"Intellectual Center of the Army"

COUNTERINSURGENCY OVERVIEW

Presented to:

COIN Leader's Workshop

(27 October 2009)

US Army/USMC COIN Center
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Agenda

- The importance of COIN Doctrine
- COIN Mindset
- Approach to COIN Overview

Thinking About War

Merged Battlespace

Information Superiority

Non-Linear

Non-Contiguous

Link

Ubiquitous Connectivity

Integrated Battlespace
Sea floor to Space

Simultaneous, non-linear
operations throughout
the battlespace

They did not get the memo.
Not on the Net?

Post Cold War

Post Napoleonic

2004

1830's

A World History of Insurgency

- 1820 - 1960
  - French in Mexico
  - American Indian Wars
  - Philippine Insurrection
  - Anglo-Boer War
  - WWI
  - Arab Insurrection
  - Banana Wars
  - WWII
  - Greek Civil War
  - Malayan Emergency

- **1960 - Present**
  - Vietnam
  - N. Ireland
  - Ethiopia
  - Nicaragua
  - El Salvador
  - Colombia
 - Somalia
  - Afghanistan
  - Iraq

History

- In almost every year since WWII, at least one insurgency has been underway in less developed areas.

  - Greece
  - Burma
  - Malaya
  - The Philippines
  - Vietnam
  - Kenya
  - Laos
  - Congo
  - Algeria

  - Cuba
  - Dominican Rep.
  - Yemen
  - Thailand
  - El Salvador
 - Ethiopia
  - Nicaragua
  - Afghanistan
  - Iraq

Global Trends in Violent Conflict 1946–2005

Peace and Conflict 2008 Executive summary, J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ted Robert Gurr, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland

Global Stress Points and Strategic Focal Points

Globalization

Climate Change

Pandemics

- **Water Scarcity**
- **Oil Production**
- **Explosive Population Growth**
- **Potential Failed States**

What is COIN?

Insurgency (JP 3-24): organized use of subversion and violence by a group to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.

Counterinsurgency (JP 3-24): **comprehensive** civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and **address its root causes**.

These are the proposed doctrinal definitions without their accompanying description, but they are broadened from the definitions of FM 3-24.

Counterinsurgency: A Mindset

Conventional war waged on *physical* **terrain…**

Counterinsurgency waged on *cognitive* **terrain…**

Reading a cognitive map:

- ✓ **Identify root causes**
- ✓ **View situations thru multiple cultural lenses**
  - ✓ **Locals & Insurgents**

Use operations to shape environment & *use environment to shape operations.*

COIN Terrain

- **Establishing Relationships**
- **Using Interpreter**
- **Negotiating**
- **Mediating**
- **Arbitrating**

"I underestimated one factor… culture. I was looking at the wrong map – I needed to look at the tribal map not the geographic map."

BGen David Fraser.
ISAF Multinational Brigade
Commander, Kandahar

Insurgent Groups

- Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami
- Harakat-i-Islami
- Hizbi Islami (Gulbuddin)
- Hizbi Islami (Yunus Khalis)
- Islamic Union
- Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan
- Jamiat-i-Islami
- Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami
- Sazman-i-Nasr
- Shura-Inqilabi-i-Itifaq-i-Islami
- Independent fronts

Cultural understanding is key to success

The Challenge to the Way We Think Asymmetric Warfare

How we tend to view things

How the insurgent views things

COIN Principles

➢ Legitimacy is main objective

➢ Political factors are primary

➢ Long-term commitment

COIN Imperatives

➢ Manage information

➢ Use appropriate force

➢ Empower lower levels

* FM 3-24

Political Strategic

Theater / Operational

Tactical

**Political Strategic Theater**

Tactical

Compression of Strategic, Operational, & Tactical levels

Rousseau
"Legitimate state authority must be derived from the consent of the governed"

Framework for Counterinsurgency: "Failed State Model"

IO/NGOs

Gov
Ldrs
Civil Svc

Psychological

Physical

The People

Psychological

Basics
• Security
• Sewage
• Water
• Electricity
• Trash
•Medicare

Max Weber
"State monopoly on violence **Ensures Taxes** "

HN Security Forces

Physical

Hobbes
The Nature of man is brutish and chaotic. Life without security is "**solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.**"

The Invasion Model:
Post L'armée Révolutionaire

IO/NGOs

The People

Psychological

Physical

HN Gov.

Psychological

HN Security Forces

Physical

Basics **(now ,your job)**
- Security
- Sewage
- Water
- Electricity
- Trash
- Medicare

Examples
- Spain 1807
- German Invasion of France 1940 (42 Days)
- German Invasion of Yugoslavia 1941 (11 Days)
- Afghanistan 1979, 2001
- Iraq 2003 (21 Days)

The People Have the Final Say

# Framework for Counterinsurgency: "War Amongst the People"

Approach to Counterinsurgency
1. Separate insurgents from Population
2. Connect Population to Government
3. Transform Environment to be inhospitable to Insurgent

Diplom/Int Pressure

Diplom/Int Pressure

HN Gov.

IO/NGO

Military

PRTs

Partner Unit TT/OMLT

Psychological

Physical

Psychological

Psychological

Military

HN Security Forces

Physical

Physical

Psychological

Physical

Insurgents

External (Non)State Actor

Political Moral

Resources Sanctuary

COIN Principles
Legitimacy
Unity of Effort
Political is Primary
Understand the Environment
Intelligence
Isolate Insurgents
Security under Rule of Law
Long term Commitment

Prerequisites

Lack of Government Control
Vulnerable Population
Leadership for Direction

Insurgency Dynamics

Leadership
Ideology
Objective
Environment
External Support
Phases
Organization

What is Victory ?

"A victory is not [just] the **destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization.** It is that, plus the **permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population**, isolation not enforced upon the population but **maintained by and with the population**."

David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 1964

*"Three Arrested Over N. Irish soldier Killings"*

CNN 14 Mar 09

Break?

The People

Neutral/
Passive

Active

Active

- Cover
- Weapons
- Supplies
- New Recruits
- Couriers
- Intelligence
- Early warning
- Funding
- Documentation

"The game of history is usually played by the best and the worst over the heads of the majority in the middle"

If the population is the battleground, what must be our method? How do we separate the insurgent from his base?

Understanding the Operational Environment

Not … *what to think*

Or even . . . *how to think*

In COIN & IW, focus on …
how to think about:
environment in which you operate &
how to influence both environment & actors in it.

"Hearts and Minds" - Reality

"The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan People"

General Sir Gerald Templer,
Director of Operations and High Commissioner for Malaya, 1952

- What Templer meant (and his subsequent actions showed) was that success in counterinsurgency rests on popular perception, and that this has
  - an **emotive ("hearts") component**, and

  - a **cognitive ("minds") component**.

Make the people choose

- **Gratitude theory** – "be nice to the people, meet their needs, they will *feel grateful* and stop supporting the insurgents"

  - **DOES NOT WORK**. Enemy simply intimidates population when we are not there. We get lip-service, but they see us as weak and easily manipulated. In time they hate us.

- **Choice theory** – "enable (persuade, coerce, coopt) the population to make an *irrevocable choice* to support us instead of the enemy"

  - **USUALLY WORKS BETTER**. The pop wants to sit on the fence. We have to get them off it and keep them there. This requires persuading the pop, then protecting them, where they live. Cannot do this everywhere, **must** do it where it counts (politically).

Hearts and Minds the "So What"

- **Hearts:** the population must be convinced that the success of their government is in their long-term interests.

- **Minds:** the population must be convinced that the government is actually going to win, and it will permanently protect their interests.

- This is about perceived self-interest, not about whether the population likes us. The principal emotive content is respect, not affection.

  - Support based on liking does not survive when the enemy applies fear: intimidation trumps affection.

  - Disappointment, unreliability, failure and defeat are deadly – preserving prestige and popular respect through proven reliability, honoring promises and following through, is key.

- Hitting the enemy hard, publicly, when feasible (Without targeting innocents) is also key.

Make the people choose: Opium
The Killcullen Theory

- Taliban 2.0 is encouraging poppy production

- Threats being used to promote poppy cultivation.

- 12.7% growing poppy

- Helmund, Badakshan account for 49.9% of poppy, 5.6% of the pop

- Value is $4 billion

- Accounts for 50% of Taliban funding

- $800 million goes to farmers,

- 79% of villages with "poor security" engaging in the production VS 22% of those reporting "good security."

- Poppy growing population is in Taliban controlled areas

- Half-acre plot = 500 kilos of wheat worth $285 or 12 kilos of poppy resin worth $571

Eradication + an alternative +security

Use of Force

- Force is NOT necessarily counterproductive **_if_**:
  - You kill the RIGHT people
  - There is a purpose to it that the people can understand
  - Your information engagement campaign is consistent with the action
  - You use appropriate force for the situation
 - It creates security as part of a nested plan

Security Matters

- Insurgents leverage insecurity
- The People won't help unless you can protect them 24/7
- Protect the people, and they will help you
- "Make them an offer they can't refuse"

Warlordism and Poor Governance

KABUL 1992-1996

Understanding, not Data

Every area is unique and must be analyzed on its own terms

COIN as Multiple Problem Set

- Understand nexus of anti-government, criminal, political, & terrorist activity ("franchise cells" competing for influence) & exploit seams
  - GIRoA to settle tribal disputes for resources
  - Build Gov't Madrassahs to dissuade use of radical madrassahs in Pakistan
  - Build Gov't Mosques in each district to defeat Taleban message that GIRA is not religious
 - Crime needs to be addressed through policing

Terrorism
CT

Insurgency 40%
COIN

Criminality
Rule of Law

Communal Conflict 60%
Peace Enforcement

Build Infrastructure … Human *and* Physical

- Human infrastructure is more critical than physical – mentor local leaders
- Good governance matters
- Help and protect those that help you

Information as the "Lens" in COIN

- Perceptions are Everything
  - We are losing the Information War.
  - *Sarposa Prison Break "Kandar about to fall, Kabul threatened"*
- Every operation sends a message
  - What is our compelling narrative?
- Mosques primary source of info
  - Friendly Mosques Need to be supported non-friendly need to be sidelined

"We need an information order with an operations annex"

Intelligence

"It is essential that Soldiers and policemen should be trained to get all the information they can by overt means... The main responsibility for developing background information rests with operational commanders and not with the intelligence organization."

Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* (1971)

Intelligence Underpins All Other Activities.

Successful COIN Practices

Population	By/With/Through HN	Security

Population
- Focus on population, its needs and security.
- Isolate insurgents from population.
- Provide amnesty & rehabilitation for those willing to support government.
- Conduct effective, pervasive & continuous information operations.

By/With/Through HN
- Encourage strong political and military cooperation and information sharing.
- Embed quality advisors and special forces with HN forces.
- Place HN police in lead with military support as soon as security situation permits.
- Expand and diversify HN police force.

Security
- Emphasize intelligence.
- Establish & expand secure areas.
- Deny sanctuary to insurgents.
- Protect key infrastructure.
- Secure host-nation borders.
- Train military forces to conduct COIN operations

Questions?