FUTURE WAR PAPER

Enduring Concepts for an Enduring Contest,
The Principles of War and the Timeless Nature of War Itself

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
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Vibrant professional communities not only reflect on how they interact with the society they serve, but also seek to improve their ability to render the unique services that grant them their *raison d'être*. Military journals capture emerging trends in technology, doctrine, and organization with the intent of informing, educating and improving the professional attributes of their readership. Journals also provide the forum for constantly testing and revalidating or modifying bedrock assumptions. Recently, a number of articles in the Naval Institute’s *Proceedings* have questioned the continued validity of the nine recognized *principles of war* without modification or wholesale change.1 Providing more fuel for the debate, the Joint Staff has prepared a white paper, *An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfighting and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century*, that among other things seeks to synthesize the existing *principles of war*, the *principles of war for Military Operations Other Than War* (MOOTW), and the *fundamentals of joint operations* into an inclusive framework of fundamentals suited for crisis resolution in the 21st century.2 The *principles of war* are actually quite modern, only existing in their current form since 1949, and have historically generated debates in regard to what terms should be used and in what manner each term should be defined.3 Just as the terms and definitions have changed in the past, the *principles* may change in the future, assuming there is a well founded reason and that the new term and/or definition is better than the one it replaces.

One premise for questioning the contemporary and future usage of the existing *principles* is the basis of their inspiration, the Napoleonic Age. Some question the utility of the *principles of war* as the profession moves beyond the Industrial Age, suggesting the Information Age demands a new vocabulary. Such a call for change would
necessarily have to demonstrate that the very character of war has changed since the current principles of war have long been able to accommodate changes in technology, doctrine and organization. Another call for change emerges from what is commonly referred to as the War on Terror (WOT), often characterized as something new, thus bringing into question the utility of something old—the existing principles of war—to adequately comprehend today and the future.

The current principles of war will serve well to the strategic horizons reflected in Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020). In their current form, the principles of war still take into account the nature of war as it exists and as the profession expects war to exist in the future. Only a few of the existing principles of war are being seriously debated; yet, in most cases, existing joint doctrine and definitions already take into consideration the supposed shortcomings of these principles in question. The Joint Staff’s white paper seeks to modify, replace, or add to the recognized principles of war in other ways not being debated in military journals. The Joint Staff’s proposal would result in a list of fundamentals no longer applicable at all levels of war and in no way better than the existing principles of war. Therefore, the current principles will, and should, continue to guide commanders from platoon-level to the White House.

There is another compelling reason for retaining the current principles of war in their current form. The existing principles of war will continue to serve perhaps an important function as a tool for the rigorous analytical study of the past. As the profession moves forward and transforms, all componencies—land, air/space, sea—require a common and simple language to communicate to one another; today’s principles fulfill that need. The nature of war has not changed, nor will it change in the
immediate future; it remains and will remain a human endeavor. The study of past
military events has benefited from the application of the principles of war; current
military operations and the study of recent operations will also benefit from the
application of these same principles. The principles of war remain remarkably capable of
dealing with sweeping societal and technological changes—the stuff of revolutions in
military affairs—and will still render valuable service in the 21st century.

Today’s principles of war—mass, economy of force, maneuver, offensive,
objective, surprise, security, simplicity, and unity of command—are ubiquitous in the
discourse of military professionals. They continue to serve a critical role in the
indoctrination and training of future practitioners of the military art by providing a means
of approaching past and present military matters. The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia
defines the principles of war as the “best effort of military thinkers to identify those
aspects of warfare that are universally true and relevant” with applicability at all levels of
war. In its premier statement of doctrine, FM 3.0, the Army views the principles as a
“guide” to commanders in combining all elements of combat power “to produce
overwhelming effects.” Like the Joint Encyclopedia definition, the Army believes the
existing principles are capable of spanning the spectrum of conflict—high intensity to
“operations other than war”— and the levels of war—tactical, operational and strategic
— but cautions that in and of themselves, the principles of war should never be
considered prescriptive for every situation. They are “the enduring bedrock” of Army
document but are not “a checklist.”6 The Marine Corps acknowledges its “warfighting
philosophy of maneuver warfare is rooted in the principles of war,” and like Army
document, it counsels against attempts at rote application since “successful application of
the principles requires a commander’s judgment, skill, and experience to adapt to constantly changing conditions and situations.”7 As used today, the *principles of war* come with a warning label that even Clausewitz would have blessed: Caution! Excellent ideas for discussing complex problems, but they require artistic application in accordance with the situation.8 A main ingredient in today’s doctrine, many of the *principles of war* appear to have unchallenged enduring value in the future.

The *principles* largely beyond debate in the military journals, but not beyond the scope of the Joint Staff quest to develop new fundamentals for the 21st century, are offensive, objective, simplicity, security, surprise, and maneuver. In their place the Joint Staff offers the following terms after combining the existing *principles of war* with the *principles of MOOTW*, and in some cases the *Fundamentals of Joint Warfare*: initiative, end state, understanding, safeguarding the force, shock, joint maneuver and tempo. In some cases the changes are more a question of semantics than substance. In other cases the result may be a useful definition for a commander at the operational and strategic level of war, but a definition of marginal or no utility at the tactical level of war for the foreseeable future.

The current principle of offensive particularly reflects themes of the *National Military Strategy 2004* (NMS2004) as a means to combat terrorists and rogue nations as the United States acts “to stop terrorists before they can attack again.”9 By definition, offensive action seeks to “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.”10 Yet seemingly concerned that offensive action alone may be viewed as an ends and means unto itself, the Joint Staff’s white paper proposes the fundamental of initiative. The new definition, “seize, retain, and exploit opportunities to impose friendly will by establishing the terms
and conditions of the action, and by forcing the adversary (if present) to react to them,” is more complex than the existing definition, using almost four times as many words to convey the same meaning.\textsuperscript{11} Substituting the current principle of offensive for initiative, a word that currently defines offensive, is unnecessary and the resulting definition is wordy. One would expect joint commanders to understand how defending does not mean surrendering the initiative if the defense shapes the enemy and sets the conditions for future offensive operations. There is no compelling reason to substitute the term initiative for offensive.

The proposal to substitute end state for objective also appears to be a question of semantics rather than necessity. The current purpose of objective “is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.”\textsuperscript{12} End state, as proposed, is defined as directing “every military operation toward a clearly defined and attainable objective that achieves intended strategic or operational outcomes.”\textsuperscript{13} The Joint Staff proposal builds on the existing definition but limits its utility by defining it at the operational and strategic levels of war, something commanders should be able to infer for themselves. Substituting end state for objective is unnecessary.

Simplicity, the preparation of “uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding,” remains especially relevant if one continues to accept war as an extremely complex human endeavor. Given \textit{NSM2004}’s recognition that rapid deployment and access will continue to depend on “regional alliances and coalitions,” an already complicated activity takes on an additional layer of complexity when one considers the cultural, linguistic and technological barriers that must be surmounted.
before the enemy is even considered. For the 21st century, the Joint Staff proposes understanding in lieu of simplicity. The new term is defined with the old definition but constrained to be only applicable at the operational and strategic levels of war. Understanding is defined as “know, comprehend, and share common relevant knowledge of the global battlespace to facilitate operational execution.” The definition is built on the promises of the Information Age that have not been fully realized and will be last achieved at the tactical level of war. In this instance the change is not one of semantics and there is the possibility of losing sight of the purpose and meaning of simplicity as it metamorphoses into understanding. Sharing is important, but military operations require direction in the form of orders. Those who may perhaps benefit the most from the admonishment of the principle of simplicity, those new to the profession of arms, would be denied its warning should it become the fundamental of understanding. Sharing information could easily be confused with passing information. Simplicity’s aim is to make sure that whatever is shared or passed in the form of orders is understood.

The events of 11 September 2001 spoke directly to the continued relevance of surprise and its reciprocal, security. Future adversaries will continue to gain access to the same technologies available to the United States, thus the relevance of these principles remains. Speed, an important concept in the transformation debate, is really a function of surprise. Proposed modifications for the principles of security and surprise are the best examples of attempts to replace useful terms and definitions with poor substitutes. Security, never permitting “the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage,” would be replaced with safeguarding the force. Whereas the current definition is succinct, the new definition leaves latitude for the imagination as it compels the commander to “protect
friendly forces from adversarial surprise or from the potential effects of other detrimental developments.”¹⁷ Surprise becomes shock under the new-naming convention. The new definition uses thirty words to accomplish what seventeen words has done better for years.¹⁸

Some visions of the future may question the relevance of maneuver. Taken to the extreme, proponents of Network-Centric promise the ability of dispersed platforms to mass their effects, not only from a distance, but without maneuver.¹⁹ This possibility seems quite distant; even Hollywood’s all-seeing Matrix retains room for maneuver and JV2004 anticipates uncooperative foes willing to resist the United States’ effort to impose its will, creating the need for “dominant maneuver.”²⁰ Moreover, the Joint Staff’s white paper sees a need for joint maneuver, a concept that again shifts away from application at all levels of war.²¹

More hotly debated are the principles of mass, economy of force and unity of command. Mass is the leading candidate for those who seek to modify the principles of war. One proposal suggests replacing mass with the principle of persistent precision.²² Today’s definition of mass—the concentration of combat power—already takes into account the technological changes that have taken place since Waterloo. Mass incorporates the notion of “effects” in both time and space and is not limited to fires or the numbers of soldiers and tanks present on the battlefield.²³ If precision increases the ability to mass effects at the right place and time from beyond the reach of the enemy, so much the better. But it is by the cumulative effect that one seeks to break the will of the enemy; precision may be a force multiplier, but it remains subordinate to the principle of mass.
The current definition of mass has a deficiency. Just as firepower is ephemeral in that it “cannot hold ground,” so are its effects.\textsuperscript{24} In this respect the current definition of mass may need an adjustment that incorporates the notion of “persistency” if the United States continues to pursue Network-Centric warfare and Effects Based Operations. Even if the United States becomes more capable of replacing traditional mass with technology, conventional mass remains a viable recourse to potential adversaries, especially if they are willing to trade their lives for the time required to erode American will.\textsuperscript{25}

Economy of force, the acceptance of risk required to “achieve overwhelming effects” in the decisive place—strategic to tactical in scope—is directly linked to the principle of mass. Remaining true to Clausewitz’s dictum “that all available force must be used simultaneously” the contemporary definition of economy of force still demands that “all elements should have tasks to perform.”\textsuperscript{26} To change the principle of mass would require rethinking economy of force, which may be the most important idea in NMS2004’s “1-4-2-1” force design and size.\textsuperscript{27} JV2020 reinforces the notion of having only just enough of the right things at the right place and time using focused logistics to achieve operational objectives.\textsuperscript{28} The Joint Staff’s proposal to combine mass and economy of force into a single term—application of combat power—risks diluting the inherent strength found in the reciprocal relationship present in mass and economy of force.\textsuperscript{29}

Calls to substitute unity of command with unity of effort ignore the role of the principles as guides for commanders from the tactical to the strategic level of war.\textsuperscript{30} Clausewitz defined war as the continuance of policy with other means, but not divorced from the other elements of national power—economic, informational and diplomatic—
cited as a reason for changing from unity of command to unity of effort.\textsuperscript{31} Undeniably, an increased role of non-military elements of national power will be required to win the WOT and this is reflected in \textit{JV2020} and \textit{NMS2004}.\textsuperscript{32} Recent general officer interest in developing new processes and organizations to better bring non-military elements of national power to bear on current problems speak to this growing consensus.\textsuperscript{33} However, the concept of unity of command already captures the essence of what is sought with unity of effort—the ability to plan, direct, coordinate, and above all make decisions.\textsuperscript{34} Ultimately, one person, the commander regardless of level of war, has to orchestrate the effort to achieve the desired objective, regardless of the means employed. The \textit{principle} of unity of command does not need to be changed, but organizational adaptations made to ensure unity of effort must continue.

Beyond changing the existing \textit{principles}, there are calls to add tempo, simultaneity, and will. The Joint Staff’s white paper calls for the additional fundamental of tempo, a derivative of converting maneuver to joint maneuver.\textsuperscript{35} Tempo is defined as the ability to “establish and control the timing, cycle, sequence, reach, and intensity of an operation to best exploit friendly capabilities against adversaries and situations.”\textsuperscript{36} What this definition really does is further define how a commander might employ maneuver or the offensive. Defining tempo and adding it to the list of fundamentals is another instance where the Joint Staff’s proposal doubts the judgment and experience of the commander. Tempo provides more direction lest the commander forget to apply artistic talent when using the \textit{principles of war} to think about, plan or execute war at any level.

Simultaneity, as described in the article calling for its addition, amounts to little more than mass as it is currently defined or an expression of economy of force with every
asset being employed. The *principles* of surprise and mass already facilitate discourse on the concept of lockout, the objective of Network-Centric Attack, thus making simultaneity redundant.

Adding the concept of will to the current list of *principles of war* seems superfluous. The profession of arms’ very identity is inextricably linked to imposing the nation’s will on those who oppose the United States. Winning the struggle of competing wills, Clausewitz’s wrestlers attempting to throw one another without being thrown themselves, is the purpose of the profession of arms. The *principles of war* lend help in getting to that objective, but is it necessary to restate the objective? The Joint Staff’s white paper derives its call for the inclusion of will in its list of fundamentals from the MOOTW *principle* of perseverance. By definition, the white paper’s proposal views will as it should be seen, in the realm of strategy, thus adding a fundamental no longer universally applicable at all levels of war.

More disturbing is the line of reasoning followed in one particular *Proceedings* article. John Morgan and Anthony McIvor offer that “will is often the deciding factor in combat and war.” Their evidence is a series of historical examples including the Spartans at Thermopylae, the American Revolution, and Guadalcanal. They also cite the perceived overall effectiveness of the recent “shock and awe” campaign carried out against the Iraqis in 2003. The examples are too simplistic. It is true that the colonists’ will was superior to the will of Great Britain, but the crown had to weigh the value of fighting in America in the context of a global war with greater economic interests elsewhere. Did the Japanese lose at Guadalcanal because the United States broke their will, or did effective interdiction coupled with fierce fighting destroy the Japanese
capacity to continue fighting? Imposing one’s will does not necessarily mean breaking
the will of the opponent. The will to resist may endure beyond the means to resist. Did
“shock and awe” break the will of the Iraqi people, or did it compel them to fight on
using different means? Breaking the will of the adversary is a laudable goal, but
imposing one’s will is the objective of war. Leonidas may have had a superior will at
Thermopylae, but the mass of Xerxes’ army ruled the day.

The current principles of war need no additions, nor do they require major
modification to satisfy the needs of today’s profession or the future as portrayed by
JV2020 and the NMS2004. Many of the revised terms and definitions proposed by the
Joint Staff’s white paper restate what the existing principles of war already say. Other
proposed changes are unnecessary because existing doctrinal terms already address the
very issues cited for inspiring revision.

As JV2020 looks to the future it also cites the need for “a Total Force composed
of well-educated, motivated, and competent people who can adapt to the many demands
of future joint missions.” It further views training and education of the joint force as
the “linchpin of progress from vision to experimentation to reality” since “intellectual
change” is the basis of the doctrinal, organizational and leadership changes required for
“a joint team capable of success across the full range of military operations.” The
principles of war will continue to play an important role in the education of all officers
and serve the armed forces well as they transform. Even so, some will still question the
relevance of ideas borne out of the Napoleonic Age and carried forward through the
Industrial Age and into the Information Age.
Ironically, those who deride the current *principles of war* as being Napoleonic miss the point that technology’s aim is to restore the Napoleonic battlefield—one on which the commander can survey all of his and the enemy’s forces less the “fog.” Common Operating Pictures may one day make the commander’s view of his battlespace more akin or better than Napoleon’s view at Austerlitz, even allowing commanders to penetrate friction-causing atmospheric conditions such as fog. However, until Network-Centric warfare has matured and provides perfect situational awareness from an all seeing sensor grid, there will still be a need for geniuses with the *coup d’oeil* described by Clausewitz. Recent scholarship by historian Jon Sumida suggests that what Clausewitz hoped to achieve with *On War* was a method of learning to facilitate educating the mind of the commander. Among the critical elements of this educational process was the use of “simple and straightforward” language. In a world of evolving TLAs (three letter acronyms), the Army’s belief that the *principles of war* hold their “greatest value” for the “education of the military professional” remains true to the notion of simple language. The principles still have an important role to play not only in helping to educate the profession about where it has been, but also by providing a common language for thinking about the future.

As a derivative of Napoleonic warfare, today’s *principles of war* are a relatively modern invention in relation to human history and war, yet they have proved remarkably applicable for the study of war predating their development. They have also met the demands of changing technology since they first appeared in the early nineteenth century. The Korean War proved even nuclear weapons did not eclipse the utility of the *principles of war*. It is not that the *principles* should never be changed, but care must be used to
avoid falling victim to an exciting “buzzword” in place of an enduring principle. Capability-Based Planning (CBP), a concept for organizational transformation within an environment of uncertainty and economic restraints, seeks to meet myriad threats by having on hand the right building blocks—airplanes, units with specific capabilities and equipment, ships. CBP assumes the assembly of various “blocks”—task organization that will inevitably reach across service boundaries—for mission accomplishment. Putting the blocks together is “old hat,” but having the organization, doctrine, command and control, and training for rapid and flexible assembly is not. New terms and radically new definitions do not lend themselves to the already complicated task of fielding new concepts like CBP; putting the purple blocks together will be much easier for all involved if the profession continues to refine and build on existing joint doctrine so heavily influenced by the principles of war.

The WOT is just that, a war. Terrorism, the use of violence or the threat of violence directed at non-combatants with the goal of breaking the civilian population’s will, has taken many guises throughout history. Al Queda may be a non-state actor, but its use of terror techniques to impose its will on those it attacks is Clausewitzian, however asymmetrical in the form it takes. The WOT, albeit not always a contest between states, is no less deserving of the application of the same helpful language, concepts and ideas encapsulated in the principles of war. Those who characterize the WOT as a new type of war and see this supposedly new war as a basis for questioning the principles of war are guilty of not critically examining the history of warfare.

One claim is that “battle space has expanded dramatically” and that the enemy is willing to seek “cover and concealment” among the civilian population. The Second
World War defined extensive battlespace. One can hardly draw a distinction between the ongoing urban fight in Iraq and Napoleonic struggles in Saragossa or Industrial Age bloodlettings in places such as Stalingrad, although it could be argued that the urban battles of the 21st century have been less sanguinary. Suggesting the nature of war has changed because the enemies of the United States make no distinction between combatants and civilians is grossly myopic. The Cold War’s strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) offers a very recent example of an unwillingness to distinguish between warriors and noncombatants. What perhaps is new is the ability of a terrorist equipped with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) to inflict more significant casualties, panic, and disruption with an asymmetrical attack. What is not new is the notion that weaker states or non-state actors will continue to search for asymmetrical means to overcome military, diplomatic, economic and informational advantages of the United States.

Even though the President declared that the WOT would not have beaches to storm, islands to conquer or battle lines, the United States and its allies have already invaded two nation states and replaced their governments. There is little new about the WOT in its characteristics or objectives in the myriad theaters that make up the collective effort. The WOT in its current form offers no reason to change the existing principles of war. Placing terrorism beyond the pale of war, and thus beyond the conventions of war, “would ultimately be self-defeating.” The use of passenger laden jet airplanes as guided missiles represented a new means of carrying out an aged technique, terrorism, but does not present a new form of war. Ongoing conventional military operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan do not defy the principles of war even though they are being conducted as parts of the larger WOT.

There is no compelling reason to change, modify or abandon the current principles of war. They have never provided a formula for success in the classroom, or in the field, but they will continue to provide the profession a means to think about what has happened in the past and how to organize its thoughts for war in the present. Rather than abandon existing terms and definitions or creating new ones, especially during the ongoing “transformation,” the profession of arms should strive for better communication and understanding inside and outside respective services. The definitions of today’s principles of war remain relevant today and as NMS2004 and JV2020 envision it in the future.

The WOT is not as new or unique as it is sometimes characterized, but institutionally it is viewed as an affair that will require a vast amount of time and resources that include military power, but also many other aspects of national power. Let the United States win this generational struggle with the same tools that have brought success in the past: creative and flexible thinking, maximum use of emerging technologies, and a resolute belief in the complexity of war as a human endeavor that is inherently unpredictable. Let the profession of arms continue this struggle with a proven vocabulary rather than inventing new ways to say the same things. Let the debate continue; when there are more compelling reasons to change the existing principles of war or eliminate them altogether the profession of arms should do so. That time has not arrived.
Notes


6 Ibid. p. 4-11, 4-12.


8 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 152. Speaking of indispensable nature of principles, rules, regulations and methods, Clausewitz cautions, as does current doctrine, that “none of these concepts can be dogmatically applied in every situation, but a commander must always bear them in mind so as not to lose the benefit of the truth they contain in cases where they do apply.”

10 An Evolving Joint Perspective, p. 47.

11 Ibid., p. 48. The current definition for offensive is six words, “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.”

12 Ibid., p. 46.

13 Ibid., p. 47.


15 An Evolving Joint Perspective, pp. 53-54.

16 NMS2004, p. 6, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000), p. 5, hereafter cited as JV2020. Those citing the emerging Information Age as reason alone to change from what they refer to derisively as the Napoleonic and Industrial Era could learn something from Clausewitz about the enduring nature of war in regard to surprise. Even in Clausewitz’s day, before the advent of satellites, CSPAN, and the twenty-four hour news cycle, it was hard for nations to achieve strategic surprise; the signs of a build up or diplomatic maneuvering were there if one knew how to read them. For Clausewitz, surprise was really a function of speed and the enemy’s inability to comprehend. On War, p. 198. In regard to speed, see Arthur K. Cebrowski and Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The American Way of War,” Transformation Trends, 13 January Issue (Arlington, Virginia: Office of Force Transformation), p. 3, accessed 28 August 2004 at http://www.av.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-thry.htm3#cebrowski.

17 An Evolving Joint Perspective, p. 52.

18 Ibid. Surprise: strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared (17 words). Shock: Strike adversaries at unexpected times and places and in manners for which they are not physically or mentally prepared, by the direction, nature, timing, boldness, and force of the attack (30 words).


20 JV2020, pp. 2, 5.

21 An Evolving Joint Perspective, p. 50. Joint maneuver seems to apply only at the operational and strategic levels of war. It would seem that once smaller units, tactical units, were thoroughly joint the very need for the adjective joint would cease to exist. Hence, the fundamental of joint maneuver would revert to the principle of maneuver since it would once again be applicable at all levels of war as they are defined today.

22 Morgan and McIvor, “Rethinking the Principles of War,” p. 36.

23 FM 3.0, Operations, p. 4-13.


26 FM 3.0, p. 4-13 and Clausewitz, On War, p. 207.

27 NMS2004, p. 18. “1-4-2-1” force size and design concept calls for the United States to be able to defend the United States, deter aggression in four regions, fight two “swift defeat” campaigns, and “win decisively” in one of the two campaigns.

29 An Evolving Joint Perspective, pp. 48-49.

30 Ibid., p. 51 and Morgan and McIvor, “Rethinking the Principles of War,” p. 36.

31 Clausewitz, On War, p. 87, emphasis added and Morgan and McIvor, “Rethinking the Principles of War,” p. 36.

32 Ibid., p. 24 and NMS, p. 7. NMS2004 contains three strategic principles: agility, decisiveness, and integration. The proliferation of special principles—strategic, joint operations, operations other than war—is in some ways an even better argument for not tampering with the nine basic principles of war.

33 The Marine Corps Association and Naval Institute Forum 2004, 7 September 2004, Crystal City, Virginia, General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

34 Jv2020, p. 37.

35 An Evolving Joint Perspective, p.45. The Joint Staff’s white paper also proposes the addition of the fundamentals of will and legitimacy, derived from the principles of MOOTW, and sustainability and adaptability, derived from the fundamentals of joint warfare.

36 An Evolving Joint Perspective, pp. 50-51.

37 Morgan and McIvor, “Rethinking the Principles of War,” pp. 36-38. The authors cite Mark Thompson, “Opening with a Bang,” Time, 17 March 2003, which describes the impact of precision guided munitions falling across the breadth of Iraq in the van of advancing forces. It also cites how “simultaneity” became a Pentagon buzzword.


39 An Evolving Joint Perspective, pp. 53-54.

40 Morgan and McIvor, “Rethinking the Principles of War,” p. 36.

41 Ibid.

42 Jv2020, p. 10.

43 Ibid., p. 43.

44 Contrary to accepted wisdom, it would seem that Clausewitz really did mean the weather condition and not friction when he spoke of “fog.” Fog might cause friction, but friction is not synonymous with the weather condition. See Eugenia C. Kiesling, “On War Without the Fog,” Military Review (September-October 2001): 85-87.

45 Clausewitz, On War, p. 103.

46 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, “The Relationship of History and Theory in On War, The Clauswitzian Ideal and Its Implications,” The Journal of Military History, 65 (April 2001): 233-234. Sumida does not argue that Clausewitz was arguing for the modern principles of war nor does the author suggest he was. On another note, Sumida would whole heartedly disagree with this paper’s use of the word “Clauswitzian” since it
differs dramatically with his own definition, a reference to a way of learning, not a way of describing the nature of war.

47 FM 3.0, *Operations*, p. 4-12.


50 Morgan and McIvor, “Rethinking the Principles of War,” p. 35. The same type of misguided language is expressed in *JV2020*.

51 Ibid.


53 For just a sample of the “war on terror” rhetoric see the following articles and public statements: “President Bus Affirms War Effort,” 19 July 2002, FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database, “President Chirac Pledges Support, Remarks by President Bush, and President Chirac of France in Photo Opportunity, The Oval Office,” 19 September 2001, FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database. Ironically, President Chirac echoed President Bush offering “that now we are faced with a conflict of a completely new nature” and that the terrorists were “attempting to destroy human rights, freedom, the dignity of man.” The same easily could have been said about Hitler and Nazi Germany. “Myers Says Terrorism May Be Greatest Threat U. S. Has Faced,” 25 September 2003, FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database, and “Rumsfeld: Americans Will Stay the Course in the Terror War,” 25 September 2003,” FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database.


55 Ibid.
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