WHERE THE DAWN COMES UP LIKE THUNDER:
THE ARMY'S FUTURE ROLE IN THE PACIFIC

by

COLONEL WARD M. LE HARDY, US ARMY

At last, a reprieve! Headlines screamed the news in late April: "President Slows U.S. Pullout From Korea." Congress followed a few days later with their own expression of concern over the planned withdrawal of US ground forces from Korea. These steps seemed to close Phase One of a relook into the future military influence the United States plans to provide in the Pacific. That relook began when President Carter reaffirmed his campaign pledge to withdraw US ground forces from South Korea within four to five years. It was that announcement that brought the Pacific onto the front burner of every policymaker's stove.

President Carter's action has caused thought and discussion, fear and imagination to conjoin in the Pacific arena with inspiring results. In Japan, it is no longer taboo to discuss defense requirements publicly, and there is now a general acceptance of the need to increase defense spending. In Korea, after an initial bout of severe withdrawal symptoms, there is now a resurgence of a positive attitude in the ability of the Republic of Korea (ROK) to "go it alone" at some point in the future.

It is my view that President Carter struck a significant blow for freedom in the Pacific by causing all nations, including the United States, to reexamine their interests and links in the Far East. Now, by announcing a slowdown of the fixed schedule of withdrawal, Phase Two of the Pacific relook can take place. Out of this second phase should come a US strategy for the Pacific that is developed in full consideration of our vital interests and the concerns of our allies.

Within the Army, there is a need to articulate the threat—military, political, economic, and the even more insidious threat of perception—that exists in the Pacific, and to determine how our ground forces can best be structured and positioned to achieve the deterrence and influence we seek. And all of this should be done prior to any renewal of a timetable for withdrawal from the Far East.

The dawn does come up like thunder in the Pacific, and history shows we have been caught sleeping on several occasions. When we have awakened, our lack of Pacific orientation has led us into some horrendous blunders. The US Army is looked upon by friend and foe alike as a sign of real national commitment, and for the United States to remain a viable Pacific power, the Army's influence must continue to be felt there. While our national attention over the past year or two has been focused on improving our ability to carry out our traditional "NATO First" strategy, the pendulum now needs to be centered to correct the perception of our foes and Pacific allies.
**Report Documentation Page**

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alike that our strategy is "NATO Only." We have an Army that is capable of projecting a credible deterrent in both NATO and the Pacific when done in conjunction with active participation by the other armed services and those of our allies.

The continuing argument that NATO faces a "real" threat, while there is no like threat in the Pacific, must be met head-on. The nation—and most certainly the Army—must clearly state the requirement for forward-deployed ground forces, based not just on the number of Soviet divisions, but on the other threats which are just as real as these direct military deployments. The presence of US ground forces deployed in the face of these various threats—economic, political, and military—attracts allied support and provides a far more realistic deterrent than does a policy statement of our intent. And in the Pacific, nations who want to support the United States are looking for signs of commitment as they wrestle with the shape of the future in the Pacific. We need to give them a positive sign!

**US INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC**

Over the past 35 years, the United States has been involved in three major wars and dozens of minor incidents in the Pacific. American lives and treasure have been lost in the defense of freedom in places never heard of before or since: Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Guadalcanal; Chosin Reservoir, Inchon, Porkchop Hill; Ia Drang Valley, A Shau, and Lochninh. These names mean little to us now, but they were among the many places in which the military arm of our national policy was exerted in our concern for our interests in the Pacific. Although these interests are many and varied and take on different levels of importance, the interests which we consider vital are those which we as a nation are willing to expend lives and treasure to protect. From the lessons of Vietnam, and the subsequent congressional constraints placed on the Commander in Chief, it is clear that any future commitment of lives or treasure must be supported by the American people. With that as a basic premise, it is important to identify our national interests in the Pacific and to measure them against that concept.

**Economic**

Throughout history, economic factors have been at the very heart of the causes of conflict. In the Pacific, US interests are centered on the maintenance and development of trade: markets for our goods and services and access to important resources that exist in the region. Trade between the US and the Asiatic-Pacific nations has exceeded our trade with the European Economic Community for the past six years and today accounts for 25 percent of all US foreign trade. In 1977, this amounted to $62 billion—a 13-percent increase over 1976. In addition to the vast amounts of consumer items imported from the Asiatic-Pacific area, several important strategic raw materials are found there. Zirconium, titanium, and manganese, as well as tin, rubber, and tungsten, are among those critical imports.

It is not only in the best interests of the United States to maintain our existing trade arrangements in the Pacific, but it is also important to expand that trade as opportunities are presented. Greater initiatives could be taken to expand our economic ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), not just to develop trade, but to bolster that association, which sits astride a very strategic location in the Pacific. Even the most cursory glance at the map will show the geographic importance of Malaysia and Indonesia to the flow of ocean trade and oil from the Indian Ocean into the Pacific region.

Of special concern to the United States is the flow of oil to our economic partners in the Asiatic-Pacific region. To Japan, that unimpeded flow of oil from the Middle East is essential for continued status as an economic power. With 80 percent of Japan's oil and 30 percent of Australia's flowing by tanker through the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, the importance of the freedom of that route becomes apparent. It is
not exaggerating to say that Japan’s security begins at the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, and until alternate sources of energy are found, the maintenance of the security of that link must be considered as a major US interest.

**Political**

Of the four major powers involved in the Pacific region, Japan is clearly the dominant economic force, but the weakest militarily. Japan walks this fine line through political maneuvering and under the defense umbrella of the United States. Our important economic ties with Japan make it in our national interests to maintain the political balance in the Asiatic-Pacific region to Japan’s advantage.

In that light, our interests are best served by denying the USSR any political advantage in the Pacific. In Africa, where our interests have been vague, we have not until recently challenged the spreading Soviet influence. In the Pacific, where our interests are more clear and traditional, we must have the ability and intent to meet head-on any increase in Soviet influence. The continuing thaw in US-PRC relations is a means of countering any Soviet expansionist intent. Although the PRC is concerned primarily with internal consolidation and industrial development, the threat of Soviet encirclement hangs heavy over the Chinese national psyche. The encouragement of the development of the unlikely political alliance of the US, Japan, and the PRC is a further means of meeting Soviet adventurism in the area. By improving those relations, US influence will be enhanced, and the Soviet planner will be forced to keep a sharp focus on the PRC-USSR border, maintaining assets there which otherwise could have been diverted to the NATO front. The policies outlined in the Shanghai Communiqué should remain the basis of our political interests in the Pacific for the rest of this century.

Korea, the focus of four-power interest in Northeast Asia, is the most likely flashpoint in the coming years. South Korea remains our staunchest ally in the Asiatic-Pacific region as a result of the stability provided by our 30 years of political support, and more recently by the stability provided by the 10-year-old administration of President Park. The US has a moral obligation to continue that support, and with a booming economy and a strong military capability, the ROK will require less and less. Our major interest in Korea is to avoid war, and in that place where war is most likely, this means that continued support of the Park government, militarily and politically, is essential for the foreseeable future. The human rights questions must be addressed, but survival of the ROK must be the paramount consideration in our political dealings with Korea. Full recognition of the ROK by all nations, particularly by North Korea, should be our long-range goal for increasing the political stability in Northeast Asia.

Although Taiwan will have to remain a pawn in the bigger chess game we must play with the PRC, our interests must include maintaining our existing ties and not sacrificing a loyal ally. Again, politically adhering to the principles expressed in the Shanghai Communiqué, and agreeing to disagree with the PRC over Taiwan is, I believe, the only logical course for the United States to take in the coming years.

Our interests in Southeast Asia are primarily political. After the Vietnam disaster, all nations in that region of the Pacific are watching and waiting to see what
will occur. Vietnam itself will need years before her gains are consolidated and she poses a real threat to anyone but her immediate neighbors. The strategic geographic importance of the area, along with the key raw materials produced and the market potential for US goods, makes the region important to us. Our political interests can best be served by developing stronger ties with ASEAN and by encouraging our traditional allies like Australia and New Zealand to take a greater role in the future of the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia.

Military

Our military interests in the Asiatic-Pacific region revolve around our ability to protect our economic and political interests and to honor our commitments. To achieve that ability, a military peacetime force presence, a demonstrated commitment to use force when necessary, and active support to strengthen our allies’ military posture are essential. With the US military presence in the Pacific at a 36-year low point, it is vital to our national interests that some other element of deterrence fill the void. Either increased capability on the part of our allies or unequivocal evidence of US resolve to come to the aid of our friends is implied. Some of this gap can be filled by increased military aid and assistance to friendly nations in the Pacific. A relook at our treaty commitments is also in order, for our friends and foes alike must perceive that we mean business when we agree to help an ally in need. In many cases, our current treaties preceded Vietnam, and our intent is questioned by those we say we will support.

For the Navy and Air Force, the bulk of our interests are in maintaining the sea and air lines of communication. From the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca to the Sea of Japan is the vital sea line of communication (SLOC) that keeps Japan’s economy humming. Until Japan becomes more powerful militarily and expands her concept of defense beyond the Japanese Islands, the US should be committed to providing needed SLOC security. Thus the criticality of the Philippine bases at Clark and Subic Bay becomes so apparent.

THE PACIFIC THREAT

The threat in the Pacific is not as clearly defined as it is in Central Europe. There is, however, a threat which could be even more dangerous than that in Europe. Because the Pacific threat has not been based so much on numbers of Soviet tanks or submarines, there is a tendency to discount it and apply US force development logic disproportionately to meeting the more easily defined threat to NATO.

One cannot cite the Soviet airborne divisions as a threat to our interests in the Pacific, nor can one count the dozens of Soviet divisions deployed along the Chinese border. Both forces certainly exist, but they do not directly threaten our interests. The Soviet naval and air power capability is growing in the Pacific both in quantity and in quality and poses a threat, but without a Soviet ground force to complement it, there is reluctance to develop ground forces to counter this threat.

Therein lies the difficulty for the Army in the Pacific. The threat that the US Army is needed to counter is an ill-defined, insidious one that comes and goes and manifests itself in the form of the perceptions in the minds of our Pacific allies. And in this time of great uncertainty over US intent in the Pacific following Vietnam, perceptions must be addressed. The Soviets have demonstrated, with apparent success in Africa, their ability to increase economic and political influence through the use of their own and Cuban forces. Although Soviet ties are not as firm in Vietnam as they are in Cuba, it takes little imagination to see Vietnam, needing economic support but unable to get it from the West, turning to the USSR and fast becoming a Soviet puppet state in the Pacific. Thailand, a party to an existing US treaty commitment, will most certainly be the first to feel Vietnam’s new muscle, probably within the next 10 years.
Likewise, North Korea, acting alone or with Russian support, presents a formidable threat to peace in the Pacific. Poised with forward deployed ground forces just 30 miles north of Seoul, with an offensive-minded leader bent on the reunification of Korea, the North Korean military force is both a realtime and a future threat that must be recognized. North Korea enjoys a two-to-one advantage in most warfighting equipment and Kim Il Sung likely perceives a deteriorating ROK-US alliance. All of which adds up to a very tense situation in Korea over the next decade. This is aggravated when one reasons that the maximum advantage held by North Korea will peak in the next few years when the influx of more modern equipment begins to take effect in South Korea.

But the threat which is of most concern is that the USSR, perceiving that a vacuum of superpower commitment exists in the Pacific, will seek to fill that vacuum. We can see just the beginning of that expansionist attitude by the Soviets as they bully Japan, gain new port rights in New Zealand, and flex their military might in new and provocative exercises on their eastern front. The USSR has ordered an 80,000-ton dry dock to be built in Japan for delivery to Vladivostok. Is this the beginning of a Pacific deployment of a *Kiev*-type carrier and the added capability of deploying forces ashore? These perceptions are in the minds of our Pacific allies, and these are the threats that I believe must be met by a US force presence and an avowed commitment to use force if necessary in support of our treaty obligations and interests in the Asiatic-Pacific region.

**THE US ARMY IN THE PACIFIC**

From Camp Smith in Hawaii, the US Pacific Command (PACOM) controls most of the US forces in Asia, the Pacific, and in the Indian Ocean area. Within that area lie 17 nations considered friendly to the United States, with a total of 4.4 million men in their armed forces. Of that total, 3.6 million are ground forces. There is little wonder, therefore, that our Asiatic-Pacific allies perceive our commitment in terms of US Army presence. Without question, the Navy and Air Force, as well as the Marine Corps, have vital roles to play; but it is the Army that denotes the permanence of the US commitment. As one Asian spokesman put it recently, “The Air Force are much like geese, they honk then fly away.” A key US policy adviser in Korea, who has spent more than 32 years in the Far East, indicated that the perceived level of commitment increases proportionately as the Boy Scouts, Marines, and Army arrive. Further, he believes that the best interests of the US are served by a strong economic, political, and military posture, for, “Strength pulls weak or undecided nations like a magnet.”

Choi Yong Hui, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the ROK National Assembly, put it this way: “In Korea, the foot soldier is what counts... Vietnam showed us the impotence of air power.” Add it up any way you like, the results are the same: In the Asiatic-Pacific region, roles exist for all services, but if we want to convey the message to friend and foe alike that we are committed to protect our interests and assist our allies, the presence of the US Army is the answer.

**THE CURRENT ARMY ROLE**

The US Army in the Pacific today is a mere shadow of its former self. From highs during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, we find today an Army structure represented by two infantry divisions and an assortment of headquarters in Hawaii, Korea, and Japan. The Army’s role in the Pacific is fragmented and piecemeal, and although locally effective, it fails to serve as an inspiration or a credible deterrent in the rest of the Pacific region.

**Hawaii**

In Hawaii, the Army no longer has a component commander serving under the unified commander in the Pacific, Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) as does the Navy with its Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and the Air Force with its Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force (CINCPACAF). As a result, Army requirements and priorities are not addressed with the same level of interest as are those of the Navy and Air Force. The senior Army representative in Hawaii (a major general) is dual-hatted. As the Commander, US Army Support Command, Hawaii (USASCH), he is a subordinate commander under US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), which is based at Fort McPherson, Georgia. As the Commander, US Army CINCPAC Support Group (USACSG), he functions as a Field Operating Agency Commander directly under Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQ, DA). Under this unwieldy arrangement, he is charged with some of the Army component command responsibilities outlined in JCS Pub 2, but he is not designated a service component commander. He develops some long-range and contingency plans for the Army in the Pacific region, but he has no authority over any major Army forces except the 25th Infantry Division which he exercises under the operational control of CINCPAC.

This ad hoc arrangement began on 1 January 1975 when the Army's Pacific Command (USARPAC) was disestablished in a space-saving effort. It has resulted in no single voice speaking for the Army in the Pacific, and is viewed by many as an abdication of the Army's role and mission there to the Marine Corps. In the Pacific region, where allied army manpower represents more than 80 percent of the indigenous military forces, our allies are puzzled by the lack of US Army presence.

**Japan**

The US Army in Japan is commanded by a lieutenant general who serves as commander of both US Army, Japan (USARJ) and IX US Corps. Wearing his USARJ hat, he commands all Army personnel in Japan (primarily signal, intelligence, and logistical support personnel) and reports through US Forces, Japan to CINCPAC for operational matters and directly to HQ, DA for purely Army matters. As Commander, IX Corps, he is involved in Army contingency planning for Northeast Asia.

Headquarters, USARJ/IX Corps also plays a very key role as the US representative force with the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF). Gradually, this link is developing into a very important one, as it becomes more acceptable to discuss defense requirements openly in Japan. There are, however, many Japanese officials who see this link as only a facade of tokenism where the style of defense consultation is ceremonial at best. This is exacerbated when, as recently occurred, Japanese GSDF personnel are invited to observe IX Corps conduct a map exercise defending the Fulda Gap!

**Korea**

The major US Army force in the Pacific is located in Korea. This force is commanded by a four-star general and is centered on the Eighth US Army, the I Corps (US/ROK) Group, and the 2d Infantry Division. Here the lines of command and control are very clear, with the Commanding General, Eighth Army having command of US elements in I Corps Group as well as of the 2d Infantry Division. For operational matters, the Commanding General, Eighth Army reports to CINCPAC as Commander, US Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA—an additional hat), and for purely Army matters he reports directly to HQ, DA. He also serves as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command and, as of November 1978, wears a fourth hat as Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command.

The mission of the US Army in Korea is also clear: deter, and if necessary, defend along with ROK forces. While many consider the 2d Infantry Division as just a deterrent force, it is clearly a well-equipped force able to fight if need be. With more antitank capability than the entire ROK Army and with ground and air radar systems to provide early warning of an attack, the 2d Infantry Division represents a major element in the defense concepts for South Korea. But, with necessary equipment, supplies, and training, ROK forces could replace the war-fighting
capability of the division. What may be more
difficult to replace is the perception by North
Korea of the strength of the US commitment
to return with ground forces if needed. And
therein lies the present deterrent value of the
2d Infantry Division.

Another key element in Korea is the Joint
US Military Advisory and Assistance Group
(JUSMAAG). Headed by a major general
working directly for the US Ambassador and
the Commander, US Forces, Korea, this
organization includes personnel of all
services. JUSMAAG is charged with assisting
the ROK Armed Forces in the transfer of US
military equipment. In the past, the role of
MAAGs was far broader, and in Korea there
once were more than 3,000 personnel
assigned to MAAG, Korea. Now, with
functions restricted to the transfer of
equipment, the size of JUSMAAG, Korea is
just over 200 people—another symbol that
our friends see as a lessening of US
involvement.

Elsewhere in the Pacific

Army influence throughout the rest of the
Pacific is reduced to a few small MAAGs;
Army attaches; and isolated signal,
intelligence, and logistical support
detachments. While many of our allies thirst
for solid Army tactical advice and assistance,
our MAAGs and attaches are equipped
primarily to talk of intelligence and logistics.
On those occasions when a visiting staff
officer from a contingency-planning group in
Hawaii or a member of the MAAG or attaché
office frankly and knowledgeably discusses
military tactics, our allies treat that officer
with special reverence.

IMPROVING THE ARMY'S
ROLE IN THE PACIFIC

The threat to US interests in the Pacific is
more oblique than direct; more one of
perception on the part of our allies and foes
than of fact. To meet that type of threat and
maintain our influence in the region, there
needs to be more cohesion in the Army's
Pacific command and control. There also
needs to be an increase in the presence and
announced commitment of the US Army in
the Pacific. There are several ways to increase
the unity of Army effort and the Army
presence without major force structure or
deployment changes.

Army Divisions

Army divisions are viewed worldwide as
the most meaningful measure of force level.
With a limited number of US Army divisions
structured to meet real threats worldwide, the
peacetime deployments and the commitment
of divisions for specific contingencies must be
done with great care and conservatism. Since
NATO is where we face the most direct
significant military threat, our existing
commitment of Army divisions to NATO
(both those assigned and those earmarked for
contingency employment) seems sound and
logical. However, any increases to that
commitment must be weighed carefully in
light of all other US interests and threats (real
and perceived). Some Army divisions must be
kept in a central reserve posture for use in the
unexpected events for which no plan has been
developed. And in light of our significant
interests in the vast Pacific area, some Army
divisions need to be deployed in and
earmarked for the Pacific. All divisions
should have secondary roles and be able to be
employed anywhere they are needed, but the
suggested breakout for primary contingency
planning would send a clear message to our
friends and foes alike, as well as to the Army
itself, that our divisions are positioned and
tailored in support of our strategy. Our
Reserve component divisions and units,
except those that round out the Pacific-
oriented active divisions, would all be
planned for the most demanding
contingency...NATO.

Command and Control

The Army made a decision to eliminate
USARPAC in the aftermath of our
withdrawal from Vietnam, and in an effort to
put more "teeth" and less "tail" in the
structure. This decision has cost the Army
dearly in the four years since its implementation. The decision eroded the once powerful position of the Army in the Pacific and caused our allies to question our resolve. The Army's needs in the Pacific are now gleaned from a variety of sources, few of which carry the authority, responsibility, rank, or knowledge of the Pacific as a whole. This must be corrected now, as a matter separate from the Korea withdrawal issue.

The reestablishment of USARPAC as a component command of PACOM should be paramount on the Army's list of “things to do in the Pacific.” The commander of USARPAC should have authority and responsibility for Army forces and Army planning in the entire PACOM area of responsibility. He should also be of equivalent rank to the Navy and Air Force component commanders in PACOM. Included in the mission of USARPAC should be:

- Command and control of all Army forces in PACOM.
- Development of Army requirements for PACOM.
- Development of Army long-range and contingency plans for PACOM.
- Coordination of advisory and training efforts with allies in PACOM.

The command and control of the Army in the Pacific undoubtedly will be faced with a transitional period pending the withdrawal of ground combat forces from Korea. But the structure of a workable command arrangement should be established now, organized to allow for the imponderables of the Korean situation and the sensitivities of the defense attitudes in Japan. Once established in structure, this organization could then be modified as the need arose, by increasing or decreasing the size of the staffs and the rank of the commander. The structure, location, and broad mission of the USARPAC Headquarters would be fixed, thus lending credence to the Army's portion of our commitment to remain a Pacific power.

Contingency Planning

Clearly the US Army should free forces stationed in the Pacific, most notably the 25th Infantry Division and the IX Corps, from any serious requirement to plan for employment outside the Pacific region. To involve Japanese GSDF personnel in even a map exercise of the defense of the Fulda Gap is ludicrous. The same teaching points and a lot more realism could be gained from a map exercise defending Hokkaido.

The IX Corps seems to be the ideal structure to plan for the employment of, and provide the command and control for, the divisions envisioned as Pacific-oriented divisions. Contingency plans for Korea's defense, for reentry into Korea after the withdrawal of the 2d Infantry Division, and for a combined defense of Japan should fit squarely into the IX Corps' charter. Additionally, IX Corps could be used as the Exercise Headquarters for the demonstration and practice of contingency plans for Northeast Asia. Once those plans are developed using designated divisions, they could then be expanded to plan for larger force involvement. A fully developed Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) for the Pacific using the designated divisions and other CONUS-based divisions not committed to NATO could well be the ultimate goal of this Pacific planning: a REFORKOR and a REFORJAP, if you will!

Withdrawal of Ground Forces

The withdrawal of the 2d Infantry Division and associated ground forces from Korea, and the replacement of that war-fighting capability with ROK forces is an achievable long-range goal. The basic premise stated by President Carter is that the withdrawal will be done slowly and in full collaboration with our allies. This implies that each phase of the withdrawal will be judged on the environment at the time and into the foreseeable future prior to its execution.

Based on the current attitudes and perceptions that exist in the Pacific among
our allies and foes, the 1981-82 time frame for final US ground combat force withdrawal is probably optimistic. But the decision to withdraw has caused great debate, and now that the initial shock is over, pragmatic solutions are being sought. Whenever the US and our allies determine that the ground forces can be withdrawn, the US Army must have the capability to fill any deterrent void that will result. Demonstrating the ability to return, by means of exercises such as “Team Spirit” and the REFORGER-type annual reinforcement exercise already suggested, will go a long way in filling the void.

Other Forces

In addition to Army divisions announced as “Pacific-oriented” and a revised command and control structure that will allow the Army to fully participate in PACOM, there are other Army forces which could be used in economy of force roles to allow Army influence to reach out to our allies.

An increased role for the Army elements of MAAGs in the Pacific and even in the Army attaché offices would be an efficient way to expand Army influence. It would appear that with a very modest increase in the size and scope of the MAAGs and attaché offices, better interrelations could be developed between the US Army and the indigenous army forces. Certainly difficulties lie in the path of that concept, but it bears further, more detailed examination.

One of our most talented organizations, Special Forces, should be reintroduced into the Pacific arena. If the mission of Special Forces were broadened, they could be deployed as small, elite training teams to teach conventional, counterguerrilla, and anti-terrorist tactics to those allies who wanted them. This is an exciting prospect which would reap high benefits for the US at low cost. A Special Forces Group, headquartered in Okinawa or Guam, could provide the command, control, and planning for these mobile detachments which could be sent on temporary duty from CONUS or stationed with the Group headquarters. It is a concept that merits further examination.

SUMMARY

In the vast Pacific region, where so many cultures and traditions collide with the reality of world power interests, the United States plays a major role as both a buffer and a catalyst. Vital US interests are in jeopardy in the Asiatic-Pacific region as our military presence is reduced, and our commitment is perceived by friend and foe alike to be in doubt.

To shore up our sagging credibility in the eyes of our allies, some major steps must be taken by the nation, and more specifically by the US Army, whose presence and influence is read as a real commitment by the US to remain a Pacific power.

President Carter established the goal of withdrawal of US ground combat forces from Korea by 1981 or 1982 and, while that timetable may be optimistic, it is an achievable goal in the long run by use of a slow and carefully orchestrated and coordinated plan. Attainment of that goal, in full concert with our allies, will leave a stronger Pacific with a more independent ROK; a stronger, more positive posture of the Self Defense Force in Japan; and a continuing commitment by the US to support militarily in Northeast Asia if needed. That goal, however, should be used as a bargaining chip with our foes to reduce tension in Korea or elsewhere in the world. Since there are no internal or external pressures on the US to withdraw, the attainment of the goal should be done in such a way as to give the US the maximum political advantage.

As we move forward to the day when ground forces are withdrawn—hopefully following a quid pro quo from the USSR in Africa, or from North Korea in the form of recognition of South Korea—the US Army must take some immediate steps to improve its posture in the Pacific. The reestablishment of USARPAC is fundamental to that effort and should be undertaken without delay. And while it is recognized that NATO should have
the bulk of Army forces designated for that most demanding scenario, there are sufficient light Army forces to allow the earmarking of some for a Pacific role in combating the threat, real and perceived.

Probably the best deterrent of all for the Pacific would be the designation of certain divisions as “Pacific-oriented.” This, followed by a realigned command and control structure in the Pacific, realistic contingency plans, and exercises to demonstrate our ability and intent to support our allies in time of need would go a long way in improving the US Army’s posture in the Pacific.

The dawn comes up like thunder in the Pacific every day. We need to be prepared to meet that dawn with confidence, both now and in the future. We can do it with the assets we now have, but we must start immediately.

NOTES
6. The views in this section have been developed from notes from personal interviews and from A. R. Pollard, “Command Relationship, PACOM—US Army” (unpublished point paper, HQ, PACOM, 31 January 1977).