawed vetting procedures and engaging in political advocacy. UNRWA and its supporters, however, maintain that UNRWA officials are fulfilling their mandated roles as well as can be expected under challenging circumstances (i.e., UNRWA’s lack of a robust policing capability and other operational limitations, political pressures, security concerns).

In testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs on April 23, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton spoke for the Obama Administration regarding U.S. oversight of contributions to UNRWA:

We have made it clear to UNRWA, the United Nations Relief And Works Agency, that we intend to carefully track any aid that they receive. They have taken additional steps, partly at our urging, to make their process more transparent, consistent with both United Nations commitments and U.S. legislation. They conduct background checks on employees. They share staff lists with us and with Israel. They prohibit staff participation in political activities. They launch investigations upon receiving information from Israel, us, or anyone else about any staff member engaging in inappropriate or illicit activities. They are actually investigating staff members right now who were elected in internal elections within Gaza. And we have pressed them very hard because they have to earn our confidence in this.

The primary concern raised by some Members of Congress is that U.S. contributions to UNRWA might be used to support terrorists. Section 301(c) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (P.L. 87-195), as amended, says that “No contributions by the United States shall be made to [UNRWA] except on the condition that [UNRWA] take[s] all possible measures to assure that no part of the United States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving military training as a member of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerrilla type organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.”

GAO Report—May 2009

The May 2009 GAO report said that, since a previous GAO report in 2003, UNRWA and the State Department had strengthened their policies and procedures to conform with Section 301(c) legal requirements, but that “weaknesses remain.” Neither report found UNRWA to be in


29 A direct written rebuttal by Israeli academic Maya Rosenfeld to the former UNRWA general counsel’s critiques is carried by UNRWA’s website at http://www.un.org/unrwa/allegations/Rejoinder2Lindsay_jan09.pdf. UNRWA also maintains a “Setting the Record Straight” section on its website to address common critiques leveled at the agency, available at http://www.un.org/unrwa/allegations/index.html.


31 See GAO, op. cit.
noncompliance with Section 301(c), and to date, no arm of the U.S. government has made such a finding. The following are some points regarding UNRWA from the 2009 report:

- The State Department has not established written criteria to use in evaluating UNRWA’s compliance with Section 301(c). State officials said compliance is evaluated based on State’s “internal level of confidence that UNRWA has taken all possible measures to ensure that terrorists are not receiving assistance, such as having procedures in place and taking measures to respond to issues that arise.” State has not defined the term “all possible measures,” nor has it defined what would constitute noncompliance with Section 301(c). The report recommended that State consider establishing evaluation criteria, and in a May 6, 2009, response to a draft of the report (included as an appendix), State concurred with GAO’s recommendation and said that it would “work together with UNRWA to develop criteria, as appropriate,” without making further specification.  

- UNRWA said that it screens its staff and contractors every six months and that it screened all 4.6 million Palestinian refugees and microfinance clients in December 2008 (and intends to make this a routine procedure) for terrorist ties to Al-Qaida and the Taliban, pursuant to a list established pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267. UNRWA said that it is unable to screen those of its beneficiaries who are displaced persons from the 1967 war because it does not collect information on those persons. 

- UNRWA’s UN 1267 terrorist screening list does not include Hamas, Hezbollah, or most other militant groups that operate in UNRWA’s surroundings. UNRWA is unwilling to screen its contractors and funding recipients against a list supplied by only one U.N. member state, such as the Department of Treasury’s OFAC list of individuals and entities subject to U.S. sanctions. Nevertheless, UNRWA officials did say that if notified by U.S. officials of potential matches, they would “use the information as a trigger to conduct their own investigation,” which led to the report’s recommendation that the State Department consider screening UNRWA contractors, presumably so that State could alert UNRWA to any potential OFAC list matches. GAO found a few potential matches from among 2002-2009 UNRWA contractors. State said that it is “actively assessing the feasibility of [GAO’s] recommendation.”

- UNRWA has established procedures to investigate inappropriate staff behavior. UNRWA [said] that it seeks information from authorities whenever staff are detained, convicted, or refused a permit or targeted by Israeli military forces. UNRWA officials said they share the names of all UNRWA staff annually with the governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian Authority but have received no information on staff members from these governments.”

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32 Ibid.
34 GAO, op. cit.
35 Ibid.
UNRWA officials said that UNRWA provides assistance “in the context of its humanitarian mandate, meaning that agency policy is generally not to deny education or primary healthcare benefits.” The officials said that if a refugee was denied benefits because of suspected militant or terrorist activities or ties, his or her child “would not be disqualified from attending an UNRWA school.”

Concerns Over Possible Resettlement of Palestinian Refugees

During the consideration of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8), concerns surfaced over rumors being spread via the Internet that part of the Obama Administration’s $20.3 million contribution to UNRWA, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs made on January 27, 2009, from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account in the wake of the Gaza conflict might go toward resettlement of Gazan refugees in the United States. Senator John Kyl proposed S.Amdt. 629 (“To provide that no funds may be used to resettle Palestinians from Gaza into the United States”). Kyl, however, withdrew S.Amdt. 629 after receiving a letter from the State Department assuring him that U.S. funds were not being used to resettle Gazans in the United States. It is unclear whether the parties fueling the rumors were aware that ERMA contributions have been routinely made to UNRWA during past presidential administrations and that aid provided to UNRWA generally goes toward basic living needs and services (i.e., food, health care, education) for the Palestinian refugees over which its mandate exists in the places the refugees are already located (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon).

Notwithstanding the State Department’s assurances that ERMA funds were not being used to resettle Gazans in the United States, some have persisted in voicing their concerns on this issue. In a July 2009 response to a CRS request for further clarification, a State Department official stated:

The United States does not resettle Palestinian refugees who fall under the mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. None of the $13.5 million in ERMA funds authorized in January 2009 for UNRWA was used to resettle Palestinians to the U.S.

The official did acknowledge that some Palestinian refugees located outside of the territories within UNRWA’s mandate, particularly some located in Iraq, are being processed for resettlement to the United States.

The U.S. has recently resettled Palestinian refugees from Iraq, who are under the responsibility of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Absent any other durable solution for these individuals, UNHCR has referred for resettlement over 1,500 Palestinians from the Al-Waleed refugee camp in Iraq near the Syrian border to countries that resettle refugees, including the U.S. We are currently processing these individuals and hope to admit many of them by the first quarter of FY2010. In all, 1,350 individuals of Palestinian origin are currently being processed for U.S. resettlement, over 95% of whom are from the Al-Waleed refugee camp. We have also resettled a small number

36 Ibid.
37 CRS correspondence with State Department official, July 1, 2009.
of Iraq-resident Palestinians who were closely associated with the U.S. mission or other U.S. entity in Iraq.\textsuperscript{38}

The official explained that these refugees are screened for potential security risks.

Palestinians from Iraq undergo screening as if they were Iraqi citizens, including the enhanced security checks undergone by all Iraqi refugee applicants. These procedures consist of name and biometric checks against various additional U.S. Government databases to ensure that the applicants pose no known security risks.\textsuperscript{39}

**Legislation**

Critiques of UNRWA's operations are routinely raised, and some Members of Congress have supported legislation or resolutions aimed at increasing oversight of the agency, strengthening its vetting procedures, and/or capping U.S. contributions. H.Rept. 111-151 contained a provision from the joint explanatory statement capping contributions to UNRWA at $119 million for its operations in the West Bank and Gaza from FY2009 funds appropriated pursuant to P.L. 111-32. This provision also required a report from the Secretary of State to the Committees on Appropriations no later than 45 days following the enactment of P.L. 111-32 on various UNRWA self-policing and transparency-promoting activities, including measures UNRWA takes to comply with Section 301(c) of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act relating to preventing assistance to terrorists.\textsuperscript{40} The same reporting requirement, without an accompanying cap on contributions, applies under P.L. 111-117 for FY2010.

**Factors in Determining Future Aid**

**Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance in Strengthening the PA in the West Bank**

Instability in the Palestinian territories is, paradoxically, both a major reason for the increases in U.S. assistance over the past three years and a factor that could lead some to oppose maintaining or boosting current aid levels. After Hamas's takeover of the Gaza Strip and dismissal from the PA in June 2007, the United States made assisting the PA with economic development and civil security—aimed at bolstering the standing of President Abbas and the Fayyad government—a higher priority. Yet, if the PA in Ramallah is unable, at a minimum, to achieve and maintain popular legitimacy and competent control in the West Bank, U.S. reluctance to provide resources

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} See H.Rept. 111-151, Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, Title XI, “Migration and Refugee Assistance.” Also during the 111th Congress, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the Ranking Minority Member on the House Committee for Foreign Affairs, has sponsored H.R. 557 (United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2009), which includes a section entitled “Withholding of United States Contributions to UNRWA,” with over 100 co-sponsors; and Representative Steven Rothman has sponsored H.Con.Res. 29 (“Expressing the sense of Congress that the United Nations should take immediate steps to improve the transparency and accountability of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) in the Near East to ensure that it is not providing funding, employment, or other support to terrorists”) with over 30 co-sponsors. Both H.R. 557 and H.Con.Res. 29 were referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in January 2009.
and training might increase, given concerns that aid could be used against Israel or Palestinian civilians, either by falling into the hands of Hamas or otherwise. Some observers argue that U.S. assistance does not enhance the legitimacy of Abbas and the PA, but rather detracts from it by leading some Palestinians to conclude that the PA is too beholden to the United States. This debate intensified in 2009 and carried over into 2010 as Abbas faced challenges to his political standing that were related to the Gaza conflict and to unsuccessful attempts at obtaining an Israeli settlement freeze as a prelude to restarting Israeli-Palestinian final-status peace negotiations.

Economic Development and International Donor Assistance

The appointment in June 2007 of Salam Fayyad, a former World Bank and International Monetary Fund official, as PA prime minister raised hopes for Palestinian reform and economic growth that have been realized in part. Fayyad produced a Palestinian Reform and Development Plan for 2008-2010 (PRDP) that helped garner major international donor assistance pledges and promises of investment. International pledges of support, however, have proven insufficient to cover the PA’s monthly budgetary expenses, occasionally requiring last-minute efforts by Fayyad to obtain outside assistance. Concerns over meeting expenses appear likely to continue unless the March 2009 pledges in Egypt result in substantially heightened contributions to the PA treasury. The ultimate success of Fayyad’s PRDP appears to hinge on two factors: keeping the public sector solvent enough to sustain long-term private sector development, and getting Israeli restrictions loosened or lifted on the movement of goods and people both within and out of the West Bank and Gaza.

Several high-profile projects—housing developments, industrial parks, superstores, entertainment complexes—have been completed or are in various stages of proposal or construction in and around Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho and the northern West Bank in an effort to jumpstart private sector development. Yet, most analysts advise against drawing the conclusion that the overall economy has turned a corner. In an October 2009 Washington Post interview, Fayyad acknowledged that the West Bank economy was growing at a rate of 8%, if not even more, but questioned whether this growth was sustainable.


42 For additional information on economic development prospects in the Palestinian territories, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. Israeli restrictions on movement have been a key factor in the Palestinian economic downturn since the second Palestinian intifada (which began in late 2000), and the closure of Gaza crossings following the Hamas takeover in June 2007 has led to a near economic standstill there. The International Crisis Group has referred to a UNDP official’s estimate that it would take five years for Gaza to be restored simply to the unenviable state in which it was immediately before the recent conflict began in December 2008. International Crisis Group, Gaza’s Unfinished Business, Middle East Report No. 85, April 23, 2009.

43 Some of these ventures have been supported by U.S. organizations—including the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Aspen Institute, the Center for American Progress, and CHF International—affiliated or involved with a public-private partnership known as the Middle East Investment Initiative. See http://meiinitiative.org.

44 See Lally Weymouth, “‘Institution building’ in Palestine,” Washington Post, October 23, 2009. Many Israelis emphasize an International Monetary Fund projection of 7% growth for the West Bank in 2009 and the loosening of some Israeli Defense Forces obstacles to Palestinian movement. Nonetheless, some Palestinians and international analysts assert that actual and prospective economic development should not be overstated because the Palestinian economy continues to be propped up by external aid, and uncertainty remains regarding movement and access and regarding progress in negotiations with Israel. See The World Bank, Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid, Access and Reform—Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, September 22, 2008, available at (continued...)
Congress has indicated an interest in staying abreast of the economic assistance Arab states provide to the West Bank and the PA. The joint explanatory statement to the conference report attached to P.L. 111-117 reads:

The conferees direct the Secretary of State to provide a report to the Committees on Appropriations not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act on international participation, including by Arab states, in the economic development of the West Bank and support for the Palestinian Authority, similar to that proposed by the House. This report may be submitted in classified form, if necessary.45

Arab states (especially Gulf states) provided large amounts of aid to the Hamas-led PA government in 2006-2007 after the United States and European Union withdrew their aid, but following the reinstitution of U.S. and EU aid in mid-2007, most of them reduced contributions.46 Routinely, they make generous pledges (including over $1.8 billion dollars in the wake of the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict) of aid to the Palestinians, but often fulfill them only in part and after significant delay.47 Their reluctance to fulfill pledges may stem from misgivings over “picking sides” in Palestinian factional disputes and from concerns that without imminent prospects either for domestic political unity or for progress on the peace process, any money contributed could be a waste. On the part of the Gulf states in particular, reluctance may also stem from a feeling that they are less responsible historically for the Palestinians’ current situation than Israel, the United States, and Europe.

However, several of the West Bank investment projects discussed above are backed by Gulf states or their citizens. Also, both Palestinian mobile phone providers, Jawwal/Paltel and the newly established Wataniya, are majority-owned by Gulf state investment companies.48

## Hamas and a “Unity Government”?

If efforts at unifying Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza under the leadership of President Abbas or those who might succeed him in the Fatah movement and the PLO—either through elections or political achievements that increase Fatah’s legitimacy—appear unlikely to succeed, cohesion might be promoted through a consensus or unity PA government that is acceptable to both Fatah and Hamas. Egyptian-facilitated efforts to reach agreement on such a government—which remain ongoing—have been unsuccessful since the collapse of the last one following Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in June 2007. Reportedly, the unity negotiations have been

(...continued)

45 H.Rept. 111-366.


47 Following international pressure, Saudi Arabia contributed $200 million to the PA’s budget in summer 2009. See Press Briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey D. Feltman, New York, NY, September 26, 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2009/129669.htm. Smaller budget support contributions in 2009 were made by the Saudis and other Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, and Oman. Information provided to CRS from State Department, June 2009.

48 For more information on Wataniya’s launch and the Palestinian mobile phone marketplace, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
complicated by differing factional views on various questions. These questions include how to integrate PA and Hamas security operations, when and how to conduct Palestinian presidential and legislative elections, and whom to appoint to government positions. A consensus or unity government may or may not significantly depart from the development and reform objectives set by the Fayyad government that are used as a major justification for current U.S. aid levels. The continuation of U.S.-sponsored PA security reform efforts (see “U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority” above), which are aimed at consolidating all Palestinian forces under a single, civilian-led chain of command, could be particularly difficult for Hamas and its militia to accept.

Regardless of the objectives of a consensus or unity PA government, were it to include Hamas without the acceptance of the “Section 620K principles” (recognition of “the Jewish state of Israel’s right to exist” and acceptance of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements—named after the section in the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-446) that sets them forth) by all of the government’s ministers, current law would require the United States to cease direct aid to the PA (see Appendix A), and there could be calls for cessation or for limits on other economic assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. Future debates might focus on whether to relax or to tighten these restrictions, on which Palestinian party/ies should be answerable for accepting and complying with the Section 620K principles, and on whether the President might be granted discretion to waive aid restrictions relating to a unity government under certain conditions and/or for specific purposes.

Assuming that the United States chooses not to engage with and/or contribute to a PA government that includes Hamas, future debates might take place over the degree to which the United States should actively dissuade others in the international community—particularly European and Arab actors—from engagement and contributions.

**Questions Regarding a Two-State Solution**

Even assuming that the immediate objectives of U.S. assistance to the Palestinians—relieving humanitarian needs in Gaza and improving security and facilitating development in the West Bank—are met, a failure to achieve progress toward a politically legitimate and peaceful two-state solution could undermine the utility of U.S. aid in helping the Palestinians become more cohesive, stable, and self-reliant over the long term. The Obama Administration has emphasized

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49 Various proposals regarding government composition include a government composed fully of independent “technocrats,” one with formally non-aligned technocrats who have various factional leanings, and one with actual Fatah and Hamas members.

50 See P.L. 111-32, Sec. 1107. See also Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-446).

the United States’s continued commitment to a two-state solution, and appointed former Senator George Mitchell as its Special Envoy for Middle East Peace in January 2009.

Nevertheless, many factors may complicate prospects for a negotiated two-state solution in the near term. One is discord within and among Palestinian factions—reflected geographically by divided rule in the West Bank and Gaza. Another is the right-wing Israeli government in power since April 2009 under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that has attached provisos—such as demilitarization—to any consideration on its part of the concept of an independent Palestinian state. Yet another is the physical entrenchment of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and of obstacles to Palestinian movement within the West Bank and in and out of both the West Bank and Gaza, together with its political and socioeconomic consequences. A fourth is the possibility of course-changing events—such as a major terrorist attack, a surprise election outcome, or an outbreak of war—occurring in the Palestinian territories, Israel, or elsewhere in the region.52

52 For further discussion of this issue, see CRS Report R40092, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti.
Appendix A. Hamas’s Role in a “Unity Government”—Different Approach to Aid Conditions?

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) includes a provision that would allow aid to be provided to a power-sharing PA government of which Hamas is a member (see “Hamas and a “Unity Government”??” below) if the President certifies that such a government, *including all of its ministers*, has publicly accepted and is complying with the principles found in Section 620K(b)(1)(A) and (B) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-446).53 These “Section 620K principles”—related to the Quartet principles—refer to (1) a public acknowledgment of the Jewish state of Israel’s right to exist and (2) commitment and adherence to previous international agreements (including the Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, commonly known simply as the “Roadmap”).54 The version of the provision in P.L. 111-32 regarding aid to a potential power-sharing PA government that was found in the Obama Administration’s FY2009 supplemental budget request did not specify whether all of the government’s ministers would have to join in accepting and complying with the Section 620K principles.55 This specification was made through the markup process in both Committees on Appropriations.

Each of the provisions regarding a potential power-sharing PA government under FY2008 and FY2009 appropriations legislation (P.L. 110-161, P.L. 110-252, P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-32) has only remained effective during the particular cycle to which it has pertained, and only with respect to the funds appropriated. The provision in P.L. 111-117 follows this pattern. Thus, it does not change any underlying, permanent legislation that pertains to funding authorization, but may only affect appropriations for the cycle to which it pertains. This is in keeping with the general legislative proposition that conditions explicitly attached to yearly appropriations generally do not last beyond the relevant appropriations cycles, unlike stand-alone legislation that does.

The provision in P.L. 111-117 (which is identical to an analogous provision in P.L. 111-32) may make conditions under which a power-sharing PA government might receive U.S. assistance less stringent than conditions attached to FY2008 legislation and the FY2009 omnibus. Some might maintain that by focusing on the behavior of the PA government, rather than Hamas as an organization, the conditions on aid to the PA in P.L. 111-117 might be more in line with the focus found in the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-446) and in executive branch policy

53 See P.L. 111-117, Section 7040(f).
54 See P.L. 111-117, Section 7040(f); Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-446), Section 2(b)(2). The text of P.L. 111-117, Section 7040(f)(1)-(2) reads, “None of the funds appropriated ... may be made available for ... any power-sharing government of which Hamas is a member... [However,] assistance may be provided to a power-sharing government only if the President certifies and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that such government, including all of its ministers or such equivalent, has publicly accepted and is complying with the principles contained in section 620K(b)(1)(A) and (B) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.”
55 Language within the FY2009 supplemental request explaining the proposed provision to designate a PA power-sharing government (instead of Hamas) as the Palestinian party subject to the presidential certification clause stated, “It is expected that such a power-sharing government would speak authoritatively for the entire Palestinian Authority government, including its ministries, agencies and instrumentalities.” Office of Management and Budget, FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Request, April 9, 2009, p. 96.
(under both the Bush and Obama Administrations) than the FY2008 and FY2009 omnibus conditions. National Security Council spokesman Benjamin Chang said of the provision (when first proposed in FY2009) that it was “consistent with our policy. It would prohibit assistance to a government that does not accept the Quartet principles but would preserve the president’s flexibility to provide such assistance if that government were to accept and comply with the Quartet principles.”56 The exact correspondence of the provision in P.L. 111-117, when taken in concert with P.L. 109-446 and other existing legislation, with the Quartet principles could be subject to interpretation.57 Such an interpretation could hang on the definition of such terms as “power-sharing government of which Hamas is a member” and “Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority.”

If the President does not certify that a power-sharing PA government including Hamas has accepted and is complying with the Section 620K principles, P.L. 111-117 permits the President to provide aid to either the PA president or judiciary—by means of a Section 620K(e) waiver on national security grounds—if they are not members of or controlled by Hamas or another foreign terrorist organization.58 A similar waiver authority allowed the Bush Administration to provide aid to PA President Mahmoud Abbas and his own security forces during the time of the Hamas-controlled government in 2006-2007.

In a House committee hearing on the FY2009 supplemental request held on April 23, 2009, Secretary of State Clinton defended the Administration’s proposed provision on a power-sharing government as follows:

this is a critically important time in the Middle East, and we don't know what will come from these ongoing [Palestinian unity] talks in Cairo. But if what emerges from these talks is a unity government that abides by the Quartet principles, we do want to have the authority to deal with that government in the peace process or negotiations that might possibly develop. Before providing any such waiver, the administration will consider all the relevant facts, including who these people were, what their role in the government was, to make sure this meets our standards and our national interest.59

One week later, at an April 30 Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on the FY2009 supplemental request, Secretary Clinton defined the Administration’s view regarding which parties within a potential PA unity government might need to commit to the Quartet principles for the government to be eligible for U.S. funding:

56 Adam Graham-Silverman, “Bid to Ease Conditions on Aid to Palestinians Faces Tough Scrutiny,” CQToday, April 17, 2009.

57 For example, the provision in P.L. 111-117 does not expressly refer to Section 620K(b)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by P.L. 109-446 (pertaining to progress on issues including but not limited to counter-terrorism and institutional reform). Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen has stated that this language appears “to ignore requirements for the dismantling of the Islamist militant infrastructure and the halting of incitement before the P.A.—before a P.A. effectively controlled by Hamas could be eligible for U.S. funds.” See Transcript of House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing: “New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration,” April 22, 2009.

57 Adam Graham-Silverman, “Bid to Ease Conditions on Aid to Palestinians Faces Tough Scrutiny,” CQToday, April 17, 2009.

58 See P.L. 111-32, Section 1107; P.L. 109-446, Section 2(b)(2).

What we have said is that if there were to be, which at this moment seems highly unlikely, a unity government that consisted of the Palestinian Authority members from Fatah and any members from Hamas, the government itself, plus every member of the government, would have to commit to the Quartet principles. Namely, they must renounce violence, they must recognize Israel, and they must agree to abide by the former PLO and Palestinian Authority agreements.60

It is unclear to what extent this statement reflects the Obama Administration’s legal interpretation of the provision that has been included in P.L. 111-117, and to what extent it reflects the Administration’s policy view regarding the circumstances that might justify a presidential waiver and/or certification to authorize direct assistance to a potential unity government.

To defend the hypothetical notion of tolerating the possibility of Hamas members serving in a PA government that would accept the Quartet conditions and/or the Section 620K conditions, Clinton pointed out at the April 23 hearing that “we are currently funding the Lebanese government, which has Hezbollah in it” because of a U.S. interest in supporting a government working to prevent the “further incursion of extremism.”61 She also drew comparisons between the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the peace process in Northern Ireland during the 1990s (with which she was acquainted as First Lady).

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