THE EFFECTS OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956 ON THE HUNGARIAN MILITARY HIGHER EDUCATION

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by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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**THE EFFECTS OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956 ON THE HUNGARIAN MILITARY HIGHER EDUCATION**

This thesis provides information and analysis of the effects of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 1956 on the Hungarian military higher education system. Providing a historical overview, the thesis sets up an understanding of the Hungarian military higher education’s situation from its establishment until the end of WWII. The thesis explains the process of reestablishment and improvement of the system after WWII. This part provides large amounts of data from 1947 until 1956, setting up the comparison of the system before and after the revolution. It examines the educational institution’s role during the days of the revolution, as well as how it affected the lives and careers of many instructors, military officers, and students. This thesis examines the military higher education’s situation after the revolution. It provides information and large amounts of data, which serves to explain the changes, as well as, the short and long term effects caused by the revolution.

This thesis analyzes many studies and provides interesting data regarding the system, the education institutions, instructors, students, and the Hungarian officers’ corps. In summary, the reader can gain an insight into the Hungarian military higher education system during the wildest years of communism in Hungary, as well as the following decades.

**Subjects:**
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


This thesis provides information and analysis of the effects of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 1956 on the Hungarian military higher education system. Providing a historical overview, the thesis sets up an understanding of the Hungarian military higher education’s situation from its establishment until the end of WWII. The thesis explains the process of reestablishment and improvement of the system after WWII. This part provides large amounts of data from 1947 until 1956, setting up the comparison of the system before and after the revolution. It examines the educational institution’s role during the days of the revolution, as well as how it affected the lives and careers of many instructors, military officers, and students. This thesis examines the military higher education’s situation after the revolution. It provides information and large amounts of data, which serves to explain the changes, as well as, the short and long term effects caused by the revolution.

This thesis analyzes many studies and provides interesting data regarding the system, the education institutions, instructors, students, and the Hungarian officers’ corps. In summary, the reader can gain an insight into the Hungarian military higher education system during the wildest years of communism in Hungary, as well as the following decades.
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<tr>
<td>ÁVH</td>
<td>State Protection Authority (Államvédelmi Hatóság)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVO</td>
<td>Hungarian State Police State Protection Department (Magyar Államrendőrség Államvédelmi Osztálya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETI</td>
<td>Unified Officer’s School (Egyesített Tiszti Iskola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense (Honvédelmi Minisztérium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGYRMF</td>
<td>Kilián György Aviation Technical College (Kilián György Repülőműszaki Főiskola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLKF</td>
<td>Kossuth Lajos Military College (Kossuth Lajos Katonai Főiskola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>Hungarian Workers’ Party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEFESZ</td>
<td>Hungarian Federation of University and College Students’ Associations (Magyar Egyetemisták és Főiskolások Szövetsége)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKP</td>
<td>Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar Kommunista Párt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MN</td>
<td>Hungarian People’s Army (Magyar Néphadsereg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MH</td>
<td>Hungarian Defense Forces (Magyar Honvédség)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZMP</td>
<td>Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Police Main Command Political Department (Budapesti Főkapitányság Politikai Rendészeti Osztálya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZMKA</td>
<td>Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy (Zrínyi Miklós Katonai Akadémia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZMKMF</td>
<td>Zalka Máté Military Technical College (Zalka Máté Katonai Műszaki Főiskola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background
Revolutions in Europe

In 1945, the Soviet Red Army “liberated” Hungary from German occupation and began their own bloody occupation of Hungary. The Soviets claimed to be liberating the working classes, but the Hungarian state was an enemy which had declared war on USSR in 1941. They came only after bloody fighting for Budapest and horrible crimes by the occupiers against the civil population. The Soviet occupation of Budapest was like that in Berlin — involving mass violence and rape against civil population. The occupation brought about changes in all parts of National life. Hungarians soon realized that the Soviet liberation meant a new, even closer bondage to the Soviet Union than Hungary had with the Germans. After that time, Hungary was covered by the Soviet communist umbrella until the political system changed in 1989. The political system, the military, the economy, and all facets of Hungarian life were organized following the Soviet model. A puppet-government was put in power in Budapest, led by Mátyás Rákosi, and was directed from Moscow by Stalin. There were numerous significant changes in the pattern of life in Hungary starting at this point. Investigations began and supporters of the pre-war and wartime regimes e.g., priests, people with ties in the West, and Rákosi’s political rivals were imprisoned, many of them were executed. The State Protection Authority (aka, the Hungarian Secret Police) did a very effective job. Between 1950 and 1953, 650,000 people were arraigned from the 850,000 who were investigated. Tens of thousands were imprisoned or spent time in internment camps.
The military started to be reorganized according to the Soviets’ requirements. Soviet type weapon systems arrived, units were organized similar to the Soviet Red Army system, and the military education institutions started to teach military and political Soviet doctrines. The Soviets sent advisors to help – and supervise – the Hungarians to build the new system. To make the military ties closer, Soviet troops would remain stationed in the country for the next 46 years. In 1949, the Hungarian Communist regime and the Soviet Union concluded a “mutual assistance treaty” which turned Soviet occupation forces into “invited allied forces.” Six years later, when Hungary joined the Warsaw Pact in 1955, it had the effect of further legitimizing the Soviet troops remaining in the country. Eleven years after WWII, most Hungarians wanted significant changes in all parts of life; university students summarized their demands in sixteen points on a student meeting on October 22, 1956 (see Annex A).¹

After Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953, political changes occurred in the Soviet Union which affected the Socialist satellite countries in Europe. By that time, Communist countries struggled with many problems. Soviet-controlled heavy handed political leaders and security organizations eliminated or imprisoned their real and putative adversaries. The newly established economic systems were ineffective, making the living standard extremely low. This led to workers strikes, demonstrations and riots in Czechoslovakia East Germany in June 1953; Russian troops were ordered to the streets in East Germany but local police forces could manage the situation in both countries. The new leaders in the Kremlin realized that changes needed to occur. They ordered the satellite countries’ leaders to improve living standard and not to force industrialization. They blamed Mátyás Rákosi to be responsible for the worsening conditions in Hungary and he was replaced in
the prime minister position by Imre Nagy in June 1953, however, Rákosi still kept the position of the first secretary of the Party. Later Rákosi undermined Nagy’s support and he was expelled from the government in April 1955 and later from the Party leadership.

The Soviet Communist Party held its 20th congress in February 1956, when Khrushchev declared the crimes committed by Stalin. “It is clear that here Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilizing the masses, he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party and the Soviet Government.” Although the four-hour speech was secret, the message reached the masses as it was released through both written media and radio and people could see this as an opportunity for changes. Protests began in Poznan, Poland in June 1956. Workers went to streets demanding higher salary, lower taxes and lower work quotas; the police put down the protest. In October 1956, demonstrations began in Poland again, led by Władysław Gomułka (reformer communist, being seen as a martyr of Stalinism). He stood up to the Soviet threats and the population saw him as a national hero. The long friendship during their common history, and their revolutions at the same time made the Poles and Hungarians sympathize with each other during those days and these feelings raised the hate further against the Soviets.

On October 23, 1956, a peaceful student demonstration started in Budapest. This peaceful demonstration eventually grew into what became known as the Hungarian Revolution. People cut the Soviet-style coat of arms from the center of the Hungarian flag, demolished Stalin’s statue in Budapest, and removed the red stars from public
buildings. The students were not the only ones taking steps for freedom. There were political and military leaders, as well as everyday people, trying to break out of the Communist system. An independent, non-Soviet-led, opposition government was organized by a communist reformer Imre Nagy and formed a coalition of freedom fighters. The Soviet political leaders hesitated, having many sleepless nights.

Negotiations began regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Khrushchev made the decision – which was supported by most of the socialist countries – not to let Hungary leave the socialist block. He saw the withdrawal as an opportunity for the West to influence Hungary. Although the bloody fights occurred in Hungary, the future of the country was decided in the Kremlin. The Soviet Army put down the revolution, deploying 150,000 troops and 6,000 tanks against the Hungarian freedom fighters. After putting down the revolution, a new communist government was established by the Soviets, led by János Kádár. Kádár promised amnesty for those who participated in the revolution or resistance. Not keeping his promise, investigations began – conducted by the Soviets, later by the Hungarian State Security Organs (apparatus) – and 26,000 people were arrested. Half of them spent time in internment camps; hundreds were executed, and approximately 200,000 people escaped to Western countries. Hoped for Western intervention did not take place and Hungarians found themselves alone facing Soviet power. Not even Tito’s Yugoslavia, which had broken with Stalin, supported the Hungarian revolution.

These external and internal events caused significant changes in Hungarian internal affairs and also in the Soviet-Hungarian relationship, affecting daily life in Hungary for many years. The revolution also affected the Hungarian military in several
ways. The education, organizational structure, weapon systems, and equipment all changed over time, following the Soviet changes. As a result of the unsuccessful uprising, the Soviets kept a watchful eye on Hungary and the Hungarian military to ensure they remained a faithful partner in the Soviet sphere of influence. The Hungarian communist government, the Party, and their security organizations helped fulfill the Soviet interests. One of the goals of Imre Nagy’s government was to have an “apolitical army,” as democratic countries do. After restoring the communist government, the army primarily served Communism and secondarily the country of Hungary. The army became one of the primary means by which the Party maintained communist power, a characteristic of regimes in general. As George Orwell wrote in his book *Nineteen Eighty-four*, “the object of power is power.”

Roots of Conflict

But this story did not start in 1945. It was a long process before Hungary was occupied by Soviet troops. The antecedents started in the 1800’s, when Hungary was part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Events followed each other like dominos as Hungary got involved in World War I. The Treaty of Trianon ended WWI with disastrous results for Hungary on June 4, 1920. Hungary lost 70 percent of its territory (189,000 square km of 282,000) and border changes placed significant portions of the population (10.7 million of 18.3 million) in different nation-states. In the early 1900’s, communists appeared in Hungary, as they did in several other countries around the world, trying to establish a Socialist system under Béla Kun. They were in power for a short time, and the aftermath raised major issues for the nation and its government. After the resignation of Kun’s government on August 1, 1919, a Social-democrat government came on power led
by Gyula Peidl. Five days later, Roman-supported government gained power led by
István Friedrich. Horthy led the Romans out from Hungary with his National Army and
became regent of Hungary on March 1, 1920. The loss of significant portions of
Hungarian territory following the First World War led the government to align with the
Nazi Germany in the 1930s, in order to regain territory given to other nations. Although
military leaders knew it could be dangerous to enter the war, political leaders took
necessary steps that eventually led to Hungary joining the Axis Powers in declaring war
against the USSR in June 1941 and the Western Allies in December 1941.

Hungary was on the losing side of the war, having suffered approximately
360,000 casualties and 600,000 prisoners of war, many of whom were later interned in
Soviet camps and never returned. Hungary had also suffered from German policy to
exterminate its Jewish minority (Horthy denied to deportation of Jews and thousands of
Jews from abroad sought for shelter in Hungary) but in 1944, when German troops
occupied Hungary, the Hungarian Fascists decided to solve the Jewish question. All
these events destabilized Hungarian society and made Soviet domination easier because
of the frayed social fabric. Budapest was a decimated city thanks to the German-Soviet
fight over it.

**Primary Research Question**

What kind of effects did the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its failure have on
the Hungarian military higher education, and how does it impact today?
Secondary Research Questions

How did the Hungarian political system, political leaders, and the security organization affect the military education system before and after the revolution and how do we see its impact today?

How did the Hungarian Army’s organizational structure, mission, and leadership change after the revolution? What does this all mean for today’s Hungarian military personnel?

Significance

The revolution and its failure brought significant changes to Hungary, which affected peoples’ lives and the Hungarian military higher education for many decades. There may be some effects we can feel even today, so it is important to understand the background of decisions and events that occurred in the recent past.

Assumptions

The revolution and its failure caused changes, which are felt indirectly even today if we study links between Hungarian politics and military.

After the revolution, the Hungarian People’s Army remained the primary source of power, not for the government, but for the Party; the socialist ideology played an important role in the Hungarian military higher education.

The quality of higher military education became lower after the revolution, having less emphasis on professionalism and more emphasis on political loyalty and improvement took long time.
Limitations

This thesis will deal primarily with information related to professional development and military education, as well as information related to the relationship between the Hungarian politics and military. The thesis will focus primarily on the years following the revolution.

During my work I will rely upon sources written in either English or Hungarian. Any sources that may become available in other languages and might be relevant, such as documents from the former Soviet Union (Russian) or neighboring countries, will not be used unless translated into English or Hungarian.

Delimitations

Although the development of police officers and border guard officers were similar, and sometimes occurred at the same institution, this thesis will provide information only about military officers’ development.

Development of political officers was part of the higher military education in Hungary, but this thesis will not study this in detail.

Although there were special courses running for special attendants in military institutions – like party functional personnel and ÁVH officers – this thesis will not provide detailed information about these courses.

The thesis will explain the situation of the military higher education not only prior and after the revolution, but will also provide a historical overview to clarify how the system was developed and what kind of changes occurred during the examined period of time.

No classified sources will be used to write this thesis.
1 1956 Hungarian Revolution Portal
www.hungary1956.com/1956_hungarian_revolution.htm#16points


6 Orwell, George, *Nineteen Eighty-four*, p. 152.


CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

There are large amounts of books related to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Many of these works are focused on the revolution itself and provided only additional information for this research. However, recent works on the history of the Hungarian military higher education proved to be helpful. Recently published books may help to find the current point of view regarding the revolution and study whether the revolution has any lasting effects on today’s life. Although this thesis does not focus on history, books about the revolution’s causes and history they help to understand what kind of factors contributed to the revolution occurring and the Soviet respond to it.

This thesis provides a brief historical overview of the Hungarian military’s higher education system. The importance of this historical overview is that the reader gains an understanding about the evolution of the military higher education system, in order to put the impact of the 1956 revolution into context. This shows how the system was organized with all the weak and strong points and how WWI, WWII and the revolution affected it. Since the first military academy was established in 1872, the system of higher education has been reorganized several times. The reasons for the reorganizations varied from changing education requirements, to the introduction of military innovations, to upheavals in the political situation. As part of the historical overview, the thesis will focus on five different periods of time: the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and World War I, the interwar period and World War II, post-World War II until the Hungarian Revolution, the period of the Hungarian Revolution itself, and the post-revolution times.
The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and WWI period provides background on events that led to the Hungarian Revolution. Sándor Szilágyi wrote a book – *The First Hungarian Military Academy* – which describes how the first military academy was established in Hungary. It provides a picture of the system of military higher education, facts, and the military students’ lives from that time. This book was published in Budapest in 1872. Szilágyi studied many official documents during his work. The information which he provides in his book is based on Law Nr. XX of 1802, the official report of the Congress of 1808, official letters sent between Hungarian and Austrian political leaders, and other letters and memoranda. He provides detailed information about the circumstances of that age and the system of military education in Hungary at that time. His work proves an understanding of how important it was for the Hungarian political leaders to establish an institution for military education where Hungarian youngsters could prepare for a military career and engage in the most advanced military studies in their native Hungarian language. The purpose of this institution was to develop a new Hungarian military aristocracy.

Later Szilágyi describes how difficult it was to create the first Hungarian military education institution in the Austrian system. The situation in Europe was chaotic in the early 1800s; Napoleon had just completed his campaign through Austria and Hungary. It did not make possible to open the academy because of the military situation which affected the country. Szilágyi describes this situation and the problems which led to continuous delay of the establishment of the academy, causing many disappointments for the Hungarian leaders.
Szilágyi also writes about historical events and problems which made the establishment of a military academy postponed even further. After the Napoleonic war, financial problems delayed the process, later the relationship between the Habsburgs and Hungarians turned bad and the revolution and war for freedom broke out in 1848, causing further delays. The author provides insight into the plans to establish a military education institution which were modified several times and how political and military leaders were ready to start developing military leaders but had their plans erased by the march of history. Szilágyi provides detailed information about the curriculum and subjects they decided to teach to the students. It is evident they wanted to emphasize not only military material, but also that they truly wanted to develop some kind of aristocracy who had a basic knowledge of a broad range of subject matter. In his book, Szilágyi provides an insight into the students’ daily life. They followed a very busy schedule, with learning and studies of primary importance.

In the final part of his book, Szilágyi describes the circumstances which finally allowed the establishment and opening of the first Hungarian military institution. He emphasizes that it was an important step in Hungarian military history because the establishment of this institution provided basis for further improvement for the whole military education system in Hungary.

In the second period which this research examined, the interwar period and WWII, it is important to understand what caused Hungary to enter the war on Germany’s side and Hungary’s role in that conflict. Many authors have written about this period; initially, the researcher studied the books of Krisztián Ungváry, Béla K. Király, and László Veszprémy. These historians provide information about this era and make the
reader understand national interests which led Hungary to WWII and the result of the war. To understand the reasons for Hungary’s alliance with Germany, it is essential to study Hungary’s situation after WWI. The document which provides insight into the situation in Hungary is the *Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary*, which was signed on June 4, 1920 in the Trianon Palace of Versailles. The treaty was signed by the representatives of the winning powers and Hungary. The treaty has fourteen parts, which established regulations for life in the new Hungary. These regulations changed not only the pattern of daily life in Hungary, but the very nature of the state of Hungary in terms of its frontiers and populace. Part V “Military, Naval and Air clauses” established strict regulations regarding the military. Through this part, the victors of WWI set up the maximum number of manpower of the Hungarian Army and order to establish the volunteer military system, while prohibiting conscription. They set up the authorized number of weapon systems, such as machine guns and howitzers; they ordered the breakup of warships and regulated the use of aircraft. Part V also established rules for recruiting and training and regulated the number and types of schools, military education establishments, and military clubs. These regulations, together with the reduced manpower and weapon systems and composition of units, affected the military education system. The treaty did not make it possible to run more institutions and forbade developing officers for certain branches, like armor and aviation. Although the winning powers did not agree completely on the treaty, it was signed by most of them, forcing Hungary into this new situation. The treaty was not the only factor which made Hungary’s life difficult. Due to the long war, the economy fatigued and the political leadership lost its popular support. Strikes and demonstrations started, political leaders
and political systems changed each other in short periods of time, and the defeated and
demoralized military had to face three enemies trying to cut as large portion from
Hungary as possible at the same time.

The third period, post-WWII until the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, was a time of significant change in Hungary with respect to domestic politics, military organization and equipment, and professional development of the officer corps. Miklós M. Szabó wrote a book – *The History of the Hungarian Military Higher Education 1947-1956* – describing the Hungarian system of military higher education during this time period. This book describes how the Hungarian military higher education system was reestablished. The author provides detailed information about the curriculum, financial problems, the problems with the shift to the Soviet methods, the composition of students and their social and education background, and about the atmosphere of that era in Hungary. In his book, Miklós M. Szabó focuses on the history of the Honvéd Military Academy – later known as the Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy – which developed officers for higher command and staff duties. The book provides insight into the hard work the leaders and select instructors did to reestablish the system of military education. The author explains how they decided on the location for the institution and what kind of tasks had to be done. Szabó provides detailed information about how the students’ education was conducted. He describes the curriculum and the changes it went through in the early years until they fully developed a set of minimum requirements. His analysis of the student population provides surprising information. They were selected for attendance based on their social background, previous education level, grades, and political loyalty. He makes clear in his writing how important politics were at that time. Every part of life
was examined through the lens of socialism. The book provides data about the
officers released because of political disloyalty or their position in the Hungarian Royal
Defense Forces. This part of his book shows that the students spent 15 percent of their
total class time in political studies. The author provides year by year data and describes
the most important events and conflicts in the life of the institution. He writes about the
cooperation with Soviet advisors working in the Hungarian military education system and
the difficulties Hungarian faculty and leadership had with the translation of Soviet
manuals. He describes the instructors’ difficulties in changing their mindset to the new
socialist system.

In the last chapter, the author writes about the education of political officers. He
provides data about their numbers, the difficulties they had to face, and their
development. In this chapter Szabó highlights many of the same problems identified in
previous chapters, particularly with regard to political disloyalty or previous military
experience, which often resulted in the candidate’s release from the school. In summary,
the author provides a detailed overview of the state of Hungarian military higher
education between 1947 and 1956.

The last two periods, the Hungarian Revolution and post-revolution era, had long-
term effects on Hungarian life, particularly with regard to the military. There are
numerous publications about the revolution itself. Some of them are written by
eyewitnesses or participants, like László Beke, Sándor Kopácsi, and Michael Korda.
These books provide a picture of the revolution through each authors’ eyes. They portray
individual emotions toward the events and participants of both sides, but usually do not
provide a broad picture of the overall situation in Hungary during this time.
László Beke played an important role in the students’ activities before and during the revolution. He was a student of the College of Arts in Budapest, and after the revolution he immigrated to Canada and published his book *A Student’s Diary*. He published his book using a false name in order to remain unknown to the State Protection Authority (Államvédelmi Hatóság, ÁVH) and protect his parents and relatives living back in Hungary from repercussions. In the pages of the Prelude to his book he paints a picture about that era. It is unimaginable today that youngsters were not allowed to wear Western-style clothes, listen to jazz-music and learn English. Beke describes the environment where he lived with his wife, and being students the only way to save money was to miss eating on Sundays. He describes how effective and accurate the ÁVH was in their investigations and finding people’s secrets.

Beke started to write a diary when he felt something would happen. He describes the most important happenings each day between October 16 and November 1, 1956. He provides information about students’ meetings and their initial efforts to expel Stalinist professors and instructors from the university. He describes the administration’s response, as the leadership did not hesitate to dismiss the students who took part in that action. As he describes the students’ demonstration on October 23, the masses’ fury against ÁVH officers, he provides an insight into the minds of the Hungarian people. He writes about the break-out of armed fights between students and ÁVH officers and the feelings they felt when saw military personnel accepting the revolutionary ideas. Pictures of lynched ÁVH officers and Hungarian flags with the red star cut from the center became symbols of the revolution. Beke describes how much the people hoped the West would help them in their fight for freedom. The revolution ended on November 1 for
Beke, as he decided to leave the country and escape to Austria and then to Canada.

Although Beke’s work is not linked to the Hungarian military education system, it provides much information about that period of time, which helps to gain a better understanding of the overall situation in Hungary and the people’s emotions.

There are other types of books about that era, written by historians and experts like Miklós M. Szabó, Tamás Aczél, Leslie Balogh Bain, Zoltán D. Bárány, István Bibó, Károly Nagy, András Boros-Kazai, John H. Hallowell, Éva Haraszti, Melvin J. Lasky, László Veszprémy, Paul Lendvai, Béla K. Király, and Victor Sebestyén. Those books are based on facts, not on personal experiences.

Miklós M. Szabó (retired Lieutenant General, former commandant of the Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy, member of the Hungarian Academy of sciences) is one of the most respected Hungarian military historians who research the history of the Hungarian military education. His book, *The History of the Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy 1955-1960*, provides an interesting insight into the daily life of the academy during the revolution’s days. His book was published in Budapest in 2007. In the first chapter, the author explains the environment in which the establishment of the academy was decided upon and accomplished. He provides details of both internal and external issues, information about Hungary’s relations with other countries, and political events which affected the state of military higher education that time. In the second chapter, the author continues explaining the effects on the academy’s establishment, but he does it through a narrower channel than in the first chapter. He also explains the situation that existed with respect to the Hungarian people’s Army. The author describes the process of opening the academy with information about all the difficulties the leadership had to face. He
provides detailed information about the first one and a half years of the academy’s work. He gives insight about both the instructors and the students, regarding to their accomplishments in the academy, grades and other results, and the various plans and orders which affected the academy’s work.

The fourth chapter describes the feelings of both the instructors and the students on the eve of the revolution and the friction created by the conflicting orders they received and the way they would have acted. This chapter leads the reader through the revolution’s early days, providing detailed data about the tasks the academy’s personnel had to perform and the difficulties they had to face while conducting these tasks. Reading this chapter, we learn about fights between Hungarian civilians and military personnel; between the Hungarian armed forces and the Soviet military; and between Hungarian military and ÁVH personnel. The author describes the loneliness of the academy’s leadership, when they had to determine what actions to take without any order or direction from above. It proves an appreciation for the losses which the academy suffered during the revolution and the losses they suffered after the revolution when the new government started their manhunt to capture the enemies of the system. After the revolution, the new leadership reorganized the system of military higher education and the academy once again started developing officers for high positions of military command and staff. The fifth chapter explains this period of reorganization, in particular the academic year that ran from April to November of 1957, called the incomplete academic year”. This academic year – following the revolution – was full of challenges for the instructors. The academy suffered from a lack of instructors and from a lack of time to complete their stated learning objectives.
The sixth chapter is more optimistic; as the academy started academic year 1957-58, the leaders could see improvement in many aspects. They could manage most of the serious problems by that time, and they saw the basics of a higher level of quality in the education. The author explains academic years 1958-59 and 1959-60 in chapters seven and eight, providing the same amount of information as in the previous chapters.

Reading this book, the reader may feel that this work is complete when read together with M. Szabó’s other book, *The History of the Hungarian Military higher education 1947-1956*. These two books provide a large amount of information about the Hungarian system of military higher education, and explain in great detail the situation that existed in Hungary from the perspective of life at the Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy. The fact that these two books do not examine the exactly same period of time – only partly – makes it important to read both of them to gain a better understanding of that difficult time.

Being an ÁVH officer in the city of Szombathely, Paul Lendvai was an insider in the Hungarian socialist system until he immigrated to Austria in 1957. His book *One Day That Shook the Communist World – The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and its Legacy*, was published in New Jersey this year (2008). The author explains not only the revolution itself, but the road to the revolution beginning from the Trianon Treaty in 1920. His book provides data about the losses caused not only by WWI, but by the peace treaty for Hungary, using a quantitative approach. According to the writer, this treaty resulted in the Hungarian leaders joining Germany before WWII in the hope of regaining their lost territory and reestablishing the Greater Hungary as it had existed for more than thousand years. He wrote about the role of Hungary in WWII, about the temporary successes and
the final losses. He described the years between 1945 and 1956 in many respects. The reader can gain an understanding of the political system, the role of Rákosi and his personal characteristics and background, the investigations which involved hundreds of thousands of Hungarians, and the eventual imposition of Soviet influence over the entire country.

The book also provides information about the brief period when Imre Nagy led the government between 1953 and 1955 and the reforms he made. The book describes how Nagy was toppled from his position by the Soviets because of the different ideas he had about leading Hungary. Lendvai dedicated one entire chapter to providing insight into the events that led Hungary to the revolution. Throughout the rest of his book, Lendvai described the events of the revolution from different aspects. He discusses how Imre Nagy took the political lead again and what the Soviet reaction was. He provides information about the key players’ personal characteristics and background, and also their fate after the revolution. The reader can find information on political and military leaders and also on the leaders of the insurgency. Interestingly, there is information about secret negotiations conducted by Hungarian and also by foreign – Soviet, Yugoslav, and Chinese – political leaders in those days. The author used memoirs and official documents as sources to study and explain those meetings. These sources provide information about how the Soviet leadership was struggling with the issue of the revolution and the Suez crisis at the same time and the main reason for their final decision to deploy troops against the Hungarian freedom fighters and not to let the Hungarians live their lives the way they wanted. He also explains what they thought about the new Hungarian political leadership – who would be the right person to lead the
country, who could be acceptable both for the Hungarian people and the Soviet leadership. Lendvai also provides information about how the West thought about the Hungarian revolution and what kinds of ideas leaders of the West developed. As Lendvai completes his analysis of the events of the revolution, he goes on to write about the post-revolution years. He provides an insight into the system of investigations, imprisonments, internment camps, and death sentences. He presents numeric data about the people who had to pay with their lives or years from their lives for their real or perceived role in the revolution and resistance.

In the final chapter, Lendvai tries to find the answer for the question of what the defeat meant victory for Hungary over the long term. He compares what happened under Kádár’s leadership and what could have happened under Imre Nagy regarding his plans and the efforts he made while he led the country. He provides an answer which we can agree with or not, based on our ideas about those times and events. He concedes the results which Kádár achieved after the revolution, but claims that Imre Nagy could have achieved more or at least different ones.

At the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution, Victor Sebestyén published his book Twelve Days –The Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. The author works as a journalist; his family left Hungary after the revolution and he started visiting the country in the late seventies when the political situation became less wild. His book tells the story in a very accurate and understandable way, which made it very popular in a short time after its publication. Victor Sebestyén’s book is based on historical facts, Soviet and Hungarian official documents released decades after the revolution, and participants’ memoirs and diaries. He provides a large amount of information derived from these kinds
of documents. He studies the background of the revolution in the first part of the book, providing information about Hungary’s internal and external issues from the years prior to the revolution, beginning in 1945. He explains the most important events which affected the lives of the people of Hungary between 1945 and 1956. In the second part he describes the several revolutions that occurred from October 23 until November 4 when the second Soviet occupation occurred. Sebestyén tells the story day by day, providing detailed information about political issues, decisions made in Budapest and Moscow, military operations, and the people’s mindset. In the third part Sebestyén describes the environment and the people’s feelings right after the revolution. He writes about Kádár’s promise of not charging the participants of the revolution with crimes against the state and the effects of this promise. He provides detailed information about how Imre Nagy was kidnapped from the Yugoslav embassy by the KGB and held in prison for almost two years. We learn how impatient Kádár was about Nagy’s execution and how difficult was to gain the Soviet leaders’ permission to bring him to trial and, eventually, execute him almost two years after the revolution. Sebestyén provides information about the fate of other members of Nagy’s government, officials, student leaders and worker leaders. Although Sebestyén’s work is not linked closely to the Hungarian military higher education, based on the official documents he cites and his extensive research, we can learn much about the causes of the revolution, the revolution itself, and its consequences.

An important work was published in Budapest in 1996 with the title of *History of the Hungarian Military Leader and Officer Development*. This book is a collection of numerous studies which provide an overview of the history of Hungarian military higher education from its initial state establishment until now. The book contains studies of
several authors: like József Kelenik, Gábor Hausner, Dr. András Gonda, László Veszprémy, and Dr. József János Szabó. The works of these authors describe the situation of the Hungarian military education from the 15th century until nowadays.

In his study *Military Education in Hungary Prior to the Mohacs Disaster*, László Veszprémy describes the system of military education in Hungary. The system was similar to other European countries’ systems. Because of Hungary’s location and its isolated situation as a result of the Turkish invasion, the system had been the same in Hungary; it was not improved, the isolation denied Hungary to adopt the new Western systems and methods, The officers’ career was open only for noblemen, and the education did not happen in schools but in forts, in real engagements. In his study, József Kelenik describes the system in the 16th century; Gábor Hausner, in turn, provides information about the Hungarian military education system in the 17th century, and the ideas that guided the efforts to create a European-style education system in Hungary.

Dr. József János Szabó’s study provides insight into the military education system of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The reader can gain an understanding about how the system was built and how difficult it was to establish. Understanding this stage of development will prove useful later when we read about the end of WWI and the effort which Hungary had to make to establish a system which only partly existed in Hungary during the monarchy.

Many of problems are addressed by Dr. András Gonda’s study *The System of Basic Level Officers’ Development in Hungary between the World Wars*. In his study, Gonda describes some of the difficulties caused by the previous system, when half of the education system existed in Hungary, but the other half of it – higher education – was in
Austria. The author provides interesting details about how the system had to work hidden from international view as a result of the restrictions set up by the Trianon Treaty, and how the military made less and less effort in hiding the restricted parts of the system as they got closer to WWII.

There are studies of the Hungarian military higher education system available online. The Zrínyi Miklós National Defense University publishes a periodical called National Defense University Forum (Nemzetvédelmi Egyetemi Fórum) which regularly provides studies about the history of the Hungarian military higher education. Dr. Antal Oroszi, chief of the university’s museum, and another historian, Zoltán Miklós have many studies published in that periodical. Their studies provide an overview of the military education in Hungary. Although these studies are too short to be a main source of information, they provide additional knowledge about the topic. Their studies cover the time period which this research examined, between the establishment of the first Hungarian military academy and contemporary time. Their studies provide a broad view of the Hungarian military higher education institutions, their establishment, their problems, the role they played in conflicts, and the series of reorganizations they went through.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The causes and history of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 have been studied by many historians. There are also studies and books about the history and evolution of the Hungarian military higher education. These topics are studied and explained from different peoples’ points of view, such as historians and eyewitnesses from Hungary, the former Soviet Union, and Western countries. These works are based on official documents and personal memoirs and show different opinions. This thesis is unique in combining the evolution of the Hungarian military higher education and the revolution’s history, explaining the revolution from the military education institutions’ point of view and examining how the revolution affected military higher education in Hungary.

The research relies on books, official documents, and studies which provide information about both the revolution itself and the evolution of the Hungarian military higher education. The thesis uses both qualitative and quantitative data to show the evolution of the military education from the period of time between WWII and 1956 and then post-revolution.

After defining the research problem, the scope had to be narrowed; a priority had to be set up in examining the military education system’s work. Due to continuous reorganization, there were a large number of military education institutions working in Hungary during the period of time which the thesis has examined. Because of this fact, not all of them were studied in detail, only the most significant ones which had a decisive role in the development of the Hungarian military higher education system. The rest of
these institutions were studied only in the necessary depth to understand how the system was built up and how these institutions affected the system’s work.

The thesis builds upon the evidence of changes and their effects through a historical overview. This overview starts with the establishment of the first Hungarian military academy in 1872 and ends in 1920 when the Versailles Treaty was signed to close WWI and establish a new political, military, and social order for Hungary. The thesis shows how the Ludovika Academy was part of the Austro-Hungarian military education system and describes the vulnerable parts of this system. The significant of this part of the thesis is that through a narrative manner it provides evidence about the highly intellectual characteristics of the military education system which existed at that time.

The next time period to examine was between the end of WWI and the end of WWII. This period is significant because it includes data about the last period of the Hungarian military higher education system which was not designed and controlled by the Soviets. This part of the historical overview sets up the comparison of the Hungarian military higher education before and after WWII. It is important as it shows how different priorities existed in the system after it was rebuilt following the Soviet model.

The next step was to examine the Hungarian military higher education system between WWII and the eve of the Hungarian Revolution. The significance of this time period is that it provides a basis for the later comparison to find evidence about the changes which occurred after the revolution that affected the higher military education for different periods of time. This develops the conditions for answering the research questions. The period of time studied was simple but necessary to define; the Hungarian higher military education system was rebuilt by 1947, just nine years before the
revolution and two years after WWII. This period of time is significant because of the new military education system they created. It was necessary for the comparison to define this time period to enable more precise analysis: the military education system was constructed following the Soviet system and was controlled by the Soviets both before and after the revolution, a fact that generates more relevant information for comparison. This part of the thesis emphasizes the fact that the system was completely reorganized after WWII, leaving the old traditions in place while building up a new system following the Soviet model.

To learn the revolution’s effects on the Hungarian military higher education, it was necessary to study the situation after the revolution. The reason for examining this period of time is to find and present information needed to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The thesis explains the tendencies and processes which occurred after the revolution. To avoid collecting irrelevant data, it was important to set up the time period in which those data were collected. This time period is approximately ten years, which was long enough to recover from the short-term destructive effects of the revolution and set up long-term improvements. During these ten years significant changes occurred in the Hungarian system of military higher education and eleven years after the revolution the system was built up which continued working for decades with only minor changes. Based on those minor changes, the contemporary Hungarian military higher education system was studied only in the necessary depth to understand the long-term effects, which in turn are essential to answer the research questions. To do that, the examined time period had to be extended until today; however, this time period was
studied only to find those long-term effects which are visible today or were visible in the recent past.

To understand the causes of the changes which occurred after the revolution, another short period of time had to be studied: the revolution itself. To remain relevant to the problem, the revolution had to be studied from the point of view of the military education institutions. To do so, the thesis explains the role of those institutions in the revolution, showing not only the heroic exploits and achievements, but also some of the mistakes that occurred.

The next step of the research was to collect information and evidence about changes which affected the Hungarian military higher education after the revolution. To do that, criteria had to be defined with respect to those changes. The criteria were that the changes needed to be supported by either qualitative or quantitative data; they had to have visible effects on the system of military higher education; and possible causes for them had to be found. Those changes are presented through a comparison, using a narrative manner, supported by qualitative data which are presented in tables and diagrams. To show the contrasts, large amount of data is necessary about both periods of time in order to analyze their characteristics, such as the instructors’ qualifications, students’ qualifications, the role of the politics in the education system, and other general information about the military education system.

The thesis uses a historical case study methodology to answer the research questions. During the historical overview, it focuses on the historical events which led to changes and the effects that resulted from them. This method makes it possible not only to provide facts about changes and their consequences, but also looks at the root causes,
representing the background of events which occurred and decisions which were made by different groups of people. The thesis presents data about the evolution of Hungarian military higher education using qualitative analysis. It uses a historical approach to provide information essential to understand the development of supporting evidence. Although the thesis uses qualitative analysis, there are also quantitative data which must be presented, such as manpower data of the Hungarian military in different times, characteristics of instructors and students in the education institutions with respect to language skills, civilian and military qualifications, and the number of military education institutions that existed in different time periods. Because much of these data are essential for better understanding and finding evidence, tables and diagrams will be used to present them. The advantage of using tables and diagrams is that they can portray a large amount of data in a concise manner. Diagrams also convey specific data which can be expressed by numbers. This approach provides an explanation of the processes which occurred in the military education in Hungary during the above-mentioned time periods. The primary criterion in this approach is accuracy; it is important to show this data as they are in order to avoid the research leading to a false conclusion. At the same time, the research has to provide relevant information and develop answers to the primary and secondary research questions. The thesis does not show new data, but rather relies only on data which existed and were explained before by different authors.

The thesis uses different ways to present data. Through the historical overview of the evolution of Hungarian military education, it uses description, telling the story in a narrative manner. Showing the events this way makes the thesis easier to read. To make
the whole story more understandable, it is important to follow the chronological order of events.

Chapter 5 will restate the problem statement. According to the data presented in Chapter 4, the problem needs to be re-defined, and a summary must be presented regarding the conditions and events which affected the Hungarian higher military education after the revolution. In this chapter, the thesis will emphasize evidence which supports – or denies – the problem statement and assumptions, and answers the primary and secondary research questions. To present this evidence the thesis will only use the data presented in Chapter 4. This chapter will present evidence of the short and long term effects; find effects which can be felt today; and find the possible causes of these effects. The chapter will explain those effects, which are divided into categories of either short- or long-term effects, both direct and indirect. The reason for this is that there were effects which were not directly caused by the revolution, but would not have had materialized if the revolution had not happened or had ended differently.

Through Chapter 5, the most important standard the thesis needs to meet is fairness. The thesis has to be impartial, it has to avoid conveying personal feelings or biases, and the conclusion needs to be based only on the data and evidence which have been found during the research process.

The thesis – built up followed this methodology – should provide a broad picture about the evolution of the Hungarian military higher education, the role of the education institutions in the revolution, and the changes which occurred after the revolution. This leads the research to the conclusion based on the facts presented in the thesis, which in
term make it possible to examine the problem and set up a conclusion from different points of view.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Historical Overview

From the Beginning to WWI

Due to its geographical location, there has not been a century in Hungarian history without facing an enemy who attempted to seize the country. Because of that, the military has always played an important role, and developing military leaders have always been an important requirement. As in other European countries, military leaders were selected from among noblemen at an early age. Development of future military leaders occurred in the court or forts, where youngsters learned the use of different weapons and built important relationships. When these boys were sent to the court or a fort at the age of 10-12, they were usually able to read and write; being members of noble class, their parents could afford to employ private teachers for their children’s homeschooling. As there were many noblemen in court from abroad, the learning of one or more foreign languages was also possible. Latin was the language of the Hungarian government and so any nobleman who wanted to be politically active had to learn that language. Given the ties with the Habsburg court in Vienna, German was typically a necessary second language for career advancement.

They had the chance to learn their enemies’ language from the prisoners of war. The theoretical learning of tactics was based on storytelling by experienced leaders. Physical training was highly emphasized: they had to be able to ride a horse, swim, and fencing was taught, both dismounted and later on horseback. They took part in hunting and jousts on a regular basis. Later the young boys went with the troops to fight an
enemy and gain experience for their future role as military leaders. The “students” were authorized to actively take part in battle after the age of 17, prior to which they could only watch the troops fighting. The military education of most young men was based on actual physical practice, with only occasional theoretical learning. There were very few boys who had the opportunity to learn in military education institutions abroad. The reason for this is that they needed different knowledge of military affairs in Hungary than in other parts of Europe. The differences were based on the fact that Hungarians had used only cavalry for centuries, while infantry was being used across the rest of Europe, as well as the special tactics Hungarians had used against the Ottoman troops for centuries. The famous Hungarian military leader and theorist Miklós Zrínyi (1620-1664) wrote numerous studies about the need for the reorganization of the Hungarian military – to create one similar to other European countries– and advocated for the reform of leader development programs, but his ideas were not brought to effect. Although the demand existed, the country’s situation did not allow it to establish an independent military education institution and the officers’ development continued on in the same way for centuries. Significant changes occurred in every part of life when Hungary became linked to the Habsburg Empire. Beginning in the eighteenth century only Hungarian noblemen could attend Austrian military education institutions and learn the Western way of war. Of course, in these institutions the language of education was German. This system provided officers for the Habsburg Empire, and as part of it, for Hungary for almost two centuries.

The history of the military higher education in Hungary started in 1808 when the Congress of Pozsony (today is Bratislava, Slovakia) established a military academy,
which would be as modern as other major military academies in Europe. The aim was to have an institute which developed military leaders for the Hungarian nation and to develop a new Hungarian military aristocracy. Because of the importance of this mission, the Congress made its decision as one man. The Hungarian Kingdom was part of the Habsburg Empire at that time and the military leader development continued in Austria; Hungary did not have its own military education institution. The Habsburg emperor – Francis I, who had the position of the king of Hungary - supported the idea to create a Hungarian military academy.

When the decision was made, a burst of activity started. The Congress decided on the name of the institution and how to finance it. According to Congress’ decision, the financial support was established from endowments, partly from the king and the Hungarian noblemen, as well as from governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Most of the noblemen were interested in supporting the academy and they collected a significant part of the required money in a short time.

The Congress decided on the name of the academy and composed a letter to Francis I, and his wife Maria Ludovika, which asked them to allow the academy to have the queen’s name of Ludovika. The king and the queen supported the idea and allowed the academy to take her name. However, due to the ongoing war between the Habsburg Empire and Napoleon’s France, the region became battlefield, and the establishment of the academy was postponed. The Napoleonic War ended, but in its aftermath financial and other problems occurred, and the academy could not be opened for many years. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars provided another reason for the Habsburgs to worry about: they feared that the French Revolution would be a good example for the
Hungarians to follow. This led to mistrust and the establishment of the academy was further postponed.

In 1848 the Hungarian Revolution and war for independence broke out against the Habsburgs. Although the country needed well-trained officers to fight the Habsburgs, this event did not cause a military academy to be opened. Instead, as another solution, a military officer training course started on January 9, 1849, and the education of 31 applicants began. The Habsburg troops threatened Budapest during those times and the course lasted only a short while; on January 17, Prince Windisch-Grätz, commander of Habsburg troops, closed the course.

The idea of an independent military academy was not forgotten, but the Habsburg Empire made it impossible to open. The independence war was put down by Habsburg and Russian troops. The Compromise, as the agreement has come to be known, between the Hungarians and Habsburgs was signed 1867 and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was established. This event later led to the opening of Hungary’s first military academy. Before the establishment of the first Hungarian military education institution, there were three military academies available: Maria Theresa Military Academy in Wiener-Neustadt for infantry, mountaineers and cavalry; the Technical Military Academy in Mödling for artillery, engineer, rail transportation and signal officers; and the Navy Academy in Fiume for naval officers. The XLI Law of 1868 established the Hungarian Royal Defense Forces. This created a difficult situation for the Monarchy. The Monarchy had four different military forces: it still had the Common Army and the Navy (Kriegsmarine) for the monarchy, the Landwehr for Austria, and the Hungarian Royal Defense Forces for the nation-state of Hungary. To emphasize the national characteristics of the Hungarian
Royal Defense Forces, it was financed by the Hungarian Kingdom, and led by the Hungarian Royal Ministry of Defense and the Honvéd Main Command. However, this chain of command worked only in peace; during wartime the Common Army, the Navy, the Landwehr and the Hungarian Royal Defense Forces came under command of the General Staff (Große Generalstab) in Vienna\textsuperscript{7}. This meant Hungary did not develop a national military doctrine but followed the monarchy’s. According to that doctrine, the Common Army was the main military force; while the Landwehr and the Hungarian Royal Defense Forces served as the second echelon and complement for the Common Army\textsuperscript{8}. The establishment of the Hungarian Royal Defense Forces made it necessary to set up military education institutions where Hungarian officers could be developed. The efforts for establishing the academy which had been planned for decades began again. In January of 1872 two military education institutions were established with the purpose of developing Hungarian officers. The academies were located in Budapest for infantry and in Jászberény for cavalry. The Ludovika Academy was opened in 1872 to develop a new military aristocracy for Hungary\textsuperscript{9}. The education curriculum in the Ludovika Academy was three years long. The students had the following courses: engineering, foreign languages, mathematics, military studies, and other activities, such as physical training, dancing and singing\textsuperscript{10}. Instructors who created the curriculum focused not only on military facts, but also on developing a new generation of officers, renaissance men, knowledgeable in many parts of the life. They provided a high level education in order to develop officers who have the same level of knowledge as every other advanced country’s officers.

The students had a carefully organized daily routine which provided enough time
for learning, but time for individual activities was limited (See Table 1). The instructors emphasized the importance of discipline. The students followed a very busy schedule in this institute where education was the focus. The Ludovika Academy developed high quality officers with quality knowledge for that time. In the early years, there were only noblemen in these institutions. The academy did not only develop a military aristocracy, but only recruited from the existing aristocracy. The structure of the society and the role of middle class changed during the 1880s, and the military followed those changes in beginning to allow the middle class the chance to apply for the military academies.

The military education system was reorganized in 1897. The three institutions which developed officers were combined into one. The academy kept the name of Ludovika Academy and became the only military higher education institution for the Hungarian Royal Defense Forces. Infantry, cavalry (hussar), and artillery officers were professionally developed in the academy. Graduates were given the rank of 2nd Lieutenant and they could serve either in the Hungarian Royal Defense Forces or in the common Army of the Monarchy. The new military higher education system began in the fall of 1898 and was not changed until 1918

Military education institutions matched each other; officers who graduated in a national one were able to serve in the common army and vice versa across the monarchy. In these years the military education system in the Monarchy was similar to the European ones, providing a similar level of quality as the rest of the major European Armies. The quality of education was high in this system and it worked for the Monarchy. Officers who graduated at Ludovika were well-educated and capable of meeting the requirements of their duty. The weak point, from Hungary’s point of view, was that Hungary ran the
Ludovika Academy but the education of higher level officers and general staff officers still occurred in Vienna Kriegsschule, Austria.

The Interwar Period and WWII

WWI ended and the armistice between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Austro-Hungarian High Command was signed on November 3, 1918\textsuperscript{13}. The war brought catastrophic results for Hungary and by 1918 both the economy and the military were exhausted. During the fall of 1918, strikes, and demonstrations started in Hungary (called as Aster Revolution because soldiers put asters in their hats) and the Hungarian People’s Republic was proclaimed on November 16, 1918. In addition, the defeated troops had to face three enemies at the same time. Romanian troops crossed the demarcation line in December 1918 from South-East; Czechoslovak troops in December 1918 from the North; and Serbian troops – supported by French units, in January 1919 came from the South with the purpose of setting up advantageous conditions for the peace conference\textsuperscript{14}. Due to the internal political crisis the Communists – led by Béla Kun – took the power and proclaimed the Hungarian Soviet Republic on March 21, 1919. Although they built up the Hungarian Red Army from volunteers and troops who had just returned from the war and pushed the Czechoslovak troops back across the demarcation lines the communists lost their popular support, due to the atrocities which they committed against hundreds of Hungarians. The Romanians reached Budapest by August 1919 and the Communist leadership resigned.

The winning powers created a peace treaty which provided compensation for the winners and deterred the losing powers from taking offensive military actions in the future. The agreement on a treaty was a long and difficult process, and even the winning
powers had different ideas about the new boundaries. Unfortunately for Hungary, the U.S. supported version – which would have set up the boundaries with regard to the nationalities – was not accepted by the other countries’ representatives. The treaty is officially called “Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary.” The Hungarian delegation was invited to sign the treaty in 1920. Count Albert Apponyi led the delegation and he conducted the defense of Hungary’s concerns. He made his speech in English and in French. Although his speech made the winning powers’ representatives understand Hungary’s concerns, they were not willing to make changes in the treaty’s text. Count Apponyi was not willing to sign the unmodified treaty, so another delegation signed it on 4 June, 1920. The treaty was signed in the Trianon palace, Versailles, and is called Trianon Treaty.

The Trianon Treaty had disastrous effects on Hungary. Part II caused the country lost approximately 70 percent of its territory and 57 percent of its population – including more than three million Hungarians – and significant part of its industrial bases, natural resources, and railway and road network and financial and bank institutions. Hungary lost its historical boundaries, which had been protected for more than a thousand years. National minorities sought the opportunity to escape from the Hungarian Kingdom, due to the unacceptable minority rights which the Hungarian political elite imposed on them. Slovaks had lived under Hungarian rules for centuries and the peace treaty brought the opportunity to break away from Hungary and create a new state with the Czechs, called Czechoslovakia. Although Croatia had its own administration system, it was part of the Hungarian Kingdom before WWI. They formed a new country with the Serbia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hungarians became minority in Transylvania due to
Romanian immigration and it provided a good opportunity to demand Transylvania for Romania. Winston Churchill’s comment shows how arguable this decision was: “The issues of principle being thus physically excluded and the integrity of Transylvania being an important factor, the Peace Conference transferred the whole country to Roumania [Romania] and thus alienated at least another million Magyars from Hungary”\(^\text{17}\). Austria gained a piece of the Western part of Hungary which was populated mostly by German-speaking people. The treaty shocked the nation and the moment the treaty was signed in Trianon, bells started ringing in Hungary as a sign of mourning.

Part V of the Trianon Treaty had strict rules and regulations regarding the military, including military education. The treaty established a maximum allowed manpower for the Hungarian military at 35,000 personnel, including officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. The maximum authorized officer corps was set at 1,750 officers. The treaty also stipulated that Hungary was not allowed to recruit through a compulsory system; only volunteers could join the military. Additionally, the treaty regulated the number of main weapon systems (such as machine guns and howitzers) that were allowed. By regulating the composition of units and equipment, the treaty limited the number of officers the military needed. The number of military schools and education establishments were also strictly mandated. The treaty did not provide the opportunity to develop more officers than Hungary needed, as it said “The number of students admitted to attend the courses in military schools shall be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled in the cadres of officers”\(^\text{18}\). The regulations laid down in the treaty created a new situation for the military. The system of military education had to be reorganized, just like the military itself. Constraints laid down by the treaty made it
possible to maintain only one military academy because of the low number of officers authorized. It was the Ludovika Academy, which continued developing military officers for Hungary.

The Ludovika continued to provide high quality education for the students through an eight-semester curriculum, equal to the European norms\(^{19}\). Students gained a good level of knowledge of not only military facts, but also of general studies. Having a high school degree was a basic requirement for Ludovika applicants. Because of the historical events of WWI and the shock caused by the Trianon Treaty, a very strong desire to regain its lost territory grew among the students and faculty; revisionist ideas were common in their education. The military, just like the civilian population, could not address the new world situation; history, the Hungarian language, and geography were taught according to the idea of “Greater Hungary.” The fact that more than 50 percent of the Hungarian military elite were born in territories outside of the new Hungarian borders, now foreign countries, strengthened this revisionist movement\(^{20}\). (See Table 2)

Eventually, Hungary’s leadership decided to increase the number of troops. This increased the number of officers as well. The government secretly established military branches which the Trianon Treaty restricted. To do so, the military middle school in Pécs was reorganized to become a military academy. The purpose and even the structure of the new academy was the same as Ludovika’s. The academy opened in October, 1928 with 100 students under the name of Provost Academy, to be hidden as a military institute.

The next reorganization occurred in 1931 when the academy in Pécs was closed and the Ludovika took over its students, becoming once again the only military academy in
Hungary. The other significant change was that students had to serve one year before beginning their studies and the period of education in the academy was decreased to three years. After 1936, the leadership took less care to hide the restricted activities and instructors and students started to wear the uniform in all military education institutions. Because of WWII, the academy was ordered to decrease the length of education time and the requirement for one year of service prior to attending was cancelled beginning in 1939. According to a decision of Admiral Horthy (regent and Hungary’s head of state) three military academies now had to develop officers beginning in the academic year of 1939-40. The Hungarian Royal Honvéd Ludovika Academy developed officers for infantry, cavalry, and artillery in Budapest; the Hungarian Royal Horthy Miklós Honvéd Aviation Academy developed officers for the air force in Kassa (today is Kosice, Slovakia); and the Hungarian Royal Bolyai János Honvéd Technical Academy developed officers for technical branches and gendarmerie in Budapest.

A weak point of the Austro-Hungarian education system revealed itself after WWI. Staff officers had been developed in Vienna Kriegsschule during the Austro-Hungarian years. Because the monarchy collapsed, Hungary did not have any military education institution which was prepared to educate officers for higher positions. Another problem was that signal and engineer officers were developed only in Austrian institutions for the monarchy’s military. Hungary now had to establish these missing parts of their military education system. After WWI a higher level education institution, the Hungarian Royal Honvéd Military Academy, was established in Budapest, with the purpose of educating officers for higher positions. Because the Trianon Treaty did not permit Hungary to have this level of military education, it was was established in a
manner to keep it hidden from officials outside of Hungary. Although the academy began working on September 27, 1920 under the name of Hungária Boulevard Officers’ Quarter, it could only be called openly Hungarian Royal Military Academy after the mid 1930s.

Education at the Hungarian Royal Military Academy existed for six months in the academic year 1920-21, twelve months in 1921-22, two years between 1922 and 1924, and for three years after 1924. The applicants had to meet strict mental and physical requirements and they had to have a good reference from their unit commanders. The instructors were selected from units according to strict procedures. The instructors spent one year in preparation; they prepared their sketches for classes and practiced teaching, this guaranteed the quality of education. During the three years, students took part in classroom seminars, field trainings and practiced at units. The first year students practiced with their own branch; the second year with another branch; the third year students went for study trips abroad. This system gave the student the opportunity to learn the other branches’ and foreign military procedures, providing learning process in combined arms operations, and practicing foreign languages. Staff rides and exercises were very common and students played roles during these training events.

This education system was similar to the German model. Clausewitz’s works played a significant role in the education and General Károly Lorx, Chief of Hungarian Royal Army, composed his “Decalogue” based on Franz Konrad von Hötzendorf’s requirements for staff officers. The goal was to develop military elite, which were willing and able to serve at a high level. A survey, taken in the 1940s shows the importance of learning foreign languages in the Hungarian military between the world
wars. Although the survey does not represent the officers’ corps as a whole, just a portion of that, it does show some surprising results regarding to the language skills of the officers’ corps in the 1940s. (See Figure 1) Seeing the data of the military elite, we can get similar results which show the importance of speaking foreign languages in the Hungarian military before WWII (See Table 3). Table 3 shows that the language skills of officers were significantly higher before WWII than after, providing a kind of evidence of the high level education occurring prior WWII.

Beginning in 1942, instructors and students were sent to the Eastern Front to serve six months and gain experience. Students served on the front for three months in one duty and another three months in a different position. They had to write about their experiences in a diary. Later their experiences were summarized and built into the academy curriculums and the military education system.

As WWII required more troops and officers, the goal of education system changed. The available time was reduced and the education system emphasized the practical experience more than theoretical studies. The military did not need officers having large amount of knowledge and educated for years, but officers with military knowledge and practical skills, educated in short time.

Military education institutions came under difficult times when coalition bombardments began in 1944; later the Soviet offensive affected the education institutions. During the fall of 1944, the Hungarian Royal Military Academy was relocated to West-Hungary, later to Germany. Because of the military situation, the academy had to move continuously, and then finally it was located in Lengriess (South from Bad Tölz) until the end of WWII. Education still worked until May, 1945 –
together with the German Military Academy – although the effectiveness and quality were low because of the circumstances.

**WWII to 1956**

After the end of WWII, the society tried to find their way ahead. The environment was uncertain and people did not know what would happen. The military was not immune to that uncertainty; leaders did not know the new direction, they only knew that they had to follow a new direction. This new direction was shown to Hungary by the Soviets. Just as in the civilian society, lack of trust and fear affected leaders and soldiers alike. Recruiting of officers was impossible between 1945 and 1947; there was no military education in Hungary at any level, which characterized this uncertain environment. At the same time, a large number of officers were either dismissed or voluntarily left the military. The causes varied but in most cases these officers were unacceptable to the new leadership because of their role in the war and the Hungarian Royal Defense Forces. The military leadership had to face problems caused by the lack of officers and the need for military education institutions to develop officers was evident.

The Honvéd Military Academy was established in 1947 with the purpose of developing officers for duty at higher commands and general staff. The general staff officers’ development occurred in the academy between 1947 and 1949; after that, general staff officers had been developed in the Soviet Union for decades. This was the first military higher education institution in Hungary after WWII. In the beginning the change of political system and the close links with the Soviet Union caused many difficulties. Everything changed after WWII. The structure of the military started to be reorganized to reflect the Soviet one and education institutions were directed to provide
education which followed the Soviet doctrines. The development of curriculum was not an easy task for the instructors. They were supposed to teach Soviet doctrine, but most of them were not familiar with that material. Most of the doctrines used at that time were given to Hungary by the Frunze Academy. Additionally, the doctrines and other necessary documents were not available in adequate amounts in the Hungarian language, which made the instructors’ job more difficult. Translation of these documents was a continuous process in order to provide required level of education. Officers were sent to the Soviet Union to learn, and later transfer their new knowledge through the curriculum of the Honvéd Military Academy.

Mutual mistrust and suspicion were common in this era, with institutions continuously looking for the enemy. Due to this process, approximately 60 percent of the officer corps was released (many officers were not only released but executed) at that time. Many officers who had high positions in the Hungarian Royal Defense Forces – not to mention if someone was member of the Arrow Cross Party (Hungarian nationalist party, established in 1939) – were released or executed. In many cases officers were released if their family owned land or any private business. This process continued for more than five years after the end of WWII\(^2\). This process led to the situation where there were very few experienced officers available to teach the next generation of younger officers.

Although the classes continued in Hungarian, instructors had to prepare curriculum exercise plans and other important documents in not only Hungarian, but also in Russian. The purpose was to submit these plans to the Soviet military advisors for approval, who studied them to see if first they met the Soviet requirements. Beginning in
1951, two advisors helped the instructors’ work in the academy, in order to show the significance of adopting the Soviet doctrines, one of the advisors was a Major General and the other a Colonel.

The quality of education was lower than it had been at the Hungarian Royal Military Academy prior WWII. The composition of the curriculum shows the importance of political education and the efforts they made to develop officers to be good communists. Political education – which occupied 15 percent of total number of classes taken – and political loyalty were highly emphasized, while the literacy of officers had only second level importance.

During that time there were a two-year academic course; regiment commanders’ course; and a higher commanders’ course being taught at the academy. The emphasis on political studies was typical for all three courses.

By the end of the two-year academic course, officers had to attain a high level knowledge of combined arms tactics to be prepared to work as regiment commanders, division chiefs of staff, or corps staff officers. They had to have basic knowledge about the operations at army level. The regiment commanders’ course lasted for one year. By the end of the year, students had to be able to work as regiment commander or regiment chief of staff. The higher commanders’ course was nine months long. This course prepared officers for division commander; corps political officer; corps chief of staff; division chief of staff; and division political officer assignments. Additionally, they had to become knowledgeable of the Marxist-Leninist theory; and had to be able to communicate in Russian, both orally and written.

Beside these courses there were four classes running at the academy. These
classes provided a unique education for special attendants. There were two classes for party functional personnel; one for ÁVH officers; and one for the political command’s officers. All of these classes were taught for military subjects.

To make instructors’ job more difficult, the waves of arrests—including officers, did not stop. To be late for classes was sufficient grounds to be arrested or dismissed from the military. It was held that officers, who committed this “crime”, abused the trust of the working class and the military that provided them the opportunity to improve themselves. In 1951, both instructors and students were arrested and even the commander of the academy, MG Béla Király, was dismissed. Conception trials were every day and no one could feel safe. To have relatives in Western countries; who had served in the Royal Army in the past or to disagree with or criticize the current political system were reasons to be imprisoned. As a result of this process, instructors changed and the number of students decreased sequentially.

In 1951, significant changes occurred in the military. The name Hungarian Defense Forces was changed to Hungarian People’s Army on June 1st. The military became one of the most important tools of the Party. It did not work under the Parliament’s control, but under the Party. The Party had the right to assign the highest military leaders to their positions. The most important consideration in the selection process was political loyalty. As a result, 53 percent of the officers’ corps had laborer backgrounds and 24.5 percent had peasant backgrounds, while 71 percent of the officers’ corps was members of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja MDP), by the end of 1951. Mistrust and fear characterized officers’ lives. During the academic year of 1950-51, a total of 1,036 students were dismissed from the military, 708 of them
due to political reasons\textsuperscript{29}. The manpower of the army was increased from 178,266 to 190,000 between November 5 and December 30, 1951. Interestingly enough, the number of officers was decreased this time; primarily because many of them were dismissed from the military (see Table 4). By the end of 1951, only 9 percent of the officers’ corps was former Royal officers\textsuperscript{30}. The composition of students at the academy – and in the military in general – was similar; the number of workers and peasants increased in the officers’ corps, while the number of well-educated officers decreased (see Table 5). The military was increased more the next year. With the increase in the total number of the military, they increased the officers’ corps manpower also; this process required a large number of officers to fill the gap which was created with the dismissing of approximately one third of the officers’ corps the previous year. The rate of officers who graduated from the academy was less than 1 percent in 1952\textsuperscript{31}. These facts made the instructors’ job extremely difficult. They were required to maintain – and improve if possible – the level of education, while they had to face the problem of teaching officers who had no military background or military qualifications. The other significant problem was that most of these officers, more than 90 percent of them, had been commissioned between 1949 and 1951\textsuperscript{32}. It means they had no or very limited experience in leading units, not only in war, but even in peacetime. To compare their age and rank with the requirements after graduation, we can see that very young men having low ranks were assigned to high positions that time. To improve the quality of education, the academy provided a three-year education beginning in the 1952-53 academic year.

There was another important issue which affected the officers’ development, not
at the academy, but at the lower level it was very important that Hungary finished
transitioning to the Soviet weapon systems and units and education institutions started to
train personnel in using them. The new weapon systems included tanks, artillery assets,
fighters, bombers and other aircrafts, which were integrated in the system by the end of
1952.

The actual political issues strongly affected not only the military, but the military
education also. On July 4, 1953, the Congress elected Imre Nagy as prime minister. The
goal of Imre Nagy was to create an apolitical military in Hungary which did not serve the
party but the government. Having a mass-army did not meet the new government’s
conception and they decided to decrease the manpower of the Hungarian People’s Army
and through this step they wanted to decrease the expenditures on the military. The goal
was to decrease the manpower by 54,466 personnel – approximately 25 percent of the
total – including 6,708 officers. This decision did not encourage youngsters to join the
army and become officers, because people did not see this career as a stable one. To
make the officer’s career more attractive, the Honvéd Military Academy and the Stalin
Military Political Academy – became recognized as college level education institutions
on August 20, 1953. This meant having high school degree became a basic requirement
for all applicants.

The continuous reorganization and the changes in required manpower made it
difficult to sufficiently vet students. This was the source of problems in the 1952-1953
academic years, when the investigation of students resulted with serious problems in 19
percent of the student population. The nine most serious problems were: previous service
in the Hungarian Royal Defense Forces as an officer or noncommissioned officer;
membership of Order of Vitéz (established by Horthy in 1920, for soldiers who showed exceptional bravery in fight); membership of Arrow-Cross Party; middle-class background and life-style; having relationships abroad; having a police record; unprincipled conduct and alcohol problems; medical problems; and unsatisfactory academic performance. Some of the officers having these problems were dismissed and others were punished in some way. The problems regarding to the officers’ background and other issues affected not only the students but also the instructors. A high level of fluctuation was present among the instructors, especially during the early years, but later still. This resulted from the fact that many of the instructors did not have the proper qualifications for teaching (see Table 6). The lack of experience was another problem which the academy’s leadership had to face. Most of the instructors had no or limited experience in leading units (see Table 7). The instructors had to plan exercises very carefully; it was not enough to be tactically correct but it was required to be politically correct as well. As Soviet advisors and Hungarian political officers supervised the education, they could not afford to make political and ideological mistakes. In 1952, the chief of the Tactics Department of the Petőfi Academy set up an exercise in which the enemy attacked from the East. The Soviet Union was Hungary’s eastern neighbor and thus politically unacceptable. These kinds of mistakes were unacceptable during this time. Although the result of this incident is unknown, problems like this took place in the monthly political officer’s reports and often were followed by punishment.

The last important event in the Honvéd Military Academy’s life prior to 1956 was when the Hungarian Cabinet Council gave it the new name of Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy on March 15, 1955. The academy kept this name until its reorganization in
To summarize the Honvéd Military Academy’s establishment and improvement after WWII, we can say that the leadership and instructors had to face serious problems. These problems were financial, political, and also theoretical. The change of mindset was probably the most challenging part of their job. They had to establish and run an education institution which developed higher level officers according to Soviet doctrines. They often had to do that without direction from higher, in an environment where everyone was trying to find the way ahead. Despite the many problems, the academies did an effective job and they were able to provide quality education by 1955.

After WWII, majority of the experienced officers were dismissed from the military. When the new structure began to be built, there was a significant demand for new officers at all levels. As we saw before, the Honvéd Military Academy was created to provide higher level officers for the army. The Honvéd Kossuth Academy was established in 1947 – in the same year with the Honvéd Military Academy, this year is called the year of resumption – with the purpose of developing officers for the military.

The entire military education system changed in 1949, when Hungary started to build a Soviet-style mass-army. The Honvéd Kossuth Academy was not able to meet the requirements of developing officers and its leaders decided to create a new system which was capable of providing the required number of officers. Between 1949 and 1951 numerous branch officer schools were established across the country (See Table 8). Even though the Honvéd Petőfi Commissar Academy was part of the branch officer’s school system, it will be examined later because of its special purpose. The schools developed a large number of officers to meet the requirements. As the most
important requirement for officers was their political loyalty, the quality of the newly
developed officers was much lower than was required. Thus, their ability to lead units at
any level was limited. Board members did not examine the previous qualification of
applicants during the selection process. This led the army to the untenable result that
more than eighty percent of the officers had only primary school as their highest civilian
qualification in 1955.36

The system changed year by year, at the beginning, these schools provided six months
education, later it was increased to eight months, then to one year. The short time
provided for developing these officers was one of the reasons officers graduated from
these schools did not meet the requirement. The system was reorganized again and the
branch officers’ schools provided two and three-year long education from 1953. Students
graduating from these institutions received the rank of Sub-Lieutenant or Second
Lieutenant. The system of branch officers’ schools was effective in developing a large
number of officers in short amount of time in order to cover the requirements, but was
not successful in developing well-educated officers who are knowledgeable and able to
lead units.

As we study the Hungarian military’s higher education, we must consider that
besides the ‘regular’ military schools there were higher political education institutions in
the Hungarian military that time. Those institutions did not develop commanding or staff
officers, but political officers who provided political advice for commanders at different
levels. To set the conditions for the political officer system, the Honvéd Petőfi
Commissar Academy was established in 1948. The academy was reorganized in 1949
and worked as the Petőfi Political Officers’ Institute after that. The academy’s mission –
as the leadership stated – was “to develop political officers and political leaders for the People’s Army, the State Protection Authority and the State Police”37. The Petőfi Institute ran a one year Political Officers’ Course, which had 1100 students in 1951; a five month Political Presenters’ Course with 154 students in the same year; and a Political Officers’ Continuation Course with 230 students. This means approximately 1500 students graduated in 1951 and the numbers were similar during the following years. Changes followed each other in the curriculum, in the Petőfi Institute there were only the one-year and the two-year courses run in the academic year 1952-53.

The defense minister ordered the establishment of the Stalin Political Officers’ Academy on November 1, 1951. After this time, the mission of the Petőfi Institute was to develop basic level political officers, while the Stalin Academy provided higher level political education. The number of students shows the high demand for higher level political officers. In 1952, there were 660 students at the Stalin Academy. Although the number of graduates was large in both institutions, the quality had to be improved. The leadership made an effort to improve the quality of education, which resulted in the Stalin Academy moving to a three-year education in the 1952-53 academic years. The Cabinet Council took an important step and proclaimed the Stalin Academy as a college level institution in 1953. The next step was in the improvement was that a high school degree became a basic requirement for applying to the Petőfi Institute.

Just like other military education institutions, the political ones were often reorganized as well. From 1952, there were two courses were run in the Petőfi Institute, one of them lasted for one year; the other for two years. Studying the curriculum for these two courses, we can see the social sciences were emphasized ahead of the military and
the general education courses (see Table 9). These students gained a certain level knowledge regarding military studies, but this knowledge was general. It was not enough to properly prepare the students for commanding or staff positions. The reorganization was not finished this point and the history of the Stalin Academy ended. On September 5, 1956, the defense minister ordered to unify the two political institutions under the name of Petőfi Sándor Military Political Academy. During their history, the institutions which developed political officers were not free of political investigations and imprisonments. General mistrust was common, just like everywhere else in Hungary. A good example of mistrust is the following sentence from the Stalin Academy’s newspaper: “tell your best friend only so much, that if it turns out he is your enemy, it will not enable him able to hurt you”38. Despite this advice there were many officers who were arrested, imprisoned and dismissed. The quality of education was improved slowly, but the instructors were not in an easy situation. They had to establish and manage a new system with no or limited experience in political work and the ideology of communism.

The Role of Military Education Institutions in the Revolution

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its collapse affected the military education system directly and indirectly and had short-term and long-term effects. The political leadership unsuccessfully tried to make Soviets withdraw their troops from Hungary and to break its ties with the Warsaw Pact through negotiations. We can see now that these efforts and their failure have had many effects on the country, the military, and the military education for decades. Being located in Budapest, the Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy could not avoid being involved in the revolution. The involvement was varied. The academy as military institution was involved in different aspects; but the instructors
and students had their own opinions and feelings toward the revolution. These opinions and feelings affected their performance. The revolution caused catastrophic results not only for the nation, but for the military and its education institutions.

On October 22, 1956, students of the Engineering University of Budapest held a meeting and stated their demands in sixteen points. On October 23, a meeting was held in the military academy where the actual situation was discussed. At the end of the meeting, the participants agreed to support the civilian students’ sixteen points. A student demonstration was planned for the afternoon of October 23 in Budapest authorized by László Piros, home secretary. This fact made it possible to permit the academy’s students to participate in the demonstration⁴⁹. There was no sign of the later events at this point, but things turned bad very quickly. On that evening, the academy was alerted, because civilian groups demanded weapons from the academy’s leadership who, of course, did not give in to their demands. That night fights occurred which resulted in military operations in the city. Units arrived from different locations and the academy was tasked to accommodate some of them. A group of officers in the academy tried to convince the newly arrived soldiers to deny orders and not to fire at the civilians and fire at the ÁVH officers instead⁴⁰. This fact shows the feelings of some officers toward the regime and the population.

Personnel of the academy conducted several tasks on October 24, reinforced by the academy’s training tanks. These tasks were limited to guarding several objects – including military institutions, military housing areas and public buildings – and cooperating with police.

The academy’s leaders had to show initiative because there was a lack of
guidance from higher commands. General chaos occurred; the highest military leaders did not dare make decisions without political permission or oppose orders conflicted with each other and no one made any statement regarding the military’s stance on the situation. The lack of guidance caused many problems in conducting military operations.

Units began to be organized in the academy on October 25. The academy’s personnel conducted transportation – ammunition and fuel – missions and guarding that day. They received information about a group of armed civilians arriving to Budapest by train; in order to prevent this, engineers from the academy exploded the railway. On this day serious events occurred; as Soviet tanks opened fire on unarmed civilians at the Kossuth Square, killing 75 people and wounding 284 others.

The next day the guard missions continued. The academy’s personnel reacted to false information which resulted civilian casualties. According to the information, a train came from Miskolc, carrying armed civilians and ammunition supply. That day 15 troops were sent to the railway station of Rákos to prevent the group from reaching their destination. When the train did not arrive, the troops moved to the railway station of Kőbánya Felső and tried to stop the express from Miskolc. The train engineer’s reaction was too slow and the troops opened fire at the train, killing two people and wounding five others. There was no weapon or ammunition on the train.

The chaos increased the following day. There were still no clear orders; cooperation between Soviet and Hungarian troops was missing. This led to fight occurring at the National Theatre between Soviet and Hungarian troops. A unit – organized from the academy’s officers – seized the National Theatre, while Soviet troops were informed that they were insurgents and the Soviet tanks fired shells on the
Hungarian officers. It was a kind of miracle that this incident caused only light wounds for them\textsuperscript{42}. On that day, the academy released a message in which they stated they supported the newly established national government.

On October 28, fights occurred between the academy’s units and armed civilian groups. The civilians initially thought that they faced ÁVH officers. Later, when they recognized the unit as military, they ceased fire. On that day, officers from the academy provided blood donations for the central hospital in Budapest.

The academy became overwhelmed by tasks on October 30, as they were ordered to send troops to several places and provided security for the Soviet embassy, Soviet housing areas, the communist party hall and other buildings. The academy did not have the required number of troops. On that day, a unit consisting of 12 personnel was sent to the Corvin Passage to organize armed civilians in military-style groups and provide basic training for them.

On October 31, the withdrawal of Soviet troops began and the academy continued to provide security for official buildings. During the following days, life began to return to its normal routine in the academy. Some units returned to the academy, while others continued to conduct guarding and patrolling missions in Budapest.

As the Soviet leaders decided in the Kremlin, the second Soviet occupation occurred on November 4. Soviet troops occupied the academy – just like every military base in the country – but the officers were allowed to keep their side arms. Leaving the academy was forbidden and the Soviets collected the officers’ side arms on the following day. Despite the prohibition, many officers left the academy. Soviet troops kept the academy occupied until the middle of November, 1956\textsuperscript{43}.

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Seeing the events and the tasks what the academy conducted during the revolution’s days we can see the chaotic environment, where it was often difficult to know who supported who and who fought who. These difficult situations resulted in many unnecessary casualties during those days.

According to later reports, signs of dissatisfaction were present among the instructors and students of the Petőfi Institute, months before the revolution. Newspaper articles were published, criticizing the Political Command and political leaders. As a result, two officers were reassigned to other military units and one other was dismissed. Although it was forbidden by higher command, instructors of the Academy established linkages with the civilian students’ leadership on the revolution’s eve. There was a meeting held on the academy in the morning of October 23. The participants agreed to support the civilian students’ standpoint. “We fight with the people through fire and water” they said. They composed a letter explaining their point of view and a delegation was sent to the civilian student leaders. The civilian students welcomed the military students’ delegation, shouting “The Army is with us!” The civilian students invited the military personnel to the demonstration that evening. Finally 250-300 military students and officers took part in the demonstration from the Petőfi Academy. As the speakers demanded more and more categorical actions, and started to cut red stars and Soviet-style coat of arm from the Hungarian flag, some of the officers left the demonstration. On that evening – just like the Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy – the Petőfi Academy was alerted. 150 personnel were ordered to protect the Hungarian Radio Station with their rifles, ammunition and bayonets. It caused some level of misunderstanding, because the defense minister strictly forbade opening fire on civilians. This group could not
accomplish its task, because of this order and was withdrawn to the academy because of the violent masses.

Like the Zrínyi Academy, civilians tried to get weapons and ammunition from the Petőfi Academy. Two attempts occurred on October 24; both of them were rejected by the academy’s leadership. The academy’s units had to fight on October 26 for the first time when a lorry carrying armed civilians did not stop and the officers opened fire from their checkpoint. Two officers died and another was wounded. It was later discovered the civilians were actually ÁVH officers wearing civilian clothes.

The academy’s personnel primarily conducted guarding missions and were engaged several times during the following days. It is an interesting fact that the personnel department started to destroy all documentation and photographs which included personal data.46

On October 30, a revolutionary council was elected in the academy. On November 1, the academy’s personnel started to provide military training for civilian students and declared that the academy remove itself from under the Ministry of Defense. Besides the military training they provided, they handed over large amount of weapons and ammunition to the freedom fighters. On the same day, they decided to change the academy’s name from Petőfi Sándor Military Political Academy to Petőfi Sándor Academy. On November 4, the academy’s revolutionary council stated it still recognized the Nagy-government, but they disagreed with the idea of fighting the Soviets. Soon after this statement, most of the officers left the academy.

The Petőfi Academy’s role in the revolution is arguable – just like the Zrínyi Academy’s role – the source of confusion derives from the fact that the officers had to
follow the orders they received, even if they originated with the protestors rather than 
with the leadership. The fact that the academy’s personnel – who were supposed to be 
politically the strongest – were very open to the civilian students’ initiation shows the 
systems’ failure. Information about the branch officers’ schools’ role in the revolution is 
limited, probably due to destruction of documents and the serial of reorganization which 
have occurred since then.

The revolution’s failure brought a different future for the whole country than 
revolutionary leaders had imagined. Soviet troops remained stationed in Hungary for 
three decades and Hungary continued its participation as part of Warsaw Pact until 1989. 
These facts significantly affected the military education.

The Post-revolution Times

Days following the revolution brought changes in the academy’s life. Every 
officer was required to sign an Officers’ Statement – a statement of unquestioning loyalty 
toward the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt 
MSZMP, established on November 2, 1956, as the successor of MDP) – as essential for 
continuing service in the army. Many officers did not agree with the statement, this 
resulted in 108 students and 70 other officers, who served the academy, leaving the 
military by December 30, 1956. Within the Hungarian military, the number of officers 
who were not willing to sign the Officers’ Statement was 6,731. By May 17, 1957, 8,999 
officers were reassigned from active duty and 361 officers left the country because their 
role in the revolution47. Of course, this created a leadership vacuum and the military 
began struggling with a shortage of officers. The data on the manpower of officers’ corps 
and the rate of new officers – who did not serve before WWII – show the effort that the
education institutions had to make in order to develop the required number of officers (See Table 10). The purpose was to reduce the number of the former Royal officers while increasing the total number. This meant that thousands of officers were commissioned each year during the recreation of a mass-army, the institutions could not manage this inflow and it resulted in a low level of officer qualification.

As everything changed in the country, the system of higher military education started to be reorganized. On December 11, 1956, the Chief of Army ordered the contraction of the Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy and the Petőfi Sándor Military Political Academy as the first change.

The academy lost one colonel; three lieutenant colonels; six majors; two captains; three first lieutenants; and one sub-lieutenant during the revolution. Although János Kádár – the new prime minister, who was put to power by the Kremlin, promised amnesty, the revolution was followed by investigations, imprisonments and executions across the country. This retaliatory process did not avoid the military. Colonel András Márton – former commander of the academy – was sentenced to ten years in prison; another colonel and a lieutenant colonel for fifteen years; a major for five years; another major for four years of imprisonment. Additionally, one major was executed because of his role during the revolution.

The students and instructors were trying to find the right way, but it was very difficult. The conditions were not set for the restart of the education system, the academy’s personnel conducted recovery, guarding and police missions. Alcohol problems became common, affecting the morale negatively.

The education system was restarted on April 8, 1957. By that time the structure of
the academy was significantly reorganized, the faculties and departments roles changed in their command relations over the students. The number of the instructors and students were sharply decreased; the number of students was cut by approximately 50 percent, because of many officers leaving the military and many others who were dismissed. The defense minister ordered every officer to be able to speak Russian; it meant that the academy started teaching Russian language classes in 1957. The 1956-57 academic year was called an incomplete academic year and underwent serials of internal reorganization for the academy. The losses that occurred during the revolution and the subsequent manhunts caused serious problems which affected the education for years. The improvement of the education system was important, but worked slowly. A large number of the instructors had a low level education; this fact was true for the students as well (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). There was a strong demand for officers and the primary requirement for applicants was their political loyalty. During that period of time many people joined the military from civilian life, having limited or no military training and education before being assigned to their positions.

Politics still played an important role in the academy’s life. In the year of 1957, 92 percent of the instructors and 97.2 percent of the students were members of MSZMP. The leadership denied the revolution, blaming former leaders as acting against the people and the “proletariat-dictatorship” before and during the revolution. On the other hand, the academy’s leadership tried to improve the instructors’ skills and the effectiveness of education process through this. To do so, there were seventeen instructors – who did not have any experience in leading units – sent to units in the 1959-60 academic years. Although the academy’s leadership opposed it, the defense minister ordered the academy
to decrease the student time at the academy from four to three years beginning in the
1960-61 academic year. According to an evaluation report from 1960, the academy’s
leadership was still dissatisfied with the results of political agitation in the academy; they
stated it was a result of lack of proper planning and consistency. On the other hand –
which is more important – the cooperation between departments showed improved
results; and the effectiveness of education – especially in tactics – increased.

In summary, the officers and instructors set up the conditions for an effective
education in the Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy during the years following the
revolution. The following decades brought more changes in the academy’s life; during
the 1960s and 1970s real, significant reforms were executed not only in the academy, but
in the whole system of the Hungarian higher military education. One of the most
significant steps – which showed the increasing quality of education – was that the
ZMKA gained the right to provide PhD degrees beginning in 1985.

After the revolution, military leaders saw the system for branch officers’ schools
was not effective enough and decided to reorganize it. Due to this decision, all the branch
officers’ schools were eliminated by the end of 1957, and the Unified Officers’ School
(ETI) was established in Budapest. The education lasted two years in the early years and
later it was extended to three years and then to four years by 1961. In the same year, the
Kilián György Aviation Officers’ School was established in Szolnok; this differed from
ETI in many aspects. Education was expanded to four years in Szolnok, from 1965. It
was an important step; this made possible to provide both military and civilian
qualification from 1965, and to provide college level education from 1967. An important
item was that officers who graduated at ETI gained both military and civilian
qualification from the early 1960s. Practice had an important role in the education at the ETI; 53 percent of time was spent on the training area and 47 percent in the classroom⁴⁹.

The next important step in the officers’ education development came in 1967, when the ETI was closed and three military colleges were established. The Kossuth Lajos Military College (KLKF) was established in Szentendre, the Zalka Máté Military Technical College (ZMKMF) in Budapest, and the Kilián György Aviation Technical College (KGYRMF) on the basis of the Kilián György Aviation Officers’ School in Szolnok. The KLKF developed officers for infantry, armor, scout, artillery and engineer branches and this institution developed officers for the State Border Guard Service, although this service belonged to the Ministry of Home Affairs instead of the Ministry of Defense. ZMKMF developed air defense artillery, air defense missile, missile, signals commander, signals technician, chemical, logistician, fighting vehicle technician, vehicle technician, radar tracker, weapon technician, and financial officers. The KGYRMF developed all kind of officers for the air force, technicians, ground and air controllers, fixed and rotary wings pilots etc.

Developing officers took four years in these institutions and they provided good quality. The system was improved continuously; the goal was to reach the level of civilian colleges and they wanted the degree these institutions provided to be considered as equal with the civilian ones. To do so, they improved their curriculum continuously, made the application process similar to the civilian one, and ensured the education provided a combined military-civilian degree for officers who graduated from these institutions. They accomplished their goal by 1973, when the military colleges became considered equal as civilian ones. Just like the other military colleges, the KGYRMF was
reorganized, and the curriculum was changed several times. These changes occurred because of new methods, technical development in education and because of updating military equipment and weapon systems.

All the military colleges provided four-year education and continuous improvement had an important role in their work. The change of political system in Hungary affected the military education when political elements disappeared from the structure, and political education was reorganized. These colleges existed as independent education institutions until 1996, when they were affiliated in the Zrínyi Miklós National Defense University which works as the successor of the Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy.

During the socialist time, the official point of view of the 1956 revolution was a kind of misrepresentation of the truth. To show the unity of the Party with the people, the 1956 events were stated to be a counter-revolution for communism. This topic was taboo in Hungary and talking openly about the revolution was not recommended.

Three decades after the revolution, significant changes occurred in Hungary, just like in other countries in the former socialist Soviet bloc. Free elections were held in 1990 and the Hungarian political system has been working as a democratic system since that time. Since 1990, the Hungarian People’s Army has been called Hungarian Defense Forces. Representatives of the Warsaw Pact countries signed a document (about the collapse of the Pact) in Budapest, 1991 and Soviet troops left Hungary. Eight years later Hungary gained NATO membership together with Poland and the Czech Republic; it was the first time former Warsaw Pact countries joined the NATO. These political and military decisions brought significant changes for Hungary, the Hungarian military and
for the Hungarian military higher education.

After the change of political system, the official point of view of the 1956 revolution was changed. It became officially stated to be a revolution instead of counter-revolution which was stated during the socialist times. Large number of civilian and military personnel was rehabilitated that time, showing respect towards their role they played during the revolution (See Table 11).

This overview provided information on how the military education institutions were established, how they worked, how they were reorganized, closed, and how they took part in the revolution. The purpose was not to study history of the revolution, just to provide the essential context in order to understand the events which affected the Hungarian military’s education system.

Changes and effects

Short-term and long-term effects

The revolution was pulled down, the ideas and efforts that the revolutionary government made were abandoned. A new regime was established, and although János Kádár stated that changes and forgiveness would come, signs of this process was not visible for many years after the revolution.

Due to investigations, executions and the fact that thousands of officers were dismissed or left the military, there was a significant shortage of officers in the military. This resulted in serious demand for new officers, and in this regard the military education institutions had to face two major challenges. One of them was the demand for newly developed officers. To meet the requirements, a large number of officers had to be developed in a short time. The officers’ careers had to be made attractive, and to achieve
this goal application requirements were lowered; the most important requirement was political loyalty regardless of previous civilian and military qualification. The other significant problem was that investigations were also conducted on instructors; many of them had to leave the military. This resulted in a shortage of well-prepared and experienced instructors, making the education situation even worse. To make the education more effective – which was essential to develop large numbers of officers – a commensurately large number of instructors had to be developed first. This took years and in unavoidable delays in the improvement of the military system of higher education. These factors made it extremely difficult to run an education system that provided high quality education.

The military remained the primary source of power for the MSZMP. Imre Nagy tried to make the military apolitical, but after the revolution this was not a question anymore. Party membership and political loyalty were primary requirements for military officers; without meeting these requirements no one could reach a high position in the military, regardless of their qualifications and experience. General mistrust characterized the military, just like the civilian population. State security services played an important role in investigating people’s background, their relationships abroad, their political angle, and even their everyday life. A network of informants was run inside and outside the military, working for the state and military security services. This originated with the investigations and retaliation after the revolution. Although executions were mostly over by 1961, the informer network continued working until the change of the political system beginning in 1989.

Imre Nagy and his government unsuccessfully tried to break the links with the
Warsaw Pact and make the Soviets withdraw their troops from Hungary. The country remained under Soviet control and a member of the Warsaw Pact until its collapse in 1991. This meant that Soviet troops had remained stationed in Hungary until 1991, even though their role as an occupation force decreased over time. This close link caused many effects which impacted the military in general and the military education system as well.

The Hungarian People’s Army remained organized following the Soviet structure. The system of political officers had worked until 1990. This fact indirectly affected the military education system. Political officers worked for the military education institutions, providing advice, supervising political work at the institution, and strengthening the students’ and instructors’ ideological beliefs. Political officers’ development was part of the military higher education system. As the change of the political system occurred and the military had less need for political officers, this program was closed. The reduction in the need for and production of political officers led to the fulfillment of Imre Nagy’s idea of an apolitical military thirty-three years after the revolution.

Military higher education institutions included political studies for students. The goal of those studies was not only to provide an understanding of different political systems but to strengthen the students’ ideological belief in socialism. After the change of the political system in Hungary, the curriculum was reorganized, and political studies were replaced by studies of social sciences. The study of social sciences was not to set up or dictate students’ ideological beliefs, but to widen the scope of their knowledge. This step was important to make the military apolitical.

The curriculum included the study of foreign languages which helped improve the
ability of Hungarian military officers to cooperate with other Warsaw Pact forces. As Hungary remained a member of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, Russian language study was mandatory not only in the military education but in the civilian one as well while other languages became overshadowed (See Table 12). The study of the Russian language kept this preeminent status until the change of the political system, at which time studying the Russian language became optional just like any other languages which were offered.

Soviet doctrine was taught in the military education and Hungarian students had the opportunity to study abroad in other Warsaw Pact countries’ military education institutions. The doctrine of the Hungarian Defense Forces was based on Soviet doctrine, and tactical methods and symbols were the same. Warsaw Pact tactical symbols were used and taught in the Hungarian military higher education until Hungary joined NATO in 1999.

Links with the Soviet Union remained close after the revolution. Those close links with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries caused an effect which had the most long-lasting impact on the Hungarian military. A significant percentage of the weapon systems used by the Hungarian Defense Forces were still Soviet-type ones. Tanks, armored personnel carriers, howitzers, trucks and other vehicles, aircraft, helicopters, and numerous types of small arms were a heritage of the Warsaw Pact membership. Those systems do not use NATO standard size ammunition and they have a different kind of communication system that was not compatible with NATO communication systems. In addition, those weapon systems and vehicles are the same types like the enemy had in the recent wars, such as those used by the Iraqi forces, which could make Hungarian forces’ participation in combat operations problematic when it
came to enemy vehicle recognition; which were friendly (Hungarian) and which were enemy? Although it does not affect the military education directly, it had an impact on the Hungarian military and on the officers who are products of the military education.

Summary

The quality of the Hungarian military higher education system was increasing before the revolution. This is an important fact, because it started from zero immediately after WWII. By 1955, improvement became visible for the problem of lack of officers and later the initially extremely low level of officers’ civilian and military qualification started increasing. Mistrust, which was present every day in the military education system, began to abate somewhat, and the primary point of view could be professionalism in selecting officers for higher education and positions. In summary, a visible improvement occurred. The revolution’s failure reversed all the progress that they achieved up to this point. Political investigations brought mistrust back, the primary requirement for officers to be politically loyal was reinstated, and a significant number of officers were dismissed. This process resulted in a shortage of qualified officers to serve in the Hungarian military, and consequently led to poor or improper selection of new officers. The same problems – general mistrust and emphasis on political loyalty, extremely low level of qualification, and lack of experience – returned the state of military higher education to the same level they been at and overcome just a few years before. Although civilian qualification does not show the result of military education but characterizes the application criteria for military education institutions, it is a good tool for measuring the state of the military education system (See Figure 4). The Hungarian People’s Army remained under Soviet control and was organized in Soviet-style, which
included having its political elements.

The country as well as the military had to pay the price for the revolution. The revolution’s failure brought back the same problems like as after WWII. Some of these problems have affected military education only for short time – for a few years – but there were many of them which had effects that remained visible for decades. Of course, we cannot say what would have been happened if the revolution had not failed – it is unpredictable – and opinions may differ, but I think everything which changed – or did not change even though change was desired by the people involved – after the revolution is in some way a result of the revolution. Due to the effects of the revolution and its failure, the Hungarian military higher education had a slow recovery. Historical events slowed the improvement of the quality of military education for many years. To overcome the short-term effects took many years, but to overcome the long-term effects took decades. One of the biggest steps on this road to recovery was taken in 1967 when the military colleges were again established. The next major step occurred in 1973 when these military colleges became considered as equal to civilian colleges. As one of the most significant step, development of general staff officers was restarted in 1993, a program that had not existed in Hungary since 1949. The Defense Minister stated on February 2, 1994 that the Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy is successor of the Hungarian Royal Honvéd Military Academy51.

1 Veszprémy, László, *Military Education in Hungary Prior the Mohács Disaster*, p. 8

2 Szilágyi, Sándor, *The First Hungarian Military Academy*, p. 150.


9 Szilágyi, Sándor, *The First Hungarian Military Academy*, p. 194.


18 *Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary*, Article 111.

19 Dr. Gonda, András, *The System of Basic Level Officers’ Development in Hungary between the World Wars*, p. 112.


21 Dr. Gonda, András, *The System of Basic Level Officers’ Development in Hungary between the World Wars*, p. 120.

23 Dr. Lengyel, Ferenc, *The Hungarian Staff Officer Education between the World Wars*, p. 123.

24 Dr. Lengyel, Ferenc, *The Hungarian Staff Officer Education between the World Wars*, p. 125.


29 Dr. Oroszi, Antal, *Enter the Museum - The Fifties*, www.zmne.hu/Forum/05elso/muzeum_.htm


49 Dr. Oroszi, Antal, *Fifty Years Ago*,
www.zmne.hu/Forum/07masodik/otven_.htm

50 Pataki, István, *About the Warsaw Pact and the South-Western Theatre*,
http://www.zmne.hu/kulso/mhtt/hadtudomany/2006/1_2/2006_1_2_12.html

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

The Hungarian revolution of 1956 and its failure brought significant changes for Hungary. These changes affected the lives of everyday as well as members of the Hungarian military, and their system of military higher education. The failure of the revolution meant the failure of the goals of the revolution. Hungary remained under Soviet control both politically and militarily. The military higher education was affected in many ways, some of which had short-term impacts, while others had long-term impacts, and there are effects which are present even today in the Hungarian military. Although most of the changes which occurred after the revolution were caused by the revolution and its failure, there were changes occurring which may not have originated from the revolution. As the winning powers – the new socialist regime led by János Kádár and the Soviet Union – considered the revolution a counter-revolution, they misrepresented history in order to prove they were right in the actions they took and with respect to the people’s support toward the socialist regime.

After the revolution, manhunts, investigations, and executions began. By May 17, 1957, 8,999 officers had left the military, many of them fleeing the country entirely; this caused a significant shortage of officers in the military. The military education system was required to develop a large number of officers to fill this gap. Based on the length of the officers’ professional development, it took years to accomplish this goal. Although high level military leaders as well as instructors were forced to leave the military, and developing their replacements required a considerable amount of time, this problem was
solved in the short term, and today has no appreciable impact on the Hungarian system of higher military education.

As the military remained the primary source of power for the Party, politics and ideology played a significant role in the army’s life. Political officers were present at every unit and education institution, providing political advice, strengthening the ideological mindset of the faculty and students, and keeping a watchful eye on everyone. Political studies were considered the most important part of the education at these institutions, and political officers’ development continued in this manner for decades. Examining political loyalty was an important part of the selection process for acceptance to the military academies and the proper ideological mindset was essential for a successful military career. State security organizations played an important role in these investigations. Social background, family relations, general behavior, and relations in foreign countries – especially Western countries – were aspects of each applicant’s life that were subject to close examination. A large network of informants was established and run, generating mistrust in the society and between the military personnel. Although these informant organizations do not exist anymore, the opinion of the general public is divided even today when it is revealed that well-known people served these organizations, making reports on their fellow citizens whose trust they enjoyed. The change of the political system made the military apolitical; the political officer system disappeared, the political officer development program was closed, and studies of social sciences replaced political studies in the military education. Political influence on the military education had an impact that lasted for decades. Large numbers of officers who were educated and developed before 1989 are still in the military; however, this part of
their education does not affect the overall military higher education system due to the fact that the Warsaw Pact does not exist anymore, the Hungarian Defense Force is an apolitical organization, and Hungary is a member of NATO.

Hungary could not break the links with the Warsaw Pact during the revolution and remained a member until 1991, which affected the military in general and the military higher education in many ways. The Hungarian military was organized following the Soviet model; development of Hungarian general staff officer had occurred in the Soviet Union until it was restarted in 1993; Soviet doctrine and Warsaw Pact military symbols had been taught in the education system until Hungary joined NATO. Hungary’s Warsaw Pact membership affected the Hungarian strategy and doctrines – which were based on the Soviet models – and assigned the role of the Hungarian People’s Army during a potential war against the West, with regard to the Soviet interests. The Russian language – as the common language for Warsaw Pact nations – had been mandatory to learn until the change of political system in Hungary. Due to continuous reorganizations and the nine years which have elapsed since Hungary joined NATO, these effects have little to no impact on today’s military education. On the other hand, the fact that the Hungarian Defense Forces still use Russian-type tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other systems which work with Russian-type communication systems can be a constraint in multinational operations, such as those conducted in concert with other NATO members.

The revolution and its failure caused a fallback in the improvement of the Hungarian military higher education. After its reestablishment based on new fundamentals in 1947, the system improved between 1947 and 1956 and was able to
overcome its initial problems. Military leaders and instructors in the education system had to start that kind of improvement again after the revolution and had to face many problem and difficulties. Although the revolution’s failure affected the military higher education system negatively in many ways, the leaders and instructors in the Hungarian military academies were able to recover the previous level of higher military education and actually improve its quality. Through continuous changes in the education institutions’ structure and the curriculum they were able to achieve their goals and the military colleges once again provided both military and civilian qualifications to graduates and were considered equal to the civilian education institutions. This improvement is due to the leaders and instructors: their professionalism, hard work, ability to adopt new and successful doctrine and methods from their coalition partners. Although this recovery and improvement required seventeen years and the education maintained different values than it holds dear today, the leadership created a well-organized system which was able to provide high quality education for future officers and prepare them for whatever duties they might face.

Finally, this thesis does not state that the Hungarian military higher education would have been better or worse if the revolution had succeeded, but definitely it would have been different.

Recommendations

This thesis examined the links between the evolution of the Hungarian military higher education and the Hungarian revolution of 1956. It developed evidence about effects which were caused by either the revolution itself or its failure and which affected the military higher education in either the short- or long-term. The thesis provided
answers to the research questions, but there are many areas which are related to those questions that were not answered and remain for future research to resolve.

One of these questions is the evolution of the basic level military education and non-commissioned officer development in the same era. The significance of this topic is that the basic and higher level military educations are closely linked, even though their purposes are different in many aspects. Examining that system’s evolution and how it changed over time could be valuable and could make this thesis the basis of additional study.

It also would be valuable to examine how the military higher education changed after Hungary joined NATO in 1999. From other respect, that research could be extended to the non-commissioned officer development because their role and development had also gone through significant changes since 1999.

To be completely up-to-date, another study could examine the currently existing military education system in Hungary. It would be instructive to see the differences and similarities between the systems prior the political change in 1989, between 1989 and 1999 when Hungary joined NATO, and in today’s Hungarian military higher education system. That thesis could be fundamental for further research to find possible ways for the improvement of the military education system in the near and far future.

Based on the fact that large number of books and studies – both printed and electronic – were used during the research for this thesis, most probably there are valuable sources available for the above mentioned possible research topics which could make this a reseachable topic.
APPENDIX A

TABLES

Table 1. Daily schedule for students of Ludovika Academy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>Until</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0600</td>
<td>0700</td>
<td>Reveille</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0700</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>Classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Classes and individual preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2100</td>
<td></td>
<td>Retreat (after evening prayer)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2. Place of birth of the Hungarian military elite before and after WWII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
<th>Members of Hungarian Military Elite 1919-1945</th>
<th>Members of Hungarian Military Elite 1945-1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary after Trianon</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>88.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enclosed to Romania</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enclosed to Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enclosed to Yugoslavia</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enclosed to Austria</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Language skills of the Hungarian military elite

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Foreign Languages Spoken</th>
<th>Members of Hungarian Military Elite 1938-1945</th>
<th>Members of Hungarian Military Elite 1945-1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Language</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Languages</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Languages</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Languages</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Languages</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six or More Languages</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4. Manpower of the officers’ corps and the military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>November 5, 1951</th>
<th>December 30, 1951</th>
<th>December 31, 1952</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Officers</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonels</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonels</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>1,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majors</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>861</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenants</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2,115</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenants</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>3,362</td>
<td>23,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-lieutenants</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>7,255</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,800</td>
<td>15,157</td>
<td>24,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Total</td>
<td>178,266</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>210,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Students’ data in the 1951-52 Class of the Honvéd Military Academy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Academy 1st Grade</th>
<th>Academy 2nd Grade</th>
<th>Regiment Commanders’ Course</th>
<th>Higher Commanders’ Course</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Students</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranks</td>
<td>10% 1st LT</td>
<td>80% 2nd LT</td>
<td>0.53% LTC</td>
<td>1% COL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80% 2nd LT –</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.19% MAJ</td>
<td>4% LTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.63% CPT</td>
<td>28% MAJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20% 1st LT</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.1% 1st LT</td>
<td>25% CPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and MAJ</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.55% 2nd LT</td>
<td>29% 1st Lt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7% Sub-LT</td>
<td>13% 2nd LT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>100% 20-30</td>
<td>66% 20-30</td>
<td>74% 20-30</td>
<td>45% 20-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34% 30-40</td>
<td>25% 30-40</td>
<td>25% 30-40</td>
<td>51% 30-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1% 40-50</td>
<td></td>
<td>4% &gt;40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker Background</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant Background</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual Background</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2% (+20% other)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified in Primary School</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated from High School</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.53% (1 person)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Military Education</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioned in 1949-1951</td>
<td>&gt;90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of MDP</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>&gt;99%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Instructors’ qualification in the Honvéd Military Academy in 1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Qualification</th>
<th>Civilian Qualification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Graduated from Soviet Military Academy</td>
<td>College Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.33%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated from Soviet Course</td>
<td>High School Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.67%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated from the Honvéd Military Academy 2 Years Course</td>
<td>Graduation From Middle School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated from Higher Commanders’ Course</td>
<td>Primary School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.67%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated from Regiment Commanders’ Course</td>
<td>Less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.44%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated From Ludovika Academy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Proper Qualification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.78%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 7. Instructors’ military experience in the Honvéd Military Academy in 1954
(Only military personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience in Years Spent in Units</th>
<th>Number of Instructors (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More Than 20 Years</td>
<td>2 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10 Years</td>
<td>11 (6.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5 Years</td>
<td>46 (25.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Year</td>
<td>47 (26.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Months</td>
<td>8 (4.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Experience</td>
<td>54 (30%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Establishment of the branch officers’ school system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Establishment</th>
<th>Place of Establishment</th>
<th>Name of School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Bem Air Defense Artillery Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kossuth Artillery Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zalka Signals Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Honvéd Logistics, later Ságvári Logistics Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gábor Áron Artillery Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Air Defense Signals School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budaörs</td>
<td>Vasvári Officers’ Training School, later Aviation Technical School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Szentendre</td>
<td>Táncsics Engineer Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tata</td>
<td>Rákosi Armor Officers’ School, later Dózsa Armor-Infantry Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Szolnok</td>
<td>Kilián György Aviator Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pécs</td>
<td>Dózsa Infantry Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Sport Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Car and Tractor Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medical Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Törökbálint</td>
<td>Interpreter Officers’ Course, later Zrínyi Miklós Interpreter Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Topographer Officers’ School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hunyadi Infantry Officers’ Extension School</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Curriculum at the Honvéd Petőfi Political Officers’ Institute for academic year 1952-53

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Science Studies</th>
<th>Facts</th>
<th>Hours for 2 Year Course</th>
<th>Hours for 1 Years Course</th>
<th>Total of 1516</th>
<th>Total of 816</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political economy</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General History</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungarian History</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History of MDP</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Work in the Hungarian People's Army</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Situation</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Studies</td>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Topography</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Artillery Studies</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armor Studies</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Signals Studies</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aviation Studies</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modal Training</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical Training</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical Training</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Procuration</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service Regulations</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Education</td>
<td>Economic and political Geography</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian Language</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungarian Language and Literature</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2880</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Manpower of officers’ corps and the rate of new officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Manpower of Officers’ Corps</th>
<th>Rate of New Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>3,004</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5,851</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>15,157</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>24,717</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>32,184</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>30,691</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>29,393</td>
<td>93.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>26,231</td>
<td>94.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>14,638</td>
<td>95.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>14,517</td>
<td>94.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>14,442</td>
<td>95.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>14,251</td>
<td>93.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>14,034</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Number of rehabilitated officers 1989-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank of Rehabilitation</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenant</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Lieutenant</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,728</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Comparison of language skills of the Hungarian military elite of 1938-1945 and 1945-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>High Level</th>
<th>Medium Level</th>
<th>Basic Level</th>
<th>Without Official Qualification</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX B

FIGURES

Figure 1. Data of language skills of officers in the Hungarian General Staff between 1919 and 1944

Figure 2. Highest civilian qualification of officers (instructors and students) of ZMKA in academic year 1957-58

Figure 3. Highest civilian qualification of instructors of ZMKA in academic year 1957-58
Figure 4. Highest civilian qualification of officers in the Hungarian military (%)

ANNEX

THE UNIVERSITY AND TERTIARY COLLEGE STUDENTS’ 16 POINT DEMAND

1. We demand the immediate evacuation of all Soviet troops, in conformity with the provision of the Treaty of Peace.

2. We demand the election by secret ballot of all Party members from top to bottom, and of new officers for the lower, middle and upper echelons of the Hungarian Workers Party. These officers shall convene a Party Congress as early as possible in order to elect a Central Committee.

3. A new Government must be constituted under the direction of Comrade Imre Nagy: all the criminal leaders of the Stalin-Rákosi era must be immediately relieved of their duties.

4. We demand a public enquiry into the criminal activities of Mihály Farkas and his accomplices. Mátyás Rákosi, who is the person most responsible for all crimes of the recent past as well as for the ruin of our country, must be brought back to Hungary for trial before a people’s tribunal.

5. We demand that general elections, by universal, secret ballot, be held throughout the country to elect a new National Assembly, with all political parties participating. We demand that the right of workers to strike be recognized.

6. We demand revision and re-adjustment of Hungarian-Soviet and Hungarian-Yugoslav relations in the fields of politics, economics and cultural affairs, on a basis of complete political and economic equality, and of non-interference in the internal affairs of one by the other.

7. We demand the complete reorganization of Hungary’s economic life under the direction of specialists. The entire economic system, based on a system of planning, must
be re-examined in the light of conditions in Hungary and in the vital interest of the Hungarian people.

8. Our foreign trade agreements and the exact total of reparations that can never be paid must be made public. We demand precise and exact information on the uranium deposits in our country, on their exploitation and on the concessions accorded the Russians in this area. We demand that Hungary have the right to sell her uranium freely at world market prices to obtain hard currency.

9. We demand complete revision of the norms operating in industry and an immediate and radical adjustment of salaries in accordance with the just requirements of workers and intellectuals. We demand that a minimum living wage be fixed for workers.

10. We demand that the system of distribution be organized on a new basis and that agricultural products be utilized in rational manner. We demand equality of treatment for individual farms.

11. We demand reviews by independent tribunals of all political and economic trials as well as the release and rehabilitation of the innocent. We demand the immediate repatriation of prisoners of war (WW2) and of civilian deportees to the Soviet Union, including prisoners sentenced outside Hungary.

12. We demand complete recognition of freedom of opinion and of expression, of freedom of the press and of radio, as well as the creation of a daily newspaper for the MEFESZ Organization (Hungarian Federation of University and College Students’ Associations).

13. We demand that the statue of Stalin, symbol of Stalinist tyranny and political oppression, be removed as quickly as possible and be replaced by a monument in
memory of the martyred fighters for freedom of 1848-49.

14. We demand the replacement of emblems that are foreign to the Hungarian people by the old Hungarian arms of Kossuth. We demand for the Hungarian Army, new uniforms conforming to our national traditions. We demand that 15th of March be declared a national holiday and that the 6th of October be a day of national mourning on which schools will be closed.

15. The students of the Technological University of Budapest declare unanimously their solidarity with the workers and students of Warsaw and Poland in their movement towards national independence.

16. The students of the Technological University of Budapest will organize as rapidly as possible local branches of MEFESZ, and they have decided to convoke at Budapest, on Saturday October 27, a Youth Parliament at which all the nation’s youth will be represented by their delegates.

Source: 1956 Hungarian Revolution Portal – About 1956
http://www.hungary1956.com/1956_hungarian_revolution.htm#16points
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