MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

ELIMINATING SUCCESS DURING ECLIPSE II:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE DECISION TO DISBAND THE IRAQI MILITARY

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

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Executive Summary

Title: Eliminating Success During ECLIPSE II: An Examination of the Decision to Disband the Iraqi Military

Author: Major Robert S. Weiler, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The grand decision to disband the Iraqi military was a flawed process that set the conditions for a malcontent and rebellious populace, and changed the liberation of Iraq into the occupation of Iraq yielding an unnecessary expenditure of U.S. blood and treasure.

Discussion: Military planners for Operation Iraqi Freedom assumed that the coalition would be greeted as liberators and that the Iraqi Army would be able to assist in reconstruction efforts. Much of Iraq did treat the coalition as liberators, but the appreciative feeling dissolved when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) removed Baathists from consideration for employment in the new Iraq, and when the Iraqi Army was dissolved. Within two weeks of arrival in Iraq, the head of the CPA, Paul Bremer, negated both of the planning assumptions. The arguments "for" and "against" dissolving the Iraqi military both had merits and consequences. Dissolving the Iraqi military removed one of Saddam’s tools of tyranny and would allow the new Iraq to begin with a more ethnically balanced security force. Conversely, eliminating the Iraqi military threw 400,000 veterans into unemployment, left the coalition undermanned, and changed the Iraqi liberation into an occupation. Security is the foundation for support and stability; therefore 150,000 U.S. ground forces had little chance of occupying and stabilizing a country of 25 million people.

The symbol of the Iraqi Army to the Iraqi people was misinterpreted by the CPA and the United States underestimated the volatility of disenfranchising 750,000 Baathists and 400,000 Iraqi soldiers. Making a new army for Iraq is still on-going; six years after the war began. It took two-years (2004 – 2006) to re-make the 40,000 Iraqi soldiers that military planners assumed they would have immediately available to them at the conclusion of the offensive. The 2007 troop surge would not have been necessary if at least one-eighth of the Iraqi Army would have been retained.

Conclusion: The U.S. decision to disband the Iraqi military via Paul Bremer and the CPA was the result of narrow thinking by policy makers unable to discern reality and practicality from preconceived ideals. None of the policy makers were accustomed with negotiating the complexities of chaos often encountered in war in order to achieve an end state. And those that had a better understanding of the situation, and were responsible for executing and dealing with the consequences of the decision, were not consulted or heeded. The decision was a product of colliding priorities. The Secretary of Defense wanted a small occupation force that commanders knew was imprudent, the military planners adapted by planning to use the Iraqi Army to make up for coalition short falls, and the CPA wanted to dissolve all things Baathist or resembling Saddam even if it was the only mechanism allowing the country to function. This collision extended the war beyond prediction and challenged the popular support of a World superpower. When the decision making process responsible for eliminating a nation’s army and committing U.S. forces indefinitely is largely influenced by Iraqi exiles with political power as a motive, the method is flawed.
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Preface

As students in Marine Corps Command and Staff College, we were collectively counseled on the process of meeting the requirements of the Master’s of Military Studies Program. We were encouraged to choose a topic of interest or an area where we desired further education. I have often asked myself, why did we disband the Iraqi military? Would it not have been more advantageous to reshape their force, particularly the senior leadership, and use them to secure their own country? This question was of particular interest when I found myself in Iraq the second time, and a third time five-years after the invasion when I was training the new Iraqi Army. How did we get to this point? How did we get such a consequential and elementary decision wrong? Was it wrong? In my mind, keeping the Iraqi military intact had clear advantages and would allow for a quicker withdrawal. This appeared to be an easy decision that a uniformed officer could trust civilian leadership to make. The fact that no other Marine Corps Command and Staff College student has written on this topic solidified my decision to write on this subject. I thought I had the opportunity to conquer some new intellectual ground.

My research unveiled that the decision to disband the Iraqi Army was not as simple as I originally thought, and unfortunately, it also revealed the subject has been well covered by journalists, political pundits, and authors. It is amazing how much political debate escaped my attention over the last several years due to the operational tempo of the war. Nevertheless, I feel what I can offer to the subject is an opinion on the strongest influencers to the decision, quantitative consequences of the decision, a recommended solution, and a conclusion from a Marine Officer with a unique qualification. My perspective is one of a combat leader that fought insurgents (who were former Iraqi Army) and then trained and conducted combat operations with a New Iraqi Army who were formerly insurgents.
I have designed the paper into an introduction, the argument “for” and “against” disbanding the Iraqi military, historical comparisons, the consequences of disbanding, an analysis of the decision and its influencers, and finally, a conclusion. The exploration of this topic revealed the burden that soldiers must sometimes carry due to questionably experienced political appointees, interagency work, and government agency organization. The challenges encountered in conducting the research are a result of politics as well. There is not any distinguishing, and clear evidence of whom, and at what level of executive power, endorsed the decision. Without policy letter signatures other than CPA orders, it is a finger pointing contest that makes Paul Bremer the prominent “stuckey”, a fitting moniker due to his hard campaigning, disregard for advice, and upstream battle to boldly deliver the decision.

I would like to thank Dr. Bruce Bechtol for his dedication to assist his students and his “911” availability that made this paper possible.
I. Introduction

ECLIPSE II is the name assigned to the stability and support phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, also known as Phase IV operations. Often in military operations, planning teams divide the operation into four phases; preparation, shaping, combat operations, and stability and support operations or post combat operations. Politicians, military critics, and academics have saturated various mediums with their opinion that Phase IV of the Iraq campaign was poorly planned by military and civilian leadership. Although this assertion may be valid, the problems encountered, post-Saddam Hussein rule, were exacerbated by the Coalitional Provisional Authority’s (CPA) decision to disband the Iraqi military. The CPA was formed for the purpose of leading Iraq from post war turmoil to a liberated and representative governed society. Paul Bremer, the head of the CPA, produced one-hundred official orders in the fourteen months of the organization’s existence. His first directive was “de-Baathification” where Saddam Hussein’s Baathist Party members were forbidden from having an active role in the new Iraqi government. The second directive, which is the focus of this analysis, is “COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 2, THE DISSOLUTION OF ENTITIES.” It dissolved the Iraqi Defense Forces, as well as other organizations. Coupled together, the repercussions were immediate and long term. It was arguably one of the most flawed decisions in the history of United States diplomacy.¹

Armed with the after-actions and historical lessons learned from the occupation of Germany, including the problems associated with de-Nazification, the CPA still elected to ostracize the people that were managing infrastructure and securing the nation.² This decision gave birth to an insurgency and fueled lawlessness. Consequentially, from 23 May 2003 to 6 September 2006, the security of all of Iraq was the sole responsibility of United States
government. The added U.S. responsibility of forming a new Iraqi army was occurring concurrently with a war in Afghanistan, a Global War on Terrorism, establishing a new Iraqi government and infrastructure, and fighting an urban guerilla war. Exacerbating the situation, the war was managed by a U.S. Secretary of Defense holding firm to a policy of a small footprint in Iraq. In September 2006, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense assumed ownership of a hastily trained and recruited Iraqi army with very limited capabilities and a fraction of its prewar strength.

The negative ramifications of vanquishing the Iraqi Defense Forces was apparent to most foreign policy and military experts and was not part of the original Phase IV plan, yet Paul Bremer, not only head of the CPA, but presidential envoy to Iraq, was surprised at the level of turmoil occurring in his new area of responsibility. Most shocking is how the decision, a decision with enormous consequences, was made with little debate or consideration with those who had to execute Phase IV. Examining this decision with historical comparisons and its consequences to Iraqis, U.S. military members, and U.S. financial health is an eye-opening journey. The grand decision to disband the Iraqi military was a flawed process that set the conditions for a malcontent and rebellious populace, and changed the liberation of Iraq into the occupation of Iraq yielding an unnecessary expenditure of U.S. blood and treasure.

II. The Argument “For” Disbanding the Iraqi Military

As of September 2007, Paul Bremer still believed that the decision to disband the Iraqi military was the correct decision and probably the most important decision he made as the head of the CPA. To still feel this way after the war has extended well beyond prediction, one would assume he must have sound reasoning. As Bremer states in his book, My Year in Iraq, he felt he
had little choice in the matter - the Iraqi military disbanded itself.\textsuperscript{4} The arguments for disbanding the Iraqi military were mostly ethnic based and symbolic, but also punitive and financial, and finally, because the alternative may have been too difficult. The alternative was to recall the Iraqi military and conduct a classic demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration process (DDR).\textsuperscript{5} It was Bremer’s assertion that most of the Iraqi Army was conscripted and displeased with their standing in the defense forces. He felt most of the soldiers would be content in remaining at home as the coalition requested through leaflets prior to the offensive.\textsuperscript{6} A part of the coalition’s information operations campaign was to convey to Iraqi soldiers that they would be rewarded after the war if they did not resist the coalition.\textsuperscript{7} Additionally, the CPA assessed that Shia soldiers would simply not respond to a recall. They believed Shia soldiers would see the invasion turmoil as an opportunity to be free of corrupt and abusive Sunni officers.\textsuperscript{8} Reinforcing the “too difficult” argument is that the military infrastructure, base headquarters, and barracks were abandoned, damaged by coalition forces during shaping operations, and then destroyed by looters seeking anything of value, to include stripping copper wires, pipes, rebar, and brick or stone.\textsuperscript{9} Soldiers seeing their leaders flee to escape persecution for Baath Party affiliation, possessed little incentive to remain at their damaged barracks and went home with their unit weapons and equipment.\textsuperscript{10} By the CPA’s estimate, recalling the Iraqi military and finding appropriate work spaces and shelter would be a bridge too far. As Walter Slocombe, Defense and Security Advisor for the CPA stated, “All the advantages, [of not disbanding the Iraqi army] they had run away with, the soldiers, the organization, the discipline, the organic transport. The facts had changed.”\textsuperscript{11}

Paul Bremer viewed the Iraqi military as a derogatory symbol instead of an institution that represented sovereignty, survivability, and unity that would eventually provide a common
thread of hope. He believed the Iraqi population viewed them as a tool of tyranny and
dictatorship.\textsuperscript{12} The image is hard to dispute after decades of brutality by Saddam Hussein’s
security forces, intelligence services, and the military’s vile extinguishing of Shia uprisings after
Operation DESERT STORM. Additionally, Saddam Hussein ordered repeated attacks on the
Kurds, to include using chemical weapons. For these reasons, buttressed by discussions with
Kurdish representatives in the United States, the CPA felt that the Kurds would never accept the
same Iraqi army reconstituted and re-armed during reconstruction.\textsuperscript{13} Using this logic, the Shia
leaders would feel the same and would believe the new government supported by the old army
would be business as usual and equality was not on the horizon. The Americans promised
liberation and the hint that there would be minimal change would remind them of the U.S.’s
unwillingness to assist in their uprising post Operation DESERT STORM.\textsuperscript{14}

In 2007, Paul Bremer defended his decision by stating that the only way for Iraq to have a
good army was to dissolve it, rebuild it, and give it the reputation of a professional multi-ethnic
and representative force.\textsuperscript{15} He believed Iraq did not want or need the old Iraqi, regardless of
whether or not it would have been loyal; Iraq wanted a new Iraqi army that was professional and
capable.\textsuperscript{16} Retaining the old army would hinder the CPA’s plans to move Iraq toward a future in
which all ethnic and sectarian groups shared equally in the economic and political life of the
country. His evidence is that the Iraqi Army is now respected and less corrupt than the Iraqi
Police Force.\textsuperscript{17} He states, “Iraq’s new professional soldiers are the country’s most effective and
trusted security force. By contrast, the Baathist-era police force, which we did recall to duty, has
proven unreliable and is mistrusted by the very Iraqi people it is supposed to protect.”\textsuperscript{18} He also
suggests that disbanding the Iraqi military prevented a civil war, as the majority Shia population
would be so disenfranchised that militia groups would combat the Sunni dominated military.\textsuperscript{19}
Not only would the old Iraqi Army pose a threat to the Shia and Kurd population, but it would pose a threat to a struggling and infant new Iraqi government that was being created to represent all people in Iraq. Recalling the old army may have allowed Sunni officers to tailor the force prior to muster, weighing the army heavily Sunni or Baathist, and setting the stage for a future coup. The CPA rightfully wanted to create a new army loyal to the principles of a new representative government. Clearly, this meant a mid- to long-term sacrifice in an indigenous security force.

Bremer was well advised of the complications of disbanding the military by prewar focus groups, but still felt the argument for disbanding the Iraqi military was more in line with national policy and why U.S. service members were sent to Iraq in the first place. Prior to his departure for Baghdad, Bremer sought assurance from President Bush that he would have his support in terms of patience and time, and that the U.S. was in this for the “long haul.” Paul Bremer’s estimate was that in the long term, recreating the army in the future outweighed the benefit of better security in the short term. A memo signed by Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, titled “Principles for Iraq-Policy Guidelines” stated the coalition will “actively oppose Saddam Hussein’s old enforcers - the Baath Party, Fedayeen Saddam, the Special Republican Guard, etc. - and will make it clear that the coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam’s Regime.” This coupled with the Department of State’s Future of Iraq Project message of, “The Iraqi Army of the future cannot be an extension of the present army, which has been made into a dictatorship” provided Paul Bremer with the ammunition he needed to dissolve the Iraqi military - it was too partial, too contaminated and too infiltrated with Baathist to be salvaged. However, the Future of Iraq Project, in its entirety, did not recommend disbanding all of the Iraqi Army.
Lastly, the CPA thought it to be inconceivable and unjust to support, and more importantly, pay over 400,000 soldiers of the Iraqi Army.24 The very institution that protected Saddam Hussein and projected fear in the hearts of its populace should not be compensated. “We don’t pay army’s we defeat” was the assertion by Walter Slocombe.25 In the CPA’s eyes it sent the wrong message to the minority populations that were oppressed by the old Iraqi Army. How could the liberators give money to an oppressive institution under the watchful eyes of the minority when the money was needed to assist impoverished people and crumbling infrastructure?

III. Argument “Against” Disbanding Iraqi Military

The argument against disbanding the Iraqi military stems from a more practical vision of how to execute a reconstruction and healing era. Every major prewar focus and study group (with accessible and published documents available to the author) concluded that retaining a foundation of the Iraqi Army outweighed a complete dissolution. These groups consisted of: The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Group sponsored by the NSC (National Security Council), Task Force IV led by CENTCOM, Office of Special Plans by OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), The Future of Iraq Project from the State Department, monographs by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, ORHA (Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance), and finally the Army War College’s Reconstructing Iraq – Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-conflict Scenario. A compilation of their reasons is provided in this section. Obviously, the security apparatuses most closely tied and loyal to Saddam Hussein (The Republican Guard, Fedayeen Saddam, Mukhabarat Intelligence Service) were recommended to be disbanded, however these focus groups concluded eliminating the
conventional Iraqi military would not be in the best interest of the coalition or Iraq due to practicality, symbolism, nationalism, economics, and to prevent mass disenfranchisement. Disbanding the Iraqi military and leaving all security tasks - internal, border, critical infrastructure and facilities, bases, ammunition supply points, etc. - to the coalition (mainly the United States military) would leave a large void in Iraq's security. During prewar planning there was a long internal debate between OSD and CENTCOM on the size of force required to invade Iraq and conduct regime change. Military commanders and planners calculated that 385,000 troops (consistent with OPLAN 1003-98, the previous CENTCOM Commander, USMC General Anthony Zinni’s estimate) were required to conduct all four phases. The Secretary of Defense was inclined to deploy a much smaller force with combat multipliers. In the end, a little more than 150,000 U.S. troops were deployed into Iraq to conduct Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Using a RAND study of previous conflicts requiring a Phase IV type mission, the coalition was vastly undermanned. The report outlines that very little can be achieved during Phase IV without security; moreover there is a positive correlation between troop strength and stability. The study states, “the higher the proportion of troops relative to resident population, the lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted.” In the Kosovo example, there were 20 soldiers for every 1,000 citizens. Using the RAND study formula the author estimates the coalition needed 500,000 troops to adequately care for and secure Iraq's population of 25 million. That is one soldier per fifty Iraqi citizens. This was clearly unsupportable given the size of the United States volunteer military, a parallel war in Afghanistan, and the lack of interest from other countries to send troops to Iraq. The numbers alone demonstrated that the coalition could not afford to disband the Iraqi military. They were a needed asset to the coalition in order to provide security
in areas that the coalition could not. Simply put, for practical security reasons, they were needed and required for success.

The Strategic Studies Institute developed a Mission Matrix for Iraq in February 2003 titled, *Reconstructing Iraq*. It provides a comprehensive list of tasks for Phase IV. The tasks are labeled critical (highest priority), essential, and then important. The list includes numerous categories, but under “Major Security Activities” there are twelve tasks (nine critical and three essential). Of the nine critical tasks, six could have been executed by the Iraqi Army or they could have greatly assisted the coalition in their execution. Under the heading “Historical, Cultural, and Recreational Services”, the Iraqi Army was best suited to tackle the critical task of “Protect Religious Sites and Access”. There are numerous other tasks that could have been assigned to the Iraqi Army upon a study of their capabilities or supplying them with the requisite equipment. If nothing else, they were manual labor and continuity that could be used to protect and improve infrastructure. Of particular interest to the CPA and American executive branch, the Iraqi military members were subject matter experts that could assist in rounding up former regime heavy-handers and explain military programs and facilities such as WMD programs. Jay Garner, a retired three-star U.S. Army general, was appointed as the head of the ORHA for Iraq stated that “the advantages of using them [Iraqi Army] were they had organization. They had equipment, especially organic transport [jeeps, trucks]. They had a structure.” Garner argued for incorporating much of the military rank-and-file into America’s occupation force. With eighty percent of the Iraq’s population reporting a dislike for American troops, putting an Iraqi face on internal security tasks would have been profoundly beneficial to the coalition.

The symbolism of dissolving the defense forces of Iraq was the most unexplored element of the debate. The opponents to retaining the Iraqi military were quick to demonstrate the
symbolism and the message sent by retaining the old Regime’s tool of oppression, but did not examine the converse symbolism of diminishing their nation’s shield. The Iraqi military was viewed as the “anchor” of the country that had remained intact through British occupation, a brutal Iran-Iraq War, and numerous coups. In Iraq’s history, previous coups would result in a purging of the army’s strategic-level opponents, but the army would be kept intact as an institution of defense. Although it was a force controlled by top level Baathists, at its grassroots it was not genuinely loyal to Saddam Hussein. Most of the coup attempts against Saddam Hussein were orchestrated by Sunni Arab officers - the sector of society that suffered the most throughout Iraq’s history, particularly under Saddam Hussein’s rule. In fact, Saddam Hussein forbade his regular army from entering Baghdad, fearing this would facilitate a coup. The author opines that any opposition to Saddam’s power was well publicized in Iraq, particularly the punishment, to dissuade other groups from attempting rebellions. Overtime, the Iraqi Army demonstrated to the populace their desire to overthrow the regime, which increased their popular respect and gratitude as well as gave the Iraqi people hope. Depending on the accurate populace perception of the Iraqi Army, stripping Iraq of its army may very well have turned the liberation into a perceived oppressive occupation.

The symbolism of keeping the army intact would also forcibly demonstrate that in democracies the military is separate from politics regardless of its ethnic and tribal composition. Although the army was dominated by Sunnis, and aside from top tier Baathist officers, the Iraqi army was already a diverse organization. There were distinguished members of the Iraqi military that represented all parts of the nation’s diverse ethnicity: Kurdish officers, Christian Special Forces Officers, and Shia Generals. For the most part, Saddam Hussein attempted to install a secular society which is consistent with the principles of the Baath Party. Many of the
members of the army as well as the remainder of the government were Baathists in name only. The realist understood that the path to economic survival and employment was to be a Baathist regardless of tribe or religious sect.

The most obvious argument against dissolving the Iraqi military was the unemployment of 400,000 Iraqi service members. It was clear to most research organizations what would happen in a highly militarized society once the regime fell if the army was not employed. The Combat Studies Institute provided accurate insight in the publication, *Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actors: Implications for the U.S. Army*.

The demobilization of a foreign army—i.e. an army of primarily men, whose means of employment was to be trained to use weapons and explosives in a skilled manner to kill—is perhaps the greatest and most critical task in a post-conflict environment. Taking away the jobs and weapons in which so many men have depended for so long, and giving them an equivalent civilian occupation in a peacetime (something even highly educated US military personnel find challenging), is a delicate and absolutely vital challenge which has little room for error. To simply disband them is extremely dangerous. Jean-Paul Sartre commented: "Violence suits those who have nothing to lose." As a former member of the French Resistance during World War II, he would know. Putting people well-trained to kill on the streets with no jobs or compensation certainly risks giving them "nothing to lose," and the potential for waves of violent crime and an insurgency becomes very real. Even the Iraqi manual on Guerrilla Warfare (1995) prescribes as the first means of recruiting for an insurgent force is from a defeated army.²¹⁻⁵

Although the publication was written in 2007, it parallels arguments made by prewar focus groups and these debatable points were available to planners and to decision makers.⁴⁶

**IV. Historical Comparisons**

When Paul Bremer arrived in Baghdad on 12 May 2003, he had with him the after action and lessons learned of the occupation of Germany.⁴⁷ This was particularly fitting since Phase IV of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was titled ECLIPSE II and the German occupation was named ECLIPSE I. Although armed with the knowledge of post-WWII Germany, Bremer will not be seen in the same light as Generals Dwight Eisenhower, Lucius Clay, or George Marshall.
distinguishing characteristic is that Bremer possessed no military experience nor did he thoroughly consult the generals, former generals, or even colonels about the disadvantages of dissolving the Iraqi military. There are some interesting lessons to be learned from the same scenarios in history where a commander or viceroy is confronted with a defeated people and or army. The most comparative is the British mandate to build an Iraqi army in 1921, along with the de-Nazification of Germany, and General Ulysses Grant’s treatment of General Robert Lee’s army during the American Civil War.

Upon the collapse and defeat of the Ottoman Empire post WWI, the United Kingdom controlled, and was entrenched in Iraq. In 1921, at the Cairo Conference, it was decided in the Treaty of Alliance that Britain would build, train, and equip an Iraqi army to protect Iraq’s new monarchy. Naturally, the Iraqi Army was trained in a British fashion, both in mentality and tactics. This among other reasons created animosity between British troops and Iraqi soldiers. Eighty-two years later, the situation is remarkably the same with American troops. Similarly, once CPA Order No. 2 was passed, the United States became responsible for Iraq’s security and for creating a new Iraqi military. As in WWI, where Iraqis fought for the Ottomans against the British, many Iraqis in the new Iraqi Army fought the United Stated during the 1991 Gulf War, and/or in the offensive of the 2003 OIF invasion, and/or as an insurgent. Overtime they resented receiving orders from their previous enemies and having dual chains of command. In both periods, the British and Americans dictated actions to the Iraqi Army and were accused of only providing enough defense equipment to guard the interests of the occupying force.

The conditions and humiliation created from being ruled by non-Muslim former enemies, created an insurgency in Iraq from 1920 through 1930, and again in 2003. In 1932, and again in June 2004, the Iraqis were given formal independence, but the occupying army did not leave.
In 1941, Iraq’s monarchy was overthrown by the Iraqi Army, and threatened to sign a treaty with the Axis of Powers in WWII. Not long after the coup, the British conducted a 40-day war to change the regime of Iraq, as did the U.S. coalition in 2003. The Anglo-Saxons were victorious in both the 1941 and 2003 war and were confronted with disbanding the Iraqi military. The British High Commissioner, in a similar situation to CPA’s Paul Bremer, elected not to disband the Iraqi military. He concluded the cost and time of raising a new army would be too expensive and would make Iraq vulnerable to the insurgency in Kurdish and other rural areas. He instead elected to purge the leadership of the Iraqi Army and ensure they were replaced by more moderate leaders. This proved valuable as they were required to defeat a Kurdish rebellion during the mid 1940s. Unfortunately, the CPA did not follow the British trend and did not have domestic forces to combat insurgents, criminals, and foreign fighters, but instead fed the insurgency with unemployed soldiers and dejected Baathists unable to participate in the new government.

The lesson that Paul Bremer could have most benefited from in the occupation of Germany was the consequences of de-Nazification. General Lucius Clay, who was in charge of the occupation of Germany in 1945, quickly discovered that former Nazis were effective in governing, and the best equipped to administer the infrastructure. Additionally, being a Nazi was a matter of economic benefit and employment. This was also the scenario with Baathists in Iraq. Being a Nazi did not mean you were of same mind as Hitler and being a member of the Baathist party did not automatically mean you subscribed to Saddam Hussein’s agenda. Employing former Nazis during post-WWII occupation was downgraded from “under no circumstances” to as long as you were not an “active” Nazi and completed a questionnaire. This Nazi questionnaire, *fragebogen*, is probably where Bremer got the idea of the de-
Baathification letter. The choice was to either rebuild Germany using former Nazis or not rebuilding it at all. Not too different from the experience in Iraq replacing “Nazi” with “Baathist”.

The U.S. occupation forces in Germany utilized the Wehrmacht (German Army) for policing and labor duties (Military Labor Service Units) for six months after the surrender of Germany until a constabulary force was trained in 1946. The use of German troops provided continuity, and with the abundance of U.S. soldiers in the European theatre, it made for a peaceful reconstruction period. Clearly, the situation was different - Germany did not have an insurgency, foreign fighter, or sectarian problem and the Germans were a defeated people relying on the Allies for bare essentials such as food and water. But General Clay was prepared for the worse, he had what Paul Bremer did not, adequate troops, amplifying the need to keep as many Iraqi soldiers employed as possible.

With one swipe of the hand, Paul Bremer discredited and disenfranchised 400,000 Iraqi veterans and 50,000 Baathist officials (of an estimated to be 700,000 Baathists) creating a condition that United States Union General, and future President, Ulysses Grant smartly avoided after the American Civil War. As Confederate President Jefferson Davis felt the future of the Confederacy in jeopardy in early 1865, he began thinking about the Spaniards success in Irregular Warfare against Napoleon and employing General Lee’s Confederate Army in that manner. General Grant and other union Generals were not strangers to the effectiveness of irregular warfare from their experience in the South, particularly Vicksburg and Missouri, where “no policy worked, every effort poured fuel on the fire.” A reconstruction campaign while fighting the likes of JEB Stuart’s and John Mosby’s raiding parties would make for a difficult to impossible healing process. With this in mind and for the admiration he had for General Robert
E. Lee, General Grant did not develop a punitive and humiliating “de-Confederation” process. Surprising the leadership of the Army of Virginia, General Grant allowed General Lee and his army to lay down their arms and go home to start the healing process. He even arranged for them to receive rations. Historians note the respectful manner in which General Grant treated General Lee’s army is what prevented a large guerilla force from heading to the Shenandoah Valley and Appalachian Mountains. The Confederate Army was able to maintain its dignity.

V. The Consequences of Disbanding Iraqi Military

The passing of CPA General Order Number One, “De-Baathification of Iraqi Society” coupled with CPA General Order Number Two, “Dissolution of Entities”, sent shockwaves throughout Iraq’s population as well as the U.S. ground forces and reconstruction teams in Iraq. Within one week the CPA had disenfranchised at least 450,000 people. Of those, 400,000 were Iraqi soldiers. The immediate reaction to disbanding the Iraqi military was one that Paul Bremer had failed to calculate, and the Iraqi perception of the former army was one that few could predict, but it was powerful enough to collide with ECLIPSE II and set it off course. The former army felt humiliated, deceived, and in a powerless situation to set a course for their future and care for their families. Unemployed and infuriated, they turned to other outlets to demonstrate their displeasure.

The Iraqi Army was the last symbol of sovereignty to a war-torn nation needing liberation from a brutal dictator. Invaded by a non-Muslim force, but also liberated, many Iraqis were willing to welcome the coalition with warm hearts, but they were not willing to be completely disassembled by a nation that did not even understand the politics of survival in their country. The Iraqi Army was a proud organization - the shield of Iraq. The largest and most effective army in the Arab region was ordered to disintegrate without being told their future
opportunities. Simultaneously, 7,000 Iraqi Police officers were fired for former regime affiliations. Without their pride and with constant humiliation in a culture and nation where honor, sharaf, is a measure similar to wealth; a powder keg was bound to ignite. The lack of security forces and lawlessness left sects and tribes competing for post-regime power. Coalition forces patrolling and searching neighborhood homes for top-level Baathists, produced a requirement for non-sanctioned internal security organizations to protect communities or provide early warning. Communities turned to former military and police men to conduct such a task. Dejected colonels and generals were ready to lead them. The arms and ammunition was available, unguarded, and the motivation was abundant. The honeymoon of liberation was clearly over and the feeling of being occupied by an Anglo-Saxon force was again the situation in Iraq.

The dissolution of the country’s defenses degraded the Iraqi immune system to outside influences and assertions. Global Arab groups provided the myth that the reason the Iraqi Army had been dismantled was to keep Arab countries weak and Israel strong. Others commented that the United States was only interested in Iraq’s natural resources and had little concern for the security and survivability of the country. The coalition and reconstruction teams did little to dissuade these thoughts. The coalition allowed the looting to occur, security to evaporate, and the government to include its military, was being fired by an occupation force. Nationalists feared what would become of their country, and history demonstrated that this has happened before. The conditions were created for an insurgency, and without the borders secured, fellow Muslims in the form of foreign fighters infiltrated to assist. The ingredients for an insurgency existed and the pot was stirring.
The reaction began with meetings, then protests, and finally violence. Former Iraqi military leaders, who had been working with ORHA to recall the army and go through a reintegration process, were confused when the new CPA, which relieved the ORHA on 12 May 2003, announced the elimination of the army. They begged for meetings and reconsideration - the CPA did not reconsider. Following Bremer's order to disband the army, 5,000 protesting soldiers carried banners that read: “Dissolving the Iraqi Army is a humiliation to the dignity of the nation.” Interviews with former soldiers and officers of the Iraqi military found that “a powerful mix of nationalism, humiliated pride and nostalgia (chiefly among the senior corps) for the old institutional benefits [of the army] is fueling anger against the decision to dismantle the army.” On June 18, Iraqi soldiers protested again carrying signs that read, “Please Keep Your Promises,” referring to the invasion leaflets. Due to some acts of violence during the protest, U.S servicemen were forced to fire on the crowd, killing two.

Disbanding the military, therefore, was interpreted by many as an attack on Iraqi identity and sovereignty. Former Iraqi Defense Minister Hazim al-Sha’lan declared that following the dissolution of the Iraqi military, the problems of “anarchy” and “lawless behavior” were exacerbated: “Through this lawlessness, certain groups built dens of deceit, crime, and corruption. Had the Iraqi Army remained these things would not have happened.” A former Army officer who joined the insurgency stated he joined due to the “shame and humiliation at the dissolution of the army.”

The insurgency began to mature after the dissolution of the Iraqi Army. Figure 1 demonstrates the level of violence in Iraq, from March 2003 to September 2007, in the form of U.S. casualties. The initial March to April 2003 casualty numbers are from the offensive, but in May 2003 following de-Baathification and dissolution of entities, the casualties quadrupled and
then increased 750% by the end of the summer. The casualties subsided in the less-active winter months, from October to late February 2004, until March, when the fully matured insurgency emerged and U.S. casualties increased from 150 to an astounding 1,214 in May 2004.

Figure 1.

**U.S. TROOPS WOUNDED IN ACTION SINCE MARCH 2003**

![Graph showing U.S. troops wounded in action since March 2003](image)

*Taken from the Brookings Institute, “Iraq Index, Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq.”*

Additional consequences of the decision to disband the Iraq military can be measured in time and the debt that the United States has incurred. At the start of the war, CENTCOM Commander, General Tommy Franks, and prior to the war, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz predicted that a significant number (two-thirds or 100,000) of U.S. troops could begin redeploying home in September of 2003. This was an ambitious prediction, even if the Iraqi Army had remained intact. The U.S. troop levels increased. In September 2007, there were 168,000 U.S. troops in Iraq compared to 150,000 in May 2003. At a pace of one battalion every six months (recruiting and training new Iraqi defense forces), the United States expended more than five years producing an Iraqi force with the ability to begin securing its own country. It took two years to recruit and train the number of Iraqi troops that CENTCOM
planners thought they would have available to utilize in Phase IV operations (40,000). No one can accurately predict that by not dejecting all Baathist and not disbanding the Iraqi military that the security situation would have been much better. But now, in early 2009, the Iraqi military has been reestablished, and former Baathists are reintegrated into the government resulting in the security situation being much improved. Clearly, the Tribal Awakening, where tribal leaders and their members rejected and fought against the foreign fighters, has had an enormous influence, but one could successfully argue that the 2007 troop surge would not have been necessary if at least one-eighth to one-quarter of the Iraqi Army would have been retained.

The extended occupation vice liberation of Iraq provided hatred for coalition forces that became quantifiable in a September 2006 poll by WorldOpinion.org. The poll shows 92% of Sunnis thought it was acceptable to attack American troops, and overall, 61% of Iraqis condoned the attacks. This contemptuous feeling obviously contributed significantly to the cost of the war in troops and treasure via insurgent support. If the majority of troops securing Iraqi villages and infrastructure were indigenous with U.S. support in the back drop this may not have been the case.

Quantifying the consequences of disbanding the Iraqi military in terms of dollars and American debt is tricky, but if one can stipulate that the surge would not have been needed if the Iraqi Army was not disbanded, then a rough figure can be extracted. Using FY06 Iraqi operating costs as the standard (101.7 billion dollars) then the increase for the surge in FY07 and FY08 cost America 86 billion dollars. The author believes this is a minimal cost of disbanding the Iraqi military. One could argue that any operating costs in Iraq beyond FY06 (FY07, FY08, and FY09 bridge) could be attributed to the result of disbanding the Iraqi security forces. This estimate is 340 billion dollars. To put this in perspective, the entire Iraq war, since September
11, 2001 through the FY08 budget has cost America 567 billion dollars. The entire Vietnam War, adjusted to today's dollar, cost 650 billion dollars.

VI. An Analysis of the Decision Making Process

War planners at CENTCOM working on OPLAN 1003V, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, finalized the plan for Phase IV and tasked the Combined Forced Land Component Commander (CFLCC), General David McKiernan, with the primary responsibility of post combat operations. ECLIPSE II, Phase IV, assumed the use of the Iraqi Army to assist in reconstruction. The Iraqi military was to undergo a DDR process and then be paid and assigned tasks to assist with the security and reconstruction effort. The plan called for an initial 40,000 Iraqi soldiers to be used with more added as required, and as U.S. troops redeployed home. The Iraqi soldiers not being immediately employed were to be paid to maintain recall information and to be at a ready status. This plan would not be seen as ideal to the Iraqi populace either, and probably heavily criticized as well, but it allowed for the Iraqi Army to be recalled and stood up much faster than the course of action that was employed. This plan was briefed and approved by the President, National Security Advisor, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

On 20 January 2003, the ORHA was formed and began preparing to assist the CFLCC in the reconstruction of Iraq. They deployed to Kuwait in mid-March confirming liaisons and waiting for hostilities to end so they could execute their role. Jay Gardner and U.S. Army Colonel Paul Hughes had arranged for a U.S. company named the RONCO Corporation to conduct the DDR process and handle the registering of Iraqi military members for call-up and employment. RONCO's plan was briefed in March and they were prepared to execute shortly
after major combat operations had ceased on 1 May 2003. Colonel Hughes, General McKiernan, and General Abizaid (Deputy CENTCOM Commander), had develop relationships with prominent leaders in the Iraqi military to bridge the gap for RONCO so the DDR process could begin.

ORHA and RONCO were never able to execute CENTCOM's plan, and the plan approved by the President, because on 6 May the President and Secretary of Defense elected to dissolve ORHA and fire Jay Gardner, replacing them with the CPA headed by Paul Bremer. The reason provided was that the President wanted someone with more political experience as his envoy to Iraq. This is the moment when the author asserts ECLIPSE II goes on a collision course with Phase IV planning.

Paul Bremer reverses the course of Phase IV by canceling the DDR process, the payment of the Iraqi military, and OHRA's plan to establish an interim government. Paul Bremer wanted to slow down the process to ensure that the right people were being put into power “so that Saddam’s men did not claw their way back into power.” He also had a desire to immediately exert his influence and demonstrate to Iraq that he was going to eradicate “Saddamism”. Within eleven days in Iraq, (12 May to 23 May), he had derailed months of planning and had already created the conditions for violent protests. To demonstrate his logic, he canceled elections in localities that commanders had established because the “right” person was not going to win. This hampered reconstruction efforts because areas remained leaderless where military commanders were attempting to coordinate humanitarian assistance and infrastructure repair.

Ultimately, the decision to disband the Iraqi military was the result of years of influence by an exiled Iraqi named Ahmed Chalabi. Ahmed Chalabi, a Shia, was reinforced by Kurdish exiles that saw disbanding the Iraqi military and a strong de-Baathification process as
advantageous to their minority group. The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was a Kurdish dominated body advising OSD and the CPA on what the future Iraqi government should resemble. Chalabi was the leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC). The INC was an Iraqi opposition group desiring the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. From 2000 to 2003, the U.S. government gave the INC $36 million for operations. Chalabi was a favorite of the policy makers in Washington, most notably, the Vice President and Secretary of Defense. Admiration for Chalabi quickly spread to high level DoD staff such as Deputy Secretary of Defense; Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary for Policy; Douglas Feith, and the future Defense and Security Advisor of the CPA; Walter Slocombe. They were largely influenced by Chalabi, due to his ability to produce Iraqi exiles with information regarding the internal operations of the Baathist party and Saddam Hussein’s regime. He was also very persuasive in leading the United States to believe that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD and that Iraq would treat the United States as liberators. He became a primary advisor for the OSD. On the other hand, the Department of State, DIA, CIA, and military commanders did not trust nor think he was a credible source, and believed his influence over the media and policy makers was dangerous.

Chalabi campaigned for months to get Jay Garner to subscribe to a strict de-Baathification policy and to disband the Iraqi military. The IGC felt the same way for roughly the same reasons - power. These actions would allow Chalabi to assume power of Iraq’s new government with all competitors removed, and autonomy to appoint ministers he favored. The IGC assumed their influence would create a government that set the conditions for more Kurdish autonomy and free from military intimidation. Interestingly, Chalabi’s advice throughout the planning process was assumed tainted by those who had more exposure to Iraq and knew the practicalities of executing in the Iraqi culture, but he was able to manipulate the most important
decision makers. In fact, when Jay Gardner refused to give Chalabi a leading role in the reconstruction of Iraq, the Under Secretary of Defense of Policy; Doug Feith, screamed at Garner, accusing him of “ruining everything” and that he should “make Chalabi President of Iraq”. Garner and his analysts distrusted Chalabi enough that they still refused. Clearly, the end of Garner’s ORHA leadership began with his refusal to accept Chalabi as a valued resource and a future leader of Iraq. Garner’s relief was a sizable victory for Chalabi. In sum, Chalabi and the IGC were exerting considerable effort on the decision making process.

Chalabi’s importance to the decision making process cannot be overstated as he permeated the top tiers of the OSD as well as the Vice President. When Paul Bremer was called to the Pentagon to begin planning for his future role as head of the CPA, he already had strong preconceptions as to what Iraq should look like and removing “Saddamism”, but the catalyst was the OSD influence born by Chalabi. Bremer consulted Feith and Wolfowitz repeatedly in the Pentagon when he was waiting for the official announcement that he would be relieving Garner. A competitor to the Chalabi manner of thinking was Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan who has been involved in U.S. Middle East and Asia policy since 1980. He conducted several meetings with Iraqi leaders on the political arrangements for a new government. He favored a more tempered approach to heal the nation, and most importantly, he had nothing to gain. He was chosen by the President and Secretary of State to assist Paul Bremer in the formation of a new Iraqi government. Chalabi and Bremer, fearing unity of command issues, and a difference in opinion of post-war Iraq, secured Khalilzad’s removal from the team at the shock and displeasure of the Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. (Khalilzad would later become the Ambassador to Iraq in 2005.) The paradigm was set. It was heavily Chalabi’s ideals running post-war Iraq policy with the removal of Garner and Khalilzad and the insertion of Bremer.
The decision to disband the Iraqi military, a decision that contradicted planning and nearly every focus group that studied it, had vast consequences, and would certainly need to be vetted prior to execution. Or would it? Paul Bremer claims that the President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, NSA, CENTCOM, and CFLCC were all briefed on the decision and accepted CPA General Order Number 2. With certainty, the Secretary of State, NSA, CENTCOM, and CFLCC state they were not consulted. It appears clear that Doug Feith and Paul Wolfowitz knew of, contributed to, and cleared the decision. Various reports conflict on the clarity Donald Rumsfeld had of the decision, but it is very apparent that his closest advisors help draft the policy. Paul Bremer states that he briefed the President on 22 May, 2003 on numerous issues including disbanding the Iraqi military via a video conference. There is no indication that Bremer received a clear approval, but he did receive a letter from the President the next day stating that he had his full support for all he was doing in Iraq. It was more a generic letter of thanks and support than an approval. As of September 2007, the President stated he did not know why the Iraqi military was disbanded or if he had approved it, but acknowledged it was not part of the original plan. Even more interesting is that not one military commander can be confirmed as consulted about the consequences or recall recommending the order prior to the issuance of the order. In fact, commanders including General Dave Petraeus, the 101st Airborne Division Commander, protested the order twice without success. Those that concocted the order (Bremer, Feith, Slocomb, and Wolfowitz) have a collective, zero, military experience. Additionally, the Military and Security Advisor to the CPA, Walter Slocomb, possessed no military experience nor did he spend one day in Iraq prior to recommending the order.
Paul Bremer's ideology and decision making became more influenced by reality shortly after his first two general orders were passed. The volume of protests by Iraqis and military commanders led him to reverse a perceived advantage to disbanding the Iraqi military - not paying them. On 25 June 2003, he decided to reverse course and begin paying regular Iraqi Army soldiers small stipends, but excluded Colonels and above.\textsuperscript{108} In 2003, the United States paid $250 million to former soldiers with hopes of ending the payments in 2004.\textsuperscript{109} Unfortunately, the damage was done and the Iraqi soldiers grew disdainful for the Americans who they believed had apparently fooled them into not fighting during the offensive just so they could subdue them after they occupied Iraq.

A consistent argument that Bremer offered to defend his decision was that the Iraqi Army had disbanded itself and did not have any barracks. Curiously, he did not recognize the fact that they were able to reconstitute for protests. He also ignored a meeting that Colonel Hughes, General McKiernan, and General Abizaid had held where prominent Iraqi leaders told them they could easily bring the army back.\textsuperscript{110} Walter Slocomb, who also attended the meeting, told them their services were not required.\textsuperscript{111} The CPA and political circles in Washington failed to appreciate that even if the army's facilities were looted, the Iraqi Army could occupy areas just as U.S. forces did, in hangers and former palaces and temporary shelters provided by U.S. contractors. It appears this argument was a red herring for the fear that Bremer and Chalibi had for the Iraqi Army creating a resurgence of power for Sunnis and Baathist vice the reasons offered. They feared the army was too ethically imbalanced and would be an obstacle to uniting the three major sects; Kurds, Shia, and Sunni. Their fears may not have been as well founded as they thought. One indication that those making decisions may not have fully debated or investigated the composition nor the symbol of the Iraqi military is the fact that only one-half of
the major generals were Baathists, an even smaller percentage of the brigadier generals were
Baathists, and only 8,000 of 140,000 NCOs and officers were Baathists. The CPA’s decision
was based on the paradigm that Saddam’s army was something that it was not without Saddam
and his top tier henchmen at the helm. It also amplified the saturating influence and unverified
acceptance of Ahmed Chalabi’s recommendations. Incidentally, Chalabi is currently under
investigation for fraud and has never won an elected seat in Iraq.

The author has produced Figure 2 which illustrates influences to the U.S. decision to
disband the Iraqi Army. A healthy amount of research has concluded that the CPA’s most
significant contributor to the decision making process was Iraqi exiles, namely the Chalabi, and
the exiles he produced and probably tainted. The second most influential element was OSD
leadership which relied upon Chalabi. Remarkably, the President of the United States (POTUS)
appears to have had little if any influence. The President’s influence, at best, can be described
as “silence is consent”. Military commanders, the Secretary of State, the NSA, Iraqi leaders,

Figure 2. Decision Making Influence

Other normal contributors were non-influential or not even consulted. Elements on the left side
of the chart “pushed” the decision with varying levels of influence indicated by the length of the
arrow. Elements on the right side of the chart were either not consulted or were unable to “push” the decision makers with their recommendation.

VII. Conclusion with Recommended Solution

The U.S. decision to disband the Iraqi military via Paul Bremer and the CPA was the result of narrow thinking by policy makers unable to discern reality and practicality from preconceived ideals. None of the policy makers were accustomed to negotiating the complexities of chaos often encountered in war in order to achieve an end state, and those that had a better understanding of the situation, and were responsible for executing and dealing with the consequences of the decision, were not consulted or heeded. The decision was also a product of colliding priorities. The Secretary of Defense wanted a small occupation force that commanders knew was imprudent, the military planners adapted by planning to use the Iraqi Army to make up for coalition short falls, and the CPA wanted to dissolve all things Baathist or resembling Saddam even if it was the only mechanism allowing the country to function.

The military commanders with the responsibility of executing Phase IV operations were handed an equation that eliminated any probability of success. The equation of an under strength coalition, a disbanded and humiliated Iraqi Army, sixty percent unemployment rate, humanitarian and essential services crisis, 450,000 disenfranchised populace with access to unsecured weaponry and ammunition, and international terrorists infiltrating the borders was certain to create a formidable obstacle to success.\textsuperscript{113} Security is the foundation for support and stability and it was unachievable given the context of Iraq in 2003 and into 2004.

A practical common sense plan for security collided with ideals of immediately creating a more ethnically balanced government and placing those that had been in power for so long on the
sidelines. Bremer chose a punitive approach prescribed by questionable exiles versus a healing approach due to his preconceived notions about Iraqi society and the symbol of Iraq’s army. It was a decision that was clearly not advised by every major organization that took the time to analyze the decision. With such a grand decision and significant consequences, it is surprising the U.S. government allowed this decision to take place. The argument for and against with historical comparisons demonstrates the information decision makers had available to them. Unfortunately, the decision to disband the Iraqi military in addition to de-Baathification created the conditions where much of the populace had little choice but to take violent action. The malcontent feelings without security extended the war five years beyond prediction and created insurgent momentum that cost the coalition lives and enormous amounts of tax-payer dollars.

It is impossible to predict that not disbanding the Iraqi military would have prevented an insurgency, but certainly it is hard to believe it would have made matters worse. The original plan developed by war planners to use the Iraqi military after a reintegration process outlined earlier (that excluded Republican Guard, Saddam Faydeem, and Mukbarjt Intelligence Service) enhanced by a feeling of nationalism would have improved the probability of success. Ayad Allawi, Prime Minister of Iraq, gave the following speech in June 2007:

“I tell you in all frankness that the prerequisite of victory is making soldiers and officers patriots who care for nothing except Iraq, regardless of their affiliations. Focus on this doctrine, the doctrine of equality, the doctrine of the homeland, the doctrine that would spare the army sectarianism, confessionalism, and political partisanship. The army must not be involved in political partisanship and parliamentary life.”

Given the positive symbolism of the Iraqi Army to the populace, reasserting them into the 2003 equation with a national and unifying message similar to the above could have set Iraq on a completely different trajectory. A leader that would have embraced the Iraqi Army and made them the foundation of the New Iraq would have set the course for reconstruction and unity and a
democratically elected government. The election process was certain to be turbulent, but with indigenous security forces from a strong Iraqi army, a representative government may have prevailed. The make-up of the government, over time through democracy, would have evolved into what Paul Bremer wanted overnight through punitive measures.
Notes

6 Bremer, "How I Didn't Dismantle the Iraq's Army."
8 Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 54.
9 Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 55.
12 Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 53.
13 Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 55.
15 Bremer, "How I Didn't Dismantle the Iraq's Army."
16 Bremer, "How I Didn't Dismantle the Iraq's Army."
17 Bremer, "How I Didn't Dismantle the Iraq's Army."
18 Bremer, "How I Didn't Dismantle the Iraq's Army."
19 Hickey.
21 Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 11.
22 Bremer, "How I Didn't Dismantle the Iraq's Army."
23 Bremer, "How I Didn't Dismantle the Iraq's Army."
26 James Fallows, "Blind Into Baghdad," 8, 10, 23.
27 Gordon and Trainor, 28-42.
28 Gordon and Trainor, 28.
31 McGinn and Dobbins, xxv.
32 McGinn and Dobbins, xvii.
34 Ricks, 162.
35 Fallows, "Why Iraq Has No Army," 5.
36 O’Hanlon and Campbell, 55.
37 Al-Marshi, 48.
38 Al-Marshi, 46.
39 Al-Marshi, 46.
40 Al-Marshi, 42-53.
41 Gordon, 485.
42 Al-Marshi, 45.
43 AI-Marshi, 44.
44 Al-Marshi, 44.
45 Gott and Brooks, 116.
46 Fallows, "Blind Into Baghdad," 8,10,23.
47 Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 38.
48 AI-Marshi, 48.
49 AI-Marshi, 48.
50 AI-Marshi, 48.
51 Al-Marshi, 47.
52 Al-Marshi, 47.
53 Al-Marshi, 47.
54 Al-Mashi, 43.
55 Al-Mashi, 43.
56 Al-Mashi, 43.
57 Al-Mashi, 43.
59 Casella, 56.
61 Ricks, 159.
62 Gott and Brooks, 120,121.
63 Gott and Brooks, 120.
64 Bensahel and others, 126.
65 Al-Marashi, 47.
66 Bensahel and others, XXVI.
67 Al-Marashi, 42.
68 Al-Marashi, 42.
69 Gordon and Trainor, 482-483.
71 Fineman and others.
72 Ricks, 164.
74 al-Sharqiyya.
75 See Ricks, 97-100, 138; and Gordon and Trainor, 459.
76 O’Hanlon and Campbell, 28.
77 Gordon and Trainor, 484.
78 O’Hanlon and Campbell, 34.
79 O’Hanlon and Campbell, 55.
81 Belasco, 12.
82 Belasco, 12.
84 Bensahel and others, 142.
85 Bensahel and others, 142.
87 Gordon and Trainor, 481.
88 Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 15.
89 Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 15.
90 Gordon and Trainor, 479.
91 Ricks, 57.
92 Ricks, 56-57.
93 Ricks, 56-57.
94 Ricks, 56.
95 Gordon and Trainor, 476.
96 Gordon and Trainor, 476.
97 Ricks, 104.
98 Gordon and Trainor, 476.
99 Bremer, "How I Didn't Dismantle the Iraq's Army."
100 Gordon and Trainor, 483.
101 Gordon and Trainor, 483.
102 Bremer, "How I Didn't Dismantle the Iraq's Army."
103 Bremer, "How I Didn't Dismantle the Iraq's Army."
104 Hickey.
105 Gordon and Trainor, 414, 488.
106 No End in Sight: Iraq's Decent Into Chao, directed by Charles Ferguson, performed by Magnolia Pictures, 2007.
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