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Submissions: We solicit articles and reader’s comments. Contributions of 1,500 words or less are ideal. Submit contributions, double-spaced in MS Word. Include name, title, complete unit address, telephone numbers, and e-mail address. Graphics can appear in an article, but you must also provide a separate computer file for each graphic and photograph (photos must be 300 dpi). Send e-mail submissions to alsadirector@langley.af.mil. ALSA Center reserves the right to edit content to meet space limitations and conform to the ALSB style and format. Next issue: September 2008. Submission DEADLINE: COB 1 July 2008. Theme of this issue is advisor Teams with Foreign Forces

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The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center, located at Langley Air Force Base, continues to research ideas from the field and publish multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) to meet "the immediate needs of the warfighter." Currently, we have 13 active projects in various phases of development with 3 additional publications going into research for revision later this year. Among those in development is *Training Security Force Advisor Teams (TSFAT)* that will assist in the training of advisor teams tasked with building partner capacity in developing nations by providing MTTP to plan, train, and execute their mission. Additionally, the revision of *Tactical Convoy Operations (TCO)* is nearing completion with an entire new segment on Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) operations and convoy reactions. Look for both of these publications towards the end of summer. Right now, look for the newly revised *Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE)* with a cover date of December 2007. You can download it today from the ALSA website or order it through your Service’s publication distribution system.

The theme of this ALSB is "Military Advisors Working with Foreign Forces." We begin at the strategic level with Maj Gen Allardice and Capt Prather who use the Arab world as a backdrop to discuss the current senior leader situation and TTP for developing senior leadership. Reaching down to the operational level, LTC Nagl and 1LT Drohan provide an overview of how developing foreign forces supports National policy. COL Ryan leads off the tactical level discussion for the warfighter by providing a "how to" article that discusses traits and characteristics an advisor must possess to be successful. He is followed by two "I was there" articles which put concepts and ideas into the context of execution. First, LTC McConnell, MAJ Matson, MAJ Clemmer, and CPT Kite introduce and analyze "Human Terrain" and provide experiences from Iraq. Maj Jacobs then relates his experiences in the Pacific Rim while training with the Philippine Rotary Wing Aviation forces. And to round out our theme, MAJ Stowell and Mr. Fox provide their thoughts on selecting advisors as they advocate the creation of a dedicated "military advisor" occupational skill with expanded advisor training.

The ALSA Center continues to change. At the JASC level, MG Barbara Fast is retiring and being replaced by BG Joseph Martz, and Lt Gen (S) Allen Peck is taking command of Air University and being replaced by Maj Gen Stephen Miller. We recently bade farewell to Lieutenant Colonel Eric Schwegler as he departed to take command of 1-82 Field Artillery at Fort Hood; Major Xavian Draper as he separated from active duty; and Ms. Margaret Simonson, our budget analyst, as she retired after 25 years of government service. Best wishes to all of you in your future endeavors. At the same time, we welcomed the arrival of Major Brian Bolio, an Army Space officer coming to us from the 4th Combat Aviation Brigade at Fort Hood, who will work in the Command and Control Branch.

This is my final edition of the ALSB as the Director of the ALSA Center. In July, I report for duty as the Deputy G3/C3 with United States Army, Central Command (USARCENT) Forward at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. The past two years have been an extraordinary experience working with an outstanding cadre of joint action officers. I would like to thank the ALSA Joint Actions Steering Committee, the Joint Doctrine Directorates, and the "iron" majors and lieutenant colonels who deserve special thanks and gratitude for their hard work ensuring every publication is the best possible. Finally, I would like to add a sincere thank you to the government civilians who do an outstanding job keeping us all on track. Colonel Steve "Judy" Garland will fleet up as the ALSA Director in June and he will add greatly to the reputation of the ALSA Center.

As always, we continue to seek publication topics that fill interoperability or doctrinal voids between the Services at the tactical level. On that note, the theme for our September 2008 ALSB is "Fires" with a suspense of 1 July 2008 for article submissions, and the theme for our January 2009 ALSB is "Maneuver" with a suspense of 1 November 2008 for article submissions. Thank you and keep ‘em coming.

THOMAS JOSEPH MURPHY
Colonel, USA
Director
Foreign Assistance Missions: Developing Senior Leaders

By
Maj Gen Robert Allardice, USAF
and
Capt Craig Prather, USAF

The current political debate focuses daily on the question of withdrawal from Iraq. As such, transitioning security responsibilities from coalition to Iraqi forces capable of securing environments conducive to the growth of a fragile government becomes ever more important. In turn, achieving such a transition aids in the development of perceptions of legitimacy (the critical requirement for victory against an insurgency) both amongst the population and state-level actors. Currently in Iraq our strategy focuses on two main efforts: generating/sustaining forces and building long-term institutional capacity within the national security architecture. Both efforts are essential to conducting security transition missions, for without developing long-term institutional capacity, the relatively short term successes of force generation may fade as the security institution cannot sustain itself. Ultimately, success depends on the combined efforts of a willing Iraqi military institution and a coalition effectively influencing Iraqi senior leaders who will ensure the long-term survivability of the security organization.

Force generation and institutional capacity are not independent lines of operation. While security assistance missions generate host nation forces, institutional capacity slowly grows in the sense that "capacity builds through generation." Of primary importance becomes the ability of the advisor to influence the senior leader’s capacity for identifying requirements and the appropriate vehicles through which to resource them. As the leader’s strategic capacity increases, the senior leader develops the ability to identify problems at the institutional level where he must rely on a foundation of organizational relationships and processes in order to solve them. A security organization that identifies strategic level problems with associated requirements for resolution and resources them effectively reflects an organization capable of sustaining itself as a result of institutional capacity. While force generation and institutional capacity relate to one another, and the long term success of a transition operation requires success in both, the nature of leader development can drastically differ between the two. This article focuses on that difference and the nature of influencing senior leaders in foreign military security transition operations.

Through tremendous effort, the coalition continues to assist Iraqis in the successful generation of a growing number of ever more capable forces assisting in the stabilization of the security environment. However, leadership development within the "capacity through generation" concept changes as a result of the varying requirements of the two main focus areas. Force generation necessitates developing leaders capable of leading newly formed units at the tactical and operational level. In contrast, institutional capacity necessitates developing senior leaders with the skills necessary to provide strategic guidance critical to identifying problems facing the organization and resourcing those resulting requirements generated by the security environment (both internal and external).
Therefore the efforts of force generation and institutional capacity span the spectrum of warfare from tactical to strategic, and so to, does the corresponding advisory mission conducted as part of security transition. At the tactical level, the advisor works to increase the technical expertise of their counterpart via a great deal of teaching and doing. This type of focus relates more closely to force generation than institutional capacity, but the latter certainly cannot occur, nor is required, without the completion of the former. Advisor actions continue to focus on developing skills critical to force generation (tactical unit employment, counterinsurgency (COIN), etc.) well into the operational level of warfare, but the shift between creating enterprise expertise versus technical expertise becomes more dramatic the closer assistance efforts move to the strategic end of the spectrum. Figure 1 displays the need for this shift in developmental focus once generated forces are fielded and have stabilized the security environment. At this point, to sustain the institution, its leaders must possess competencies necessary to produce policies and procedures resident in a government system for identifying, planning, and securing resources against requirements essential to organizational longevity: aka institutional capacity.

However, developing a leader at the tactical or operational level requires teaching a significantly different skill set than trying to develop a senior leader charged with the maintenance of the institution. “Ideally, senior leaders are fully qualified for their positions,” 1 possessing sufficient knowledge of the functional area, training, and experience matching current job requirements, and understanding the interactions of the parent organization with external entities. Strategic-level advisors are often challenged by the varying levels of baseline functional and enterprise knowledge present among advisees. Those foreign senior leaders that may possess relatively higher levels of “domain and enterprise knowledge” 2 from a former regime will still require assistance in developing the appropriate skills for the type of force our assistance missions aim to create (Western influence versus Saddam Era). Therefore, in almost every case, the aim of the advisor becomes increasing enterprise knowledge and influencing a senior leader’s ability to think strategically.

Figure 1. Shift in Developmental Focus
In Iraq, roughly a generation's worth of leadership experience eroded at the hands of war, neglect, and a general lack of organizational maturity. These perils directly impacted the ability of foreign senior leaders to build their domain knowledge by the means identified in figure 2. Particular weak points exist in the development of knowledge via familiarity "gained through education, training, or experience." Advisors however, as reflected in figure 2, bring a great deal of education, training, and experience gained through years of service within highly developed organizations focused on individual growth. The advisor must bring these resources to the area of responsibility (AOR) in order to build the foreign senior leader's enterprise knowledge and their ability to think and act strategically. Growing a foreign senior leader's knowledge of the importance that enterprise and organizational relationships play in the success of the institution; and influencing that knowledge in a manner that delivers long-term institutional capacity becomes the ultimate goal of the strategic-level advisor.

Advisors become the leverage point for the foreign leader in order to more effectively operate within the greater organization. Use of advisors by the foreign senior leader to aid in effective decision-making processes leads to developing the leader's enterprise knowledge and ability to think strategically through education and advice. The advisor fills gaps created over years of developmental neglect by providing insight and understanding of the foreign leader's domain, but more importantly, the advisor must grow the individual's comprehension of enterprise issues. Revealing the mechanics and the importance of how the leader's functional area fits into and interacts with the parent and external organizations becomes the first of many steps towards building institutional capacity. However, enterprise and domain knowledge are individual competencies, the advisor must also account for and effectively influence the leader's use of these competencies in a manner consistent with the context and landscape of the decision-making environment.

The locations of current and future security assistance missions place Western advisors into cultures significantly different from their own.

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The advisor fills gaps created over years of developmental neglect by providing insight and understanding of the leader's domain...
These differences cannot be overstated and must be taken into account by an advisory corps when attempting to influence foreign senior leaders. To not do so will only result in frustration and a waste of resources on both sides as an advisor from a low-context, highly structured, formally organized system tries to "force-feed" their ways of thinking on leaders from a high-context, moderately structured, informally based culture/institution. In Iraq, an adaptation of Nadler’s Congruence Model (figure 3) provides a relatively accurate portrait of the situation faced by the advisors of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.

In Arab security assistance missions the power of personal relationships and the informal rules and arrangements generated by them can, and often do, overpower the formal structures/processes of the formal organization established even after years of coalition-assisted organizational development. The advisor must be aware of that fact and consider it when focusing efforts on the development of foreign senior leaders. What begins to become readily apparent to the strategic advisor is that more often than not you cannot simply tell the advisee what to do, or how to act in a given situation; you can only hope to influence in a way that gently sends them in the direction required by the external environment. The final measure of success in strategic advisory initiatives shall be growth in the capacity of the organization as reflected by the collective leadership’s ability to support their functional areas via effective engagement across the enterprise and within the greater government system.

Significant gains and success in the realm of force generation, with its associated advisory efforts at the tactical and operational level, aid in the stabilization of an environment within which Iraq’s security institutions grow daily. As this growth occurs, coalition leaders have found that advisory teams must influence the growth of strategic capacity within Iraqi senior leaders. In turn, their growth lends itself to institutional growth and long-term sustainment. However, this requires the addition of organizational theory in a cultural context at the strategic level to the areas of preparation required for advisors. In order to influence Iraqi leaders we must first grow a new type of advisor comfortable with applying enterprise perspectives in a complicated, personality based, environment. This development not only aids in the continuing success of transition efforts in Iraq, but will undoubtedly prove useful in future assistance operations to yet be conducted.

![Figure 3. Adapted from Nadler’s Congruence Model](image)
Developing Institutions: The Purpose of Foreign Security Force Advisors in National Strategy

By
LTC John Nagl, USA and
1LT Brian Drohan, USA

“One would expect the primary groups of any society to be protected by some social mechanism—for the integration of the primary groups is of key social importance.”
—Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations

Civil society provides the foundation for a functioning government—but society itself rests on institutions. An institution is a social mechanism that provides a means of maintaining order and cooperative behavior among individuals and groups within a society. Culture and tradition, voting systems, religious establishments, and political parties represent various examples of institutions. Weak states often lack viable institutions, whether security institutions, legal, financial, political, or all of the above. Many such states face internal and cross-border threats from terrorist organizations and other violent groups, such as Pakistan (internal Al-Qaeda influence), Ethiopia (cross-border threats from Somalia), and Colombia (internal separatists and drug trafficking).

...future American strategy will likely combine Department of State and Department of Defense resources to leverage all political, military, and economic elements of US national power to buttress weak states.
In the modern world strong institutions are the key to maintaining the state as a viable social and political entity. States that capably maintain strong institutions are able to provide structured forums for debate, decision, and action as well as a foundation for peacefully continuing the national political system. A state with strong security institutions and an inclusive society that respects the rule of law can withstand cross-border and internal security pressures, creating the conditions for a strong and dynamic civil society. Without functioning institutions, states face the breakdown of social and political order. Therefore, future American strategy will likely combine Department of State and Department of Defense resources to leverage all political, military, and economic elements of US national power to buttress weak states.

Besides global terrorism, anchored in a brutal ideology, the United States faces security obstacles such as ethnic and sectarian conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and failed/failing states imploding from instability and internal disunity. Such threats present dire implications for regional and global security in addition to the threat posed by global terrorist organizations. The 2006 National Security Strategy sets the military’s security priorities which fall into six general themes:

- Strengthen alliances.
- Work with other partner states to reduce conflict and promote cooperation.
- Prevent the threat from WMD.
- Support global economic growth.
- Strengthen and support democracy and open societies.
- Transform American national security institutions for the 21st century.

The nature of the security concerns presents a clear picture of future military commitments. We should expect that irregular warfare, according to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.” Essentially, these threats stem from the breakdown of civil society in weak and failed states across several regions of the globe.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism recognizes that “the paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our national power and influence.” The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledged that “long-standing alliance relationships will continue to underpin unified efforts to address 21st century security challenges” and that the Department of Defense must expand its ability “to train and equip foreign security forces best suited to internal counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.”

The multitude of official policy documents articulate a vision in which “future warriors will be as proficient in irregular operations, including counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, as they are today in high-intensity combat.” Indeed, the Marine Corps has already created several foreign military training units to support this mission. With this vision in mind, the foreign security force (FSF) advisor mission will remain a vital tenet of national security policy for the foreseeable future.

FSF assistance supports national policy by strengthening partnership ties with states around the world by
promoting stability and supporting the development of nascent security institutions in weak and failing states. American advisor and training missions cannot solve all of a partner nation’s social problems—nor should they. But FSF assistance to foreign states does provide the United States with opportunities to reinforce the importance of: civilian control of the military, the military’s role as defender and protector of civil society (rather than oppressor), and military respect for human rights and dignity. Establishing and maintaining host-nation military forces that support the government and respect the citizenry are crucial elements for the success of operations such as counter-insurgency.

Other elements of government that provide social order and security, such as the judiciary and police, rely on the concept of legitimacy gained from civil society. American advisors provide the teaching, coaching, and mentoring of such security forces that is necessary to create and perpetuate functional, legitimate local forces capable of providing security for their country. The recently-published *Counterinsurgency* Army Field Manual (FM 3-24) instructs that successfully defeating an insurgency “requires the host nation (HN) to defeat insurgents or render them irrelevant, uphold the rule of law, and provide a basic level of essential services and security for the populace. Key to all these tasks is developing an effective HN security force.” Advisors contribute to improved domestic civil-military relations and the rule of law within a legitimate political framework by helping to cultivate and professionalize the armed forces of partner states.

As a general rule, advisors develop host-nation security institutions. The Philippines, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Mali, Niger, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Colombia have all received advice and training assistance from the United States. These efforts range from large-scale US military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan to small training teams deployed to countries such as Mali.

The United States has seen some success in areas like the southern Philippines, where a US Joint Special Operations Task Force has helped train Philippine troops in counterinsurgency techniques and small-unit tactics. They have also assisted Philippine forces with planning civil-military operations and information operations by sharing US force multipliers such as intelligence information. The efforts resulted in driving the Al-Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf Group out of many of their former sanctuaries.

Despite achievements in FSF assistance, military-oriented assistance alone does not always suffice. US assistance to Kenya demonstrates that FSF advice and training can help prevent terrorist infiltration and external destabilization (such as anarchy exported from Somalia). However, recent violence and instability in Kenya emerged as a result of domestic political problems related to election tampering and latent ethnic animosities. The domestic social and political problems highlighted the necessity for providing holistic political-military assistance programs with the goal of developing institutions that not only improve security but also improve governance and local economies. Military assistance is only one dimension of a multidimensional issue highlighting the importance of interagency and combined State-Defense Department political-military cooperation.

Given the current challenges facing American national security and future threats outlined in the National Security Strategy, the global necessity of providing FSF advisors
and trainers to support partner governments and weak states will remain a national security obligation. Current advisory missions support security policy across the world, but weak states remain vulnerable to terrorist influence and penetration, such as Indonesia and Pakistan. The military must remain prepared to conduct FSF operations.

The Armed Services must embrace the FSF advisor mission and institutionalize the necessary capability to provide larger numbers of advisors than required in the past. Each state—each member of the international community—faces the threat of international terrorism. Regional and local problems such as poor health systems, economic underdevelopment, and poverty put stress on failing state institutions thus making each state more susceptible to political violence conducted by narco-terrorists, criminal organizations, warlords, and jihadists. The United States can achieve national policy goals of strengthening states with weak institutions by strengthening individual members of the international community through FSF assistance and State Department engagement to improve economic, security, and political institutions within partner governments.

Strengthening partner countries’ ability to resist instability and violence within their borders prevents domestic, social, and political problems from spilling across international boundaries.

As the Secretary of Defense exhorted, “arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries.”

Enabling and empowering our partners supports national policy goals and national security. The global security situation is such that these challenges will endure for the foreseeable future, requiring FSF advisor competencies to remain a necessary military competency in much greater demand than has been the case in the past.

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**END NOTE**

1 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, remarks at Kansas State University, 26 November 2007.
4 QDR, p.42.
5 QDR, p.42-43.
Being an Advisor: What you always wanted to know!

By

COL Sean Ryan, USA

“What will win the Global War on Terrorism will be people that can cross the cultural divide, reach out to those who want our help, and figure out how to make that happen. That is how we will win this thing.”

—General John P. Abizaid
Commander US Central Command testimony before the House Military Appropriations Subcommittee, March 2004

Influence is the name of the game for advisors. From our own experiences, we can pick out those leaders who possess the natural gift of being charismatic and those who possess the natural penchant for working well with others under stressful conditions. Lieutenant General John H. Cushman noted in his 1972 debriefing report that:

“The qualities which might make for effective, or even outstanding, performance as a battalion or brigade commander are not necessarily those which make the best advisor. A marked empathy with others, an ability to accommodate, a certain un-militarily philosophical or reflective bent, a kind of waywardness or independence, and the like—these are often found in outstanding advisors, but may be frowned on in a troop chain of command situation.”

His point is that some leaders naturally make outstanding advisors; the rest of us need to work to be successful. Being an effective advisor is more than just being charismatic or affable. Being an influential advisor requires three basic things that can be learned:

1. The advisor must establish and maintain effective rapport with his indigenous counterpart.

2. The advisor must bring value.

3. The advisor must be credible in the eyes of his counterpart.

RAPPORT

Rapport is simply the relationship between two people. Rapport can be positive or negative. Effective rapport is a function of three things: mutual understanding, respect, and trust.

The better an advisor and his counterpart understand each other, the stronger their relationship will be. Understanding is the first tenet of building and maintaining effective rapport.
positive rapport. An advisor can improve his understanding of his counterpart through studying the operating environment prior to deploying. Then, after meeting a counterpart, an advisor can learn more about his counterpart by spending time with him, talking with him, and most importantly, listening to him. T.E. Lawrence noted in his famous “27 Articles,” “Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for…” Lawrence’s advice gets to the heart of rapport. This is no different from a good leader in the US military.

When an advisor spends time to get to know a counterpart and possibly learn some of his native language, he demonstrates respect for his counterpart. **Respect** is the second tenet of building and maintaining positive rapport. Respect is fundamental to all good relationships and critically important between combat leaders.

Working across cultural boundaries may require some additional effort. Living as an advisor with an indigenous counterpart in a developing country can be challenging at a deep personal level. The advisor may have to look for a reason to respect his counterpart. One Iraqi colonel who I had the honor of knowing serves as a constant reminder of how to find things to respect. This particular colonel, I’ll call him COL Ali, had been an officer in the former Iraqi Army. He was determined to see his nation rebuilt and came to work with the coalition in 2004. Over a 3-month period there were multiple attempts on COL Ali’s life involving rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), machine guns, and a command detonated explosive device. Yet, COL Ali continued to come to work with us. That type of determination and courage demands respect, regardless of how any of us may feel about the performance of the former Iraqi Army.

**Trust** can be hard to build, especially in a hostile environment. Trust takes time to build and can be fragile. Trust is not faith; it is a combination of knowing a person’s motivations and demonstrated performance. This may seem to be counterintuitive, but a high threat environment can be advantageous for building trust. Soldiers, fighting from the same foxhole or walking patrol together, living and suffering side-by-side, learn to trust each other at an accelerated rate.

**VALUE**

After rapport the second facet of an advisor’s influence is the value he provides to his indigenous counterpart. What we bring to bear, as US advisors, is professional expertise and tremendous resources. It is extremely valuable for an indigenous commander to have on call US firepower and direct access to US resources; however, it takes more than firepower or resources for an advisor to improve a host nation leader or unit over the long term. The advisor’s greatest impact is bringing influence to bear on various tasks.
CREDIBILITY

The third facet of an advisor's influence is credibility. Credibility is a function of an advisor's core military professional competence. Are you a credible force that your counterpart can rely on? Not all advisory missions are combat related; but in a combat environment, there is no substitute for first rate combat skills.

An advisor who is a credible professional, who brings value to his counterpart, and who understands the fundamentals of building and maintaining effective rapport is positioned to be highly effective.

COMMON PITFALLS

There are several common pitfalls that advisors may make with their counterparts. History shows that the following examples represent a few difficulties that were common among advisors regardless of where they served. Advisors from Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Iran, Oman, Iraq, and Afghanistan have all faced similar challenges.

IMPOSING “US” SOLUTIONS

For example, our professional development system demands high degrees of literacy that do not exist everywhere. It is important to remember that some of history’s outstanding leaders have been illiterate. Subotal, arguably Genghis Khan’s greatest strategist and general is one such leader. There are other ways to learn besides reading. It is the advisor's job to resolve each challenge he faces; and to be optimally effective, the advisor must seek solutions that work within his counterparts context and environment.

Another common example of imposing US solutions is defining the role of the noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in cultures that lack a meaningful middle class. Our own NCO corps, the backbone of our military, works because it fits into our societal culture as an industrial nation. Not all cultures can readily accept the decentralized leadership style epitomized by effective NCO leadership. This does not mean that establishing an NCO corps is not a worthy goal; however, it is important to understand that developing an effective NCO corps may take a generation to build. So it is critical to be pragmatic when measuring progress.

DOING TOO MUCH

Perhaps one of the most common mistakes made by inexperienced advisors is doing too much. T.E. Lawrence warned against doing too much unilaterally in his “27 Articles,”

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”

Lawrence’s points are true for all cultures, not just Arab culture. When advisors act unilaterally, whether it is going out on patrol, inspecting indigenous outposts without the host nation commander, or planning an operation by themselves without the participation of their counterpart staff, they are actually robbing their charges of the legitimacy they require in order to succeed in improving security in their homeland.

CORRUPTION VERSUS CULTURE

Accepting that what we, as United States citizens, consider graft and corruption as a cultural norm is important. It does not mean that we must openly accept behaviors that are counterproductive to good order, military discipline, and performance. It is critical to remember that as advisors, we will not change professional behavior, let alone...
professional culture overnight. It is critical for an advisor to bear in mind that his relationship with his counterpart is paramount to his being successful in his overall advisory mission. Almost every day, the advisor will face the question of whether or not a specific issue is worth risking the relationship he has developed—is a few gallons of diesel fuel worth the loss of rapport that may result from pushing too hard? Only the advisor can answer that question when it arises.

CONFUSING SOCIAL CULTURE WITH PROFESSIONAL CULTURE

An advisor’s mission is to help his counterpart improve his performance, and as a result, improve the performance of his unit or organization. Over time, if an advisory effort is effective on a broad scale, the professional culture of the host nation security forces will evolve. As advisors we must not despair with cultural nuances. Professional culture will initially mirror the host nation societal culture, but effective influence brought to bear by advisors will result in an improved professional leadership culture. The warrior ethos will prevail.

CONCLUSION

Superior leadership will always stand out as the critical element of a superior fighting force. In terms of applying effective leadership across the cultural divide, US leaders must develop the ability to influence those foreign leaders with whom they may serve as advisors. Developing this influence requires that US advisors be capable of applying good advisor fundamentals, regardless of whether they come from special operations forces or multipurpose forces.

The best advisors will always be those with a natural penchant for this line of work, as MG Cushman pointed out in his 1972 out brief. Ideally, our Military Departments will identify and track those leaders with this natural proclivity; however, regardless of whether or not a leader possesses a natural inclination for working with foreign forces, he or she can be successful by applying good advisor basics and learning to avoid common mistakes. The leader who can apply these advisor fundamentals will prove to be influential—and influence is not only a hallmark of good leaders, it is a good combat multiplier.

MIT Advisor and Iraqi Soldiers practice map reading skills during their weekly training in Suwayrah, Iraq, 28 July 2007. (Photo by MC2 Christopher Perez, USN)

END NOTE

4 Advisor Basics Briefing; Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Fort Leavenworth, KS. p. 11.
By

LTC Richard A. McConnell, USA
MAJ Christopher L. Matson, USA
MAJ Brent A. Clemmer, USA and
CPT Jared Kite, USA

This article is based on our team’s experiences mentoring and coaching an Iraqi Army (IA) battalion and the Iraqi police with whom the IA operated. It presents ideas we have about fostering teamwork within the “Human Terrain” [aka cultural terrain] in Mosul on the route towards a more self-sufficient Iraqi Army. We will attempt to provide practical examples of the best practices we observed performed by US brigade combat teams (BCTs)—what follows is our best efforts toward getting Iraqis to truly take the lead while diminishing the need for US leadership. No matter what kind of US element you are a part of as you read this article, your goal should be the same—build cooperation between the IA and Iraqi police (indeed all Iraqi Security Forces [ISF]) as they provide security to Iraq while reducing the need for US forces leadership.

MEETING AND MANAGING EXPECTATIONS

If we are to successfully coach and mentor Iraqis, we must be patient enough to allow them to conduct missions their way even if we do not initially understand. We need this patience because the process of transitioning the IA into the lead while working with its Iraqi police counterparts can be confusing and frustrating. The cause of this confusion can be traced to preconceived notions about how army and police units should act and be developed.
Calculating success based on US military standards and expectations is both challenging and misleading. If you are a US Soldier, you can’t help but have these notions when working with Iraqis. The trick is to understand what you are expected to accomplish and what you are not expected to change. You can then help the Iraqis fashion their army and police into the force necessary to protect this fledgling democracy.

You must help the IA and police become strong enough to beat the insurgency and sustain security in their country. You can’t (and would not want to) change the culture and social fabric in Iraq. We must accept that the methods may be different than ours but in order for US aims to be met in Iraq, we must ultimately allow the Iraqis to do things their way.

A turning point was reached when we reexamined our role from the perspective of Military Training Teams (MiTT) marketing. One of our team members asked “Who is our customer?” and “What is our product?” The answers were the Iraqi Army and our advising, coaching, and mentoring. In order to succeed, we had to understand our customer and design our product to maximize the strengths of the Iraqis with whom we were working.

As a MiTT we needed to manage expectations across the battlefield, from expectations we held for ourselves, to those we held for our US partners, the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi police, the media, and local civilians. Everyone, we realized, had preconceived assumptions and expectations that had to be anticipated and dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

**Best Practices:** The best units working with Iraqis “managed US expectations.” The way this was accomplished in one US unit had everything to do with their attitude—we will call this unit “Company A.” Company A had been in Mosul 18 months earlier and had seen what the embryonic ISF was capable of then and saw how much progress had been made. This perspective gave Company A a very optimistic attitude of where the ISF was developmentally and that optimism was contagious. Additionally, units who managed their expectations in this way tended to be less judgmental of what the Iraqi element was failing to do and more optimistic of what that Iraqi unit could possibly accomplish with proper coaching. Key to our success in developing Iraqi security was attempting to see the situation from the perspective of the people we are there to help—the Iraqis. Company A was successful not only because they accepted the Iraqis’ way of operating—they celebrated the difference and designed their approach to maximize those strengths.

The bottom line, whether we embrace it or not, is that a uniquely IA and Iraqi police will be the result of our mentoring and coaching. But before you can build a team, you must understand who the players are and how they interact within the “Human Terrain.”

Social factors and relationship building are paramount in the Middle Eastern mind. An example of this was how we got our Iraqi Army personnel and the Iraqi police in our sector to work together as a team. It was difficult to bring these groups together because our battalion was Kurdish and the police in Mosul are predominantly Sunni Arab. We started slow—a weekly meeting in order to foster teamwork. In other words, we did not start by trying to change attitudes, but rather, behavior in the hope that changed behavior might ultimately impact attitudes.

The first meeting took place over several cups of Chai [tea]. During this gathering, conversations tended to focus on informal topics and little
was attempted by either side other than small talk. We gently encouraged the meeting to take place just prior to the evening meal knowing that Iraqi customs make it almost a requirement for the IA battalion commander to invite the police chief to dinner if dinner becomes ready during the meeting. We saw this as a key event because in Iraq the act of breaking bread together is a significant rapport builder and the first step towards building trust.

We celebrated the meal as a tremendous event as we continued with countless more weekly meetings. The result grew and improved with each sitting and eventually developed into a relationship based on trust and understanding. Our meetings began to focus on intelligence and operations and recommendations of improving how they could work together. Evident improvement was seen when the Iraqi Police ‘patrolman’ started interacting and sharing meals with the Iraqi Army Soldiers on a regular basis.

Further proof became obvious with the passage of time. Initially, when the police were attacked, the Army usually did not respond to assist or vice versa. After several meetings led to truly joint operations, anytime the Army or police were attacked the other ISF partner would respond.

THE “HUMAN TERRAIN” SYSTEM

The understanding of the “Human Terrain” is very important for any US unit that hopes to work with Iraqis. Rushing to judgment was usually caused by a lack of understanding, a constant study of the Human Terrain will provide a more comprehensive picture of the environment in which we will operate and will have a direct relationship on our level of effectiveness.

“Cultural awareness is a force multiplier; reflects our recognition that knowledge of the cultural “terrain” can be as important as, and sometimes even more important than, knowledge of the geographic terrain.”

US units tend to ignore the Human Terrain to our detriment. Notably groups within the ISF in Iraq are effective only when they can be coordinated toward a unified goal—security of the people, legitimacy of the government, and illegitimacy of the insurgency.

Unity of effort is key when dealing with the complex “Human Terrain” within an insurgency. Achieving unity can be difficult among fellow Americans and requires commitment at all levels of command. We sold the concept to our Iraqi counterparts by using the metaphor of calling each entity a finger in “The Five Fingers.” These are: the Iraqi Army, MiTTs, coalition forces, Iraqi police, and US Military Police squads.

When these fingers act in a coordinated effort they form a fist. This fist is stronger than any individual finger and can defeat any adversary. Success in coordinating those five fingers, however, lies in gaining an understanding of all the players.
SHOWING RESPECT

Iraqis are sensitive to being shown respect and will quickly sense a lack of respect. It is important that you do not make a poor first impression through an unintentional act of disrespect. You will not be able to mentor or coach the Iraqis if their leaders view you as lacking respect for them. Likewise, you could get a few steps into the team-building process and have to start all over because of a simple act of disrespect. Ironically, from the beginning showing respect was the first omission of many that US units failed to accomplish.

US units who were most effective at working with Iraqis were respectful of their Iraqi counterparts and yet still commanded respect. Most Iraqis will respond in kind when treated with respect. Right from the start it is important to acknowledge that your student counterpart is both worthy and capable. To do otherwise compromises the entire effort.

Best Practices: Company A worked with and treated Iraqi casualties as if they were American. The junior Iraqi Soldiers and leaders saw this and it paid huge dividends.

This was a great example for the IA which is learning how to display the level of concern for their Soldiers that our Army does routinely for our Soldiers. It is a great rapport building event when brother Soldiers work together to care for their wounded.

Weathering tragedy together was hugely important. During our year, the MiTT team attended funerals of Soldiers in the battalion and IA leaders attended memorial services for American Soldiers who were killed in action. These occasions were loaded with meaning for both parties and were incredible rapport builders—more than that, they created brothers in arms.

BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS

Once you have established respect for each other, then you can figure out how you are going to work with the members of the unit. This encompasses everything from how you share battlespace to how you will share information. You are here to put this organization in the lead so make sure they know who is in charge—they are.

Best Practices: The most effective US units who worked with Iraqis did not waste time telling them what to do but rather respectfully modeled correct procedures. Company A was especially proficient at this technique and the Iraqi Army unit responded very well to this approach. The key moment in the process transpired when Company A was invited to dinner by the Iraqi unit.

Over dinner the US Soldiers and NCOs began to see what they had in common with the Iraqis. Iraqi Soldiers were serving in Mosul to keep terrorists out of their home town—US Soldiers were serving in Iraq to keep terrorists out of their home town. This revelation constituted common ground between brothers in arms. The US unit began to spend more time with the Iraqi unit socializing prior to joint missions and in the process Iraqi Soldiers saw US unit NCOs conducting pre-combat checks and inspections (PCC/PCI), rehearsals, and hip pocket training.

Iraqi interpretations of PCC/PCIs emerged about a month later. The Iraqi NCO corps became stronger and standards among troops improved because Iraqi leaders began to check troops more consistently. This would not have been possible if the US had not displayed a genuine respect for the IA unit and desire to help throughout the entire US chain of command.
One of the best examples of respect serving as the foundation for progress was the vast improvement in the intelligence arena and its linkage to operations. This progress may not have been possible if we had failed to respect the unique approach our IA would take to these vital disciplines. It is thus a good idea to understand how US units differ from IA in intelligence gathering and how they might apply this information to operations.

**IRAQI INTELLIGENCE TRAINING AND OPERATIONS**

Midway through our tour, the Iraqis sent a platoon of 20 soldiers to undergo reconnaissance training. This platoon consisted of mostly younger enlisted soldiers and NCOs, with a second lieutenant as the platoon leader (PL). The platoon underwent a month of rigorous training consisting of surveillance and counter-surveillance, mounted and dismounted reconnaissance, target development, weapons familiarization and advanced small-arms firing techniques. It constituted a quantum leap forward for the IA battalion and their ability to gather and analyze actionable intelligence.

One specific example of an Iraqi intelligence-driven operation took place immediately after the reconnaissance platoon completed its training. One of the Iraqis S2 NCOs approached the MiTT S2 advisor and informed him they had received information from one of their sources that there was a suspected insurgent who lived in a house close by. They showed a simple plan of attack, which included building a simple target packet and conducting a reconnaissance of the house to take some pictures of the residence and possibly of the residents of the home. The S2 advisor recommended proceeding with their plan.

The reconnaissance platoon sergeant and the S2 NCO came back a few days later with photos they had taken with their cell phones, sketches of the home and surrounding area complete with ingress and egress routes, and biographic information on the suspected insurgent. The only thing that had been recommended to them was to find out more about who else resided in the house and a few more helpful hints to complete their intelligence preparation of the battlefield. They obviously exceeded our initial expectations while at the same time producing a uniquely IA product which was readily understandable by their unit.

We subsequently witnessed many similar missions, which led us to conclude that despite the simplicity of the Iraqi operational and intelligence-collection methods, they were still capable of accomplishing huge tasks. The most important learning point was that the Iraqis are motivated and they believe in their abilities. The best way to assist the Iraqis from an Operations and Intelligence perspective was to encourage them and let them know that despite not having the best equipment or the latest technology they can still use what they have to great effect.

Often the Iraqis would receive information from a source and would want to begin an operation immediately, without using another source to verify the information by another means. However, by the end of our tour, they were employing their reconnaissance platoon to verify information when it was practical.

An understanding of the differences between US and Iraqi intelligence is very helpful if we wish to effectively train IA units to improve in this vital area.

**Patience is key:** These best practices are not easily implemented but they are effective. In our Army we are dedicated to expediency and value efficiency in every operation. However, when interacting with Iraqis it is not uncommon to sit with...
your counterpart drinking *chai* for hours, just spending time together. Although we would work through many issues in the time required to exchange pleasantries with the Iraqis, these casual conversations should be considered time well spent. Indeed, a level of patience uncommon to American Soldiers is required throughout the Iraqi process.

The Iraqi approach is neither good nor bad but a reality. You must be aware that our concept of time is not shared by our Iraqi counterpart. To be successful in your mission, you must operate in their environment without becoming frustrated. Work with your US counterparts behind closed doors to resolve those issues you know you can resolve, then provide a united front to the IA battalion commander.

On occasion, your advice will be disregarded by the Iraqis who will implement a different solution. View that as a good thing. When the IA unit accomplishes the mission, it learns and gains confidence in its abilities. If you come into conflict with the Iraqi perspective, you will show disrespect and damage the relationship, causing you to start all over with building rapport. This entire process will be frustrating only if you do not endeavor to understand the nature of the “Human Terrain” in which you are operating.

Transitioning Iraqi units into the lead can be very fulfilling as long as we focus on the goal—getting US forces out of the lead. Your first step is to embrace the “Human Terrain” in your Iraqi area of operations.
The Strategy of Enablement: 
Foreign Internal Defense and the SOF Advisor

By
Maj Christopher Jacobs, USAF

Prior to 11 September 2001, Special Operations Forces (SOF) advisors from the Army, Navy, and Air Force deployed to their areas of responsibility and trained to their advisory mission essential task lists by training with foreign forces. These were normally short deployments, lasting about a month or so. The skills for which they trained prepared these forces for their roles in lending support for counterinsurgency. One collateral benefit was that SOF advisors could engage with many of our friends and allies where conventional forces could not. There were several reasons for the conventional forces' limitations which ranged from legal restrictions on conventional forces training with foreign forces to the fact that SOF could engage with partners that did not have robust militaries. However, there were still numerous peacetime restrictions that constrained SOF advisor activity.

In the ensuing years, the role of SOF advisors and their relevancy in combating a global insurgency in the war on terror has been underscored by the growth of advisor teams. The concept of enabling our friends and allies has gained traction as a concept with a farther-reaching strategic impact than direct US tactical actions. SOF advisors, having been specially trained and equipped for tactical missions, are the force of choice—and not just in Iraq or Afghanistan.

SOF advisors largely operate in the foreign internal defense (FID) arena. Many unfamiliar with FID might think of it simply as the training of foreign military personnel. This is far from reality. Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, defines FID as, “the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” FID enables other governments to plan, execute, and sustain viable internal defense and development (IDAD) programs through a total effort encompassing diplomatic, economic, informational, and military support.

It is therefore no surprise that any FID program on the part of the US government is an interagency effort. In fact, the Department of State—not the Department of Defense (DOD)—is normally the lead agency in FID programs. However, DOD does provide some of the personnel and equipment that achieve FID objectives. Due to the interagency dynamic at the strategic planning level, SOF advisors know that their actions must move in concert with those of other US government agencies such as Department of State, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and US Department of Agriculture (to name just a few) to ensure a coordinated effort toward bolstering a host country’s IDAD program.

The reasoning follows that a total IDAD effort must be geared toward enabling the host government to provide stability, safety, and security of its populace in the eyes of its citizens. This is not meant to be simple “eyewash” but legitimate efforts that convert people into supporters of their own government which is genuinely mindful of their welfare. Only when that happens can a host government make its land infertile to the seeds of insurgency that take root when governments are
deemed illegitimate by their own citizenry.\textsuperscript{5}

In recent years, emphasis has been placed on growing the number of SOF advisors to meet the challenges of this enablement strategy. For example, in 2006, Marine Special Operations Command stood up the foreign military training unit in response to the need for more advisors to conduct FID. Further growth of SOF advisors also occurred in the Air Force. In 2006, the Quadrennial Defense Review directed the Air Force Special Operations Command’s 6\textsuperscript{th} Special Operations Squadron to double in size because they have the DOD’s only dedicated combat aviation advisory (CAA) unit.

Advisors in the 6\textsuperscript{th} SOS, a selectively-manned unit, are adept at working in the interagency environment. Units are regionally specialized, politically-astute, and culturally-sensitive to their areas of operation. Their extensive training allows them to operate as small self-supporting teams in austere environments. They are as comfortable in an embassy setting as they are in the field. Additionally, CAA units—like other joint SOF advisors—forge working relationships founded on trust with their foreign counterparts. This allows them to be effective over years of continuous engagement with a partner nation.

Combat aviation advisors specialize in assisting a partner government to use airpower to strengthen its IDAD program. Advisor circles have posited that a 21\textsuperscript{st} century government might encounter extreme difficulty legitimizing itself without possessing viable airpower assets and programs. Airpower used in an IDAD program has many applications. Airpower allows governments to respond during disaster relief operations in outlying areas and provide support necessary to enforce and control large borders in otherwise ungoverned territories;\textsuperscript{6} bring engineers to impoverished areas to drill for clean water; and build schools and clinics, or construct local government offices.

A 6th Special Operations Squadron advisor and a Philippine Air Force range security team conduct medical evacuation procedures during a combined training exercise. (USAF Photo)
Another more obvious application is the tactical use of airpower to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and/or close air support for surface forces to strike at the heart of insurgencies. Typically, CAA force employment goes beyond the concept of just aircrew advisors providing training to their foreign aircrew counterparts. In the CAA context, bringing airpower advisors to a FID effort involves advisory assistance utilizing aircraft maintenance and logistics personnel for aircraft sustainment issues; security forces personnel to advise on asset protection; medical personnel to advise on aerospace equipment; health and casualty evacuation; communications advisors to advise on command and control; and survival instructors that teach aviation forces how to persevere in a downed-aircraft environment. All of the facets of airpower enable a host-nation’s aviation program to be viable and sustainable so that it might contribute to the larger IDAD effort.

6th SOS CAAs can be found throughout the world, providing advisory assistance to our friends and allies.

6th SOS CAAs can be found throughout the world, providing advisory assistance to our friends and allies—often in conjunction with other advisors from joint Services. From Central and South America to the Middle East to sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia they adapt their logical sequence of advisor methodology to assess, train, advise, and assist to meet every tasking. In all cases, they are working to achieve US national interests. These endeavors require an investment of time—change in developing nations rarely comes quickly.

Such is the case with the publicized efforts of the 6 SOS in the Philippines. Since 2002, the squadron has been helping the country implement a coordinated FID effort in the war on terror. Security assistance, through interagency efforts, provided UH-1 helicopters that enable the Philippine Air Force (PAF) to better support forces conducting operations against insurgents in the southern part of the country. However, at the time of aircraft delivery, the PAF was limited to day-only operations that severely constrained operations. The insurgent-terrorists owned the night. Therefore, security assistance also brought advisors from the 6 SOS to the country to build this partner capability to conduct night tactical operations using night vision goggles (NVGs) including insertion/extraction for raids, rescues, and casualty evacuation.

Such a program has taken time and patience. PAF lessons learned on the battlefield were integrated into successive training cycles. Once armed with the aviation skills necessary, Philippine ground forces were introduced into the training with their US Special Forces advisors alongside them. Scenario-based training was expanded to include the insertion of a Philippine Army ground force, the rescue of hostages, the subsequent insertion of a PAF casualty evacuation team, the extraction of all parties, and in-flight medical care of the wounded as they were lifted to safety.

This strategy of enablement has paid off. In 2005, “Oliver”, one of the tactical flight medics (TFM) on a PAF casualty evacuation team, approached a 6th SOS advisor in the Philippines and told his story. Earlier that year, ground forces were battling insurgent-terrorists on the island of Jolo at night and there were several injured. The PAF UH-1 aircraft, aircrews, and TFMs that were on alert launched, and using NVGs, reached the scene. Once there, the TFMs collected the wounded, loaded them onto the helicopters, and began administering care. To Oliver’s surprise, one of the wounded was a soldier who had participated in the scenario-based training described earlier. In Oliver’s words, “It was just like the training,
so I knew exactly what to do and I saved his life.”

Prior to such training, Philippine ground forces knew that being wounded in action at night meant a long, life-threatening over land ride to a medical treatment facility—if there was one in the area. This resulted in reluctance by ground forces to strike at night. A new confidence emerged after the training and publicized casualty evacuations.

This example is only one success story of how SOF advisors, as part of a larger FID program, contribute to a nation’s IDAD program. There are many other IDAD efforts ongoing throughout the world. We have illustrated the far-reaching impact of airpower enablement and the saliency of building partner capacity to provide security and stability within that partner’s borders. Working in concert with other government agencies, this strategy utilizes the full range of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military options to promote our national interests. This concept has changed little since the Kennedy administration. Now that we are faced with a global insurgency, such an enablement strategy has become a key component in US military efforts worldwide, which will likely continue as we meet the challenges of tomorrow.

END NOTE

2 Vick et al.
5 Vick et al.
American military personnel are currently advising internal security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as performing tasks that look very much like advising in several other countries. Traditionally a task for special forces and other government agencies, the advising effort has been taken over mainly by “conventional forces” due to the extremely high operational tempo of more specialized forces.

“Transitioning the fight to the Iraqis” (and Afghans) is one of the primary tasks for US military forces—and indeed, is a major component of current US national strategy. At the forefront of this effort are American advisor teams working hand in hand with foreign forces on a daily basis. This article deals with the DOD’s foreign security forces (FSF) assistance effort and lays out options for a possible “way ahead”—professionalizing the American advisor. Both authors’ background is Army so most of the examples used will have an Army flavor.

BACKGROUND

After rapidly defeating the militaries and national command structures of Afghanistan and Iraq, the US was faced with the complex task of rebuilding not only the military forces, but also police and border security forces in both countries. Services quickly formed, trained, and deployed teams of advisors—initially and primarily comprised of Reserve forces personnel. These Military Training Teams (MiTTs) were trained at multiple locations, by multiple trainers, with different results in the quality of training.

Additional advisor teams were formed “out of hide” from units already deployed, as the large scope
of the problem became apparent. These internal MiTTs created problems due to their allegiance to parent units. All external MiTTs are evaluated independently of the supporting unit, while internal teams maintain their original rating scheme. Internal teams are often forced to cater to the demands of the parent unit even if it is not in the best interest of the advised forces. Internal teams often rotate personnel as team members assume command of companies and other key staff positions adversely affecting the relationship needed between the advisor and their counterpart. Finally, internal MiTTs were assigned a wide variety of people who received no training on their role as an advisor. Some units recognize the importance of the mission and send skilled people, while others see this as just another tasker and fill it with any available Soldier.

Advisor training deficiencies were soon apparent and the Services took steps to improve advisor capabilities by establishing consolidated training. The Army did so at Fort Riley, Kansas, tasking the 1st Infantry Division to establish the advisor training effort. While the improvement in advisor training rested on the high caliber of its leaders and Soldiers, they were not properly resourced at the institutional level.

RECRUITING

The initial results of the consolidated training showed immediate improvement from the previous effort but major deficiencies remain in the current *ad hoc* method of shaping advisor operations—not just in training but in the entire “advisor program” as a whole.

First, the Services must identify and appoint a proponent for their advisor programs. No proponent exists to provide oversight of the current efforts and responsibility for the program. The result is divergent efforts from multiple organizations, all trying to provide support to the deploying teams and the combatant commander.

Secondly, the Services should attempt to attract the most suitable candidates to be advisors, taking purposeful steps to increase the attractiveness of the assignment. Some initial suggestions are:

1. “Advisor Pay”—Additional bonus pay commensurate with the hazards and difficulty of the mission, especially combat advisor missions (i.e., National Police Training Teams for Iraq).
2. “Advisor Tab”—While serving in an advisor billet, Soldiers should be authorized to wear a distinctive tab identifying them as a trained advisor.
3. Award an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI)—This identifier would be awarded after completing an advisor assignment.
4. Joint Tour Credit—This credit would be based upon the specific assignment within the advisor effort.

Implementing these suggestions would go a long way towards improving esprit de corps and providing credibility amongst fellow Soldiers and advised forces.

The Services could then make efforts to advertise these changes targeting the high quality Soldiers and leaders best suited to serve as advisors. The command message would be: “We are dedicated to the transition of security responsibility to national security forces through the professional American advisor program.”

Next, promotion boards could be instructed to grant higher weight to advisor assignments. If Soldiers perceive advisor assignments as beneficial to career development, they will be more likely to volunteer.
SELECTION

A sound selection process must be developed after attracting qualified applicants. It should not, however, be conducted in such a way that failure to select would reflect negatively on a Soldier.

Not every Soldier is capable of being a good advisor. This does not make them “bad Soldiers” it just means they do not possess inherent traits necessary for working in such an ambiguous environment. For example not every Soldier possesses the ability to learn a foreign language, hence the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) exists to evaluate this trait.

Necessary advisor traits should be identified and then applicants screened for these traits. These would include psychological, mental, and physical traits. The band of desirable traits is wide, but there are limits. Soldiers should not be selected to serve as advisors if they lack these traits. Finally, combat experience brings instant credibility among the advised forces and should be required whenever possible.

Primary disqualifiers for selection as an advisor are medical profiles/issues, lack of security clearances or inability to gain a clearance, and lack of appropriate traits. Method of screening would include: sending an on-line questionnaire designed to verify the Soldier possesses desired traits and skills, requiring the Soldier to submit a security clearance verification letter, meeting a minimum score on the DLAB, and completing a physical.

TRAINING

Once a Soldier has volunteered (ideally) or been selected by Human Resources Command (HRC) and then successfully completed the initial selection process, he must then be properly and adequately trained.

The Services should establish formal advisor training centers and school organizations staffed by former advisors.

An advisor training center cadre should have served at least one tour as an advisor followed by a tour back in their primary Military Occupational Specialty. Ideally, they would have just completed an advisor tour. The assignment as cadre should be a PCS move and last for several years.

The Army’s current 60-day advisor training course is too short—especially considering the fact that many Soldiers selected as advisors need re-training on basic military skills such as weapons qualification and first aid. Subjects such as cross-cultural communications, language training, and foreign military structure and functions are not trained or are inadequately covered. The minimum course length for any Service should be at least 4 months in order to adequately cover the requisite material.\(^5\)

The advisor training course should be organized into three modules or phases. Phase one would include individual skills training such as first aid, basic communications, weapons training, and so on. Language training would probably start at once and continue throughout the course.

Phase two would include individual skills training such as more in-depth communications, medical, and special staff training. Ideally, those selected to advise foreign staff elements would already possess the requisite staff knowledge and could spend this time focusing on how the foreign military staff functions. A critical change in philosophy should be emphasized, that we should not advise foreign militaries on how to operate as the American military operates, but rather on how to improve their existing military within their own culture.
Phase three would include a series of vignettes and field exercises with “actors” portraying foreign military, civilians, and enemy personnel. These would lead up to a culminating exercise where advisor teams would be challenged to advise an exercise with a “foreign force” and react to various situations likely to occur during their upcoming tour.

Deploying advisor teams would not be formed until at least half way through the advisor course. This way, Soldiers who fail to complete the advisor training course (or who are recycled) do not adversely affect a deploying team.

Once formed, advisor teams should begin an area study of the specific area and foreign forces unit to which they will be assigned. The team would then begin communicating with the advisor team they are designated to replace to facilitate their upcoming relieve in place and transfer of authority (RIP/TOA).

An advisor training center and school organization is best suited to meet the myriad of training needs associated with advisors. Different electives and short courses can augment the primary training modules to tailor team training for each assigned mission. Modules focused on team training and area development would reduce required training time for subsequent advisor assignments. The organization should have the ability to adapt scenarios to meet mission-specific needs for teams deploying into a combat theater.

UTILIZATION

Advisors could be awarded a specialty code to facilitate tracking and future assignments. Additionally, advisors could be assigned in a way similar to the former Army officer “functional areas” or noncommissioned officer “secondary MOS” whereby personnel would serve one tour as an advisor, followed by a tour in their primary career field followed again with an advisor billet. It is critical that the Services maintain a pool of experienced advisors to train future advisors, command advisor elements, and serve on staffs. The movement of trained advisors should cross-pollinate the conventional forces with advisor experience, which can help prevent a “we versus they” atmosphere where, “we don’t do advising tasks.”

The greatest need for advisors is in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) at present, but this will not always be the case. The US military will undoubtedly become more involved in advisor efforts elsewhere.

Advisors could eventually be trained and assigned regionally much like Army special forces. Advisor teams could be assigned to geographic combatant commanders to deploy on joint combined exercise for training (JCET) missions, thus providing a critical resource to each commander. This would allow the advisors to maintain a regional orientation and continue to use “advisor skills” inherent in working with foreign militaries.

The greatest need for advisors is in the USCENTCOM AOR at present, but this will not always be the case.

The Marines developed a model organization identified as Foreign Military Training Units (FMTUs). A unit similar to the FMTU would provide a critical tool for the combatant command (command authority) to maintain or improve stability in the region as well as generate command and staff opportunities for Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) and other qualified leaders.

EMPLOYMENT

Command and control of deployed advisor teams should be standardized and streamlined. Advisors must have a clear and unambiguous chain of command with all teams ultimately coming under control of a single entity. The command and control of advisor
teams could migrate solely to a single entity as the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan are handed to their security forces. Advisor teams in Vietnam retained a single chain of command to great affect—district advisors reported to provincial advisors who reported up to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) (i.e., battalion advisors to brigade advisors to division advisors).  

CONTINUITY AND RIP/TOA

It is critical to maintain continuity within the advisor effort. This is the best way for the foreign militaries to benefit from our advisor teams. The current deployment of teams has an extremely short amount of time allotted for RIP/TOA and is therefore a roadblock to providing continuity for the Iraqi and Afghanistan security forces. Thus it limits true progress.

Teams could deploy as sections every 6 months. The teams would essentially have two advisors for each staff role; therefore each section could have a leader and a representative for each staff element. One section forms and trains, and conducts a RIP/TOA with the replaced section; yet half of the team with 6 months of experience remains in place. The RIP/TOA would focus on team battle drills and rehearsals.

Logistical support should likewise be standardized and streamlined. Supply chains should be clearly delineated and rigidly enforced. Advisors require training on current systems of logistical support—both US and host nation.

CONCLUSION

Advising foreign forces is a mission that will not disappear. To the contrary, this mission will continue to grow in scope, depth, and indeed expand into even more operational areas. The Services must take immediate steps to institutionalize and professionalize the process of recruiting, training, and employing advisors to adequately address future mission needs, thus professionalizing the American advisor.

END NOTE

1 Interview with MAJ Randy Judd, internal MiTT leader, 2-34 AR Please spell out all the terms highlighted., 7 November 2006.
2 Interview with CPT Andrew Henderson, current MiTT member, February 6, 2007.
3 Interview with LTC(P) Oscar J. Hall IV, former advisor OPMSANG Please spell out., February 7, 2007.
4 Interview with LTC(P) Oscar J. Hall IV, former advisor OPMSANG, February 7, 2007.

5 FMT Please spell out all highlighted terms.. Brief to VCSA by CTD, LTC Sarah Carey, 18 November 2005. Conclusions: Advisor Team training requires several months of pre-mission training.
6 FMT Brief to VCSA by CTD, LTC Sarah Carey, 18 November 2005. Conclusions: Length of training depends on size, scope and mission as well as type of US unit conducting the FMT.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADUS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Defense of the United States</td>
<td>22 MAR 04</td>
<td>FM 3-01.1 NTPP 3-26.1.1 AFTTP(I) 3-2.50</td>
<td>Supports planners, warfighters, and interagency personnel participating in air defense of the US by providing planning, coordination, and execution information. Pub is primarily focused at the tactical level. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations</td>
<td>9 JUL 05</td>
<td>FM 3-06.1 MCRR 3-35.3A NTPP 3-01.04 AFTTP(I) 3-2.29</td>
<td>Provides MTTP for tactical-level planning and execution of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation urban operations. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFIRE Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower</td>
<td>17 DEC 07</td>
<td>FM 3-09.32 MCRR 3-16.4A NTPP 3-09.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.6</td>
<td>Pocket size guide of procedures for calls for fire, CAS, and naval gunfire. Provides tactics for joint operations between attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft performing integrated battlefield operations. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSEAD / ARM-J Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses in a Joint Environment</td>
<td>28 MAY 04</td>
<td>FM 3-01.4 MCRR 3-22.2A NTPP 3-01.42 AFTTP(I) 3-2.28</td>
<td>Provides joint planners with a consolidated reference on Service air defense systems, processes, and structures to include integration procedures. Status: Revised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KILL BOX Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment</td>
<td>13 JUN 05</td>
<td>FM 3-09.34 MCRR 3-25H NTPP 3-09.21 AFTTP(I) 3-2.59</td>
<td>Assists the Services and JFCs in developing, establishing, and executing Kill Box procedures to allow rapid target engagement. Describes timely, effective multi-Service solutions to FSCMs, ACMs, and maneuver control measures with respect to Kill Box operations. Status: Rescind Pending; Replaced with ADUSCAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System</td>
<td>12 OCT 04</td>
<td>FM 3-01.15 MCRR 3-25E NTPP 3-01.8 AFTTP(I) 3-2.31</td>
<td>Provides joint planners with a consolidated reference on Service air defense systems, processes, and structures to include integration procedures. Status: Revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURVIVAL, EVASION, AND RECOVERY Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery</td>
<td>20 MAR 07</td>
<td>FM 3-50.3 NTPP 3-50.3 AFTTP(I) 3-2.26</td>
<td>Provides a weather-proof, pocket-sized, quick reference guide of basic survival information to assist Service members in a survival situation regardless of geographic location. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAGS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System</td>
<td>10 APR 07</td>
<td>FM 3-52.2 NTPP 3-52.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.17</td>
<td>Promotes inter-Service awareness regarding the role of airpower in support of the JFC’s campaign plan, increases understanding of the air-ground system, and provides planning considerations for the conduct of air-ground ops. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TST Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets</td>
<td>20 APR 04</td>
<td>FM 3-60.1 MCRR 3-16D NTPP 3-60.1 AFTTP(I) 3-2.3</td>
<td>Provides the JFC, the operational staff, and components MTTP to coordinate, de-conflict, synchronize, and prosecute TSTs within any AOR. Includes lessons learned, multinational and other government agency considerations. Status: Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems</td>
<td>3 AUG 06</td>
<td>FM 3-04.15 NTPP 3-55.14 AFTTP(I) 3-2.64</td>
<td>Establishes MTTP for UAS addressing tactical and operational considerations, system capabilities, payloads, mission planning, logistics, and most importantly, multi-Service execution. Status: Current</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIRFIELD OPENING</td>
<td>15 May 07</td>
<td>FM 3-17.2 NTTP 3-02.18 AFTTP(I) 3-2.68</td>
<td>Description: A quick-reference guide to opening an airfield in accordance with MTTP. Contains planning considerations, airfield layout, and logistical requirements for opening an airfield. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDON AND SEARCH</td>
<td>25 APR 06</td>
<td>FM 3-06.20 MCRP 3-31.4B NTTP 3-05.8 AFTTP(I) 3-2.62</td>
<td>Description: Consolidates the Services' best TTP used in cordon and search operations. Provides MTTP for the planning and execution of cordon and search operations at the tactical level of war. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>27 OCT 05</td>
<td>FM 4-30.16 MCRP 3-17.2C NTTP 3-02.5 AFTTP(I) 3-2.32</td>
<td>Description: Provides guidance and procedures for the employment of a joint EOD force. It assists commanders and planners in understanding the EOD capabilities of each Service. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTMTD</td>
<td>11 NOV 03</td>
<td>FM 3-01.51 (FM 90-43) NTTP 3-01.13 AFTTP(I) 3-2.24</td>
<td>Description: Documents TTP for threat missile target development in early entry and mature theater operations. It provides a common understanding of the threat missile target set and information on the component elements involved in target development and attack operations. Status: Rescinded April 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY DECEPTION</td>
<td>12 APR 07</td>
<td>MCRP 3-40.4A NTTP 3-58.1 AFTTP(I) 3-2.66</td>
<td>Description: Facilitate the integration, synchronization, planning, and execution of MILDEC operations. Serve as a &quot;one stop&quot; reference for service MILDEC planners to plan and execute multi-service MILDEC operations. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLW</td>
<td>16 AUG 07</td>
<td>FM 3-22.40 MCWP 3-15.8 NTTP 3-07.32 AFTTP(I) 3-2.45</td>
<td>Description: Supplements established doctrine and TTP providing reference material to assist commanders and staffs in planning/coordinating tactical operations. It incorporates the latest lessons learned from real world and training operations and examples of TTP from various sources. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEACE OPS: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations</td>
<td>26 OCT 03</td>
<td>FM 3-07.31 MCWP 3-33.8 AFTTP(I) 3-2.40</td>
<td>Description: Provides tactical-level guidance to the warfighter for conducting peace operations. Status: Awaiting Program Approval</td>
</tr>
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### LAND AND SEA BRANCH – POC alsab@langley.af.mil

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<tr>
<td><strong>TACTICAL CONVOY OPERATIONS</strong>&lt;br&gt;Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations&lt;br&gt;Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>24 MAR 05</td>
<td>FM 4-01.45&lt;br&gt;MCRP 4-11.3H&lt;br&gt;NTTP 4-01.3&lt;br&gt;AFTTP(I) 3-2.58</td>
<td>Description: Consolidates the Services' best TTP used in convoy operations into a single multi-Service TTP. Provides a quick reference guide for convoy commanders and subordinates on how to plan, train, and conduct tactical convoy operations in the contemporary operating environment. Status: World Wide Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TECHINT</strong>&lt;br&gt;Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Technical Intelligence Operations&lt;br&gt;Approved for Public Release</td>
<td>9 JUN 06</td>
<td>FM 2-22.401&lt;br&gt;NTTP 2-01.4&lt;br&gt;AFTTP (I) 3-2.63</td>
<td>Description: Provides a common set of MTTP for TECHINT operations. Serves as a reference for Service TECHINT planners and operators. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UXO</strong>&lt;br&gt;Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations&lt;br&gt;Approved for Public Release</td>
<td>16 AUG 05</td>
<td>FM 3-100.38&lt;br&gt;MCRP 3-17.2B&lt;br&gt;NTTP 3-02.4.1&lt;br&gt;AFTTP(I) 3-3.12</td>
<td>Description: Describes hazards of UXO submunitions to land operations, addresses UXO planning considerations, and describes the architecture for reporting and tracking UXO during combat and post conflict. Status: Current</td>
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### COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) BRANCH - POC: alsac@langley.af.mil

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<tr>
<td><strong>BREVITY</strong>&lt;br&gt;Multi-Service Brevity Codes&lt;br&gt;Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>15 JUN 05</td>
<td>FM 1-02.1&lt;br&gt;(FM 3-54.10)&lt;br&gt;MCRP 3-25B&lt;br&gt;NTTP 6-02.1&lt;br&gt;AFTTP(I) 3-2.5</td>
<td>Description: Defines multi-Service brevity codes to augment JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. It standardizes air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface brevity code words in multi-Service operations. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIVIL SUPPORT</strong>&lt;br&gt;Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Civil Support Operations&lt;br&gt;Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>3 DEC 07</td>
<td>FM 3-28.1&lt;br&gt;NTTP 3-57.2&lt;br&gt;AFTTP(I) 3-2.67</td>
<td>Description: Fills the Civil Support Operations MTTP void and assists JTF commanders in organizing and employing Multi-Service Task Force support to civil authorities in response to domestic crisis. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMCAM</strong>&lt;br&gt;Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations&lt;br&gt;Approved for Public Release</td>
<td>15 MAY 07</td>
<td>FM 3-55.12&lt;br&gt;MCRP 3-33.7A&lt;br&gt;NTTP 3-13.12&lt;br&gt;AFTTP(I) 3-2.41</td>
<td>Description: Fills the void that exists regarding combat camera doctrine and assists JTF commanders in structuring and employing combat camera assets as an effective operational planning tool. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HAVE QUICK</strong>&lt;br&gt;Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for HAVE QUICK Radios&lt;br&gt;Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>7 MAY 04</td>
<td>FM 6-02.771&lt;br&gt;MCRP 3-40.3F&lt;br&gt;NTTP 6-02.7&lt;br&gt;AFTTP(I) 3-2.49</td>
<td>Description: Simplifies planning and coordination of HAVE QUICK radio procedures. Provides operators information on multi-Service HAVE QUICK communication systems while conducting home station training or in preparation for interoperability training. Status: Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HF-ALE</strong>&lt;br&gt;Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the High Frequency-Automatic Link Establishment (HF-ALE) Radios&lt;br&gt;Approved for Public Release</td>
<td>1 SEP 07</td>
<td>FM 6-02.74&lt;br&gt;MCRP 3-40.3E&lt;br&gt;NTTP 6-02.6&lt;br&gt;AFTTP(I) 3-2.48</td>
<td>Description: Standardizes high power and low power HF-ALE operations across the Services and enables joint forces to use HF radio as a supplement / alternative to overburdened SATCOM systems for over-the-horizon communications. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDM</strong>&lt;br&gt;Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Improved Data Modern Integration&lt;br&gt;Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>30 MAY 03</td>
<td>FM 6-02.76&lt;br&gt;MCRP 3-25G&lt;br&gt;NTTP 6-02.3&lt;br&gt;AFTTP(I) 3-2.38</td>
<td>Description: Provides digital connectivity to a variety of attack and reconnaissance aircraft, facilitates exchange of near-real-time targeting data, and improves tactical situational awareness by providing a concise picture of the multi-dimensional battlefield. Status: Revision</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFF MTTP for Mark XII IFF Mode 4 Security Issues in a Joint Integrated Air Defense System Classified SECRET</td>
<td>11 DEC 03</td>
<td>FM 3-01.61 FM 3-01.61 MCWP 3-25.11 NTTP 6-02.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.39</td>
<td>Description: Educates the warfighter to security issues associated with using the Mark XII IFF Mode 4 Combat Identification System in a joint integrated air defense environment. Captures TTP that addresses those security issues. Status: Revision Pending: Merging with IADS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JATC Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>17 JUL 03</td>
<td>FM 3-52.3 (FM 100-104) MCRP 3-25A NTTP 3-56.3 AFTTP(I) 3-2.23</td>
<td>Description: Provides guidance on ATC responsibilities, procedures, and employment in a joint environment. Discusses JATC employment and Service relationships for initial, transition, and sustained ATC operations across the spectrum of joint operations within the theater or AOR. Status: Revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF IM Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>10 SEP 03</td>
<td>FM 6-02.85 (FM 101-41) MCRP 3-40.2A NTTP 3-13.1.16 AFTTP(I) 3-2.22</td>
<td>Description: Describes how to manage, control, and protect information in a JTF headquarters conducting continuous operations. Status: Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF LNO Integration Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Officer Integration Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>27 JAN 03</td>
<td>FM 5-01.12 (FM 90-41) MCRP 3-40.1B NTTP 5-02 AFTTP(I) 3-2.21</td>
<td>Description: Defines liaison functions and responsibilities associated with operating a JTF. Status: Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPROGRAMMING Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing Systems Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>22 JAN 07</td>
<td>FM 3-13.10 (FM 3-51.1) MCRP 5-06.1 NTTP 3-51.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.7</td>
<td>Description: Supports the JTF staff in planning, coordinating, and executing reprogramming of electronic warfare and target sensing systems as part of joint force command and control warfare operations. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISK MANAGEMENT Approved for Public Release</td>
<td>15 FEB 01</td>
<td>FM 3-100.12 MCRP 5-12.1C NTTP 5-03.5 AFTTP(I) 3-2.34</td>
<td>Description: Provides a consolidated multi-Service reference, addressing risk management background, principles, and application procedures. Identifies and explains the risk management process and its differences and similarities as it is applied by each Service. Status: Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTICAL RADIOS Multi-Service Communications Procedures for Tactical Radios in a Joint Environment Approved for Public Release</td>
<td>14 JUN 02</td>
<td>FM 6-02.72 MCRP 3-40.3A NTTP 6-02.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.18</td>
<td>Description: Standardizes joint operational procedures for SINCGARS and provides an overview of the multi-Service applications of EPLRS. Status: Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHF TACSAT/DAMA Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Package for Ultra High Frequency Tactical Satellite and Demand Assigned Multiple Access Operations Approved for Public Release</td>
<td>31 AUG 04</td>
<td>FM 6-02.90 MCRP 3-40.3G NTTP 6-02.9 AFTTP(I) 3-2.53</td>
<td>Description: Documents TTP that will improve efficiency at the planner and user levels. (Recent operations at JTF level have demonstrated difficulties in managing limited number of UHF TACSAT frequencies.) Status: Assessment</td>
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**ALSA ORGANIZATION**

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**Air Defense of the US (ADUS)**

**Aviation Urban Operations**

**Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)**

**Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE)**

**Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)**

**Kill Box Employment**

**Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (JSEAD)**

**Survival, Evasion, and Recovery**

**Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)**

**Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets (TST)**

**Theater Air-Ground System (TAGS)**

**Airfield Opening**

**Conducting Peace Operations (PEACEOPS)**

**Cordon and Search**

**Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)**

**Military Deception (MILDEC)**

**Nonlethal Weapons (NLW)**

**Tactical Convoy Operations (TCO)**

**Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)**

**Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations (UXO)**

**Brevity Codes**

**Civil Support Operations**

**Combat Camera Operations (COMCAM)**

**Have Quick Radios**

**High Frequency-Automatic Link Establishment Radios (HF-ALE)**

**Improved Data Modem Integration (IDM)**

**Joint Air Traffic Control (JATC)**

**Joint Task Force Info Mgmt (JTF-IM)**

**Joint Task Force LNO (JTF-LNO)**

**Mark XII IFF Mode 4 Security Issues (IFF)**

**Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing (Repromming)**

**Risk Management**

**Tactical Radios**

**Ultra High Frequency Tactical Satellite and Demand Assigned Multiple Access Operations (UHF TACSAT/DAMA)**