ENGAGEMENT TECHNIQUES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Joint Planning Studies

by

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## Engagement Techniques in sub-Saharan Africa

### Abstract

During a staff meeting at United States European Command (USEUCOM), while General James L. Jones was the USEUCOM commander, he said that “Engineers are the maneuver force for Phase Zero operations.” In this paper, I will argue why engineers should be the main effort in sub-Saharan Africa during Phase Zero operations. I will discuss why religious extremism is attractive to poor impoverished countries, specifically the rural areas, and how this affects operations and planning in accordance with the National Defense Strategy. “Can engineers be the maneuver force for Phase Zero operations in sub-Saharan Africa?” The researcher will explore the number of missions that engineers have done in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the last four years versus the need for these missions. The researcher argues that engineers cannot be the maneuver force during Phase Zero operations in SSA because AFRICOM has not been able to ask for the support by creating the proper programs to enable engineers to get into theater. AFRICOM is the driving force to get engineers into country and it does not possess the structure within its organization to take on this task. AFRICOM does have regional engineers; however, they need the support of an organization that has the assets to provide the flexibility to conduct complex operations. The researcher will look at the availability of engineers that can be utilized and the available methods that military engineers could get into the sub-Saharan countries under the guidance of the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and Service Component Command (ASCC). The researcher will (a) look at the alternative to not using military engineers and maintain the status quo (b) explore what can happen when military engineers and the GOTUS invest in people, and (c) determine how it correlates to the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The underlying issue that needs to be addressed is the reason why religious extremism is attractive?

### Subject Terms

Engagement techniques in sub-Saharan Africa
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

ENGAGEMENT TECHNIQUES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, by MAJ Frank E. Hopkins III, USAR, 68 pages.

During a staff meeting at United States European Command (USEUCOM), while General James L. Jones was the USEUCOM commander, he said “Engineers are the maneuver force for Phase Zero operations.” In this paper, I will argue why engineers should be the main effort in sub-Saharan Africa during Phase Zero operations and discuss why religious extremism is attractive to poor impoverished countries, specifically the rural areas, and how this affects operations and planning in accordance with the National Defense Strategy. The researcher will explore the number of missions that engineers have done in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the last four years versus the need for these missions. The researcher argues that engineers cannot be the maneuver force during Phase Zero operations in SSA because AFRICOM has not created the proper programs to enable engineers to get into theater, and it does not possess the structure within its organization to take on this task. AFRICOM does have regional engineers; however, it is not able to conduct complex operations. The researcher will look at the availability of engineers that can be utilized and the available methods that military engineers could utilize to get into the sub-Saharan countries under the guidance of the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and Service Component Command (ASCC). The researcher will (a) look at the alternatives to not using military engineers and maintain the status quo; (b) explore what can happen when military engineers and the GOTUS invest in people; and, (c) determine how it correlates to the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The underlying issue is the question why religious extremism attractive.
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARFORGEN</td>
<td>Army Force Generation</td>
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<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Service Component Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Critical Capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>Center of Gravity</td>
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<td>CR</td>
<td>Critical Requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSL</td>
<td>Cooperative Security Locations</td>
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<td>CV</td>
<td>Critical Vulnerabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>DATT</td>
<td>Defense Attaché</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>ENCOM</td>
<td>Engineer Command</td>
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<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>Forces Command</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Component Commander</td>
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<td>GOTUS</td>
<td>Government of the United States</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operations Area</td>
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>JPAT</td>
<td>Joint Planning and Assessment Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLO</td>
<td>Logical Lines of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>ODC</td>
<td>Office of Defense Coordination</td>
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<td>OEF-TS</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara</td>
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<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Volunteer Organizations</td>
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<td>RE</td>
<td>Religious Extremism</td>
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<td>SETAF</td>
<td>Southern European Task Force</td>
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<td>SOCEUR</td>
<td>Special Operations Command Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub Saharan Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWEAT</td>
<td>Sewer, Water, Electric, Academic and Trash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSCOM</td>
<td>Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>Theater Security Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACE</td>
<td>United States Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Aid to International Development</td>
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### ILLUSTRATIONS

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During a 2006 staff meeting at United States European Command (USEUCOM), General James L. Jones said “Engineers are the maneuver force for Phase Zero operations.”

In this paper, I will argue why engineers should be the main effort in Sub-Saharan Africa during Phase Zero operations. I will discuss why religious extremism is attractive to poor impoverished countries, specifically the rural areas, and how this affects operations and planning in accordance with the National Defense Strategy.

The traditional four phases of a military campaign identified in Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* are deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition. Phase Zero encompasses all activities prior to the beginning of Phase I, that is, everything that can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place. Executed properly, Phase Zero consists of *shaping* operations that are continuous and adaptive. Its ultimate goal is to promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts (Wald 2006, 73). For the United States, this approach is typically non-kinetic and places heavy emphasis on interagency support and coordination. In many instances, Phase Zero involves execution of a broad national strategy where the Department of Defense (DOD) is not the lead agency and its programs are only one part of the larger U.S. Government effort (Wald 2006, 74).

The study’s primary research question is, “Can engineers be the maneuver force for Phase Zero operations in sub-Saharan Africa?” The researcher will explore the
number of missions that engineers have done in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the last four years versus the need for these missions. The researcher will look at the availability of engineer forces and the available methods to gain access to sub-Saharan countries under the guidance of the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and Service Component Command (ASCC). First, this work will look at the alternative to not using military engineers and maintain the status quo. Next, it will explore possible outcomes when military engineers and the GOTUS invest in people. Finally, it will determine how these alternatives correlate to the National Defense Strategy (NDS).

The study finds that engineers cannot be the maneuver force during Phase Zero operations in SSA because AFRICOM has not asked nor obtained the support. AFRICOM is the driving force to get engineers into country and it does not possess the structure within its organization to take on this task and conduct operations. The researcher’s objectives for this thesis are to determine if engineers can serve as the main effort during phase zero operations in accordance with the AFRICOM Commander’s Theater Security Cooperation objectives.

The primary way to successfully accomplish Phase Zero operations is by engagement of the country populace. One of the most significant ways to engage a country or a people is to provide humanitarian assistance. Though humanitarian assistance is manifested in many different ways, there are specific methods that achieve immediate results. Medical assistance, donation of equipment and supplies, and construction are primary means. By focusing on construction, the military has the capability to provide vital developmental support for country engagement. There is nothing more engaging than working side by side with a village or tribe to construct a
clinic that will save lives or a school that will enrich the lives of children. However, these units cannot appear overnight and take coordination to get them into theater. An emphasis must be placed on the training, readiness and capabilities of construction engineers.

For too long the use of military engineer units for engagement has been neglected and the United States (US) has utilized alternative, sometimes quicker, means to get missions done. An example is KBR, Inc. (formerly Kellogg Brown & Root) and Blackwater through their efforts in support of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Though the use of government contractors is necessary in some cases, it does not produce the engagement of working side by side with the country you are supporting. Staff planners look at the immense size of these units and the logistics required to get them in the country and immediately back away. They overlook the fact that the presence of these large units directly correlates to the commitment of the US; thus creates more trust.

The problem has not been looked at from the host nation’s perspective. It is an assumption that because a country doesn’t want a large combat footprint, it does not want a military presence in the form of humanitarian assistance. However, when contractors are used as an engagement tool instead of military engineers, engagement is not achieved and the support is sterilized.

Trans-Sahara Africa is a group of countries consisting of Mali, Niger, Bakino Faso, Chad, and Mauritania. These countries have great potential for economic growth as well as the political potential to rise from the devastation that has plagued them for the past several years due to drought, internal fighting and Muslim extremism. These countries are on the brink of being contributors to the betterment of their region as well as being contributors to the overall success of the African Union. Although these countries
want to better themselves, there is an element that would not like to see them modernize. This is the reason the Nation Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy are so important in the pursuit to build partner capacity. These documents are the stage setters for the operational environment (FM 3-07, paragraph 1-57). The American strategy for this region and the global war on terrorism is the key for shaping a region to be free of extremism.

It is a foregone conclusion that people have to work together to create and maintain a peaceful environment that will allow urban-populated areas to exist. Why is that? First of all, there is a coming together of people from different walks of life forming a union for a single purpose: survival. Survival can be categorized depending on the situation that an individual may be in; for example, if you are a farmer and you have experienced drought for the past several years you still need to feed your family. If you are simply looking for a better way of life, you are going to go a different environment. If you are looking for religious freedom, again you have to move.

Taking a look at how urban population centers grow there is the key factor. With urbanization come rules. As people migrate to cities, rural areas have a tendency to be neglected by the capital regions in power because they no longer are relevant to the overall betterment of the country. The people in these rural areas start to feel inferior to those in power at the population centers. Essential services shut down or are not even developed at all. Education loses relevancy and becomes more of a luxury than a necessity due to the need for survival. As these conditions set in (inferiority, irrelevancy and survival) what happens to the human spirit? It doesn’t matter where in the world you are (such as Mexico City, London or Leavenworth), people turn to something or someone
who will fight and defend them or give them something to believe in. These areas become a breeding ground for religious extremism, hate of the established government or the classic “us against them” attitude.

Why is religious extremism (RE) attractive? History has shown us when people are depressed or down trodden by their system, they turn to something or someone who can make their life better (FM 3-24, para 1-15). The same can be said about vulnerable states (FM 3-07, para 1-47). People look for a cause to be part of something that elevates everyone’s well being.

What is the alternative to RE? Does RE provide education, essential services, freedom of expression, human rights and food on the table? If an alternative option to RE is not presented, people have no other place to turn to for survival except what is available. If a man is dying of thirst and the religious extremist is handing him a cup of water, it is not surprising that he is going to drink it. As stated in the National Military Strategic Plan for the war on terrorism, the enemy is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, individuals and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends (CJCS 2006, 4). Our key to combating religious extremism in the trans-Saharan region is being the source that offers the cup of water. The quintessential cup of water is engagement.

Why is engagement important and what is the best way to produce it in SSA? In support of the second research question, the researcher will justify the significance of why engagement is important versus limited or no engagement. The researcher will examine the total number of projects that have been generated in the sub-Saharan region,
the number of humanitarian assistance projects, and finally the number of exercise related construction projects.

How does the US become the source that offers the cup of water without being seen as imperialistic? First, the GOTUS has to determine that there is a need. It is pivotal to determine the government’s role and if the host nation can support our efforts. It is also important to identify the reason why the host nation cannot support itself. A contributing factor could be that the country is either in a fragile or vulnerable state (FM 3-07 para 1-45, 1-47). For this study, the researcher will focus on Niger which falls into the vulnerable state category.

Niger ranks nearly last on the United Nations Development Fund Index of Human Development. It is a landlocked, trans-Saharan nation, whose economy centers on
subsistence crops, livestock, and some of the world's largest uranium deposits (CIA 2009). Niger is extremely poor with limited resources; however, the resources it does possess are controlled by the government. Furthermore, Niger concentrates its governance mostly on the population centers where you find university schools, essential services and opportunities.

In the northern region of Niger, there are few schools, essential services, water wells and ultimately little interest on the part of the central government. The local governments and people in rural northern Niger are looked upon as liabilities not contributors, which results in contempt for the system of government. This is the reason why religious extremism as an alternative is so attractive.

These areas give the religious extremist the freedom to train with little fear of being pursued because the national governments of these states either cannot or will not do anything about it. There is only so much a poor country can accomplish with a limited budget. These countries have to concentrate their efforts on their population centers, which are their own centers of gravity. When nothing is done, the more confident religious extremism organizations grow because there is no rule of law (FM 3-07 para 1-40). The more time their ideology has to soak into the barren soil of the oppressed and down trodden, the more chance a foothold can be established. This is the religious extremist cup of water.

As mentioned in the introduction, the SSA countries are in need of health clinics, veterinary clinics, agricultural centers, schools, roads, wells, and bridges. How does the US provide these things in a manner that it can directly control, and achieve results that will not incite the neighboring countries; rather stimulate them to participate? A possible
answer is humanitarian assistance through military to military engagement. These efforts are often essential to demonstrating benevolence and good will abroad, reinforcing support for local governments and mitigating problems that extremists exploit to gain support for their cause (CJCS 2006, 7).

US military engineers, executing military to military engagement with host nation forces, are a means to get results. The US military’s access to foreign military leaders influences the way they think about the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and the actions they take to counter violent extremists and promote moderates (CJCS 2006, 7). The researcher’s experience in Africa was that the Niger military took great pride in their soldiers working with US soldiers. They did not feel as though they were subordinates but that they were equals. Both elements worked together to achieve an established goal. Currently, the way business is done in SSA is through the US Embassy; however, is this the most efficient way of conducting business? As mentioned before, everyone wants to do the right thing; however, it must be asked if this is the most efficient way to spend the tax payers’ money? To mitigate these circumstances why not have any and all construction engagements controlled through a single source possibly a joint engineer task force and the Army Corps of Engineers who in turn would answer to the ambassador through COCOM channels.

The contract construction agent, either the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) or NAVFAC, would serve as the stabilization force and would manage the civilian contractors in order to maintain construction standards and codes as well as manage the funding. Through the use of an established contract, such as a MATOC, the construction agent could limit the competition for the design and construction of facilities to only a
few capable construction companies (Hackenbracht 2009). The engineer task force would provide the man power and equipment, as well as the coordination between the host nation engineers to ensure both command and control information flows. This task force would also be the organization to de-conflict disagreements between the COCOM Commander’s TSC plan and the US Embassy’s construction priorities based on availability of assets, resources and funding. This would include the coordination with private volunteer organizations (PVO) such as Engineers without Borders, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent to ensure unity of effort is maintained.

Assumptions

The northern regions of Niger farthest from the national governmental centers are the areas that need the most humanitarian assistance and suffer most from lack of governance.

Limitations

There are two limitations of this study. First, the researcher cannot travel to the locations in SSA and Germany specific to the research. Second, the researcher has been restricted to using only unclassified information for this study.

Delimitations

This thesis will not address every country in sub-Saharan Africa. It will focus on Niger and the northern area where religious extremism is most prevalent.
Roadmap

The research will gather literary resources for Chapter 2 that portray a picture of how the funding is being managed in SSA. Chapter 3 will illustrate the logical lines of operations based on concepts found in Dr. Jack Kem’s monograph on campaign planning. The researcher will use the COG model to explain engagement techniques in SSA. The researcher will address the research questions and break down what the CRs, CCs, and CVs are in conjunction with the COG. The researcher will interview subject matter experts in this field based on five questions and then make an assessment of the responses and apply them to the primary research question, rendering a conclusion.
CHAPTER 2
LITERARY REVIEW

The purpose of this research is to answer the question whether or not engineers can be the maneuver force for phase zero operations in SSA. The objective for this thesis is to determine if engineers can serve as the main effort during phase zero operations in accordance with the AFRICOM Commander’s Theater Security Cooperation objectives. The purpose is to examine why engagement is important and necessary for a phase zero operation to be successful.

Problem Statement

The mission of AFRICOM is to build capacity for our partner nations. How does the US achieve this effect without looking imperialistic to the Africans and achieving buy-in from US governmental agencies, specifically the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (DOS)?

Primary Research Question

Can engineers be the maneuver force for phase zero operations in SSA?

Secondary Research Question

Why is engagement important and what is the best way to produce it in SSA?

Phase Zero

There are many articles written on the subject of Phase Zero operations, but few books because this is a fairly new concept. Nearly a third of the sources gathered support arguments from AFRICOM or the AFRICOM concept. This identifies that there is a
problem and something needs to be done. The literature gathered also focuses on the need for engagement and support of SSA nations. The remaining sources of literature focus on doing nothing and staying out of the nation building business. The question is how should the world or the US respond to the problems of SSA, which can be linked to global terrorism? The researcher will cross reference articles to identify the root cause of the problem using the art of design and a Center of Gravity Analysis. There is limited literature on engagement techniques, specifically about the use of military engineers. Therefore, the researcher will look at phase zero operations from the perspective of military engineer engagement support to Mauritania, Bakino Faso, Mali, Chad, with a primary focus on Niger.

**Phase Zero or Not to Phase Zero**

What are the alternatives for not engaging African nations? AFRICOM was created with a heavy interagency design in order to promote unity of effort between DOD and DOS, which will translate into a campaign to stabilize and secure the African continent. What does that mean and how does that come to fruition? “AFRICOM Problems and Possible Remedies”, by former Ambassador Edward Marks, points out the fire power that a COCOM can bring to engagement versus that of an embassy. Marks also touches on the politics of sending a military force (albeit military engineers) into a region and the effects that it might create.

A specific danger in the creation of AFRICOM is the installation of a military command as the primary *de facto* American interlocutor with African governments. Its current mission statement will authorize, indeed encourage, AFRICOM to engage African governments on almost every question of politics and economics as well as military affairs. With its bureaucratic muscle and prominence AFRICOM will almost certainly outshine the civilian agencies that are in fact the responsible agents for the broad range of intergovernmental
relations and economic development. It is important to remember that “Any military intervention is extremely significant in politics. The political fallout is the same whether you send in a platoon or an army into another country – you have placed troops on foreign territory.” Uniforms do make a difference. (Marks 2009)

If a deeper look is taken at where religious extremists are coming from, or being grown, it is the sparsely populated areas such as the trans-Sahara desert region that cause the most trouble; thus, America’s policy for OEF-TS. Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) is the US military component of the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI).

AFRICOM executes OEF-TS through a series of military-to-military engagements and exercises designed to strengthen the ability of regional governments to police the large expanses of remote terrain in the trans-Sahara (GlobalSecurity 2009). If conditions on the ground were perfect there would be no need for an AFRICOM; which is the reason a COCOM that has both a military and civilian component was created. Dennis R. J. Penn in "USAFRICOM: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy", supports this view by his interpretation of what AFRICOM does and how it can make a difference by engagement.

With an emphasis on interagency cooperation, coordination, and collaboration, Phase Zero represented a natural outgrowth of, or evolution in, the concept of proactive peacetime engagement. In recognition of the need for a unified response to Africa’s growing importance, the George W. Bush administration established a new unified combatant command, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). Though the arrival of USAFRICOM represents the next logical step in proactive peacetime engagement implementation, the new command underscores the appearance of policy militarization and ultimately weakens the link between the two threads. If, however, the proactive peacetime engagement thread were to reflect a nonmilitary lead coupled with still more diversified U.S. Government participation, the bond between threads could actually strengthen rather than weaken. (Penn 2008)
Charles F. Wald’s article, “New Thinking at USEUCOM, The Phase Zero Campaign” identifies what Phase Zero is by systematically breaking it down. Wald expresses that it is the preferred medium through which engagement can happen. Wald’s article establishes (1) What Phase Zero operations are, (2) What theater security cooperation is, and (3) How it can be used at an operation rather than strategic level.

The primary goal of Phase Zero, however, is to invest fewer resources in a pre-crisis situation to avoid an exponentially larger expenditure later. The non-kinetic emphasis is the heart of Phase Zero, the driving force behind a major new strategy at the command. To achieve strategic objectives, the command has coordinated a variety of previously disparate TSC activities with information operations (IO) and other more traditional military operations into a seamless, effects-based program of operationalized TSC. (Wald 2006, 72)

**Interagency participation and PVO/NGOs**

The Pentagon’s growing commitment to addressing instability in fragile and post-conflict countries is a commendable response to demonstrable shortcomings in U.S. civilian agencies. Nevertheless, DoD’s growing assistance role carries significant risks. If not carefully managed, it could displace or overshadow broader U.S. foreign policy and development objectives in target countries, as well as exacerbate the longstanding imbalance in the resources the United States currently budgets for military and civilian components of state-building. (Brown and Patrick 2007)

“The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD's Expanding Role-Working Paper 131”, by Steward Patrick and Kaysie Brown, focuses on the military’s involvement or engagement for global development. They question whether it is feasible for the military to be engaged in areas that civilian organizations should be involved in such as: Department of State, Non-Governmental Agencies and Private Volunteer Organizations. However, they argue that these organizations are not up to the task which brings back the argument of why a COCOM is the preferred method. They emphasize how after September 11, 2001, the US began to change its tactics in reference to unstable countries. This indentifies the need to get these countries stabilized because an unstable
country could become a threat to the US. Brown and Patrick also point out how difficult it is for civilian agencies to provide aid in an organized means because they are not set up to carry out such tasks. The growing reliance on U.S. military forces to carry out ostensibly civilian tasks of reconstruction, development and capacity-building reflects a combination of three factors: the perceived security imperatives of the “global war on terrorism,” including changing U.S. threat perceptions following 9/11 and the practical challenges of stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan and Iraq; the difficulties civilian actors confront in delivering aid in volatile contexts; and continued U.S. underinvestment in U.S. civilian capabilities (Brown and Patrick 2007).

**Rural Population Support**

The rural population is the high ground on the battlefield and all efforts need to be made to achieve this objective. It is not enough to say that the US is here to help when help never materializes. Michael Clemens points out in his article “Seattle, Third-World Backwater: Why it's Easy to Understand What Poor Countries Want From Us” how poor countries need support, how history repeats itself and how we can capitalize on lessons learned from 19th century America. Clemens explains how poor, undeveloped and war torn countries are going through the same stages that America went through in its struggle for economic and social independence.

Imagine how different the world would look 150 years from now with Kenyan-made computers, a Congolese chain of cafés, or Laotian aircraft flying the skies? If these things seem ridiculous, try telling the 22 people who came aground in the mud at Alki Point in 1851 that one day the richest man on earth would be from Seattle. Then try explaining to them how he made his money. It was neither fur-trapping, nor gold-mining, nor wheat-harvesting, my friends. The possibilities for today’s poor countries in the 22nd century are just as unimaginable. What is not hard to imagine is that they will need help--our help, and a lot of it. We know that because Seattle got similar help from the outside. The only question is whether or
not Seattle and the nation it helps make strong will give today’s poor countries a step up to the level playing field, or kick away the ladder. (Clemens 2003)

Is it worth the investment in other countries? The Spokesman Review speaks against frivolous unethical spending as demonstrated in post conflict Iraq. The authors ask is it worth the investment in other countries? The NDS reinforces the argument why investment in destabilized or under developed countries is in fact important.

One of the ironies of the Bush administration is that a crowd that once disdained nation-building is now spending more than $5 billion a month on “post-conflict” operations. Indeed, no sooner had the administration presented its latest budget than it submitted a supplementary request of $82 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan. With a projected deficit approaching half a trillion dollars, members of Congress will try to slash wherever possible. One item they should spare is $141 million earmarked for a little-known State Department office: the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. This modest investment—one-third of 1 percent of the Pentagon’s budget—will pay multiple dividends if it can prevent a repeat of the bungled planning and execution of post-conflict operations in Iraq. (Spokesman-Review 2005)

Funding/Logistics Throwing Money at the Problem

As mentioned in chapter 1, is throwing money at the problem a viable solution?

Ken Menkhaus’ article, “Quasi-States, Nation-Building, and Terrorsit Safe Havens”, makes reference to quick fixes and counter productiveness. Menkhaus illustrates mistakes that have been made in the past and the lack of paying attention to historical lessons learned.

Unintended consequences are hardly a surprise in the messy and chaotic context of collapsed states like Somalia and Afghanistan. But in this instance the problem is also the result of a partial misdiagnosis of the relationship between terrorism and failed states—a product of conventional wisdom led astray by a seemingly self-evident set of assumptions about the kinds of operating environments terrorist networks need. That misdiagnosis, combined with chronically suboptimal execution of nation-building—one driven by the compromises inherent in multilateralism, financial foot-dragging, sub-contracting to the UN, risk aversion, and a preference for quick fixes—is yielding halfway measures rather than a comprehensive, strategic, and effective long-term response. When it comes to the pursuit of nation-building in the name of combating terrorism, half-way measures
are not merely inadequate—they are actively counterproductive. (Menkhaus Fall 2003, 7)

Ross, Roodman and Standley state in their article, “The Global War on Terror and U.S. Development Assistance”, that some policymakers feel that giving assistance to countries with a large Muslim population is good use of foreign policy. This is an attempt at instant foreign policy in order to reduce the probability of RE growing amongst the population. But, does this produce engagement? If money is being thrown at the problem and there is no oversight, the US relies on the embassy to send out contractors and deal with the corruption problem mentioned in chapter 1 (Ross, Roodman and Standley 2005). USAID is investing millions of dollars in sub-Saharan Africa and it looks good on a spreadsheet, but is it an effective strategy? (see figure 3).

Figure 2. USAID Assistance
Is the Military the Solution?

Currently the Corps of Engineers (USACE) is working in SSA in support of both HA/HCA and OEF-TS. The projects range from solar water wells to 2.5 million dollar exercise reception facilities also known as cooperative security locations (CSL). What if the momentum that USACE has was complemented with a hefty dosage of troop construction coupled with military to military engagement and NGO and PVO participation? The table listed below shows the projects that USACE has been managing in Africa over the last three years. (See Figure 4) Most of the attention has been on exercise-related construction (ERC) and the remainder on humanitarian civic assistance (HA/HCA). Broken down by types of projects, exercise-related construction is what is done for the US while humanitarian civic assistance is what is done for the HN. Where’s the engagement? USACE is managing over $20 million US dollars in SSA; therefore, the investment in SSA is there. Most is going to OEF-TS support and the remainder going to HA. Is the US throwing money at the problem or producing engagement? Should the military provide construction support for country engagements? In chapter 5 the researcher plans to go into depth on a concept of using USACE in conjunction with troop labor to produce engagement.
Before any viable program can be started, the corruption problem must be dealt with even though this seems to be the standard of doing business. The speech “Corruption and Development: An Impolitic View” by Dennis de Tray gives an insight into sources of corruption and possible ways of rooting it out.

Corruption is--like bad infrastructure, poor human capital, and weak financial systems--a barrier to development. As with these other barriers to development, no country has the resources to fix all aspects of corruption. Just as we need to make tough choices on which infrastructure we build in poor countries, we need to make choices on which of the many battle fronts we want to fight corruption. We need to know the likely benefits of reducing a particular aspect of corruption, the likely costs (some sense of rate of return to our efforts), so that we can decide where best to devote our efforts—or more accurately where best to help countries devote their efforts. (De Trey 2006)
De Trey’s uses the phrase a “barrier to development” which is pivotal to his argument. This relates to my primary research question by addressing the prospect of using the military to assist, which is above corruption due to transparency. This could allow a country to start out with a strong foundation for self sustainment in the future.

**Strategy**

The National Strategic Plan emphasizes why engagement is important and how engaging the populace is the best way of deterrence. The National Military Strategic Plan gives guidance on why RE is attractive and how the US needs to engage destabilized governments in order to reduce the possibility of producing terrorist safe havens.

One of the most important resources to extremists is the safe haven. Safe havens provide the enemy with relative freedom to plan, organize, train, rest, and conduct operations. Safe havens can be physical or non-physical. Terrorists benefit from physical safe haven when states grant them access to territory, or when they gain access to ungoverned, ill-governed, or under-governed space within states that lack effective control over their own territory. Terrorists sometimes conceal themselves in remote hideouts, with minimal contact with authorities and limited access to transportation and communication lines. (CJCS 2006, 15)

Producing engagement is the key to neutralizing RE ideology and the best way to produce engagement is by producing or restoring essential services to the population. The NMSP identifies how RE grows that could lead to terrorist activities.

Extremist ideology motivates violent action and inspires individuals to provide material resources. Ideology is the component most critical to extremist networks and movements and sustains all other capabilities. This critical resource is the enemy’s strategic center of gravity, and removing it is critical to creating a global antiterrorist environment. (CJCS 2006, 18)

The Al Qa’ida Associated Movement (AQAM), comprised of Al Qaida and affiliated extremists, is the most dangerous present manifestation of such extremism. Certain other violent extremist groups also pose a serious and continuing threat. There is
a direct relationship between the enemies’ motivations and the willingness to use terror
tactics. “The enemies of the United States and its partners are motivated by extremist
ideologies antagonistic to freedom, tolerance, and moderation. These ideologies have
given rise to an enemy network of extremist organizations and their state sponsors and
non-state supporters. Extremists use terrorism--the purposeful targeting of ordinary
people to produce fear, to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of
political, religious, or ideological goals” (CJCS 2006, 4). Extremists use terrorism to
impede and undermine political progress, economic prosperity, the security and stability
of the international state system, and the future of civil society (CJCS 2006, 4). It is an
ideological belief, reinforced by propaganda operations, that convinces recruits and
supporters that their actions are morally justifiable (CJCS 2006, 18).

Niger

The letters by J. R. Bullington are a historical account from an ambassador’s
prospective. Bullington gives a detailed account of his experience in Niger. He identifies
the need for schools by highlighting the poor adult literacy rate. He identifies the need for
clinics by highlighting the low life expectancy and infant mortality rates. Bullington
identifies the need for roads in order to improve the country’s lines of communication as
a key to any successful venture. He also identifies that there is plenty of help in Niger
from PVOs; however, are the PVOs providing effective help or cancelling each other
out?

The next most striking impression is the poverty, evident in the houses, public
buildings, roads, dirt, etc. According to a UN-produced “poverty index” which
measures both income and a series of social indicators, Niger ranks 173 out of
174 countries assessed. Last year, it was 174. It moved up not because things here
improved, but because the situation in Sierra Leone deteriorated faster. All the
indicators are grim: per capita income of less than $200 per year; life expectancy 47; adult literacy 14 percent; infant mortality rate 123/1000; etc. And in a country nearly twice the size of Texas, with over 10 million people, there are less than 500 miles of paved road. (Bullington 2000)

Bullington’s second letter is a graphic visualization and historical account of Niger from his vantage point and the problems that occur at the ground level when lawlessness runs unchecked.

My most recent trip to Iferouane, however, was not to visit the volunteers but to evacuate them. We had been increasingly concerned about the security of these volunteers because of difficulties in communicating with them and transporting them in the event of an emergency. There had been at least one incident where a volunteer had been robbed at gunpoint, compounding the safety concerns. (Iferouane is a hard two-day trip from Niamey.) The International Union for the Conservation of Nature project in the Iferouane region, to which the volunteers were attached, was supposed to provide them a radio link and a vehicle when necessary, but it was foundering and scheduled to come to an end soon. (Bullington 1996)

Barry Wood Washington identifies in his article, “Experts Urge US to Help Agriculture Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia”, the need for agricultural support that implies that irrigation techniques need to be taught, water sources need to be found and water wells need to be emplaced. Washington’s article is supporting documentation that justifies the need for help in sub-Saharan Africa.

The panel's other co-chairman, former US agriculture secretary Dan Glickman, says the recommendations are aimed at the more 700 million people in rural Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia who subsist on the equivalent of $1 per day. Glickman says increased funding for research and education is a priority. “Agriculture development has fallen off our development agenda. We must put it back on. As a result of the decline for agricultural support, if it continues, we cannot see significant improvements.” (Washington 2009)

**Why this Study is Significant**

AFRICOM’s mission places an emphasis on humanitarian assistance being the best way to produce engagement. Building schools, clinics, roads and digging wells is
what leaves a lasting impression at a minimal of cost. This is also important in order to
(1) get all interested parties oriented in the same direction, (2) point out the possibilities,
and (3) identify solutions to the problem at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

On my last mission to the country of Niger, I was astonished to witness the vast opportunities for creating and establishing a partnership that will provide for the region for years to come. These opportunities would be fortified by the prospect of working side by side with the African people. After colonialism, the people in countries that I visited were very suspect about the intentions of western countries who affirmed that they wanted to help. Our paradigm of thinking has to change in order to take the perspective of others into account. While in Niger, I learned something very important. The people there have pride and wealth that does not correspond to our thinking and expectations about pride and wealth. A taxi driver with a ragged taxi in Niamey, Niger once asked me, “How many wives do you have?” and “How many children do you have?” I responded one wife and no children. He then began to feel sorry for me and said, “You are a poor man.” Money to them does not necessarily equal wealth. I learned as in dealing with any person or community that you can throw money at a problem or you can roll up your sleeves and help. Throwing money at a problem and not taking the time to get to know a person is disrespectful. Though some may view this as the very definition of humanitarian assistance, it makes the person in need feel inferior. A man will resent you for giving him a house and respect you for helping him build his own. For this reason I have chosen to write my thesis on engagement techniques in sub-Saharan Africa.

Significance of Study

This study is significant because AFRICOM’s mission places an emphasis on strengthening partner nations. It is the researcher’s opinion that engagement is the best way to strengthen nations suffering from instability and the best way to provide engagement is through humanitarian assistance (HA). There are many ways to provide HA; however, building schools, clinics, roads and digging wells is what leaves a lasting impression with minimal cost.

Research Methodology

The methodology will take a twofold approach that will consist of a) interviews from sources considered to be SMEs and b) the campaign design process translated by
Dr. Kem (Kem 2009, 12). The design process applied in this study will be based off the following four questions:

1. What is the current situation?
2. What is the desired end state?
3. What is the problem?
4. How to get from the current situation to the end state?

The COG analysis has been done by the researcher in accordance with the AFRICOM Commander’s guidance. The COG analysis only reinforces the need for engagement and the fact that engineers providing humanitarian construction is the best way to produce it. (Ward 2009)

**Interviews from SMEs**

Why is engagement important and what is the best way to produce it in SSA? The researcher will justify the significance of why engagement is important vs. limited or no engagement cross referenced with chapter 2 and the interviews from SMEs. Each interviewee was provided a US Army Command and General Staff College consent form. The form stated that the interviewee would voluntarily relinquish all rights and interest in the recording. The researcher assured the interviewees that their emails would not be altered and their information would be presented as it was. Each interviewee sent in a signed consent form. In the case of the only telephonic interview, BG Watson was given a recap of the conversation that reflected his thoughts by the researcher. After a review of his comments, BG Watson sent a signed consent form to the researcher. The researcher used five questions to set the conditions for the analysis based off the opinions of subject matter experts and leaders in their specific professions. The questions are:
1. Do you believe that engineers should have a more active role in sub-Saharan Africa?

2. What do you believe to be the best solution to engagement in SSA?

3. If you could make the change, would you place military engineers into the SSA region?

4. What do you consider to be the major hurdle to providing support in SSA?

5. What or how would you create Synergy between contractors, be it host nation or PVOs, NGOs and military engineers in SSA?

The members represent AFRICOM, USACE, US STATE DEPARTMENT, US Army Engineer School, and the 416th Engineer Command. The researcher used the questions to keep the SMEs within the context of the primary and secondary research questions. The SMEs were first approached and asked to give their general overall view of whether or not engineers were providing enough support in phase zero operations to be considered the main effort. The researcher gathered assessments and situational knowledge and cross referenced it with the COG. The COG analysis model illustrated was derived from the US AFRICOM command overview (See appendix). Once the researcher consolidated the information the researcher answered the design questions specifically focused on US Army assets providing support in SSA based off the responses from the interviewees.

**What is the Current Situation?**

The current situation in the operational environment in SSA is one of poverty, lack of essential services, lack of education and potential for terrorist safe havens. What is the current situation as it relates to engineer engagement in Africa? An emphasis has
been placed on building capacity of partner nations. However, this has not materialized into engineers on the ground. AFRICOM has had trouble finding a permanent home on the continent due to concerns about neo-colonialism and nation building (Ploch 2009, 26). The AFRICOM staff has been working the many opportunities in Africa in order to address the rapidly growing economies, increasing democratization, emerging regional security--economic communities and the growing political will to confront challenges (Ward 2009). However, AFRICOM faces security challenges that include: piracy and trafficking, non-professional--irregular militaries terrorism & extremism ethnic strife and under governed areas (Ward 2009). With all of these challenges that AFRICOM faces, it is understandable that the current staff does not have the capacity to confront the problem of providing engagement. An addition to this problem is how to engage and keep an African face on it.

**What is the Problem?**

How can the US provide engagement in SSA using military engineers without giving the appearance of nation building or colonialism? What are the methods of achieving this objective while keeping an African face on African solutions? The researcher will use a pictorial to illustrate the problem and how each organization relates to the other in an effort to produce engagement in SSA. The pictorial will show how the strategic, operational and tactical levels could be used in harmony to produce engagement. This will be done in accordance with FM 3-0 under the commander’s visualization of the problem (FM 3-0 2008, para 5-19, 5-20) (Ward 2009). The elements used in the pictorial are illustrated as:
1. Foundation
2. Hammer
3. Nails
4. Wood frame
5. Land

The foundation represents the rural population as mentioned in chapter 1. The hammer in the pictorial represents military engineers both host nation and engineers from the US military. The house frame represents AFRICOM by way of an unfinished project that is in need of completion. The nails represent the Army Service Component Command, the Engineer Command, and the Corps of Engineers. The land is the map of Niger represents SSA furthermore it represents the areas that the foundations must be established in building the house. The children in the center of the icons represent the populace.

![Figure 4. Pictorial View of the Problem](source: Created by author)
What is the Desired End State?

The researcher will address this question by using the illustration in figure 6 below. The researcher will use this figure to reinforce what the end state of AFRICOM’s possible use of engineer forces by cross referencing the measures of performance with the measures of effectiveness.

Figure 5. Endstate-MOE/MOP Crosswalk


How to Get From the Current Situation to the End State?

The researcher used FM 3-0 as a guide to determining the logical lines of operations model as an illustration to answer this question. The researcher has created a
model based on the AFRICOM commander’s guidance which emphasizes engagement through humanitarian assistance efforts, exercise related construction and civil action programs. This model is articulated through the illustration of a LLO provided by Dr. Jack Kem (Kem 2009, 122).

![Figure 6. Lines of Operations](source: Jack D. Kem, Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army, Command and General Staff College, 2009), 122.)
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this research is to answer the research question on whether or not engineers can be the maneuver force for Phase Zero operations in SSA. The researcher’s objectives for this thesis are to examine how engineers can act as the main effort for Phase Zero operations in accordance with the AFRICOM Commander’s Theater Security Cooperation objectives and explore how engagement is important and necessary for this operation to be successful.

Organization

The researcher has organized chapter 4 first by cross referencing the ideas of the SMEs in accordance with the primary and secondary research questions, and second by providing the answers to the four questions derived from Dr. Kem (2009, 12). As shown in chapter 3 the four questions are:

1. What is the current situation?
2. What is the desired end state?
3. What is the problem?
4. How to get from the current situation to the end state?

Interviews from SMEs

The SMEs interviewed during this research are Richard Howley from USACE, LTC Douglas Bell from the US Department of State, BG Bryan Watson from the Army Engineer School, BG Joe Chesnut from 416 ENCOM, and MG Paul Hamm from the 412 ENCOM. Each interview followed their own format and used the questions as a base.
They did not answer the questions in a survey format. The researcher first contacted Richard Howley from the Headquarters G3 for the Army Corps of Engineers and his initial thoughts were:

I like it, but it will take a lot of work to develop. First, you have developed a course of action without defining the task and purpose. This concept could be part of AFRICOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan but you have to lay out the benefits for AFRICOM and then the benefits to reserve engineers. Second, USACE has no authority over the ENCOMs. They report to the USARC and the USARC has made that clear to us. That being said, if you can develop the concept, we could approach the TECs on it, probably through USACE reserve affairs and BG Chesnut at the 416th. I think if we approached them today, the question that would be asked is what is the task and purpose? (Rick Howley)

The researcher contacted BG Joe Chesnut who is the Deputy Commanding General of the 416th Engineer Command in order to get the perspective from an operational unit that would possibly supply the manpower. BG Chesnut’s initial thoughts were:

BG Chesnut expressed concerned about the legal issues of using reserve component soldiers short of mobilization with great interest mainly because of this specific issue as it relates to the 416th ENCOM’s ties with the Corps of Engineers. BG Chesnut posed the question on what can the ENCOM do short of Title X mobilization under what we deem as training. He mentioned that a recent very successful integration of the Medical folks was the MEDCOM's placement of USAR Soldiers on s Navy hospital ship that did ports of call in Joint training to provide medical support in Central America. BG Chesnut stated that “Using reservist in this capacity provided great opportunities to shape the environment like General Jones intended. The problem was it was an exercise and it is limited in what it can do.” BG Chesnut was up front in stating that “The COCOM must pay the way so it has to be resourced. The concept of using USAR is sound and has been proven in our historical ties to USAREUR and USARSO as examples. The issue becomes time, money and the legal aspects of shaping.”(Joe Chesnut)

The researcher then corresponded with LTC Douglas Bell from the United States Department of State whose initial thoughts were:

I think these initiatives will flow from the COCOM vice USACE. Additionally, DODI 3000.05 will give you high level policy "top cover" as it specifically states "Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of
Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations." In your approach to Africa, you have it right to look at it regionally. The political boundaries are just lines on a map. You do well to address sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. My office focuses on UN peacekeeping missions, and you know as well as anyone, whenever you deploy a force, EN requirements abound. For example, before we could deploy an aviation outfit to support the mission, someone had to construct a suitable airfield. Might not sound like much, but these are austere environments. I understand nations may hesitate when considering the “blue beret.” (Douglas Bell)

The researcher corresponded via telephone with BG Watson from the Army Engineer School in order to get a prospective from the military engineer community providing enduring support to engineers as the maneuver force for phase zero operations in SSA and the feasibility of this concept. When asked if he believed that engineers should have a more active role in sub-Saharan Africa? BG Watson’s response was, “Yes; however, key decisions have to be made by the nation.” Watson went on to state that, “Heavy engineer commitment has not been done yet primarily because the military is decisively engaged in OIF/OEF and AFRICOM has just been created.” When asked what do you believe to be the best solution to engagement in SSA for Engineers? BG Watson recommended the following: Engineer Command or possibly a Joint Engineer Command as a command and control element using a Theater Engineer Command (TEC) as a deployable command post using engineer capacity in Afghanistan as the template specifically the Afghanistan Engineer District. To support his argument BG Watson stated that “There are no other theater level engineer commands by the service components other than army assets.” Therefore, he felt that it should be built around the structure of an Army Engineer Command. Due to the structure, expertise and reach back capabilities these commands have with the Corps of Engineers. In addition, BG Watson felt that engineer commands could synch State Department and military activities and
assist PVO/NGOs affectively in order to create synergy and unity of effort while building capacity. BG Watson emphasized that the Army needs to be grown to support it.

When asked if you could make the change, would you place military engineers into the SSA region? If so how would you task organize them? BG Watson’s response was: Command and control should be at the ENCOM level. Because the size and capabilities of the engineer command give them the flexibility to conduct complex operations. When asked how he would break it down from operation to tactical, BG Watson’s response stated that Operational missions include: Building capacity for Emerging industry, logistics for entry, and African military engineers. Tactical missions could include: Route Clearance, training, military to military activities, construction, and logistics. When asked if air force, navy and marine units could participate? BG Watson’s response was tactical units could very well be Joint, Active or Reserve component. BG Watson pointed out that AFRICOM would have to ask for engineer C2.

BG Watson stated that using a TEC could be on a rotational basis; however, that footprint should be left up to the GCC dependent upon his theater security cooperation priorities. When asked how he foresaw getting started, BG Watson stated that the TEC would utilize OCP visits, initially coordinated by AFRICOM. He put emphasis on establishing a direct link to the COCOM as an intermediately. These actions would transition to the land component command (SETAF) if required. He also stated that the TEC would be in Direct Support (DS) to AFRICOM for specific missions based on the theater security cooperative objectives. When asked what he considered to be the major obstacle to providing support in SSA? BG Watson stated that: “Not using TECs for future engagements is a good example is, the 412th Engineer Command pulling out of Germany
and no TEC associated with AFRICOM.” BG Watson also said that DA and DOD must decide to resource the requirement though the requirement is there through the NDS it has to find its way into programatics. It will require some decisions by DA and the POTUS. The final question that BG Watson was asked was how would you create synergy between the different entities be it host nation, DOD contracts like MATOCs, PVOs, NGOs and military engineers in SSA? His response was to use engineer lines of support focused on assured mobility enabling exhibition of strategy by setting conditions for: expeditionary logistics, partnerships, and emerging industries with an overall intent of building capacity.

Comparison of SMEs

In a comparison between the thoughts of Mr. Howley, BG Chesnut, LTC Bell and BG Watson, cross referenced with Lauren Ploch’s report to congress, the researcher has come to this assessment. Three of the four interviewed agreed that a theater engineer command would be the best type and size organization to take on the task of engineer engagement in SSA. However, the researcher believes that an engineer command would be best suited to task its subordinate brigades on a rotational time frame dependent upon the AFORGEN process. The underlying impression was that the NDS does give approval; however, it does not give enough for direct action to be taken as mentioned by BG Watson, “DA and DOD must decide the requirement has to find its way into programatics.” The researcher feels that BG Watson illustrates how bureaucracy and red tape get in the way of directives and how those directives do not materialize into support. LTC Bell uses other references to fortify the directives given while Watson emphasizes that decisions have to be made by DA and POTUS. BG Chesnut states that in order for
the TEC to support the very concept that BG Watson has stated, specific guidelines in using USAR forces must be followed; however, his initial comments supported Watson’s concept of placing the onus on the COCOM for funding and guidance. Both Watson and Bell agreed that a C2 node has to be established, whether or not it is on the ground would be the prerogative of the Global Combatant Commander. Looking at the CRS report, Ploch states that: DOD signaled its intention to locate AFRICOM’s headquarters on the continent early in the planning process, but such a move is unlikely to take place for several years, if at all. U.S officials are consulting with strategic partners in the region to determine what type of presence on the continent would be most appropriate, and what location, or locations, might be most suitable (Ploch 2009). The researcher has determined this to be another instance of how the bureaucracy and red tape get in the way. For example, how can Watson’s plan be supported if AFRICOM doesn’t know where it is going to be or if it is going to be on the continent? BG Watson addresses Howley’s task and purpose question by utilizing engineer lines of effort with a focus on expeditionary logistics, partnerships, and emerging industries, all of which a theater engineer command can support.

What Is Going on at AFRICOM

In recent years, analysts and U.S. policymakers have noted Africa’s growing strategic importance to U.S. interests. Among those interests are the increasing importance of Africa’s natural resources, particularly energy resources, and mounting concern over violent extremist activities and other potential threats posed by uncontrolled spaces, such as piracy and illicit trafficking. In addition, there is ongoing concern for Africa’s many humanitarian crises, armed conflicts, and more general challenges, such as the devastating effect of HIV/AIDS. In 2006, Congress authorized a feasibility study on the creation of a new command for Africa to consolidate current operations and activities on the continent under one commander. Congress has closely monitored the command since its establishment. (Ploch 2009)
The purpose of AFRICOM is to build capacity of partner nations in order increase the security of the United States from unstable countries or regions that could breed religious extremist. It does this by reducing conflict, improving security, defeating violent extremism, and supporting crisis response. As envisioned by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM aims promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen regional stability and security through improved security capability and military professionalization. If directed by national command authorities, its military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises (Ploch 2009).

What is the Desired End State?

In accordance with the GCC’s directives the desired end state conditions are:

1. Population can see that something is being done
2. Government is responsive to the population's needs
3. Extremist activity is reduced while mil to mil engagement is increased
4. Clinics, veterinary facilities, wells, and schools are being built with the help of the population (Ward 2009).

The researcher has found that a component of the desired end state of the AFRIOCM commander can be accomplished through a campaign plan which utilizes the suggested logical lines of operations (LLO), conditions, MOEs and MOPs illustrated by the researcher. The LLOs are:

1. Information operations
2. Support to government
3. Security operations--combat operations
4. Reconciliation

5. Infrastructure development.

These LLOs can be tied into the comments made by BG Watson primarily focusing on infrastructure development--emerging industry.

What is the Problem?

How can the US provide engagement in SSA using military engineers without giving the appearance of nation building or colonialism as stated in the previous chapter 3? What are the methods of achieving this objective while maintaining an African solution to African problems? Using the COG model from the US perspective the researcher has illustrated some of these methods broken down by the following criteria:

1. Critical requirements (CR),
2. Critical capabilities (CC),
3. Critical vulnerabilities (CV).

The researcher has determined the (CCs) to be: Influence the Population, Provide Effective Support, Protect the Rural Population, Conduct Operations to Counter Terrorism and Maintain a positive message. These are critical capabilities because these five categories encompass the intent of the AFRICOM commander based on his guidance, and they are the most effective ways to accomplish engagement (Ward, 2009).
Influence the population: Do what needs to be done so that the populace agrees with your efforts. This is a critical capability because without support of the host nation population African problems will not have African solutions. This first requires the US to be a good guest in SSA including the rural areas. It also requires a positive message and information operations (IO) campaign. This is done in order to maintain momentum to ensure that the right message is going out and the right people are getting the message. The identification of essential services is paramount to winning the hearts and minds of the population. This would require the US to prioritize which services need to be
established right away; for example, clean water. Using this method would ensure that the population sees immediate results.

Effective Support: Provide the right service at the right time. This is a critical capability because providing either the wrong service at the right time or providing the right service at the wrong time fails to achieve the intent and desired effects. This requires the US to not promise anything that cannot be delivered. It also requires the US to not provide a service that is not needed or cannot be used. Finally it requires the US to ensure that any provided services do not breakdown and are rendered useless.

Protect the Rural Population: Secure the population one village at a time. This is a critical capability because if the population is not protected then they become more susceptible to RE. This requires the US to stay actively involved and increase communication. As in influence the population it requires that a positive message goes out as well as staying engaged with the local population through human contact. It also requires an increased capacity for local police to conduct law enforcement so that the host nation can protect its own population.

Conduct Operations to Counter Terrorism: This is a critical capability because it is actively eliminates RE and denies terrorist safe havens. This requires the continued support of OEF-TS missions to included Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises and Joint Planning Assessment Teams (JPAT) missions. This also requires a steady build up of Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) in accordance with the embassy and GCCs directives.

Maintain a positive message: Build on success. This is a critical capability because it is imperative that the population hears the successes of the host nation in order
to build confidence their government. This capability cannot be stressed enough and is in accordance with influencing the population. As more and more wells are dug and schools are built the message must continue to go out to the population so that they can see that something is being done.

The researcher has determined the (CRs) to be: Niger military engineers, military engineers, Niger governmental support, US Department of State, existing infrastructure in rural areas, and the neutral population.

Niger military engineers: Encourage Military to military engagements. It is imperative that the military engineers work side by side with host nation engineers. This ensures that engagement is happening at the lowest levels.

Military Engineers: Military engineers have command and control headquarters that can control many multiples of complex projects for AFRICOM. These headquarters are critical to the ability to deploy capability and manage execution. The engineer commands could also serve as the executive agent for AFRICOM. They possess both the technical and tactical capabilities to oversee construction in an austere environment. The military engineer headquarters can help ensure unity of effort between troop construction units, contract construction, as well as efforts from PVOs, NGOs and host nation engineers.

Niger Governmental Support: The requirement for the Niger government is to take the lead, with State Department advice and support. Any effort must be seen as the initiative of the Government of Niger. This would require AFRICOM to stay heavily involved with embassy (DATT, ODC) at the strategic levels to ensure they are working to accomplish objectives dictated by the Government of Niger.
US Department of State: The linkage with DOS is important because AFRICOM has strong interagency ties and the structure to ensure smooth transitions in accordance with the embassy and country team through staff to staff coordination.

Existing infrastructure in rural areas: This would require a realistic sewer, water, electric, academic and trash (SWEAT) assessment by USACE prior to mission approval process. In addition this would tie into the engagement goals for GCC’s TSC plans, JSOTF and the embassy’s campaign plan.

Neutral Population: To succeed requires a population that is neither openly supportive of RE or US/host nation engagement but is open to engagement. The population has to accept the engagement efforts otherwise the message and intent will not register.

From the US perspective the researcher has determined the (CVs) to be: Corruption, Rural Population Support, Availability of Units and Forces, Potential from RE attack, Unity of Engineer Command, Funding/Logistics, the Tyranny of Distance, Interagency Participation, and PVO/NGO participation.

Corruption: Lack of control over corruption is a critical vulnerability because corruption delegitimizes all efforts of engagement. Conditions must be set in order to neutralize corruption in order to build host nation capacity to govern itself. This would be done by increasing transparency when dealing with HN contractors. This would be reinforced by open communications with tribal leadership in addition to open communication with the HN government.

Rural Population Support: Lack of support from the rural population is a critical vulnerability because if the population does not support US engagement efforts, support
will never materialize into programatics. It is a struggle between the extremist and the host nation government that cannot be lost. There is a divide between the rural and urban populations. In order to have host nation legitimacy the government must effectively administrate in both rural and urban areas. This is best overcome by a combination of the CCs.

Availability of Units and Forces: Lack of engineer forces is a critical vulnerability because they are the means that produce engagement by construction. Due to GWOT requirements AFRICOM has a lack of engineer support. This requires participation from USACE and the ENCOMs to work together and establish a concept of support that can be resourced through the Army in ARFORGEN and utilizing OEF-TS funds.

Potential from enemy attack: This is a critical vulnerability because if the projects, which are the ways are not secure, the means cannot produce engagement. This is solely dependent upon SOCEUR and the JSOTF. There would also need to have assurance that projects and missions are done in a secure environment. The method used would be to build up and then out, relying on previous success; for example, building a road to enhance lines of communications.

Unity of Engineer Command: Lack of unity within the engineer command is a critical vulnerability because without unity of command unity of effort cannot be attained. This requires AFRICOM to determine how joint engineers consisting of army, air force, navy and marine engineers get involved. In addition this would illustrate how the joint operations area (JOA) is divided up and how the AFRICOM engineer would direct the engineer task force to comply with the campaign plan.
Funding/Logistics: Lack of funding is a critical vulnerability because without funding nothing materializes into programatics. The major consideration would be where does the funding come from? The funding could come from JCS exercise funds in addition to OEF-TS funds to support this effort. However, there would have to be a distinct separation between training funds and operational funds. Another requirement would be to identify where the equipment comes from and under what program.

Tyranny of Distance: The inability to overcome the tyranny of distance is a critical vulnerability because of the importance of operational reach to produce effective engagement. The greatest hurdle for an operation in Africa is extending operational reach to overcome the distance. There would need to be substantial support from TRANSCOM as well as Army and Air Force Material Commands. This would also require a directive on what the size of the lowest level of engineer units that could effectively produce engagement.

Interagency Participation: The lack of interagency participation is a critical vulnerability because the military cannot take on the task of engagement alone. Engagement requires utilizing the full force of AFRICOM working to leverage interagency capability.

PVO/NGO participation: Lack of PVO/NGO participation is a critical vulnerability because without these organizations contribution the engagement is sterilized. The requirement would be for the ENCOM through AFRICOM to tie in these organizations with the Engineer Joint Task force. This would ensure that all efforts are properly coordinated and all areas are covered to the best extent. Finally LNOs and USAID members would be required to improve interoperability.
The pictorial in chapter 3 illustrates how the strategic, operational and tactical levels could be used in harmony to produce engagement. It uses the building of a house as a metaphor. The foundation represents the rural population as mentioned in chapter one. The rural population is the key to the overall success of the house because without the support of the rural population the house cannot stand. The hammer in the pictorial represents military engineers both host nation and engineers from the US military. The hammer also represents the PVOs and NGOs that could bring legitimacy to the engagement concept in the world community. These organizations together are the swinging hammer that symbolizes the kinetic energy necessary in building the house and embody the tactical level of commitment.

The house frame represents AFRICOM by way of an unfinished project that is in need of completion. AFRICOM and its interagency connections represent the strategic level of commitment needed for the completion of the project (Penn 2008).

The nails represent the Army Service Component Command, the Engineer Command, and the Corps of Engineers. These elements represent the operational level of commitment.

The map of Niger in the pictorial represents SSA; furthermore, it represents the areas that the foundation must be established prior to building the house. It also represents building one house at a time that over time will create a neighborhood.

The children in the center of the icons represent the future of SSA and are a reminder of what the overall purpose is. The children, map, frame, nails, hammer and foundation all together represent engagement.
How to Get From the Current Situation to the End State?

The researcher has determined that there are five lines of operations that support AFRICOM’s engagement techniques using Kem’s interpretation. (Kem, Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade, 2009) (See figure 7 chapter 3). The researcher will focus on the strongest operational objective for all LLOs in order to streamline the discussion. The first LLO is information operations. In order to influence the population, a robust IO campaign must be designed. This incorporates word of mouth and a positive message going out to the population to gather support. Even the most opposed of the population see’s that something is being done.

The second LLO is support to governance. This LLO is supported by three of the five operational objectives. The most important operational objective for this LLO is effective support. What the US does must meet the needs of the population. There is nothing worse than building something that the population cannot use; for example, a state of the art clinic when there hasn’t been coordination to provide doctors. One particular instance told to the researcher in 2007 by a member of the country team in Niger. A rural village was given a clinic provided by the embassy. When embassy personnel made an inspection visit six months later, the clinic was full of livestock and being used as a barn.

The third LLO is security and combat operations. Protection of the rural population and counter terrorism operations are the most important operational objectives on this LLO. In order for the population to be protected there has to be a structure to assist local law enforcement and government in order to protect the population. Often there is no funding for such facilities as mentioned in chapter 1; therefore, the support is
lacking at best. For counter terrorism OEF-TS support is at the forefront to ensure local law enforcement and the military is trained to combat terrorism or RE (GlobalSecurity 2009).

The fourth LLO is reconciliation in order to get support from local leaders. This LLO is supported by four of the five operational objectives. The most important operational objective is to maintain a positive message. Maintaining a positive message is pivotal to getting support from the local leadership. The local leadership is the cornerstone for a successful engagement in SSA.

The fifth and final LLO is infrastructure development. This LLO incorporates four of the five operational objectives. The most important operational objective for this LLO is influencing the population for this operational objective. When schools, clinics, roads and wells are constructed it provides services to the population. When the population receives services that it previously did not have it is influenced by this support. A positive message goes throughout the local community and the leaders are supportive. The extremist is then marginalized by these efforts of engagement (CJCS 2006). The cup of water has been provided and the population drinks.

**Key Players**

The researcher has identified the key players as the US Department of State, AFRICOM, ASCC, USACE, ENCOM, and USARC. The US Department of State is a key player because they control the embassy and represent US diplomacy as well as any and all foreign affairs. The USDoS also controls funding from USAID which gives humanitarian assistance and funds country development. The United States Army Corps of Engineers are a key player because they possess the oversight and technical
capabilities with their resources in the civilian and military sectors. The Army Engineer Commands (both the 412th and 416th) as well as the United States Army Reserve Command are important because they control the Soldiers from the reserve component who might be tasked to provide future engineer support in SSA if troop projects were required.

Can engineers be the maneuver force for phase zero operations in SSA? After analyzing the data and researching various literature, the researcher has determined that engineers cannot be the maneuver force for phase zero operations. AFRICOM has not established a way to facilitate this due to a problem with resources. The support of engineers has not materialized into programatics. The very presence of the AFRICOM
staff is to consolidate and reorganize missions and synchronize efforts. There are tools in the AFRICOM toolbox - engineering being one of them, with medical and mil to mil engagements being the others. The reason for engineers not being the maneuver force is due to lack of clear requirements to utilize troop support in the region.

**Why is Engagement Important**

Engagement is important because engagement can counter balance civil unrest that can develop as a result of a corrupt government that does not focus on the needs of the population. Civil unrest can create an opportunity for an extremist organization to gather support to fight against what is perceived to be unjust treatment (Djibo n.d.).

Engagement is also important because addressing the lack of essential services can influence a population. When schools, clinics, roads and wells are constructed, essential services to the rural population are provided and a positive message is created. As a result, support by the population is gained throughout the local community which causes leaders to be supportive.

The use of engagement can marginalize extremist’s views and create credibility between the rural population and the host nation government. An effective engagement plan would build host nation capacity and give the population and alternative to the cup of water offered by religious extremists. An effective engagement plan is how extremist ideology and extremist networks and movements are defeated. Engagement isolates the enemy’s strategic center of gravity, and removing it is critical to creating a global antiterrorist environment (CJCS 2006, 18).
What is the Best Way to Produce Engagement in SSA?

Military engineers are the best way to produce engagement. Military engineers work side by side with the population and the host nation military.

Figure 9. Picture of Construction in Niger
*Source*: Department of Defense, photo by Army Maj. Steven R. Moon.

Military engineers have command and control assets that are best suited for this task. Military engineers do not work for a profit and are not profit based or motivated. Military engineers work in order to achieve the directives in accordance with the NDS and remain focused on doing so. They do this by (1) Unity of Engineer Command, (2) Interagency Participation, and (3) The coordination and participation of PVO/NGOs. The engineers would direct and coordinate engineer tasks via contractor, NGO, PVO or military to military troop construction to comply with the campaign plan. They would do this under the guidance of an engineer task force with reach-back to USACE, which
already has a strong presence in Africa (see figure 1). Military engineers would increase interagency participation at their level by utilizing the full force of AFRICOM and the embassy in order to de-conflict disagreements between organizations. The use of military engineers would remove AFRICOM and the embassy from execution, and allow them to focus on planning and coordinating. The use of engineers C2 would streamline the process of getting the right engineer units into country
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Engineers are not the Maneuver Force for Phase Zero Operations

The reason why engineers cannot be the maneuver force is due to lack of clear requirements to utilize troop support in the region. Due to the political climate of the region and the inability to find a permanent home on the continent, the task may be too great for AFRICOM to overcome in its current embryonic stage (Ploch 2009, 8).

Engineers cannot be the maneuver force unless AFRICOM (1) Requests the strategic airlift funds required to get engineer units into SSA countries, (2) Commits to placing heavy engineer equipment at CSL sites throughout SSA, and (3) Officially asks for the support through higher channels so that the ENCOMs and USACE can source the requirements.

What is the Best Way to Get Military Engineers in SSA

Though the researcher has argued that engineers cannot be the maneuver force during phase zero operations in SSA, the researcher will offer a solution. As stated in chapter 3, the COG analysis has been done by the researcher in accordance with the AFRICOM Commander’s command overview brief. The researcher has illustrated why using engineers, specifically military engineers with PVO and NGO support is the best way to produce engagement. This is true because military engineers work side by side with the population and the host nation military. Military engineers through the COCOM have command and control assets that are far better than any other system in the world. “Uniforms do make a difference” (Marks 2009). Military engineers do not work for a
profit and are not profit based or motivated. Military engineers work in order to achieve
the directives in accordance with the NDS and remain focused on doing so. They do this
by (1) Unity of Engineer Command, (2) Interagency Participation, and (3) The
coordination and participation of PVO/NGOs. As mentioned in chapter 4 military
engineers through the COCOM and ASCC provide unity of Command. The engineers
would direct and coordinate engineer tasks with the campaign plan. They would do this
under the guidance of an engineer brigade or ENCOM DCP with reach back to contract
construction agents like USACE, which already has a strong presence in Africa. The use
of military engineers would give AFRICOM and the Embassy the ability to monitor and
direct instead of execute. The use of an engineer C2 headquarters would stream line the
process of getting the right engineer units into country quickly so that the right
engagement is provided. An engineer joint task force built around an Army ENCOM
could be this headquarters.

How Does this Transform into Programatics?

The most difficult task to undertake in the establishment of engineers as the
maneuver force is to get a program started that will give the engineers task and purpose.
Why not use the same approach taken currently in AFRICOM in regards to the Africa
Partnership Station (APS). APS is a method by which AFRICOM resources and executes
in conjunction with partnership nations. It is an international initiative developed by
United States Naval Forces Europe-Africa, which aims to work cooperatively with U.S.
and international partners to improve maritime safety and security in Africa as part of
AFRICOM’s Security Cooperation program (Ward, 2009). The steps for APS are:
requirement, request, communicate, implement, assess and follow-up (Ward 2009). It is
the recommendation of the researcher to first establish one of the deployable command posts (DCP) located within the TECs. The DCPs would remain in CONUS until or unless called forward by AFRICOM, either for natural disaster or contingency operations. Next the researcher would pre-position an early entry module at AFRICOM that could facilitate the GCC’s needs in addition to reach back capability to the DCP and the Corps of Engineers. The DCPs would be on a four year rotation due to the ARFORGEN process; however the EEM would remain under the command and control of one TEC. The EEM would be a small team of rabidly deployable engineers both military and civilian that would ensure that the DCP would be able to plug into the COCOM for any contingency that the GCC deemed necessary. The EEM’s main function would be to provide reach back capability to the COCOM while working closely with the regional engineers in AFRICOM. The secondary function of the EEM would be to provide RSOI operations to the DCP on rotation. Once these organizations were established and operational the TECs would assign a brigade to a country and the brigades would assign battalions to regions within the country. The brigade would take over missions from the DCP and work closely with the regional engineers in AFRICOM to ensure that the AFRICOM Engineer’s intent is met.

The researcher recommends that AFRICOM would need to increase its STRATCOM lift budget IAW NDS and GWOT. Without this budget increase, no manpower or equipment would make its way into the region. Next, AFRICOM could take advantage of existing JCS exercises that support OEF-TS such as Silver Eagle and Flintlock in order to attain additional funding and create additional construction efforts. Because it takes two years to develop a new JCS exercise, doing so would immediately
give the JCS a funding destination while developing a new JCS exercise in SSA centered on humanitarian assistance and exercise related construction, much like New Horizons created by SOUTCOM. Concurrently, the country teams through the Chief of Mission would need to get permission to place a small foot print of construction engineers in country. The nations selected would be the nations where JCS exercises were already taking place. Upon approval from the Chief of Mission, AFRICOM would have two critical tasks (1) get permission to pre-position heavy engineer equipment that is currently left behind in Iraq and maintained by Army Material Command (AMC) and (2) get permission from the Chief of Mission to place the heavy equipment at existing secured CSL sites. Once the heavy equipment was emplaced, the DCPs and ultimately the engineer brigades would conduct construction operations from the CSL sites in unison with a pre-planned JCS exercise. If these steps were achieved the conditions would be set for engagement to commence allowing engineers to be the maneuver force for phase zero operations in SSA.
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