EXPANDED PUBLIC INFORMATION IMPERATIVE IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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2005

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Strong public affairs activities and operational support promote a greater understanding of the Army and its contribution to the nation, relevant in obtaining international legitimacy and support. The problem is that current Army Public Affairs doctrine, resources, and training constrained efforts to adequately service tactical and operational level leaders on the battlefield and to adequately inform the American public during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Thus, the central research question is: Is public information expansion to all audiences imperative in the contemporary operating environment? The grounded method of research uses the DOTMLPF model to review current public affairs doctrine, to illustrate how public affairs support was extended to all media in one case, and to explain expanded public information effects on operations. Army Public Affairs can focus support to fully exploit the advances in the global information environment and to provide an increased valued service on the battlefield. Military credibility in forward theaters creates conditions for stability in a region of uncertainty, at little to no cost and effort. A focused public affairs program could have mitigated coalition forces’ current struggle to “win hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people by effectively using truthful information as the primary weapon of choice.

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

18. NUMBER OF PAGES

19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Public Affairs, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPE)

Unclassified

UU

87

a. REPORT

b. ABSTRACT
c. THIS PAGE

Unclassified

Unclassified

Unclassified

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Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

17-06-2005

Master’s Thesis

August 2004 – June 2005

Expanded Public Information Imperative in the Contemporary Operating Environment

Unclassified

Unclassified

Unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239.18
MAJOR OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

EXPANDED PUBLIC INFORMATION IMPERATIVE IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, by Charmaine R. Means, 87 pages.

Strong public affairs activities and operational support promote a greater understanding of the Army and its contribution to the nation, relevant in obtaining international legitimacy and support. The problem is that current Army Public Affairs doctrine, resources, and training constrained efforts to adequately service tactical and operational level leaders on the battlefield and to adequately inform the American public during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Thus, the central research question is: Is public information expansion to all audiences imperative in the contemporary operating environment? The grounded method of research uses the DOTMLPF model to review current public affairs doctrine, to illustrate how public affairs support was extended to all media in one case, and to explain expanded public information effects on operations. Army Public Affairs can focus support to fully exploit the advances in the global information environment and to provide an increased valued service on the battlefield. Military credibility in forward theaters creates conditions for stability in a region of uncertainty, at little to no cost and effort. A focused public affairs program could have mitigated coalition forces’ current struggle to “win hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people by effectively using truthful information as the primary weapon of choice.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .......... ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................... vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .................................................................20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection of Data ..........................................................................................................21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of Data .............................................................................................................26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects of Expanded Public Information.................................................................31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine ......................................................................................................................31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization ...............................................................................................................35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training ......................................................................................................................38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material ......................................................................................................................41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Development .................................................................................................43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel ....................................................................................................................44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities .....................................................................................................................48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Public Affairs Enhanced Commander Capabilities ..........................................48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Personnel ..........................................................................................................49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Expectations .....................................................................................................53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television ...................................................................................................................54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio ..........................................................................................................................56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper .................................................................................................................56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings .....................................................................................................................58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing ...................................................................................................................58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Future of Public Affairs in the Transformed Army ..............................................60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine ......................................................................................................................60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization ...............................................................................................................61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training ......................................................................................................................61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material ......................................................................................................................62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>A/22nd MPAD</td>
<td>Alpha Team, 22nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFN</td>
<td>Armed Forces Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKO</td>
<td>Army Knowledge On-Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCTP</td>
<td>Battle Command Training Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUA</td>
<td>Battle Update Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFLCC</td>
<td>Coalition Forces Land Component Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFLCC-PAO</td>
<td>Coalition Forces Land Component Command – Public Affairs Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Compact Disk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Coalition Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPIC</td>
<td>Coalition Press Information Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DINFOS</td>
<td>Defense Information School (Fort Meade, Maryland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development, Personnel, Facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>DVD</td>
<td>Digital Video Disk</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIE</td>
<td>Global Information Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GT</td>
<td>General Technical (Army Aptitude Test)</td>
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</tbody>
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GWOT  Global War on Terrorism
G6    Division Signal Officer
HMMWV High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle
IO    Information Operations
JFCOM Joint Forces Command
JIB   Joint Information Bureau
MTOE  Modification Table of Organization and Equipment
NCOIC Noncommissioned Officer in Charge
NTSC  National Television System Committee
OIF   Operation Iraqi Freedom
ORHA  Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
PA    Public Affairs
PAL   Phased Alternating Line (European Broadcast Standard)
QDR   Quadrennial Defense Review
SAIC  Science Applications International Corporation
TOE   Table of Organization and Equipment
TTP   Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
US/CENTCOM United States Army Central Command
UA    Unit of Action (Modular Brigade-size element)
UEx   Unit of Employment “X” (Modular Division-size element)
USMC  United States Marine Corps
2BCT  2nd Brigade Combat Team (101st Airborne Division – Air Assault)
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“We must fight terrorist networks, and all those who support their efforts to spread fear around the world, using every instrument of national power – diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, informational, intelligence, and military” (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003). The military is one instrument of power for America’s national defense. The military’s source of power is people – both the internal service of soldiers and the external support of society. The military’s strength is determined by its relationship with the society it defends. The military relies on society to provide people for service, money for resources, and national support for influence. So, who bridges the relationship between the military and society? The media, both foreign and domestic, could effectively foster positive relationships with society through the use of information, a second instrument of power. Army Public Affairs serves to provide media access and encourage reporting about the American military. As the Army transforms to prosecute the global war on terrorism (GWOT), Army Public Affairs must also transform to retain relevance as the proponent to fulfill the informational needs of the media and society about military operations in support of national defense.

The central objective of the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 shifted the basis of defense planning from a “threat-based” model to a “capabilities-based” model for the future. This approach requires the transformation of US forces, capabilities, and institutions to extend America’s asymmetric advantages well into the future. To achieve defense strategy objectives, transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches to operational concepts and
capabilities, as well as the use of old and new technologies. Transformation also results from new forms of strategic and operational challenges, and opportunities that render previous methods of conducting war obsolete or subordinate (Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, iv, v, 29).

“Transformation is necessary to ensure United States forces continue to operate from a position of overwhelming military advantage in support of strategic objectives. We cannot afford to react to threats slowly nor have large forces tied down for lengthy periods. Our strategy requires transformed forces that can take action from a forward position and, rapidly reinforced from other areas, defeat adversaries swiftly and decisively while conducting an active defense of United States territory. Transformed forces also are essential for deterring conflict, dissuading adversaries, and assuring others of our commitment to a peaceful world” (Transformation Planning Guidance, 4).

Army Public Affairs exists to assist the media effort in bridging information between the Army and the American public which provides a method of military accountability. Public Affairs principles specify, “The active Army, US Army Reserve and Army National Guard have an obligation to keep the American people, its internal audiences and other key publics informed about their achievements and successes, as well as their problems and failures. Providing information openly and honestly – with minimum delay – shows courage, candor, competence and commitment, and contributes to confidence, trust, respect and esteem in the force. The Public Affairs Officer communicates the Army’s professional character, beliefs, values and ethics. Army Public Affairs promotes a greater understanding of the Army and its contribution to the nation” (FM 46-1 1997, 15).
Army Public Affairs could not adequately service tactical and operational level leaders on the battlefield nor adequately inform the American public during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003. Confined by current doctrine, resources, and training, Army Public Affairs relied primarily on the embedded media to service the public information needs of the American and international audiences during OIF. Although a successful technique of reporting military operations in Iraq, the embedded media program essentially dissolved in May 2003, when ground hostilities were declared over. As the embedded media departed Iraq, the information bridge also dissolved between the military and the serviced audiences.

The Army missed a window of opportunity, between the fall of Baghdad in May and late 2003, to provide timely, relevant information to the American, the international and the Iraqi audiences. This resulted in deteriorated American public support, questioned American intent by the Iraqi people, and increased the legitimacy of anti-American media outlets. Army Public Affairs was not prepared nor resourced to maintain both the information momentum of the embedded media program, and to fill the State Department’s public information void with the Iraqi public. Meanwhile, commanders operating in Iraq, arguably the primary focus, had an immediate need for effective public affairs support to bridge the information gap with the Iraqi and American public.

Military engagements in today’s global information environment (GIE) demand a change in traditional thinking and methods of operations. The 21st Century United States armed forces will “emphasize synergistic total joint force employment of active duty forces and the reserve components [and] enhance liaison capabilities and share appropriate DOTMLPF change recommendations to achieve unity of effort and operational integration in multinational operations” (An Evolving Joint Perspective 2003). This paper, therefore, will expand the scope of
discussion beyond the Army and the American audience to incorporate joint services and coalition partners.

Information, as an instrument of power, has significant consequences in a combat zone, yet costs little to employ. However, information employment produces unpredictable effects involving the human dimension of an immediate audience that may positively or negatively affect military operations in a region. Well-informed audiences, foreign and domestic, can potentially increase soldiers’ survivability on foreign soil.

To leverage this effect, Public Affairs must focus support to fully exploit the advances in the GIE and provide a valued service to modern day commanders on the battlefield. Transformation of current public affairs doctrine, resources, and employment is imperative to retain public affairs’ relevance on the battlefield and to maintain credibility with both foreign and domestic audiences. Public Affairs currently possess the basic foundation to bridge the information gap between forward deployed commanders and the host nation audience, such as the Iraqis. Public Affairs can also establish relations with host nation media for a cooperative effort to inform a local audience, while simultaneously servicing the information needs of the American public. The by-product of these public affairs efforts to obtain coalition forces’ credibility produces stability in a region of uncertainty, at little to no cost and effort. A focused, active public affairs program during OIF in 2003 could have mitigated coalition forces’ current struggle to “win hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people using information as the primary weapon of choice.

This paper describes effects of information on operations to demonstrate the necessity of Public Affairs transformation. More precisely, these effects demand the expansion of public information beyond the American audience in today’s operational environment. This paper also
suggests the potential instrument of power commanders inherit with the modular brigade as public affairs assets are integrated into the brigade structure. Additionally, this paper proposes that the Army and the American public could benefit immediately from available public affairs assets at little cost. The proposal suggests employing an expanded public affairs program in forward theaters of operation, synchronizing public affairs information objectives, and marketing public affairs products to all publics – foreign and domestic. By default, public affairs programs, aggressively executed to enable the commanders’ information instrument of power, supports national objectives where the military is deployed.

The scope of the research explores current public affairs doctrine, one public affairs team’s contributions in direct support of tactical commanders, and the effects of directly engaging Iraqi media during OIF from April 2003 to January 2004. Although the paper focuses on public affairs employment at the tactical level, the global reach of the media has strategic implications.

This paper contains five assumptions to further refine discussion of the topic. First, the Department of Defense (DoD) Public Diplomacy Office has the ability to organically support an office deployed on foreign soil with DoD civilian employees. A civilian employed staff would relieve the military requirement to fill the governmental staff void. This assumption is necessary to maximize Army Public Affairs personnel and resources availability to support commanders on the battlefield, and focus public affairs efforts on marketing near real-time information all publics.

Second, this research assumes that the military minimizes damage on television and radio towers during offensive operations to allow for expeditious repair of the country’s media infrastructure and support future communication requirements between the commander and the
host nation public. This assumption is made because communication mediums must exist or be quickly repairable to optimize the information opportunity presented during the operational pause following hostilities or during transitions. Upon arrival into a foreign region, military forces must have a near-immediate capability to communicate with the host nation public to obtain credibility.

Third, this research assumes that public affairs assets are available and attached early or organic to maneuver units deployed in critical, large population areas. This assumption is necessary to establish public affairs assets availability to expeditiously bridge information with the host nation public through media. Timely employment of public affairs assets creates positive conditions by providing immediate information about the occupying military force.

Fourth, this research assumes that civil affairs elements did not plan to rebuild the media infrastructure or intend to establish relationships with the ‘former’ Iraqi media during OIF. Instead, DoD’s Office of Strategic Communications was assigned the task to establish a media network in Iraq for the American interim government known as the Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). The interim government ORHA was later renamed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). CPA sub-contracted the media network project to Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) for the establishment of “Iraqi Media Network,” later known as “Al-Iraqia.” This network was CPA created and operated using Iraqi hire. The Baghdad-focused broadcast network operation did not initially plan for or provide region-specific broadcasting to local Iraqi audiences. This assumption is necessary to acknowledge that the military did not plan for or have influence over the Iraqi media. Media outlets in Iraq were necessary and effective public information mediums during post-conflict,
stability operations. Coalition forces’ use of existing Iraqi media infrastructure directly affected stability in the multiple regions.

Fifth, closely tied to the former, this research assumes that DoD had planned a media information infrastructure that would allow coalition forces access to communicate regional updates of progress to the Iraqi public. Information infrastructure support from SAIC arrived nine months too late in Northern Iraq. This assumption must be made to address considerations for planning future operations that synchronize organic public affairs expanded public information efforts and interagency efforts to enhance commanders’ capability during post conflict operations.

This research topic is limited in five areas. The first limitation is the ability to measure the effectiveness of public affairs products passed by public affairs elements from Iraq to Army Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Pentagon using Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) satellite equipment. These satellite systems, known as the SCOTTY system, were intended to provide large-file transfer capability of daily public affairs print and broadcast products, and video teleconferencing capability, as well as a reach-back capability to the United States. A/22nd MPAD, in Mosul, was directed to discontinue the public affairs product push to the CENTCOM state-side SCOTTY satellite terminal in late April 2003 and to the Pentagon terminal in early May 2003. The author is unaware of the method that CENTCOM and the Pentagon received public affairs products to support CONUS press briefings following the termination of this media production outlet.

A second limitation is the author’s ability to measure effects of SAIC contracted media network progress throughout Iraq since the company’s focus was primarily Baghdad. SAIC
media efforts did not attentively work on the media network in Northern Iraq until December 2003. No means exists to accurately measure media support effectiveness across all of Iraq.

The third limitation is identifying civil affairs units’ overall interaction with the Iraqi media and contribution to the media infrastructure rebuilding effort. Although not planned, some units quickly filled the need to close the information gap through local media outlets. The author is unable to measure civil affairs units’ media infrastructure reconstruction efforts based on differing operational priorities among regions.

The fourth limitation is determining the responsibilities of the DoD’s Office of Strategic Communications in relation to the American military’s Public Affairs responsibilities since this office is fairly new. Army doctrine has not yet been developed to define roles and relationships between these organizations in a forward theater during post-hostilities or stability operations.

Finally, the fifth limitation is the author’s reliance on taped material evidence dated 2003 from the Iraqi Northern Region Manager and the public affairs team’s translator. These individuals are no longer available for real-time interviews.

Delimitations within this paper, which would require individual theses, include the following concepts: merging public affairs with information operations (IO); embedded media to replace the public affairs service to fulfill the American publics’ need for information about the American military; and public affairs assets filling the DoD’s public diplomacy void on foreign soil. Although a prevalent topic in the Army today, this paper will delimit the concept of merging public affairs with IO to further define public affairs relevance on the battlefield as a contributor or an enabler that supports commanders’ IO campaigns. Inherently, public affairs and IO exist on diverging principles – public affairs on the ability to inform all audiences, and IO on the ability to influence a targeted audience to support military objectives. When merging the two battlefield
functions, one automatically injects questionable credibility. The ability to win hearts and minds is rooted in unbent truth with supporting words and deeds. Therefore, public affairs is related to the information operations function, but not an exclusively supporting function.

A second delimiting concept is the Army and the American public’s reliance on embedded media to inform the American public about military campaigns on foreign soil. This concept, too, implies irrelevance of public affairs assets on the battlefield. “There have been some who have opined that embedded media would be the Army’s PA force of the future, but that hardly seems likely given the defects inherent to that approach, for example: 1) Each reporter can only describe the piece of the fight he/she sees. Unless you have large masses of media throughout the battle space, the sum total of the story will inevitably have huge gaps. Even with 500+ embeds, the logistics (the majority of the force) and medical stories were essentially untold; 2) Embedded media are not “task able.” If the military thinks the embeds got it wrong or missed something, they can’t task them to do it over/different, or to tell the story the military thinks they missed; and 3) Embeds may (with some limitations) dis-embed at will. When Baghdad fell, the media dis-embedded in droves. How will the military tell its continuing story if the embeds leave? By mid-April 03, the embed program was functionally dead” (Colonel Gary Hovatter interview). An over-reliance on this reporting method fails the commander on the battlefield because American and international media have no staying power in theater; their safety in and around the combat zone remains a paramount concern; and non-military reporters lack thorough understanding of the Army and its operations.

Finally, the third delimiting concept is using Army Public Affairs directly to execute political messaging in forward areas of operation. The merging of Army Public Affairs and United States Strategic Communications net the same result of merging public affairs and IO.
Both inherently contain diverging principles, the first to provide timely, accurate, truthful information and the second to satisfy appropriate messaging to support national strategic objectives. Army Public affairs doctrine is designed to expose the American military that service the people, foreign and domestic, and not directly defend United States political objectives.

Limitations and delimitations are given to focus this topic on modifications that Army Public Affairs can internally remedy or request support from DoD. This focus supports Public Affairs’ increased relevance and effectiveness for commanders on the battlefield, while servicing information needs of all audiences – foreign and domestic. If the public affairs field merges into IO, the entire argument of public affairs relevance, rooted in truthfulness and credibility, is no longer valid. Although successful for a short period of time for OIF in 2003, the embedded media program can never replace public affairs on the battlefield to achieve the designed effects of Army Public Affairs. The contributions of embedded or unilateral media do not invalidate the need for public affairs support to commanders on the battlefield. And finally, deployment of Army Public Affairs to fulfill United States strategic objectives in a forward deployed environment does not overshadow public affairs responsibilities to commanders on the battlefield and the needs of all publics.

Expanded public information through host nation media is necessary to win hearts and minds of the local populace. Public Affairs can assist commanders’ efforts in establishing regional stability and rebuilding a nation by using fundamental public affairs principles. Through the host nation media, public affairs elements can facilitate commanders’ information instrument of power by enabling the communication capability with the host nation audience.

For a base of reference on the public affairs topic, this paper will define four key terms in this paragraph – public affairs, public information, command information, and community
relations. “Public Affairs fulfills the Army’s obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed, and helps to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America’s Army and its readiness to conduct operations in peacetime, conflict and war. Public affairs functional areas have historically been public information, command information, and community relations. As broad reference, the terms are still useful. Public information is a general term describing processes used to provide information to external audiences through public media. Internal information, also know as command information, is communication by a military organization with service members, civilian employees and family members of the organization that creates an awareness of the organization’s goals, informs them of significant developments affecting them and the organization, increases their effectiveness as ambassadors of the organization, and satisfies their desire to be kept informed about what is going on in the organization and operation. Community relations is establishing and maintaining effective relationships between military and civilian communities through planning and active participation in events and processes, which provide benefit to both communities” (FM 46-1 1997, 15 and 20).

Overall, this paper will focus on the implications of public affairs change and the necessary expansion of public information to “other key publics” in the contemporary operating environment to achieve understanding and enhance contributions to the mission. “The Public Affairs Officer provides input to the warfighting planning process, and supports political, economic, and informational goals, as well as military objectives. The PAO assesses the impact of military operations in both the global and military information environments” (FM 46-1 1997, 15). Thus, the paper explores the dynamics of bridging these two environments through the use of media to reach an expanded audience and to obtain informational effects for commanders on the battlefield.
"Ours is not an age of democracy, or an age of terrorism, but an age of mass media, without which the current strain of terrorism would be toothless in any case" (Kaplan, no. 128). This research was guided by this concept of information as an instrument of power. The research question directed the study of public information extended to all audiences in operational environments through the public affairs functional area. Is public information expansion to all audiences imperative in the contemporary operating environment? Based on evidence from desired effects, what are the implications of change? How, then, would public affairs change to more effectively achieve desired effects on the battlefield?

The preponderance of literature review was focused on military operational effects of information from a public affairs approach from 2001 to 2005. In an attempt to understand public affairs and the media’s role in contemporary military operations, the author examined the specific topic of expanded public information for two years. The author spent the first year as a participant in the public affairs process during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003 by providing direct support to commanders to meet informational requirements of both the military community and the host nation, Iraq. The author spent the subsequent year at the United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in research of professional literature and attendance of professional discussions on public affairs (PA) and related topics of psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), and information operations (IO).

Since information was obtained over a two year period through participation, observation, and reading, this literature review only highlights key source references. Research
of this thesis began with a review of current doctrine to obtain a basic understanding of information related functional areas in the Army. Interviews and published articles through June 2005 then provided an explanation of non-doctrinal information support of many organizations participating in OIF to accomplish operational success.

The foundation of doctrinal research was based in Department of Defense (DoD) directives, field manuals and open source information from the internet. The primary directive used in this research was the Secretary of Defense’s directive in the DoD Principles of Information (DoD Directive 5122.5 2002). Primary field manual review included Public Affairs Operations (FM 46-1 1997); Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (FM 3-61.1 2000); Psychological Operations (FM 33-1 1979); Civil Affairs Operations (FM 41-10 2000); Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (FM 3-05.401 2003); and Information Operations (FM 100-6 1996, and FM 3-13 2003). Primary internet research provided a basic understanding of information service providers at the national level – the Office of Global Communications, the Office of Strategic Communications, and State Department Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (www.whitehouse.gov/ogc, www.publicdiplomacy.org).

The author reviewed reports and articles about public affairs from 1996 to 2000, to gain an appreciation for public affairs operational concerns with regard to public information prior to OIF in 2003. “Information warfare is not new. What is new is the seamless and integrated approach to the conduct of information and disinformation and its lethality. Media molds opinion and is a potent force multiplier or force degrader. The information gap includes a ‘public affairs’ component comprising use of media to keep populations informed and to build support through overt and covert dissemination of messages and at the same time remaining alert to counter a hostile media” (Malik 2004).
Primary referenced reports from 1996 to 2001 were obtained from the Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), United States Naval and Army War College, and Central Queensland University. Major Carl E. Fischer suggested that public affairs was a ‘Force XXI Multiplier’ by using all available media to tell the Army story while simultaneously conducting command information programs (Fischer 1996). Naval Lieutenant Commander Anthony Cooper suggested that public affairs was an instrument of power for the operational commander to maintain national will and support as well as provide operational deception and intelligence gathering (Cooper 1997). Army Colonel W. C. Garrison suggested “making a weapon of public affairs” by changing objectives of its public information function in the global information environment (Garrison 1999). Navy Lieutenant Commander John F. Kirby suggested that public affairs was an operational function necessary to shape the battlefield through the use of mass media (Kirby 2000). Jacqui Ewart suggested that “a community comes to recognize and hence know itself through its representation in the local media” (Ewart 2000). Explanations within these references reflected similar analysis to those proposed in this paper.

Since events of 11 September 2001, marked the beginning of many changes in the American military, the author focused this research specifically on the expansion of public information from 2001 to 2005. These literary works spanned consideration of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines – both active and reserve; addressed information as associated with public affairs, psychological operations, civil affairs, and information operations; and focused review of 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 4th Infantry Division, 5th Marine Regiment, and United States Strategic Command.

Highlighted literature for this period included media assessments on Iraq, operational after action reports, Center for Strategic Leadership reports, and monthly Information Operations
newsletters. The primary media assessment on Iraqi media reviewed was conducted 15 May 2003 to 15 June 2003 by Baltic Media Centre, Index on Censorship, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, and International Media Support that assessed the media environment in post-war Iraq and the United States Coalition Provisional Authority information contributions (Baghdad, London, Copenhagen, May – June 2003). A key report reviewed was the Center for Army Lessons Learned Initial Impressions Report on Operation Iraqi Freedom that incorporated several lessons learned and DOTMLPF implications in the areas of information operations, civil military operations, engineer, and combat service support (CALL No. 04-13, May 2004). A primary document referenced from the public affairs community was the draft copy of Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Public Affairs Insights created and tasked by the Chief of Staff of the Army in early April 2003 to identify short-term observations having immediate impact on our Army and deploying formations; gather mid-range lessons learned that could shape the Army across DOTMLPF; and write a long-term history of the Army in OIF that informs the general military and civilian readership (APAC 2003). Another key document reviewed was a Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper on the military and the media’s joint experience during OIF that primarily addressed embedded and unilateral media coverage of military operations (Pasquarett October 2003). This paper also considered a collection of Information Operations Newsletters, a monthly compilation of news articles that address information effects on military operations, from October 2004 to May 2005 (USSTRATCOM 2004-2005).

During OIF 2003, the Army relied primarily on the embedded media program to satisfy the information needs of the American and international public in which many recent articles address. Public affairs articles about military operations in Iraq that address expanded information discuss the embedded media program and information operations. However, the
author found few written documents specific to public affairs directly engaging the host nation media, the Iraqi media in this case. Most of this research was based on interviews, seminars, and public affairs and information dissemination directives from senior military leaders addressing the operational overlap of information functional areas.

The author obtained public affairs and information perspective from several public affairs officers and operational commanders in Kuwait and Iraq from February 2003 to January 2004. Key public affairs officers included Colonel Rick Thomas, CFLCC-PAO Chief; Colonel Guy Shields, CPA-PAO; Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Julian, Deputy CFLCC-PAO Forward; and Lieutenant Colonel Henry Huntley, CFLCC-PAO Rear. Key commanders included Lieutenant General David Petraeus, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); Colonel Joseph Anderson, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); Lieutenant Colonel Rice, Director of Civil Military Operations Center in Mosul early 2003; Lieutenant Colonel Fred Humphreys, Director of Civil Military Operations Center in Mosul 2003 to 2004; and numerous other Brigade and Battalion Commanders in the Northern region of Iraq from 2003 to 2004.

Additionally, the author considered several interagency perspectives obtained during operations. Coalition Provisional Authority and sub-contractor perspectives were obtained from Gary Thatcher, Director of CPA-Strategic Communications; Loren Flossman, Iraqi Media Network Project Manager; Ron Roughhead, Iraqi Media Network Operations Officer; and Tom Barnes (SAIC), Jim Stewart (SAIC), Nick Ackerman (Reed, Inc), Jan Bosman (Reed / Harris, Inc) – Iraqi Media Network Northern Regional Managers. Non-governmental agency perspective was also considered, primarily Ms. Abouzeid, Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International representative in Northern Iraq.
This research also considered numerous Iraqi media, government officials, and translator perspectives to maintain focus on public affairs’ expanded public information relevance to current military operations.

From 2004 to present, the author obtained public affairs and information perspective from additional public affairs officers and operational commanders. Key public affairs officer perspective included Brigadier General Robert Gaylord, Chief of Army Public Affairs in 2004; Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, Chief of Army Public Affairs in 2005; Colonel Gary Hovatter, Director of Army Public Affairs Center in 2004 to 2005; Colonel Billy Buckner, XVIII Airborne Corps Public Affairs Officer; Lieutenant Colonel William McDonald, 4th Infantry Division Public Affairs Officer in 2003; and retired Lieutenant Colonel Rick Olsen, former Public Affairs Officer.

The author also considered perspectives from the American media primarily through college media panels and guest speaker lectures that were focused on the last two years of Operation Iraqi Freedom on the relationship between the military and the media and on basic journalistic expectations. Individual guest speakers included Joe Galloway, Knight Rider News, and Rick Atkinson, embedded journalist with 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in February to April 2003. The first media panel included Tom Ricks, The Washington Post; Michael Hirsh, Newsweek; and Sean Naylor, Army Times. The second media panel included Brigadier General (Retired) David L. Grange, Grange on Point; Lou Dobbs, CNN; Steve Cochran, KDWB FM; Ken Robinson, CNN Military Analyst; and Timothy McNulty, Associate Managing Editor of Foreign News.

Other key contributors to the information perspective were two former battalion commanders who served during Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003 to 2004. Lieutenant Colonel
Charles Heatherly, commanded a civil affairs battalion in Najaf, stated that he would have purchased his own radio station provided he had money to do so (Lieutenant Colonel Charles Heatherly interview). Lieutenant Colonel Jochen Thomas, commanded a signal battalion in Baghdad, stated the importance of communicating with the Iraqi people and coalition forces obligation to inform all audiences (Lieutenant Colonel Jochen Thomas interview).

During CGSC in 2004 to 2005, senior military leaders spoke of Phase III, combat, and of Phase IV, transition or post-conflict, operational lines no longer existing, but rather these two phases occurring simultaneously. Traditional garrison and tactical responsibilities of PA, PSYOP, CA, and IO of the transitional Army have blurred as well in prosecuting the war on terror in the global information environment (GIE).

Senior military leaders have acknowledged the need to expand information in operational environments such as Iraq. Army Public Affairs, specifically, deployed a mobile training team to train Iraqi ministry public affairs workers on media interaction (Huval, August 2004). Most recently, a news article states that “the United States Special Operations Command has hired three firms to produce newspaper stories, television broadcasts, and websites to spread American propaganda overseas.” The article further states that the military may spend up to $100 million for this media campaign in the next five years (Crawley 2005).

Literature reviewed for development of this paper suggested the American military has not yet found a solution to remedy negative effects of information and exploit positive effects of information in the contemporary operating environment. This paper attempted to explore possible techniques for information management in these environments from a public affairs perspective. The grounded approach was used throughout the explanation of current doctrine and
these proposed concepts. Concepts, theory, and doctrine were matched with actual effects of expanded public information during OIF.
A qualitative method of research is essential in developing this single, explanatory embedded case study to support the credibility of the concluding recommendations. Much of the fieldwork and data collection was done prior to the final definition of study questions and hypotheses (Yin, 2003). The goal of this research was to discover a theory by directly observing a social phenomenon in its raw form (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The method of this research specifically reviews public affairs doctrine, illustrates modified public affairs employment in a forward theater designed to serve as an effective resource for commanders on the battlefield to win hearts and minds of the local populace using a truthful information flow, and illustrates effects that assisted regional stability and nation rebuilding efforts.

This qualitative research allowed the researcher to understand people from their own frames of references and value all perspectives of their given situation. The concept of close identification by participants with the results of the study increases the credibility of the results (Marshall and Rossman 1989). This technique of research was useful in identifying and understanding a range of human behaviors and beliefs (Grunig and Hunt 1984). Effects of a single piece of information have the potential to span all levels of war – strategic, operational, and tactical. This paper will focus primarily on effects of information at the tactical level during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from April 2003 to January 2004 that had strategic implications through global media. With respect to the three tenets of public affairs, this paper will explore one expanded tenet of public information in the operational environment. The paper recommends techniques for public affairs employment to increase support to commanders on the battlefield.
and the American public by applying modified doctrine to support all media outlets, foreign and domestic.

The strength of this interactive process of research method provides the ability to use the participants’ own language and symbols which increases the validity of the results (Marshall and Rossman 1989). However, this method of research is limited in the number of participants which limits the scale to measure patterns. The design for the interactive process seeks to answer why public affairs employment was modified during OIF, how public affairs assets were employed, and the effect obtained for commanders and host nation publics due to modified employment. The case study method is designed to determine whether or not public affairs should modify their current doctrine to enhance commanders’ informational capability in the contemporary operating environment.

Collection of Data

Evaluative criteria included a combination of interviewing, participation, observation, and analysis of the method. The researcher spoke individually to participants in the form of long interviews to gain a full understanding of their perceptions. The research weights individual perspectives heavily and uses the triangulation approach to validate the concept. The participant sample is limited by time and funding, but are critical personnel of influence in the field of discussion.

The preponderance of literary evidence draws on interviews from commanders and public affairs experts involved in the planning and execution of OIF 2003 to 2004. Data is also obtained from written documents such as plans, public affairs guidance, and after action reviews; and from participation and direct observation of the writer and interviewees who served in key positions during the operation. Public Affairs plans and guidance were provided from
Department of Defense (DoD) and Army Central Command (CENTCOM) for use as background only, thus is not directly attributed in this paper. After action reviews are primarily from 4th Infantry Division Public Affairs Officer (4ID PAO), and Alpha Team, 22nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (A/22nd MPAD). After action reviews from CFLCC-PAO were referenced for background purposes only.

Interviews were conversations with a purpose rather than a structured set of formal questions (Kahn and Cannell 1957). Interviews were open-ended and unstructured to permit the researcher a full understanding of complex areas and uncovered analytical categories shared by the subjects throughout the exploration of this topic. Advantages of the interview include: the immediate collection of large amounts of contextual data; facilitated analysis, validity checks, and triangulation; and the flexibility to form or change hypotheses (McCracken 1988). Disadvantages of the interview include: misinterpretation of results because of subjective differences between participant and researcher; dependent on a small group of key participants; often difficult to replicate; dependent on a participant’s honesty; and dependent on the researcher to be resourceful, systematic, and honest while controlling bias (Marshall and Rossman 104). Thus, triangulation is used in this research to control disadvantages of the interview method and maintain credibility of the study.

Three categories of interviewees include battlefield commanders, public affairs leaders and Iraqi media leaders. Interviews from two battlefield commanders, Lieutenant General David Petraeus and Colonel Joseph Anderson, provide a description of effects from one public affairs team directly engaging Iraqi media in Mosul, Iraq, from April 2003 to January 2004. Lieutenant General David Petraeus, currently the Multi-National Security Transition Command Commander, commanded the 101st Division (Air Assault) during OIF in 2003 and extended
A/22nd MPAD’s tour in Iraq for continued direct operational support to the division and the local media in the region. Colonel Joseph Anderson, currently the Executive Officer to the Secretary of the Army, commanded the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (2BCT) during OIF in 2003 and provided command guidance and support to the team throughout the operation. These former commanders engaged all media nearly daily and offer insightful perspectives on public affairs as a critical instrument of combat power.

Public affairs leaders include Colonel Gary Hovatter, Colonel William Darley, Lieutenant Colonel William McDonald, and Brigadier General Vincent Brooks. Colonel Hovatter is currently the Director for the Army Public Affairs Center, responsible for developing doctrine and equipping public affairs units. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Colonel Hovatter served as Director of Operations, USCENTCOM Coalition Press Information Center in Kuwait (CPIC-Kuwait) from March to April 2003 and Director of Operations, ORHA (then CPA) Joint Information Bureau (JIB), Baghdad from April to July 2003. Colonel Hovatter offers a senior perspective of public affairs employment from Kuwait to Baghdad during the operation, public affairs responsibilities and interface with the governmental agency in charge of Iraqi media, and public affairs doctrine and unit resourcing pre- and post-deployment in support of OIF, and near-term changes to public affairs doctrine and equipping public affairs units. Colonel William Darley currently serves as Editor in Chief of Military Review at Fort Leavenworth, offering a unique perspective of related top military events. During OIF, Colonel Darley served as a public affairs advisor in Baghdad in 2003. Colonel Darley offers a senior public affairs perspective of overall public affairs activities, perspective on related public affairs responsibilities with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, and perspective on professional writing since redeployment from the operation. Lieutenant Colonel McDonald served as 4ID PAO during OIF
2003 and currently serves with Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). He offers experiences that required engaging Iraqi media using a similar approach to A/22nd MPAD, only differing in the selected primary medium – the newspaper. Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, Chief of Army Public Affairs, offers vision for the future of Army Public Affairs and support to commanders in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These Public Affairs experts offer insight to pre-deployment plans, in-progress modifications to public affairs plans, and significant lessons learned for future employment of public affairs assets.

Interview material was also obtained from two senior public affairs non-commissioned officers (NCOs), Master Sergeant Ken Heller and Sergeant First Class Eric Hendrix. Master Sergeant Heller served as the MPAD First Sergeant during OIF in 2003 and recently completed the Sergeant Majors Academy. He offers comparative analysis among traditional public affairs employment, current operational experience, and recent challenges within the senior ranks of public affairs. Sergeant First Class Eric Hendrix served as the A/22nd MPAD NCOIC during OIF in 2003 and currently serves as a broadcast instructor at the Defense Information School (DINFOS). He offers comparative analysis among traditional broadcast employment, current operational experience, and current broadcast training perspective. These senior public affairs NCOs offer the soldiers’ perspective to the discussion, identify effects of public affairs personnel assignment and training, and recommend solutions to enhance public affairs contributions to commanders on the battlefield.

Lastly, Iraqi media leaders and media translators offer the Iraqi perspective of the utility of public affairs assets serving as the bridge between coalition forces and the information to the local public. Research offers discussion of the public affairs team’s direct interface with Iraqi media to highlight unique talents exploited for the benefit of both the coalition forces and the
Iraqi people that were not organic to the American military nor supported by traditional public
affairs doctrine. Supporting evidence was obtained from participation and from a taped interview
of the Mosul public affairs team translator, who worked directly with the local media, CPA-
Media, and the former Ninevah Region Broadcast Manager.

Participant observation is used extensively in this research and synthesized with
interviews frequently to mitigate bias of the researcher. The strength of this method builds theory
from the participant’s perspective which enhances credibility of the results (Adler and Adler
1994; Yin 1989). Other advantages to this method include the ability to collect data on a large
range of behaviors, greater variety of interactions, and more open discussions on the research
topic (Morgan 1988). Disadvantages to this method includes time consuming research for at least
a year or two (Agar, 1980) and possibly over involvement of the researcher causing increased
susceptibility to bias (Denzin 1989). Therefore, the researcher must be more attentive
maintaining objectivity and in mitigating bias of the study.

This research uses the grounded theory, the inductive discovery of theory from data
which develops a theory from analyzing diverse data (Strauss and Corbin 1990). The theory
should be comprehensible and make sense to both the persons who are studied and to those
practicing in that area; be abstract enough to make it applicable to a variety of contexts related to
that situation; and provide control with regard to action toward the situation. The grounded
theory approach, then, is a method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an
inductively derived theory about a phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin 1990).

Grounded theory is similar to participant observation with regard to strengths and
weaknesses. A challenge with this method considers closeness to data in an attempt to relate to
theory, but also requires certain distance from the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Again, the
researcher must maintain objectivity and injects the method of triangulation to mitigate bias of this research.

A single case study is the tool of this qualitative research that allows in-depth probing of single situation (Fortner and Christians 1989). This research includes elements of all six sources of evidence: documents (internal documents and corroborative evidence from other primary sources); archival records (events logs and records); interviews (in-depth, open-ended); direct observation (observed environmental conditions and relevant behaviors and extensive field notes); participant observation (active member); and physical artifacts (other physical evidence) (Yin 1989). The strength of this case study enhances the understanding of complex social phenomena that allows for explanation of how and why using real-life context (Yin 1994). A second strength of this case study allows for triangulation of multiple perceptions and comparison to clarify their meaning (Flick 1992).

To obtain a deeper understanding of the situation, the research will incorporate a discussion of media expectations from various American news agencies on informational expectations of the media from military personnel, as well as effects obtained from the Iraqi media and Iraqi translator bridging information between Coalition Forces and the local Iraqi public with public affairs facilitating the effort. The implications of public affairs change are explained primarily with how public affairs units are trained, equipped, and employed.

Analysis of Data

The qualitative method was used to develop this research to address the significance of public affairs employment in the forward theater and ultimately, implications of transformation. Research briefly begins with a review public affairs doctrine, followed by examined evidence of public affairs application in Iraq during operations in 2003. The case study structure is explained
through the DOTMLPF model and evidence is presented in the order of: 1) doctrine, 2) non-traditional application of public affairs, 3) effects of nontraditional application from commanders and public affairs officers’ perspective. Long interviews were used to obtain these perspectives which fostered in-depth understanding of the situation. This research also considers methods of communication through media infrastructure and marketing, as well as Iraqi participation through public affairs application buy-in.

Evidence included in this case study spans two years of the researcher’s participation, observation, interviews, research, and graduated understanding of public affairs activities in Iraq, as well as a developing understanding of public affairs role in the transforming Army. Research questions emerged from commanders’ desired informational effects on the battlefield. The author deduced a theory from analyzing desired effects and current public affairs doctrine. The central research question is: Is public information expansion to all audiences imperative in the contemporary operating environment? Based on evidence from desired effects, what are the implications of change? The implications of change are divided into categories of DOTMLPF model and matched with informational effects. How, then, would public affairs change to more effectively achieve desired effects on the battlefield? Within the DOTMLPF structure, a sample is provided to explain of non-traditional public affairs application. What are these desired effects? Through quotes, commanders comment on effects achieved through the use of nontraditional public affairs application during OIF in 2003. Marketing is addressed as a key contributor to massing information effects. The research further describes effects on the Iraqi media that proved to be a significant contribution to this public affairs application. Lastly, how will the future public affairs configuration support the transformed brigade? Public Affairs
developers provide insight to initial work-in-progress for future application of public affairs assets.

The researcher has imposed strict internal scrutiny to effectively reduce bias due to direct participation, thus commenting primarily on events. To ensure credibility of analysis, triangulation of interviews is used to describe effects and is the basis for concluding recommendations. The grounded approach to developing questions resulted in findings to develop a theory; in this case, the imperative to expand public information in the contemporary operating environment.

The introduction establishes the background for this research of public information expansion. First, the paper defines public affairs and the purpose of the organization. Analysis begins with the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, the Secretary of Defense’s directive of military support to the National Security Strategy; and Transformation Planning Guidance that outlines the purpose and method for Army transformation. This paper also addresses the DoD Principles of Information that establishes the foundation for all DoD public affairs activities. This research is then matched to current public affairs doctrine; how public affairs is organized, equipped, and trained; and whether the current public affairs structure provided adequate support to commanders in Iraq and adequate information to the American public during OIF in 2003. Is public affairs configured to support the modular brigade? Should public affairs transform and what are the implications of change?

Chapter 4 consists of three sections. The first section describes effects of expanded public information during OIF in 2003 using the DOTMLPF model. The analysis compares current public affairs doctrine to an alternative method of employing public affairs in an attempt to more effectively service commanders’ information requirements with the host nation. The second
section describes how one public affairs team enhanced commander information capabilities in northern Iraq through the four primary mediums of television, radio, newspaper, and meetings. Additionally, this section offers an American media perspective of desired military access for information and the effects of public affairs personnel direct interaction with Iraqi media. The third section describes the evolving vision of the future of public affairs in the transformed Army using the DOTMLPF model.

The final chapter establishes patterns of research to determine public affairs requirements to increase effective public affairs support to commanders on the battlefield. The chapter ends with recommendations that have evolved from the research to enhance public affairs contribution to commanders on the battlefield and to improve information to all audiences, foreign and domestic.

Research design of the paper also considers the construct of the reviewing committee that by design incorporate professional specialties of discussion in the paper to include garrison public affairs, deployed public affairs, civil affairs, and psychological operations. Committee member composition lends effective vantage points to analyze and direct the topic for possible modification to the future employment of public affairs assets. Lieutenant Colonel (Reserve) David Howey currently serves as the Fort Leavenworth garrison public affairs officer (PAO). He is grounded in public affairs doctrine and principles, and he offers an objective opinion for future employment without bias that may accompany direct participants in OIF. Colonel William Darley currently serves as the Chief Editor of the Military Review. He offers senior public affairs perspective on current issues in the field, as well as a participative reference to OIF. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Plowman currently serves as a professor at Brigham Young University in the Department of Strategic Communications. He offers expertise and perspective from
multitasked reserve officer in public affairs, civil affairs, psychological operations, public relations, conflict resolution, and infantry tactics. Collectively, committee members for this project possess professional expertise in the majority of topics discussed.

Each question is matched to documents and measured for effectiveness through participation or direct observation of at least two interviewees. The paper is checked for the writer’s objectivity due to participation and direct observation through the triangulation method of two other sources, one document-based and the other effects-based interview. The weighted criteria are commanders’ interviews of effects-based employment and public affairs lessons learned from OIF to determine whether public affairs requires modification to support the Army undergoing transformation in the contemporary operating environment.

This research also suggests that current public affairs doctrine, if modified to address all audiences through the expansion of public information, would serve more relevant to commanders on the battlefield. This question is analyzed to determine if modification of doctrine is necessary, feasible, and sustainable. Necessary is determined through an analysis of the current public affairs doctrine and support requirements for the transformed Army. Feasible is determined through an analysis of the existing personnel and equipment and suggested support requirements. Sustainable is determined through an analysis of the suggested public affairs personnel support to current operations.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Effects of Expanded Public Information

Doctrine

Department of Defense (DoD) Principles of Information chart the course for all DoD Public Affairs activities and apply to the full continuum of day-to-day activities and operations. Commanders are responsible for ensuring that all planning for military activities and operations efficiently and effectively achieve the goals set by these principles. A pivotal principle for Army public affairs is “timely and accurate information will be made available so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security, defense strategy, and on-going joint and unilateral operations” (DoD Principles of Information, 2002). Army public affairs must also balance a free flow of general and military information, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their family members; and ensuring information withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national and operations security or threatens the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces (FM 3-61.1 2000, A).

Army public affairs doctrine targets the American audience to achieve DoD directives for public information. The public affairs mission “fulfills the Army’s obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed, and helps to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America’s Army and its readiness to conduct operations in peacetime, conflict and war. When employed to maximum effect, Army Public Affairs helps the commander achieve information dominance and conduct coordinated information operations, and also contributes to the preservation of public support” (FM 46-1 1997, 3).
As a nation conducting a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in the global information environment (GIE) while transforming the Army, is it time to expand the scope of the public affairs audience beyond the American public? Dynamics of this movement suggests changes primarily in how public affairs personnel are equipped and employed in support of current operations. Interviews with tactical commanders define effects on the battlefield when one public affairs team addresses all audiences, particularly the Iraqi people through their media.

On 22 April 2003, Alpha team, 22nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (A/22nd MPAD) arrived in Mosul, Iraq, with 2nd Brigade Combat Team (2BCT) commanded by COL Joseph Anderson. As the team collocated with the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) the following day, the Iraqi people expressed disdain for coalition forces at the recently established CMOC through demonstrations, chants, and graffiti. Since the civil affairs unit did not have civil information officers to service immediate media concerns, the public affairs team identified immediate information needs of the Iraqi public. The public affairs team conducted informal surveys with participants of Iraqi demonstrations and provided the Iraqi broadcast media immediate information about coalition efforts; this visual media consisted of relevant humanitarian assistance stories within one day of coalition assistance. The effects on the Iraqi people were surprisingly calming. The public affairs team continued to grow and expand relations with the former and newly forming Iraqi media outlets from television to radio and, as Iraqis became more confident, newspaper.

The public affairs team followed all public affairs principles governing public information. The team merely expanded the audience to include the Iraqi media while encouraging Iraqi media professional growth and coordinated support for media infrastructure repair. Simultaneously, the public affairs team provided command information, in both print and
broadcast media, to CFLCC-PAO and 101st commanders. The team also furnished public
information by providing imagery to both CENTCOM and the Pentagon for use during press
briefings. Additionally, the team served as media escorts for the American and international
media.

Some argue that the State Department had the responsibility to inform the Iraqi people of
coalition efforts and to address media infrastructure and personnel concerns (Colonel William
Darley discussion). Others argue that civil affairs had the responsibility to interact with the Iraqi
media (Colonel Gary Hovatter interview). And still others argue that psychological operations
personnel had the responsibility to influence the Iraqi public through all available print and
broadcast mediums (Colonel Gary Hovatter interview). The author found no evidence stating
that public affairs had the responsibility to directly engage the Iraqi media to provide information
about coalition forces. However in Mosul, public affairs served as a known credible source of
information and source of access to coalition forces. The public affairs team also understood
print and broadcasting journalistic needs, as well as information medium requirements to
communicate with publics.

The A/22nd MPAD team communicated directly with Iraqi former media managers and
journalists in Northern Iraq to identify Iraqi information needs. First, the team identified existing
Iraqi media infrastructure and capabilities. Then, the team gained an appreciation for Middle
East cultural journalistic techniques while educating the Iraqi media on western journalistic
techniques.

The public affairs team’s daily priorities included: 1) standard public affairs story
acquisition in coordination with the 101st commanders, key staff; and civil affairs, 2) publishing
print and broadcast products through coalition forces channels, 3) converting the same broadcast
stories to appropriate broadcasting standard for local Iraqi viewing nightly, and 4) coordinating media opportunities for Mosul television and radio journalists with the 101st commanders and key staff. These techniques enabled the presentation of timely, relevant news on events within the northern region of Iraq.

“Great work by the MPAD with the local media in northern Iraq helped provide the Iraqi people information about a variety of endeavors in their province designed to help rebuild the infrastructure, ensure security, improve basic services, and boost employment. This served the overall informational needs of the Iraqi people and also fostered a very helpful understanding of what the 101st Airborne Division was doing for the region and the people” (Lieutenant General David Petraeus Interview).

“The Iraqi people cannot read about what’s going on around them in the National Enquirer tomorrow. Someone has to communicate coalition efforts” (Colonel Joseph Anderson Interview). Host nation publics must be informed of coalition efforts to improve the welfare of the Iraqi people to support stability in the region and ultimately allow coalition forces to accomplish military objectives in a timely manner.

The 4ID PAO directly engaged Iraqi media by allowing them to attend daily press conferences that provided updates of the last 24 to 48 hours within their area of responsibility – both good and bad news. The 4ID PAO equally offered Iraqi media a scope of understanding and access to information about coalition forces as any other media in attendance. The effects of interfacing with local Iraqi media enhanced public affairs credibility for providing trustworthy information that was timely and relevant to the audience directly affected by military operations (Lieutenant Colonel William McDonald interview).
Organization

“Army and USMC PA technology focused on capturing material and generating product and not on the timely distribution of product. Post-G-day, standard PA communications systems (very sparse in the TOE) were wholly insufficient to conduct routine PA C2, let alone providing CFLCC-generated product from the battlefield” (Colonel Gary Hovatter interview). The organization and manning authorization of Army public affairs assets were configured to support the doctrinal employment of public affairs. Under the traditional force structure, public affairs assets were attached at the division level in garrison and augmented as required in the forward theater (FM 46-1 1997). Under modularity, limited public affairs assets are organic at brigade-level in both the forward and rear environments (Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity).

During OIF 2003, the Army’s only active duty Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD) was assigned to 3rd Army Public Affairs (CFLCC-PAO) in Kuwait in temporary change of station status. The 22nd MPAD’s MTOE design authorized 20 total personnel consisting of a headquarters and three teams; however, the MPAD deployed 18 personnel reorganized into two teams to support operations in Kuwait and Iraq. Alpha team’s primary responsibility was the northern sector of Iraq; Bravo team’s primary responsibility was support to V Corps in Baghdad (22nd MTOE).

Upon initial arrival in Mosul, A/22nd MPAD traditionally employed soldiers for story acquisition and release for the American audience. The team accomplished traditional public affairs support by publishing a field newspaper for 101st soldiers. Both the print and the broadcast stories were then sent to CFLCC-PAO in Kuwait, CENTCOM Headquarters in Qatar and Florida, and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. using the SCOTTY satellite system.
Once the team identified an information vacuum with the Iraqi people, the team expanded the public information reach to include the Iraqi people through the one television broadcast station spanning coverage to only the city of Mosul. The team offered the Mosul television manager a nightly video update containing the same public affairs stories sent for American audience use. The team treated the exchange with the Iraqi media as a garrison newspaper submission, using the same principle of submitting a newspaper article to a hometown news agency and allowing the news agency the choice to publish the material. The team quickly learned that the Iraqi people were starved for information about coalition forces activities in their region. The public affairs team and the Northern Region Iraqi media relationships grew daily in a joint effort to find and fulfill ‘win-win’ opportunities to serve both coalition forces and Iraqi people needs.

After two months in Mosul, the division public affairs office and A/22nd MPAD refined areas of focus to meet the informational demands of all publics – American, international, and Iraqi. The 101st PAO maintained focus on embedded and unilateral media facilitation primarily on American and international media. A/22nd MPAD focused efforts primarily on humanitarian assistance coverage sent to CFLCC and local Iraqi media outlets, video-teleconferencing to the Pentagon, and Iraqi media integration and infrastructure rebuild.

In an attempt to service these newly defined joint needs of the Iraqis and coalition forces, the team reviewed the media infrastructure to determine if viable mediums were available to communicate information about coalition forces to the people of northern region Iraq. The civil affairs communications department focused on commercial telephones and World Wide Web connectivity while the division G6 focused on tactical C4I connectivity. For a timely review of media outlets, the public affairs team leader divided six soldiers into teams of two – two soldiers
focused on television, two soldiers focused on radio, and two soldiers focused on newspaper. For a period of about two weeks, the three teams identified media infrastructure needs, journalistic training needs and informational desires, and identified media interest for follow-up media opportunities with coalition forces leaders and regional events. The team NCOIC focused on broadcast news production and the unit first sergeant focused on marketing print production to all audiences. The team leader liaised between the Iraqi media regional manager and the 101st commanders, and liaised with CFLCC-PAO and the CPA.

Once Iraqi media needs were identified, the 101st commanders obligated commander discretionary funds to purchase materials for the Iraqi employees to reconstruct their own media infrastructure – television stations, radio station, and newspapers. A/22nd MPAD soldiers returned their focus to story acquisition and publication. The team NCOIC researched and purchased CONUS digital broadcasting equipment to upgrade Iraqi broadcasting quality. Within a week of the purchased equipment arrival, A/22nd MPAD soldiers inventoried, integrated, and trained a group of Iraqis on the new equipment.

The Iraqi media were now equipped to move more freely around the region to acquire their own news material. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Commander requested one embedded Iraqi media team (Ninevah TV) to travel with the command group as they conducted battlefield circulation. This method provided Iraqis access to major events in the region to create and report on their own news with the full support and access to Coalition Forces.

Once Iraqi media were equipped and gathering their own local news, A/22nd MPAD began a series of embedding public affairs soldiers with different brigades to broaden print and broadcast coverage beyond Mosul. This technique of public affairs support provided 1st and 3rd Brigade Combat Teams much needed and requested public affairs exposure through published
print and video stories to all audiences and video-teleconferencing interviews with CFLCC and the Pentagon, a capability not organic to their force structure. Simultaneously, A/22nd MPAD team leader increased the coordinating effort for CPA media integration and media operational hand-over in Northern Iraq.

“We could not have done what we did without our public affairs team. It clearly was a combat multiplier and a critical element in our effort to keep the local citizens informed about what we – and their government – were trying to do for them” (Lieutenant General David Petraeus interview).

Training

Doctrine also serves as the basis for an authorized number of personnel identified to perform a specific military occupational skill that is directed by the modification table of organization and equipment (22nd MPAD MTOE). By MTOE, Alpha team, 22nd MPAD was authorized five public affairs personnel – one Captain, one Staff Sergeant, and three soldiers – consisting of combined skill capability in both print and broadcast. The Captain, typically a career field designated 46 military occupational skill, is schooled in a broad curriculum of public affairs elements during the Public Affairs Officers Course. The Staff Sergeant is technically trained in his or her specialty – either print or broadcast journalism. And soldiers are technically trained in their specialty, specific to print or broadcast journalism, and receive less than five percent instruction through distance learning during advanced individual training on the public affairs career field. Additionally, all training is governed by doctrine that specifies an informational service to the American audience only (Sergeant First Class Hendrix interview).

During preparation for deployment in support of operations in the Middle East, A/22nd MPAD trained on warfighter survivability skills and full scope public affairs support. Public
affairs technical deployment preparation training included, but was not limited to, operating a media operations center, responding to media queries, drafting news releases, and compiling open source information for rapid response. The pivotal training objective was providing timely, accurate, relevant information.

Upon arrival to Mosul, A/22nd MPAD was comprised of one Major, one First Sergeant, one Staff Sergeant, one Sergeant, and four soldiers in grades of Specialist and below. Although very qualified in their specific military occupational skills, the team lacked battlefield integration experience and subset skills that synchronized informational contributions of PA, PSYOP, and CA. However, the team had received some cultural instruction from a well-established CA officer in Kuwait prior to entering Iraq. During execution of operations in Mosul, the team learned and trained on necessary skills daily to notably fulfill a significant information role for commanders and the Iraqi people through the media. A highlight of some of these new skills included understanding Iraqi cultural differences based on region, understanding internal ethnic rivalries and local political sensitivities, and Iraqi journalistic techniques. Technically, these new skills included converting broadcast products from NTSC American broadcast standard to PAL European broadcast standard for Iraqi medium compatibility, creating Armed Forces News (AFN) production-style news, and identifying media infrastructure requirements. And well beyond the scope of PA duties, some new skills included identifying and requesting CONUS media sponsorship for Iraqis, procuring digital equipment from CONUS, and training Iraqi broadcast journalists on new equipment. Finally, internal cross training was required among A/22nd MPAD journalists from print to broadcast skill set to increase the depth of support to the broadcast coverage demand.
Additionally, the team relied on interpreters for initial coordination with local Iraqis and would not have been capable of success without such dedicated interpreter assets. The CMOC director in Mosul understood the public affairs team’s intent and provided full logistical and informational support within his means such as living space, local telephone connectivity, vetted interpreters, and information gathering forums. Through operational trials, the third interpreter remained a key component of the public affairs team that proved to be a critical link between commanders and the Iraqi people throughout the deployment; later, he bridged relations for non-governmental agencies and US State Department employees with the Iraqi people as well.

The public affairs team’s fast learning in all of the aforementioned areas earned a rooted respect and credibility between the Iraqi media and 101st Commanders. “Training in respect to geographic history, culture and linguistics is mandatory when engaging in any type of information environment. You must understand the other person in order to know why they express the things they do and what their motivations are” (Master Sergeant Heller interview).

The team’s broadened scope of cultural understanding and the acknowledged professional skills of the Iraqi people empowered the Iraqi people to remedy many problems within their control faster and more efficiently than the American military would have been capable. The emerging Iraqi media quickly earned the confidence of Coalition Forces commanders and served as the key communication medium between Coalition Forces and the local civilians by providing timely information about major events occurring in their region. With the information mediums in place, relevant regional information from commanders reached the Iraqi local audience through television, AM radio, and newspapers spanning from Baghdad to the overlapping northern borders of Iraq. The overall effect of providing timely, relevant
information directly to the Iraqi people supported regional stability and encouraged Iraqi participation in safeguarding their own country.

The 4ID PAO assessed a need to increase NCO education to full scope public affairs instruction. Every soldier must first be proficient in warfighting skills, and then possess a ‘big picture’ understanding of public affairs objectives. Public affairs must grow soldiers’ assertive skills. This characteristic enables Army specialists to effectively obtain newsworthy information from senior leaders and better serve as media escorts in obtaining appropriate access to senior leaders to fulfill informational needs of commercial media. Public affairs personnel must understand the full scope of media facilitation – from knowing the purpose of escorting media, to identifying media opportunities, to understanding the strategic implications of reporting (Lieutenant Colonel McDonald interview).

Material

In terms of maneuver and force protection under the traditional public affairs structure, a public affairs team was ill equipped to autonomously move throughout the battlefield gathering newsworthy stories. By MTOE, A/22nd MPAD was authorized two HMMWVs, one mounted generator, but not authorized a fill device for the one FM radio nor crew-served weapons. Additionally, the detachment was unable to draw their full complement of authorized ammunition prior to crossing the line of departure due to the lack of crew-served weapons. For operations, the reconfigured team of eight personnel used one additional vehicle for a total of three tactical vehicles to move autonomously from Kuwait to Mosul. To remedy vehicle maintenance challenges, the team worked temporary solutions to move vehicles with flat tires into Mosul, but lacked formal command relationships to acquire supplies and logistical support to meet force protection requirements for movement to obtain stories. In Mosul, the team co-
located with the CMOC and adopted the technique of coordinating rides for public affairs soldiers with CA teams moving throughout the city. Civil affairs teams were configured to meet force protection movement requirements of three-vehicle convoys with tactical communications and crew-served weapons. Although an effective method of movement, this technique slowed the production of many public affairs products. A/22nd MPAD team leader identified priority story opportunities through 2BCT updates, Regional Information Center meetings at the CMOC, CMOC director priorities, and CFLCC priorities identified in the battle update analysis (BUA) to appropriately place soldiers for story acquisition. Under the modular structure with organic public affairs assets, some of these maneuver and force protection concerns will be augmented and better logistically supported at the brigade-level based on the maneuver commander’s priorities.

In terms of required technical equipment, Alpha team was authorized by MTOE, one digital still photography camera and one digital video camera with one editing suite for the team of five personnel. On the move into theater, the team was given one of five Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) SCOTTY satellite terminals to support the push of imagery to CENTCOM and the Pentagon. Upon arrival in Mosul, Alpha team used all available personal cameras and one additional video camera locally purchased by the CMOC director to augment the shortage of equipment to support the demand for humanitarian assistance coverage. Traditional public affairs equipment authorizations were insufficient and provided no contingency for broken commercial equipment. Additionally, the mechanical lifespan of the equipment on hand both professional and personal was severely shortened due to the environment and a lack of technical expertise for either in-depth cleaning or repairs. Services and repairs were not available in the CENTCOM
area of responsibility so equipment had to be evacuated; this began to cripple the team’s effectiveness over a long period of time.

JFCOM SCOTTY satellite equipment enabled public affairs to push media globally. Public affairs equipment must maintain interoperability with commercial media networks to increase global public reach to remain effective for commanders and the American public.

Leader Development

The paragraph on training briefly describes educational development of a public affairs team leader and a public affairs team noncommissioned officer. In 2002, the Public Affairs Officer Course provided a basic overview of public affairs activities in a garrison environment, but did not address or insufficiently addressed the type of public affairs activities later encountered during OIF 2003. The same training focus exists for public affairs NCOs, garrison support functions versus tactical support to commanders. PAOs and NCOs require increased training on such topics as establishing and operating a CPIC or JIB; identifying and managing information with strategic implications of daily activities; and tracking and escorting embedded and unilateral media. Additional skills that would have been helpful included mitigating second and third order of effects of inadequate support to all nationalities of media; and identifying and coordinating communication mediums to pass information in austere environments. Developing such educational activities at training centers in CONUS would help to offset such experiences, but as of yet, not one of the training centers maintains the capabilities to provide these learning experiences due to a lack of experienced public affairs NCO observer/controllers (Master Sergeant Heller interview).

A/22nd MPAD NCOIC’s training and experience was primarily in the broadcasting field. He was assigned to the MPAD shortly before deployment from CONUS and was placed on
Alpha team in Kuwait. Upon arrival, he lacked print journalist oversight experience and the other vast operational requirements of OIF. Public Affairs NCOs require the same full scope training as public affairs officers to adequately service commanders’ informational needs in the absence of officers.

Personnel

Public Affairs soldiers are intelligent by measure of having above average GT scores for Army placement. Critical to mission success for A/22nd MPAD in OIF 2003 were the personal talents and experiences of the soldiers not exclusively provided by the Army. The public affairs team exploited personnel strengths, cross-trained personnel weaknesses, and broadened full-scope public affairs contributions to real-world operations of each individual.

Every soldier had a personal talent that complemented the dynamics of the rest of the team that further enhanced support to commanders. Staff Sergeant Eric Hendrix, A/22nd MPAD team NCOIC, arrived with extensive broadcast experience in Armed Forces Network – Korea and Germany, exceptional talents in computer graphics design, and vast broadcast technical expertise. Highlighted key contributions that Staff Sergeant Hendrix brought included the creation and production of “Iraqi Freedom News,” a graphically packaged compilation of public affairs broadcast stories for daily news updates. He also resolved formatting incompatibility between NTSC and PAL broadcasting standards, conducted the Iraqi television and radio equipment assessment, and procured appropriate digital broadcast equipment from the United States.

During predeployment preparation at Fort Bragg, Sergeant Raymond Flores participated in a partnership program with National Public Radio on Fridays. The commercial interaction proved as a critical experience exchange as Sergeant Flores coached radio journalistic techniques
to the Iraqi radio employees and served as a bridge to coordinate sponsorship from CONUS. Additionally, Sergeant Flores served as the team’s maintenance, supply, and force protection NCO to ensure the team maintained focus on survivability skills throughout the deployment.

Specialist Bo Weiss joined the Army following 9/11 as a commitment to contribute to the GWOT. He offered the team a myriad of talents as an artist and a former free-lance broadcaster with experience in documentaries. His highlighted contributions were primarily in the artistic-style of capturing emotion and realism of the interface between coalition forces and the Iraqi people. This style proved to be an effective visual communication with the Iraqis, despite the initial language barrier.

Specialist Grant Peters possessed a college degree in broadcast journalism and an incredible talent to rapidly master technical aspects of all equipment. He managed primarily the JFCOM SCOTTY satellite terminal to conduct video teleconferencing and to execute file-transfers with CENTCOM and the Pentagon. Additionally, he mastered the digital video disk (DVD) production that was self-taught in theater. His digital video compilation of 101st Division events ranging from combat operations to humanitarian assistance served as a visual information tool to senior military and congressional leaders that visited Mosul. These talents effectively bridged information from tactical to strategic levels of leadership, reaching the American public primarily through the Pentagon Press Corps.

Specialist Randy Randolph, a print journalist by experience, was cross-trained as a broadcast journalist the day he joined the team in Mosul. His quick-learn of multi-tasks added flexibility of public affairs coverage and depth to the team. Specialist Randolph contributed in all three areas of television, radio, and newsletter that reached both the American public and the Iraqi public through media outlets.
Specialist Blake Kent, a college graduate of Baylor University, served as a print journalist for the team. He was the primary organizer of the team-generated, open-source information the team anticipated during deployment preparation. This task enabled him to education himself and master website construction. He also quickly mastered field newspaper layout that supported timely turnaround of packaged information to all audiences. These talents also served useful upon redeployment as he constructed a webpage for the MPAD on the XVIII Airborne Corps website to support a free flow of command information.

Private First Class Mary Xenikakis had a brilliant eye for photography that reached national news agencies such as FOX, CNN, AP, and numerous websites. Her aggressive nature quickly earned her the confidence of senior leaders that provided increased opportunities to key events throughout the northern region of Iraq. Her rapid turnaround on story production and rapid mastery of newsletter layout design enhanced timely information to all audiences receiving the team’s print stories and newsletter.

First Sergeant Ken Heller specialized in print journalism and brought a wealth of operational public affairs experience from deployments and the National Training Center (NTC). He designed the 101st newsletter, “Iraqi Destiny,” and ensured daily production and marketing of print stories. First Sergeant Heller built the marketing base that pushed current photographs and print stories initially to American audiences through CENTCOM, CFLCC, 101st Division Family Readiness Groups, and individual family requests. This base continuously expanded to various audiences interested in general information about coalition forces in Iraq during which he operated at the maximum potential limit authorized by the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) capabilities. He also established the outreach initiative to Iraqi newspaper journalists that served to reestablish the newspaper base in the northern region of Iraq. Additionally, First Sergeant
Heller served as an experienced advisor to the non-career field designated “46” public affairs team leader and to the 101st commanders that proved invaluable in obtaining command support and operational efficiency in the forward theater.

Major Charmaine Means served as the public affairs team leader in Mosul. As a signal officer in the operational field by trade, she brought an understanding of communications connectivity that focused efforts on establishing mediums to communicate public affairs information to all audiences – national, international, and Iraqi. This basic understanding proved to validate Iraqi requests for support from the 101st commanders.

The complementary mix of personal talents of the public affairs team in Mosul serves as an illustration of the inherent strength and talents of today’s soldiers. This description of personnel talents highlight a level of intellect and assertiveness beyond that taught in the Army and suggests natural skill sets to support expanded public information beyond the American audience. Effects of merging personnel talents, military training and experience, and overall understanding of the public affairs mission and intent, empowered A/22nd MPAD soldiers to produce immediate results for commanders on the battlefield. The public affairs team leadership ensured soldiers were updated regularly on missions, expectations, standards, and safety. A/22nd MPAD soldiers understood the full scope of public affairs on the battlefield, appropriately leveraged access to senior leaders to fulfill informational needs of commercial media, and understood a dimension of the strategic implications of their reporting.

“Alpha Team brought a myriad of capabilities to my area of operation. There wasn’t a thing I couldn’t request that they could not figure out a way of producing. Those eight soldiers made a lasting impact on my BCT and the Iraqis we encountered. Continuing the education and
expanding the capabilities of such a team only enhances the warfighting commander’s capabilities” (Colonel Joseph Anderson interview).

Facilities

This paper briefly explored facilities requirements to note simply that public affairs support at the brigade-level must be mobile and timely. Facility concerns should be remedied under the modular configured support at the brigade-level and by equipping teams with satellite reach-back communications capability.

For operational purposes, A/22nd MPAD public affairs coverage needs were best served by co-locating with the civil affairs operations center in Mosul. This provided situational awareness of critical concerns of the Iraqi people and of the command’s support priorities which facilitated the opportunity to provide progress information to among CA teams, the public affairs team, and Iraqi audience.

How Public Affairs Enhanced Commander Capabilities

Prior to the war in 2003, the Iraqi Ministry of Information generally served as Saddam Hussein’s propaganda medium. This messaging was down-linked nationwide from Baghdad to the Iraqi people, thus it was the only ministry identified to be dismantled with no intent of reconstruction. The CPA planned to establish the “Iraqi Media Network” (IMN), a mini-broadcasting network downlink capability from Baghdad, intended to provide information across Iraq from the CPA office in Baghdad. The CPA media effort did not functionally arrive to begin infrastructure repairs in the northern region of Iraq until December 2003. Commanders had an immediate need to communicate with the Iraqi people upon arrival in late March 2003, nine months earlier.
Iraqi Personnel

Critical to coalition forces’ success in northern Iraq was the Iraqi’s acceptance of coalition efforts. Two Iraqis in particular, Ahmed Jasim Mohammad and Mahir Hazem Alqassab, were instrumental in establishing and managing information mediums that allowed coalition forces to effectively communicate to the Iraqi people within Ninevah Province of northern Iraq. These gentlemen provided the public affairs team a wealth of information on Iraqi culture and politics, media communications capabilities, Iraqi employee and journalistic capabilities, and information demands of the people within the region. At great personal risk, these men dedicated themselves to developing the Iraqi media. This fostered the growth of the information bridge servicing informational needs between coalition forces and the Iraqi people to support stability in the northern region.

A/22nd MPAD’s search for communications mediums began with Ahmed Jasim Mohammad at the northern region’s only operational television station at Mosul University, a contingent television station for the city. Prior to the war, Ahmed served as the Ninevah Province Broadcast Manager of the Mosul and Sinjar television stations. On 11 April 2003, he began a satellite downlink of various television programs such as Koran readings, traditional Iraqi music, BBC news, and the like in an attempt to keep the people calm (Jasim interview).

Late April 2003, the team leader began discussions with Ahmed Jasim to identify Iraqi concerns and capabilities that developed into a willing acceptance of coalition media products that met broadcast quality standards. The Iraqi people were starved for information about coalition forces in their region, so coalition forces attempted to fulfill the obligation to inform the Iraqi people. Filling this gap of information served as a tool for stability in the northern region. A
daily working relationship evolved from these initial meetings that continued to advance the region’s media infrastructure, beginning with television and extending to radio and newspaper.

Ahmed Jasim provided a tremendous amount of technical broadcast expertise, grounded in international studies and experience in the northern region since the 1970’s. He effectively communicated Iraqi capabilities of the television infrastructure, broadcast equipment, broadcast and programming employees, and Iraqi desires for coalition support.

With a mutual respect for capabilities, the public affairs team leader and the Iraqi regional broadcast manager began identifying and pursuing ‘win-win’ information opportunities for the Iraqi people and coalition forces that were endorsed and funded by 101st commanders. The initial agreements began with Iraqis broadcasting relevant public affairs stories to the city of Mosul and grew into include nightly coalition forces updates. The public affairs team acknowledged Iraqi media potential and provided Ninevah Province media employees hope. The 101st Division provided resources and equipment in good faith that Iraqi media would produce their own news and be fair in their reporting. Coalition forces were pleasantly impressed with Iraqi media interest and quality of reporting.

The evolved trust and confidence between Iraqis and coalition forces combined with Iraqi expertise enabled the Iraqi manager and his employees to rebuild Mosul’s main television station within two weeks for a live address from the 101st Division Commander. Mosul television employee success spurred improvements in Sinjar’s television infrastructure that reached audiences in Syria, Turkey, and Iran. When adequate video equipment was available, the division encouraged and supported one Iraqi broadcast team’s full access and transportation with the 101st command group to facilitate nightly newsgathering for Mosul television. The Iraqi media and 101st Division relationship merged to provide a direct communication medium
between the Iraqi people and the 101st Commander as evident through a one hour live call-in television show by late December 2003.

Additionally, Ahmed Jasim worked with Mosul radio. This medium, too, quickly evolved and supported commanders daily as a communication medium to the Iraqi people. Radio ranged further than television and was a cheaper resource of information for the poorer class of people. These media relations proved to be a dynamic two-way information tool for the command as 2BCT Commander held a weekly live call-in radio show to address local Iraqi concerns.

The established relationship between the northern region’s Iraqi broadcast media and coalition forces legitimized the local media for the Iraqi public. Of more significance, the Iraqi media gained increased confidence of the newly established governing ministries which bridged information between the Mosul ministries and the people they served. Additionally, 120 Iraqi personnel were employed with television and radio in the Northern region by early June 2003. By mid-June 2003, numerous newspaper journalists were employed.

Ahmed Jasim continued to serve the Iraqi public’s broadcast information needs as an employee of CPA’s Al-Iraqia who assumed control of media outlets in northern Iraq late December 2003. In October 2004, Ahmed Jasim was assassinated on his way to work, making the ultimate sacrifice to serve the Iraqi people.

Mahir Hazem, an Iraqi citizen who fled the country for 20 years, lived throughout Europe and returned. He became the “Voice of Mosul” and a powerful communicator for coalition forces. Mahir brought to the Iraqi media an understanding of westernized journalism and an understanding of democratic process. He also quickly synthesized for the public affairs team the dynamics of the many cultures in the northern region and the Iraqi media’s expectation of coalition forces. Additionally, Mahir spoke numerous languages in dialect throughout the region
that expanded the public affairs’ team capability in understanding the interaction among subjects during story acquisition.

The public affairs team’s trust in Mahir grew exponentially, as well as his job responsibilities. He served as the team’s primary trusted translator; the team’s culture advisor; information source validation; Arabic news researcher; Mosul nightly news anchor; radio and television live call-in show mediator for local commanders; roundtable discussion facilitator; and more. He provided direct support to 101st Commanders on demand without missing a beat.

Mahir Hazem effectively communicated coalition forces messages in terms of intended receipt of the culture, not in word-for-word translation. His skill set alone proved a powerful communication medium for public affairs and commanders. The expansion of communication mediums extended timely, relevant information to the audience being affected by those occurring events.

Mahir’s job was not without risk. Mahir and his family became a target to those attempting to disrupt Iraqi progress in the region, as he has been a victim to numerous assassination attempts. In view of positive information effects on the local audience and of attempts to disrupt information mediums by adversaries, information proves a tremendously effective instrument of power.

Mahir continued to support the improvement efforts in Iraq as an employee of non-governmental agencies and of the United States’ Department of State. Mahir continues to understand the dynamics of external support and the needs of the Iraqi people that have proved to be a strong bridge in creating a foundation of democracy in Iraq.
Had the public affairs team not engaged the Iraqi media directly, coalition forces would not have enjoyed the successes of this powerful capability of employing Iraqi talents for the benefit of both the Iraqi people and coalition forces.

Media Expectations

“The foremost role of public affairs is to protect the integrity of the military as an institution overall by ensuring that it is recognized as the most reliable source for official military information among all other competing sources” (Darley 2005). Not talking to the media is no longer accepted as demonstrated through the embedded media program during OIF in 2003. The commander must balance the amount of information the media receives to ensure good order and discipline in the unit and the Army (Rick Olsen interview). Expectation management between the commander and journalist up front served to mitigate any future hazards of misinformation (Lieutenant Colonel William McDonald interview).

The American media and the American military serve the same constitution and thus the same customer – the American public. Both the media and the military have expectations of one another; the challenge is to balance the needs of both. A panel of media highlighted their expectations of the military in a few points: 1) Credibility is what’s important not an organizational chart; 2) Established relationships with media prior to crisis serve as a power tool for military leaders; 3) Truth counts; and 4) The maximum effective range of a camera lens is the world. When both organizations understand the needs each other, both complement each other to fulfill their common objectives – in this case, service to the American public. The media panel consisted of: Brigadier General (Retired) David L. Grange, “Grange on Point;” Lou Dobbs, “CNN;” Steve Cochran, “KDWB FM;” Ken Robinson, “CNN” Military Analyst; and Timothy McNulty, Associate Managing Editor, “Foreign News.”
Over time, Iraqi media had similar information expectations and these concepts were afforded the Iraqi media in Mosul and Tikrit during OIF 2003. The Iraqi media and the American military expected to obtain truthful, credible information from each other in order to accomplish objectives in the northern region of Iraq. Positive media relations between the two organizations fostered the informational maximum effective range through television, AM radio, and local newspapers. Additionally, Iraqi media desired to receive equal access to press conferences and media opportunities that proved fruitful to the 4ID and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) respectively (Jasim, Alqassab, and McDonald interviews).

In an American documentary that followed Al-Jazerra media during their embedding in the early days of the Iraq war, Al-Jazerra media had very similar expectations of the military as other international media. The Al-Jazerra senior producer stated his intent to educate Arabs, establish conditions to conduct free debate, and to wake up societies. Both the Arab media and American military and political leaders quickly lost credibility with one another that have set them on diverging paths since. Despite the diverging paths of these culture groups, the Arab culture, the Iraqi people, and the American public need to know about military activities in the Middle East (Control Room, 2004).

In addition to providing command information print and broadcast products to CFLCC, CENTCOM, Pentagon, and 101st commanders, A/22nd MPAD enhanced public information capabilities to fill the information gap in Mosul. The Iraqi people enjoyed coalition forces’ support in rebuilding their infrastructure and their lives.

Television

Upon arrival to Mosul, the only existing media outlet was one television station on Mosul University grounds that broadcast 1km radius to the city. A/22nd MPAD coordinated with the
Iraqis to drop a compact disk (CD) with them nightly containing that day’s collated public affairs stories for their use if they chose. Due to the informational desire of the Iraqi people, the television employees played every CD they received and later, played them a number of times throughout the day.

On 7 May 2003, within two weeks of arriving in Mosul, A/22nd MPAD discovered the full scope of capabilities of the former main television station, completely looted and occupied by an infantry company. One month later, commander discretionary funds were obligated to the main television reconstruction effort. Within two weeks, Iraqis rebuilt the station; on 23 June 2003, the 101st Division Commander broadcast a live address to the Iraqi people within a 100km radius.

Local programming included web downloaded news; nightly updates from coalition forces subject matter experts; public affairs compiled news stories; regionally traditional music and religious material; and CPA down linked news from Baghdad. Coalition forces monitored programming content through normal media analysis methods using a translator. The local television manager worked daily with coalition forces to ensure both the Iraqi people and coalition forces’ needs were being met.

This television capability grew to accommodate more ‘win-win’ opportunities for both coalition forces and the Iraqi people. The Iraqi people established local and regional news programs and acquired their own broadcast stories. Coalition forces augmented the Iraqi nightly news with nightly updates from coalition subject matter experts on critical events of the day, weekly updates from the 2BCT commander, and public affairs produced stories in both English and Arabic. By December 2003, Iraqi television employees conducted the first live call-in show hosted by the 101st Division Commander.
Radio

Within one month of arriving in Mosul, A/22nd MPAD discovered a radio capability as a communications medium. Once the team identified equipment and informational needs of the Iraqi radio employees, the AM radio, operating from a mobile trailer in an open field, provided an increased capability to reach audiences that were too poor to own television sets. With a few materials using commander discretionary funds, the AM radio extended broadcast coverage at a radius that reached Baghdad on a clear night.

The Iraqi radio personnel established an impressive radio program on their own. The public affairs team initially facilitated the 2BCT commander’s weekly call-in radio show and later passed the project to a 101st PSYOP Captain and the 2BCT IO Captain. These call-in shows were unscreened Iraqi concerns that were addressed directly by the coalition forces commander in charge of their region. “Communicating via radio with the local populace allowed me the personal insight of what I may need to consider in upcoming days without a number of filters interpreting and relaying information. It became one of my most trusted and reliable sources of information” (Colonel Joseph Anderson interview).

By late June, the public affairs team also created a daily news program containing recent updates from public affairs video production for the Iraqi radio staff’s broadcast use.

Newspaper

The foundations of the newspaper began the second day the team was in Mosul. The first publication was one-page in length and contained a story on electricity being installed. Initially, a daily publication of “Iraqi Destiny” was pushed out; then as operational tempo increased, the publication was distributed about every third day.
Although the intended audience was CFLCC and CENTCOM, the immediate audience for *Iraqi Destiny* became 101st soldiers and local hired translators operating within the team’s area, which in turn found its way into the hands of many Iraqis outside of the military. One of the most effective information mediums during initial operations was by word of mouth from Iraqi translators to the Iraqi people on the street. The newsletter distribution list grew to include commanders that reached soldiers in the field, family readiness group leaders that reached family members in CONUS, and many other audiences that cannot be accounted for by virtue of the “forwarding” capability of the internet. Additionally, the *Iraqi Destiny* was posted on the 101st website in Kentucky and on the CENTCOM website reaching a large audience.

Within one month of arrival into Mosul, the team discovered an Iraqi journalist interested in restarting his newspaper production. A/22nd MPAD was able to assist the journalist with equipment using commander discretionary funds, to share journalistic techniques, to provide access to coalition forces and command interviews, and to provide a copy of current published newsletters. When Iraqi interest grew beyond one newspaper vendor, the team held weekly meetings with all newspapers to provide updates, guidance, media opportunities, journalistic training as requested, and encouragement.

In August 2003, a PSYOP team actively engaged these newspapers to conduct their media analysis to define their operational objectives. For 4ID, “Meeting with the journalists constantly increased our trust of one another. That human dynamic can not be replaced by any other form of communication” (Lieutenant Colonel William McDonald interview).

“Making use of all capabilities to reach the population is essential. And our public affairs elements proved extremely helpful in that regard – providing TV spots, organizing radio and TV call-in shows, and even helping the local media get their operations going again” (Lieutenant
General David Petraeus). Immediate effects of the public affairs team’s direct involvement in building relations with the local media supported timely employment of the Iraqi people. The team’s direct involvement also supported timely reconstruction efforts of critical information enabling mediums such as television, radio, and newspaper. This level of coalition forces support increased Iraqi patience and region stability by providing timely, relevant information about coalition forces. Subsequent effects instilled Iraqi confidence in a hopeful future and an opportunity to participate in the improvement and growth of their own country.

Meetings

To maintain situational awareness and commander priorities of interest, the team initially referenced CFLCC-PAO priorities from daily CFLCC battle update analysis in Kuwait. In Mosul, the team accessed CMOC meetings for CA opportunities, 2BCT nightly updates for coalition forces city priorities, and 2BCT IO targeting meetings for information priorities. Later, the team expanded access to 101st Division updates for coalition forces region priorities, IO targeting priorities, and infrastructure updates.

With regard to Iraqi media meetings in Mosul, A/22nd MPAD met daily with Iraqi television and radio management that tapered off to two to three times a week in the latter months. Contact with newspapers averaged once a week. Transition between Iraqi media and the CPA took much longer to establish.

The 4ID PAO engaged Iraqi media directly through the press briefing opportunities hosted initially by CPA.

Marketing

In early May 2003, a CA NCO was reviewing Arabic news for CFLCC-PAO media analysis and noted that “the Arabic community was not witnessing contributions of coalition
forces and viewed American forces as an occupying force.” A/22nd MPAD team leader further queried the CFLCC-PAO battle desk for the unclassified distribution list for news releases; at the time, the only distribution list that could be found was for classified distribution.

A/22nd MPAD team leader conducted initial research for Arabic news outlets that included coordination with the Public Affairs Officer for the American Embassy in Kuwait, New Iraqi Radio, Kuwaiti Journalist Society, Kuwaiti Satellite Television, and the Kuwaiti Ministry of Information. All of these organizations expressed interest in operations in Iraq, and in some cases, were waiting for CFLCC approval to enter Iraq.

Based on information obtained in Kuwait and the knowledge of the volumes of stories available in Mosul alone, the A/22nd MPAD team leader prepared a public affairs marketing plan for CFLCC-PAO. The highlighted recommendations included: 1) established priorities for target audience through media outlets in the order of Arabic, international, and American; 2) establish a partnership with the existing Arabic media infrastructure beginning in Kuwait; 3) establish centric marketing management at CFLCC-PAO for collection and distribution of all public affairs products; 4) inform local [Iraqi] Arabic communities of public affairs stories relevant to their region; 5) establish collective Iraq video coverage through lateral connectivity of SCOTTY systems among public affairs elements throughout Iraq; and 6) centric news release approval at CFLCC-PAO and distribution to any relevant community (Public Affairs Marketing Plan 2003).

The proposed public affairs marketing plan was approved but not implemented at the CFLCC-PAO level. However, elements of this method were implemented in Mosul; and effects were impressive. The advantages of providing public affairs stories to the local Iraqi public were two fold: 1) in gaining their understanding of coalition forces’ genuine efforts in securing their
welfare, and 2) over time, in obtaining their participation in reporting adversaries to facilitate a policing response for security. In January 2004, CFLCC-PAO expressed a renewed interest in public affairs application in Mosul.

The Future of Public Affairs in the Transformed Army

Army Public Affairs has recognized a need to adjust operations in order to effectively support joint operations and is currently under development. Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, Chief of Army Public Affairs, said, “What has changed is the level at which we provide direct support to our commanders. We provide the same public affairs service, but now at the brigade-level as well.” He further stated the need to define ‘an acceptable overlap’ of informational responsibilities among organizations in the Army to best support operations in the forward theaters (Brigadier General Brooks interview). A few areas below are work in progress for public affairs developers.

Doctrine

“The biggest change will be how we address non-U.S. media. Otherwise, there will be a major change, but it will be more in the fleshing out of existing concepts and updating them for current conditions” (Colonel Gary Hovatter interview). Army Public Affairs is currently proposing a change in doctrine to remove “internal” from the public information definition (Joint Public Affairs Operations Conference notes). “Joint Public Affairs Operations would have the ability to plan and synchronize U.S. military public information activities and resources in order to communicate truthful, timely and factual unclassified information about joint military activities within the area of operation to all foreign, domestic, and internal audiences to achieve the commander’s operational and strategic objectives, to include advising on the effectiveness of information activities and their support of effects-based operations” (Derived from JP 3-61).
Community relations is also redefined as the ability to plan and synchronize programs to enhance interaction and communication among U.S. Joint Forces, coalition partners, and Host Nation populations throughout all operational phases to support commander’s strategic and operational objectives (Joint Public Affairs Operations Conference notes).

Public affairs must be explored to a wider variety of audiences in today’s information environment. On-going Joint Public Affairs Operations Capability Refinement and Comment Resolution Conferences and interview material from the Director of the Army Public Affairs Center support each of the areas below using the DOTMLPF model.

Organization

“Organization and force structure may make the units more modular. We have made major changes in their ability to communicate and coordinate on the move (satellite comms/radios) and in their ability to distribute product and/or conduct live feeds from the battlefield” (Colonel Gary Hovatter interview). Public Affairs is addressing the issue of marginally staffed and equipped elements where the rubber hits the road. Capabilities and experience must already be increased at the Unit of Action (UA) level based on current operational demands.

Training

“Training is borderline adequate due to the many new TTP developed to execute old doctrinal concepts. Absent significant training changes, new equipment and Army Modularity will invalidate current training programs. That said, DINFOS and other programs are aware of the issue and will respond” (Colonel Gary Hovatter interview).

“The Army should re-evaluate its task training selection for both enlisted and officers in the public affairs career field. Training must focus more directly on supporting the local
community while in garrison and supporting the brigade while in deployed theaters to better serve informational needs of the Army and civilian publics. “Traditional broadcast training should decrease in garrison-style “American Forces Network” training in the overall course design of initial entry soldiers since AFN specific skills are obsolete due to the reduction of overseas-stationed Army members” (Sergeant First Class Hendrix interview).

Material

Army Public Affairs has employed six Digital Video Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS) since June 2004 to provide public affairs units’ easier reach-back capability to American media (Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Julian interview). “The [DVIDS] system fielding is very successful in engaging local and regional CONUS media markets. It has also been used to engage Arabic and other foreign media in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its utility for national-level media is more a marketing than a capability issue. This is a major step into the future (Colonel Gary Hovatter interview).” This new equipment has not yet been optimally used by all public affairs elements in OIF 2005 (22nd MPAD).

Leader Development

Army Public Affairs Center is reviewing leader development (Colonel Hovatter interview); however, core course curriculum has not yet been altered to integrate full spectrum public affairs (Sergeant First Class Hendrix interview). Leader development must continue to evolve to ensure “mature, knowledgeable and experienced public affairs leaders develop through both current operations and realistic training” (Master Sergeant Heller interview)

Personnel

“The Army is only required by law to have one PAO, the Chief of Public Affairs. All the other PAOs are a mechanism for conducting commanders’ PA function. If there were no PAOs,
there would still be a PA function to be performed. There may be an alternative to PA forces, but a viable model has not been devised” (Colonel Gary Hovatter interview). Force structure changes are occurring under modularity to provide public affairs support at the battalion level (3rd Infantry Division). The author has found no current changes to personnel support to provide expanded public information specifically, nor is the author suggesting more personnel are required to perform this task.

Facilities

“Mobile and expedient facilities with multiple technological and communications capabilities must be evolved and employed. Transmitting a digital product from the hood of a HMMWV via a laptop and cell phone should be the standard, not the exception” (Master Sergeant Heller interview).
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

As the Army transforms to combat the global war on terrorism (GWOT), so must Army public affairs transform to fulfill the informational needs of the public through the media about military operations in support of our nation’s defense. Strong public affairs activities and operational support promote a greater understanding of the Army and its contribution to the nation. Military engagements in today’s global information environment (GIE) demand a change in traditional thinking and methods of operations. Evolved methods of operations require public affairs practitioners to communicate with a much broader audience during the GWOT, which in turn fosters international support.

A focused public affairs program during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003 would have mitigated coalition forces’ current struggle to “win hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people providing them with timely and accurate information from which to base their personal decisions. Public affairs, in general, did not possess the foresight, the material preparation or adequate field training to provide immediate information to the Iraqi public during the post-hostilities phase which may have contributed greatly to country-wide stability. In turn, the lack of immediate information caused coalition forces to lose some credibility with the local populace. This research suggests that transformation to current public affairs is imperative to retain public affairs’ relevance on the battlefield and to maintain credibility with all publics, foreign and domestic. Public Affairs can simultaneously bridge the information gap between forward deployed commanders and the host nation publics. Public Affairs is also capable of establishing relations with host nation media for a cooperative effort to inform its local audience,
while simultaneously servicing the information needs of the American public at little additional expense or effort.

Results of this research follow the DOTMLPF model and are described in terms of the research pattern, effects of pattern application, consequences of pattern non-application, and the conclusion of results. Doctrine research patterns indicate that public affairs doctrine must be expanded to address all audiences – foreign and domestic – in our contemporary operating environment, not just a national audience. The effect of communicating timely, relevant information to host nation audiences enhances military credibility necessary for region stability and nation rebuilding. The consequence of not expanding the media to include non-American media reduces public affairs relevance to commanders forward deployed in the contemporary operating environment. Public Affairs must transform with the modular force through the expansion of the public information tenet to reach all audiences equally.

Organization research patterns suggest a structure that supports a unit’s capability to provide timely, relevant information to host nation media. The effect of providing public affairs capability at lower levels to address host nation publics enhances commanders’ ability to stabilize a region of uncertainty through information. The consequence of not reorganizing public affairs impairs the commanders’ ability to effectively communicate with civilians on the battlefield or with the American public. Information is a critical instrument of power with which Army public affairs must organize as a commander’s enabler of success in today’s GIE.

Training research patterns propose increased public affairs training of every soldier in overall effects of public affairs from tactical to strategic level, as well as assertive techniques for handling media and commanders. The effect of soldiers’ broadened scope of public affairs understanding enhances an active information tool, equipped to execute a commander’s intent in
fulfilling informational demands. The consequences of not empowering public affairs personnel are inaction or reaction to significant public informational issues. The Army must adequately train every public affairs soldier that serves as the potential ‘strategic corporal’ based on his or her access to the universal media. In the future, public affairs soldiers may be required to possess regional skills with an in-depth knowledge of culture and linguistic capabilities.

Material research pattern suggests that public affairs teams require greater and more capable tactical and technical equipment, both secure and non-secure, than the force currently possesses. The effects of adequate tactical equipment support force protection movement throughout the combat zone facilitating the commanders need to release information that educates masses of people throughout the world as to intent and progress. The effects of adequate technical equipment enable increased story acquisition, timely news to external outlets, and expanded marketing to reach all audiences. The consequences of inadequate tactical and technical equipment confines public affairs soldiers capability to gather newsworthy stories and provides no outlet for their story efforts. Every public affairs soldier must be equipped to adequately support informational demands of commanders and all audiences, foreign and domestic.

Leader development research pattern proposes that PAOs require increased professional development and junior PA NCOs require the full complement of public affairs training equivalent to PAOs. The effects of increased leader development at the junior NCO level provide depth to a commander’s informational enabling tool in a unit and expand public affairs expertise in the field. The consequences of not increasing leader development at the junior NCO level limits a unit’s ability to service public affairs informational demands in the absence of limited public affairs officers and senior NCOs especially in the Army’s mission of transformation and
the desire to push more capabilities to a lower level of command. Junior PA NCO serve as critical inlets to Army operations and require additional development for increased responsibility on behalf of a command.

Personnel research pattern suggests that dynamics of personal talents provide significant contributions to operational support. The effects of acknowledging and exploiting all talents of both public affairs personnel and host nation media increase and, in some cases, expedite successful operations at no additional cost to the Army. The consequences of denying the integration of nontraditional technical skills and host nation media talents reduce rapid operational effectiveness. Public affairs must exploit every available resource and talent to expeditiously improve the informational instrument of power.

Facilities research pattern proposes that public affairs elements must remain mobile to effectively service rapid commander support. The effects of ready, mobile public affairs support to commanders enhance the efficiency of timely, relevant information to immediate publics. The consequences of stationary public affairs support facilities again limit coverage and response time to informational needs. Public affairs support must remain a flexible resource for commanders’ employment to effectively provide timely, relevant information.

Overall major patterns in this research suggest that public affairs’ transformation is imperative to enable commanders to stabilize a region of uncertainty and to achieve success in today’s GIE. Primary areas of public affairs transformation are in doctrine, training, and equipping. Well-informed audiences, foreign and domestic, can potentially increase American soldiers’ survivability on foreign soil.

The future employment of public affairs teams using the same method in a different situational or cultural environment may not net the same positive results as described herein.
However, an effective illustration of public affairs assets, that directly engage the host nation media to serve as an information conduit between the Army and the local public, may assist public affairs planners. The described methods suggest potential resources necessary for personnel, equipment and guidance to support future deployments, increasing public affairs relevance to the warfighting commander and all interested publics.

The suggested expansion of public information requires little additional effort or money. The Army and the American public can benefit from existing public affairs foundation to bridge the information gap between forward deployed commanders and the host nation audiences now. This can be accomplished by merely employing an active, expanded public affairs program; synchronizing public affairs information objectives; and marketing public affairs products to all publics, foreign and domestic. People are the center of gravity when attempting to win hearts and minds.

Recommendations

The proposed recommendations in this paper suggest public affairs techniques to contribute to the ‘acceptable overlap’ of informational responsibilities in forward theaters of operation. As the Army transforms to prosecute the GWOT, public affairs has the ability to transform traditional techniques of operational support at little cost to contribute to the military’s information superiority in support of national security.

In doctrine, recommend the mere expansion of public information to address all audiences relevant in obtaining international legitimacy and support. Organic public affairs assets must arrive at their unit ready to assume rapid, flexible information demands of the media and of the command. To accomplish this, public affairs elements must be appropriately organized, equipped, and trained to directly engage all media, foreign and domestic. Aggressive,
synchronized public affairs marketing plan is a necessary component of the public affairs operational plan.

In order to best access host nation publics, recommend public affairs elements collocate with CA units during operations including war and operations other than war to facilitate story acquisition of coalition forces tied to relevant information needs of the host nation populace. This tie effectively addresses informational needs of both the American public and the host nation public simultaneously. This also requires that information release authority for regional events remain with the regional commander to increase timely information for the relevant audience to support regional stability and information release authority for strategic events must be retained at the strategic level.

In organization, recommend that public affairs assets are organic to battalion-sized units as soon as people and equipment are available to the Army. Public affairs integration at the UA or UEx level reduces the demand on coalitions to establish ad hoc organizations to fill commanders’ increased informational demand. The number of public affairs assets should also be increased at the UA level of operation to that of a current public affairs team, or eight personnel. Lessons learned over the last 15 years indicate that any fewer number of public affairs specialists render a team ineffective (Master Sergeant Heller interview). Additionally, an active public affairs plan that expands public information to all audiences both foreign and domestic enhances the unit’s credibility and the commanders’ capability to communicate with the host nation as demonstrated in Mosul.

In training, recommend the Army re-evaluate its task training selection for both enlisted and officers in the Public Affairs career field that focuses training more directly on support of public information at the local community level while in garrison and at the brigade level while
deployed. These tasks include Corps Warfighter exercise tasks such as preparing subject matter experts for interview, coordinating with media for event coverage, serving as media escorts and responding to queries (Sergeant First Class Hendrix interview). Additionally, recommend increased cultural and linguistic training for senior public affairs practitioners in the grade of E8 and above at the Defense Language Institute (Master Sergeant Heller interview).

In material, recommend authorization and acquisition of full communications, weaponry and maneuverability equipment be provided to public affairs soldiers to increase their ability to be effective for the battlefield commander to include both tactical and technical assets. These public affairs assets must arrive with their full complement of tactical equipment to enhance individual survivability.

In leader development, recommend skill sets are established organic to the following command levels to enhance leader experience in the officer and NCO grades. Particularly, increase experience at lower levels: senior 46Z NCOs at the grade of E7 be assigned to battalion sized commands, E8s be assigned to brigade-level commands, and that 46Z NCOs in the grade of E9 be assigned to division or higher level of commands based on increased levels of responsibility and potential. This level capability would increase public affairs team vetting of host nation media and expedite host nation education to enable a public affairs exit strategy. A critical task of these public affairs leaders would require teams to aggressively offer media opportunities and increased interview access to key leaders (Master Sergeant Heller interview).

Finally with regard to facilities, recommend selective targeting to preserve as much media infrastructure and facilities possible to allow near-immediate use to reach intended audiences. Negotiated use of host nation facilities supports a more rapid exit strategy than rebuilding the supporting facilities and antennas.
Information is a commander’s instrument of power that must be effectively managed. “When employed to maximum effect, Army Public Affairs helps the commander achieve information dominance and conduct coordinated information operations, and also contributes to the preservation of public support. Army Public Affairs helps increase understanding, dedication, discipline and the will to win” (FM 46-1 1997, 7).

This paper has illustrated the imperative to expand public affairs applications at a very basic level through an explanation of operational effects using the DOTMLPF model. Expanded public information to all audiences is essential to operations in today’s GIE. This approach not only suggests providing information to host nation audiences for purposes of positive support of coalition efforts, but also suggests providing reinforcement information to deter conflict throughout a region using truthful information – thus, supporting regional stability.

Under modularity, commanders will now possess a powerful information capability organic to their brigade. A public affairs capability at the brigade level increases the Army’s need for trained public affairs personnel with supporting equipment that is joint, interagency, and commercially compatible. Public Affairs must rapidly increase personnel, equipment and training to support this transformation effort to maximize informational effectiveness in the contemporary operational environment.

The basic foundation of this expanded public information concept already exists. Employment of this concept is relatively inexpensive to implement, but produces tremendous positive effects for commanders on the battlefield. The concept simply suggests employing an expanded public affairs program, synchronizing public affairs information objectives, and marketing public affairs products to all publics, foreign and domestic. By default, Army Public
Affairs aggressively executed will effectively support national objectives where the American military is deployed.

“The principles of public affairs are no different in a joint environment that for single-service operations. The primary aim is still to expedite the flow of complete, accurate, and timely information about the activities of U.S. joint forces” (FM 46-1, 36).
GLOSSARY

Civil Affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs activities (1) embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities and population in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civilian government, which enhance conduct of civil military operations. These activities may occur prior to, during or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.

Command and control warfare. The integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict. Also called C2W. C2W is both offensive and defensive: a. counter-C2—to prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system. B. C2-protection—to maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system.

Community relations. Establishing and maintaining effective relationships between military and civilian communities through planning and active participation in events and processes which provide benefit to both communities.

Community relations program. That command function which evaluates public attitudes, identifies the mission of a military organization with the public interest, and executes a program of action to earn public understanding and acceptance. Community relations programs are conducted at all levels of command, both in the United States and overseas, by military organizations having a community relations area of responsibility. Community relations programs include, but are not limited to, such activities as liaison and cooperation with associations and organizations and their local affiliates at all levels; armed forces participation in international, national, regional, state, and local public events; installation open houses and tours; embarkation in naval ships; orientation tours for distinguished civilians; people-to people and humanitarian acts; cooperation with government officials and community leaders; and encouragement of armed forces personnel and their dependents to participate in activities of local schools, churches, fraternal, social, and civic organizations, sports, and recreation programs, and other aspects of community life to the extent feasible and appropriate, regardless of where they are located.
Global information environment. All individuals, organizations, or systems, most of which are outside the control of the military or National Command Authorities, that collect, process, and disseminate information to national and international audiences.

Ground rules. Conditions established by a military command that govern the conduct of news gathering and the release and/or use of specified information during an operation or during a specific period of time.

Host Nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.

Humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (JP 3-05.3)

Information Operations. Actions taken to affect adversary, and influence others’ decision-making process, information and information systems while protecting one’s own information and information systems.

Internal Information. Communication by a military organization with service members, civilian employees and family members of the organization that creates an awareness of the organization’s goals, informs them of significant developments affecting them and the organization, increases their effectiveness as ambassadors of the organization, and satisfies their desire to be kept informed about what is going on in the organization and operation (also know as command information)

Joint Information Bureau (JIB). Facilities established by the joint force commander to serve as the focal point for the interface between the military and the media during the conduct of joint operations. When operated in support of multinational operations, a joint information bureau is called a Combined Information Bureau or an Allied Press Information Center.

Media facilitation. The range of activities such as providing access and interviews that assist news media representatives covering military operations.

Media operations center. Facility that serves as the focal point for the interface between the military and the media covering and event or operation.

Military information environment. The environment contained within the global information environment, consisting of the information systems and organizations – friendly and adversary, military and nonmilitary – that support, enable, or significantly influence a specific military operation.
News Media Representative. An individual employed by a civilian radio or television station, newspaper, newsmagazine, periodical, or news agency to gather information and report on a newsworthy event.

Offensive information operations. The integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect enemy decision makers or to influence others to achieve or promote specific objectives (FM 3-0, 2001).

Propaganda. Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly (JP 1-02)

Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.

Public affairs assessment. An analysis of the news media and public environments to evaluate the degree of understanding about strategic and operations objectives and military activities and to identify levels of public support. Includes judgments about the public affairs impact of pending decisions and recommendations about the structure of public affairs support for the assigned mission.

Public Information. A general term describing processes used to provide information to external audiences through public media.

Stability operations. Promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.
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