MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

TITLE: BUILDING OPERATIONAL LANGUAGE EXPERTISE IN DOD OFFICERS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

ACADEMIC YEAR 2005-2006

Mentor: _______________________________________
Approved: _____________________________________
Date: _________________ ______________________
**Report Documentation Page**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Building Operational Language Expertise in DoD Officers

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THESIS: DoD officers require a different educational background than the traditional technologically based one in order to better prepare them for success on the modern battlefield. This background should be humanities based emphasizing cultural understanding enabled through foreign language education.

DISCUSSION: Based upon ongoing military operations around the world in 2006, there is a starkly recognized need for enhanced cultural appreciation by Department of Defense (DoD) personnel. From Afghanistan, to Iraq, to the Philippines, to the Horn of Africa, broader spectrums of military officers have enmeshed themselves in other cultures during operations. One may accept that this pattern of military contact will remain the norm for the near future. Those military members tasked with leading the way in this challenging environment, officers, require a different educational background than traditionally emphasized. Part of this background should include foreign language expertise, a skill that is a force multiplier for the joint force commander during military operational planning and execution. There are at least three broad strategies the DoD can implement to build a new foreign language foundation for its officers; modify the educational emphasis of officer accession programs, continue to develop language sustainment programs, and examine possible technological enhancements to operational foreign language use.

CONCLUSION: During the most recent fifteen years since 1991, the U.S. military has engaged indigenous populations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Iraq, and Indonesia during major operations. For this broad spectrum of contact, the U.S. military needs officers with an educational background enabling their effectiveness on the cultural terrain of modern contested spaces. A key enabler of this effectiveness is a strong measure of foreign language expertise that is best achieved by transforming the desired educational background for the majority of new officers from technical to humanities based.
PREFACE

My interest in the topics of cultural understanding and the way in which foreign language expertise enables that understanding began during my early education. After high school French courses and an undergraduate French minor at the United States Air Force Academy, I had a basic understanding that knowledge of a foreign language provides insights into a native culture. I cemented that understanding following my French education at the Defense Language Institute and tour as a personnel exchange program officer in Quebec, Canada from 2001-2004. My ability to understand and speak French opened doors professionally and personally that I saw closed to other exchange officers who did not have a good command of the native language spoken by Canadian Forces personnel at my duty location. By combining this background with SAW’s curriculum on cultural understanding from historical case studies and planning problems, I wanted to contribute to current DoD efforts towards enhancing cultural understanding through language education for military officers.
Based upon ongoing military operations around the world in 2006, there is a starkly recognized need for enhanced cultural appreciation by Department of Defense (DoD) personnel. During major combat operations as those envisioned in the past on the rolling terrain of northwest Europe, or those that actually occurred for limited objectives in the open desert of Kuwait, the U.S. military did not emphasize cultural appreciation for all but a small segment of the force. However, most American military operations in the middle to late 1990’s involved extended contact with indigenous populations much more so than with regular or even irregular combat formations. From Somalia, to Haiti, to Bosnia and Indonesia, larger and more varied elements of the U.S. military found themselves engaged in fulfilling basic needs like governance, security, and nutrition in their areas of operations rather than engaged in traditional combat tasks. These operations existed under the aegis of some sort of coalition where English was just one of many languages spoken by members of that coalition, not to mention the varied non-governmental and private voluntary organizations (NGO and PVO) operating in the same area. Military involvement in such operations increased dramatically in 9/11’s wake. From Afghanistan, to Iraq, to the Philippines, to the Horn of Africa, broader spectrums of military officers have enmeshed themselves in other cultures during operations. One may accept that this pattern of military contact will remain the norm for the near future. Those military members tasked with leading the way in this challenging environment, officers, require a different educational background than that traditionally emphasized.

The Department of Defense accesses officers through three broad sources: the service academies, the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), or an officer training school (OTS).* Two of the sources, the academies and ROTC, have traditionally emphasized scientific and technological degree programs for their graduates. While officers’ strong technical and scientific

*OTS here is a generic term meaning a formal service officer accession school
backgrounds have enabled American military technological superiority, current and most probable near-term, operations demand a much different educational background. A strong education in cultural studies will better enable future officers for success on the modern battlefield where they more often have contact with civilian populations than with enemy military forces. A major component of these cultural studies is a foreign language expertise that officers should acquire or possess during military entry and sustain throughout their career.

**Operational Goals of Foreign Language Training**

The United States government (USG) conducts foreign policy using diverse means, including military forces. Since 1990, the U.S. military has been engaged in almost every continent on the globe as part of the USG foreign policy apparatus. During these commitments, they have made contact with many different cultures with dissimilar languages. National leaders once again realized that effectively operating in another culture and with its native language was an important skill for military officers. Apparently, some military officers were not up to the task and civilian leadership took notice. For example, in May 2004 the U.S. House Armed Services Committee (HASC) wrote in House Report 4200 that it was “concerned that the education and training provided to officers both before commissioning and throughout their careers may not adequately prepare military leaders with the skills needed for [Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom] and similar future operations.” They thus recommended enhancement of language and regional studies for the officer population.¹

Take note of the qualifier “once again” in the above paragraph. This is not the first time in American military history that the USG found officers wanting in cultural awareness. From the U.S. Army’s first implementation of civil affairs (CA) personnel during the 1943 allied occupation of Sicily, the occupation of Germany and Japan post-WW II, through American
military involvement in Vietnam there has been a background clamor for U.S. military personnel with better foreign language skills than available at the time. One may wonder why this is so. How can foreign language expertise in military officers provide operational advantages to combatant commanders?

**Operational Goals during Planning**

Foreign language skills can be force multipliers for the joint force commander during military operational planning and execution. The link between planning joint operations and language may be difficult to discern, but not if one accepts that knowledge of a culture’s language can provide insights into that culture. In other words, foreign language expertise is a contributor to cultural IPB. As Professor Kurt Muller, formerly of the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterrey, California has argued, language is of equal importance to political and philosophical influences of a particular culture when trying to understand that culture.² Similarly, a Naval Postgraduate School English professor responsible for teaching foreign officers asserts, “it is not just a matter of learning the grammar structures, the slang, the military language, or when to shake hands, remain seated, initiate conversation. It is more a matter of how to perceive and then master the concepts behind the new language and behavior, and to interpret and imitate the multiple layers of social behavior which unconsciously drive native speakers (emphasis added).³ For the military officer, foreign language expertise specifically enhances cultural IPB in the same way that knowledge of an enemy’s political outlook and goals or of his general worldview will enhance the same IPB; language is an important and complimentary source of understanding. While language’s influence on operational planning may be challenging to grasp concretely, an officer’s foreign language capability during military operations is altogether clearer.
Operational Goals during Operations

During the U.S. military’s current major operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, foreign language skills are proving critical to successful operations. In Afghanistan, special operations forces (SOF) worked directly with Northern Alliance formations during the beginning of OEF to defeat the ruling Taliban in a remarkably short period. A Sciences Applications International Corporation (SAIC) language study claims that part of their success is traceable to the fact that even though most didn’t speak the native language, just the fact that they had a strong background in linguistic and cultural studies enabled the SOF operators to quickly bond with their allies. This bonding helped set the conditions for their success.4 As coalition conventional forces transitioned from Phase III (major combat) to Phase IV (stability) operations during OIF, contact with local Iraqis significantly increased. Ground combat commanders from platoon level and up found themselves one day on a combat footing, and the next day as de facto local government officials performing duties analogous to those performed by U.S. occupation forces in Germany and Japan following WW II. For the most part, these officers had limited modern foreign language skills, instead relying on interpreters to accomplish their mission.

If officers involved in governance had some foreign language expertise, perhaps not even Arabic, at the very least they would have been able to establish a greater bond with the populace. At least one philological expert, J. Vendryes, noted that one of man’s unique social traits is to find a common ground with others living in his same community, and that language plays an important role in this dynamic.5 The previously cited SAIC language study suggests that understanding one culture, partly through language study, more readily prepares an officer to be sensitive to cultural constraints in a different culture, better enabling him to guide subordinate behavior and work with local authority figures.6 Through a common language, officers directly
involved with stability operations would help cement a linkage with local officials, an important element in stabilizing their AO. If one accepts the previous examples as models for military operations during the next decade, a significant question is what can the DoD do today in order to reap cultural awareness benefits during future operations?

**Standards and Methods of Officer Foreign Language Training**

Following a two year examination of the department’s foreign language expertise requirements in light of current operations and national security strategy documents, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) published the *Defense Language Transformation Roadmap* (DLTR) in January 2005. The DLTR established four interrelated goals for meeting the department’s needs:

1) Creating a foundational language and regional area expertise

2) Creating the capacity to surge foreign language training in response to anticipated operations

3) Establishing a cadre of language professionals possessing an Interagency Language Roundtable proficiency of 3/3/3* in reading/listening/speaking while addressing language requirements below 3/3/3

4) Establishing a process to track the accession, separation, and promotion rates of military personnel with language skills and foreign area officers (FAOs).* These goals are complimentary, but the first goal is the key enabler. Once the department has a strong foundation of language expertise, the capacity to surge both in depth and in breadth becomes easier. There are at least three broad strategies the DoD can implement to build the foundation required by the DLTR; modify the educational emphasis of officer accession programs, continue to develop language sustainment programs, and examine possible technological enhancements to operational foreign language use.

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* See Appendix 1 for explanation of numbering system
Transforming Officer Foreign Language Education during Pre-Commissioning

From a military operational perspective, the goal of officer education and training is to produce a more effective military officer capable of executing assigned missions across all spectrums of operations. A useful term to describe foreign language requirements during these assigned missions is *operational language expertise*, meaning having the requisite foreign language proficiency to produce direct benefits when planning and executing military operations. A defense attaché having foreign language expertise is not OLE, but having the same expertise in an infantry officer is OLE. An important subsidiary of this definition, as inferred from the DLTR, is that not all officers require the same level of OLE. For example, USAF space operators, USA pilots, or USN submariners do not need great depth in a foreign language. One may assume limited resource expenditures to get such categories of officers to an OLE of 1/1/1 (common notation for listening, reading, and speaking from Appendix 1), thus meeting the foundational breadth goal of the DLTR. Military specialties such as ground combat officers, civil affairs officers, intelligence officers and engineer officers require higher OLE skills to be effective. For example, an infantry company commander might require an OLE of 3/3/2 in order to execute effectively during stability operations. There are non-trivial challenges to increasing foreign language expertise for these officers, most significantly due to the type of officer traditionally sought by the service components.

The large number of military officers in the Defense Department makes it difficult to build an expert language foundation from existing personnel. A more effective, long-term solution is transforming the type of initial entry officer accessed by the department. Requiring a targeted level of foreign language expertise upon initial commissioning, regardless of the source, is the best way to begin building the language foundation in order to have an expert language
force by 2015. Each of the commissioning sources provide unique challenges and require unique responses.

Of all the commissioning sources, the DoD has the most leverage in how to produce a “new” language-savvy officer at the service academies. Presently, they all focus on producing career-minded officers with a strong moral, academic, and leadership background, with unique curricula reflective of their parent service’s roles and missions. However, none of them currently places a strong emphasis on foreign language education. The United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) does not have any foreign language requirements in its core curriculum, instead requiring either 0, 6, or 12 semester hours (0, 2, or 4 semesters) of foreign language depending upon the cadet’s major. Generally, the “hard sciences” do not require any foreign languages (including civil engineering). The 2005-2006 Course Curriculum Handbook recommends that foreign language courses be complete after the sophomore year even for those disciplines requiring 12 semester hours. The United States Military Academy (USMA) 2005 Curriculum (inclusive of the 2008-graduation class) requires cadets to take only two language courses as part of its core curriculum. Foreign language courses then fluctuate numerically depending upon the chosen course of study. Like USAFA, for academic year 2005-06 the United States Naval Academy (USNA) does not have any core foreign language courses. Of its three broad academic major divisions, only the Division of Humanities and Social Sciences require midshipmen to take four semesters of a foreign language. Again like USAFA, the “hard sciences” do not require any foreign language courses for the enrolled midshipmen. A recent study shows up to 55% of midshipmen complete four semesters of a language as elective courses. However, the study expected that number to drop to 30-35% because of an increased demand for technical majors. Each academy offers majors in a foreign language as well as opportunities for selected students
to participate in extra-curricular language studies. As detailed, though, the current service
academy curricula do not support the goals of the DLTR and should undergo a revision to better
focus them on DoD requirements.

Transforming service academy curricula is a difficult endeavor. The academies design
their curricula to meet unique demands of their service, both in technical and in “officership”
terms. One requires a considerable impetus before changing academy academic requirements.
Traditionally that motivation is preparedness to deal with future operational military challenges.
As mentioned in the introduction, current and likely future military operations, coupled with the
DLTR goals, demand an officer with more mental orientation on cultural awareness than on
technology. The American military has a huge technological edge over likely competitors, what
it lacks is even parity in cultural awareness and OLE. What the DoD may require is a shift from
a general 60/40 split between technical and non-technical degree programs at the academies to
just the opposite, providing space in the curricula for more language and cultural education.

This motivation for change is not constant for each academy since current stability
operations do not bring significant numbers of Air Force or Naval officers in close, daily contact
with indigenous populations. Conversely, Iraqi, Afghani, and other indigenous peoples have
contact with Marine graduates of the USNA as well as graduates from West Point every day.
One strategy for modifying academy curricula to meet the DLTR goals would have all service
academies include foreign language courses as part of their core curricula, and would make a
targeted distribution of advanced language courses to certain cadets or midshipmen based upon
service needs and likely future career tracks. Even though the DoD has the most control over
service academy curricula, the majority of officers are accessed through either ROTC or OTS.
American universities, through ROTC, provide the majority of officer accessions; correspondingly, ROTC foreign language education has a broad impact on the DoD officer population. A unique challenge to increasing language education in ROTC exists because each university has its own language education requirements and infrastructure. As the SAIC study points out, not only do most colleges and universities in the United States not have foreign language graduation requirements, but Air Force and Navy ROTC programs emphasize science and engineering majors more than Army ROTC programs. Hence, added to the service-specific language requirement challenge is the challenge of having limited influence on individual university foreign language infrastructure. Only through indirect influence can the DoD transform the type of officer accessed through many ROTC programs and will simply have to demand that the new officer possess a requisite amount of foreign language skills prior to commissioning. Just as ROTC provides unique challenges due to a lack of direct DoD control over curricula, OTS has its own transformational challenges for the type of officer accessed.

The unique challenge to service language education arising from OTS revolves around the brevity of the program and the educational background of each officer candidate. Since officers commissioned through this source essentially arrive on a service’s doorstep with their education complete, the services have the least control over their foreign language education. Added to this is the short length of the program, which does not provide requisite time to add a foreign language sub-program to OTS. For this source, the services will simply have to require that the officer candidate begin OTS with some amount of foreign language expertise and, like ROTC, possess language skills prior to commissioning.
Responding to Pre-Commissioning Language Education Challenges

Largely due to challenges highlighted for ROTC and OTS, language education for officer candidates should be based upon likely military specialty. Like any other military endeavor, increasing language expertise should be an economy of force effort because of resource constraints. At the service academies, it may not be feasible to know their future specialty at the beginning of a cadet or midshipman’s junior year, but it is feasible to have at least some idea based upon varying factors such as service needs, student aptitude, and student desires. The service academies could then more effectively target their foreign language education, which will help minimize budget, instructor, and time constraints that would exist from providing every cadet or midshipman the same degree of instruction. Instead of linking language education to course of study, from junior year on the academies should tie it to likely post-graduation specialty. In this way, the academies could efficiently ensure an OLE of 1/1/1 across the board, with targeted graduates meeting higher OLE’s depending upon service needs. This will require the services to detail OLE’s for each of their officer military specialties

Since the services have limited control over university foreign language programs and must accept the education resident in their OTS candidates, they will have to modify their effort with these sources. Having at least some influence over ROTC cadet or midshipman chosen courses of study, the services could mandate for ROTC a similar program as at the academies. Using the same benchmark as the beginning of the cadet or midshipman’s junior year to determine likely military specialty, ROTC can require their future graduates most likely to require operational language skills to graduate with a higher OLE than their peers do. A challenge might arise if a particular university does not have a foreign language program of sufficient depth or if the cadet or midshipman’s degree program does not allow room for
language electives. In this case, the services may have to make a certain OLE a prerequisite for commissioning into certain military specialties. The solution for OTS may be the same; the services might have to restrict officer candidates without adequate OLE scores from certain military specialties. While modifying officer accession language emphasis will have the broadest long-term effect on DLTR goals, it would be incomplete without sustainment programs to embed a new military culture that values foreign language education.

*Sustaining Initial Foreign Language Education*

Currently, there are nascent foreign language sustainment processes throughout DoD as a result of the DLTR and growing recognition of the need for enhanced cultural awareness. Robust foreign language sustainment programs are a key embedding mechanism to emphasize language and cultural awareness throughout the department. The DLTR recommends sustainment programs such as distance/distributive-learning, language study inclusion in formal PME, and financial and promotion incentives. Essentially, the DLTR is requiring a major shift in DoD culture to view language expertise as a skill requiring maintenance on the same level as physical fitness standards or aviation proficiency. While this is not predominant in the department currently, there is one DoD component that does view language expertise this way.  

Generally, the only component of DoD that views language expertise as a perishable skill needing sustainment is USSOCOM based upon its mission areas and required ability to work with indigenous populations. As the DLTR now demonstrates, senior defense leadership recognizes that the entire DoD needs a similar culture, thus DoD could model one aspect of its strategy for increasing language expertise on a current USSOCOM strategy.

A September 2003 US GAO report detailing how USSOCOM was using distance/distributive-learning to provide its operators with language sustainment could serve as
the model for the entire DoD. This type of learning can help officers maintain proficiency in their language even if not exposed to it on a daily basis. Since the scope of increasing language expertise in accordance with the DLTR precludes language immersion for large numbers of officers, distance/distributive-learning is a good alternative. Some examples of this type of learning in the GAO report include an Internet-based learning support system from DLI, an initiative from the U.S. Army Intelligence Center called Broadband Intelligence Training System that USSOCOM believes can deliver on-demand language sustainment training, a language training simulation from DARPA, and mobile training teams.\textsuperscript{14} Since the availability and sophistication of distance/distributive-learning is only increasing, this medium is the best candidate to sustain the initial language expertise gained during new officer accession. One can imagine various types of media providing airmen, marines, sailors, and soldiers with foreign language sustainment training during pre-deployment preparation or while actually deployed on operations. Outside this surge capability, another forum for sustaining language education is during formal PME.

All the services now include foreign language classes at an increasing number of formal PME institutions. For example, the Marine Corps is teaching Arabic at its Command and Staff College and the USAF will include language and cultural studies at its Air War College, Air Command and Staff College, and Senior NCO Academies starting in the 2006-07 academic year.\textsuperscript{15} The ability to do so comes from the FY 07 DoD Budget, which includes $181 million in FY 07 and $760 million across the FYDP to increase foreign language training, pay, and personnel recruitment in order to “Prevail in Irregular Warfare Operations.”\textsuperscript{16} In addition to these formal PME institutions, all services should include language sustainment education in unit
training events and during informal, unit-level PME. One method to help ensure this local training occurs is to incentivize increased individual and unit language expertise.

To more successfully embed a language expertise culture, the DoD should employ traditional incentivizing methods. Historically, when large organizations want to change a culture they provide motivations for their personnel to adopt the new culture. Germaine to a language expertise culture, two general methods the DoD can use are financial incentives and professional advancement. Currently, the DoD pays Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP) to its personnel based upon their level of proficiency and whether or not their current assignment actually requires them to be language proficient. Both the DLTR and the SAIC report suggest modifying FLPP by more effective targeting and/or significantly increasing the incentive pay.

Regarding professional advancement, again both the DLTR and the SAIC report concur that the services should include designated language expertise standards as part of their officer assessment and promotion systems. For example, the SAIC report discussed the ramifications of requiring a standard of 2+/2+/2+ as part of command selection criteria, promotion to flag rank, and eligibility for certain assignments. Incentives as described would be strong cultural embedding mechanisms for military officer language expertise.

One Technological Solution

The final strategy for increasing OLE throughout DoD is through technological means. In addition to distance/distributive-learning that makes language education available to a broader DoD population, technology can assist in language use during operations. Given the growing availability of voice recognition software for commercial use, it is not difficult to imagine similar technology on the near-future battlefield. Note the following fictional future scenario.

Prior to conducting a cordon and search operation in a local village, a Marine platoon commander wants to meet with local influential civilians in order
to prep the battlespace and ensure his operation goes peacefully. Included in his personal gear is a new real-time translation technology that, via an earpiece, unobtrusive microphone, small microprocessor, and speaker enables him to converse directly with the local leaders without using a translator. As he speaks into the microphone in English, the microprocessor translates his speech in real-time and rebroadcasts it via a small speaker to the local leaders in their language. At the same time, the system picks up the leaders’ speech, translates it, and broadcasts it into the platoon commander’s earpiece in real-time. In this way, the commander can note facial expressions and get a much better sense of his impact on the leaders as well as their feelings towards him and his Marines; he is actually carrying on a conversation in another language assisted by technology.

Technology such as this would not supplant the real operational benefits described earlier that come from cultural and language studies. It would enable the lieutenant to operate in a language different from the one he studied at Annapolis, or might make him more confident and thus effective in his dealings with local groups. In this case, technology is an enabler, not a replacement for the cultural and language education described above.

**Conclusion**

During the fifteen years between the end of the Vietnam War and the first Gulf War in 1990-91, the U.S. military engaged indigenous populations during major operations in two areas, Lebanon and Central America. During the most recent fifteen years since 1991, the U.S. military has engaged indigenous populations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Iraq, and Indonesia during major operations. Additionally, it has conducted smaller operations in many other world regions. The DoD displayed its awesome technological superiority in relatively short, violent operations such as OPERATION ALLIED FORCE and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM I. Yet, on-going contact with local civilians, religious and political leaders speaking a language much different than English has taken up the majority of the U.S. military’s time during these past fifteen years. That trend is unlikely to change during
the next fifteen given our national security and national military strategy documents and policy statements by national leaders.

For this broad spectrum of contact, the U.S. military needs officers with an educational background enabling their effectiveness on the cultural terrain of modern contested spaces. There is not a short-term solution to the challenge since language education and sustainment is a time consuming process. The best strategy for the DoD, and one in line with the DLTR, is to transform our officer accession from one emphasizing technological undergraduate degrees to one emphasizing humanities degrees. The DoD still requires officers with strong undergraduate educations in technology related fields, but the manner in which the department will succeed on the modern battlefield demands officers with cultural understanding enabled by language expertise. The department will begin to construct its foundation of officer experts only by modifying the type of officer accessed through the various commissioning programs.

Sustainment programs must support the foundation in order to provide career-long opportunities for maintaining language proficiency. These programs run the gamut from distance/distributive-learning methods, mobile training teams, and a modification to career incentives. Technological enhancements as described above can enable language use during operations, but cannot replace the benefits from embedding a DoD-wide mindset that values cultural understanding as a key to success for future operations. If the DoD does not continue to emphasize this cultural shift, future operations will see U.S. military officers less effective during the current Long War and our cultural failings will offset whatever technological advantages we may enjoy.
## Appendix 1: Foreign Language Capabilities at Proficiency Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proficiency level</th>
<th>Listening</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Speaking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0+ - None</td>
<td>Understands certain memorized utterances in areas of immediate needs with extra-linguistic cues.</td>
<td>Reads alphabet or high-frequency characters; recognizes some numbers and isolated words.</td>
<td>Produces telegraphic utterances for immediate survival needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – Elementary</td>
<td>Understands basic survival utterances, simple questions and answers on familiar topics, and main ideas.</td>
<td>Reads simple, predictable material in print or type, identifies general topics.</td>
<td>Maintains very simple conversations on familiar topics; cannot produce continuous discourse unless rehearsed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Limited working</td>
<td>Understands routine conversations and discourse about familiar topics; gleans all the facts.</td>
<td>Reads simple, authentic, straightforward material on familiar topics; uses contextual cues.</td>
<td>Handles routine, high-frequency, limited interactions and conversations about current events, family, and common topics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - General professional</td>
<td>Understands essentials of all speech; grasps opinions and inferences.</td>
<td>Reads a variety of prose on unfamiliar subjects that may include opinions, hypothesis, and analysis.</td>
<td>Participates effectively in most formal and informal conversations about practical, social, and professional topics within a shared context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - Advanced professional</td>
<td>Understands all forms and styles of speech, even some non-standard dialects; develops and analyzes argumentation.</td>
<td>Reads fluently and accurately all styles and forms; grasps full ramifications of texts within wider contexts.</td>
<td>Uses the language fluently and accurately for all purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - Functionally native</td>
<td>Understands extremely difficult and abstract speech and how natives think as they create discourse.</td>
<td>Reads very difficult and abstract prose.</td>
<td>Commands language with complete flexibility and intuition; pronunciation consistent with that of an educated native speaker.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Notes

1 Fred Dolan, Elizabeth Mitchell, and Steve Rader, "Language and Regional Expertise in Officer Development," (Science Applications International Corporation, 2005), iii.
4 Dolan, Mitchell, and Rader, "Language and Regional Expertise in Officer Development," 5.
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18 "Military Training: Strategic Planning and Distributive Learning Could Benefit the Special Operations Forces Foreign Language Program," 33.