A Test of U.S. Civil-Military Relations: Structural Influences of Military Reform on the Conflict between Presidents and Senior Military Commanders during times of War

A Monograph
by
MAJ Michael J. Baim
U.S. Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 2009

Approved for Public Release, Distribution is Unlimited.
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 30-11-2009
2. REPORT TYPE SAMS Monograph
3. DATES COVERED (From - To) FEB 2009 – DEC 2009

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
   A Test of U.S. Civil-Military Relations:
   Structural Influences of Military Reform on the Conflict
   between Presidents and Senior Military Commanders during times
   of War

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)
   MAJ Michael J. Baim, US Army

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff
   ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
    Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
    This study seeks to understand the influence of U.S. military reform on U.S. civil-military relations functioning within a
    zone of cooperation or conflict between political and military realms during times of war. It seeks to demonstrate how various
    efforts at organizational military reform have influenced the structural relations between the president and his senior military
    leaders, and how these structural reforms were not always designed to prevent civil-military relations from functioning in the
    zone of conflict. The conflict that structural reforms cannot prevent is typically based on policy differences between a
    president and his senior military commanders during times of war. The conflict is inherent in the nature of war as a political
    instrument. It often leads to the removal of the senior military commander due to a disconnect between the political objectives
    the president desires, and the military strategy designed to achieve those objectives. The national security structure established
    by reform does not guarantee cooperation, nor has it consistently prevented conflict in civil-military relations. Although
    military reform establishes the framework for key actors to function, it has not always been able to overcome the personalities
    of the individuals involved, or ensure policy agreements between the president and his senior military commander.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
    Civil-Military Relations, Presidents, Commanders, Command, Leadership, Military Reform

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
    a. REPORT (U)
    b. ABSTRACT (U)
    c. THIS PAGE (U)
17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
    (U)
18. NUMBER OF PAGES 48
19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
    Stefan J. Banach, U.S. Army
19a. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 913-758-3302

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Title of Monograph: A Test of U.S. Civil-Military Relations: Structural Influences of Military Reform on the Conflict between Presidents and Senior Military Commanders during times of War.

Approved by:

__________________________________ Monograph Director
Ethan S. Rafuse, Ph.D.

__________________________________ Director,
Stefan Banach, COL, IN School of Advanced Military Studies

__________________________________ Director,
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. Graduate Degree Programs
Abstract

A Test of U.S. Civil-Military Relations: Structural Influences of Military Reform on the Conflict between Presidents and Senior Military Commanders during times of War by MAJ Michael J. Baim, U.S. Army, 48 pages.

This study seeks to understand the influence of U.S. military reform on U.S. civil-military relations functioning within a zone of cooperation or conflict between political and military realms during times of war. It seeks to demonstrate how various efforts at organizational military reform have influenced the structural relations between the president and his senior military leaders, and how these structural reforms were not always designed to prevent civil-military relations from functioning in the zone of conflict. The conflict that structural reforms cannot prevent is typically based on policy differences between a president and his senior military commanders during times of war. The conflict is inherent in the nature of war as a political instrument. It often leads to the removal of the senior military commander due to a disconnect between the political objectives the president desires, and the military strategy designed to achieve those objectives. The national security structure established by reform does not guarantee cooperation, nor has it consistently prevented conflict in civil-military relations. Although military reform establishes the framework for key actors to function, it has not always been able to overcome the personalities of the individuals involved, or ensure policy agreements between the president and his senior military commander.

The study uses a comparative case study methodology based on secondary sources to analyze the influence of national security structure on civil-military relations in the United States. It begins by outlining a broad theory of civil-military relations, and goes on to explain the national security structure at the time of three particular conflicts, the Civil War, the Korean War, and the Kosovo War. The three case studies selected for review are the Calhoun reform influences on President Abraham Lincoln and Major General George B. McClellan, the Root reform and National Security Act of 1947 influences on President Harry S. Truman and General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, and the Goldwater-Nichols influences on President William J. Clinton and General Wesley Clark.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 1
Review of Literature ..................................................................................................................................... 5
Methodology ................................................................................................................................................. 8
Analysis .......................................................................................................................................................... 9
  Theories of Civil-Military Relations ......................................................................................................... 9
  The Calhoun Reforms ............................................................................................................................. 17
  The Civil War – Relation Between Lincoln and McClellan ................................................................. 20
  The Root Reforms and National Security Act of 1947 ........................................................................ 24
  The Korean War – Relation Between Truman and MacArthur ........................................................... 27
  The Goldwater-Nichols Act ..................................................................................................................... 35
  The Kosovo War – Relations Between Clinton and Clark ................................................................. 37
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 43
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................ 47
Introduction

“…a commander-in-chief must also be a statesman, but he must not cease to be a general. On the one hand, he is aware of the entire political situation; on the other, he knows exactly how much he can achieve with the means at his disposal.” –Carl von Clausewitz

Article II, Section 2, of The Constitution of the United States states, “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,…” This establishes the foundation of American civil-military relations which numerous theories and laws have attempted to explain and manage. Civil control of the Armed Forces of the United States is engrained in American culture, and for the most part, relations between the highest civilian and military leaders in our country function effectively. We can view these leaders as functioning within two domains. In one side is the political domain; in the other is the military. Between these political and military domains there exists a somewhat undefined overlap, a ‘gray area’ per se, which is defined as the ‘zone of cooperation or conflict’ for the purpose of this writing.

![Political and Military Venn Diagram]

---

This study seeks to understand the influence of U.S. military reform on U.S. civil-military relations within the zone of cooperation or conflict during times of war. It seeks to demonstrate how various efforts at organizational military reform have influenced the structural relations between the president and his senior military leaders, and how these structural reforms were not always designed to prevent civil-military relations from functioning in the zone of conflict. The conflict that structural reforms cannot prevent is typically based on policy differences between a president and his senior military commanders during times of war. The conflict is inherent in the nature of war as a political instrument. This conflict often leads to the removal of the senior military commander due to a disconnect between the political objectives the president desires, and the military strategy designed to achieve those objectives. The study first reviews general theories of civil-military relations, then explores the relationship between military reform and select periods of conflict in American civil-military relations.

Dale Herspring outlines some of the theories of civil-military relations in his 2005 book, *The Pentagon and the Presidency*. He describes six significant theorists of civil-military relations: Carl von Clausewitz, Harold Lasswell, Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Peter Feaver, and Eliot Cohen. Only Lasswell is not referenced as relevant in this study. The other major theorists establish conceptual frameworks for studying civil-military relations and set the stage for understanding some of the significant military reform movements in the United States.

Andrew Goodpaster and Samuel Huntington state that civil control over military power is predicated on the principle that “the military does what the civil authority determines, and only that; it does not do otherwise.” Major national security structural reforms in the United States have greatly

---


3 Harold Lasswell published an article in 1941 called the “Garrison State”, where he espoused fears about the military running the country, effectively merging all political and military considerations. Since this fear has never become reality in the United States, his findings are largely irrelevant for this study.

influenced civil-military relations. These reforms include the Calhoun reforms of the 1820s, the Root reforms of 1903, the National Security Act of 1947, and the Goldwater-Nichols Acts of 1986. Their effectiveness is ultimately tested during times of war and conflict. Several prominent examples of presidents removing top generals from command demonstrate how the national security structure of the time could not prevent conflict in civil-military relations.

The Calhoun reforms of the 1820s influenced the national security structure of the Civil War and civil-military relations between President Abraham Lincoln and Major General George B. McClellan. During the Civil War, Lincoln relieved McClellan as general commanding the Army in November 1862. Lincoln made his decision after McClellan repeatedly failed to outmaneuver Confederate forces commanded by General Robert E. Lee and capture Richmond. There were policy differences between the two men, and from Lincoln’s perspective, McClellan did not develop and execute an appropriate military strategy to achieve Lincoln’s policy objectives.

The national security structure established by the Root reforms of 1903 and the National Security Act of 1947 provided organizational context for civil-military relations between President Harry Truman and General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. During the Korean War, Truman dismissed MacArthur as the Commander in Chief of United Nations Forces in Korea. MacArthur’s dismissal followed a breakdown in civil-military relations over differing policy views, mainly over a response to Chinese intervention in Korea. Truman did not support the military strategy advocated publicly by MacArthur to achieve the desired national strategic end state. MacArthur believed Truman’s policies against the communists in the Pacific did not go far enough.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 established the national security structure in which a breakdown of civil-military relations occurred between President William Clinton and General Wesley

---


Clark. Just after the end of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Clark was replaced as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). In July 1999, General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed Clark that Secretary of Defense William Cohen was replacing him, and that the Clinton administration cleared the replacement. This came somewhat as a shock to Clark, who would only serve two years as SACEUR rather than the normal three to four.⁷ While the reasons for Clark’s removal are not entirely clear, the apparent cause was a conflict between Clark’s military strategy for conducting the Kosovo War, and the Clinton administration’s policy objectives.

These case studies provide examples of presidents and their senior military commanders operating in the zone of conflict between the political and military domains of civil-military relations. The national security structure established at the time of the conflict was influenced by various military reform movements which attempted to improve the effectiveness of civil-military relations, but failed to prevent conflict between the presidents and their senior military commanders. This study helps provide context for studying American civil-military relations theory and demonstrates how military reform aimed at changing national security structure does not always prevent conflict between the political and military domains, largely due to war’s political nature and differing perception of policy ends and military strategy.

---

Review of Literature

This section briefly reviews the significant literature referenced throughout this monograph. The major focus areas are (1) theories of civil-military relations, (2) military reform movements, and their influence on civil-military relations, (3) and relations between Lincoln and McClellan, Truman and MacArthur, and Clinton and Clark. The purpose of this section is to describe some of the major similarities and differences among the significant schools of literature and explain their relevance to the research topic.

There are numerous civil-military relations theorists significant to this study. Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz are considered the modern fathers of civil-military relations theory. Huntington theorized about civilian control of the military in the context of the views of the people, the government, and the military. Janowitz assumes civilian control of the military and describes the conditions which may cause the professional military officers’ desire to influence political policy. Several other authors seek to refine civil-military relations theory – Peter Feaver, S.E. Finer, Andrew Bacevich, and Eliot Cohen. They place civil-military relations in contemporary context, often basing their underlying theories on Huntington and Janowitz. The notable similarities between the theorists are a belief in the virtue of civilian control over the military. Notable differences are their inability to agree on what causes conflict between civilian leaders and their military officers, and how it can be resolved. They often place the responsibility for the conflict on the military leader’s inability to completely submit to civilian control, personality conflicts, a discrepancy between civilian policy and military strategy, or a combination of these three. There are only minor arguments among theorists that civilian leaders are unable at times to properly articulate their policies to their subordinate military commanders, and the possibility that this may be a cause of conflict as opposed to cooperation between the political and military domains. Nor is there any clear study that the national security structure established by Congress may create an environment which could lead to conflict.

There are several eras of military reform movements that influenced the relations between the presidents and their senior military commanders reviewed in this study – the Calhoun reforms, the Root
reforms and the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986. Literature on the Calhoun reforms was studied primarily through biographies of Secretary of War Calhoun and articles on his influence. Roger Spiller’s book, *John C. Calhoun as Secretary of War, 1817-1825*, was most useful and his arguments and analysis are endorsed by other biographies of Calhoun.

Literature on the Root reforms was studied by accessing numerous articles on Root’s influence on military reform. Secretary Root’s article on “The General Staff” which appears in the book *The Making of America*, Vol. IX, provides the most substantial evidence. Root gives a clear articulation of his intended reforms to reaffirm civilian control of the military on the defense establishment. The National Security Act of 1947 was reviewed using a book titled *Roles and Missions of the United States Army*. Its effects were reviewed using the Strategic Studies Institute book, *Organizing for National Security*. Both pieces of literature provide a good understanding of the National Security Act of 1947 and can be confirmed by other sources.


There is significant literature on the relations between President Abraham Lincoln and George B. McClellan. The large volume of work by various authors paints a somewhat complex picture of their relations, and is mixed with bias opinion at times. But all point to the clear existence of conflict between Lincoln and McClellan, if not the precise reasons for the conflict. Two main books were therefore used as a basis for studying their conflict, George McClellan’s memoir, *McClellan’s Own Story*, and Ethan
Rafuse’s book, *McClellan’s War, The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union*. These works provided the main sources of evidence of conflict between Lincoln and McClellan.

The controversy between President Harry S. Truman and General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is another well documented conflict in civil-military relations. There are numerous volumes of literature; two main authors were selected among the works because of their clear portrayal of the conflict and its possible causes. Richard Lowitt’s book, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy*, and Richard Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger’s book, *General MacArthur and President Truman*, provided the best descriptions with the least bias. David Jablonsky’s article, “The State of the National Security State,” published in *Parameters* in 2002, provided a good description of Truman’s broad policy to contain communism. These works established the existence of the zone of conflict between Truman and MacArthur and provide some in-sight into the reasons.

The conflict between President Clinton and General Clark is perhaps the least documented and understood, largely because it occurred merely ten years ago and followed a somewhat successful war in Kosovo. Two main works describe the existence of conflict: *War Over Kosovo*, by Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, and Clark’s *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*. The conflict in civil-military relations present in these works point to an apparent disconnect between civilian leaders’ policies and military commanders’ strategy for attaining them. The presence of conflict is confirmed by other works not used directly for this study.

There are substantial works available for this study. The theories of civil-military relations are presented by multiple authors. The military reform movements are well documented, and their possible effects on civil-military relations are referenced. And the conflict in civil-military relations between select presidents and their senior military commanders during times of war or military conflict are also evidenced by multiple sources.
Methodology

This monograph uses a comparative case study methodology based on secondary sources to analyze the influence of national security structure on civil-military relations in the United States. It begins by outlining a broad theory of civil-military relations, and goes on to explain the national security structure at the time of three particular conflicts, the Civil War, the Korean War, and the Kosovo War. The actors examined in this study were chosen based on three primary considerations: (1) the general acted as a commander and a president or his representative removed him during a war or military conflict; (2) a president removed the general primarily because of a conflict in civil-military relations; and (3) the military conflicts were separate distinct events. The analysis does not make a significant distinction between the specific verb used throughout history – firing, removing, replacing, etc. Instead, the research focuses on the influence of military reform on national security structure, and circumstances leading to a conflict in civil-military relations between a president and his senior military commander. The strength of the study is based on the amount of historical evidence evaluated and the consistency between the evidence. The research attempts to look beyond specific author bias, and tries to simply draw facts as presented by the authors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant Theories of Civil-Military Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calhoun Reform Influences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root Reform &amp; NSA ’47 Influences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldwater-Nichols Era Influences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion & Proposals for Future Research
Analysis

“And so far as the commander-in-chief is concerned, we may well ask whether history has ever known a great general who was not ambitious; whether, indeed, such a figure is conceivable.” –Carl von Clausewitz

This section reviews notable theories of civil-military relations and their corresponding applicability to the zone of cooperation and conflict between the political and the military. It then examines three military reform periods, the Calhoun reforms, the Root reforms and the National Security Act of 1947, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The military reform periods are the backdrop to three separate conflicts, the Civil War, the Korean War, and the Kosovo War, respectively. The reforms and conflicts are analyzed to determine how the national security structure established by the reforms either contributed to, or failed to prevent a conflict in civil-military relations between the president and his senior military commander.

Theories of Civil-Military Relations

The major civil-military relations theorists selected for review are Carl von Clausewitz, Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Peter Feaver (along with Christopher Gelpi), S.E. Finer, Andrew Bacevich, and Eliot Cohen. These theorists help establish the conceptual framework for studying civil-military relations and for understanding some of the significant military reform movements in the United States.

In On War, Carl von Clausewitz establishes one of the most significant and timeless descriptions of the relations between civilians and the military when he states how the tendencies of war and conflict produce a “paradoxical trinity” between the government, the military commander, and the people. In theory, the government establishes the political aims of war; the military provides the primary means for conducting the war; and the people provide the motivation, or fuel, for going to war. Clausewitz states “the main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines

---

8 Clausewitz, 122.
9 Clausewitz, 101.
that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace.”

His observations are significant because they establish the importance of relations between civilian and military leaders in times of war and conflict.

Samuel P. Huntington is one of the most influential modern students of civil-military relations. In his 1957 book, *The Soldier and The State*, he presents two types of civilian control and five patterns of civil-military relations. The two types of civilian control are objective and subjective control, but these are not presented as absolutes. Huntington argues that objective civilian control maximizes the professionalism of the military by separating political power between the military and civilians, thus producing more professional attitudes and behavior among military officers. The opposite of objective control is subjective control, where substantial overlap exists among the political and military domains. Huntington states that under subjective control, “civilian control decreases as the military becomes progressively involved in institutional, class, and constitutional politics.”

---

10 Clausewitz, 731.
control of the military has a long history, but it does not create complete separation between the political and military domains, thus producing the presence of a zone of cooperation or conflict.

Huntington’s five patterns of civil-military relations correlate closely with Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity. His patterns are based on ideology: the passion of the people toward the military, the political influence of the military, and the professionalism of the military. The five patterns are: (1) an antimilitary ideology, with high military political power, and low military professionalism under subjective civilian control; (2) an antimilitary ideology, with low military political power, and low military professionalism under subjective civilian control; (3) an antimilitary ideology, with low military political power, and high military professionalism under objective civilian control; (4) a promilitary ideology, with high military political power, and high military professionalism under objective civilian control; and (5) a promilitary ideology, with low military political power, and high military professionalism under objective civilian control. There is no promilitary ideology with low military professionalism among Huntington’s patterns. Within the overlap between the political and military domains, these patterns help determine the nature of the zone of cooperation or conflict. For instance, the presence of an antimilitary ideology when military leaders attempt to exert increased influence over government policy can produce conflict. However, a highly professional military functioning with a promilitary ideology and objective civilian control where the military does not feel the need to exert a greater influence within the political domain may produce cooperation.

In *The Common Defense*, Huntington provides a relevant discussion on the role of strategy and structure in military policy. He describes how strategy becomes the prominent factor in political affairs when nations are faced with external threats. The military power of the nation grows to respond to these threats, but when peace settles in, the political debate shifts away from strategy and becomes one of

---

12 Huntington, 96-97.
structure, dealing with the size and organization of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{13} Military reform begins to take place, adjusting the structure of the armed forces in response to the lessons of the previous conflict. These structural reforms are eventually tested in the next conflict, where structure adjusts to strategy, and strategy is constrained by structure.

In \textit{The Professional Soldier}, Morris Janowitz describes how an organizational revolution in technology causes military leaders to grow increasingly concerned with political, social, and economic policies, and how specialization has blurred the roles within civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{14} Janowitz states “the military commander must develop more political orientation…a capacity for public relations, in order to explain and relate his organization to other military organizations, to civilian leadership, and to the public.”\textsuperscript{15} His perspective helps to demonstrate the undefined overlap of a zone of cooperation or conflict between the political and military domains within civil-military relations. This creates the potential for increased civilian control over the military which may create tension between civilian leaders and a specialized professional military class.

Janowitz presents the problem of access to executive authority for military leaders, which affects the nature of the zone of cooperation or conflict between the political and military domains. Since political decisions influence the application of military means, especially during war and conflict, military leaders feel the need to “influence the political dimensions of policy.”\textsuperscript{16} Cooperation occurs when presidents provide open access for the counsel of military leaders. Conflict potentially results when significant bureaucratic barriers exist between military leaders and the president, which may contribute to a discrepancy between political ends and the military strategy to achieve them.


\textsuperscript{15} Janowitz, 10.

\textsuperscript{16} Janowitz, 368.
Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi analyze the differences of opinion between civilian and military elite when it comes to when and how to use military force in their book *Choosing Your Battles*. Their observations clearly relate to the zone of cooperation or conflict between the political and military domains. Feaver and Gelpi state that civil-military disagreements in the American system over the use of military force revolve “over the how question, with civilians seeking limited uses and gradual escalation and the military seeking fewer restrictions on how force is used.” They contend civilian policy makers are more inclined to use military force for less essential national security issues and only in controlled amounts. Civilian leaders are more in tune with policy costs and cannot always openly explain the complexities of political calculations and decisions to their military leaders.

Feaver and Gelpi’s study points to an opinion gap on the use of force. They argue civilian elites, particularly non-veterans, favor a liberal application of the use of military force as a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives, especially for interventionist purposes. They also view military force as a potentially more effective tool than military elites themselves believe. But where military elites desire fewer constraints on applying force once the decision is made to use it, civilian elites “are more willing to place limits and constraints on the manner in which force will be used.” The level of military experience among civilian elites affects policy decisions, thus contributing as a variable within the zone of cooperation or conflict between the political and military domains. Both civilian and military elites must also recognize the unpredictability of the use of force in achieving political objectives, representing a more experienced understanding of the role of chance from Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity.

In *The Man on Horseback*, S.E. Finer discusses some of the reasons for military intervention in the political domain, and alludes to professionalism as a major cause. The very concept of professionalism, Finer argues, may lead the military to feel they are more servants of the people, than of

---

18 Feaver and Gelpi, 25.
19 Feaver and Gelpi, 53.
the government. A conflict of moral obligation may pit the officer between the interests of the
government and what the military interprets as the interest of the people. Finer’s points parallel closely
to Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity, except where the military domain attempts to influence, or intervene,
in the political domain for the benefit of the people. But this raises the issue of a professional military in
conflict with political civilian control, not so much for their own benefit, but because they feel more of a
professional obligation to the people and not so much to the political government. Finer actually
highlights General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who states, “I find in existence a new and heretofore
unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty
to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of Government rather than to the
country and its constitution which they are sworn to defend.” This supports the argument that the
political and military domains of civil-military relations are not separate entities, but overlap, creating a
zone of cooperation or conflict which is difficult to purely define in absolute form.

Andrew Bacevich expands on the potential problems of an overly professional military that
desires to shape the political environment for which it functions in The New American Militarism. He
claims the current separation of the American military from society has produced military professionals
who are culturally and politically different. Bacevich believes the military has evolved its own views of
global security and actively shapes policy, stating “senior officers have…demonstrated considerable skill
at waging bureaucratic warfare, manipulating the media, and playing off the executive and legislative
branches of government agendas against each other to get what they want.” Military professionals
appear not only to be aware of the overlap between the political and military domains, but they have
actually learned how to influence the zone of cooperation or conflict to their advantage.

---

20 S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. (New York: Frederick A.
21 Finer, 26.
22 Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War. (New York:
Unfortunately for some military professionals, attempts at political influence do not always turn out as designed. Bacevich describes how General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), used coercive diplomacy to take advantage of a politically distracted President Bill Clinton. Clark advocated the threat, and later use, of military force to influence Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic during the Kosovo War. The war was longer and costlier than expected, and the resulting conflict between the president and Clark resulted in Clark’s premature retirement as SACEUR.23

In *Supreme Command*, Eliot Cohen analyzes the interaction between statesmen and soldiers during times of war and conflict using four case studies – Lincoln during the American Civil War, Clemenceau of France during World War I, Churchill of Great Britain during World War II, and Ben-Gurion of Israel in 1947. He also presents an appendix on the theory of civilian control which is most relevant to this research. Cohen states, “the overall record of the American military…remains one of complete ‘subordination and loyalty’ to the Constitution.”24 He goes on to argue that the lines between the political and military domains are often hazy and present the military professional with complex and difficult moral choices. The political objectives which drive the employment of military means are sometimes vague and contradictory, potentially frustrating the military professional.25 This can add tension, increasing the likelihood that the overlap between political and military domains produces an unhealthy zone of conflict, rather than cooperation.

Cohen disputes some of Huntington’s theory that objective control of the military is essential for professionalism, because uncertainty exists between the political and military domains. While he warns against pure rejection of objective control, Cohen states “if the boundaries between political ends and military means are more uncertain than Huntington suggest, civilian control must take on a form different

---

23 Bacevich, 58-61.
25 Cohen, 257.
from that of ‘objective control’, at least in its original understanding.”

26 He proposes that for civilian control to remain supreme, an “unequal dialogue” must exist between the civilian leader and his military commander. There are no two men of equal comparison in any sphere of action. While the military commander provides judgment and advice on military action, the statesman is willing to make military sacrifices for a larger goal. 27

When the disconnect between political ends and military strategy becomes so broad that the civilian leader considers removing their senior military commander, the political influence of the general becomes another consideration. Cohen highlights how the dismissed commander can become a political rival. 28 McClellan ran for president as a Democrat against Lincoln in 1864, MacArthur considered a run as a Republican presidential candidate against the Democratic Truman in 1952, and Clark sought the Democratic nomination for president in 2004. These senior military commanders clearly felt they had great enough political influence to consider becoming President of the United States.

These theorists point toward a civil-military environment in the United States that is composed primarily of political elite seeking to exercise civilian control of the military, and specialized, professional military elite which is supposed to be submissive to that civilian control. Disagreements over the ends, ways, and means of strategy in civil-military relations are potentially caused by an inability of political elites to openly and clearly articulate their political considerations and policy ends. And military elites that at times find it difficult to develop the military ways and means to achieve those ends. The zone of conflict between the political and military domains can be attributed to a misunderstanding between political ends and military means. This may result in political elites that attempt to overexert control over the military means, and the potential desire of military elites to influence the political considerations and policy ends. In both cases, the development of separate political and military cultures, perhaps caused by

26 Cohen, 264
27 Cohen, 214.
28 Cohen, 215.
structural design, contributes to a disconnect between political and military domains and the creation of a zone of conflict. This structural design is influenced by the various military reform movements historically present in the United States to manage the civil-military relations between the political and military elites.

The Calhoun Reforms

John C. Calhoun was a former congressman from South Carolina who became secretary of war under President James Monroe from 1817 to 1825. Calhoun was charged with defining the role of the military after hostilities with Great Britain and during the expansion of the United States to western territories. He sought to develop a capable military prepared to defend American interests from internal and external threats, and balance the fear of citizens that the military would remain under civilian control and not pose a threat to the elected government.

In the years following the War of 1812, Congress debated the proper size and composition of the U.S. Army. Traditional American views were skeptical of a standing professional military which might threaten the ruling government. There was fear of a Napoleonic type government and institution forming. The bulk of America’s fighting forces had previously come from militias, which were politically acceptable, but at times militarily ineffective. The militias’ use was often reactionary, and unable to keep up with the development of military technology.29

Anti-military feelings at the time, combined with economic constraints and government tax revenue, prevented the creation of a fifty thousand strong professional army. Instead, the Army’s strength remained around ten thousand, with the House of Representatives desiring an army of about six thousand. Calhoun became an advocate for an expansible army based on a professional officer corps which would serve as cadre during times of war. The plan was based on input from Brigadier General Winfield Scott,

29 Roger Spiller, John C. Calhoun as Secretary of War, 1817-1825. (London: University Microfilms International, 1979), 50-61
who anticipated the need for the Army’s reorganization based on congressional debate and wanted to influence the potential outcome.\(^\text{30}\)

Key political influences on the Calhoun reforms centered on the balance of power between the federal Army and the state militias, and a civilian desire to avoid any potential federal military threat against the elected government. The benefits of a standing professional army under federal control, as opposed to a more amateur militia, persuaded Calhoun to argue for the former. In his opinion, the militias were unable to keep up with the scientific advances in war, and would best serve guarding their own territories or integrating into the federal Army. And the people began to see the benefits of a standing peacetime army to build roads, fortifications, and other public works, which had been advocated by Major General Jacob Brown to Calhoun in December 1820 as another reason for not reducing the Army’s strength.\(^\text{31}\) This led Senator Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey to note, “…The apathy of the people upon this subject, to judge from their silence, would indicate that their former jealousies of permanently standing armies, by some strange influence, had been put to rest forever.”\(^\text{32}\)

However, Calhoun’s larger concern revolved around the composition of the officer corps. “That corps, educated and trained in peacetime, was the essential difference between an armed crowd and an effective defense,” Calhoun said.\(^\text{33}\) Public and private debates on the need for a large standing professional officer corps created much uneasiness, with Thomas Cobb of Georgia stating, “I can see no utility in an army of officers.”\(^\text{34}\) But if politicians were attempting to limit the military’s political influence, it may have had the opposite effect. In many cases, congressional and public debates actually increased the military officer’s desire to influence the Army’s reorganization, and further, when officers

\(^{30}\) Spiller, 263-267.
\(^{31}\) Spiller, 280.
\(^{32}\) Spiller, 283.
\(^{33}\) Spiller, 277.
\(^{34}\) Spiller, 282.
publically advocated more funding for military civil works projects during the congressional and presidential elections of the early 1820’s.\textsuperscript{35}

Calhoun pushed for congressional legislation in 1818 and 1821, which revitalized the United States Military Academy as an institution capable of producing professional military officers, and regulated the staff of the Army by creating staff bureaus.\textsuperscript{36} Calhoun sought to fix the wartime mobilization problems from the War of 1812, which had left the support services for the Army in the hands of contractors who were poorly supervised. He created permanent administrative staff bureaus in Washington, called the “General Staff”, which would facilitate the preparations for future wars as a continuous responsibility of the federal government.\textsuperscript{37} The acts also changed the previous northern and southern divisions of the U.S. Army into an Eastern and Western Department and created a single commander over the Army assigned to Washington, D.C., titled Major General Commanding the Army.\textsuperscript{38} Calhoun’s successes in gaining congressional support demonstrated his ability to influence political debates toward the acceptance of a professional officer corps.

Unfortunately, neither Calhoun nor Congress clearly outlined the general commanding the Army’s powers and responsibilities.\textsuperscript{39} If the general commanding the Army truly commanded and could act as he saw fit, he would infringe on the president’s role as commander-in-chief as written in the Constitution. If he did not, then the civilian leadership in Washington was free to ignore him, making his position in effect merely an honorary one. Without a formal job description, the effectiveness of the

\textsuperscript{35} Spiller, 287.

\textsuperscript{36} Spiller, 161-177.


\textsuperscript{39} The major general commanding the army has also been referred to in numerous publications as the general-in-chief, the commanding general, or the general commanding the army as it is used in this study.
general commanding the Army depended on the character of the individual and on his informal relationships with the Army and the nation’s political leaders.\footnote{Ethan Rafuse, “Ulysses S. Grant: America’s Second Three-Star General,” \textit{Civil War Times} (April 2004), \url{http://www.historynet.com/ulysses-s-grant-americas-second-three-star-general.htm} (accessed April 13, 2009).}

While the Calhoun reforms recognized the need for a professional military officer corps, it vaguely defined the relationship between the political and military elites. This is somewhat understood, as many American officers were traditionally appointed based on their political connections, especially in state militias. It was common for these officers to have strong political connections and influence, particularly over local politics.\footnote{William B. Skelton, \textit{An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861}. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 110.} So the desire of Calhoun to create a professional officer corps which did not stray into political matters often went against American tradition. The reforms hoped the overlap between the political and military domains of civil-military relations would function within a zone of cooperation, with civilian control over the military clearly recognized. The political influence of the military professional and the possibility of a zone of conflict were widely ignored. The solutions proposed to prevent conflict were largely structural. The structure of a professional federal army was kept small, mostly because of the limited concept of federal power at the time, and to limit its ability to threaten the federal government. The creation of a professional class of military officers was largely there to maintain specialized expertise in warfare, serve as a base to grow a larger army during times of war, and perform constabulary tasks.\footnote{Skelton, 128-129.}

\textbf{The Civil War – Relation Between Lincoln and McClellan}

Within the context of the Calhoun reforms, we examine the relations between President Abraham Lincoln and Major General George B. McClellan during the American Civil War. With the country on the verge of war following his election in 1860, Lincoln possessed little military knowledge and experience, especially at the highest levels of responsibility. Initially, he relied heavily on the advice of
his military commanders to formulate and achieve desired policy ends, such as General Commanding the Army Winfield Scott. But Scott was old and ill, and Lincoln began to overrule his military advice.

Following successful operations in western Virginia, McClellan was brought to Washington, D.C., eventually replacing Scott. The conflict which developed between Lincoln and McClellan demonstrates the interaction between the political and military domains during the Civil War.

McClellan’s military command in the Union Army was frequently fraught with political displeasure and controversy. He was a professional soldier, and claimed to be a statesman with a dislike of politicians and political matters.43 Although he also claimed to be a strong Democrat of the Stephen A. Douglas school, McClellan stated he only ventured into the political domain “with the hope of doing something towards the maintenance of those political principles which I honestly thought should control the conduct of the war.”44 But McClellan was viewed as a hero to the Democratic Party, and they frequently promoted him for their own political purposes, often without his knowledge or consent.45 He was drawn into political affairs, which would be freely discussed, even if his political views differed from Lincoln’s. In meeting with abolitionists after his arrival in Washington in 1861, McClellan spoke on the sensitive policy issue of slavery, stating that while he was opposed to it, he also opposed any broad measure of emancipation, believing it should be accomplished gradually.46

The elevation of McClellan by the Democrats would add stress to his relations with the Republican backed Lincoln. Although McClellan believed Lincoln and his advisors mistook his actions on the battlefield and influences on wartime objectives as a desire for political advancement, his rhetoric behind the scenes equally displayed his distrust of the Republican administration.47

43 Ethan Rafuse, McClellan’s War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 123.
44 George McClellan, McClellan’s Own Story. (New York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1887), 34-35.
45 McClellan, 35.
46 McClellan, 33.
47 McClellan, 35.
administration was directing wartime activities based on what he believed was reason and moderation, McClellan would remain within the military domain. But once their motivation in his views became based on passion and extremism, he would venture back into the political domain, favoring and promoting Democratic policy agendas as opposed to Republican policy. While he did not directly hold strong partisan beliefs based strictly along party lines, he would clearly take sides during political arguments, and express his opinion on policy differences.

While these influences created a somewhat negative political environment, the direct relationship between Lincoln and McClellan in the beginning was mostly cordial and cooperative. McClellan sought limited wartime objectives to preserve the Union and focused on conciliation, while at the same time Lincoln limited wartime objectives until the Army was built and the momentum of battlefield victories created conditions to promote further political objectives. Lincoln would eventually push policy beyond conciliation, and promote an antislavery agenda in conjunction with the Republican Party, furthering the war aims. Thus, McClellan was caught in the zone of conflict between the political and military domains. His battlefield setbacks promoted radical Republican ideals at the expense of the Democrats, and against McClellan’s own political beliefs.

McClellan’s support for Lincoln would slowly erode. At first his displeasure was based on military grounds and strengthened his belief that political and military matters should remain isolated. Expressing a lack of confidence in Lincoln’s understanding of military matters, McClellan stated, “The president ignored all questions of weather, state of roads, and preparation, and gave orders impossible of execution.” He became even more distraught when Lincoln began detaching units from McClellan’s command to other field commanders for seemingly political purposes. Here, the general commanding the

48 Rafuse, McClellan’s War, 124.
49 Rafuse, McClellan’s War, 126.
50 Rafuse, McClellan’s War, 127.
51 McClellan, 162.
Army conflicted with the commander-in-chief, and McClellan stated that Lincoln “assured me that he knew this thing to be wrong, and had informed me that the pressure was only a political one…”, adding “to this it might be replied that the commander-in-chief has no right to order what he pleases; he can only order what he is convinced is right.”\textsuperscript{52} In McClellan’s view, there should have been a clear line between the political and military domains, at least in terms of the politicians staying out of military matters.

As political pressure increased to produce battlefield success and further wartime objectives, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton began to insert himself between McClellan and Lincoln to help manage the war. Stanton began to limit McClellan’s frequent personal contact with Lincoln, and McClellan believed that Stanton was telling the president one thing and McClellan the opposite to appease both sides.\textsuperscript{53} McClellan believed he was being misrepresented to the president for political purposes. Republicans became fearful of McClellan’s growing popularity and his influence as a potential Democratic presidential candidate. Following congressional and state elections in November 1862 that produced Republican loses in both the house and several key governorships, Lincoln relieved McClellan as general commanding the Army.\textsuperscript{54}

As tested under war, the Calhoun reforms failed to prevent a conflict of civil-military relation or adequately address the interaction between the political and military domains. The reforms simply established a new structure under which the president and the senior military commander would function. The differing policy beliefs between Lincoln and McClellan led to this breakdown of civil-military relations, as well as a disagreement between Lincoln’s political ends and the military strategy applied by McClellan. Nor could the formal structure established by the Calhoun reforms overcome the personality differences between the president and his senior military commander, or overcome the close ties between

\textsuperscript{52} McClellan, 164-165.
\textsuperscript{53} McClellan, 195
\textsuperscript{54} Rafuse, \textit{McClellan’s War}, 372.
the political and military realms which are particularly complicated during a civil war. But the position of general commanding the Army would continue for several decades after the Civil War.

**The Root Reforms and National Security Act of 1947**

Elihu Root served as the secretary of war from 1899-1904. His military reforms followed the success of the Spanish-American War, but he concluded, along with the Dodge Commission, that many of the problems during the war were a result of poor organization and planning within the War Department. A predominate portion of his reforms oriented on correcting a perceived deficiency of the Calhoun reforms by eliminating the position of general commanding the Army and the bureau system, and replacing it with an Army chief of staff and supporting general staff.\(^{55}\)

Part of Root’s reasoning for eliminating the general commanding the Army was his desire to strengthen civil control over military affairs. Even though theoretically the general commanding the Army and the general staff still reported to the secretary of war, split responsibility between the general commanding the Army and the secretary of war produced “almost constant discord and a consequent reduction of efficiency.” While the general commanding the Army was responsible for the efficiency, discipline, and conduct of the troops in peace and war, civil control was maintained by the secretary and his bureaus controlling finances, supply, and transportation, but staying out of purely military affairs.\(^{56}\) This structural inefficiency established by the Calhoun reforms had inhibited cooperation between the political and military domains.

Root’s reforms reaffirmed the president as the constitutional commander-in-chief of the Army. They strengthened the secretary of war’s authority as the primary representative of the president on military matters. The Army chief of staff would report directly to the secretary of war, or when the


president saw fit, directly to him to convey information and advice. Civilian control over the Army was confirmed, and it would be exercised by the Army chief of staff with a supporting professional general staff. The reforms helped alleviate some of the previous problems of inefficiency due to split responsibilities.\footnote{Root, 111-112.}

Root faced severe resistance to his reforms from within the military. The general commanding the Army, Nelson Miles, leaked information regarding military events in the Philippines to Congress which painted President William Howard Taft and Root in a bad light. It was supposedly done because Miles was dismayed by the proposed reforms Root sought in the War Department which increased the power of the secretary and replaced the position of the general commanding the Army with the Army chief of staff.\footnote{Rene Escalante, “Elihu Root and the Pacification of the Philippines, 1899-1903,” PHIUPPINIANA SACRA, Vol. XLU, No. 125 (May August, 2007), 411.} In 1903, Miles retired when the congressional act creating the general staff abolished the general commanding the Army and officially introduced the Army chief of staff.\footnote{John Whiteclay Chambers II, “General Staff Act”, The Oxford Companion to American Military History 2000, (Oxford University Press 2000), http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O126-GeneralStaffAct.html, (accessed September 17, 2009).} Miles’ actions further demonstrated the desire of military officers to influence political events when they felt civilian control overstepping into military matters, adding conflict to civil-military relations.

The general staff was composed of two main elements, the general staff serving at the War Department and the general staff serving with generals commanding geographical departments.\footnote{Root, 110-111.} The general staff at the War Department placed greater emphasis on intelligence gathering and strategic planning, and was credited with reducing the War Department’s planning time. The act also reaffirmed the Army chief of staff’s authority to supervise the bureau chiefs, or geographic commanders. Although fought by the bureau chiefs, the Root reforms rotated the general staff officers between the bureaus and
the War Department to prevent unhealthy entrenchment. Bureau chiefs had previously been treated as tenured positions, and the reforms sought to reduce their power over time.  

Another significant change of the Root reforms was the formation of joint army and navy boards to address joint problems. This board placed greater emphasis on cooperation between the services, increasing the more effective joint use of intelligence and logistics capabilities at a reduced cost. Root saw tremendous benefit in getting the services to work together rather than entirely independent of each other.  

The National Security Act of 1947 was the next major organizational military reform movement. Flowing from the experience of World War II and anticipating the continued international role of the Cold War, the act sought to refine the American defense establishment’s organizational structure. Major proponents for reorganization included the Army chief of staff, General of the Army George C. Marshall, and President Harry S. Truman. Both men called for unification of the armed forces, while the navy fought it. In 1944, then Senator Harry Truman published an article stating there “must be integration of every element of America’s defense in one department under one authoritative, responsible head. Call it the War Department or the Department of National Security or what you will, just so it is one department…One team with all the reins in one hand…” This was another structural solution through military reform to promote cooperation between the political and military domains, and further cooperation among the military services.

The National Security Act of 1947 created the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. The act stated that the secretary of


62 Root, 114-115.


defense “shall be the principal assistant to the president in all matters relating to the national security.” It charged the secretary with establishing general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment (NME) and for all of the departments and agencies therein; exercising general direction, authority and control over such departments and agencies; eliminating duplication or overlap in the fields of procurement, supply, etc; and supervising and coordinating the budget estimates of the departments and agencies. The act charged the joint chiefs with preparing strategic plans and direction of military forces; preparing and supervising joint logistics plans; establishing unified commands in the interest of national security; formulating policies on joint training and education of military forces; reviewing major materiel and personnel requirements of the military forces; and providing military representation in accordance with the charter of the United Nations.65

But the NSA of 1947 did not entirely live up to the expectations of Marshall and Truman. It did not create a chairman for the joint chiefs, it created an additional independent service, the U.S. Air Force, and the powers of the secretary of defense were called “disturbingly general and indefinite” by Senator Ferdinand Eberstadt during Senate hearings.66 While the secretary of defense was charged with executing the NME, Eberstadt was concerned that the NSA lacked a “definite mechanism for fostering unity and teamwork among the military services…”67 Where the intent of military reform was cooperation, its ambiguity maintained the potential for conflict. The nation security structure established by the Root reforms and the NSA of 1947 would be tested during the Korean War.

The Korean War – Relation Between Truman and MacArthur

President Harry S. Truman became the 33rd President of the United States following the death of President Franklin Roosevelt in April 1945. After World War II, he adopted a policy of containment in

---

65 Epley, 197-203.
66 Stuart, 16.
67 Stuart, 16.
response to the expansion of communism. This policy would eventually bring the United States into conflict in Korea in 1950. 68

The policy of containment was a grand strategy adopted by the Truman administration in 1947 to stem the spread of communism. One of the main issues exposed by the Korean War would be the level of commitment the administration was willing to make globally. Would the administration seek to contain communism everywhere in the world, or would it focus mainly on vital areas such as Europe and Japan, and adopt risk management policies toward other areas? If the administration failed to contain communism in some places, this might encourage the communist’s to attempt expansion in other areas. 69 These questions of the containment policy and the administration’s level of commitment toward military strategy would influence civil-military relations between President Truman and his senior military commander at the start of the Korean War.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was a hero of World War II and serving as Commander in Chief of United States Forces in the Far East and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan at the outbreak of the Korean conflict. As such, he was the natural selection to become the Supreme Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea, and the first United Nations general ever, adding to the dynamic complexity of civil-military relations. 70

In June 1950, communist North Korean troops invaded South Korea. In response, the United Nations Security Council issued a proclamation calling on North Korean forces to retire above the thirty-eighth parallel and the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued orders committing the United States military to meet the threat. The decision to go to war on the Korean peninsula had significant impacts within political and military domains, some of which conflicted. 71

71 Lowitt, 4.
Truman stated that the United States was fighting in Korea to achieve the following: to
demonstrate that Soviet aggression would not be tolerated; mobilize the free world to meet the threat;
demonstrate American commitment to Korea and the rest of the free world; demonstrate to those living in
the shadow of the Soviet Union of the reality of communists aggression and that they need not accept it;
inspire worldwide resistance against communism; to motivate and unite the Western World against the
Soviet Union; and promote collective security through the United Nations and strengthen American
national security interests. The American response to communist aggression in Korea was clearly a
political choice. But Truman also acknowledged that he was only willing to take the policy so far, stating
afterward, “Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: to
prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world. This meant
that we should not do anything that would provide the excuse to the Soviets and plunge the free nations
into full-scale all-out-war.”

These policies established a conflict between the stated political policy and the military means
committed to achieve them. How far were the Americans willing to escalate the conflict in Korea?
Disagreements continued as to Korea’s strategic importance from a military perspective. While
MacArthur was focused on achieving the task of preserving independent South Korea by defeating
communist North Korean forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to balance global diplomatic and strategic
requirements. Was America committed to defeat communism everywhere? There would be risk in
Western Europe if the U.S. became over committed in the Far East. Extensive debates occurred between
Washington and the Far East Command, and with the threatening commitment of communist Chinese
“volunteer” forces to Korea in November 1950, the policies were leaning toward a limited war.

72 Rovere and Schlesinger, 104.
73 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Year of Decision (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday &
74 Lowitt, 3.
A global strategic concern of the Administration and other free nations was that the commitment of Chinese forces in Korea would detract from America’s commitment to protecting Europe and Japan. Truman would maintain a Europe first policy similar to Roosevelt’s during WWII, and believed that only American aid deterred communist aggression there. His focus in Europe primarily consisted of “aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, the decision to hold fast in Berlin,” and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.75

There were several political-military disagreements between Truman and MacArthur. One of the first was the issue of using Chinese Nationalist troops against communism in Korea. The Chinese Nationalist Government based in Formosa (Taiwan) offered 33,000 troops to support the United Nations mission, and MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea, wanted to use them. Truman, however, was opposed for fear of Communist Chinese reaction and expansion of the conflict.76 The Communist Chinese had recently threatened to invade Taiwan, and the administration, stepping into the military domain, advised MacArthur to discuss Taiwan’s defense against such an invasion.77 But the real reason appeared to be to dissuade suggestions of Chinese Nationalist troops being used in Korea because of the possible negative political reaction by other nations. This could change UN Chinese-Communist-Formosa policies, as the Communist Chinese were bidding for a seat at the UN.78

MacArthur advocated stronger policies against the Communist Chinese and made his views public. He sought to roll back communism, not just contain it. In a published letter to the National Commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) on August 28, 1950, which was later withdrawn, MacArthur implied that the administration advocated “appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia.”79 He viewed the conflict in Korea as part of a broader

75 Lowitt, 21.
76 Lowitt, 5.
77 Lowitt, 6.
78 Lowitt, 7-8.
79 Lowitt, 10.
effort by communist forces to make gains in the Far East, and stated “to pursue any other course would be to turn over the fruits of our Pacific victory to a potential enemy.” MacArthur was walking a fine line between his duties as a United Nations commander and his role as an American general. Truman wanted him to publically withdraw his statement, stating it was in conflict with U.S. policy. The president and MacArthur were clearly not communicating effectively with each other and MacArthur believed that the president’s political advisors were playing strategist and the military advisors were playing politics. Either MacArthur did not understand the role of the president in ultimately determining the policy to support the UN mandates, or he disagreed with the president’s approach and sought to influence the political domain based on his own interpretation and beliefs.

The situation died down with events on the ground changing and Truman’s desire to quietly contain MacArthur and not directly or publically confront him. Following successful landings at Inchon, MacArthur and the administration were keen to complete the destruction of the North Korean threat by crossing north of the thirty-eighth parallel. But with this crossing came the threat of Communist Chinese intervention, which neither MacArthur, nor the administration gave any serious consideration based on their discussions at Wake Island in October 1950. In MacArthur’s calculations, the Communist Chinese would be foolish because UN airpower alone would wreck havoc against communist bases in China. Once Communist Chinese forces began crossing south of the Yalu River and into Korea, MacArthur sought to retaliate against the Communist Chinese directly. But this violated Truman’s desire to keep the war confined to the Korean peninsula and prevent further escalation. Tensions between Truman and MacArthur grew, with Truman feeling MacArthur’s outspokenness was a main cause of Chinese communist intervention, and MacArthur becoming frustrated at what he deemed as Truman’s inadequate response and constraints on military action.81

80 Lowitt, 10-11.
81 Lowitt, 18-24.
Following an overwhelming Chinese attack in late November and the developing situation in December and early January, Truman sent a message to MacArthur on January 13, 1951, containing somewhat conflicting guidance. The message reinforced the president’s broad policy ends, but also contradicted itself by recognizing the lack of military resources for achieving them. Truman tells MacArthur, “We recognize, of course, that continued resistance might not be militarily possible with the limited forces…” The Administration was also concerned with protecting Japan from external threat, stating “…in the present world situation your forces must be preserved as an effective instrument for the defense of Japan and elsewhere…” Truman further reinforced his emphasis on keeping the Korean conflict limited by stating, “Steps which might in themselves be justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western Europe in large-scale hostiles.” In MacArthur’s view, this lack of clear support to Korea from the president, combined with a growing number of limitations would cause MacArthur to try to extend his influence on the political domain. MacArthur was advocating a military strategy to support the president’s public statements, which conflicted with the president’s less public policy intent. It appears that Truman’s political objectives were in conflict with each other, and MacArthur did not want the responsibility for losing Korea to the communists to be placed on his shoulders.

MacArthur’s vocal dissent against the administration’s policies added to tension between him and the president. He again asked for Chinese Nationalist troops based on military necessity to achieve the president’s previously stated objective to secure all of Korea. But this request met political resistance, and where MacArthur wanted to fight to destroy Communist Chinese forces and unite Korea, Truman sought to end the conflict and simply revert back to its original containment policy. MacArthur

---

82 Rovere and Schlesinger, 104.
83 Lowitt, 34.
84 Lowitt, 34.
85 Lowitt, 26-28.
continued to express his beliefs publically and the president, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a message to curtail his speeches.\footnote{Lowitt, 29-30.}

Truman sent the Army chief of staff, General J. Lawton Collins, to assess the situation and emphasize his policy of a limited war.\footnote{Lowitt, 30-35.} On February 1, 1951, the United Nations officially declared Communist China the aggressor in Korea. But to MacArthur’s dismay, Truman refused to support any aggression outside of Korea against communism, bringing the President of the United States in conflict again with the Supreme Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea. Fearing possible Soviet aggression elsewhere, the administration sent four American divisions to NATO command in Europe, while denying further reinforcements in Korea. Representatives in Congress began to weigh-in to support MacArthur’s position against the president, and MacArthur spoke out again in favor of the United Nations mission and against Truman’s policy.\footnote{Lowitt, 36-39.}

The final straw in Truman’s decision to fire MacArthur was the general’s open letter to Representative Joe Martin, the Republican minority leader in the House of Representatives. Martin had been a strong supporter of MacArthur and took numerous opportunities to publically proclaim his policy differences with Truman over the Korean conflict. Martin did not believe Truman was being open with the American people concerning the situation in Korea, and frequently sought MacArthur’s opinions directly. MacArthur’s connection with the Republican Party, combined with his continuous desire for publicity produced great tension between the political and military realms. On 12 February, 1951, Martin delivered a critical speech of Truman’s policy toward Korea. The speech was supported by MacArthur through a letter of endorsement obtained by the administration on 5 April.\footnote{Michael D. Pearlman, \textit{Truman and MacArthur: Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown}. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), p178-180.} On 11 April, Truman relieved MacArthur, stating “With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties.”

The Korean War was a major test of the national security structure established by the Root reforms and the NSA of 1947. While it refined the relations between the president, the secretary of war, and the Joint Chiefs, it did not redefine the relations between the president and his senior military commander at war. The Joint Chiefs had responsibility for establishing the unified commands, but the relationship of the unified commands with the president and secretary of war was less defined. The Korean War demonstrated the continued existence of a zone of conflict between the political and military domains, and a disconnect between the political objectives, and military strategy to attain them. Military reform aimed at fixing civil-military relations by establishing formal structure failed because it could not overcome the personalities of the individuals involved, or manage the policy differences between the political and military realms. The establishment of a formalized structure did not negate the use of informal connections, which contributed to the president and his senior military commander functioning within the zone of conflict as opposed to cooperation. While the Joint Staff was added to the national security structure under the Root reforms and NSA of 1947, they too failed to stem the conflict between the president and his senior military commander during a time of war. While initially reluctant, the Joint Chiefs eventually played a pivotal role when Truman fired MacArthur, as Truman sought their support to help stem a public perception that the political realm was overly influencing the military. This creative use of the Joint Chiefs in opposition to a unified commander essentially turned the military realm against itself.

---

90 Lowitt, 45.
91 Pearlman, 181-186.
92 The legal influences on a U.S. President’s decision to remove a U.S. general commanding United Nations forces were not examined in this study. Nor were the policy differences between the Truman administration and the U.N. mandate which influenced the development of MacArthur’s military strategy examined as a source of conflict in U.S. civil-military relations.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act

The origins of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), date back to President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s directed reorganization of the Department of Defense in 1958. Three major themes underpinned Eisenhower’s reorganization: strengthening a civilian authority (i.e. the president and secretary of defense) to facilitate strong, unhindered executive action; maximizing the effectiveness of defense through unified commands; and creating an institution capable of keeping up with fast changing military challenges. But major problems still existed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There still was no unified voice among the chiefs, and the Navy and Air Force resisted an effort which reduced their independence. The JCS continued to operate by consensus, often giving both contradictory and weak advice to the civilian authorities. Several amendments to the NSA of 1947 sought to refine the reorganization, particularly concerning the JCS, but failed to establish the envisioned unity among the services at the operational levels.

The attempted hostage rescue in Iran in 1980 and issues during the invasion of Grenada in 1983 were major catalysts for additional military reform to reverse a lack of unity, rivalries among the services, and operational disconnects. Six former secretaries of defense testified to Congress that the reforms were essential to fix “serious deficiencies in how the military advises the president, divides the budget, and prepares for combat.” Two major areas the Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed were roles and responsibilities of the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS), and the role and responsibilities of the combatant commanders.

94 Medlock, 50.
95 Medlock, 51.
96 Medlock, 52-53.
97 Medlock, 54.
98 Medlock, 55.
The CJCS was given more authority under the GNA, even though the JCS was removed from formal command responsibilities over the unified commands. He became the principle advisor to the president, the National Security Council, and SECDEF, responsible for presenting a unified military position, and took control of the joint staff. The CJCS helped to reduce interservice rivalries and increase joint interoperability among the services. While he had oversight responsibility, he had no formal command authority over the combatant commanders.99

The combatant commanders now took their directions directly from the president and the SECDEF. They maintained control over a geographical sphere of operations and were responsible for all military operations and forces, interservice training, and logistics within that sphere.100 While the CJCS remained the principle military advisor to the president and the SECDEF, the CINCs became the primary executors of the president’s policies. The GNA also stated that if a combatant commander “at any time considers his authority, direction, or control insufficient to command effectively, the commander shall promptly inform the secretary of defense.”101 This intent appeared to strengthen the relationship between the SECDEF and the unified commanders.

The 1989 invasion of Panama and the 1991 Gulf War appeared to vindicate the GNA. Some argued the system worked almost flawlessly, with the combatant commanders developing and executing the plans, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advising the civilian leadership, the president and secretary of defense making decisions, and the services supporting the execution.102 These were relatively short, decisive conflicts when compared to the challenges which existed during the Civil War and Korean War. The political and military realms worked within the zone of cooperation, with clear policy objectives and supporting military strategy.

99 Medlock, 56.
100 Medlock, 57.
101 Medlock, 58.
102 Medlock, 57.
Some concerns still existed, particularly among the service chiefs whose role had essentially been reduced to providing trained, equipped, and ready forces. They were concerned that the increased power of the CJCS as the primary advisor would limit the options presented to the president. Eliot Cohen observed that, “[W]hen the use of force was contemplated in Panama and the Persian Gulf, the civilian leaders were briefed not on several military options, with their associated risks and benefits, but on one plan and one plan only.”103 But the GNA assumed cooperation between the CJCS and the combatant commanders to link military strategy to the political objectives. If the two senior military officers are in conflict, the physical location of the CJCS to the SECDEF gives him more access to executive authority than the combatant commander. The GNA also essentially gave the CJCS more ability to influence the political domain.

The Kosovo War – Relations Between Clinton and Clark

The Kosovo War, also known as Operation Allied Force, began in the spring of 1999 to stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanians by Serbs in Kosovo. It was planned predominately as a NATO air campaign to enforce a United Nations Security Council resolution which called for a cease-fire and return of refugees and displaced persons.104 The United States committed the preponderance of military force to the operation aimed at compelling Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw Serbian security forces from Kosovo.

General Wesley K. Clark, U.S. Army, commanded Operational Allied Force, while serving as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), and the Commander of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). As SACEUR, Clark essentially worked for NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, and as the Commander of EUCOM, he worked for the President of the United States, William J. Clinton.


This placed Clark as a key player within the zone of cooperation or conflict between the political and military domains of civil-military relations. He was responsible for developing the military strategy to support the president’s political objectives in Europe. But Clark’s inability to effectively manage a complex set of political influences while applying military force toward achieving political objectives would eventually lead to his premature removal from command.

At the very start of Operation Allied Force, Clark was placed in a difficult position. This would be NATO’s first real test beyond the Cold War, and the need to maintain the political unity of the alliance would continuously influence military planning. Some alliance members were even willing to sacrifice military necessity to achieve this political consensus among the participating nations. This led Clark toward a plan that called for an escalated military response that balanced the alliance’s willingness to apply more and more force against Milosevic’s ability to resist. Some nations would desire only a quick show of force by bombing key targets and minimizing casualties, believing “that the campaign will last two nights and that after two nights, Mr. Milosevic would be compelled to come to the table,” said one senior U.S. general. The wishful political thinking of some, coupled with the limited willingness of others, would restrict the military options considered. On the first day of the bombing campaign, President Clinton clearly signaled the limits of his commitment when he stated “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.” From the onset of the war, Clark’s military strategy to achieve the political objectives was thus limited by the political considerations.

Phase I of the campaign, a limited 48 hour bombing, failed to persuade Milosevic and actually increased the amount of ethnic cleansing by the Serbs and produced a large exodus of refugees. Phase II of the campaign was meant to send a stronger signal, with President Clinton announcing at the White

---

105 Arkin, 4.
106 Arkin, 2.
108 Arkin, 9-10.
House, “I strongly support Secretary General Solana’s decision yesterday to move to a new phase in our planned air campaign, with a broader range of targets including air defenses, military and security targets, and forces in the field.”109 Politics continued to influence military operations, with the U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen stating, “There was some…confusion in terms of how this is going to operate, in terms of whether or not individual (alliance) members had to approve or disapprove [targets].”110 This statement, made toward the beginning of the Kosovo War, demonstrates that even the SECDEF did not have a clear understanding of how civil-military relations within the alliance would function within the zone of cooperation or conflict between the political and military domains.

Phase II also failed to achieve its political objectives, and alliance members were starting to feel more uncomfortable. Where politics first restricted military options, now a lack of military success began to influence the political alliance. A Pentagon spokesman said, “I think right now it is difficult to say that we have prevented one act of brutality.”111 Frustration over how the war was progressing mounted, with Clinton asking the American people to “have a little resolve here, to stay with your leaders, to give us a chance to really see this thing through.”112 The campaign was off to a rough start, and political and military failures would have to be explained and corrected. As the war seemed to drag on, the disconnect between political objectives and military strategy created conflict between the president and the combatant commander. And it does not appear that the SECDEF or the CJCS were able to step in and create an environment of cooperation between the political and military domains.

It should be obvious that there was also a miscalculation of political wills between NATO members and Milosevic. NATO members assumed he would succumb quickly, and initially they made public announcements saying as much. And the political influences into the military domain restricted

---

109 Arkin, 10.
110 Arkin, 11.
111 Arkin, 13.
112 Arkin, 13.
the proposed options, to include not even the threat of introducing ground forces. This sent a potentially
dangerous signal to Milosevic allowing him to calculate his adversary’s willingness to sustain a military
campaign. Tension also existed between the Clinton cabinet and Clark concerning media interviews
when Clark indirectly admitted that the bombing campaign was not preventing the ability of Serb forces
from entering Kosovo. The *New York Times* headline read, “NATO Chief Admits Bombs Fail to Stem
Serb Operations,” and *The Washington Post* wrote, “Clark Reports Yugoslavia Pours Troops Into
Kosovo.” From this standpoint it appears that the bombing campaign was not producing the desired
effects. General Hugh Shelton contacted Clark and stated, “The secretary of defense asked me to give
you some verbatim guidance, so here it is: Get your f-------g face off the TV. No more briefings, period.
That’s it.” The conflict between the political and military domains was presenting the adversary with
exploitable opportunities, as the political and military elites lacked unity.

Over a month into the air campaign, political willingness eventually allowed the operation to
move on to Phase III, targeting of economic and energy infrastructure. The effect was to put pressure on
the Serb civilian population directly, and after a few days, Serb mayors and civilians were beginning to
blame Milosevic for the war. But these attacks also increased collateral damage, something the
alliance sought to avoid. To help shore up popular support, President Clinton announced that “Each day,
we hear reports of desertions in the Serbian army, dissension in Belgrade, unrest in Serbian
communities.” Clark continued to walk the fine line between maintaining political unity, and achieving
military and political objectives. NATO also began planning for possible use of ground forces, something
unforeseen at the start of the operation.

As political unity and military strategy in NATO began to shore up, the adversary’s willingness to
continue the conflict began to wane. After 78 days of bombing, Milosevic finally agreed to withdraw his

Affairs, 2001), 273.
114 Arkin, 17-18.
115 Arkin, 19.
forces and accepted the deployment of NATO peacekeepers. While Operation Allied Force eventually achieved success through the sustained use of air power, it took far longer than the initial 48 hours NATO members assumed it would take in the beginning. In the years following the war, there has been much debate and criticism regarding the established political objectives and the military means used to achieve them.

General Michael Short, Clark’s air commander, criticized the political restrictions placed on him. He felt the best strategy for stopping the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was to “have gone for the head of the snake on the first night.” But political restrictions kept the air campaign primarily limited to Kosovo, and not Serbia. And Clark and Short failed to educate and convince the political leadership of the best strategy toward achieving the desired political objectives, even though some of the alliance members may have found this strategy politically unacceptable initially. On the political level, leaders underestimated the ability of Milosevic to endure an air campaign, and his ability to exploit political conflict among the elites.

Just after the end of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Clark was replaced as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander of the U.S. European Command. In July 1999 General Shelton informed Clark of his replacement, and that Secretary Cohen and the Clinton administration had cleared it. This came somewhat as a shock to Clark, who would only serve two years as SACEUR rather than the normal three to four. While the reasons for Clark’s removal are not entirely clear, the apparent cause was a conflict between Clark’s military ways and means for conducting the Kosovo War, and the Clinton administration’s political objectives.

\[\text{Arkin, 20.}\]
\[\text{Arkin, 27.}\]
\[\text{Clark, 408-411.}\]
\[\text{The ability of a combatant commander to develop a single military strategy to support all of the individual NATO nation’s political objectives is questionable, so this study focused primarily on the Clinton administration’s political objectives as the primary influence to military strategy. The study did not examine the}\]
Although the GNA sought to strengthen the relationships between the president, the SECDEF, the CJCS, and the combatant commanders, it could not ensure unity and cooperation between the political and military domains of civil-military relations during times of war. While personalities appeared to be less of an issue during the Kosovo War, a disconnect between political objectives and military strategy remained a source of conflict. These disconnects continued to be present even after centuries of military reform aimed at structural solutions to improve civil-military relations. As demonstrated by the Kosovo War, the CJCS was tied closely with the political domain in Washington, D.C., with a more direct ability to advise and influence policy objectives, but the CJCS was unable to synchronize the military strategy of the combatant commander because he lacked the authority to do so. And the combatant commander, who could control the military strategy, could not effectively influence the policy objectives across multiple NATO countries.\textsuperscript{120} The conflict between the political and military domains remained a factor in civil-military relations.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{120} This study focused solely on U.S. military reform and did not examine military reform movement within the U.N. or NATO. It should be recognized that multinational politics influences the relations between a president and his senior military commander, for which U.S. military reform has not accounted for.
\end{flushright}
Conclusion

“Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many governments do when they are planning a war, and ask them for purely military advice…Only if statesman look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse.” –Carl von Clausewitz

The zone of cooperation or conflict is ever present in U.S. civil-military relations. While we may never understand the exact effect of military reform on civil-military relations between a president and his senior military commanders, military reform has clearly been used as a tool to manage these relations. The zone of cooperation or conflict between the political and military domains is influenced by more than just national security structure. Conflict is usually a result of disconnect between a president’s policy objectives and senior military commanders’ military strategy for achieving those objectives. The national security structure established by reform does not guarantee cooperation, nor has it consistently prevented conflict in civil-military relations.

Although military reform establishes the framework for key actors to function, it has not always been able to overcome the personalities of the individuals involved, or ensure policy agreements between the president and his senior military commander.

While civilian control of the military remains an underlying given in the U.S. Armed Forces, history provides numerous examples where relations between the president, or his representative, and a senior military commander existed in the zone of conflict. A recent article by Lieutenant Colonel Donald Drechsler and Colonel (Ret) Charles Allen titled, “Why Senior Military Leaders Fail, and What We Can Learn from Their Mistakes,” highlights that these relations fail “when the civilian leaders and military commanders become disconnected.”

A conflict between the president’s national policy and the commander’s military strategy often contributes to this disconnect, but due to the nature of war itself,

---

121 Clausewitz, 734-735.

122 Conflict may actually play a needed role in helping political and military leaders clarify and connect policy with strategy, but the benefits of such conflict were outside the scope of this study.

theorists cannot definitively point to a clear cause for why the actors are unable to prevent the disconnect. The blame frequently falls on the senior military commander, without a clear understanding of why the actors were unable to resolve differing policy views. If the military is viewed as a machine for achieving political ends during times of war and military officers are responsible for ensuring how that machine functions, civilian leadership ultimately has the final say on where and why that machine is used and how it interacts with the rest of the government.

The strategic vision of civilian leaders and the ways and means employed by their military commanders should work in cooperation. Drechsler and Allen state that serious disconnects are generally prevented when military commanders possess good communications with their civilian leaders, a reasonable self-awareness of their actions, and remain sensitive to the strategic context.\textsuperscript{124} This contributes to civil-military relations that operate within the more desired zone of cooperation. But Clausewitz would add that “statesman often issue orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve.”\textsuperscript{125} He also states that if policy is correct, its influence on military operations can only be positive, and “if it has the opposite effect the policy itself is wrong.”\textsuperscript{126} While Clausewitz does not propose an answer for every situation, he raises an interesting point. We often blame a commander’s military strategy for failing to support the policy, but at what point does the policy itself contribute to the conflict in civil-military relations? Prescriptive answers to such questions are often unfeasible when the political and military realms of war cannot simply be divorced from the chance and emotion of war.

If simple disconnects between the president and his senior military commanders over policy are the cause to conflict, then why are these differences not easily resolved? The evolution of the national security structure through military reform has not solved Janowitz’s problem of access to executive authority as a source of conflict, nor the inability of the civilian leaders to consistently describe their

\textsuperscript{124} Drechsler and Allen, 44.
\textsuperscript{125} Clausewitz, 735.
\textsuperscript{126} Clausewitz, 735.
policy and vision of military strategy to military commanders. Conflict may then result when there are numerous bureaucratic barriers or a complex misunderstanding between senior military leaders and the president, which may lead to a discrepancy between political ends and the military strategy to achieve them. This is particularly true when the bureaucratic systems expand to include complex multinational operations acting with UN or NATO authorization. In the absence of formal structure to resolve these conflicts, perhaps an informal structure too influences civil-military relations. In *Modern Organizations*, Amitai Etzioni points out that many organizations are influenced by a mix of both formal and informal structures. But the research of the informal structures and bureaucracies between the president and his senior military commanders, and the relations between the formal and informal structures are beyond the scope of this study.

Another consideration, as Peter Feaver states, is that civilian leaders cannot always openly express the complexities of political calculations and decisions to their military leaders. While presidents may express a grandiose policy to the American people for short term political gain, they may not always be willing to commit long-term resources toward achieving that policy. And Eliot Cohen believes the political objectives which drive the employment of military means are sometimes vague and contradictory, potentially frustrating the military professional. If you couple vague policy guidance and objectives with a misunderstanding by political elites of the capability of military means, tension develops, increasing the likelihood that the overlap between political and military domains produces an unhealthy zone of conflict, rather than cooperation.

It would be overly reductionist to say that the conflict in civil-military relations between a president and his senior military commander is simply over a disconnect between policy views. But as demonstrated by the three case studies of Lincoln-McClellan, Truman-MacArthur, and Clinton-Clark,

---

128 Feaver, 25.
129 Cohen, 257.
military reform does not always provide a structural solution for preventing or resolving conflict between the political and military domains. As future responses to global challenges point more toward a whole of government and multinational approach, and not just military strategy to achieve political objectives, these domains will increasingly overlap, rather than operate as separate and distinct spheres. This will undoubtedly provide more case studies to reveal the causes of conflict in civil-military relations during times of war.\textsuperscript{130} As history demonstrates, military reform as a structural tool for resolving these future conflicts provides no guarantee. Structural solutions cannot definitively account for the political nature of war itself, or the differing perceptions of policy ends and strategy among the key actors in civil-military relations.

\textsuperscript{130} The multinational dimension on political objectives and military strategy will continue to influence U.S. civil-military relations. The effect of U.S. commanders being dual-hatted for commanding both U.S. and multinational forces in a single theater of war, along with their ability to develop a singular military strategy to serve varying political objectives remains an area of future research not addressed in this study.
**Bibliography**


