Pakistan’s Stability/Instability Complex
The Politics and Reverberations of the 2007 November Emergency

Anita Singh

“Although radical Islamic groups may stage a comeback, they are very unlikely ever to impose their radical vision on Pakistan and transform it into a nuclear-armed Afghanistan,” argued Stephen Cohen in 2002. Yet, as Taliban militia marched through the Buner district recently, just 100 kilometers short of Islamabad, many have come to question the verity of Cohen’s assertion. Further still is the memory of the democratic euphoria that surrounded the 2008 election as Asif Ali Zardari announced, “We are bound together in the spirit of democracy,” when his coalition government came into power, winning 154 of 268 seats in the national legislature. This victory came from the ashes of Pres. (Gen) Pervez Musharraf’s declared state of emergency throughout Pakistan in November 2007. Musharraf had argued the declaration was necessary to address the “activities of extremists and incidences of terrorist attacks,” while others suggested he made this declaration to avert Supreme Court rulings on his own presidency. Police raids, opposition-party house arrests, and thousands of civilian arrests suggest that the latter might be truer than Musharraf initially indicated. It is clear that the combination of judicial, legislative, and security crises in 2007 brought Pakistan to a point of potential state failure, setting the stage for its current crisis and instability.

As the Pakistan army successfully continues its surge against the Taliban, it is no stretch to argue that Pakistan is not a failed state. Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has suffered a half-dozen coups d’état, several armed independence movements, growing extremism and Islamicization within the population, and system-wide corruption and lack of political
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institutionalization. Yet, the question of its future continues to arise as it once again teeters on the brink of failed statehood. A crucial turning point for Pakistan, the November emergency encompassed multiple areas of state failure, including an out-of-control insurgency, loss of sovereignty within the border areas, and the seizing of both parliament and the judiciary. Despite these events, Pakistan has managed to bounce back from imminent state failure, engaging in elections and forming its current government in February 2008. Despite its claims, this new government is no exception to Pakistan’s pattern—its beginnings marred with decisions surrounding the constitutionality of the president’s office and the Supreme Court, its inability to deal with an insurgency that has moved far enough inland to threaten Islamabad, and more recently, its growing economic crisis. These conflicting outcomes are at the heart of this article, where one argument claims that Pakistan is only now emerging from its colonial past, coming to terms with the contest between its Islamic and secular identities. Conversely, others argue that Pakistan is in decline—a state increasingly incapable of addressing its internal political crises—and the aftermath of the November 2007 emergency is an example highlighting Pakistan’s state failure.

With this debate in mind, what then explains Pakistan’s oscillation between state failure and stability? Most scholars would point to the literature on failed states, using its theoretical framework to apply its generalizations to this case. Yet, at a theoretical level, the failed-state literature has difficulty explaining the Pakistan case because of its strong bias towards African-centric, democracy-oriented, and conflict-biased analysis. Not only does the literature fail to distinguish the characteristics of a failed state, but it is also unable to identify how states change from stable (non-failed) to failed-state systems. Pakistan provides an important case study, as it has not only teetered toward failure on a number of occasions but has also bounced back and continues to persist. Second, failed-state literature is problematic because its analysis is based on “snapshots” in time, unable to differentiate between the causes of state failure and its resulting effects. Pakistan’s persistence can only be explained by its historical process, acknowledging the November emergency as a data point within the larger context of Pakistan’s development.

Centered on the time frame after the November emergency, this article introduces the concept of the “stability/instability paradox” to better explain Pakistan’s oscillation and persistence as a state. Its conclusion analyzes a
number of determinants for Pakistan’s future stability and the security of the international system.

**Setting the Stage: The November Emergency and its Aftermath**

Geopolitical and intrastate security ramifications of state failure have ensured its prominence in international relations, linking the phenomenon to the growth of international terrorism, refugee movements, humanitarian crises, and intra- and interstate conflict. Despite this, the theoretical work in this area has yet to offer any concrete knowledge about its causes, prevention, or even post-failure reconstruction to protect the international system from this phenomenon. Rather, the term *state failure* has been misused as a catchall concept to explain issues of corruption, conflict, and collapse within non-Western and developing states. Therefore, for this inquiry, it is important to ask why Pakistan has *not* failed, despite its many moments of insecurity and instability. One could go so far as to argue that of all the states in Asia, Pakistan has a higher propensity for state failure than all others in the region. In fact, in the last three years, Pakistan has been in *Foreign Policy* magazine’s Failed State Index top 10 twice, alongside conflict-ridden Afghanistan.

The November emergency is the culmination of several domestic and international variables that have challenged the stability of Pakistan. Before 2001, Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were used as government-sanctioned training grounds for both regional and international terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Tamil Tigers, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. After 2001, the NATO intervention in Afghanistan, growing Islamicization, and weaponization of the region shifted the objectives of terrorist and insurgent groups to include Pakistan as a target for their violent activities. Blamed for complicity with American troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan suffered its first terrorist attack on its own soil in 2003. Since then, these attacks have degraded the authority of the central government, and the autonomous tribal regions have become even less hospitable to federal authority. These ethnic, religious, and security-based tensions came to a head in November 2007, when President Musharraf declared a state of emergency in Pakistan—revoking civil liberties, imprisoning thousands, dismissing the Supreme Court, and engaging in large-scale
counterinsurgency missions in the NWFP, a shocking admission that the government had lost control in the border regions. The aftermath of the emergency might be the best indicator of Pakistan’s future, because it encapsulates many of the tensions that brought Pakistan to the forefront as a potential failed state.

**Figure 1: Border areas with insurgency in Pakistan** (Reprinted from Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire—Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” *International Security* 32, no. 4 [Spring 2008]: 41–77.)

**The Crisis of the Judiciary and Elections in Pakistan**

One of the major catalysts for the events in late 2007 included a judicial and constitutional crisis that began earlier in the year. In March 2007, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was arrested and removed from the Supreme Court under charges of impropriety and corruption. As Chaudhry claimed innocence, his supporters argued that his arrest was due to his presiding over a number of “unfavorable” decisions, including the Supreme Court’s reversal of the sale of the national steel mill and his investigations into “disappearances” supposedly conducted by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). Protests across Pakistan resulted in Chaudhry’s subsequent reinstatement on 20 July, suggesting that the formerly state-
controlled Supreme Court was given new life as a proactive, democratic, and independent judiciary.

The timing of Chaudhry’s reinstatement was particularly important within the politically charged atmosphere in Pakistan, as he was expected to preside over two important cases in the following months. First, the Supreme Court was scheduled to rule on the constitutionality of Musharraf’s candidacy in the upcoming presidential elections while holding the titles of both army chief of staff and president. Second, the court was to rule on the legality of both Benazir Bhutto’s and Nawaz Sharif’s candidacies in the upcoming parliamentary elections because of corruption allegations that had removed them from office in years previous.

In October 2007, with the Supreme Court yet to render a ruling, Musharraf proceeded with presidential elections in the National Assembly. A boycott of the election by over 80 opposition members of the legislature confirmed a numerical majority for Musharraf’s Muslim League-Q (MLQ) party, and he was easily reelected president. After declaring the emergency in early November, Musharraf then disbanded the Chaudhry-led Supreme Court, replacing it with an interim judiciary, which immediately declared the election valid. With this ruling, Musharraf resigned as head of the armed forces and was sworn in for his second term as president.

Benazir Bhutto, who had self-exiled to Dubai in 1998, returned to Pakistan in July to campaign in the parliamentary elections in the new year. She was allowed back into the country primarily due to a power-sharing agreement negotiated between the MLQ and her Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Despite this agreement, Musharraf was surprised with the level of her grassroots support, marked by protests and demonstrations across the country, and responded by keeping Bhutto under house arrest for much of the emergency. At the same time, Nawaz Sharif, who had been exiled from Pakistan after the Musharraf-led coup in 2000, attempted a dramatic political comeback in October 2007, only to have his plane turned around and sent back to Saudi Arabia. It was not until his swearing-in ceremony that Musharraf allowed Sharif back into the country and released Bhutto from house arrest to campaign for the February 2008 parliamentary elections.

After Bhutto’s assassination at the end of December, the PPP came under the leadership of her widower, Asif Ali Zardari, with 84 seats in the National Assembly and formed a majority coalition with Sharif’s Muslim League-N
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(PML-N). In August 2008, the coalition deposed President Musharraf and elected Zardari as the new president. Musharraf did not leave office under the auspices of constitutional power change; rather, he left because of his miscalculation that he was powerful enough to retain the office of the president. His declining political legitimacy and popularity, as evidenced by the Lal Masjid crisis, assured he did not have the support to continue his presidency.

Despite its success, this winning coalition eventually disbanded over a long-term disagreement vis-à-vis the reinstatement of the Supreme Court justices dismissed by Musharraf. While Sharif’s PML-N wanted full reinstatement, the PPP refused in fear that the return of Justice Chaudhry to the bench would reinstate corruption charges against Zardari. Even with the dissolution of the coalition, the PPP continues to form a coalition government with a number of smaller, regional parties, under Prime Minister Yusuf Gilani and President Zardari.

Lal Masjid and the Crisis of Control

The events surrounding the judicial crisis were amplified by a further political and religious crisis over the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad. While Western commentators have often overlooked the importance of the connection between the religious institution and its political connections, the Lal Masjid has long been one of the spiritual centers for the Pakistan-based Taliban. Therefore, it was not surprising when a group of female students and teachers from the Jamia Hafsa seminary were involved in an 18-month campaign of “re-Islamicization” in the city, closing down music and video stores, movie theatres, and other entertainment venues through a laathi raj (rule by sticks). In March 2007, female students from the seminary kidnapped three women accused of running a clandestine brothel, only releasing them after taping forced confessions. In response to both the laathi raj and the kidnapping, Islamabad police arrested two female teachers from the seminary and their drivers. With complete disregard for the authority of law enforcement, the mosque leaders subsequently ordered the kidnapping of two policemen and confiscated their vehicles, storing them within the Mosque. In June, women from the seminary kidnapped nine Chinese nationals from their residential acupuncture center with similar accusations of prostitution. This event even drew attention from China, which called on the Musharraf government to act against the lawless mosque.
Despite these activities, the Musharraf government remained wary of military action against the Lal Masjid, expecting strong repercussions. It was not until students from the Jamia Hafsa set fire to the nearby Ministry of Environment and cars in its parking lot that Musharraf mobilized forces and attacked paramilitary forces protecting the mosque. On 5 July, a thousand students surrendered to security forces, while dozens remained inside asserting their willingness to face martyrdom. By 11 July, with many of the innocent surrendered, the government stormed the mosque, killing 100 people. One of the more important people killed in the raid was Abdul Rashid Ghazi, a mosque leader and a principal organizer of the standoff.

Despite the successful strong-armed response by the government, the siege has become a landmark event in Pakistan for three reasons. First, it further undermined the legitimacy of the Musharraf government amongst Islamicists in Pakistan. After Musharraf’s decision to join the US-led war on terror, many accused him of pandering to the United States and, for the most part, Musharraf became a symbol of Western hatred within Pakistan. This perspective was effectively manipulated by organizers of the siege, who campaigned the events as a struggle between Islam and the corruption of Western influences, suggesting Musharraf supported the latter. For example, while trapped in the masjid, Abdul Rashid Ghazi used his cell phone to access numerous media stations, calling for Pakistan-wide action against Musharraf. It has been suggested that a rocket attack on Musharraf’s plane on 6 July while inspecting floods in Balochistan was a Taliban response to the events of the Lal Masjid. By making Musharraf a symbol of anti-Islamism, the siege had the effect of delegitimizing the government within Pakistan’s population.

The siege had a second effect of highlighting the relative weakness of the government in relation to the Lal Masjid, which is often called a “state within a state.” Not only did the madrassa attempt to deliver religious law enforcement within Islamabad, it also became apparent that conflict (and the lack thereof) within Pakistan’s rogue provinces was centrally dictated by the mosque. Similarly, Ghazi’s call to arms within tribal regions and Musharraf’s inability to stop the madrassa’s re-Islamicization campaign indicate a significant failure of domestic sovereignty. Third, Musharraf’s response to the siege catalyzed divisions and renewed violence between the government and Taliban-related insurgencies in border regions of Pakistan. Consequently, the siege resulted in the end of a peace agreement between the government and warring factions in North Waziristan because of retaliatory violent clashes between
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government soldiers and militants. This effect was foreseen by Ghazi, who warned government forces that “any actions against the madrassa” would generate an “appropriate response” by Taliban members.16

Insurgency and the Crisis of Sovereignty

By all measures, the Lal Masjid crisis marked the beginning of the uncontrollable insurgency in Pakistan’s northern provinces and affirmed the existence of pseudo-states in the tribal areas, many under Taliban rule. In 2007, nearly 3,600 people were killed in insurgency-related violence in Pakistan, including civilians, security forces, and terrorists—more than double from the year previous.17 President Musharraf’s midnight declaration of a state of emergency on 3 November 2007 directed attention to the increasing inability of the government to address the growing terrorist and insurgent threat within the state. The preeminent focus of the government was on the near-Iraq levels of conflict occurring in the NWFP and the FATA, as shown by the numbers of casualties in figure 2. Musharraf’s opening statement in the emergency declaration noted that the “visible ascendancy in the activities of extremists and incidents of terrorist attacks, including suicide bombing, IED explosions, rocket firing, and bomb explosions and the banding together of some militant groups have taken such activities to an unprecedented level of violent intensity posing a grave threat to the life and property of the citizens of Pakistan.”18

![Figure 2: Number of people killed in the Northwest Frontier Provinces since 2002](http://www.satp.org/)

(Data collected by South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/)
Referencing several disturbing trends in Pakistan’s insurgency and the failure of several peace treaties earlier in the summer, Musharraf further argued that the emergency was necessary because “constant interference in executive functions has weakened the writ of the government; the police force has been completely demoralized and is fast losing its efficacy to fight terrorism; and intelligence agencies have been thwarted in their activities and prevented from pursuing terrorists.”

In addition to the increased levels of violence, the insurgency in 2007 had become increasingly bold. Two days before the declaration of emergency, insurgents paraded 48 captured soldiers in front of media in the Swat district, a once-popular tourist destination. The soldiers were dressed in local attire rather than in their uniforms, which were reported to have been thrown away or given to insurgents. Reports estimate that 300 soldiers were held hostage at the time, all of them part of a 2,500-troop counterinsurgency paramilitary group added to the 100,000 soldiers already stationed across the NWFP and the FATA. One disturbing report suggested that many Pakistani troops voluntarily surrendered, in some cases without shots being exchanged. Upon stumbling across the bodies of a dozen mutilated paramilitary forces, troops began surrendering, hiding within the local population, and abandoning rank altogether. By October 2007, 100 paramilitary officers had been killed, and others were found badly mutilated or beheaded by insurgents in North Waziristan.

A third trend in the insurgency is the public security and law enforcement role assumed by militants in many of these regions. Reports argue, particularly in the Swat district, that Taliban-related insurgents have been seen delivering “vigilante-like” justice and, in one incident, killing 12 suspected thieves instead of deferring to local law enforcement agencies. In other cases, Taliban have been seen following mundane law enforcement tasks, including directing traffic and conducting public floggings for anti-Islam violations.

Finally, as a consequence of the events in 2007, suicide bombing has increased in addition to the traditional asymmetric methods used by the insurgents. Over the five years from 2001 to 2006, Pakistan suffered 22 suicide bombings, while in 2007 alone there were 56 suicide attacks, the bulk of them occurring soon after the July siege. In addition to the increased numbers of suicide attacks, the attacks have been increasingly bold and have come from unlikely sources. In early December, a full two weeks before the end of emergency rule, Pakistan’s first-ever female suicide bomber detonated
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her bomb outside a Christian school in Peshawar. As noted by much of the literature on female terrorists, the inclusion of women in terrorist activity suggests an increased radicalization of local politics in the Tribal Belt. Further, the existence of female suicide bombers undermines government claims that insurgencies are an extreme phenomenon, not representative of the population. These overall trends have continued well into 2009, including major cases such as the Marriott Hotel bombing in September 2008, an attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in early March, and Pakistan’s largest suicide bombing at a mosque in late-March 2009.

Post-2007: A Turning Point in Pakistan’s Politics

While events surrounding the November emergency were both drastic and destabilizing in their own right, some argue that the subsequent February elections were exemplary of state stability rather than leading to further crises. The November emergency’s relevance lies in its aftermath and contribution to the current crisis in the country.

The peaceful transfer of power and the power-sharing agreement between the Zardari and Sharif camps might suggest an unprecedented move towards democratization and stabilization in Pakistan, but it does not adequately exemplify the unconstitutionality of power sharing within Pakistan’s political system. Institutionally, the new government has had increasing difficulty consolidating its power and legitimacy within the state. In February 2009, one year after the coalition government victory, the interim Supreme Court reinstated corruption charges against Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbhaz, the chief minister of Punjab, barring them from running in any future election or holding public office. In light of the ruling, President Zardari used his federal power to dismiss the Shahbhaz Sharif state government in Punjab, Pakistan’s largest and most wealthy state. Citizen response to this event overwhelmed security forces, as the former prime minister’s latest “exile” was rejected as power-based party politics by Zardari’s government. Zardari responded to a mass demonstration planned for 15 March 2009 by placing the army on standby with orders to quash the civilian movement if necessary. During this standoff, all access to the national legislature buildings was blocked and scores of protesters were detained. Further, the government blocked access to any media, such as GEO-TV, which had been particularly critical of the government in recent months. Rather than reinforcing
the stability of the government, the events of March seemed to reflect its inherent weakness.

Zardari’s diminishing control corresponds to the increasing political and legal dominance of Taliban-related groups in regions such as Swat. Similar to the strategy employed against the Musharraf administration, the Islamist campaign has managed to equate the Zardari government to an anti-Islam, pro-American government, simultaneously delegitimizing the national government while encouraging the growth of pseudo-statehood in tribal areas. With the success of this strategy, the national government has actively devolved its own sovereignty to consolidate its legitimacy within religiously conservative regions. No example illustrates this better than the March 2009 Malakand cease-fire, when the Pakistani Taliban successfully negotiated the implementation of Sharia law in the Swat district of the NWFP with the Pakistan government. Under this accord, the government agreed to release 12 Taliban militants in exchange for an agreement to an indefinite cease-fire between militants and counter-insurgency forces. Critics of the government’s approach are unsurprising; most argue that the government has shown its position of weakness, as indicated by its major concessions. In fact, the Taliban entered negotiations with unprecedented power; they were even able to demand that they would only negotiate cease-fire terms with Mohammed Javed, a Taliban-sensitive Pakistani civil servant from the NWFP. As Christine Fair from RAND argued, “These deals have been essentially ratifying [government] defeats on the ground.” Second, numerous criticisms of the agreement have come from civil rights groups in Pakistan, noting the lack of provisions for women’s rights in districts now under Sharia. Third, because of the government’s weakness, no enforcement mechanism has been established within the agreement, resulting in reports of numerous violations and no Taliban disarmament.

More importantly, the insurgents’ actions in the area have underscored the increasingly national political agenda espoused by the Taliban-related groups, shifting their attacks to economic, law enforcement, and political urban targets. This is exemplified by a number of Taliban activities such as the forcible takeover of two emerald mines outside Swat, inviting impoverished locals to work the mines as a sign of their economic clout in the region. Another example in early-April 2009 shocked both Pakistan’s secularists and international observers: the release of a videotape showing an extrajudicial lashing of a 17-year-old girl by three Taliban members.
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The Taliban’s new national agenda has taken form in the most recent round of fighting. Negotiations of the Malakand Accord allowed insurgent groups to rearm and organize; less than a month after the agreement, the Taliban led a surge into the Buner district. In its hasty yet necessary response to the cease-fire violation, the Pakistan army had retaken Buner, forced a Taliban retreat, and begun operations in Swat. By the end of May, the army had cleared the Taliban out of Mingora, the largest urban center in Swat. Mingora has been a focal point for analysis of the region, as it is the first time in this surge that Pakistan’s troops have fought in an urban setting, and holding the city will be an important test case for the army. Reports have indicated that Taliban members have resorted to shaving their beards to blend in with the large numbers of refugees leaving Swat.

Despite the military’s success, the fighting in Swat is representative of a larger picture of the Taliban objective within Pakistan. Instead of limiting their conflict to the autonomy of specific regions, these fighters now have set their sights on the state, targeting regions ever closer to Islamabad. This suggestion has not simply been inferred from insurgent actions, but a number of warnings have been issued by the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mahsud, that his group would take over Pakistan unless the government stopped supporting NATO operations in Waziristan and Afghanistan. In February 2009, President Zardari, responding to the suggestion that his government was fighting insurgents on behalf of American allies, stated, “We are aware of the fact [the Taliban are] trying to take over the state of Pakistan. So, we’re fighting for the survival of Pakistan. We’re not fighting for the survival of anybody else.”

Therefore, the aftermath of the November emergency and the most current round of fighting have resulted in three new determinants of Pakistan’s future. First, Pakistan sits on a delicate balance of public opinion, highly dependent on the army’s success in the current battle. Agreeing to the Sharia deal in Swat neutralized grassroots support for the government; negotiation with Taliban members has signalled to the population that resistance will not be supported from the center. Coupled with accusations of government corruption and the out-of-control humanitarian crisis, government leaders face the challenge of maintaining their public support. This being said, the latest successes by the Pakistan army and increased awareness of Taliban atrocities in Swat have improved the public perception of the government as locals have begun to denounce the religious extremism associated with Taliban rule.
Second, Pakistan’s ability to address the growing humanitarian crisis will determine whether new refugee camps become recruiting grounds for extremists. In the last month of conflict, Pakistan has become the world’s fastest-growing humanitarian crisis, displacing nearly three million people to refugee camps near Peshawar, Islamabad, and other urban centers in the country. United Nations, NGO, and American aid has flooded the area but can only reach refugees if the military can sustain its victories.

Third, Pakistan’s leaders face an important decision between internal political battles and victory over the Taliban. While the latest fighting has seen a surge in Zardari’s popularity, Nawaz Sharif’s opposition will have to decide if it uses the current crisis as an opportunity to support or denounce the government.

Pakistan as a Failed State?
A Stability/Instability Paradox

Many policy recommendations describing the politics of Pakistan rely on the label “failed state” to explain the security concerns of the state. Yet this is not an accurate explanation of the causes of events in Pakistan. The November emergency tipped the state closer to failure, yet resulted in peaceful and fair elections by February 2008. Nawaz Sharif’s removal from politics in March undermined the institutional capability of the current government until his reinstatement in April 2009. The Sharia agreement in Swat challenged the state’s sovereignty in the region but was eventually controlled by the army’s advance into Mingora. Recognizing the outcomes of the November emergency identifies the major shortcomings of failed-state explanations, as it has little to contribute to the ever-changing events in Pakistan’s current crisis.

In analyzing the events of 2007, the stability/instability paradox serves as both an explanation of the Pakistan problematique and a critique of the failed-state concept. This paradox argues that state fragility and its potential failure come from the structural relationship between variables that undermine the stabilization efforts of one another. Because these variables are so interrelated, stabilizing gains in one area (e.g., military consolidation) are undermined by their resulting effect (e.g., a decrease in the viability of parliamentary governance). Conversely, state failure conceptualizes a linear model where inherently weak states decline in a linear fashion. Therefore, it is assumed these actors dichotomously either contribute or
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detract from state stability, but not both. As shown in Pakistan, none of these assertions are necessarily true. It is because of this shortcoming that scholars are unable to generalize cause-and-effect relationships regarding state failure.

The case study presents three areas where this dichotomy is prevalent. First, the stability/instability paradox is prevalent in Pakistan’s competing identities as a secular or Islamic state. Institutional failures, regional divisions, and ethnic conflict are not causes for state failure in themselves but effects of Pakistan’s internal divisions between these identities. Second, the institutional configuration of power within government is highly subject to the stability/instability paradox, where differing power centers have divided the stability of the state. Third—not mentioned in previous sections, yet an important part of Pakistan’s political scene—the army has been a major exemplar of this dynamic.

Pakistan: An Islamic State?

Divisions between Pakistan’s secular and Islamic identities inevitably call into question which factors within Pakistan foster or detract from stability. Often presented as a dichotomy, there is an inherent association of militant groups with destabilization and secular actors with stability. In some ways, the facts support this association, as Pakistan has been at its most stable when its Islamic and secular identities have been mutually reinforcing. The conventional understanding of the Pakistan conflict underscores that until 2001, Pakistan’s political relationship with its Islamist actors supported the state’s overall foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. Yet, with the aftermath of 9/11 and Musharraf’s subsequent support for the US-led war in Afghanistan, the state’s Islamist actors turned inward, and Pakistan became a target in its own right. A closer look at Pakistan through the framework of the stability/instability paradox shows that all Islamist actors in Pakistan do not solely contribute to instability.

Compounding the stability/instability paradox, the Islamic-secular divide within the current conflict has become increasingly complicated. There is an intuitive sense among Western commentators that Islamist groups are inherently divisive and destabilizing, reinforcing the tendency to group militants, insurgents, and terrorists under a single heading without taking into account the divisions that exist between these groups. At the organizational level, there are important distinctions between the Pakistan-based and Afghanistan-based Taliban, the tribal groups in Waziristan
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and Balochistan, and terrorist organizations such as Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM). One of the most relevant divisions between these groups includes their differing mandates vis-à-vis their vision of Pakistan. Pakistan-based terrorist groups and the Pakistan Taliban share “foreign policy” objectives such as violence against India, unification of Kashmir with Pakistan, and Islamicization of South Asia. Yet, their differences lie in their domestic objectives—terrorist organizations like LeT view Pakistan as a platform to conduct these objectives, and historically, their foreign objectives have been supported by the state as a tool to use against the Indian threat. Conversely, the Taliban see the current state of Pakistan and its leadership as their main antagonist; their objective is to convert Pakistan into a Taliban-ruled Islamic state. The divisions between these groups have become so acute that in early 2009, members of the terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Toiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen were placed on Taliban hit lists demanding that these terrorist groups leave Taliban-controlled areas in the Swat, Dir, and Mehmand districts.

While the events of the November emergency revealed a close relationship between tribal leaders in Waziristan and the Lal Masjid, this does not necessarily describe all tribal–Taliban relationships. A significant backlash from tribal leaders has stalled Taliban advances against Pakistan by proscribing recruitment in their regions. In early June 2009, for example, tribal leaders organized a lashkar (Urdu: “army”) as a response to a Taliban-organized suicide bombing in a tribal mosque, which killed 40 people. In the Upper Dir district, villagers surrounded two Taliban strongholds and killed 14 militants. The army’s response to this countermovement has been supportive, going so far as to arm the ad hoc lashkar groups. Yet, the most significant element of this countermovement has been its grassroots support. A sudden rise in popularity for both the government and the army suggests that the locals have changed alliances when faced with the brutality of Taliban rule, particularly after the Swat agreement.

Similarly, there are important divisions between the leadership, organization, and objectives of the Pakistani Taliban (self-titled Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP) and their Afghan Taliban counterparts. The TTP, while conducting recruitment and small-scale operations in the tribal areas since 2004, did not exist until December 2007 when it was created as an umbrella group for several Islamist groups within the FATA and the NWFP under the leadership of Baitullah Mahmud. Until this most recent conflict, the
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Afghan Taliban used Pakistan's refugee camps and training centers in the tribal areas as safe havens and were largely unconcerned with conflict in Pakistan.

Divisions between these organizations should not undermine their similarities and ties, as fragmentation has not completely negated the convergence of support for the Taliban. Many tribal leaders have found the strategic “branding” of a singular Taliban heading useful, as it allows them to maintain control over their specific regions; the most susceptible regions include Waziristan, the Taliban stronghold and organizational center.40 Further, recent reports have noted a new consensus between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP in anticipation of the new surge in American troops; “the refortified alliance was forged after the reclusive Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, sent emissaries to persuade Pakistani Taliban leaders to join forces and turn their attention to Afghanistan.”41 While this suggests that attacks in Pakistan may let up as the Taliban seek to refocus their attention on Afghanistan, the more important message suggests a newly adopted coordination of efforts and a more unified message, objective, and strategy for the continued insurgency.

The mainstream perspective on Pakistan does not acknowledge these differences within the population, citing that largely, insurgent groups, independence movements, and terrorist organizations both stem from and cause state fragility. Yet, the divisions among Islamist groups in Pakistan indicate a more complex picture of their contribution to the stability of the state. The Taliban is not a unified or organized entity, nor are the terrorist groups within the state; each has its own objectives, leadership, and territorial claims. The most recent upsurge in anti-Taliban lashkar groups is an important clue in this direction, as these groups had been relatively supportive of the Taliban until violence turned the people against its growing influence.

Pakistan's Political Institutions

Pakistan’s Islamic and secular identities have been embedded in its institutional foundation. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s first leader, followed a secularist ideology but founded the country on the principle of protecting South Asian Muslims from the “tyranny” of Hindu-dominated India, framing a debate for all successive governments—was Pakistan a secular or Islamic state? The Islamist regime of Gen Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq oversaw the financing of new madrassas, ISI training for terrorists, and international terrorist deployments. Later, Nawaz Sharif used Islam as
an instrument to consolidate his political control over rogue parts of the population while also addressing the perceived threat from India. Regardless of the administration, Pakistan’s historic divisions are largely determined by the confluence of individuals within the government, military, religious, ethnic, and tribal leaderships.42

The government’s response to the insurgency issue illustrates the dichotomy described by the stability/instability paradox. President Musharraf’s strategy to stabilize the state heightened perceptions of the Islamist threat despite the challenges this posed to the stability of the political institution. His support for the American-led coalition in Afghanistan, his crackdown on fundamentalist groups in the NWFP and the FATA, and his strict closures of illegal madrassas since 2001 have resulted in several assassination attempts, the growth of independence movements, and increased intra-state terrorist activity.

In comparison, Musharraf’s parliamentary opposition, particularly those now in government, argue that this crisis is one of governance. They see the insurgency as a product of the regime’s failure to protect the democratic process during the elections at the end of 2007. Focusing on parliamentary consolidation during his election campaign, President Zardari spoke of strong military measures to deal with the growing crisis. Since his election, his public comments have fluctuated towards both negotiations with terrorist entities and long-term solutions, including economic and civil society development, without committing to a short-term plan for the counterinsurgency. His international speaking engagements and interviews have been geared towards convincing the international community that Pakistan will not collapse. In reality, both perspectives oversimplified the needs of the Pakistani state in consolidating a stable governmental regime.

Government stability depends on three areas of power sharing. First, the governmental crisis is largely due to the weakness of the constitution compared to the practical precedent established over decades of power sharing in Pakistan, which has shifted power between the presidency and the prime minister’s office since independence. Under the regimes of Zia and Musharraf, the bulk of powers shifted toward the presidency, while under the Bhutto and Sharif administrations, power was contained in the office of the prime minister. Since the current government comes from the same party as the president, there has been little issue of power sharing, but as evidenced by the actions during recent protests, concentration of political decision-making power in the PPP has been questioned by
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Pakistanis at all levels. Since the February elections in Pakistan and the resulting debates on power sharing and counterinsurgency tactics, attempts to solve the problem have widened this divide between secular and Islamic Pakistan.

A further division exists within the structure of decision-making power outside the government. The Stephen Cohen–labelled “Establishment” is an unofficial oligarchic network in Pakistan made up of military staff, ISI agents, jihadist civilians, and bureaucrats who control much of the politics of Pakistan. Their overstretch into Pakistan’s politics includes the support of various Islamic terror groups, a coalition of conservative political parties, and anti-India polities in the state. The Establishment contributes to the instability of Pakistan by undermining the legitimacy and control of the National Assembly and other policy-making bodies. Cohen has argued that Pakistan’s politicians spend more time attempting to gain influence within the Establishment than in exercising the duties of their offices, skewing the power structure within the state.

Third, growing Islamicization has also had a major effect on the political circumstances of the state. Pakistan’s 2002 elections worried many observers because of a seeming increase in support for conservative and religious parties. While these parties, such as the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), only garnered 8 percent of total votes cast in the election, the bulk of votes came from conflict-ridden regions in the NWFP and the FATA, resulting in an immediate conservative shift in the politics of the region. For example, as soon as it came to power, the MMA movement in the NWFP dictated the closure of entertainment, music facilities, and girls’ schools and revised school curricula that were seen to be inconsistent with Islam. The 2008 election has seen the reverse of this phenomenon, and election results have swung back to favor secular parties, particularly in the regions once taken over by the MMA. Analysts suggest that this is particularly important because discontent with policies associated with Islamic parties suggest that there is a secular, state-oriented civil society in Pakistan dedicated to the stability of the state.

Pakistan’s Army

Intimate in its relations with the Establishment, Pakistan’s military also contributes significantly to the stability/instability paradox. The strength of the military as a stabilizing force in Pakistani politics is relatively undisputed. Even Indian scholars, such as C. Raja Mohan, argue that “the
extraordinary strength” of the army has been the “core” of Pakistani identity, providing a check and balance on the instability of both political and Islamist actors. It has become particularly relevant since the military is the only institution with the ability to stem the rise in extremism and insurgent violence and, unsurprisingly so, since Pakistan historically commits nearly a quarter of its annual budget to the military. There have even been two interpretations of Pakistan’s numerous coups d’état. While some argue that each coup has brought Pakistan to the brink of state failure, others argue they can be seen as a check and balance against Pakistan’s corruption-ridden and inconsistent civilian governments’ demands.

In the post-Musharraf area, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, the new chief of army staff after the November emergency, has reversed a number of destabilizing policies within the military. For example, the military has traditionally involved itself in all areas of political control in the state and, under Musharraf, had infused more than a thousand of its own staff within the bureaucratic system. Educational facilities, specifically universities, had their governance structures stacked with military personnel, resulting in revisionist curricula and controlled access to information. Under Kayani, the military has recalled all its personnel from civilian posts in the government and brought all communications between military personnel and politicians to a stop. His track record thus far has been impressive; in 2008, for the first time in Pakistan’s history, the military budget was presented to and negotiated in the National Assembly. Further, General Kayani has made a point to confirm his commitment to the democratically elected Zardari government, unequivocally communicating this sentiment within the media and to US counterparts, stemming speculation of another coup in Pakistan.

Yet, this stabilizing feature has been attained at the cost of Pakistan’s political system and civil society. Kayani’s unwillingness to involve himself in Pakistani politics has made the army complicit in a number of questionable decisions by the government, most recently with his support for the imposition of Sharia in the NWFP. While Kayani has been seen as a stabilizing force in Pakistan’s shaky politics, there have been questions as to how far his loyalties will remain with the government.

First, Kayani’s bold internal military reforms have not been as productive within the larger military and civilian establishment. In early 2009, Zardari was forced to replace the ISI chief with a civilian because of accusations that the ISI has continued to support and perpetuate terrorist groups in the
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country despite the Islamist crisis. As this role is normally held by a military official, the proposition was rejected by the army, leaving this crucial position vacant. While Kayani has made the assurance that the ISI has been purged of individuals “who might be undermining the entire anti-terror effort,” recent reports have suggested that the ISI continues to support militant groups fighting in Afghanistan and India. Ironically, some have suggested that the ISI has attempted to continue its support of the Afghan Taliban while engaging in counterinsurgency activities against the Pakistani Taliban.

Further, there has been some speculation regarding Kayani’s ability to control those troops directly engaged in the counterinsurgency missions, developing a general unwillingness to fight insurgents from within the army. The Frontier Corps is a division of the military which has 100,000 soldiers stationed within the NWFP and Balochistan, with the bulk of the corps derived from the local population. Because these soldiers are often intimately acquainted with insurgents and are ill-equipped and trained, there is a resistance to engage in counterinsurgent activities that come from within.

Failing or Failed? Pakistan’s Future Trajectory

The stability/instability paradox repudiates Pakistan’s trajectory towards failed statehood. On one hand, Pakistan is overwhelmed by the growing insurgency and fundamentalism within its borders; on the other, it continues to show signs of an independent judiciary, self-restraint within its military, and growth of civil society. The case of Pakistan shows that there is an important interplay between several levels of analysis that lend to both its stability and instability, particularly in understanding Islamism and insurgency in the state. An alternative view informed by analysis of Pakistan’s complexities suggests that predictions of state failure in Pakistan may be premature. Its history of perseverance in the face of a persistent stability/instability paradox suggests a resilience that holds state failure at bay. While it is unlikely that Pakistan will progress further to state failure, there are three central areas that could determine the country’s future trajectory.
The Fight for Public Support

Anti-Americanism (extended to all Western states) in Pakistan has been one of the main pillars of recruitment for the Taliban movement. As argued above, by establishing the Zardari administration as an anti-Islam, pro-American government, the Islamist campaign has attempted to delegitimize the national government while increasing its own support. Therefore, the paradox for the current government is to continue pressure to reduce Islamist violence while simultaneously not reinforcing the public relations campaign that has undermined Zardari’s support. An apt example of this paradox is a protest held at the beginning of June in Islamabad. Wearing signs with the words “Go Taliban Go” (read: Go away, Taliban), a few hundred protesters gathered to support the government’s actions in Swat. At the same time, protesters also yelled the phrase “Go America Go,” indicating that Western actions are perceived by the general population to be equally as negative as extremist violence. In Pakistan, the balance of public opinion will be highly dependent on the army’s success in the current battle and its distance from American influence.

As Taliban often target the most vulnerable and frustrated members of Pakistan’s society, the state’s ability to address the growing humanitarian crisis will largely be determined by recruitment campaigns in refugee camps. The latest refugee displacement has multiplied the humanitarian crisis that began with fighting earlier this year. Further, plight of the permanent refugees from the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan has also been worsened by the influx of new waves of refugees. The successful provision of aid is absolutely necessary, as its efficiency determines the success of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. In fact, Taliban-related groups have used humanitarian assistance to derive support from impoverished populations such as victims of the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, when militant groups were major providers of aid to the affected population. In a conflict sensitive to public opinion and radicalization, Pakistan’s struggle will have to focus on improving public opinion of its humanitarian situation.

Stemming the Insurgency

As of June 2009, Pakistan’s forces had established control over the majority of the Swat valley from the Taliban insurgency. Yet there are a number of military issues that could destabilize the army’s progress. First, the Obama administration has continued the Bush policy of drone attacks in the FATA region of Pakistan, killing over 500 people in the first few
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months of 2009 alone. Zardari’s government had repeatedly requested an end to these attacks, arguing that they undermine Pakistan’s sovereignty and have the effect of inflaming the insurgency in the region.

Second, despite its successes, there have been complaints about the inefficiencies of the army’s response to the Taliban. During the tribal uprising against the Taliban, the army initially supported the actions with helicopter gunships due to the lack of ground troops. With air strikes, the army was unable to identify its targets, shooting indiscriminately and making locals wary of further military contribution to their uprising. Overall, the measure of Pakistan’s military success will not be its ability to kill numerous Taliban; rather, it will be based on its success to maintain grassroots support in its counterterrorism efforts. Third, the activities of the last few months have treaded the fine line of public support. On one hand, agreeing to the Sharia deal in Swat has challenged grassroots support for the government. Government negotiation with Taliban members has signaled to the population that resistance will not be supported from the center. On the other hand, the latest successes by the Pakistan army and increased awareness of Taliban atrocities in Swat have provided the government with new life, as locals have begun to denounce the religious extremism associated with Taliban rule.

Engaging India

Arguably, India has one of the largest stakes in maintaining a stable Pakistan and is acutely aware that state failure there will be counterproductive to stability in South Asia. Since the Soviet war in Afghanistan, India has recognized that the growth of extremism in Pakistan and Afghanistan has resulted in increased violence in Kashmir. Further, Pakistan’s strengthened terrorist and insurgent groups have caused further attacks on the Indian mainland, such as the 26 November 2008 attacks in Mumbai.

From Pakistan’s perspective, one of the largest destabilizing features is its dependency on the Indian threat as its military’s raison d’être. There are two important reasons why an India-centric military is destabilizing to Pakistan. First, as long as Pakistan sees India as a threat, it will continue to prioritize spending on its conventional military over economic growth and social services. Pakistan consistently spends a quarter of its yearly budget on military expenses and half its budget on debt financing, which leaves very little money for internal development and state stability. Many argue that the rise of the Taliban could have been slowed with investment in the
public education system, as more and more families became dependent on free education offered by radicalized mosques. Second, the army’s preoccupation with India has led to some questionable decisions about the internal crisis. Even with a strengthened insurgency on Islamabad’s doorstep, an estimated 70 percent of the military remains on the Indian border, resulting in an understaffed counterinsurgency fought by air strikes and inefficient ground raids.

India’s contribution to resolving the Pakistan crisis must be carefully engaged. Obviously, there is an anti-India bias within many sectors in Pakistan; however, there has been a series of positive movements in the relationship that would indicate India’s involvement would be welcome. On a humanitarian level, India could offer a contribution to relieving the refugee crisis in the region. There is a precedent for these actions, such as the Kashmir earthquake of 2005. Following the earthquake, Pakistan accepted many offers for humanitarian aid from foreign powers, including NATO’s offer for soldiers and airlift capabilities. Then, a few days after, Pakistan accepted India’s offer for humanitarian aid—taking into account its geographic proximity and the time it would take NATO contributions to arrive—allowing Indian helicopters to cross over the Line of Control to deliver food aid. India eventually donated the equivalent of $25 million towards humanitarian aid for earthquake relief, the first monetary transfer between the two states since independence. Second, India could offer conditional guarantees to the Pakistan army that it will not take advantage of Pakistan’s weakened political system by threatening its border areas. In a goodwill measure, brokered by NATO forces, India could make a gesture by pulling a number of soldiers from the border area. While there is inevitably hesitation in engaging India, these efforts can result in small victories for Pakistan’s army against Islamists.

It is not an exaggeration or an understatement to argue that the internal security and stability of Pakistan will determine the security and stability of Afghanistan. To date commentators, analysts, and policy makers have looked at Pakistan not through the lens of its own stability but through its insurgent training camps, terrorist recruitment, and border and transmigration effects on the conflict in Afghanistan. While NATO policy makers have recognized that Pakistan and Afghanistan are not separate foreign policy issues, there continues to be a tendency to treat Pakistan as epiphenomenal to the Afghan conflict. Yet, the case of Pakistan shows that there is an important interplay between several levels of analysis that lend
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to both its stability and instability, particularly in understanding Islamicism and insurgency in the state. There is more happening in Pakistan, and those who attempt to make a definitive conclusion about Pakistan's trajectory based on traditional theories of state failure ignore the obvious complexities of the case.

Notes

3. Both before and after declaring the emergency, Musharraf had taken steps to stem any potential mass protests in Pakistan, which would have ended his control of the crisis. These steps included controlling the media, home arrest for Benazir Bhutto, and “negotiations” with other political parties. David Blair, “Pakistan—The Key Questions,” Telegraph, 5 November 2007, http://telegraph.co.uk.
6. Some of the most drastic and important protests during the buildup to the emergency were conducted by lawyers in defense of Justice Chaudry's innocence.
8. In Pakistan, the parliament is elected in a general election, and the president is then elected by the legislature. This usually results in the presidency and government representing the same party. Nirupama Subramanian, “85 Pakistan parliamentarians quit in protest against Presidential poll,” Hindu International News Agency, 3 October 2007, http://www.hindu.com.


10. Incidentally, this group of students was also involved in kidnapping a brothel owner in Islamabad earlier in the year.

11. This particular standoff lasted a mere several hours. Once police released the teachers, the kidnapped policemen were released as well.


13. This article uses the term Islamicist as a reference to actors that use Islam instrumentally to forward political goals.


15. Another example is noted by Feisal Khan, who argues that the loss of sovereignty was also indicated by the patterns of humanitarian donations during the 2005 earthquake, the bulk of which went to Islamist and other charities rather than the government. Feisal Khan, “Corruption and the Decline of the State of Pakistan,” Asian Journal of Political Science 15, no. 2 (2007): 219–47.


19. Ibid. It has been suggested that these peace treaties have failed because of events associated with the Lal Masjid incident.


22. Ibid.


25. During the Red Mosque siege, female students stated that they were willing to become suicide terrorists in response to government aggression, sparking concern over the changing face of terrorism in Pakistan. “Female Suicide Bomber Dressed to Kill,” Daily Times, 24 February 2007. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk

26. The Sharif situation has recently been cleared by the Supreme Court, which turned down the initial ruling by the Lahore High Court. This decision allows Sharif to retain his federal legislative seat, and he is now allowed to run in upcoming elections.
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29. The accord signed in Malakand amends the 1999 Nizam-e-Adl Resolution to allow the implementation of Sharia in several districts in the NWFP, including Malakand, Dir, and Swat.


33. “Pakistan ‘in fight for survival’.”

34. For example, in early June, tribal leaders responded to a mosque bombing by forming people’s militias and attacking Taliban strongholds. “Villagers fight Taliban after Pakistan mosque blast,” Reuters India, June 7 2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-40141420090607sp=true.

35. Economic explanations for state failure are beyond the scope of this article. For a good overview, see Iftikhar H. Malik, “The State and Civil Society in Pakistan: From Crisis to Crisis,” Asian Survey 36, no. 7 (July 1996): 673–90.


37. The various separatist movements within Pakistan have been active since before the “war on terror,” but their relationship with groups like the Taliban has become increasingly close since 2001, as discussed later in the article.

38. Observers of the military’s use of these actors have labeled the war fighting low-intensity conflict.


42. President Zia-ul-Haq pursued a policy of Islamicization across the country as a mechanism for nation-building. Therefore, his strategy to unite the state under Islam was total—it economically imposed a nationwide Zakat tax, judicially created a federal Sharia Court, politically supported rising Islamic parties, and socially imposed restrictions against women. Yet, this Islamicization process was not only a mechanism for domestic control; promoting Islamic groups was strategically effective in supporting insurgencies in Kashmir following the conventional military defeat by the Indian army in 1971.
43. The original 17th constitutional amendment gave the president the right to unilaterally dissolve the parliament. However, there has been a motion under the current government to annul this veto power.

44. Cohen, Idea of Pakistan, 68–73.

45. Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).

46. C. Raja Mohan is a former member of India’s National Security Council. Mohan goes so far as to argue that the proliferation of insurgent violence is an indicator of state strength, because Pakistan’s military establishment promoted the growth of these organizations. Mohan, “What if Pakistan Fails?”; Cohen, “Nation and the State of Pakistan;” and Cohen, Idea of Pakistan.


48. For example, General Musharraf’s coup d’état against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was conducted with the argument that the coup was necessary to stem the growing economic crisis, rising extremism, and corruption that had taken place under the Sharif government. During his tenure, Sharif was responsible for a number of attempts to neutralize the strength of the opposition by pushing forward corruption charges against Benazir Bhutto and the PPP. He undermined the capabilities of the judiciary, skirting his own corruption charges by threatening members of the Supreme Court and ransacking their houses. Finally, when Sharif attempted to fire Musharraf, owing to disagreement over the 1999 Kargil conflict against India, Musharraf was “forced” to conduct the coup.


50. Fareed Zakaria, “This is Pakistan’s War,” Newsweek 151, no. 9 (3 March 2008): 33.


55. In fact, even within the context of a growing insurgency, after the 26 November attacks in India, Pakistan moved 80 percent of its air force to its eastern border, assuming an Indian attack was forthcoming.