Developing an Institutionalized Advisory Capability

A Monograph
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The precursor to this monograph “The US Army and Security Force Assistance: Assessing the Need for an Institutionalized Advisory Capability,” utilized three criteria: importance of advisory operations, frequency of advisory operations, and difficulty developing advisory capability to determine if the US Army needs and institutionalized advisory capability. Based on analysis of past advisory experiences, current US Army doctrine, and anticipated future requirements the study concluded that advisory operations will be a frequent and essential element of future operations and that advisory capabilities are difficult to develop when needed. Based on this conclusion the study determined that the US Army does require an institutionalized advisory capability.

Based on this assessed need, the next step, and the purpose of this paper, is to answer the applied question of what characteristics the US Army requires in an institutionalized advisory capability. This paper provides a review of the current discourse within the defense community concerning advisory requirements to help frame the problem and possible solution sets in order to identify key considerations for analysis. The study then utilizes the seven domains of DOTMLPF – doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities – to determine capability requirements. The study bases the analysis of each domain on a wide range of considerations including doctrine, ongoing and past advisory experiences, US Army force management considerations, and input from the ongoing discourse within the defense community on stability and advisory operations. This study does not provide a specific force structure solution, but rather identifies the characteristics the US Army requires in an institutionalized advisory capability.

The most significant domain in this analysis is the organizational domain. The tradeoffs required to create a large standing advisory capability are not acceptable in the context of the anticipated future security environment. Conversely, a purely Brigade Combat Team based advisory capability does not meet the operational needs of the same anticipated future security environment. The US Army requires a range of capabilities that includes both independent advisory capability as well as BCT-based advisory capability. Therefore, the US Army must pursue a hybrid solution that includes an independent advisory capability and does not require a reduction in the number of Brigade Combat Teams. The US Army must also create an advisory command responsible for the resourcing and support of established advisory force structure. These organizational decisions then serve as the driving factor for considerations within the other domains.

Advisory Capability, Security Force Assistance, Force Structure, Host nation security forces, Doctrine
Title of Monograph: Developing an Institutionalized Advisory Capability

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Abstract


The precursor to this monograph “The US Army and Security Force Assistance: Assessing the Need for an Institutionalized Advisory Capability,” utilized three criteria: importance of advisory operations, frequency of advisory operations, and difficulty developing advisory capability to determine if the US Army needs and institutionalized advisory capability. Based on analysis of past advisory experiences, current US Army doctrine, and anticipated future requirements the study concluded that advisory operations will be a frequent and essential element of future operations and that advisory capabilities are difficult to develop when needed. Based on this conclusion the study determined that the US Army does require an institutionalized advisory capability.

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Introduction

Six years into Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) the US Army is still grappling with the issues of how to properly resource the advisory effort in Iraq. As the need for an advisory capability in Iraq developed in 2003, the US Army was unprepared to resource this requirement. As a result, the advisory effort progressed through a series of resourcing solutions from the internal resourcing of advisory teams from units and assets assigned to the theater, to the external sourcing of advisory teams from the general Army force structure, to the utilization of existing Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) restructured into Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AABs). Throughout this progression, the US Army experienced a wide range of difficulties including doctrinal, organizational, personnel, and training challenges. A cursory review of these challenges supports the need for an institutionalized advisory capability in order to avoid similar unpreparedness in future operations. However, US Army force management decisions occur within the context of a finite budget and personnel endstrength and require thorough analysis to justify capability needs and requirements.

The precursor to this paper, “The US Army and Security Force Assistance: Assessing the Need for an Institutionalized Advisory Capability,” addressed the conceptual question of whether or not the US Army needs an institutionalized advisory capability.1 This study concluded that the US Army requires an institutionalized advisory capability and provides the detailed justification for this assessment. Based on this assessed need, the next step, and the purpose of this paper, is to answer the applied question of what characteristics the US Army requires in an institutionalized advisory capability.

The first section of this paper summarizes the analysis and conclusions of the previous paper in order to establish the need and justification for an institutionalized advisory capability. The second section provides a review of the current discourse within the defense community concerning advisory requirements. The purpose of this review is to help frame the problem and possible solution sets in order to identify key considerations for analysis. The third section, and focus of this paper, analyzes the requirements for an institutionalized advisory capability. The analysis will utilize the seven domains of DOTMLPF – doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities. Analysis of each domain requires a wide range of considerations including doctrine, ongoing and past advisory experiences, US Army force management considerations, and input from the ongoing discourse within the defense community on stability and advisory operations. By analyzing the seven DOTMLPF domains based on the identified considerations, this study seeks to determine the characteristics an institutionalized advisory capability requires to address the doctrinally anticipated future operating environment. This paper will not provide a specific force structure solution, but rather will identify the characteristics the US Army requires in an institutionalized advisory capability.

**Justification for an Institutionalized Advisory Capability**

In the absence of additional funding and personnel, the development of new operational capabilities comes at the cost of eliminating or reducing other capabilities. Therefore, any justification for the development of an institutionalized advisory capability must rationalize the resultant costs. An analysis of current doctrine, ongoing advisory operations, and past advisory experiences based on three criteria – operational importance of advisory operations, difficulty developing advisory capability, and frequency of advisory requirements – provides a basis for justifying the development of an institutionalized advisory capability. If the analysis determines that advisory capability will be an important element of future operations, will be required
frequently, and is difficult to develop when required, then the development of an institutionalized advisory capability can be justified.

A review of current doctrine indicates both a frequent and essential role for a range of advisory operations in future conflicts, from limited efforts focused on specific aspects of a host nation security force to comprehensive efforts providing support for an entire host nation security force from the institutional level to tactical level. According to Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, “America is at war and should expect to remain fully engaged for the next several decades in a persistent conflict against an enemy dedicated to U.S. defeat as a nation and eradication as a society.” The enemy threat “will focus on creating conditions of instability, seek to alienate legitimate forces from the population, and employ global networks to expand local operations.” To address this threat, FM 3-0 states that all US Army operations focus on “reducing the violence level and creating conditions that advance U.S. national strategic goals. Commanders conduct a series of operations intended to establish conditions conducive to a stable peace.” Stability operations applied across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to general war, set the conditions for stable peace and transition of responsibility to a host nation government. According to FM 3-07, Stability Operations, “stability operations were likely more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat operations.”

Development of host nation governance capacity, which includes the military task of security force assistance, represents a key tenet of stability operations. Field Manual 3-07

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2 Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 27 February 2008), vii.
3 Ibid., 1-5.
4 Ibid., 2-2.
5 Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 6 October 2008), 1-3.
6 Ibid., vi.
7 Ibid., 1-8.
defines security force assistance as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.”\textsuperscript{8} Doctrine thus identifies operational requirements for a spectrum of advisory efforts from limited to comprehensive efforts across the spectrum of conflict from stable peace to general war.\textsuperscript{9} Doctrine also indicates that advisory operations will be frequent and essential element of future operations.\textsuperscript{10}

Ongoing US Army operations represent the opening actions of the era of persistent conflict referenced in FM 3-0, and therefore provide an applicable model for future conflict. Currently, the US Army conducts a wide range of advisory operations. In many cases, such as the limited efforts in the Philippines, Colombia, and Africa, planned advisory operations are the primary means of applying military power. In other cases, such as the comprehensive effort in Iraq, advisory operations emerged as an unforeseen requirement driven by the dismantling of the Iraqi military structure and emergence of an insurgent threat. Current operations establish a paradigm in which advisory capability is utilized both as a planned asset and as an unexpected requirement of other operations.

In each of these cases, advisory efforts emerged as essential elements of US operations either as the primary means of applying military power or as a key element of the exit strategy for larger operations. The 2008 Multi National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) Commander’s Counter-insurgency Guidance identifies “develop the capability and legitimacy of the ISF” and “conducting operations by, with, and through our Iraqi partners” as essential elements of US strategy in Iraq. “As Iraqi security forces stand on their own, coalition forces will increasingly

\textsuperscript{8} FM 3-07, 6-14.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 6-14 – 6-15.
\textsuperscript{10} FM 3-0, Chapters 1-3, FM 3-07 Chapters 2,3, and 6.
enable from overwatch.”

Operational experiences provide additional support for this assessment. Since the end of World War II, the US has an extensive history of utilizing advisory capability in conflicts similar to the doctrinally anticipated future conflicts. Past advisory operations include Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Phillipines, Laos, Cambodia, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Common threads among these historical examples and predicted future conflicts include failed or failing states, insurgencies, civil war, demographic changes, resource conflicts, and importance of host nation security capability. While the international security environment and specifics of each conflict vary, similarities in the nature of conflict and the resultant use of advisory capability remain.

Analysis of the advisory operations in the Greek Civil War, Korean War, Vietnam War, and El Salvador Civil War identifies the essential role advisory operations played in each of these conflicts. Throughout the Greek Civil War and El Salvador Civil War and in the initial periods of operations in Korea War and Vietnam War, advisory operations represented the primary application of military power. In both Greece and El Salvador domestic political considerations precluded the use of US combat forces, leaving advisory operations as the only viable option for the application of US military power to pursue US interests. In both Korea and Vietnam, advisory operations constituted comprehensive efforts to develop and support host nation security forces essential to the conduct of the wars and the long-term legitimacy and governance.

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capability of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Vietnam. The frequent and essential role of advisory operations in past conflicts supports the frequent and essential role for advisory operations identified in doctrine.

The comprehensive advisory requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the challenges the US Army faces in resourcing the spectrum of advisory efforts required by doctrine and ongoing operations. “No American military leader entered Iraq in 2003 expecting to train, equip, or advise the entire body of security forces in a new Iraq on a multiyear basis, and to do so in the midst of an intense insurgency.” As a result, the advisory effort in Iraq experienced significant organizational, personnel, and training challenges. Additionally, more than six decades of operational experience with advisory operations demonstrates the difficulty of developing advisory capability after the need arises. Analysis of the Greek Civil War, Korean War, Vietnam War, and the El Salvador Civil War all indicate a difficult ad-hoc advisory capability development process. These experiences show that developing an advisory capability is a difficult, time-consuming process not easily accomplished after the operational need arises. Additionally, past and present advisory operations experienced doctrinal, organizational, personnel, and training challenges.

The US Army has a choice to either maintain an advisory capability constituted and prepared to conduct operations or maintain the status quo, accepting a diminished capability and delay in the development of host nation security forces as the US Army develops the required advisory force structure. Given the expected frequency and importance of advisory operations in an era of persistent conflict and the difficulty developing advisory capability after the need arises,

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the US Army must be prepared to conduct advisory operations. Therefore, the US Army must develop an institutionalized advisory capability prepared to address the full range of advisory requirements from limited to comprehensive. An institutionalized advisory capability must establish the doctrine, organization, personnel management policies, and training base to quickly support the conduct of advisory operations. A deployable and effective advisory capability is essential to US operations and national interests in an era of persistent conflict.

**Current Discourse**

Although the US Army has not decided to institutionalize an advisory capability, the subject has generated discourse within the defense community. The discourse has resulted in a wide range of advisory concepts and intense debate on the future of advisory operations. Proposed solutions range from one extreme of a large standing advisory corps to the other extreme relying on existing force structure and expanding the BCT Mission Essential Task List (METL). This discourse helps to frame the problem and establish the limits of the possible solution sets. Examination of the major concepts within the current discourse identifies key considerations for determining requirements for an institutionalized advisory capability. The current discourse on advisory capability features four primary concepts: establishment of a large standing advisory corps, establishment of a dual surge force, utilization of existing US Army force structure, and establishing standing Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAGs).

**Standing Advisory Corps**

The primary proponent for a large standing advisory corps is Dr. John Nagle, a retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel. Nagl is currently the president of the Center for New American Security (CNAS) and has written extensively on advisory and counterinsurgency operations including his doctoral thesis *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, multiple CNAS papers, and as a
member of the writing team for FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*. Nagl believes that advisory operations will be a frequent and essential element of future operations and as a result advocates the establishment of a large standing advisory corps to conduct future advisory operations.

Nagl outlines his concept in two CNAS issue papers, “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent Advisor Corps,” and “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for an Army Advisor Command.” In “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent Advisor Corps,” Nagl stated:

The counterinsurgency campaigns that are likely to continue to be the face of battle in the 21st century will require that we build a very different US Army than the enormously capable but conventionally focused one we have today.

Based on this assessment, Nagl recommends that the US Army develop a “permanent standing advisor corps of 20,000 combat advisors—men and women organized, educated, and trained to develop host nation security forces abroad.” Nagl proposes the establishment of a US Army Advisor Command, led by a lieutenant general, to fulfill the Title X “force provider” role. “This command would be the proponent for all aspects of the advisor mission: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities.” It would serve as “the advocate for all aspects of the advisor mission within the institutional Army.” The operational component of Nagl’s advisor corps would consist of three advisor divisions, each commanded by a major general and consisting of 250 advisory teams with 25 personnel per team. Each division

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15 CNAS is a policy institute started in 2007 by the current Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy. The stated mission of CNAS is to “develop strong, pragmatic and principled national security and defense policies that promote and protect American interests and values.” CNAS has focused significant research on counterinsurgency and stability operations.


17 Ibid.


19 Ibid.
would include 8 division advisor teams, 5 brigade advisor teams per division team, and 5 battalion advisor teams per brigade. Nagl envisions advisory capability deploying as divisions with the advisory division commander and staff providing command and control and coordination with conventional forces in theater.\textsuperscript{20}

Nagl identifies three key advantages with his proposal: established doctrine, training, and organization; improved in-theater command and control and advisory operations; and improved predictability and quality of life for advisors’ families. Based on the identified advantages, Nagl’s proposal highlights key issues to consider in determining capability requirements including the importance of specific advisory doctrine, established organizational models, effective training programs, established command and control relationships, established operational tactics, personnel selection, and quality of life. The one drawback Nagl identifies is that the cost to the US Army would be four fewer BCTs, degrading conventional military capabilities.\textsuperscript{21} This also highlights the primary external criticism of Nagl’s proposal, which is the cost of eliminating combat power while the US Army is currently stressed providing combat forces for Iraq and Afghanistan. Additional criticism of Nagl’s proposal includes concerns with creating a split force and the potential for creating haves and haves not with regard to personnel assignments and career tracks. These disadvantages identify issues to consider in determining capability requirements including budgetary and personnel limitations, capability tradeoffs, ongoing operational requirements, and personnel management.

\textbf{Dual Surge Force}

Dr. Andrew Krepenevich, a retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel, proposes a radical restructuring of the US Army to address the changing nature of future conflicts. Krepenevich is

\textsuperscript{20} Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation, It’s Time for a Permanent Advisor Corps.”

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
currently the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) and has written extensively on advisory and counterinsurgency operations. Krepenevich outlines his concept for a dual surge force in a CSBA report “An Army at the Crossroads.” Krepenevich believes that future conflicts will increasingly involve irregular warfare:

Given the long expected service life of most of its major assets, the US military force structure, which underlies the concepts of operation that drive the US “way of war,” is still based primarily on the premises and experience of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Arguably much of the current Program of Record remains similarly reflective of that period. Yet the looming strategic challenges look to be significantly different. Thus there is a danger that many of the forces that the Defense Department plans to acquire may prove to be unsuitable for dealing with future threats.

Based on this assessment, Krepenevich believes the US Army should develop a dual surge force, capable of conducting irregular warfare operations and large scale conventional operations.

The dual surge force would include permanent security cooperation units to address peacetime stability operations and to build partner capacity along with conventional combat forces. In order to achieve this force, Krepenevich proposes a radical restructuring of US Army forces. US Army force structure would be reduced to 42 BCTs consisting of 13 Heavy BCTs, 6 Stryker BCTs, 8 Infantry BCTs, and 15 Security Cooperation BCTs. In addition to the BCTs, the proposal would establish a rapidly deployable training and advisory capability. “This capability can reside within the institutional Army, in the form of officers and NCOs assigned to Army schools as instructors or students; at Army headquarters; or as staff, faculty, and students at a school where instruction is given on how to serve as a trainer or advisor.”

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22 CSBA is a national security oriented policy institute. CSBA identifies itself as “an independent, non-partisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions in matters of strategy, security policy and resource allocation.”


24 Ibid., 66.

25 Ibid., 63.
proposes resurrecting the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) groups from the Vietnam period.\textsuperscript{26}

Krepenevich envisions the Security Cooperation BCTs focusing on Phase 0 forward presence operations to “keep weak states from becoming ungoverned states” and to support stability operations in subsequent conventional operations. Combat forces would focus on conventional operations to effect regime change, counter an irregular force capable of posing a hybrid warfare threat, and to deter conventional threats. The standing training and advisory capability would be utilized to build partner capacity to create an “indigenous surge capability that can begin to restore stability to the threatened area.”\textsuperscript{27} The training and advisory capability and the security cooperation BCTs have overlapping responsibilities for development of host nation capabilities, but are clearly identified as two separate elements. Krepenevich envisions a segmented force that specializes in specific areas but is also capable of reinforcing each other when necessary.

Krepenevich’s plan shares the same advantages and resultant considerations for capability requirements as Nagl’s plan. However, Krepenevich’s plan offers an alternate concept for institutionalizing advisory capability – the concept of institutionalizing the capability within trained and identified personnel operating within the institutional force that can be mobilized when needed. This concept provides a method to leverage the need for maintaining trained personnel while limiting the impact on force structure requirements. The potential advantages for this concept should be considered when determining capability requirements. The dual surge force concept also has several disadvantages. First, splitting the US Army into specialized forces creates a force structure that can respond well to small contingency requirements but would

\textsuperscript{26} CORDS was a program started in 1967 to coordinate civilian and military pacification programs in Vietnam. CORDS established civic action programs throughout Vietnam as well as the Phoenix program which sought to eliminate communist elements from South Vietnam.

\textsuperscript{27} Krepenevich, 63.
experience difficulty responding to large operational requirements, particularly at the high end of the spectrum of conflict, general war. Second, the dual surge force would prove difficult to implement due to radical changes to force structure, budgets, personnel requirements, and training. Third, the advisory personnel are mobilized as borrowed military manpower that leaves donor organizations such as staffs and schools short of personnel during times of conflict. These disadvantages identify key considerations for determination of advisory capability requirements including capability tradeoffs, operational risk, personnel management, and difficulty of implementation.

**Status Quo**

At the other end of the spectrum, General Peter W. Chiarelli proposes a solution with minimal impact on the current force structure. General Chiarelli is currently the Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army with extensive experience as a professional soldier across the spectrum of conflict. General Chiarelli outlines his proposal for addressing advisory capability requirements in a 2007 *Military Review* article “Learning From our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future.” General Chiarelli views the comprehensive advisory operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as anomalies, which are not indicative of future operational requirements.28 Based on this assessment General Chiarelli proposes maintaining the current Army force structure.

Because of the complexity of our current wars, some believe we should reorganize our forces into two types of units: those that work only at the high-intensity level of a campaign, and those designated and equipped for the low-intensity fight and classic nation-building. Having done their jobs, the high intensity force would hand off responsibility to the low-intensity force. This solution is both unsustainable and unaffordable: we simply don’t have the resources to divide the military into “combat”

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and “stability” organizations. Instead we must focus on developing full-spectrum capabilities across all organizations in the armed forces.29 He anticipates that the predominance of future advisory requirements will be limited advisory efforts, which fall within the capabilities of US Army Special Forces. General Chiarelli stated:

I don’t believe it is in the military’s best interest to establish a permanent “Training Corps” in the conventional military to develop other countries’ indigenous security forces. The Special Forces do this mission well on the scale that is normally required for theater security cooperation and other routine foreign internal defense missions.30

In the event that advisory requirements exceed Special Forces capacity, responsibility for advisory operations should shift to conventional forces already operating in the battle space. In order to prepare for this contingency, the BCT METL would expand to include advisory operations.31

General Chiarelli identifies three advantages from utilizing existing force structure to execute advisory operations. First, the proposal inherently maintains unity of command between combat forces and advisory elements. Second, if unit commanders are assigned the mission to advise host nation forces, they are more likely to assign their best personnel to accomplish the mission. Third, utilizing existing force structure eliminates the need to draw individual augmentees from units, resulting in a degradation of manpower and skillsets within the unit. These advantages identify several considerations for the determination of advisory capability requirements including command and control relationships, operational tactics, and personnel selection. General Chiarelli’s proposal also has several disadvantages. First, expansion of the BCT METL adds additional training requirements to an already stressed training schedule. A unit trained on advisory operations as one of many tasks would not be as effective as a unit

30 Ibid., 7.
31 Chiarelli, 8, 12.
trained specifically for advisory operations. Second, operational focus would be diminished. Units would potentially split operational focus and assets between combat operations, advisory operations, and stability operations. Finally, the BCT does not have the officer and NCO density required for advisory operations. The BCT would have to conduct advisory operations with unqualified lower ranking personnel or require individual augmentation to provide the personnel needed. These disadvantages identify several considerations for the determination of advisory capability requirements including training, operational tactics, and personnel requirements.

**Military Advisory and Assistance Group**

Robert Killebrew, a retired US Army Colonel, proposes a hybrid solution that utilizes a combination of new force structure and existing force structure. Killebrew has over thirty years experience as a US Army officer and as a former instructor at the US Army War College. Killebrew outlines his proposal for addressing advisory requirements in a 2008 *Armed Forces Journal* article titled “SecDef Has Signaled a Turning Point in US Defense Thinking.” Killebrew believes that the US Army will face continued requirements to develop host nation security forces in the pursuit of national strategic goals. According to Killebrew, the main challenge for the US Army is to determine “how to merge military power with other government agencies to support allies in emerging states before events reach crisis proportions, and to help our friends manage their own affairs without U.S. conventional forces.”

Based on this assessment, Killebrew advocates the establishment of Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAGs) supported by existing force structure to execute required advisory operations. MAAGs would be created for each combatant command and for specific countries as required. The MAAG would consist of trained advisors, permanently assigned to the

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specific region or country. The long-term assignment would allow advisors to develop the understanding and relationships required to conduct effective advisory operations. Killebrew envisions the MAAG working directly with the appropriate State Department Country team in order to coordinate civil and military actions to develop host nation capacity. When advisory requirements exceed the capability of the MAAG, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) generated from the conventional force would augment the MAAG to meet operational requirements. The MAAG would provide the command and control and operational support for the MTTs. Killebrew envisions MTTs from the squad to battalion level with tailored for each specific mission requirement. Killebrew also recommends the development of a training and education system to provide training for personnel assigned to the MAAGs.33

Killebrew’s proposal has several advantages. First, proposed training programs and permanent assignment of personnel to the MAAG supports the expertise and relationships required for effective advisory operations. Second, the MAAG concept provides a scalable solution that can address a range of advisory operations from limited advisory operations to large scale comprehensive operations. Finally, this solution limits the impact on current force structure and provides a solution that is relatively easy to implement. These advantages identify several considerations for the determination of capability requirements including training, advisory tactics, scalability, and capability tradeoffs. Killebrew’s proposal also has two disadvantages. First, his plan relies on MTTs drawn from the conventional force for larger advisory operations or for specific expertise. The MTTs will most likely not have the required advisory training or familiarity with the assigned country. Additionally, most of these teams would be created on an ad-hoc basis. Second, MTTs drawn from conventional forces could potentially disrupt training and deployment timelines. These disadvantages identify key considerations for the determination

33 Ibid.
of advisory capability requirements including training, advisory tactics, and established advisory organizations.

**Considerations for Determination of Advisory Capability Requirements**

Analysis of the major concepts within the current advisory capability discourse identifies several key considerations for the determination of advisory capability requirements. These considerations apply directly to one or more of the seven domains of DOTMLPF utilized to determine capability requirements.

**Doctrine**

- Standardize a scalable advisory organizational structure that can support a range of advisory operations from limited to comprehensive
- Establish command and control relationships
- Standardize advisory tactics and procedures

**Organization** – consider organizational requirements in the context of:

- Budget and personnel limitations
- Capability tradeoffs
- Anticipated operational requirements
- Implementation requirements
- Scalability

**Training**

- Unique skill requirements for advisory duty
- Range of advisory training requirements for both individual and units.

**Materiel**

- No considerations identified

**Leadership**

- Key leader support for organizational change

**Personnel**

- Selection of Personnel
- Management of personnel
Facilities

- Title X man, train, equip requirements

While not identifying all of the necessary considerations, this list does present the predominant issues that are creating debate within the defense community.

**Determination of Capability Requirements**

In 2003, then Army Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker wrote,

> We must immediately begin the process of re-examining and challenging our most basic institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures to better serve our Nation. The end result of this examination will be a more relevant and ready force—a campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. Our Army will retain the best of its current capabilities and attributes while developing others that increase relevance and readiness to respond in the current and projected strategic and operational environments.\(^{34}\)

The need for an institutionalized advisory capability, established in the precursor to this paper, represents a re-examination of the current force structure and identification of new capabilities required for a more relevant and ready force, as directed by General Schoomaker.

The identification of an operational capability need initiates the US Army Force Development Process. This process “defines military capabilities, designs force structures to provide these capabilities, and produces plans and programs that, when executed through force integration activities, translate organizational concepts based on doctrine, technologies, materiel, manpower requirements, and limited resources into a trained and ready Army.”\(^{35}\) The process consists of five steps: determine requirements, design organizations, develop organizational models, determine organizational authorizations, and document organizational authorizations.


This paper focuses on the first step of the US Army Force Development Process – determine requirements. As stated in the introduction, this paper will utilize the seven domains of DOTMLPF to determine the capability requirements. Analysis of each domain requires a wide range of considerations including doctrine, ongoing and past advisory experiences, US Army force management considerations, and input from the ongoing discourse within the defense community on stability and advisory operations. Doctrine provides the primary consideration for analysis of each domain. Doctrinal analysis will focus on FM 3-0 *Operations*, FM 3-07 *Stability Operations*, FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency Operations*, and FM 3-07.1 *Security Force Assistance*. Analysis of ongoing and past advisory experiences provides insights into challenges and requirements experienced in operations similar to doctrinally anticipated future operations. The study will focus on five operational experiences: the Greek Civil War (1947-1950), the Korea War (1946-present), the Vietnam War (1954-1973), the El Salvador Civil War (1979-1993), and Iraq (2003-present). Force management considerations include endstrength, budget, timeframe, 

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36US Army War College., 46.
and competing operational capability requirements. Finally, the analysis will also address the key considerations identified by the defense community discourse on advisory operations.

**Doctrine**

The US Army is a doctrinally based institution. Doctrine provides the intellectual underpinning that defines how the US Army organizes, trains, equips, and conducts operations.\(^\text{37}\) Current doctrine effectively addresses the need for and role of advisory capability across the spectrum of conflict. Field Manual 3-0 states that operations across the spectrum of conflict seek to establish conditions conducive to a stable peace.\(^\text{38}\) Stability operations, and more specifically the development of host nation governance capability, represent an essential element of establishing stable peace. Therefore, operations across the spectrum of conflict have a potential requirement for advisory efforts to develop host nation security capability. Field Manual 3-07 identifies security force assistance as an essential element of developing host nation governance capacity and dedicates a chapter to identifying the principles of security sector reform.\(^\text{39}\) Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations* also identifies security force assistance as an essential element of counterinsurgency operations and dedicates a chapter to identifying the principles of developing host nations security forces.\(^\text{40}\) Field Manual 3-07.1 focuses on the conduct of advisory operations with modular brigades augmented for security force assistance and advisory tactics for individual advisors and advisory teams. However, this still leaves a doctrinal void for advisory operations.

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\(^{37}\) FM 3-0, preface.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 2-2.

\(^{39}\) FM 3-07, 1-8, Chapter 6.

Field Manual 3-07.1 is the only manual that specifically addresses advisory operations tactics and procedures. However, the manual focuses exclusively on the conduct of advisory operations with an augmented modular brigade, which does not address the full scope of advisory organizational requirements. Both doctrine and operational advisory experiences indicate a need for a range of advisory capabilities, including independent organizations not tied to BCT force structure. The following section, Organization, provides the analysis to support this argument. Additionally, one manual does not seem sufficient to address the complexity of the advisory mission. In contrast to one manual for advisory operations, doctrine contains eleven manuals within the 3-19 series for the conduct of military police operations, which address in detail both organizational and operational considerations. Finally, while FM 3-07.1 addresses advisory tactics at the individual and team level, it does not address how an overall advisory effort supports the operational requirements identified in FM 3-0, FM 3-07, and FM 3-24.

The ongoing advisory operations in Iraq illustrate the problems caused by a lack of doctrinal guidance. The lack of doctrinal guidance for the organization of advisory structure resulted in a progression of sourcing strategies from the initial ad-hoc efforts with the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) to the current advisory structure established under the Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG). Developing an effective and stable organizational structure required more than three years. The inefficiency and turmoil during this period limited the effectiveness of the advisory effort and slowed the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The lack of operational doctrine further complicated the conduct of advisory operations and slowed the development of the ISF. “In training their battalions, initial US advisor teams could not rely on a standardized program. Indeed, in the spring of 2004, the coalition was still developing programs of instruction and other written training.” More than four years into the

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41 Wright, 435, 475-477.
42 Ibid., 458.
advisory effort in Iraq the ISF was still not prepared to challenge internal and external security threats. “Part of the reason for this slow development was that for the first 12 months of OIF, the ISF program was largely an improvisation,” due to the lack of both organizational and operational doctrine.43

Past advisory experiences reinforce the need for organizational and operational doctrine and illustrate the problems caused by a lack of doctrine. Aside from limited Special Forces doctrine on foreign internal defense, the US Army has not had doctrine for the conduct of advisory operations prior to recent doctrinal changes and additions. In most post World War II US advisory efforts, the lack of organizational doctrine resulted in initial ad-hoc efforts that eventually progressed into effective organizational structures. For example, in Korea the advisory effort progressed from an initial ad-hoc effort of eighteen officers in 1946 to train constabulary forces to a comprehensive effort of almost 2900 personnel in 1953.44 In Vietnam, the advisory effort grew from 342 personnel in 1954 to over 14,000 in 1970 with organizational changes and additions occurring throughout this period.45 The lack of operational doctrine also impacted the effectiveness of these advisory efforts. In Korea, the 1953 Advisor’s Procedure Guide identified what an advisor needed to do, but provided little guidance on how to do it. “How a division advisor, a member of a relatively small detachment, or how a regimental advisor, at most one of two officers, tackled the arduous task of overcoming cultural and linguistic

43 Wright., 475.


obstacles and accomplished the advisory tasks was left largely to trial and error.” In reference to the US advisory effort in El Salvador, Ambassador Thomas Pickering stated,

… we had neither the doctrine nor the support nor the coordination in the US Government that would really be required to deal effectively with that kind of operation. I don’t think we ever developed it. We still are kind of ad hoc in our way of viewing the problem. That is really quite a critical comment.

In each case, the inability to employ effective organizational structures and established operational procedures in the early stages of these conflicts resulted in a delay of host nation security force development that contributed to either mission failure, as with Vietnam, or the extension of US operations, as with Korea.

Analysis of the doctrinal domain must also address key considerations identified from the defense community discourse on advisory operations. All four advisory concepts acknowledge the importance of clearly identifying and codifying in doctrine organizational structures, advisory tactics, and command and control relationships. The tactics for individual advisors and advisory teams remain relatively constant across all four concepts. Field Manual 3-07.1 provides doctrinal guidance for general advisory duties at the individual and team level that is applicable across all four concepts. However, the four concepts differ on organizational requirements and the resultant command and control relationships. Field Manual 3-07.1 only addresses Chiarelli’s concept utilizing the existing BCT force structure. Field Manual 3-07.1 does not address the additional organizational requirements needed to achieve scalability across the spectrum of conflict and the range of advisory operations from limited to comprehensive identified in the following section.

Based on this analysis, current doctrine must be adjusted and new doctrine established to support the requirements of an institutionalized advisory capability. First, doctrine must address

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46 Ramsey, 14.

the full range of organizational requirements identified in the following section and the resultant command and control relationships. Without organizational doctrine, future advisory efforts will repeat past experiences, progressing by trial and error through a series of organizational structures delaying development of the targeted host nation security force. Second, doctrine must expand on the individual and team advisory tactics outlined in FM 3-07.1. As with the 1953 Advisor’s Procedure Guide for advisors in Korea, current doctrine must provide more detail on how to execute the individual advisor and advisor team roles and responsibilities identified in FM 3-07.1. Finally, doctrine must establish how an overall advisory effort achieves the security sector reform principles identified in FM 3-0, FM 3-07, and FM 3-24.

Organization

The organizational domain provides guidance for force structure requirements. In this analysis, the organizational domain provides the guidance for development of the permanent force structure needed to support advisory capability requirements. Currently, the US Army does not have any permanent force structure dedicated to conducting advisory operations and is relying on temporary force structures to accomplish these missions. In Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the US Army utilizes the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) which commands and controls the advisory effort and Task Force Phoenix with its associated Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), to train and mentor Afghan security forces. In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) the US Army utilizes the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) to continue support of the institutional Iraqi Army and ISF force generation.

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48 Task Force (TF) Phoenix is a military organization established to develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The stated mission of TF Phoenix is “trains and mentors the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) comprised of forces of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) to conduct independent, self-sustained counter-insurgency and security operations in the Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan in order to defeat terrorism and provide a secure, stable environment within the borders of Afghanistan.” The ETTs are the advisory teams under Task Force Phoenix tasked to provide direct advisory support to Afghan National Security Forces.
However, the US Army is eliminating the Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG) and transitioning responsibility for advising the ISF to BCTs augmented for security force assistance.\textsuperscript{49} Additionally, the US Army has closed the advisory training program at Fort Riley, Kansas and shifted advisory training responsibility to 162\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry Brigade and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. With this move, the training strategy will begin a shift from resident training for individual advisors and advisor teams to mobile training teams (MTTs) to train augmented BCTs at their home station.\textsuperscript{50}

This situation highlights several key issues. First, the lack of organizational and operational doctrine resulted in differing advisory force structures across the different theaters of operation. These differences complicated resourcing efforts, training efforts, and limited the ability to translate lessons learned between theaters. Second, the current advisory structures are truly temporary. The US Army has already eliminated the advisory structures in Iraq, the training center at Fort Riley, and is planning to transition advisory operations in Afghanistan to a BCT based model as soon as feasible.\textsuperscript{51} Finally, these actions indicate that the US Army is shifting towards Chiarelli’s concept of a BCT-based advisory capability.

The problem with this shift is that current doctrine, ongoing advisory operations, and past advisory experiences indicate a need for a range of advisory capabilities that includes independent organizations as well as a BCT-based capability. Field Manual 3-0 and FM 3-07 anticipate the need for advisory capability across the spectrum of conflict, which includes situations in which deploying a BCT is not appropriate or feasible and situations in which demands for BCTs to conduct combat and stability operations preclude the use of BCTs to

\textsuperscript{49} The IAG was established in 2006 to command and control the advisory teams supporting operational Iraqi Units.

\textsuperscript{50} Dennis Steele, “Advisor Training Shifts to Fort Polk: Army Establishes Enduring Mission,” Army Magazine (September 2009): 50.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
conduct advisory operations. The ongoing operations under Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) illustrate a situation in which deployment of a BCT-based advisory capability is not appropriate. A key element of CJTF-HOA operations includes advisory operations to build partner nation security capacity. However, deployment of a large American ground force on the African continent could undermine US interests in the region. The organization of CJTF-HOA reflects this concern, utilizing a limited force structure of approximately 2000 personnel organized into small specialized units to execute its mission. Deploying a BCT-based advisory capability would be inappropriate in this situation.

At the other end of the spectrum of conflict, the initial advisory effort in Iraq and ongoing advisory effort in Afghanistan illustrate the need for non-BCT based advisory capability. In both cases, operational requirements exhausted available BCT force structure and could not support a split BCT focus between advisory responsibilities and other operational responsibilities. As a result, the US Army developed independent advisory force structure including headquarters elements to provide command and control and advisory teams to conduct operations. Although the security situation in Iraq and the development of the ISF has progressed to the point that BCT-based advisory capability can be utilized, that does not invalidate the need for independent advisory force structure.

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54 Based on personal experience as a HQDA G-35 War Plans Division Strategist assigned to work Title X MiTT sourcing requirements from 2005-2007 and as an Iraq MiTT leader in 2006. Sourcing discussions in 2005 considered the use of BCT based advisory capability, but determined that global BCT demand exhausted available BCT force structure and that a BCT based advisory capability was not appropriate for generating and fielding new ISF force structure.
Past advisory operation experiences reinforce the need for an independent advisory capability. US advisory operations in Greece, Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador all utilized independent non-unit based advisory capability. Furthermore, in Greece, and the initial phases of Korea and Vietnam, strategic and domestic considerations precluded the use of US combat units. More than six decades of US Army experience with advisory operations indicates the need for an independent team based capability. However, this does not invalidate the utility of unit based advisory capability either. In El Salvador, the US Army utilized conventional combat units to support training of El Salvador security forces at the Regional Military Training Center in Honduras. Doctrine, ongoing advisory operations, and past advisory experiences indicate the need for a spectrum of advisory capability including independent advisory teams and unit based capability.

However, any force structure decisions must account for the realities of US Army force management. The US Army has a finite budget and personnel endstrength. Therefore, any new force structure requires the reallocation of limited resources to include organizational structure, personnel, equipment, funding, and intellectual capital. In 2007, the Joint Staff recognized a staggering global demand of 33 BCTs. Because of this demand, US Army BCTs operated at a .8 to 1 non-deployed to deployed ratio, far exceeding the desired ratio of 3 to 1. At the desired

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56 Pico Iyer, Ricardo Chavira, and David DeVoss, “Some Reluctant Friends,” *Time Magazine*, July 16 1984. A 160 man cadre and a rotation of Army combat units to supported training and joint exercises at the RMTC.
deployment ratio of 3 to 1 with a 45 active component BCT end state, the US Army can only
provide 12 active component BCTs per year for contingency operations. In context, the
operational demand in Iraq alone has exceeded 12 BCTs throughout OIF.\textsuperscript{57} Therefore, any force
structure decision with regard to advisory capability must limit the impact on the 45 BCT active
component end state.

Analysis of the organizational domain must also address key considerations identified
from the defense community discourse on advisory operations. First, all four concepts recognize
the importance of establishing standardized organizational structures and command and control
relations for conducting advisory operations. Additionally, all four concepts recognize the
importance of establishing standardized training and doctrine to support the conduct of advisory
operations. However, the options offer differing organizational concepts.

The Advisory Corps, Dual Surge Force, and MAAG concepts all advocate the
establishment of permanent force structure to support advisory operations, while the Status Quo
concept advocates utilization of existing force structure. First, the Advisory Corps, Dual Surge
Force, and MAAG concepts advocate the establishment of permanent force structure to support
the Title X functions of manning, training and equipping advisory forces. Second, these concepts
identify the importance of dedicated operational force structure to address the complexities of
advisory operations as opposed to adding an additional operational requirement for the BCTs.
Utilizing the existing BCT force structure assumes operational risk by increasing training
requirements and splitting operational focus between combat duties and advisory duties. Finally,
these three concepts identify the need for an advisory capability that is scalable across the
spectrum of conflict. Dedicated force structure can be designed to operate across a spectrum of
requirements while a BCT represents a large finite commitment of forces.

\textsuperscript{57} Based on personnel experience as a HQDA G-35 War Plans Division Strategist assigned to
The analysis of these concepts reveals the limitations of force structure decisions. The Advisory Corps and Dual Surge concepts require radical changes to current force structure. Implementation of these strategies would prove difficult, requiring a wide range of support including senior military leaders, Congress, and US Army culture. Additionally, these concepts require a reduction in combat forces that is not acceptable given current operational requirements and anticipated requirements in an era of persistent conflict.

Based on this analysis, adjustments to the current force structure and establishment of new organizations are required to support an institutionalized advisory capability. First, advisory force structure organizational design must be scalable across the spectrum of advisory requirements. This requires establishment of permanent independent advisory structure and adjustment to the current BCT force structure to support advisory operations when necessary. Second, the establishment of independent advisory structure cannot come at the cost of reducing BCT force structure. This limits the potential size of independent advisory structure and requires a force structure design that leverages limited permanent personnel availability with an ability to expand operational capability when required. Finally, a permanent advisory command must be established to manage the Title X responsibilities of man, train, equip for advisory force structure. This advisory command must be able to address the training, materiel, and personnel requirements identified in the following sections.

**Training**

The training domain provides guidance for requirements to develop individual soldiers and units to execute assigned responsibilities. Current advisory doctrine identifies extensive and specialized training requirements to develop advisory skills. Field Manual 3-07 states, “to be effective, advising requires specially selected and trained personnel. Trainers and advisors must be capable of dealing with challenges inherent in working with poorly trained and equipped forces. To contend with these challenges, predeployment training focuses on the stresses and
ambiguity associated with developing host-nation security forces.” Field Manual 3-07.1 provides more clarity on training requirements by identifying advisory skill requirements. Identified skills include teaching, coaching, advising, language, cultural understanding, cross-cultural communication, establishing rapport, cross-cultural influencing, and cross-cultural negotiating.

Past advisory experiences reinforce the requirement for specialized skills and training to conduct advisory operations. A 1953 Operational Research Office study on advisory operations in Korea concluded “a tour as a MAAG advisor is sufficiently unique and important duty to justify special preparation.” A 1965 RAND study on advisors in Vietnam concluded:

Professional expertise is a requirement both obvious and easily measurable, and it has not been the crucial problem in the advisor-counterpart relationship. A faculty for effective interaction with a foreign national, and the skills necessary to developing and expressing that faculty, are much more intangible. They play no part in traditional military pedagogy, and their great importance is perhaps not yet fully understood in all quarters that must concern themselves with the novel requirements of counterinsurgency.

The study identifies a wide range of skills specific to advisory operations including language, culture, building rapport, influencing, and negotiating. In a 1992 after action report, an El Salvador advisory team leader concluded that his advisory experiences “presented a far more difficult job and a greater challenge that anything else our army has done in many years. For all the difficulty of conventional operations, they are not even in the same ball-park as far as the need

58 FM 3-07, 6-14 – 6-15.
60 Gerald C. Hickey, The American Military Advisor and His Foreign Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, March 1965), v.
61 Ibid., xii - xvi.
to be innovative, creative, and juggle a host of political, military, social and economic requirements.”

US Army advisory experiences illustrate the implications of not having a standing advisory training capability. In both Greece and Korea, the US Army never developed a formal training program to prepare personnel for advisory duty. As a result, the typical advisor reported for duty with little knowledge of his mission or duties, operating conditions, operational guidance, or support structures. Prior to 1962, advisors in Vietnam advisors received little to no training before assuming advisory duties. To remedy this shortcoming, the US Army established the six-week Military Assistance Training Advisory (MATA) course in 1962 and the Military Assistance Security Advisor (MASA) Course in 1971. While both of these training programs proved successful, implementation of the first course did not occur until eight years into US involvement in Vietnam. Due to the lack of training prior to the MATA course, advisors lacked the specific knowledge or the skills required to serve effectively as an advisor. Preparation for the advisors in El Salvador consisted of a two and one-half day Security Assistance Team Training and Orientation Course (SATTOC) that did not address advisor duties or El Salvador specific information. One student described SATTOC as “very close to completely useless.” In Iraq, the US Army did not have a training or preparation program for the first year and a half of the advisory effort. The US Army initiated a stateside training program in 2005, but relocated


63 Ramsey, 12-13.

64 Hickey, v - xii.

65 Ramsey, 91.

66 The initial CMATT personnel received no training and in most cases were assigned with little warning from troops already in theater. The establishment of MNSTC-I in 2004 did not change the training situation. The 98th Division, assigned to source MNSTC-I, received no advisory specific training prior to deployment into theater. The division was trained and prepared to conduct basic institutional training, but was not prepared to serve in an operational or combat advisory role.
the course three times in just over a year, which diminished the consistency and effectiveness of the training program.\textsuperscript{67} In each case, training deficiencies resulted in advisors unprepared to execute the required advisory tasks.

Analysis of the training domain must also address key considerations identified from the defense community discourse on advisory operations. All four concepts recognize the complex nature of the new security environment and the changing skill requirements. Chiarelli stated, “In today’s complex, constantly changing climate where the levels of war are increasingly interwoven – when they are even relevant at all – we must develop leaders at all levels, from small unit to strategic and political, who are agile and sophisticated enough to make adjustments.”\textsuperscript{68} Krepenevich stated, “Like many other aspects of stability operations, organizing, training, and equipping host-nation security forces is a complex and challenging mission.”\textsuperscript{69} Based on these changing requirements, the Advisory Corps, Dual Surge Force, and MAAG concepts all call for establishment of permanent advisory training capability to ensure that the US Army has personnel and units prepared to conduct advisory operations. These concepts also recognize the importance of a training capability that can support a range of training requirements.

Based on this analysis, changes to US Army training for advisory operations are required to support an institutionalized advisory capability. First, the US Army must establish a permanent advisory training capability. The US Army cannot afford to wait until advisory capability is required to build training capacity. Second, the training capability must be able to support a range of training including, individual personnel, small advisory teams, and larger unit

\textsuperscript{67} The Advisory training moved was initiated at Fort Bliss in early 2005, then quickly moved from Fort Bliss to Fort Carson in early 2005, Fort Carson to Fort Hood in January 2006, and Fort Hood to Fort Riley in May 2006.

\textsuperscript{68} Chiarelli, 12.

\textsuperscript{69} Krepenevich, 55.
training such as battalions and BCTs. The US Army will require a scalable advisory capability that requires training from the individual to BCT level. Third, the training capability must be able to support continued and progressive training. Advisory operations require complex skills that are perishable and require continual reinforcement. At the individual level, advisory skill requirements grow and change with rank. The training capability must provide a range of individual training and provide a means to update an advisor's training. Finally, training capacity must address the unique skill requirements of advisory operations including, but not limited to, teaching, coaching, advising, language, cultural understanding, cross-cultural communication, establishing rapport, cross-cultural influencing, and cross-cultural negotiating.

**Materiel**

The materiel domain identifies equipment needs. In this analysis, the materiel domain must address the unique equipment requirements of advisory operations. Doctrine indicates that advisory elements must be capable of independent operations in austere conditions. Field Manual 3-07.1 states, “advisors live, eat, and work with the officers and men of their host units. Often, advisors soon regard themselves as one of them. The sharing of common hardships and dangers forges potent emotional ties.”\(^7\) The requirement for advisors to live with their counterparts creates the need for a unit that can operate in potentially austere conditions with limited conventional logistical support. Additionally, the advisory unit must be prepared to provide its own force protection, without the immediate support of other US forces. As a result, equipping strategies for advisory units must provide additional capabilities and redundant capabilities not normally provided to conventional forces of similar size. Field Manual 3-07.1 also states, “advisors are interpreters and communicators between U.S. superiors and foreign counterparts …

\(^7\) Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1, *Security Assistance Force* (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 May 2009), 7-1.
Advisors with quick and easy access to influential counterparts can sometimes be the best possible means of communicating.”

Advisory teams must be able to communicate quickly and reliably with US forces from remote and austere locations. As a result, advisory teams require communication capabilities, such as satellite communications, normally assigned to higher echelon forces.

Experiences from the ongoing operations in Iraq support the doctrinal assessment. Advisory teams preferably live with their Iraqi counterparts on an Iraqi base camp. In many cases, these Iraqi base camps lack sufficient life support systems including water, electricity, shelter, latrine, and food. As a result advisory teams frequently have non-standard equipment requirements including power generators, potable water and storage capacity, building materials and tools, portable latrines and shower facilities, and food service equipment. These small advisory teams operating independent of other supporting units also require additional force protection equipment including multiple personal weapons per soldier, barrier material, vehicle enhancements, increased density of larger caliber weapons, increased ammunition density, and increased transport and storage capacity. Finally, remotely located advisory teams require enhanced communications to maintain contact with higher command and combat support assets. Enhanced communication assets include satellite network uplinks, satellite radios, satellite telephones, increased density of amplifiers, increased density of long range antennas, redundant FM radios, and local cell phones to communicate with host nation counterparts.

Past advisory experiences reinforce the need for advisory teams to operate in remote locations independent from other forces. In Greece, El Salvador, and the early stages of Korea and Vietnam the advisory elements were the only US forces on the ground. The US advisory forces had to rely on their own capabilities and whatever host nation support was available for life support and force protection. Even in the later stages of Korea and Vietnam, when US combat

71 FM 3-07.1, 7-1.
forces were on the ground, advisory teams still operated independently with their host nation counter-parts. In Korea, “since the ROK were usually stationed in the more mountainous areas along the front where communications were difficult, most of the advisors had to operate independent of KMAG and Eighth Army headquarters and had to rely heavily upon their own judgment and resourcefulness.”72 A 1965 RAND study on advisors in Vietnam stated, “nearest the operational level advisors not only spend all their time with their counterparts but share their food and bivouac and even the dangers of battle.”73

Based on this analysis, materiel requirements standards need adjustment to support an institutionalized advisory capability. First, equipping plans must provide sufficient equipment to account for the remote operating conditions, independent operations, small team size, and the enhanced communication requirements of advisory teams. Equipping considerations include life support equipment, force protection equipment, and communication equipment. Second, equipping plans must provide redundant capabilities. Finally, equipping plans must allow for flexibility and the addition of non-standard equipment and materiel as operational environment dictates.

Leadership

The leadership domain provides guidance for senior leaders in support of a capability requirement. In this analysis, the leadership domain must provide guidance for supporting the implementation of an institutionalized advisory capability. The measures called for in the other domains of DOTMLPF require changes that cannot be implemented without support of senior leadership. Senior Army leaders, including the Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff, believe that while stability operations and the associated advisory operations are important, the US Army

72 Sawyer, 151-152.
73 Hickey, vi.
must maintain its focus on conventional warfare and conventional forces that are capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations. These leaders see the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan as anomalies and not indicative of future conflicts. They believe the current requirement for conventional forces to support comprehensive advisory operations will end with Iraq and Afghanistan and the advisory mission will return to the Special Forces community. General Casey stated, “I’m just not convinced that anytime in the near future we’re going to decide to build someone else’s army from the ground up.” He further stated, “And to me, the advisory corps is our Special Forces – that’s what they do.” Currently the Chief of Staff and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army do not support establishing the institutionalized capability envisioned in this paper.

The current lack of an institutionalized advisory capability resulted from the inability of senior leaders to understand the importance of lessons learned from past advisory operations. A former member of the American aid mission to Greece asserted that the experience had “lessons for the administrators of a future Greece, Korea, or any other war-plagued nation that might need, in a hurry, to be saved from Communism.” Yet, the US Army failed to use those lessons to better prepare for the advisory operations in Korea and Vietnam. In the aftermath of defeat in Vietnam, the US Army abandoned counterinsurgency doctrine, determined that there would be “no more Vietnams.” Perversely, this attitude ensured that the Army did not have the tools it would require to fight the “next war” in El Salvador. Unfortunately, the lessons learned from one advisory experience were rarely passed on to the next.

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74 Dreazen.
75 Yochi.
76 Jones, 233.
78 Ibid.
Each time the US military response to advisory requirements was an ad hoc, secondary endeavor. Each time results were expected. Each time advisors tried their best. Each time results were mixed. Each time the experience was forgotten --relegated to that lesser important, not-to-be-done-again-anytime-soon pile of military tasks.\textsuperscript{79}

Institutionalizing an advisory capability requires the commitment of limited resources to include organizational structure, personnel, equipment, funding, and intellectual capital. Force structure change cannot occur without the support of senior US Army leadership. A consensus must exist on the anticipated increase in advisory operations as well as the requirement for an advisory force structure capable of supporting the spectrum of advisory requirements from limited to comprehensive. The allocation of resources to develop and field an institutional advisory capability cannot occur without the implicit support of the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army. Without gaining key leader support, dismissal of advisory force structure concepts will continue. Advocates must present a justification capable of persuading senior Army leaders to support an institutional advisory capability. Until the Chief of Staff and senior leaders accept a requirement for an institutionalized advisory capability, no action will be taken.

Based on this analysis, senior leader support is essential to implementation of the DOTMLPF recommendations in this study. First, senior leaders must accept the need for an institutionalized advisory capability. Second, senior leaders must accept the capability requirements identified in this paper. The most problematic recommendations concern the establishment of independent force structure and an advisory command. Finally, once a decision is made to pursue the recommendations in this study, senior leaders must actively support cultural change within the US Army to accept the proposed recommendations. Changing US Army culture with regard to advisory doctrine and advisory personnel management represent the greatest challenges to developing an institutionalized advisory capability within the US Army.

\textsuperscript{79} Ramsey, 107.
Personnel

The personnel domain provides guidance for the management of personnel in support of a given capability. In this analysis, the personnel domain must address both the selection and management of personnel in support of advisory operations. Doctrine identifies unique requirements for personnel to conduct advisory operations. Field Manual 3-07.1 states,

Not every Soldier is well suited to perform advisory functions; even those considered to be the best and most experienced have failed at being an advisor. Effective advisors are only the most capable individuals. Advisors are Soldiers known to take the initiative and who set the standards for others; however, they are also patient and personable enough to work effectively with Foreign Security Forces.80

Based on this assessment, FM 3-07.1 provides a list of no less than sixteen personality traits that enhance the ability to conduct advisory operations. Field Manual 3-07 reinforces this assessment stating, “To be effective, advising requires specially selected and trained personnel.”81

However, the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the personnel resourcing challenges. The US Army did not have a ready pool of personnel to resource advisory requirements. Therefore, the personnel for each advisor position had to be taken from other organizations. Existing requirements for individual augmentees to support other non-doctrinal organizations further strained the personnel system. As a result, the US Army progressed through a series of personnel resourcing methods including reserve units, the Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS), and taskings to the major commands (MACOM), all with limited success. These systems failed to provide personnel with the experience or skillsets required for advisory duty.82 The personnel provided by these systems routinely violated Headquarters

80 FM 3-07.1, 7-3.
81 FM 3-07, 6-14.
82 The 98th Division (Institutional Training), used to man MNSTC-I in 2004, provided personnel capable of conducting the institutional training of Iraqi forces but less capable to support a combat advisory role. See Wright, 461. WIAS selection criteria were limited to rank and MOS. The system did not have the mechanisms or personnel to conduct more effective screening to select the appropriate personnel. The MACOM tasking system shifted the selection of personnel to the providing unit. Units tended to send
Department of the Army (HQDA) guidance including problems with rank, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), gender, disqualifying medical conditions, pending retirement, and retiree recalls. These systems also failed to provide enough personnel, with advisory teams frequently deploying undermanned.\textsuperscript{83} The transition of the personnel selection process to Army Human Resources Command and the regular assignment system in 2007 resolved most of the personnel issues. However, the US Army required almost four years to implement an effective system, further hindering the advisory effort and development of the ISF.

Past advisory experiences illustrate similar difficulties resourcing appropriate personnel without an institutionalized system. In Korea, the personnel selection process limited candidates to personnel in theater and repeatedly lowered rank, longevity, and experience standards to fill advisory positions. Predictably, the process selected many officers who were not suited for advisory duty.\textsuperscript{84} Through 1960, selection criteria for advisors in Vietnam remained limited to rank, MOS, and vulnerability to an overseas tour. However, even these limited criteria required frequent violation to fill advisory billets.\textsuperscript{85} Though the US Army proved successful in selecting a series of exceptionally qualified colonels to serve as United States Military Group in El Salvador (MILGROUP) commanders, personnel selection for the rest of the MILGROUP proved less successful. A former MILGROUP member stated, “we had the third team here.”\textsuperscript{86} Though perhaps too harsh, the statement contains a grain of truth. While many outstanding officers served in El Salvador, the US Army assigned lesser-qualified personnel in surprising numbers.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{83} All of the advisory operations sourcing challenges identified in this paragraph are based on personnel experience as a HQDA G-35 War Plans Division Strategist assigned to work Title X advisor sourcing requirements from 2005 – 2007 and as an Iraq advisory team leader in 2006.

\textsuperscript{84} Sawyer, 42-44.
\textsuperscript{85} Ramsey, 37-38.
\textsuperscript{86} Bacevich, 17.
In each case, personnel issues limited the effectiveness of advisory operations and threatened mission accomplishment.

The defense community discourse on advisory operations also supports the doctrinal assessment of specialized personnel requirements. Nagl states, “the need for well-trained, professional combat advisors is unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future.”

“Given their extraordinary importance as the enabler of victory in current wars and the likelihood that their expertise will continue to be required to win other campaigns in the Long War, it is past time for the Army to institutionalize and professionalize the manning and training of combat advisors in permanent Army force structure.”

Chiarelli hints at the specialized nature of advisory operations, stating, “we must also ensure that the value we place on broader experience (versus traditional tactical military experience) is truly reflected in those leaders we select for continued advancement.”

Krepenevich believes that “the Army may be underestimating the amount of time needed for its officers and NCOs to be trained to serve effectively as advisors.” He quotes a 1990 RAND study which concluded, “In the past the US military has failed to comprehend the amount of experience and specialized area, language, and military experience needed for effective advisory and training missions in the third world.”

Killebrew states that an advisor “is diplomat, trainer, adviser, mentor and friend when appropriate.” Based on this assessment Killebrew concludes, “The duty is highly individualistic, and great sensitivity to cultural differences is both vital and demanding.”

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87 Ibid., 16.
88 Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation, It’s Time for a Permanent Advisor Corps,”
89 Ibid.
90 Chiarelli, 12.
91 Krepenevich, viii.
93 Killebrew.
qualified personnel to support advisory operations, presents a common theme throughout the defense community discourse on advisory operations.

US Army advisory experiences demonstrate the impact of personnel policies on this problem and measures taken to resolve these issues. The inability to attract the right personnel for advisory operations in Korea was directly attributable to personnel policies, which adversely affected advisor morale, performance, and selection. Perceived inequities for awards, promotions, rest and relaxation and rotation policies between advisors and officers in tactical units lowered advisor moral and performance and made advisory duty undesirable.94 The US Army took limited actions to resolve the problematic personnel policies in Korea and faced continued personnel problems throughout the war. A 1965 RAND study on advisors in Vietnam recognized a similar inability to attract the right personnel for advisory operations and recommended establishing a screening process to test an advisory candidates’ suitability based on professional competence, adaptability to foreign cultures, tempermental disposition towards privation, language skills, and operational fatigue.95 In response to the need to attract highly qualified personnel, the Chief of Staff of the Army implemented an incentive program that included “a personal letter of invitation to the program from the Chief of Staff; promotion preference; location preference in South Vietnam; preference for next assignment; special accommodations for family either stateside, Hawaii, or Guam; a 2-week leave with family in Hawaii after 12 months; and a 30 day leave.”96

The ongoing advisory operation in Iraq encountered a similar inability to attract the right personnel for advisory operations due to ineffective personnel policies. Advisory duty interferes with recognized career paths, jeopardizing promotions and career advancements. An Army major

95 Hickey, 28-30.
96 Ramsey, 39.
recently stated, "We have to have certain jobs to be competitive." He voiced reluctance to
advisory duty stating, "That takes me out of the cycle. In essence, it sort of hurts you." In an
try to resolve this issue the US Army has implemented new personnel policies including;
assigning advisors through the regular Human Resources Command assignment process,
recognizing advisory duty at the major and lieutenant colonel level as key developmental
positions, assigning lieutenant colonel positions off of the command selection list, and guidance
from the Chief of Staff to promotion boards to appropriately value advisory duty. Ongoing and
past advisory experiences recognized the importance of personnel policies to attracting the right
personnel for advisory duty and took actions to implement supportive personnel policies.

Based on this analysis, personnel selection processes and management must be adjusted
to support an institutionalized advisory capability. First, personnel selection for advisory duty
must seek officers and NCOs highly qualified in traditional military skills. Second, personnel
selection must screen for personality traits conducive to advisory operations. Third, personnel
management must ensure that an adequate number of personnel are available for advisory duty.
Finally, personnel policies must be implemented to incentivize and reward advisory duty in order
to attract the right personnel.

Facilities

The facilities domain provides guidance for infrastructure requirements to support a
capability. In this analysis, the facility domain must provide guidance to support the operations
of the advisory command. The advisory command requires facilities to support standard force
generation activities including doctrine development, personnel management, training, equipping,

and deployment/redeployment. The doctrine and personnel management activities require dedicated office space to support normal staff operations. The training activity requires a combination of classroom facilities and field sites. The command will require dedicated classrooms and offices for instructors, curriculum developers, and other support staff. Field training requirements include small arms training, vehicle training, and maneuver space for training lanes. The training activity will require dedicated motorpool space to support vehicles and dedicated arms room space to support weapons and sensitive items, but can leverage base controlled ranges and maneuver space. The equipping activity will require warehouse space to store, maintain, and issue/recover equipment, arms room space to store weapons and sensitive items, and motorpool space to store vehicles. Finally, the host military installation must be able to support deployment/redeployment activities through both commercial and military means. The US Army must provide the facilities to support the full breadth of an advisory commands responsibilities.

**Conclusion**

The first step of the force development process, identify capability requirements, determines the characteristics the US Army requires for an identified operational need. The DOTMLPF analysis provides a framework to identify the capability requirements for a desired operational capability. Each domain provides guidance within specific focus areas to identify characteristics required for an operational capability. In this study, the DOTMLPF analysis provides guidance for the required characteristics of an institutionalized advisory capability in the US Army.

**Doctrine**

- Codify advisory organizational requirements
- Establish command and control relationships for the range of organizational requirements
- Expand on the individual and team advisory tactics identified in FM 3-07.1
- Developmental operational doctrine for the spectrum of advisory requirements
- Establish how an overall advisory effort achieves the security sector reform principles identified in FM 3-0, FM 3-07, and FM 3-24.

**Organization**

- Establish an organizational design that is scalable across the spectrum of advisory requirements including:
  - Independent advisory force structure
  - BCT based advisory capability
- Organizational design cannot reduce existing BCT force structure
- Establish advisory command responsible for:
  - Doctrine
  - Training
  - Personnel management
  - Equipping
  - Deployment / Redeployment of advisory force structure

**Training**

- Establish a permanent advisory training capability
- Training capability must support continued and progressive training as advisory trained personnel advance in rank and their careers.
- Training capability must address the unique skill requirements required for advisory operations

**Materiel**

- Equipping plans must provide sufficient equipment to account for
  - Remote operating conditions
  - Independent operations
  - Small team size
  - Enhanced communication requirements
- Equipping strategies must provide redundant capabilities
- Equipping plans must allow for flexibility and the addition of non-standard equipment as conditions on the ground dictate

**Leadership**

- Senior leadership accept need for institutionalized advisory capability
- Senior leadership accepts capability requirements identified in this paper
- Senior leadership actively supports cultural change within the US Army to accept the proposed recommendations

**Personnel**

- Personnel selection process seek officers and NCOs highly qualified in traditional military skills
- Personnel selection process must screen for personality traits conducive to advisory operations
- Personnel management must ensure that an adequate number of personnel are available for advisory duty
- Implement incentive and reward policies to attract the right personnel to advisory duty

**Facilities**

- Establish facilities to support force structure resourcing activities
  - Command and Control – office space
  - Doctrine development – office space
  - Personnel management – office space
  - Training activity – classrooms, field sites, motorpool, arms room, office space
  - Equipping activity – warehouse space, motorpool, arms room
  - Deployment / Redeployment

While the DOTMLPF framework maintains separate domains, the analysis has shown the interconnectedness of the characteristics identified within each domain.

The most significant domain in this analysis is the organizational domain. Organization is the most contentious issue within the defense community discourse on advisory operations. This contention is driven primarily by the realities of force structure development in the context of limited resource availability. In an ideal world, the US Army would maintain specialized forces to conduct a wide range of tasks. However, the US Army has a limited budget and personnel endstrength, which requires tradeoffs with existing force structure to add new force structure.

The tradeoffs required to create a large standing advisory capability are not acceptable in the context of the anticipated future security environment. On the other hand, a purely BCT-based advisory capability does not meet the operational needs of the same anticipated future security environment. The US Army requires a range of capabilities that includes both independent advisory capability as well as BCT-based advisory capability. Therefore, the US Army must pursue a hybrid solution that includes an independent advisory capability and does not require a reduction of the BCT force structure. The US Army must also create an advisory command responsible for the resourcing and support of established advisory force structure.

These organizational decisions then serve as the driving factor for considerations within the other domains. While the personnel domain must provide highly qualified personnel
regardless of the organizational design, the number of personnel required, the types of assignments, and the required personnel policies and incentives are directly shaped by organizational decisions. While the training domain will train similar concepts, tactics, and skills regardless of the organizational design, the magnitude of individual training requirements, training timelines, and the types of unit training required are directly shaped by organizational decision. While the materiel domain will provide certain types of equipment regardless of the organizational design, the magnitude of equipment requirements and the distribution and maintenance of the equipment are directly shaped by organizational decisions. While the facilities domain will provide support for the advisory command regardless of the organizational design, specific requirements for training, equipping, and deployment / redeployment activities are directly shaped by organizational decisions. The doctrine domain must then synthesize all of the characteristics and requirements of the other domains and codify how the US Army conducts advisory operations into doctrinal manuals. Finally, the senior leadership must accept these requirements and concepts and provide support for the implementation of an institutionalized advisory capability.

**Future Research**

The next step in the force development process is to design an organization to fulfill the capability requirements identified in this analysis. This step begins to provide the details for an institutionalized advisory capability. Once again, organization is the most important consideration in this step. The details of the organizational structure then shape the requirements in the other domains. A range of potential organizational solutions exists. First, advisory capability could be maintained in trained personnel that are called upon and organized into advisory teams when needed. The solution would eliminate the need to maintain standing advisory units. A second concept would maintain a small core of standing advisory teams to conduct limited advisory operations in support of phase 0 shaping operations and serve as the
initial elements to support larger comprehensive advisory operations. For larger and/or long term advisory requirements trained personnel would be called upon and organized to augment and replace the standing advisory teams. A third concept would create advisory teams within each combat battalion and BCT in the US Army. These teams could be utilized in conjunction with the combat forces or detached and utilized as independent elements. A fourth concept would utilize BCT based advisory capability as conditions within the theater of operations permit or demand. The organizational design will most likely utilize aspects of all or some of these concepts in order to provide an advisory capability that can address the full spectrum of operational requirements.
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