A NEW AMERICAN DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE FOR EUROPE?

by

DR. HAROLD C. DEUTSCH

For some years, there has been a widening demand for greater sense of proportion in US world policies—an aspect of the current scene that is bound to be further accentuated in the period immediately ahead. Achieving more symmetry would require a restatement of fundamental national aims and a concomitant reappraisal of the commitments and sacrifices necessary on their behalf. Anything like a single doctrine of global application will find it difficult to secure a consensus within the national polity and may indeed prove unattainable. On the other hand, demarcation of American concerns within specific geographic or politically defined areas may prove more feasible.

With respect to such limited areas, the most favorable prospect for agreement would seem to involve Europe. Only a little over 30 years ago the world was still thought of as Europe-centered. Since then we have lived in the “American age,” but Europe has remained at the hub of world affairs in the sense that bipolar confrontation of the superpowers focuses on the heart of that continent. For the United States it represents the sole area outside of North America where its fate could conceivably be determined in short order. In consequence, though the immediate attention of American policymakers may shift around the world in accord with the incidence of crisis, Europe always remains the most preemptive claimant on their attention.

In effect, it has been concern for the fate of Europe which has drawn a reluctant United States out of its isolation and forced upon it the key role in the balance of power. America was obliged to share Europe’s perils in two World Wars and throughout the troubled period thereafter. Anxiety about the threat to Europe was the principal raison d’être of the cold war and has had much to do with detente. Until the advent of long-range missiles, the only way the United States and the Soviet Union could get at each other’s power effectively was across the body of Europe. When nuclear standoff hove in sight in the late sixties to give renewed life to the concept of flexible response, Europe’s role as the most obvious conventional battlefield between them acquired additional meaning.

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THE US MILITARY COMMITMENT TO EUROPE

Conceptions of Europe's place in US external relations since 1945 have undergone both highly visible and subtle changes since the crucial recognition of their intertwined destinies in the late forties. For well over a decade, the "special relationship" with Britain at times eased, while at other times it complicated American efforts to promote links with and within the old world. Of the early postwar US commitments, NATO has proved by far the most entangling and enduring—rather more enduring, probably, than had been originally anticipated in Washington. The United States, largely for the sake of legislative tactics and the national tradition of limiting "foreign entanglements," was reluctant to commit itself too indefinitely to enmeshment with the other side of the Atlantic. This thought was demonstrated by such moves as restricting the obligation to 20 years, in contrast with the 50 years of the Brussels Treaty, the principal instrument that NATO superseded. At that time it was taken for granted by many Americans that a reviving Europe would gradually take over its "own" defense. This expectation appears further illustrated by the original force goals for the Alliance, which were tailored to the thought that the eventual removal of the American contingent would still leave enough European forces in existence for the needs of European defense. However, over the years NATO force goals were gradually reduced, making it ever more problematical that Europe could defend itself without American troops.

Nevertheless, as the years have passed, Washington has become more rather than less reluctant to profess that the projection of its power to redress the military balance on the other side of the Atlantic had as its only conceivable time limit the passing of the threat to western security. Instead, the American wish for at least partial release from this burden has steadily grown, though the outlook for a major withdrawal has appeared no less hazardous. The official adoption of a strategy of flexible response, in fact, has further underlined European dependence on a substantial American military presence, in view of Europe's seeming inability to field sufficient standing forces. Any drastic diminution of that presence would make a mockery of such a comprehensive strategy and disrupt the increasingly precarious balance of forces in Europe.

Since the early days of the Atlantic Alliance, there have been two, and only two, conceivable ways that would permit a severe curtailment of the American military component without disastrous results. As no American public figure has ever failed to acknowledge a vital interest in European security, one or the other of these roads of escape has been under constant and hopeful scrutiny. The first of these two premises is an expectation that Europe will achieve sufficient political unity so that it can coordinate its economic and military resources and replace the American contingent with levies of equal capability. Despite some impetus toward greater unity derived from painful experiences with regard to the Middle East, the current outlook on this possibility is less hopeful than it was 15 years ago. Sad to relate, but understandable in view of its never-ending frustrations, a contributory factor is some lessened enthusiasm of the United States about European integration. It should suffice to note, despite hopes raised by the scheduling of direct elections to the European Parliament for 1978, that no government anywhere in the world could at this time base domestic or foreign policy calculations on the expectation of a confederated Europe coming into existence in the foreseeable future.

The other conceivable escape route for Americans from their military commitments in Europe would lead across that bridge to Moscow, which US leaders fancied themselves to be building in the last years of World War II. Despite occasional periods of hope as evidenced in the "Spirit of Camp David" and renewed talk of bridgebuilding under President Johnson, such tentatives did not get much beyond the blueprint stage. Confidence revived at the turn of the seventies with the rise of the watchword of detente. Its architects ventured to expect from it a
sufficient relaxation of pressure against the Atlantic-oriented half of the continent, so that even a loosely joined “Europe” might look ahead with a certain confidence in its security. By such means as mutual and balanced force reductions, it was argued, many, and eventually perhaps all, Americans would be able to go home without seriously eroding the military balance on the continent of Europe. Detente thus appeared to promise to lower somewhat the barriers between the two Europes and at the same time to lessen demands on American resources for Western defense.

DETENTE AS A ROAD FOR US ESCAPE FROM EUROPE

The partition of Europe which followed World War II was arbitrary and artificial, in that the crucial factor that determined the fate of the individual states was their accessibility to force as exercised against them from the east.1 This division of the continent at first looked too odious and too absurd to have any lasting quality. Despite its sympathies, the United States never saw itself in a position to seriously challenge this hard fact of international life. Such solemnly proclaimed but really fanciful policies as “liberation” and “rollback” were never more than domestic political slogans. In fact, the West had no choice but to help nail down the partition further by erecting divisive barriers of its own in the form of West European and Atlantic institutions. No Western leader has thus far been prepared to advocate ending the division by force.

Though the hope is not entirely in the realm of fantasy, no contemporary statesman could build policies on the faith that some day a political miracle could sufficiently change the character, intentions, or capabilities of the Soviet Union to permit Eastern and Western Europe to reunite. No portents of such a development have revealed themselves during the last quarter century. Hence the sole expectation that has been taken at all seriously by Western opinion is of gradual East-West accommodation on such issues as armaments limitation, trade, and technological exchange. These seem to hold the only serious promise of lifting the military confrontation sufficiently to give Europe the necessary sense of security without the full American presence.

The Soviets have fostered these illusions, if illusions they are, by such maneuvers as extending in the mid-fifties enticements to Germany to forego rearmament. They followed this with the Rapacki Plan and recurrent references to “peaceful coexistence.” Detente, of course, has far wider implications than the status of Central Europe or even the fate of Europe generally. The concern with it here, however, is essentially on how detente has been associated with hopes in the Atlantic world generally that it might lessen Western Europe’s dependence on the United States for its security.

The first Western impulsion toward detente was that of Charles de Gaulle with his journeys to East European capitals. The credit for its eventual implementation belongs to Willi Brandt’s Ostpolitik, which both symbolically and actually was more representative than de Gaulle’s overtures of a broad Western initiative. The steps taken by Brandt did much to diminish in the East-West borderlands the residual suspicions and enmities of the Hitler era.

Dr. Harold C. Deutsch joined the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute as a Political Scientist in 1974. A graduate of the University of Wisconsin (B.A., M.A.) and Harvard University (M.A., Ph.D.), he served during the two previous years as Director of European Studies at the National War College. Dr. Deutsch was on the faculty of the University of Minnesota as professor of history and served as department chairman from 1960-66. During WW II, he was chief of the Political Subdivision for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and then headed the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS Mission in Germany. His main area of interest lies in the history of WW II and the period since, and three of his four previous books are in this field. His fifth and most recent book, *Hitler and His Generals: The Hidden Crisis of January-June 1938*, was published in 1974.
The Ostpolitik also helped improve the atmosphere between the blocs generally and may justly be characterized as the main overture to the broader American detente venture, particularly as exemplified by the achievement of the Quadripartite Agreement. From the standpoint of this discussion, the most significant features of what may be called the period of detente euphoria were efforts to soften the more belligerent aspects of the opposing military postures in Central Europe. From these efforts, it was hoped, would flow much else that would improve East-West relations.

The detente euphoria alluded to was very real in many Western quarters, including some official and other sophisticated ones. There was widespread confidence that Soviet pressures on Western Europe were weakening. The established policies and outlooks of the Cold War were found embarrassing. They looked like a dead hand from the past that would not relax its icy grip on nations that should be constructively working for a better and safer future. An increasing sense of security from attack batted on the nuclear standoff, which was taken by optimists to promise more restraint and less risk-taking all around. Economic anxieties blossomed into independent pressures for force reduction in virtually all of the NATO countries.

Depending largely on future events, the verdict of history may well be that the Soviets missed a rare opportunity due to their aversion to restricting their massive military presence in Eastern Europe. The then existing climate of opinion in the West favored their scoring points on most issues that might have been negotiated. They could thus have emerged with a position which, in the aggregate, would have added up to a relative plus in the way of conventional military power in Europe. In particular, the Soviets may have overestimated and misread the slackening in Atlantic Alliance affairs due to both the American tie-up in Vietnam and the impact of the 1973 Middle East War.

In any event, those in the West who had appraised detente as a positive step to ameliorate the East-West military confrontation in Europe are now much disillusioned. Disenchantment in Europe, though less pervasive than in the United States, is more sober and may in time go deeper. The board has been cleared of much self-deception, and the outlook on the problem of the military balance in Europe is in many places where it was when detente got under way. The really disturbing element is that the Soviets have used the hiatus to increase and upgrade their forces, while the West has mostly marked time and is in some respects worse off militarily than it was before. Indeed, the existing cleavages in the Alliance might not have evolved in the same degree if the Cold War environment had continued unabated.

Altogether, the situation demands an ongoing review of where we stand in the defense of the West’s front in Europe. Such a review must be conducted in sharp awareness of new or worsened situations at a number of critical points. Leading among these is a Communist advance in southern Europe which faces us with the first problems of communism on the march in the Western continent since the late forties. There are also regional problems of broad import and, especially, the burning issues of Yugoslavia after Tito and of the rising Soviet military pressure on Norway.

THE COMMUNIST ADVANCE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

Between the late forties and the early seventies, there was no noteworthy accretion in the strength and influence of Communist parties in Western Europe. Into the sixties, they tended generally to remain both essentially Marxian and to follow the lead of Moscow. Occasional shock waves, such as that engendered by the Soviet suppression of the liberalizing regime in Hungary (1956), resulted in no more in Western Communist parties than sloughing off small fringes of idealists and intellectuals. The repression of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the sole instance when Soviet moves were condemned by the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) and others.

The 1961 Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was
something of a turning point. The shock of the definitive break of the USSR with China and Albania had worldwide repercussions, most notably in Italy. This rift in the world movement, which minimized such familiar bickerings as those between Trotskyites and Stalinists, challenged the comfortable Marxist thesis that in a Communist-run world there would be no more war or critical international controversy. The Communist Party of Italy thereafter multiplied its divergencies from full orthodoxy. The path away from complete submission to Moscow was smoothed considerably by an increasing spirit of compromise across the whole Italian political spectrum. The papal succession of the tractable John XXIII to the less flexible Pius XII helped greatly in this trend in Italy. The famed "opening to the left" inspired a new conciliatory spirit between parties that had been at sword's point with one another.

In 1968 the more independent-minded Communist leaders all over Europe went beyond traditional latitudes of criticism in their exasperation over the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. From that time on, one can, indeed, speak of genuine autonomist trends within most of the Communist parties of the West. Given this more relaxed atmosphere, a certain convergence emerged within European politics which softened the clash of ideologies. Most parties were now inclined to tolerate much that had previously been unthinkable. Some assuagement of the bitter rift between the Communist and Social Democratic branches of the Socialist movements played a large part in this process. Popular front tendencies began to revive, notably in France. The idea, well beyond this, and once anathema, of coalitions with a spread from far left to moderate right began to be taken seriously. This is especially the case in Italy, where the PCI and Christian Democrats have for years been cooperating informally on several levels.

Two particularly persistent questions demand, but do not as yet find, clear answers in the urgent task of evaluating the full significance of such trends. These concern the degree to which their Communist proponents should be credited with sincerity in accepting democratic procedures; and, the role of Moscow in this course of affairs.

Defenders of free enterprise or of democratic socialism would heave sighs of relief if they could convince themselves that this movement is a revival of the revisionist trend which swept Socialist parties at the turn of the century. Reformist and evolutionary ideas at that time began to crowd out the more revolutionary dogmas. If this were really the case now, one could justifiably speak of a "new revisionism." At this date, however, a time when balanced judgments are especially imperative, such an optimistic appraisal would be misleading to the point of self-deception. For our purposes it will be wiser for the nonce to employ the more modest "new line" to describe the apparent trend in Western communism.

It may be granted that Communist fanaticism has mellowed somewhat in many parts of the world, that the fallacies which time has revealed in regard to such Marxist predictions as a harmonious community of "socialist" states have made an impression, and that there are genuine autonomist aspirations everywhere within Communist parties. Yet no one can seriously doubt that tactical considerations are playing a large and almost surely a major part. The ultimate judgment of the "new line" of national communisms will depend on the eventual balance struck between utilitarian tactics and more substantive trends. Circumstances may thrust the course of events in one direction or another. If the "new line" fails to prove fruitful, if voters or traditional ruling elements remain deaf to coalitionary proposals, if popular front arrangements boomerang or prove unproductive—if, in short, the long wait on the threshold of power drags on, then we can anticipate that more traditional party postures will reassert themselves.

Given the opposite assumption that the "new line" tactics triumph and Communists are accepted into coalition cabinets, events will be governed much according to the then current state of affairs. Under totally chaotic conditions, such as threatened for a time in
Portugal, the temptation will be strong to strike directly for complete power, ignoring promises to stick to the democratic way of doing things. Otherwise, the probabilities favor great caution, if only to consolidate gains or avoid spoiling the game in other countries where compacts on coalition government may be pending. Therefore, instead of strident calls for constitutional and social changes or pushing demands for sensitive portfolios such as interior (police) and defense, Communist coalition partners may well concentrate on doing their jobs well and putting together an impressive record. Quite aside from keeping promises made by them, they are also likely to go easy for a time on departing from international institutions on the Soviet black list, such as NATO and the Common Market. In the latter instance, in fact, even a PCI government, for example, would face compelling domestic concerns to remain associated with the EEC and other Western instrumentalities for economic cooperation.

For the longer haul and assuming no catastrophic interventions, the outlook should be rather less reassuring. True, a certain relaxation of revolutionary élan and of personal dedication may be expected from the gradual addiction to the fleshpots of politics. Some Communist leaders may well hesitate to take chances at compromising a good thing. Their countrymen and foreign observers may feel relieved that social disruption, political turnover, and Western disalignment fail to materialize. But there can be no dependable guarantees for the future, least of all if any “revolutionary situations,” the persistent dream of every Marxist, should eventuate. Short of that, one must contemplate a slow process of “boring from within,” with as much penetration of police, armed forces, educational institutions, and other key governmental activities as circumstances permit. As for the promise to observe democratic procedures, even to the point of stepping down if the voters so decree, one may hope for this but would be thinking wishfully to count on it. Unless new experience indicates otherwise, coalition regimes seem likely to remain potential transmission belts to takeover.

The 25th Congress of the CPSU (February-March 1976) dealt in no uncertain terms with the incipient deviationism of the “new line” not to speak of a “new revisionism.” With obvious targeting at the French and Italian Communists, the concept of “proletarian internationalism” was resoundingly reaffirmed. Such a course was inevitable and surprised no one, least of all the wayward “national Communists” against whom it was directed. But does disapproval represent the true sentiments and purposes of the Kremlin leadership?

No one can doubt the resentment of the Moscow directorate over anything that appears to be defiance or an independent ideological line among the Western parties. A political system with so much emphasis on outward show of uniformity must shirk at such threats to its prestige. The signs of disobedience are perhaps scarcely less painful than a genuine conversion to more democratic ways. Thus, though in the past the Soviets have perforce allowed the outside parties some latitude to observe expedience, this flexibility has always been severely limited. It appears least likely that Moscow itself would ever have initiated the new tack, especially if it is one that promises further propagation in the homelands and contagion abroad. Even without its grimmest experiences—China and Albania—we may conclude that the Kremlin may well prefer the continuance of capitalist states to their replacement by dissident Communist ones. Moscow, in fact, by now may have begun to gloom over its own private nightmare—a mutinous “southern tier” stretching from Romania to Iberia and composed of disobedient offspring, each flaunting its own brand of defiance with possible contagious effects in Eastern Europe.

Despite all this, it is entirely conceivable that the price the Kremlin must pay for stepping up Communist pressures on the West is not overly exorbitant. The silver lining for Moscow is the increased menace to the prestige and unity of the Atlantic Alliance and the way in which Europe’s vulnerable southern flank is laid open to many kinds of penetration. Considering the vast expansion of Soviet influence and naval power in the
Mediterranean, the Kremlin may also feel able to count on recovering any political ground it may lose for a time on its northern littoral. Finally, on the principle that, if one of the superpowers faces difficulties, the other stands to gain, the Soviets appear entitled to believe that, in the aggregate, they stand more to win than to lose from the Communist advance in the south tier countries. Notably, they can count on this if the United States mishandles the situation in such a manner as to impel the Communist parties back toward the Moscow camp.

We may thus assume that Moscow, while keeping the record straight on ideological matters by orthodox pronouncements like those of the 25th Congress, will move carefully and avoid the appearance of drastically disciplining its overly independent children. It can least afford to be too greatly at odds with the only two mass parties within the larger countries of the free world (France and Italy). It will probably proceed gingerly with such two-edged weapons as excommunication and interdict, recalling how badly they backfired in dealings with Tito.

The perils to the West from the forward surge of communism in the southern tier of Europe have been sources of kindred anxieties since the thirties. The new surge is the more disturbing, after the quiet of the fifties and sixties, in that it occurs at a time of political and economic disarray in many lands of the Atlantic community as well as in some aspects of cross-Atlantic relations. For the West, there is some consolation, not overly great, to be found in the manifestations of insubordination to Moscow. Many also find reassurance in the milder posture of the Communist parties, taking hope mainly from the ostensible acceptance of some of the basics of democratic societies. But the greater ease of accommodation with them also carries its perils, burdening the West with a heavy mortgage upon its future.

Both the United States and its allies here face problems of gravest import. Most immediate is the attitude to be taken toward the formation of coalition governments that include Communists, and the problem of how to deal with them if they are installed. Not immediately pressing, but lurking ominously beyond this, is a more serious issue: the course to adopt in face of an imminent or actual Communist attempt to take sole power by force or some other form of illegal means.

Few doubt a continuing American interest in discouraging Communist participation in coalition governments. The degree of this concern, the possibility of prevention, and the price tag for attempting it are extraordinarily difficult to evaluate. If success were certain, one could make a strong argument for employing to this end the arts of diplomacy, economic influence, and perhaps moderate pressure. Yet even such limited devices would be counterproductive if they failed to achieve the desired end. Most vital would be avoidance of anything resembling intervention and whatever would impose an intolerable burden on future relations with a coalition regime it had proved impossible to prevent. It goes without saying that anything done through third parties or by the Alliance as a whole would be vastly preferable to unilateral American action.

As already stated, the most crucial decision the United States could be forced to make in dealing with Communist advances in the stretch of territory from Greece to Iberia would be in response to an actual or impending takeover by force or by other means subverting a constitutional order. A number of conceivable moves could meet the latter definition. Historic examples are Mussolini’s “March on Rome” and the machinations employed by Hitler to secure dictatorial powers via the Enabling Act of 1933. On the Communist record are the different forms of intimidation, including movements of Soviet troops on the frontier of Czechoslovakia, which facilitated the 1948 grasp at power in that country.

Any decision confronting the United States in such situations would necessarily hinge on factors like the strategic location of the country, the domestic elements on whose support one could count, the state of US relations with the Soviet Union, the sentiment of other members of the Alliance, the
prevailing deployment of US forces, and, ultimately, the mood of the American people. A single crass act of usurpation would clearly involve less of a problem than a staged process, each step of which, standing by itself, would make a series of incremental decisions on some form of intervention that much tougher.

Most vital to the West, perhaps, in the whole range of issues raised by the current Communist advances is the formulation of a defensive doctrine of specific but also of more general application. Such a set of principles for policy guidance would need to enlist the support and, if at all possible, the enthusiasm of the nations of the Atlantic Alliance. Its best chance of accomplishment would lie in fashioning a meaningful framework that interrelates logically the attack upon the various major problems currently faced by Western defense in Europe.

IMPORT OF THE FATE OF YUGOSLAVIA

One challenge would involve anticipating the dangers that continue to move closer with the advancing age of Tito and the constantly nearer moment of his departure from the scene. Despite his appearance of tolerably good health, the ghost of Tito has been flitting between the blocs for the better part of a decade. Predictions about the impact of his departure approximate in interest questions about key world figures which have long challenged crystal ball specialists, such as “After de Gaulle (Mao? Brezhnev?) what?”

Almost as provocative are speculations on the conceivable Soviet responses to the succession of crises widely expected after Tito is gone. Tito has long been occupied with building maximum stability in his country and in attempting to provide for every contingency that occurs to him. Yet no one believes that he can wholly succeed in healing traditional divisions or in erasing the bitter memory that over half of the 1.7 million Yugoslavs who succumbed during the war found death at the hands of their own countrymen. The more irreconcilable separatist elements appear certain to redouble their agitation, once the curb of Tito’s presence has been removed.

One may count on the vested interest of the well-purged civil and military authorities to close ranks and resist attacks on the country’s unity; but as yet there is no sign of “another Tito” among them. Everywhere in the social fabric are the resentful thousands who, for one reason or another, were ejected from places of authority and whose ambitions and sense of grievance can be exploited. Pro-Moscow emigre groups in Prague or Kiev claim that the number of “cominformists” expelled or arrested is no less than 200,000. The post-Tito waters are thus bound to be troubled, and the temptation of the Soviets to fish in them should prove hard to resist.

If the increasingly feverish and apparently effective activity of the Yugoslav government in ferreting out Soviet agents and sympathizers is to be taken at face value (there have been trials in six of the seven constituent republics), one would conclude that the Kremlin’s anticipatory maneuvers were stepped up dramatically just about when Tito entered the ninth decade of his life. In part, this enhanced Yugoslav vigilance must be ascribed to increased sensitiveness on the part of Tito and his colleagues as the critical time continues to move closer. It is unthinkable, however, that the Kremlin should not be fully aware of the extent to which it can exploit Yugoslav internal embroilments and prepare itself accordingly.

The actual course of Soviet policy is likely to owe more to circumstance than design. It is good to examine from Moscow’s standpoint what is at stake. Since the formulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, there has been wide appreciation that its more extreme logical interpretation would cover Yugoslavia. The mere fact that the Tito contumacy antedates this enunciation by two decades means nothing if conditions are favorable for Soviet intervention. Restoration of Yugoslavia to the fold would almost certainly involve coincident or subsequent moves against Romania and, conceivably, Albania. This sequence would reconfirm the grip of the Kremlin on Stalin’s heritage from World War II and restore its prestige in the Communist world to the highest point it has enjoyed since the Chinese strutted their heresy in 1961.
The impact of restored Soviet domination over Yugoslavia would be equally dramatic in the free world. The course of events in the last half decade has accentuated the precarious state of US positions in the Eastern Hemisphere generally and in the Mediterranean particularly. The Communist surge in the southern tier of Europe, the spectacular expansion of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, and the varied challenges to American influence in the Middle East have raised gravest doubts about the future US role in this part of the world. What the Soviets may prove able to do about post-Tito crises in Yugoslavia can have a vital, conceivably a determining, effect on the posture and behavior of the Communist parties in Western Europe.

Some urge that national sentiments, the personal ambitions of leaders, and a yearning for autonomy and management of their own affairs will prevail upon these parties to be more leery than ever of Kremlin domination if it pushes too hard in Yugoslavia. They would close ranks, it is argued, and stand up more firmly to Moscow's dictates. Another school of opinion would lean in the opposite direction. It would maintain that anything like a return, forcible or not, of Yugoslavia to the Soviet bloc would reawaken the enthusiasm of Moscow's adherents and intimate advocates of the "new line," always assuming, of course, the correctness of our interpretation that revisionist flirtations have not been a product of Moscow's machinations in the first place. In the case of the PCI there would be an additional intimidating factor in the physical proximity of Soviet-dominated territory immediately across the Adriatic.

Standing by itself, the impact of an extension of Soviet control over Yugoslavia on Communist movements in the West might not loom so formidable. Some would argue that, alarming as it would be, a Soviet establishment of domination over Yugoslavia will tend to reverse the malaise in NATO and reinvigorate its defensive efforts. More alarming is the intimate association of this impact with a potentially serious blow to the strategic position of the Atlantic Alliance. It is this which has during the last year or two given the question marks on the post-Tito period their most disturbing aspect. In marked contrast to what still prevailed in the summer of 1973, Italy alone among the states on the southern flank of the Alliance remains wholly committed to NATO. That flank is now functional only on the tactical level. Even in this restricted sense it has suffered serious impairment.

To compound the effect of these fateful developments, Soviet naval power has been projected westward through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and has gained footholds in the southeast Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Egypt has developed into a major gap in the potential chain, but no one can guarantee the continuance of that omission. More inhibitive for the expansion of Soviet power is the lack of aircraft carriers and of a territorial linkage between the eastern Mediterranean and the frontiers of the Soviet bloc. It will take some time to provide the carriers and, even then, their addition to the Soviet fleets may not change matters too greatly. A land-link with these waters, on the other hand, could have a revolutionary effect on strategic confrontation in that part of the world. By a single stroke, it would create a sustained challenge to allied fleets from Malta eastward.

Such a land-link could be accomplished by control over Turkey, Greece, or Yugoslavia. Despite the sad deterioration of US ties with Greece and Turkey, no visible sign of a probable change of front has as yet manifested itself. Yugoslavia after Tito appears a more promising target for Soviet ambitions. Aside from the strategic angle, as has been noted earlier, its fate can conceivably determine, in one direction or another, much of the course of the Communist movements in the states to the west. A grip on Yugoslav territory for the establishment of naval bases and of land-based aircraft today has a very different significance from that of the time before Soviet fleets prowled the middle sea.

However great the temptations here enumerated, the best guess would seem to be that, after the departure of Tito, the Kremlin
will play a waiting game and hold its hand until the type and range of Yugoslav troubles and the extent of Western concern about them have revealed themselves. The initial Moscow theme may well emerge in the form of a siren song of good will and a plea for harmony and cooperation in Eastern Europe. Solely in the event of virtual political chaos or civil war, possibly created by Kremlin machinations, when pretexts would offer themselves in abundance, would a full fledged Soviet military intervention to deal with “counterrevolution” become a possibility, perhaps a probability. Such an eventuality, as mentioned earlier, would offer a convenient occasion for chastising and bringing Romania fully back into line. A “sideshow” in Romania might be made to appear as a mere incident of the operation and add less to international turmoil and opprobrium than if undertaken by itself. The simplest Soviet procedure, and hard to refuse, would be to demand passage for troops going to Yugoslavia. Under the plea of maintaining lines of communication, it would then be relatively easy to stay on indefinitely.4

A vital question concerns the degree of restraint the Soviets may exercise on behalf of detente, given that this retains whatever potency it has until the time of decision. The events of October 1973 demonstrated resoundingly what should have been clear from the beginning: Moscow will clothe its actions, and may in some degree temper them, to conserve whatever values it sees in detente; but this inhibiting factor will always be subordinate to the exploitation of more notable opportunities that may present themselves. The glittering prize of restored control over Yugoslavia would certainly belong in such a category. Considerations of detente, therefore, are more likely to evidence themselves in the form of externals rather than in the substance of policy.

The Soviets must be aware that the same priority applies also to the other superpower—that detente, whose stock of late has been doing poorly on the Washington exchange, will carry but small weight when balanced against more clearly perceived national interests. Does Moscow have to fear aught else when calculating the probable American response to an assault on Yugoslav independence?

It can be argued with force that if the United States were prepared to make this a crucial issue—in other words, to confront the Kremlin with a decision which, as in the Cuban crisis of 1962, might approach a grim choice between peace and war—the game to the Soviets would not appear worth the candle. This is said in full awareness that the situations of the superpowers have been largely reversed with respect to their ability to deploy military power in the critical area involved.

To date, Washington has not displayed an inclination to put that high a priority on the fate of Yugoslavia. Though not as clearly enunciated as when Dean Acheson, in an unhappy moment, seemed to exclude South Korea from the sphere of major American concern, official indicators have usually pointed in the opposite direction. Thus far, the US assurance of support if Yugoslavia were invaded is limited to the “material” aid promised by Secretary of State Rusk at a NATO meeting, shortly after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

It remains highly questionable whether the upward evaluation of US-Yugoslav interests has reached a point where they would plead for a higher level of risk-taking. To get the necessary attention, an American “hands-off” to Moscow would have to be clearly stated well before any moment of ultimate truth, be a logical corollary to fundamental tenets of national policy, and appear wholly credible from the standpoint of the seriousness of intentions. The question whether such a doctrine that would be broad enough to cover, if at all possible, US heightened regard for the independence of Yugoslavia can be formulated in the years ahead will furnish the ultimate focus to this essay.

Whatever happens in the way of Western response to a crisis with the Soviet bloc over Yugoslavia must in the first instance depend on the general readiness of the United States to deepen, and possibly to broaden, its commitment to the defense of its frontier in
Europe. Such a posture will affect correspondingly the situation of the West with respect to rising uneasiness at the other end of its defensive line, namely, Norway.

PRESSURES ON NORWAY

Among the portentous but least publicized turns in European affairs during recent years is the mounting Soviet pressure on the northern flank of NATO. As the 1000-mile western coast of Norway makes up most of this flank, it is on this country that the squeeze, though still comparatively mild, is largely exerted. Russian interest in the northern reaches of this coast, and therewith in a window on the North Atlantic, has been evident since the nineteenth century. The temptations beckoning to the Tsar’s government have been compounded many times by a vast expansion of Soviet naval power in Arctic and North Atlantic waters. The otherwise so unpromising Kola Peninsula already bristles with the world’s mightiest complex of military bases. Over 500 naval vessels are stationed there; Murmansk alone harbors more of them than all US ports together. There are 18 military airfields—not all of them manned but capable of being made operational at brief notice. Two motorized rifle divisions, one of them trained for amphibious warfare, are stationed there, as well as a naval infantry regiment.

The Norwegians know, of course, that this buildup is essentially global in strategic motivation, representing the northern horn of a two-pronged encircling movement directed at Western Europe, of which the southern counterpart is the thrust westward in the Mediterranean. But this is small consolation in face of the implications for them of such a concentration of force on their doorsteps. A severe shock to their sense of security was the lining up of Soviet tanks only a stone’s throw from their boundaries during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. Since 1970, Johan J. Holst, of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, has further pointed out to them that, as the Soviet defense perimeter is extended westward, their country is actually falling behind this perimeter. There have been repeated Soviet maneuvers in the North Sea, as well as manifestations of an intent to push the Soviet defense line toward Iceland and the Faroes.

These developments give new point to public discussions that have taken place in Norway since the mid-sixties over membership in NATO. There have been debates about such topics as how Norway became associated with the Alliance in the first place. The challenges come mostly from the far left but have at times gained a wider audience. There are charges that Norway’s membership in NATO is turning into a provocation of the Soviet Union. In some contradiction, it is also argued that the Soviets’ new Delta Class submarines, with a reported range of 4200 nautical miles, will permit reaching American targets from bases in the Barents Sea, thus making control of the Norwegian coast less important for the USSR. This lessening of the criticality of the Norwegian coast, it is urged, means that Norway would no longer be letting its Allies down if it withdrew from NATO.

It remains to be seen what the development of Norway’s promising oil resources will do to influence attitudes over a longer period. Some have been fearful that, with the Soviet threat growing on its frontier, a country swollen and perhaps somewhat spoiled by oil wealth could more easily be pressured into paying blackmail to Moscow. The more optimistic view is that this hardy land will continue to see its true safety in solidarity with its only conceivable protectors, its NATO Allies. Thus far the portents are encouraging. Basic approval of NATO as indicated by polls has risen to a spectacular 70 percent from a low figure of 42 percent in 1965. It is evident that the Norwegian preference continues to be a posture of resistance rather than of subservience, given always fundamental confidence in the firmness of the Alliance and particularly in that of its principal member.

The United States can do much to strengthen this confidence. The answer hardly lies in new unilateral assurances to Norway; they would only give weight to charges that association with a grouping that includes its rival superpower will increasingly be
interpreted by the Soviet Union as a provocation.

On the other hand, American policies that promise to reinvigorate the Alliance generally and indicate readiness to extend and deepen, rather than contract, the American commitment to Europe's defense should prove fruitful in giving Norway greater ease as a continuing member of NATO.

EUROPE AS A FACTOR IN THE WORLD BALANCE

For 30 years, though in highly varying degrees, the military position of the Soviets in Central Europe has outweighed the conventional forces facing them. During most of this period, the imbalance was redressed from a global standpoint by the nuclear armament of the United States. In the time of President Kennedy, this still amounted to a ten-to-one superiority in strategic weapons. Today there is a standoff at the nuclear level. On the other hand, the long-standing disproportion in conventional arms in favor of Moscow has steadily increased.

Perhaps worse, Vietnam, Watergate, Angola, and what can only be called a fiasco in handling the Greco-Turkish problem have sapped American prestige and self-confidence. There has been a loss, too, especially for European youth, of that magnetism and a certain magic quality which adhered to the name “America” and which have been, and in some measure continue to be, positive assets.

It ought to follow that the West should recognize the need to close ranks and react as one against all forms of Soviet pressure in the Atlantic area. Unfortunately, for some time there has been a lack of unity and sense of common purpose on both sides of the Atlantic. For too long the United States has given too much attention to pursuing momentarily more pressing interests on the other side of the globe. Even those Europeans who approved of what Washington was doing often felt rather thrust aside and left to their own devices. In their distraction, Americans also forgot or thought too little about what was at stake for them across the Atlantic. The view advanced in this essay is that the United States never adequately appreciated what ties with Europe meant in terms of world prestige, aside from their obvious meaning in the confrontation with the Soviet Union. In many past world situations the United States and Europe have been reckoned as a single force, even in situations where their viewpoints may have differed.

In sum, a United States considered without Europe, completely apart from involving the ultimate disaster of Soviet dominion over the western continent, would find American weight diminished in every corner of the globe.

A relevant role in Atlantic misunderstandings is that of an all-too-frequent reversion in the United States to the fancy that it is “protecting Europe.” This habit of thought goes with looking upon our stay as temporary and saying that Europe must find ways and means to “defend itself.” But the frontier in Central Europe is also that of the whole Western world, and the watch on the Elbe is as much our job as that of the Europeans so long as any part of the common heritage is in danger. To regard the Europeans as solely responsible for it is like maintaining that only the inhabitants of our Pacific coast should feel obligated to defend it—or that the West Germans, established as they are by no choice of theirs at the critical point of East-West contact, should see to the defense of this frontier by themselves.

The guard of that common Western frontier is a common Western responsibility that should be shared to the best of their various abilities by all free Western nations. A renewed American dedication to this truth would be most welcome in whatever form it took. The effectiveness of Western defense should be greatest when it is an integral part of a framework of principles that more inclusively deepen the American commitment.

THE PAST DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK FOR US POLICY

Insofar as American policy of the post-World War II era was influenced by broad policy pronouncements, any more specific relevance to Europe was quite naturally short-lived. Within the 10 years after
the war, the institutional framework for Atlantic cooperation had solidified so greatly that in cohesiveness it transcended any existing doctrine that could have been applied to it. Thus the Truman Doctrine, though related initially to areas near the juncture of Europe and Asia, was understood to have some of its most logical application to the western half of the continent. As basic US obligations came to be spelled out in a stream of public documents, this association was gradually dismissed from thought. In the popular mind, the doctrine was essentially linked with the peripheral areas of Europe.

George Kennan also was thinking primarily of Europe as the area to be shielded by a policy of containment. Here, too, the forging of extensive trans-Atlantic ties quickly outstripped, insofar as that continent is concerned, his advocacy of broad-gauged commitment to threatened territories. In time, the psychological divorce between the idea of containment and US ties to Europe reached a point where mention of it, in promoting new forms of support, could only have downgraded the relationship. It would have been as supernumerary an exercise as demanding application of the concept to attacks upon our own territory. To overstate the obvious is to raise doubts about the firmness of a policy in question.

Containment itself, however much it may retain its ritual place in the minds of policymakers, also has come upon evil days with respect to popular sentiment. For many Americans it has become almost synonymous with involvement in distant regions of questionable importance to the nation, distracting its attention from others of such vital concern as Europe and South America, and with the nightmare of a bottomless maw endlessly swallowing the nation's wealth. Another reason for the unpopularity of the idea of containment is its association, wholly misleading, with the fancy that the United States is acting as "the world's policeman." A busybody Uncle Sam is pictured running around rather aimlessly, trying to put things to right that would often be better off left alone. Thus the term "containment" may have outlived its usefulness whether or not the original idea retains much validity.

The Nixon Doctrine was another in this American series of pronouncements. After its proclamation, much ink was spilled on whether, to what extent, and in what manner it should apply to Atlantic relations. Such speculation faded away rather quickly because whatever relevance it may have had to Europe evaporated almost as fast as the debate could be joined. The Nixon Doctrine's general tenor of limiting our foreign obligations, and its implications of at least partial American withdrawal from overseas, simply did not fit in with Atlantic situations associated with the Middle East crisis. Moreover, its supposed call for less American tutelage seemed to be contradicted by Secretary Kissinger's proposal for a new Atlantic Charter and US cavalier treatment of its Allies in relation to Middle East affairs.

Any more specific focus of the Nixon Doctrine for Europe lay in the demand for less burden-bearing by the United States and broadened burden-sharing by its Allies. Achievement of this objective has been endangered by recessionary trends in Western economies, making it difficult enough merely to maintain current contributions. Basically, then, the Nixon Doctrine, if it ever had any pertinence in our dealings with Europe, was deprived of immediacy by developments which outdistanced the premises upon which it supposedly was founded.

US interests in Europe have often enough needed more exact definition but have scarcely seemed to require the kind of concise elucidation of aims and principles of operation that can be encapsulated in declarations of "doctrine." Whatever may have been the case earlier, the continued absence of any succinct official statement on the extent and limits of these interests may have produced a chink in the Western armor. Among arguments suggesting a review of the scope of the American commitment, the most salient would stress the impact that may be anticipated from a convincing reaffirmation and deepening of the American dedication to the cause of Atlantic unity and defense. Any "doctrine" expressing this ought, if at all possible, to strike something like a least common denominator among US concerns discussed in the present essay.
ASPECTS OF AN ATLANTIC DOCTRINE

Discussion has reached a point where thought must be given to the more specific aspects of what could conceivably be called an “Atlantic Doctrine.” As the term forcibly implies, this would have to aim at the most emphatic possible reaffirmation of Atlantic priorities within the framework of US world policies. The step could be publicized as a return to the rule of “first things first” after a period of unfortunate distraction by secondary problems and areas. Such a stress could be counted on to attract a certain measure of support both at home and in Europe.

A first corollary, given the all-too-conceivable failure of the MBFR negotiations, could be introduced by expressing the distress of the Atlantic nations at their inability to moderate the more pugnacious and costly aspects of the East-West military confrontation. Such a statement could be followed by another that, in view of this and until the unhappy state of affairs could be altered, the only course for the United States and its Allies is to recommit themselves to the common defense. The United States could then voice its firm resolve to participate in this defense as long as it proved necessary—in effect, indefinitely! Though it would have to be put very carefully, it would be well to join this with a strong inference that there is no less iron in our souls than in those of other peoples who are prepared to shoulder the burden of implementing their national purposes for generations if necessary.

A second corollary could develop the theme that Western defense is not merely conceived in the narrow sense of resisting invasion. We must equally guard against other forms of trespass on those common values which are essential to the Western way of life and the preservation of its form of society. In effect, an Atlantic Doctrine should be aimed to safeguard the internal integrity of the member states of the Alliance equivalent to that provided by NATO against physical penetration. It must be made evident that what it is meant to resist are endeavors to subvert governments of Western Europe by illegal or violent means. In its strongest form such a policy, except in one sense, would resemble a counter-Brezhnev Doctrine. The profound difference in the Western version would be the absence of any claim to deal with mere erosions of democratic rule parallel to the wearing away of the Communist order of affairs in Czechoslovakia against which Moscow mobilized the Warsaw Pact. To approximate the Soviet procedure would mean preventive measures, including or bordering on intervention, against Communist-infiltrated coalition governments. Though the institution of such governments must be held injurious to Western interests, few, and certainly not the present writer, would advocate such a policy, least of all a declaration of principle concerning them.

A conceivable third corollary would be considerably more controversial and its form and tenor would have to depend on the state of affairs at the time of the promulgation of the doctrine. This would be to extend as much as possible of the protective umbrella to Yugoslavia as an outlier of the free world. A view expressed earlier is that, if the United States could credibly declare itself prepared to take whatever steps were needed to assure the independence and integrity of Yugoslavia, this in itself would be sufficient to preclude any physical Soviet intervention in that country. Such credibility, of course, is not attainable in view of the current and foreseeable national mood and that of our NATO Allies. Nor, though one official American spokesman has defined US interests in preventing Soviet domination of Yugoslavia as “bordering on vital,” can this as yet be taken to represent a consensus within the American government. In any event, raising the rating to “vital” in the years just ahead appears more than improbable, however much one may allow for mounting awareness of the strategic importance of the area.

For the sake of prolonging the argument, let one assume the unassumable—that the above appraisal falls short of the state of public sentiment and official concern at some future moment of decision. Aside from the
familiar array of diplomatic and economic pressures, possibly enhanced in weight by increased Soviet dependence on technological, managerial, and other forms of assistance, would further means of pressure be available? A military advance into the area of sufficient potency to effectively counter a Soviet incursion is scarcely conceivable and would almost certainly launch World War III. Barely more realistic, but perhaps worth mentioning as an alternative that may be proposed under unusual circumstances, would be running a tripwire in the form of a small, highly mobile force entering the country in response to a Yugoslav invitation, thus placing the burden of calling for a showdown on one's opponent. The time element offers a glimmer of hope for this in terms of reaching the critical area first. Having no common frontier with Yugoslavia and no good prospects for the kind of airlift that succeeded against Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets must perform proceed via one or more of the connecting territories: Austria, Hungary, Romania, or Bulgaria. In Czechoslovakia, surprise was achieved so well because the time for it seemed to have passed. It would appear quite impossible to effect a massive Soviet buildup against Yugoslavia without warning signals to all interested parties. The prior presence of a Western force could thus provide the tripwire that might give the Soviets pause. A hitherto observed rule of the Cold War has decreed that US and Soviet troops should not trespass on territory where the other party is present.

The above play with ideas has no immediate relevance to declarations of US policy in the European sphere. What may prove acceptable within such a broad framework would be a statement of extreme concern for the independence of the noncommitted states of South Central Europe, thus including Austria. The actuality of a potential threat to that country becomes visible in recalling the anxiety in 1968 about the menace of an invasion coincident with that of Czechoslovakia, rousing a near-panic in Austria.

A key issue would be the form of and occasion on which an Atlantic Doctrine of the type delineated could be enunciated. A glance at the problem reveals how much easier it is to discern what should be avoided than to define positive aspects. One need think only of some of the things that went wrong in 1973, the scheduled “Year of Europe.” What was sincerely designed as a period of fence-mending turned sour and ended with less harmony all around. No doubt the central explanation lay in the Middle East imbroglio, which proved too trying for the members of the Alliance at that stage of their relations. But the American campaign to revitalize Atlantic relationships had gotten off to a bad start months before by advocacy of a New Atlantic Charter. All too many Europeans found the accent patronizing and hinting at a return to American tutelage. There was resentment at what was thought to be precipitation in taking up again the reins that had been allowed to drag all too long. The overture, in short, was decried as smacking of an American brand of Gaullism.

It is never possible to exaggerate the importance of tone in international relations—a particular truth with policies that depend on suasion and must shun any hint of pressure. It is equally consequential that a protective doctrine has nothing of the color of a “protectorate.” Nor can the United States afford the appearance of promoting either its more specific interests in Europe (e.g., economic ones) or seeking to involve Europe in world rivalries with the USSR. There must also be no cause for suspicion that the initiative derives from hopes to enlist Europe in pushing particular US interests in the Middle East or anywhere else outside the immediate European complex. Last but not least, the doctrine must in no way be taken to be the occasion of the renunciation of detente or equivalent to a declaration of Cold War II.

Lest the above comments be misunderstood, it is perhaps appropriate to emphasize that the American interests enumerated are entirely legitimate and may be advanced in various proper ways in the course of policymaking and execution. But they would seem to have no place in a declaration of principles of policy meant to convey a renewed and high-minded
commitment to the common Atlantic defense and welfare.

Statements of basic intentions capable of integration into a guiding doctrine for policy formation can be accomplished in various ways. They can be staged as situations arise that invite response in a manner that ideally would transcend mere reaction to initiatives of an opponent. At a suitable point, the vital parts can then be made to fall into place in logical association. Or the declaration can be promulgated as a single act on a dramatic occasion when public interest is assured and the prospect of acceptance, if not necessarily of enthusiastic welcome, in the NATO countries appears greatest.

There are too many conceivable turns in world affairs to enumerate and describe the types of occasion that might prove most suitable. By way of illustration, one might suggest the time of the possible breakup of the MBFR negotiations. The time and circumstances selected can contribute a number of criteria that could facilitate the task.

Moments of gathering tension or actual crisis obviously stress the relevancies of and command wide attention for declarations of policy. Yet a strong case can be made for avoiding them as seeming to buttress charges of provocation or of exacerbating international controversies. More to be recommended would appear to be junctures where general reviews of policies, both foreign and domestic, are a matter almost of routine. What would lend itself perfectly to this would be the inaugural address of a new President or either his State of the Union or State of the World messages to the Congress. Such a course would also facilitate a designation that would perhaps be happier than "Atlantic Doctrine," too much a reminder possibly of the ill-fated proposal for a New Atlantic Charter. The declaration might well be called by the name of the President. Both the dignity of the occasion and a happy formulation could contribute much to winning popular support and a sympathetic ear abroad—crucial elements in gaining credibility.

A statement of this nature could be phrased in terms largely familiar yet conveying an emphasis unique since Vice President Johnson, in Berlin (1961), pledged "our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor." To stress the return to first principles, it would be crucial to recognize candidly the pernicious consequences of the distractions of the last decade. Without specific reference to past connotations and, perhaps, without even using the term, it could be made unmistakably clear that, so far as Western Europe is concerned, the idea of containment is as relevant as ever. The concept could then be extended to comprise the internal political integrity of the members of the Alliance as well as, within whatever bounds may at the time appear essential, the independence of the states of South Central Europe.

A reference by the President to the hope that our European friends will welcome our rededication to the Alliance and will seek to strengthen it within their own capabilities would seem entirely in order. But spelling this out on such an occasion would scarcely be appropriate, nor has there been any attempt to do so within the confines set for this essay.

Any proposal for extending American commitments abroad or, for that matter, to maintain them, must perforce reckon with the post-Vietnam mania for noninvolvement. The popular temper has taken such extravagant, almost grotesque, shapes as a refusal (in a national poll) to contemplate defending our closest ally, Britain. A substantial minority did not hesitate to exclude even Canada from our protection. Such displays of apparent isolationist spirit are dismaying enough. But serious as they are, they should not be taken at face value. They can perhaps best be described as a masochistic spree that finds a momentary perverse relish in shock effects both on oneself and one's fellows.

Actually the national mood has been showing numerous signs of returning to more normal channels. There appears to be a growing reawareness of the continuing dangers to national security. The demand of the times is plainly for clarification of the basic issues in US world positions. It is a
season when leadership can do much by sober 
reappraisals of American interests in key areas 
of the world, and in appealing to the sounder 
instincts of a sadly confused people. Popular 
moods reverse themselves with startling 
rapidity, and the policymaker who is too 
intent on following them may well find 
himself outdistanced.

CONCLUSION: A TIME FOR INITIATIVES

There is much about the current world 
scene to impress us with a need of returning 
to fundamental verities and first principles. 
Notions of a pentagonal global power 
configuration lost much force with the fourth 
Arab-Israeli round in the Middle East. No 
fancy juggling of international balances can 
now give assurance of a more secure world 
equilibrium. Most telling—whatever the hopes 
and illusions or continued values of detente, 
the Soviet threat from the standpoint of 
military and naval capabilities and evidences 
of continued expansive urges is more 
omnipresent than ever before. In these critical 
times, there is also a growing impression that 
the United States is in a receding phase and is 
more and more dealing from weakness while 
the Soviets are doing so from strength.

For centuries the European balance was 
equivalent to the world balance. For some 
time this has no longer held insofar as 
relations between the European powers are 
concerned. Yet Europe remains the area 
about which the world balance largely turns, 
however much some may believe this place 
may in time be taken by the Middle East, 
China, or some other part of the globe. It is in 
Europe, therefore, where positive steps for 
the foreseeable future can have the most 
resounding global impact.

Partly as a result of US setbacks in 
Southeast Asia, partly because of 
all-too-evident manifestations of the public 
obession with noninvolvement, people in 
many parts of the world are less likely, or 
have already ceased, to ask in tight 
international situations: “What will the 
United States do?” At the height of the 
disturbances in Lebanon, it does not seem to 
have occurred to anyone that Washington 
would take a hand in one way or another.?

No one wants the United States to make a 
parade of busyness as if in response to an 
injunction, “Don’t just stand there, do 
something!” But it would be a tonic to the 
North Atlantic peoples to feel that America is 
breaking away from the indicators of retreat 
and withdrawal. Such an impression would do 
much to allay the burgeoning complaints 
about the lack of US leadership that are being 
heard even from European statesmen (e.g., 
West German Foreign Minister Gentscher).

Shunning everything that may resemble 
belligerence, not to speak of bellicosity, it is a 
time when constructive initiatives along lines 
that accord with the lessons of the last 
quarter century should do wonders to restore 
confidence and self-esteem on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Whatever can return more life to 
the sense of common purpose and 
consciousness of a shared fate on the part of 
the peoples who live on the shores of the big 
Western lake should contribute richly to this 
end. An Atlantic Doctrine capable of 
graphically displaying American recognition 
of what is at issue may help to fill the bill.

NOTES

1. How unnatural this criterion was is illustrated in the 
case of four of the national groupings which fell in the Soviet 
sphere (the Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, and East 
Germans), all of whom could be counted as traditionally 
among the more anti-Russian and anti-Communist elements 
in Eastern and Central Europe.

2. This threatens in France where the Socialist Party has 
gained more of the limelight and public support than the 
Communists from their political liaison.

3. It should be held in mind, of course, that in Portugal 
the Communists never did pledge to respect representative 
government as they have done in France and Italy. Their 
public statements, in fact, expressed the exact opposite. 
Their drive for sole power, of course, turned into a fiasco, 
thought the final returns may be far from it.

4. The need of maintaining such lines to East Germany 
has been the Soviet justification for a military presence in 
Poland for the last 30 years.

5. Witness the furious denunciation in the United Nations 
of Ambassador Moynihan by the British Ambassador, Ivor 
Richard. Not many years ago, so humiliating an arraignment, 
whether justified or not, by the representative of a major ally 
would have appeared inconceivable.

6. The same charge in reverse, of course, can be directed 
with much justice against America’s NATO allies. They may 
be accused of inadequately appreciating their dependence on 
ties with the United States and the damage suffered by their 
own place in the world by American setbacks and 
embarrassments elsewhere.

7. This should not be understood as an argument for any 
kind of US involvement, but merely as an illustration of some 
tendency to assume that Uncle Sam is counted out of the 
game.