A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

BY

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### Abstract

The US “surge” strategy in Iraq was almost implemented too late. However, it appears that it has worked to create the opportunity for political progress as a fledgling Iraqi government struggles to enfranchise Sunnis, Kurds, and extremist Shia militias. Increasing this already monumental challenge is the eventual withdrawal of American troops and low oil prices. Despite these challenges, hope now exists where it did not before. This project examines the major counterinsurgency lessons I learned as a squadron commander responsible for a violent Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad during the surge of US troops in 2007-08. Armed with a new strategy based on population security, American commanders spread out across Baghdad and its surrounding belts in a final attempt to bring the many different faces of the Iraq insurgency under control. As one of those commanders, I learned that economical opportunity, personal relationships with the civilian population, and a sense of justice were close partners with population security in rooting out a stubborn insurgency.

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A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

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The US “surge” strategy in Iraq was almost implemented too late. However, it appears that it has worked to create the opportunity for political progress as a fledgling Iraqi government struggles to enfranchise Sunnis, Kurds, and extremist Shia militias. Increasing this already monumental challenge is the eventual withdrawal of American troops and low oil prices. Despite these challenges, hope now exists where it did not before. This project examines the major counterinsurgency lessons I learned as a squadron commander responsible for a violent Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad during the surge of US troops in 2007-08. Armed with a new strategy based on population security, American commanders spread out across Baghdad and its surrounding belts in a final attempt to bring the many different faces of the Iraq insurgency under control. As one of those commanders, I learned that economical opportunity, personal relationships with the civilian population, and a sense of justice were close partners with population security in rooting out a stubborn insurgency.
A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

“The conduct of military operations in a large city, in the midst of the populace, without the benefit of the powerful weapons it possesses, is certainly one of the most delicate and complex problems ever to face an army.”

—Roger Trinquier

The United States has a long history of fighting insurgencies. From the scorched earth of the post-Civil War South to the jungles of the Philippines and Vietnam, the U.S. Army has spent nearly as much time battling insurgents as fighting conventional foes. Today we face a relentless insurgency in Afghanistan, while the insurgency in Iraq is quiet but far from defeated. Since our adversaries have a greater chance of prevailing in a protracted insurgency than in a conventional conflict, we must be prepared to fight and win counterinsurgency campaigns. We must ingrain the successful characteristics and principles of counterinsurgency into the Army’s thinking, training and doctrine in order to recognize and to stop future insurgencies in their earliest stages. Noted counterinsurgency expert John Nagl succinctly summarized the tenets of effective counterinsurgency practice when he wrote, “Population security is the first requirement of success in counterinsurgency, but it is not sufficient. Economic development, good governance, and the provision of essential services, all occurring within a matrix of effective information operations, must all improve simultaneously and steadily over a long period of time if America’s determined insurgent enemies are to be defeated.”

What follows are the major lessons I learned as a squadron commander during the “surge” in Iraq. Many of these lessons were paid for in blood and endless frustration. My hope is that current and future leaders of our military can study these lessons, remembering them not as dogmatic law but as one unit’s pragmatic approach to
accomplishing its mission under the most arduous of circumstances. A deliberate plan to build an alliance with the people, local economic development that provides an alternative to the insurgency, and efforts to build a bridge between the citizens and their government all were critical to our success in Baghdad. In the future, these lessons, or a variation of them, may prove useful in similar circumstances as we continue to face insurgency, either as a primary type of warfare or as an integral part of hybrid war.\textsuperscript{iii}

**Early Mistakes**

I served as the commander of 1\textsuperscript{st} Squadron, 4\textsuperscript{th} Cavalry Regiment in Southwest Baghdad from February of 2007 through March of 2008. I made several mistakes during our first 8-10 weeks on the ground in Baghdad. Many of my mistakes were actions I failed to take rather than actions taken. I had several “blind spots” with regards to fighting the counterinsurgency in the early months of 2007.

First, I did not have a true sense of the cause behind the insurgency. We were assigned to the neighborhood of Doura in the Rashid District of Baghdad. This neighborhood was almost exclusively Sunni, violent and very much under the control of the insurgency. An initial failure to understand the dynamics of the neighborhood led to frustration throughout our formation. We had little understanding of why we were being attacked when we were trying to help the people of Doura. In fact, there were over fifty enemy initiated events within the first thirty days. The chasm between our Sunni citizens and the Shia-led Iraqi government was wide and deep. In personal conversations with neighborhood citizens, I initially exhorted them to support the newly elected Iraqi government. But the Sunnis viewed the Iraqi government as a powerful sectarian organization run by Persians bent on destroying them. With each exhortation, my
credibility decreased. In addition, our partnered National Police battalion, dominated by Shi’a, was an accelerant to an already volatile situation. As the only visible representation of the Iraqi government (government officials remained huddled in the Green Zone), Sunnis viewed the National Police as a Shia militia in uniform. When we patrolled with them, resentment grew toward our soldiers, causing our efforts to be met with more resistance.

This initial failure to understand the true causes of the Sunni insurgency created a gap in my mind about who our enemy really was and what he was about. Every insurgent, in fact, was not a hardcore member of Al Qaeda. Many insurgents were simply people with a legitimate grievance caught up in a chaotic situation. David Kilcullen, an Australian counterinsurgency expert, describes this phenomenon in his recent book, “The Accidental Guerilla”. In it he states that, “The local fighter is therefore an accidental guerilla – fighting us because we are in his space, not because he wishes to invade ours.” The insurgent, he writes, “is engaged (from his point of view) in “resistance” rather than “insurgency” and fights principally to be left alone.”

Over time we would learn that these “accidental guerillas” could be reconciled or would conform to societal norms if greater security was provided and more economic opportunity existed.

Another major problem was that our inability to identify and locate active insurgents. I did not understand how to effectively build a wide-ranging intelligence network that would allow us to get to the insurgent hiding amongst the population. Without a coherent strategy to develop such a network we relied on a handful of informants and anonymous calls to our tip line. Aggressive, reactionary questioning after an attack and broad clearing operations provided little actionable intelligence —
only frustration. We developed sources through chance meetings with concerned citizens, but this technique relied far too much on luck. I also found myself developing an over-reliance on local neighborhood government leaders who were adept at complaining and at trying to secure contracts but refused (or were unable) to provide useful intelligence. The intelligence we needed lay inside the courtyards and living rooms of the citizens barricaded in our neighborhood. But it took many weeks before we developed a plan to target these potential sources.

Finally, I knew that we would be focused more on protecting the population than on transitioning responsibility to Iraqi Security Forces, but I had little conception for how we were to protect the population. Without an effective intelligence network in place, we spent a great deal of our time fruitlessly reacting. Our first soldier was killed during a firefight right in the heart of an urban area. Despite repeated questioning and detailed searches, not a single person claimed to have any idea who was responsible. I was also plagued during these early weeks of our tour with complaints from the people that we were too slow to react to the tips that were called in. The frustrating truth is that they were right. We patrolled frequently but not 24-hours-a-day. It takes time to prepare a patrol and maneuver it to the right area, even if it comes from a nearby outpost.

An issue out of our control during these first many weeks was that we simply had too large an area to cover. It would be June before the final “surge” brigade was in position. While the strategy of establishing combat outposts was certainly an effective one, it also placed an additional burden on already taxed units. For example, in a company-sized outpost, one platoon secured the outpost while a second either just
came off of duty or was about to assume those responsibilities. The third platoon was available to patrol for a few hours before it too had to participate in the security of the outpost. Many above the battalion level had a difficult time accepting the manpower cost of an outpost.

Separating the Insurgent from the Population

For a ground combat soldier engaged in a counterinsurgency, every decision and action is focused on finding the insurgent and removing him from the conflict. American ground forces are still in the business of destroying the enemy on the battlefield. Whether the form of warfare is conventional, counterinsurgency, or “hybrid” warfare, the mission will always center on identifying and destroying the enemy and his capability along with any other agents who stand in the way of our assigned mission.

I found it helpful to divide insurgents into two basic categories: The first is the insurgent who is motivated by ideology. This is the most dangerous group because no amount of goodwill or aggressive action will cause him to alter his way of thinking or behavior. We found this group to be rather small in our area of operations. The second category of insurgent are those who found themselves caught up in the insurgency but lacked a true philosophical tie to the violent ideologues. Some were often local thugs who decided to take advantage of the chaos to seize power. Others were motivated to participate due to a lack of economic opportunity. With few available jobs, it was easy for them to accept modest amounts of money to serve as lookouts reporting on our location or to bury and detonate improvised explosive devices. Many were teenagers lacking parental supervision who were persuaded to join the insurgency in order to gain a form of respect.
The first category of insurgent had to be removed from society by being captured or killed. There was no other way. The second group, however, could be reconciled with or convinced to stop aiding the insurgency if the circumstances in his neighborhood drastically improved. The single most important advantage that the insurgent has is his ability to hide in plain sight. This contrasts with our most clear disadvantage—that our adversary knows where we are and what we are doing at all times. The insurgent freely moves about a neighborhood hidden within the population. Soldiers, meanwhile, patrol in a standard uniform and on a known platform. We could never change our uniform or hide amongst the population. That left us, as it has all counterinsurgents, one option; we had to find a pragmatic approach that would motivate the local population to tell us exactly who and where the insurgents were. If we could remove the ideological insurgents and change the conditions that attracted the insurgents of “opportunity”, then we could create the breathing space necessary for establishing security. For a soldier on the ground, this would be a major step toward victory.

Without well established intelligence networks, our efforts to find insurgents were mostly in vain. In a futile attempt to surprise, we routinely executed large cordon-and-search missions that blocked the exits to a particular area. We also methodically searched through every home hoping to find some evidence connecting the resident to the insurgency. On a rare occasion, we located a cache of weapons or someone we suspected might be involved in the insurgency. Yet it was almost impossible to know for sure due to the deafening silence of the population. Because of a lack of intelligence, the critical element of surprise was never realized. Top insurgents fled from the targeted neighborhoods to safer areas, where they would wait until U.S. forces left.
Clearing neighborhoods, we would learn, is a process, not an operation. Indeed, we need not have learned this on our own. More than 45 years earlier, French counterinsurgency theorist Roger Trinquier wrote in his book “Modern Warfare” that, “Large unit sweeps, conducted with conventional resources within a framework similar to that of conventional warfare, and invariably limited in time, temporarily disperse guerrilla bands rather than destroy them.” More recently, in his acclaimed book “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife,” John Nagl described this same flawed approach. “Gradually, the army learned that ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ sweeps were not productive but actually counterproductive; instead of massing troops, the army developed small patrols that used the skills of native trackers and intelligence... to target selected terrorists with the minimum force required.”

This kind of war is a battle for intelligence and intelligence could only come from the local population. French military officer David Galula wrote in his 1964 treatise “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice” that, “intelligence has to come from the population, but the population will not talk unless it feels safe, and it does not feel safe until the insurgent’s power has been broken.” Galula’s observation in 1964 was also true in Baghdad in 2007. The people refused to tell us who the “ideological” insurgents were for fear of their own lives. Even more challenging, some refused to tell us who the insurgents of opportunity were because they were family members and neighbors. Besides, the insurgent efforts were focused on coalition forces, who many felt were responsible for the violence, chaos and lack of security.

A failure to understand this mindset will result in a failure to gain actionable intelligence. Trinquier wrote, “… because we have not prepared anything (meaning an
intelligence network), we will be tempted to obtain by violence information that a well organized service would have given us without difficulty.\textsuperscript{viii} Some soldiers felt that the local population owed them information and became frustrated when the only answer they received from locals after an attack was, “I don’t know anything! This is all done by outsiders.” This can lead to a feeling of animosity towards the people, which can greatly hamper one’s ability to gather intelligence on the insurgent. The Marines acknowledged this same problem during Vietnam, when a survey of small unit leaders suggested that “probably one-third go forth with a strong dislike for the local people. This is not just academic. It is costing us lives.”\textsuperscript{ix} The fact is the people of Baghdad do not owe us anything. We were the ultimate authority in our neighborhood and as the authority, we owed them.

**Protecting the Population**

So, exactly what did we owe them? First, we needed to protect the population in order to create conditions that would allow provide them to talk to us. Second, we had to earn their trust and confidence to motivate them to provide intelligence. Our efforts to create opportunity and then to supply motivation were all oriented toward our single goal: removing the insurgent from the neighborhood.

During the Malayan Emergency, Gurkha battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Walter Walker noted that in fighting the insurgency, “Intelligence was absolutely the most supreme requirement. Everything else that we did was geared to producing intelligence.”\textsuperscript{x} In an attempt to build a far reaching, viable intelligence network, we adopted a two pronged approach in Doura. First, we secured the population 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week with two mutually supporting platoons in our most populated neighborhoods.

Second, we conducted an ongoing census (Operation Close Encounters) that helped us begin the process of separating the insurgents from the population. Underscoring this approach was an emphasis on developing personal relationships with people that grew over time into an alliance against the insurgency. Concrete barriers also contributed to the security of the population by forcing people and vehicles to enter and exit through controlled checkpoints.

One of the centerpiece strategies of the surge in Iraq during 2007-08 was to move forces off large forward operating bases and onto smaller combat outposts among the people. I found that these outposts were quite useful, but not sufficient to truly meet the intent of being among the people. Trinquier wrote extensively on the utilization of outposts and correctly noted that, “Outside of a quite limited circle of vision, they were blind, particularly at night when they missed everything. The Vietminh, who knew the limits of this circle, were able to harass us easily.” For this same reason and for our own protection we decided to remain on the streets every hour of every day. We eventually learned through our discussions with locals of the powerful psychological effect of our relentless presence. The sight of our HMMWVs on the streets and soldiers engaging people in conversation all day and night sent a message to insurgents and average citizens alike. Unlike units of the past, who were forced to conduct a quick patrol and unable to engage the people, we literally never left. We were easily accessible and, therefore, began to receive more tips on insurgent activity. Our constant
presence allowed us to immediately act on tips and investigate suspicious activity without delay.

The density of troops available in Baghdad for the surge allowed us an opportunity that no unit had since the start of the war. As late as fall 2006, there were only two battalions operating in the Rashid District in Southwest Baghdad. By summer 2007 there were five battalions assigned there with a peak of seven battalions when two Stryker battalions temporarily operated in the highly contested Doura neighborhood. Our constant presence was amplified with the initiation of Operation Close Encounters, which, at its core, was a census. We collected more than just data about residents in the neighborhood. The operation increased the personal contact between our soldiers and the population, thereby increasing the opportunities for those who were willing to provide intelligence. Espousing the benefits of a census, Galula noted that, “Spontaneous information is hard to come by at this stage because of the population’s fear of the insurgent and because of its lack of confidence in the counterinsurgent. To overcome this attitude, would-be informers should be given a safe, anonymous way to convey information.”

We did not just visit targeted homes; we visited every house on an assigned street. This technique provided the crucial anonymity the population needed to provide information. In the privacy of their home, and with the knowledge that we would visit every house, most were willing to talk to us freely. Sometimes an individual offered specific information on an insurgent in the form of a sworn statement; other times we would get a tip that several unknown males had just moved into an empty house across
the street. Regardless, we could act on this information immediately or use it to create a target folder.

During these relaxed meetings we collected basic information about people, including taking the photos of the adult males. Soon we knew where groups of families were located and we began to learn who got along and who did not. This afforded us the opportunity to engage with those vital to rebuilding civil society, including a former provincial governor, doctors, general contractors, as well as carpenters and engineers. On occasion, we met former Army officers who were eager to share intelligence. A select few were even running their own sources on the insurgency. In only six weeks, we went from zero sources to 36; a number that would increase to well over 100 by the time we redeployed nine months later.

Insurgents began to grow numb to our presence and remained confident in their ability to hide within the population. In fact, we avoided the practice of posting wanted posters for fear of scaring off those we were looking for. We had amassed a large collection of pictures of people taken during Operation Close Encounters, as well as during casual engagements on the street. Sources would look at these pictures and identify both upstanding citizens and those who might be involved in the insurgency. With statements of evidence in hand and positive identification of a photo, we began to detain insurgents without any disruption to the rest of the neighborhood. More than once we even coaxed an insurgent to drive himself to the forward operating base with the promise of a weapons permit, whereupon we detained him. In a matter of months, the tables had turned. Before, we had no idea who was watching us or plotting attacks; now
insurgents had no idea who was giving them up. This is how we cleared the area of the ideological insurgents and those closest to them.

Economics

The dissolute economic situation in our area also fueled resentment toward the government. The lack of economic opportunity spured otherwise law-abiding residents to participate in the insurgency in provide for their families. Alissa Rubin, a reporter for the New York Times, spent several days with our unit in December of 2007. One local man told her that, “We have a lot of unemployment, and anyone, if he doesn’t have a job, takes even a job where he does bad things to provide for his family.”xiii It was clear that an improvement in the economic situation would contribute to a decrease in participation in the insurgency, lowering the level of violence.

The possession of guns, physical toughness, and the authority that comes with them only carried American soldiers so far. Treating people with respect, sympathizing with their personal plight, and being culturally sensitive were also important. But to achieve our goals, we required money. Authority without money would have reduced us to pleading with citizens to cooperate. Money gave us the means and political capital to motivate otherwise wary residents to help. The Iraqi District Advisory Council and associated neighborhood council members signed paperwork, held meetings, and showed up for every school and clinic opening. But they had no influence or power over the citizens that they purportedly represented. This was true for one reason: they had no discretionary budget. Citizens do not respect or take an interest in political representation that cannot improve their personal plight.
We distributed money in the form of rewards for information, micro-grants for small businesses, salaries through local contracts, and condolence payments. Reward money did not serve as the motivator for intelligence that one might think. Troop commanders had immediate access to reward funds that was paid in amounts ranging from $20 to $50 for on-the-spot tips. There was also a more laborious application process for sources that provided intelligence that led to the capture of a high value individual or a large cache of insurgent material. It was not uncommon for people to refuse the smaller rewards. It was also not unusual for sources to continuously provide intelligence without getting paid. Many felt it was their duty and several told us that they received great satisfaction in seeing us capitalize on the information provided. Those registered sources that regularly sought intelligence and risked their lives needed the reward money to concentrate their efforts on intelligence gathering. Our best source often warned us that he would have to stop working for us in order to drive a taxi and make money to support his family if we could not get him something to live on.

Targeted micro-grants had an immediate and visible impact on the economy. The brigade commander could approve up to $5,000 per micro-grant. The turn-around from application to money in hand was often less than two weeks. While some who received grants had never run a business before, it did not take much skill to open a cell phone store or sell food. Most, however, were carpenters, welders, and otherwise experienced businessmen who quickly opened small shops and hired a one or two people. Because of the dynamics of Baghdad (fear of illegal detention at a checkpoint, kidnapping, and general violence), most of the citizens were forced to shop locally, so there were plenty of customers. We started the program with a centralized application process but soon
realized that platoon leaders on patrol were the most effective conduit for handing out applications to prospective businessmen. We learned over time that, like Operation Close encounters, the psychological impact of handing out a significant grant was immeasurable. It is one thing to tell people you sympathize with them; it is quite another to do something about an immediate need.

When selecting a project we always involved trusted local advisors who actually resided in the community. Our most successful projects included trash collection, the installation of new curbs and sidewalks, the capping of a dirt median, and the construction of soccer fields and parks. Galula saw an even greater benefit to local projects such as these years ago, “...the counterinsurgent leads the inhabitants gradually, if only in a passive way, to participate in the fight against the insurgent by such work as building roads of military interest, helping in the construction of the village’s defensive installations, carrying supplies to military detachments, providing guides, and sentries.”

Other projects such as micro-generation, the installation of new transformers and power lines, and efforts to repair the damaged sewage system did not employ large numbers of people but directly impacted the quality of life of local citizens.

Condolence payments were also an important effort on our part to assist innocent people who had been injured as a result of our kinetic actions. Almost without exception, the condolence payments of up to $1,000, we made were a result of escalation of force incidents where people were injured by warning shots. We killed one man who was taking his son to get a haircut and shattered the windshield of a car taking a pregnant woman to the hospital after curfew. These payments would not undo
tragedy but did serve as a salve to what could have been perceived as reckless behavior.

**Government**

Disenfranchisement is the wellspring of insurgency. A given group feels as though it has been dealt an injustice and sees no legitimate way to correct it other than lashing out against its oppressor. This makes insurgencies especially reliant on changes in the political environment. Our own manual on counterinsurgency, published in 2006, states that, “In the long run, developing better governance will probably affect the lives of the populace more than any other COIN activities. When well executed, these actions may eliminate the root causes of the insurgency.”

The political challenges were immense within our almost exclusively Sunni neighborhood. The few local politicians that we had were invisible, lacked money, and possessed little legitimacy with their constituents. The Sunnis in Doura felt that the national level government was completely biased toward Shi’a and dominated by Iran. There simply was no connection between the central government and the people in our neighborhood. Most considered us their real governmental authority since we provided security, created jobs, and repaired broken infrastructure. Alissa Rubin captured this sentiment in an article involving our unit when she quoted a local resident as saying, “We ask the government for help, for electricity, for any services, but they do not even meet with us,” he said. “The only government that has cleaned anything in our area is Captain Cook, he is our government.” With Al Qaeda in Iraq essentially defeated in Baghdad, it was clear to me that if the Iraqi government would just reach out to the
Sunni population there would have been no reason for them to continue aiding and fueling the insurgency.

We pleaded for Iraqi government officials to visit Doura in late 2007 and early 2008. We wanted to show them that the neighborhood was no longer the insurgent haven that many locked up in the Green Zone still believed. We twice brought Iraqi journalists to film the neighborhood and interview the residents to get the truth out and catch the eye of those in government. When General Petraeus visited us in early January of 2008, he brought with him Nada Ibrahim, a Sunni legislator, to see the change that had taken place.

Giving the people a stake in their own security is critical to a positive long term solution. The establishment of the Sons of Iraq provided us an opportunity to do that while providing a paycheck to formerly unemployed military aged men. Unlike the Anbar province or the Baghdad neighborhood of Ameriyah where there was a kinetic revolt by the Sons of Iraq against Al Qaeda, our Sons of Iraq organization was formed from our widespread source network. These men did not show public support for the counterinsurgency until the local insurgency was largely defeated. However, their visible presence on the streets and at key locations throughout Doura essentially insured that there would not be a return of Al Qaeda or its influence to that neighborhood.

An opportunity arose in March of 2008 when the Iraqi Government announced that they wanted to form tribal support councils from the local population to serve as another voice for residents. In many ways, it appeared to be a parallel organization to the District Advisory Councils that existed - but such was politics in Iraq. We worked with our most influential leaders in the area and coached them on organizing and
holding an election. These neighborhood leaders came to an agreement on which candidates they wanted to nominate, and then began organizing support for them. An influential sheik in the area hosted the election under the supervision of the National Police. After one long afternoon we had representative leadership who actually got the opportunity to interface with the central government. We were not under the illusion that political victory was at hand, but it was clear that the situation was better than before the elections.

Conclusion

The path to victory for a counterinsurgent force is a pragmatic one. While there is no specific set of steps that will lead us to assured victory in asymmetric conflicts, history serves as a resource to draw from. Intuitively, counterinsurgents know that they need the people to identify the insurgents. More than that, they need the people to serve as allies in the battle against insurgents. To achieve this requires a deep understanding of the cause of the insurgency as well as the culture in which it is happening. The counterinsurgent must create opportunities and supply motivation in order to gain the allegiance of the people. This occurs in the form of personal engagement with and protection for the population. Equally important is the promise of greater economic opportunity.

The mission of the United States military still revolves around imposing our will on the adversary, whether our adversary is a standing conventional army or a group of insurgents hidden among the population. Our current and future enemies realize that they have a better chance of defeating us by engaging in an irregular war. As we work to bring the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to a close, let us make sure that we are just
as prepared to engage in counterinsurgency as we are conventional warfare.

Otherwise, the cost in blood, time and treasury will be will higher than the nation can bear.

End Notes


v Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, p 49


viii Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, p 32

ix Bing West, *The Village* (Pocket Books, 2003), 13

x Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife*, 106

xi Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 47

xii Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* 84


xiv Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* 82

xv This man drove his car into the rear of our formation while we were involved in a firefight on a day when all vehicle traffic had been banned by the Iraqi Government. He failed to respond to our audible warnings, and shots into the hood of his car. He was killed less than fifty feet from our soldiers while still accelerating. His actions are a mystery.

xvi US Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, (University of Chicago Press, 2007), 171

xvii Rubin, “In a Force for Calm, Seeds of Conflict” (Captain Cook commanded A Troop, 1-4 Cavalry)