STATE DEFENSE FORCES, AN UNTAPPED HOMELAND DEFENSE ASSET

Lieutenant Colonel Brent C. Bankus

INTRODUCTION

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City and Washington DC, a comprehensive federal government review of homeland security and homeland defense has led to a massive effort to coordinate assets at the local, state, and federal level, with an emphasis on contingency planning and information sharing. In addition, several new organizations were formed to address homeland security and homeland defense issues including the Department of Homeland Security and DoDs Northern Command (NORTHCOM), at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. Also, civilian volunteer programs such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency sponsored Citizen Corps and the White House sponsored USA Freedom Corps were formed. In the U. S. National Security Strategy, President George W. Bush makes it clear, “Defending our nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal – military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cutoff terrorist financing.” Additionally, in a recent interview Democratic Presidential hopeful, retired General Wesley Clarke announced his proposal to create the “Civilian Reserve.” His plan consists of a "Civilian Reserve," and will comprise a cross section of everyday Americans using their skills in efforts to address community based problems ranging from repairing local schools structures to less tangible goals such as "securing the homeland."

Yet, little has been written about expanding the use of current volunteer organizations, specifically State Defense Forces (SDF), who continue to play an important but unheralded role in defending the homeland. These local volunteer organizations have historically been referred to as State Militia, Home Guards, State Guards, or State Guard Reserves and represent a heretofore untapped asset and potential additional force for Homeland Security/Defense in the Global War on Terrorism. Since before World War I, State Guards and Naval Militias have been called upon to fill the void left by the federalized forces, particularly the National Guard, and have ably carried out their assigned duties. Also, as currently demonstrated, state recognized SDFs and Naval Militia units carry on the tradition of their predecessors in approximately half the states and territories of the United States, with little fan fare mostly on a limited budget, and without standardized policies and procedures.

HISTORICAL ROOTS

Colonial America

Similar to the U.S. Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve, State Guards/ State Defense Forces trace their roots to the colonial militia. The militia tradition in early America obligated all able-bodied men to bear arms when called upon by the government fulfilling two requirements:

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1 Prepared, submitted and approved as a Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College research paper on 7 March 2003.
2 For more details see web page, Citizen Corps, http://www.citizencorps.gov/about.shtml.
4 Wesley Clark and patriot games interview, by Robert Yoon, CNN, Tuesday, October 14, 2003 Posted: 9:14 AM EDT (1314 GMT).
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
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Providing local defense and security service (resisting enemy attacks, suppressing insurrections and enforcing laws),

Providing manpower for expeditions during wartime.\(^5\)

Subsequent to the American Revolution, the Founding Fathers attempted to institutionalize their distrust for a large standing active force by depending on local militia units as the first line of defense. This idea was abandoned due to defense requirements for an expanding nation, command and control, and reliability challenges associated with militia troops.\(^6\) As an alternative, in 1789 Congress granted special permission to maintain a small military force autonomous of state control with the understanding that the militia would be used as augmentation for emergencies.

This system was viewed as adequate as militia or volunteer units served on numerous occasions throughout the 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) centuries, participating in domestic and overseas actions ranging from defending their homes from Indian attacks, (Indian Campaign 1867-98), to traditional operations (War of 1812, Mexican War 1846-48, Civil War 1861-65, Spanish American War 1898) to Military Operations Other than War (Philippine Campaign, 1899-1903; China Campaign 1900; Cuban Pacification 1903; and the Puerto Rico Occupation 1899-1903) to name a few.

However, the increased federal demands on local militia or volunteer units beginning with the Spanish American War in 1898, caused concern among decision makers with respect to personal readiness and equipment interoperability when supporting the active forces. This prompted a review of the effectiveness of the Militia Act of 1792, the first attempt to regulate local militias. It stated that “all able bodied males citizens between the ages of 18-42 to arm themselves and attend regular muster.” While well meaning, the Militia Act of 1792 was never widely enforced and unit effectiveness varied.\(^7\)

In response to these problems, Congressman Charles Dick of Ohio sponsored legislation, later named the Dick Act of 1903, which differentiated between the organized militia and the unorganized militia by granting Federal recognition to the land forces of the organized militia and designating them as the “National Guard.” Federal recognition was crucial since it provided federal funding for monthly drill periods and a five-day summer encampment to units that had previously been only state sponsored. In addition, National Guard units were directed to emulate the active force in structure and training. The Act also stipulated that the duration of Federal service would not exceed nine months and overseas assignments were forbidden. In 1908, this legislation was amended, effectively lifting sanctions on length and location of federal service.\(^8\)

Arguably, the National Defense Act of 1916 proved the most influential as the National Guard was officially designated the Nation’s second line of defense giving it dual status as both a state and Federal force under Title 10 United States Code. Consequently, National Guard soldiers were required to swear two oaths of allegiance, one to their state the other to the federal government. In addition, National Guard units were permitted to retain their unit designations while in federal service, thereby preserving

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\(^6\) COL Edmund Zysk, “Stay Behind Forces For the National Guard, Soldiers or Policemen?”, unpublished thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 1 May 1988, p. 3.
lineage and honors. More importantly, there was concern, that if large numbers of National Guard units were federalized, states would be without the necessary means for self protection, since most state police forces remained relatively small and were unable to cope with large scale state emergencies.

Mexican Border Campaign and World War I

Federal service for the new National Guard was soon tested as large numbers of units were mobilized for the Mexican Border Campaign in 1916. An American Expeditionary force augmented by National Guardsmen, was sent to the southern border with Mexico to apprehend Pancho Villa, who had recently raided U.S. border settlements. Although Villa was never captured, the expedition proved valuable as National Guard units received extensive training and experience that would later prove valuable in World War I.

As the Mexican Border Campaign stabilized, National Guard units were returned to state control in 1917 only to be re-activated in preparation for World War I. With their National Guard units federalized numerous states found themselves ill prepared to provide a similar force to accomplish traditional state missions such as law enforcement assistance, and providing flood and disaster assistance to local authorities. Consequently, state governors inundated the War Department with requests for federal troops. These requests went largely unmet because the War Department could spare few federalized forces for traditional state missions, and governors were advised to organize replacement units.

Prior to World War I, federal laws prohibited states from maintaining armed forces other than the National Guard. However, the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916 provided cursory authority to do so as the last sentence of Section 61 stated, “that nothing contained in this act shall prevent the organization and maintenance of state police or Constabulary.” Governors used this clause as permission to begin preparations for organizing replacement National Guard units. The stipulation being, replacement forces were designed only for state service and would not be eligible for overseas duty as a unit, although individual members could be federalized.

The Federal government made several additional attempts to assist State Guard programs by passing the Home Guard Act of 1917 and the subsequent War Department Circular #3 of March 1918. This 1917 amendment to the Dick Act provided for Federal aid to State Guards when practicable, and the circular stated State Guard units organized and recognized by federal authorities after August 5th 1917 would be furnished arms, equipment, and uniforms by the federal government. In reality, the organization and maintenance of State Guard units defaulted to the governor, principally due to inadequate supplies in all categories of war stocks.

Composition of World War I State Guard units routinely consisted of retired or prior service personnel, many former National Guardsmen, or those who for one reason or another were ineligible for federal service. Training varied as several states pressed Civil War and Spanish American War veterans into service as training cadre. Additionally, the reliability and efficiency of State Guard units varied,

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10 Ibid, p. 23.
depending on location, local and state government support. Several of the more effective units were established in the Northeastern states including Massachusetts and Connecticut. These states created effective and centralized state military forces that provided invaluable assistance during the “Spanish Influenza” outbreak in 1918 supplying much needed manpower, transportation, and medical assets for this emergency.\footnote{13} Texas also extensively used State Guard units to fill the void. Due to the recent raids by Pancho Villa, an additional five cavalry and three infantry regiments were organized for strictly state service, guarding the border with Mexico.

Fortunately, other than labor strikes and associated local contingencies, no incidents required large scale domestic military intervention and the presence of State Guard units provided a calming effect to the local populace. Approximately 27 states created State Guard units representing an additional 79,000 soldiers for strictly state duty.\footnote{14} After the war, as the nation turned its attention to prosperity and internal affairs, State Guard units were mostly disbanded, but would again be called upon to serve in World War II.

**World War II**

As World War II began in September 1939, the United States was caught in the throes of preparations for mobilizing a long neglected military. National Guard units were again called into federal service in late 1940, with the first peacetime draft in American history. Originally recalled for one year, this length of service was later extended to eighteen months. Recognizing the impending dilemma, and with advice from General George C. Marshall, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the State Guard Act of October 21\textsuperscript{st} of 1940.\footnote{15} More comprehensive than the previous Home Guard Act of 1917, the 1940 Act clarified the constitutionality of organizing State Guard forces as replacements for the federalized National Guard and permitted access to Federal supplies and equipment, when available. As part of the organizational process, State Guard command and control policies and procedures were established as the Militia Bureau (later National Guard Bureau), became the strategic command and control headquarters, while each state Adjutant General exercised operational and tactical control of State Guard units.\footnote{16} However, while the State Guard Act of 1940 effectively relieved the War Department from supervision of many State Guard functions and responsibilities, Guard possession and use of Federal small arms and related equipment placed State Guards under scrutiny of the U.S. Army.\footnote{17} As such, State Guard units were subject to periodic inspections to ensure proper care and maintenance of Federal facilities and equipment. At first, these inspections caused consternation between state forces and their Federal inspectors. As the war progressed, these tensions subsided and the two sides grew increasingly interactive and cooperative, as the nine Service Area Commands within the United States incorporated State Guards into their defense plans, and furnished training programs specifically designed for these replacement National Guard units.

State Guard forces were autonomous of Federal control, but the Hawaiian Territorial Guard was an exception. Due to their strategic location, and credible status they were placed under operational control

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{14} Barry M. Stentiford “The American Home Guard, The State Militia in the Twentieth Century, 2002, p. 51
\item \footnote{15} COL Edmund Zysk, “Stay Behind Forces For the National Guard, Soldiers or Policemen?”, unpublished thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 1 May 1988, p. 7.
\item \footnote{17} Ibid.
\end{itemize}}
of the Commander, Army Forces of the Pacific from the beginning of the war through May 1942. They demonstrated their ability to perform as part of the overall defense plan.\(^{18}\)

Missions outlined for World War II State Guard forces mirrored those of the National Guard and included performing the peacetime duties such as response to natural and manmade disasters. They performed full time guard duty in coastal regions and other vital areas, trained for combat to ensure interoperability with federal troops in the event of an invasion and performed internal security functions. All of these duties were reflected on their Mission Essential Task List (METL).\(^{19}\)

Drill periods also followed the National Guard model, e.g. training one night a week at the local armory, and conducting a five-day annual training period, usually during the summer months, using standard Army training manuals as their doctrinal base.\(^{20}\) Since State Guards were volunteer organizations, weekly drill periods were conducted in a non-pay status. However, soldiers normally received full pay and allowances for the annual training period or any state active duty service. Training courses were sometimes in a pay status, when funding was available.

Personnel readiness standards were also established as modified physical examinations were given to all enlisted members to account for the variation in age, which ranged from 21-50. No maximum age limit was established for the officers however, in order to optimize the prior service manpower pool available at the time. Some men much younger than the above stated range, were accepted into service with State Guard units.\(^{21}\) However, the constant turnover of personnel due to Federal service became an important readiness issue for State Guard units. Many units experienced 100% turnover in a year’s time. While detrimental in one sense, training received in State Guard units was valuable preparation for personnel later serving as active component NCOs during the war. Frequently, recruits receiving training in State Guard organizations prior to entering federal service attained promotion more quickly than those with no prior training.\(^{22}\)

Equipment for State Guard units, particularly small arms, was in short supply during the war. Available arms included M1903 Springfield bolt action rifles, military issue shot guns, Reising and Thompson sub-machine guns, and turn of the century derivatives of the Colt machine gun. Officers were responsible for obtaining their own side arms and ammunition. As the war progressed and federal stocks were more plentiful, uniforms, equipment and weapons were upgraded.\(^{23}\) Research indicates the weapons arsenal for State Guard units primarily consisted of small arms, but in some cases, such as Pennsylvania they had M-3 half-tracks later in the war. Employment of State Guard forces during the war varied from state to state. Understandably, they were extensively used in strategic areas such as the West Coast of the United States, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. While governors were permitted wide latitude on force structure, most modeled their units after the National Guard with Infantry forces being the dominant.

During the critical period several weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, approximately 13,000 State Guard troops were called to service and prepared to defend the homeland. As the emergency subsided in late

\(^{18}\) Ibid, p. 148.  
\(^{21}\) Mr. William Perry, correspondent, Hazelton Standard Speaker newspaper, Hazelton, PA, interview by author 8 May 2003.  
\(^{23}\) The Pennsylvania Guardsman Magazine, March 1942, p. 5; Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA.
January 1942, units were returned to their normal status of drilling one night a week and one-week annual training. However, again, due to their strategic location, states such as California kept a portion of their State Guard on state active duty for the balance of the war.\textsuperscript{24}

Although never called for combat actions, these volunteer units proved valuable in providing homeland defense for the nation. State Guard units provided comprehensive security assets and assistance during times of civil unrest and labor disputes. In addition, their success as an additional armed force freed personnel needed in other areas of the war effort while also providing a sense of security for the population. Approximately 35 states, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone created State Guard forces for service during World War II. Several State Guards, including Pennsylvania remained active into 1948, as an interim force while National Guard units returned from World War II service, were reconstituted and returned to state control.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{The Korean War and the Cold War}

As National Guard units returned to state service after World War II, interest in State Guards effectively vanished. This situation changed following the surprise move in June 1950, when Communist North Korean forces crossed the 38\textsuperscript{th} Parallel and invaded pro-U.S. South Korea. Renewed interest in State Guard programs was experienced throughout the nation. While the U.S. response to North Korean aggression was immediate, it was of a lesser magnitude than that of World War II. Nonetheless, President Harry S. Truman authorized a Presidential Selected Reserve Call Up as National Guard units were sent to Korea, while others were replacements for active component units sent into the theater of operations. In total, eight National Guard Infantry Divisions, three Regimental Combat Teams, and 714 company size units were called to federal service for the Korean War.\textsuperscript{26}

For the fourth time in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the departure of large numbers of National Guard units left states without substantial means to execute traditional National Guard missions. During the Korean War, several states re-activated their State Guards to replace the departed National Guard. For example, Pennsylvania activated at least one Regiment for service in the western portion of the state. Missions for the Korean War era State Guards was not substantially different from World War II, with the exception of defending against gas attacks.\textsuperscript{27}

In the post-Korean War era all but a handful of states disbanded their State Guard units. During much of the 1950s and 1960s enthusiasm for the State Guard declined until 1972 when Defense Secretary Melvin Laird began the Total Defense Policy, that called for increased reliance on Reserve Component organizations to assist the nation in its ability to wage war. However, substantial interest in State Guard programs was again not noticeable until after the collapse of U.S. – Soviet détente in the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{28}

By the spring of 1985, interest in State Guard units (now known as State Defense Forces or SDFs) had risen to the point of the State Defense Force Association of the United States being formed. This group

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{24} COL Edmund Zysk, “Stay Behind Forces For the National Guard, Soldiers or Policemen?”, unpublished thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 1 May 1988, p. 8
  \item \textsuperscript{25} The Pennsylvania Guardsman Magazine, November 1948, p. 5; Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Barry M. Stentiford “The American Home Guard, The State Militia in the Twentieth Century, 2002, p. 194.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} The Pennsylvania Guardsman Magazine, June 1950, p. 25; Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA.
\end{itemize}
State Defense Forces, an Untapped Homeland Defense Asset

(Changing their name to the State Guard Association of the United States, or SGAUS in 1993) “was organized to promote the role of state authorized and organized defense forces, state guards, or state military reserves, and to foster and encourage cooperation between the various state defense forces, the Department of Defense, the National Guard, the active armed forces and their reserves, other government agencies, and the general public.” SGAUS acts as an advisory council for the collective of all the State Defense Force units and provides guidance on missions and related State Guard issues.

21ST CENTURY ISSUES

Military/Military Support to Civilian Authorities Capabilities

Present SDF missions and related training generally mirror their World War I and World War II counterparts as National Guard replacement units. Potential missions include meeting domestic emergencies within the state, assist civil authorities in the preservation of order, guard and protect critical industrial installations and facilities, prevent or suppress subversive activities, and cooperate with federal military authorities. Also, since National Guard units are being mobilized in increasing numbers, SDFs are charged with assuming control of state armories and Federal property and when directed, assist in the mobilization process.

Today’s SDFs continue their traditions of World War I and World War II by providing value-added assets in the areas of manpower and specialized expertise. These assets include infrastructure site security, emergency operations center operations, search and rescue capabilities, medical, religious, legal, Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effects and air assets. Several SDF units are modeled after a Military Police organization or have substantial Military Police assets within their force structure due to the current emphasis on site security. For example, the Alaskan SDF, primarily a Military Police organization, provides security for the Alaskan pipeline and harbor’s of Anchorage and Whittier, using four patrol craft armed with crew served weapons. Their training focus reflects this emphasis as core courses of formal instruction are in law enforcement. With an instructor cadre of either current or former state troopers, graduates of the Alaskan SDF Military Police academy have the same certifications and arrest powers as Alaskan state troopers, thereby increasing the law enforcement strength of Alaska by several hundred. Due to strategic importance, vast expanse and sparse population, utilizing Alaska’s SDF in a Military Police role compliments well the security assets of the region, to include the active and reserve Federal forces.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, several states utilized their SDFs for security. Alaska’s SDF was on duty for five months protecting critical infrastructure sites. In addition, the New York Guard (NYG) Army Division’s Military Police Brigade was used for perimeter security at Camp Smith, NY and critical infrastructure sites within the city. However, Army SDFs are not the only volunteer organizations that provide security assets. For example, the “blue suit” or Air Force SDFs are the second dimension of volunteer organizations providing security assets. Air Force SDFs routinely augment security forces,

particularly in the states of New York and Texas, providing security for Air National Guard installations (see Table 2).33

Naval Militias are the third dimension, providing water borne patrol assets for security missions, particularly critical in coastal areas on the Great Lakes or in states containing sizeable rivers. For example, the New York Naval Militia was extensively used in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, providing routine security for the nuclear power plant at Indian Point, NY and providing transportation assets to and from the crash site. Ohio also routinely utilizes their naval militia for patrolling Lake Erie in the vicinity of Camp Perry, site of the national rifle matches, and complimenting the U. S. Coast Guard in the region.

The authority for volunteer Naval Militias is provided by either Title 10 OR Title 32 United States Code. Of the four active Naval Militias (Alaska, New York, New Jersey and Ohio), Alaska and New York are organized under Title 10 USC. This legislation stipulates that 95% of personnel must be drilling reservists of the Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard Reserve, hence, they are a federally recognized force.34 Conversely, Ohio is strictly a state recognized Title 32 organization, while New Jersey is a combination with one battalion of drilling reservists and two battalions of non-reservist volunteers. The distinction between Title 10 and Title 32 authority is important since Federal recognition equates to Federal funding. Conversely, a Title 32 organization is strictly a state force and therefore ineligible for Federal funding. As a consequence, state funding does not always satisfy unit requirements, particularly in the areas of material and supplies and overall readiness. Title 10 also affects mission support, if called to state active duty by the Naval Militia and by their reserve unit, members are required to serve with their Federal reserve unit, effectively rendering the volunteer Title 10 Naval Militia non-available for duty. Table 1 provides a comprehensive view of current funding levels for SDFs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Active Strength</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Type Unit by branch &amp; function</th>
<th>Prior Service</th>
<th>Age Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>30K</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>22-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>26.5K – 1 Mil</td>
<td>M.P.</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>20-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>225K</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>80+%</td>
<td>18-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry/Cavalry</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>18-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>40K</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>21-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Admin HQs</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>50-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>17-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Admin Det.</td>
<td>60-75%</td>
<td>18-65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20-70+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>18-78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33 Col Robert Cheeseman, Commander 4th Air Wing, Texas Air Force State defense Force, San Antonio, TX, interview by author, 10 August 2003.
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<tr>
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<th>Age Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>7K</td>
<td>M.P.</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>18-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>75K</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>16-65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>14K</td>
<td>M.P</td>
<td>50+%</td>
<td>17-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>21-75+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>18-65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>1,630</td>
<td>300K</td>
<td>Support Det.</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>16-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>45-50%</td>
<td>17-75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>53K</td>
<td>Light Infantry</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>18-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>103K</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>17-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>17-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Light Infantry</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>18-70*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>18-64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Approximate age.

Support for county and state Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) is another important mission SDFs frequently support. With many retired or former National Guard personnel in the force, SDF assets represent an experienced force knowledgeable in state and National Guard emergency operations processes and procedures. The Louisiana SDF for example, provides a team of soldiers and desk officers for each parish (county) EOC, consisting of subject matter experts in operations and logistics. They are part of the integrated civil, military team manning these centers.\(^{35}\)

As an integral part of the Georgia Department of Defense, the Georgia SDF is a major contributor in providing EOC assets. They have a robust training program evidenced by their recent participation in a Weapons of Mass Destruction command post exercise, reacting to a “dirty bomb” scenario, detonated in the port of Charleston, SC. In addition to providing trained desk officers for the National Guard Joint Emergency Operations Center at Dobbins AFB, Atlanta, GA, they operated their own headquarters tactical operations center. Training, appearance, and mission execution was not substantially different from any battalion Tactical Operations Center, and all staff sections were exercised. In addition to refining tactical standing operating procedures, exercising command and control of subordinate units, issuing operations orders and FRAGOs and coordinating communications protocols with a variety of state agencies.

In addition to traditional missions, support to civil authority, such as search and rescue, are an important part of several SDFs METL. Search and rescue assets vary from state to state, and can include personnel with medical training such as emergency medical technicians, and enhanced search capabilities including horses and fixed wing aircraft. For example, with former Special Forces and Ranger members, the Tennessee SDF has a robust search and rescue organization somewhat modeled after a Special Forces “A” team. The team contains licensed paramedics, civilian structural engineers, communications specialists, and a canine section that are both airborne and scuba qualified, adding to their capability for insertion into austere locations. While they extensively use current Special Forces and Ranger doctrine

for military task training, such as map reading, their certification for search and rescue tasks are accomplished by utilizing the National Association of Search and Rescue standards.\textsuperscript{36}

Although SDFs are predominately land based, several states including Tennessee, have privately owned fixed wing aircraft detachments, sometimes augmenting the local Civil Air Patrol in search and rescue operations. Virginia extensively uses their aircraft by supplying aircraft as drones for WMD scenarios, providing realistic training for air defense units of the Virginia National Guard. They are also active in assisting the Virginia Fish and Game Commission by flying reconnaissance missions over the Shenandoah Valley searching for poachers as bear poaching is on the rise in the region and the vast land expanse requires additional air assets. The Connecticut SDF, while predominately a ceremonial organization, used their cavalry detachment for cross-country search and rescue missions augmenting the ground search operation on at least one occasion. These examples are a sampling of the capabilities available in SDFs units.

To help face the growing threat of possible Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorist attacks, several SDFs provide relevant professional services. For example, the Georgia SDF has robust Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) capabilities. With the Center for Disease Control and several well know hospitals located in Atlanta, the Georgia SDF has acquired the skills of a number of chemists, medical doctors and various other professional skills relating to WMD to fashion an organization to advise, assist and train with specialized National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction, Civil Support Teams.\textsuperscript{37}

Other SDF professional service capabilities for external missions include legal, medical, and religious support assets. With the current high operations tempo, SDF professionals in the medical, legal and religious fields are highly desirable and used extensively. For example, the NYG supplied legal and religious support in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, in addition to manning the medical clinic on Camp Smith, NY to include a full compliment of licensed Chiropractors. In total, the NYG 244th Medical Detachment treated 844 patients, mostly at the crash site.\textsuperscript{38} Other states specifically Georgia and Virginia routinely provide legal support to their National Guard units during mobilization for federal missions. Table 2 provides a list of the missions SDFs regularly support.

| Table 2. State Defense Forces – Army – Missions/Capabilities |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Alabama | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Alaska | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| California | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Connecticut | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Georgia | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Indiana | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Louisiana | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Maryland | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Massachusetts | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |

\textsuperscript{36} LTC Lynn Carr, Brigade S-3, 4th Brigade Tennessee State Guard, Atlanta, GA, interview by Author, 11 July 2003.

\textsuperscript{37} Information Paper, National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams Overview and Update, Ms. Kathi Heaton, National Guard Bureau, September 24th, 2002.

\textsuperscript{38} After Action Review, Headquarters, Army Division, 244th Clinic, New York Guard, 9 January 2003.
ALTERNATIVE TO AC/RC SERVICE

Expanding the use of SDFs provides an opportunity for increasing numbers of citizens to serve in a military organization in a less demanding environment than the Federal active or reserve military. For example, of those who enter the active military, 14% leave during the first six months and more than 30% leave before their first term is complete. The main reasons for the high attrition rate include inadequate medical and pre-entry drug screening and recruits fail to perform adequately because they are in poor physical condition for basic training or lack motivation.\(^{39}\)

Routinely, State Guard units of World War II took advantage of National Guard discharges from active service due to stringent physical standards associated with overseas deployments. Approximately 3,400 National Guardsmen were discharged prior to deployment providing trained resources for State Guard service. While disqualified from Federal service, these trained soldiers were fully capable of enduring the less strenuous regimen of service in State Guard units.\(^{40}\) As well, the State Guard programs of World War II provided for the patriotic spirit of the day permitting non-prior service personnel, who were not eligible for federal service to participate.

Professionals in the legal and medical fields who desire continued service are finding SDF organizations particularly attractive. As doctors and lawyers often have their own practice or are part of a small consortium, the prospect of an extended deployment as part of a Federal reserve unit represents a significant loss of income if not bankruptcy. Participation in SDFs represents a viable alternative, as units are designed strictly for state and not Federal service, thereby not subject to deployments.\(^{41}\)

FOSTERING PATRIOTISM THROUGH SERVICE

In recent articles a number of authors echo the argument of Samuel Huntington on the growing concern that the military is not representative of U.S. society. Journalist Thomas Ricks has warned of a “sense of separation between this military and this society.” For a variety of reasons, such as a shrinking

military, and fewer installations, the current military can be compared with our pre-World War II military, where duty in remote locations of the South and West insulated the military from the rest of society. In a 1994 article Huntington states “In the recent decades the basic outlook of the military has not changed, but the “baby boom” generation are more antagonistic to and questioning of the fundamental assumptions of the military approach than any previous generation.” Former Navy Secretary John Lehman comments, “without the draft, the military is increasingly being populated with career professionals, an important link to society has been lost.”

Misperceptions of SDFs also abound, as past critics have complained that “ultra right wing survivalists” are their main source of these volunteer organizations. A law suite filed by the Chrsitic Institute in 1995, a Washington based interfaith legal foundation, charged the State Defense Forces are drawn from “weekend survivalists Training Centers or ultra right war game schools.” These examples represent but a few of the misperceptions of military overall and SDFs in particular. Expanding their use would be a viable solution to erasing that perception as a broader base of society would have the opportunity to participate, performing valuable community service while experiencing the regimen of a military organization.

**Volunteer Spirit / Community Service**

Between September 2001 and September 2002, approximately 59 million Americans or 27.6 per cent of the non-institutional public performed volunteer service. For a variety of reasons, the 35-54 year old category was the most likely to volunteer, with one in three donating their time. Additionally, a January 2003 poll conducted by the Center for Information in Civic Learning and Engagement, of Americans ages 15-25 believe that volunteering in local community activities to address local problems is the most important kind of activity in which a person can be engaged.

By these numbers, conventional wisdom suggests the American public is taking an active role in shaping their environment. Partly due to the 9/11 attacks, but more so due to the younger generation whose parents were the protestors of the 1960s, are believed to be more action oriented than previous generations. Expanding the use of SDFs would be a viable option for younger Americans to fulfill the need as both volunteers and the ability to make a contribution in changing the environment.

**Multidimensional Assets and Life Skills**

Given the median age of these volunteer organizations is between 45-60, these soldiers, airmen, and sailors represent a seasoned force, many with combat experience. Research suggests that SDFs in 20 of 22 states, have a 50% or higher prior service percentage in both the NCO and officer ranks, many being former National Guardsmen with extensive knowledge of civil military operations. SDF units are replete with experienced personnel, particularly in leadership positions, representing a wealth of

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42 “The Mirror is Cracked, Not Broken” by Erik J. Dahl, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis MD, Dec 1999, Vol. 125, Iss. 12 p. 34.
45 “A generation to be Proud of” by Peter D. Hart and Mario Brossard, The Brookings Review, Fall 2002; 20, 4; Research Library, p. 36.
46 “The Mirror is Cracked, Not Broken” by Erik J. Dahl, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis MD, Dec 1999, Vol. 125, Iss. 12 p. 34.
knowledge allowing them to make a positive contribution. This is not a new phenomenon as both World War I and World War II State Guards heavily utilized prior service personnel.

A prime example of the World War II officer manpower pool was Brigadier General Robert Vail, Brigade commander of the Pennsylvania State Guard. A career National Guardsman, BG Vail was a veteran of the Spanish American War, Philippine Campaign, the Mexican Border Campaign, and World War I and continued to serve until his retirement in 1939. With the mobilization of the 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania Army National Guard in 1940, he was returned to state active duty as both the State Guard commander and acting Adjutant General. BG Vail and many others with extensive prior service, applied their vast experiences for state service, providing outstanding leadership to the State Guard.

SDF service provides an opportunity for present day veterans to again serve their country. With 24 million veterans distributed throughout the U.S. 50 states and four territories, the availability of an experienced manpower pool for possible service is encouraging.

During preparations for activating the Pennsylvania State Guard for service during the Korean War, Pennsylvania Governor James H. Duff stipulated that regimental and other command staff positions for the Pennsylvania Stat Guard would be manned by prior service personnel, particularly those with combat or overseas experience. These examples are representative of the civilian leaderships desire to call upon the prior service population, as a start point for placing proven leaders in charge of these replacement National Guard units.

Another example of a prior service leader is BG Barry Hartman, the Commander of the NYG Army Division. Hartman, has extensive credentials as a West Point graduate, Vietnam Veteran and former advisor to the New York National Guard’s 42nd Infantry Division. The NYG Army Division Sergeant Major is also experienced, being a Vietnam Veteran (173rd Airborne Brigade) and former member of the Army Reserve. BG Joel Seymour, Commander of the Georgia SDF is also quite experienced being a retired Georgia National Guardsman with expertise in command, control and operations from the platoon thru the headquarters, Georgia Army National Guard level.

The education and experience of these and many other SDF soldiers is difficult to replace and their expanded use provides a venue not only for prior service personnel but a force with a high degree of education. For example, of the approximately 210 officers in the Georgia SDF, 46% have either a masters or doctoral degree demonstrating a rather substantial education level contained in these volunteer organizations. Since these numbers are representative of SDF soldiers nation wide, life experiences coupled with prior military experience provides states a well educated and proven force to be utilized where needed.

**COST EFFECTIVENESS**

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47 The Pennsylvania Guardsman Magazine, November 1952, p. 28; Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA.
48 Sources of Perceptions Military Service, by Jerry Lehnus, defense Manpower Data Center & Mike Wilson, Westat, Inc, data as of 1999, Table 3, p. 6
Given that all land SDFs are strictly state organizations, their operating budgets are most often minimal when compared to Federal forces such as the National Guard. Similar to their World War I, World War II and Korean War counterparts, today’s volunteer SDFs and Naval Militia’s receive no pay or allowances for training and drill attendance. In addition, unless called to state active duty, mission support is also done strictly in a non-pay status. Each time SDFs are used for a function in a non-pay status, states save money, sometimes representing substantial savings for the professional services rendered. Table 3 provides a comprehensive list of the reported funding levels of each active SDF.

**Table 3. State Defense Forces - Army**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Active Strength</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Type Unit</th>
<th>Prior Service</th>
<th>Age Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>30K</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>22-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>26.5K - 1 Mil</td>
<td>M.P.</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>20-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>225K</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>80+%</td>
<td>18-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry/Cavalry</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>18-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>40K</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>21-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Admin HQs</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>50-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>17-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Admin Det.</td>
<td>60-75%</td>
<td>18-65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20-70+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>18-78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>7K</td>
<td>M.P.</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>18-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>75K</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>18-65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>14K</td>
<td>M.P.</td>
<td>50+%</td>
<td>17-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Support HQs</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>21-75+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>18-65*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>1,630</td>
<td>300K</td>
<td>Support Det.</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>16-65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>100K</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>45-50%</td>
<td>17-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>53K</td>
<td>Light Infantry</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>18-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>103K</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>17-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>17-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Light Infantry</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>18-70*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>18-64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, during 2002 the Georgia SDF contributed more than 1,797 days of operational service saving the state an estimated 1.5 million dollars. In 2001, their service saved Georgia in excess of $754,000.00.\(^{51}\) During the 9/11 crisis the 244th Medical Detachment of the NYG provided medical services saving the state of New York approximately $400,000.00.\(^{52}\) These examples provide insight into the financial advantage of not only using SDFs, but makes a sound argument for expanding their current force levels. In addition, since SDFs possess little equipment overhead costs are relatively small.

\(^{51}\) Ibid, p. 3.  
\(^{52}\) After Action Review, Headquarters, Army Division, 244th Clinic, New York Guard, 9 January 2003.
Since SDFs are all-volunteer organizations, salaries are paid to its members only in the event of activation for state active duty. Table 4 outlines the categories of legal authority to activate National Guard soldiers, the third choice relating to SDFs.

**Table 4 Legal authority to mobilize the National Guard:**

**The three distinct legal authorities available to mobilize the National Guard**

*Title 10 – Armed Forces, U.S. Code, Sections 12301 – 12304* is federal active duty under the command and control of the President.

*Title 32 – National Guard, U.S. Code, Section 102* is federally funded active duty “in the service of the United States,” but where command and control remains with the governors and adjutants general.

*State active duty (SAD)* allows the governor to use National Guardsmen or State Defense Forces with state funds for state specific events.

**CHALLENGES TO BE RESOLVED**

Expanding the use of SDFs, while attractive, requires resolution to several strategic and operational issues with the lack Federal recognition as the most prominent. Understandably, as state entities, SDFs were designed for state and not federal service, but their lack of federal recognition has several second and third level effects. First, current laws prohibit SDFs from purchasing excess Federal equipment of all types such as uniforms, and other individual equipment. Without at least cursory Federal recognition overall readiness and unit morale is affected. This issue is not new, as similar problems were experienced for both World War I and World War II. However, both President Woodrow Wilson and President Franklin Roosevelt were able to lend assistance by passing the Home Guard Act in 1917 and the State Guard Act in 1940 respectively. Essentially, both pieces of legislation granted at least cursory recognition to state forces and permitted their use of Federal equipment and weapons when available. Also, since the US is not involved in a conflict of the magnitude of a world war, research suggests enough excess equipment exists to fulfill the operational needs of these volunteer organizations.

As a collective, SDFs lack an active command and control headquarters to provide strategic direction on types, Table of Distribution and Allowances, readiness reporting, missions, training and personnel policies. Standardization and cohesion in policies and procedures are essential to ensure interoperability with their federal counterparts and other state agencies and is crucial for mission success. Similar to World War II, National Guard Bureau is currently the DoD executive agent and the channel between the state and federal government in all matters pertaining to SDFs. As such, National Guard Regulation (NGR) 10-4 provides guidelines on such matters as potential missions and wear and appearance of the uniform, but lacks authoritative language to ensure compliance.

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54 Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau Regulation NGR 10-4 21 Washington DC, September 1987.
Command and control was also an issue during World War II, particularly in light of the possibility of State Guards and active forces operating in the same area. However, by adopting a common sense approach and choosing cooperation over turf battles, both state and Federal force headquarters found a workable solution.\textsuperscript{55} An alternative for the current issue of an oversight organization is the State Guard Association of the United States or SGAUS. Since most recognized SDFs belong to SGAUS and their charter is to promote the roles of and foster cooperation between SDFs, the Department of Defense, the National Guard, the active armed forces and their reserves they would be the logical choice for that responsibility.

Given, that a “one size fits all” mentality is not realistic, research suggests unit types and missions have changed, but not substantially. For example, most World War II State Guard units were modeled after either a light infantry or M.P. organization in form and function. Today, several SDF organizations mirror that traditional structure, yet there is a substantial derivation as a growing number of administrative and support headquarters within the force. This lack of standardization also reflects the lack of concern at the strategic level as to where these volunteer organizations fit into the overall defense plan.

The current world environment reflects similarities to World War II, as some have compared the 9/11 attacks to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. However, differences include the possibility of the entire National Guard being called to Federal service is minimal, yet mobilizing a preponderance of forces from an individual state or region is possible. In addition, there is increased concern over possible threats of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons of Mass Effects (WMD/WME), and Information Technology threats. As demonstrated by the 2002 anthrax attacks against U.S. domestic targets, the ease of proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical agents causes constant concern by local, state and Federal government officials questioning whether sufficient manpower exists to defend against an attack of one or more of these agents.

Information Technology is another potential asymmetric threat by terrorist groups and is becoming increasingly difficult to locate and eradicate. The importance of information technology cannot be overstated, as our dependence on computers and “the information highway”, and the ease of subversives “hacking” into government systems causes great concern. Again, questions regarding sufficient numbers of trained personnel to meet this threat are being voiced at every level.

Readiness reporting also requires resolution as research suggests there is not formal process to report SDF unit readiness posture such as a DA 2715 Unit Status Report. While commanders periodically brief their Adjutant General on readiness, the process is without formal structure and the readiness of units is unknown at echelons above the state headquarters, particularly at National Guard Bureau.

Taking the lead from Army Field Manual #1 (FM1), “The Army”, doctrine is crucial to training. The lack of codified missions impacts on the doctrine and associated training for SDFs as a collective. It is important for SDFs to have a clearly established universal task list, approved METL, and associated doctrine to develop challenging and meaningful individual and collective training programs.

To date all 23 SDF organizations offer military training courses to their soldiers and officers, such as Basic Non-Commissioned Officers Course, Advanced Non-Commissioned Officers Course for the enlisted ranks or Basic and Career Courses for officers. These courses were designed by the units themselves using current doctrine such as Soldiers Manuals, STPs, MTPs and TTPs, adapted to the needs of the organization. However, unlike their active Army and Reserve counterparts, the course program of instruction varies from state to state.

For example, the Tennessee SDFs BNOC and Basic Officer courses are approved through the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Ft. Monroe, VA.\textsuperscript{56} The NYG Army Division courses are also well organized, designed by former non-resident USAR course instructors.\textsuperscript{57} While these initiatives are commendable, there is no set standard to ensure the collective curriculum is as well organized and all soldiers are receiving basic and uniform instruction.

Further, SDFs are prohibited from participating in non-resident training such as the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Research indicates the school prohibits SDF participation due to their lack of Federal recognition. This argument however, lacks credibility since officers of foreign armies are permitted entrance into the course of instruction.\textsuperscript{58} In efforts to educate their officers, states such as California and Georgia have enrolled them in the U.S. Marine Corps Command and General College, who despite their non-federal status permits enrollment of SDF officers.

A venue which SDFs utilize to train their officers and soldiers on military support to civil authorities is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) website. In fact, many states including Georgia, California and New York require FEMA courses as a pre-requisite for advancement. Again however, no standards exist to ensure a base level of education in military support to civilian authorities. Table five provides a comprehensive list of military courses offered by SDFs.

**Table 5. State Defense Forces – Army - Schools**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Basic Training</th>
<th>PLDC</th>
<th>BNCOC</th>
<th>ANCOC</th>
<th>Sergeant Major</th>
<th>Officer Basic/Co Grd</th>
<th>Officer Advanced</th>
<th>CGSC</th>
<th>OCS</th>
<th>Warrant Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
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<td>New York</td>
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\textsuperscript{56} LTC Lynn Carr, Brigade S-3, 4\textsuperscript{th} Brigade Tennessee State Guard, Atlanta, GA, interview by Author, 11 July 2003.
\textsuperscript{57} BG Barry Hartman, Commander, NYG Army Division, Camp Smith, NY, interview by author 16 May 2003.
\textsuperscript{58} Mr. Michael Turner, Chief, Non-Resident CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, interview by author, 29 June 2003.
SDF personnel issues such as recruiting, medical and physical readiness standards, rank structure and security clearance procedures also require clarification and resolution. Most units have screening procedures in place to ensure quality recruits, such as criminal background checks however, standards vary and are directly linked to funding shortfalls. Due to cost, most units use any means available to check service records (Department of Defense Form 214) for prior service personnel and background checks with the local police departments for non-prior service personnel.

Medical and physical standards for SDFs also vary greatly within the force, with height and weight standards as a prime example. Some commanders such as the BG Lawrence Morrell, Commander of the New Mexico SDF states, “if they do not present a soldierly appearance in uniform, we discharge em.” BG Barry Hartman, Commander NYG Army Division, uses a modified AR 600-9, by adding 20 pounds to each height category, while other SDF commanders enforce no height and weight standards. This area is of particular importance not only linked to duty performance but health issues and potential law suites to these volunteer organizations. Without directive guidance and compliance measures in place this area remains highly decentralized and potentially a major problem area.

Liability for its soldiers is another operational concern as current laws prohibit SDF soldiers from operating Federal equipment, such as vehicles, weapons or construction equipment. Professionals in the medical or legal fields are also prohibited from practicing their trade unless on state active duty orders. When supporting week end or annual training, medical doctors are permitted only rudimentary medical advice or referring patients to civilian or active duty medical facilities. This lack of standardization represents a potential loss of valuable professional services particularly in the medical field.

CONCLUSION

While it is understood these units possess challenges that require resolution, available evidence suggests their expanded use makes sense for several reasons. First, with the OPTEMPO currently experienced by our forces, particularly the National Guard in its growing Homeland Defense role, it is likely trained Federal forces may be at a premium and augmentation forces will be required for future contingencies. The possibility of National Guard units being inaccessible to state governors is a growing concern. Therefore, by actively supporting the SDF concept, governors have an alternative to provide a trained force at least in cadre strength providing uninterrupted service to their citizens.

Currently, SDF units successfully operate in 22 states and Puerto Rico, with another handful maintaining a volunteer Naval Militia. The cost associated with maintaining these volunteer forces is much less than an active or reserve federal force while providing trained personnel for state missions.

Additionally, with the increased volunteer spirit in the United States particularly after 9/11 events, SDFs provide a viable alternative to active or reserve federal service. SDFs, including Title 32 Naval Militia units, provide an opportunity for continued community service for both prior and non-prior service
personnel, in a less strenuous setting, while maintaining the discipline and values of a military organization.

Lastly, as research has demonstrated, historically SDF organization and use has been an afterthought. From the Mexican Border expedition through the Korean War, State Guard/SDF use has been a last minute, knee jerk reaction to unexpected circumstances, much like the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of 9/11. With today’s increase in asymmetrical methods of warfare particularly global terrorism, it is imperative to explore the use of all the existing force structure to meet our national security requirements, particularly homeland defense. Expanding the use of volunteer organizations such as SDFs represents a step in that direction.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the current restrictions placed on these volunteer organizations, it is recommended the current laws be changed to grant Federal recognition at least to facilitate SDF access to excess government equipment. Since these units are strictly volunteers, participating mostly in a non-pay status, denying access to basic necessities such as uniforms and accoutrements makes little sense and effects unit morale and readiness.

Lack of Federal recognition also impacts on the SDFs ability to tap into existing non-resident military courses, particularly the Non-Resident U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The idea of officers and soldiers being denied access to training courses and instead utilize sister service non-resident training e.g. The Marine Corps Institute courses seems a bit extreme. In light of foreign army students having access to such courses, it is recommended current policies and procedures be changed to permit recognized and approved SDFs participation.

Funding has always been an issue with these volunteer organizations. Since they are state supported their funding stream is at the behest of the governor. Research suggests most SDFs operate on a minimal budget, often unable to supply soldiers with the basic necessities. In efforts to augment funding levels, it is recommended partial Federal funding be initiated through National Guard Bureau and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. Civilian organizations of similar ilk, e.g. the Citizen Corps and the USA Freedom Corps have access to Federal funding, SDFs should enjoy the same privilege.

With the increase in National Guard OPTEMPO, it is recommended that non-participating states and territories consider activating an SDF organization. The recommended size of proposed units should be at least Regiment, following either the light infantry or military police model, with the associated organic combat service support organizations such as Nuclear, Biological and Chemical organization, plus medical, and legal sections in their Table of Distribution and Allowances. For those shore line states or who have borders with or contain large bodies of water, activating a Naval Militia in either Title 32 or Title 10 status is advisable to augment their current security assets. As demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks, recovery operations are extensive and manpower intensive and can be multi-dimensional in the ability to utilize land, air and sea assets. Trained volunteer organizations can and do provide manpower and professional services that permit federal forces to concentrate their efforts in other critical areas.

There are several recommended solutions to the command and control issue of SDFs, since it is currently a highly decentralized process. As the DoD agent for SDF issues, it is recommended that National
Guard Bureau be more proactive in providing guidance in standardizing roles and missions, training and doctrine and personnel matters in conjunction with the Department of the Army and each Adjutant General. While SDFs exist at the behest of each governor, and he/she will dictate policy on force employment, standardized missions and related training, doctrine and personnel matters would add much legitimacy to these organizations. It is further recommended that an office of at least three fulltime staff members be activated at National Guard Bureau to dispense with such matters. It is important that SDF programs be given proper attention, and guidance in establishing and quantifying standards on a number of issues, which cannot be accomplished by staff officers as an additional duty.

As an alternative it is also recommended further study be conducted to place SDFs, as a collective, under the operational control of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in much the same manner as the U.S. Coast Guard. Since a primary focus of SDFs is homeland security, their inclusion under the umbrella of DHS would be a valuable assistor particularly concerning funding issues. It is also understood for this recommendation to be a reality, a high level of cooperation between state and federal officials and possible new legislation would be required.

Also, further study should examine SGAUS as the organization to provide standards for SDFs. Since SGAUS exists for the sole purpose of advising and informing on SDF matters and their board of directors consists of SDF members from programs nation wide they would be a logical choice.

Finally, research suggests the question of liability for volunteer SDFs is of growing concern particularly at the National Guard headquarters of participating states. It is therefore recommended Federal legislation be implemented to encourage state legislatures to change their policies to clarify liability issues associated with state service while not on State Active duty orders. Clarification is required at both the state and federal levels since professional service protection such as malpractice insurance for medical doctors is the responsibility of state legislatures.