A NEW TWIST TO AN AGE OLD NAVAL TRADITION: THE MARITIME
STRATEGY AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND
MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS

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LCDR DAVID B. WAIDELICH

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Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member:
Approved: Yes
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Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member:
Approved: Cos
Date: 17 March 09

United States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Marine Corps University, 2076 South Street, Quantico, VA, 22134-5068

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Introduction

In October of 2007, the U.S. Navy released its new Maritime Strategy, *The Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower*. When the strategy was released, the United States faced complex and challenging situations around the globe. There was no longer a definitive enemy such as the Soviet Union but rather unconventional warfare against non-state actors. The Navy, drawing on the shift in the *U.S. National Security Strategy 2006*, drafted a document that called for it to develop six core competencies. The first four were “enduring capabilities” - forward presence, deterrence, sea control, and power projection and focused on the traditional, “hard power” aspects of the Navy. In an effort to enhance international cooperation and demonstrate America’s goodwill, the Navy introduced two new “expanded capabilities” – maritime security, as well as proactive humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The Strategy’s ability to balance the enduring “hard power” capabilities with a new emphasis on the expanded “soft power” made it a unique document.

While the Army and Marine Corps find themselves stretched fighting two ground wars in two theaters, the Navy’s reduced role in these conflicts has afforded them the opportunity to deploy units focused on building partnerships and administering aid. The Navy has begun executing this new Strategy and its subsequent “expanded capabilities” as a number of ships are underway as part of the Global Maritime Partnership initiatives and proactive humanitarian deployments. The Maritime Strategy stated, “preventing wars is as important as winning wars” and by executing these two new aspects of the Strategy, the U.S. Navy has met the complex and irregular challenges that face the maritime environment of today.¹
The Messina Earthquake of 1908

On December 28, 1908, at 5:20 in the morning, a massive earthquake struck the straits of Sicily. The carnage and devastation from the earthquake and subsequent tsunami that followed was catastrophic. Almost 80,000 lives were lost, 90% of the buildings were destroyed, and three cities lay in ruin. The Italian people and its government needed help in recovering from the worst natural disaster they had experienced in recent memory. The aid and assistance they would receive came from Italy’s conventional allies around the world. The most significant foreign contributor in this immense relief effort that would help Italy rebuild and recover would be from a most unlikely entity – the United States Navy.3

In 1907, in an effort to increase America’s influence around the world, President Theodore Roosevelt, sent 16 battleships on a mission to circumnavigate the world. His Great White Fleet was sent as a demonstration of America’s military strength and was extremely successful in this endeavor. The devastation that took place in Italy in December, 1908 gave the United States an opportunity to show the world a more diplomatic and compassionate side of the Navy.4

When the Messina Earthquake hit Sicily, a squadron of four battleships was exiting the Suez Canal. As news of the disaster reached the squadron, it diverted to the coast of Italy to offer assistance and supplies. In the effort that followed, the Navy delivered much needed food, medical relief, and supplies, as sailors were used on shore
to extract bodies and rebuild homes, shelters, and hospitals. The overall effort lasted a few months and is considered one of America's greatest humanitarian achievements.⁵

The unexpected response of the Great White Fleet to the Messina tragedy marked the genesis of a long tradition of response to natural disasters in the form of humanitarian assistance for the United States Navy. Since its inception, the Navy had offered aid while on the high seas. Rescues at sea, aiding vessels in distress, and transport of supplies had been a tenet of naval operations since the days of John Paul Jones. However, the response in Messina marked the first time the Navy had been used on foreign soil in such a role.⁶

Over the next century, as the Navy grew into a preeminent world naval force, it continued to respond in varying degrees to natural disasters around the world. Yet, almost a century after this first humanitarian endeavor, a similar catastrophic event took place that would mark the beginning of another new chapter in the Navy's role in humanitarian assistance – the Indonesian Tsunami of 2004.

*The Indonesian Tsunami of 2004*

On the 26th of December, 2004, a massive earthquake and subsequent tsunami struck the Pacific in the region of Southeast Asia. The earthquake's magnitude measured 9.0, one of the 10 greatest earthquakes ever recorded. Over 150,000 people were dead, 1 million displaced, and more than 26,000 missing. In terms of human suffering, it was the most destructive tsunami in history.⁷ The impact of its destruction reached countries from Thailand to India to Somalia; the greatest suffering took place in Indonesia. The devastation and suffering there was unimaginable as over 100,000 people perished in the country alone. In addition to the human toll, the tsunami caused inconceivable damage to
the infrastructure and the environment. Much of the coast of Indonesia lay in ruins and the fear of disease and epidemic necessitated an immediate and drastic response. The response came in a relief effort that would become one of the most challenging ever faced.

The relief effort, Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, was a multinational, inter-service, interagency venture led by U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) whose mission was to “prevent further loss of life and human suffering by expeditiously applying resources to the overall relief effort.” The Task Force created for the mission included the countries of Australia, Japan, Russia, Singapore, France, and Malaysia; the interagency and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) included United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Save the Children, and Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Yet, when the initial stages of the relief effort began, there was a unique challenge. Over 110 miles of coastal infrastructure were destroyed, creating an inability of aid to be transported to the disaster area via roads. With the dearth of access by land, the Navy became a key contributor as they were able to leverage their capabilities and resources from the sea.

When the Indonesian Tsunami occurred, the U.S. Navy had forces in East Asia but did not have any ships in the immediate area. Within, 10 days, there were 25 Navy ships and approximately 13,500 military personnel off the coast. Operating from a “sea base”, the Navy became a key player in organizing and executing the relief effort. Through coordination with the government and military of Indonesia, the U.S. Navy and its partners were able to deliver much needed materials, food, water, and medical treatment to the ravaged coastal population. UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, lasted almost two
months and by the end of the operation the Navy had delivered 10 million pounds of food and 400,000 gallons of water. Thousands of patients were treated on the hospital ship, USNS MERCY. In the end, the Navy’s goodwill had helped transform Indonesia’s attitude toward America.

The success of UNIFIED ASSISTANCE not only had profound effects on the people of Indonesia, but also was a stimulant for a new way of thinking about how to deploy naval assets throughout the world. Navy leadership began to realize that the lessons learned from UNIFIED ASSISTANCE would help shape thinking and strategy for the 21st century. A first area of focus dealt with the cooperative aspect of the operation. In January of 2006, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen published an article in which he discussed the concept of “The 1,000 Ship Navy.” “The 1,000 Ship Navy” is defined as “a global maritime partnership that unites maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies to address mutual concerns.” It does not purport 1,000 ships at sea, but rather promotes global capabilities and partnerships.

A second transformative aspect of the Tsunami relief effort was the overwhelming impact that the humanitarian effort had on the hearts and minds of those affected. Admiral Gary Roughead, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander during the operation, realized the effect his forces had on the region. The supplies and medical aid they provided were tangible actions that directly influenced the opinions of the population. Following the Tsunami, favorable opinions of the United States increased from 15% to 34%. Realizing the significance of this information along with positive feedback from leaders in the area, Navy leadership began to think that instead of reacting to such
disasters, what if the Navy proactively deployed ships whose primary mission was goodwill and humanitarian aid? How much good could be done and what impact would this have on the attitudes of the people who came in contact with these goodwill ambassadors from the United States Navy? With these two visions in mind, the origins of the new Maritime Strategy had begun.

The Maritime Strategy

"This strategy builds upon changes that have already been underway for some time, and formally endorses operations that we are already carrying out." – The Honorable Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy

Through much of its history, the United States has been a maritime nation and the Navy has played a prominent role in making it the preeminent world power it is today. Despite the focus on the ground conflicts being fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, the security of the maritime environment remains vital to global prosperity. The earth is approximately 70% water. Eighty percent of its population lives near a coast, and upwards of 90% of global commerce is transported via the sea. Due to the globalization of world economies, any disturbances in this flow of goods could have significant ramifications to a number of countries including the United States. It is evident that in order to serve its national interests, the United States must maintain a strong maritime presence throughout the world. Thus, the three maritime services, the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps, developed a strategy designed to enhance their ability to protect the nation’s vital interests.

There was not a relevant maritime strategy in place when the development of the current maritime strategy began in early 2005. The last maritime strategy was released in 1986 and was a Cold War centric strategy designed to defeat the Soviet Union. While
effective at the time, it provided no guidance for the complexities and multidimensional challenges of operating in today's maritime environment.23 In October of 2005, naval leaders from around the world met in Newport Rhode Island at the International Sea Power Symposium. It was at this conference that the discussions took place that led to the beginnings of the strategy.24 Many of the leaders at the conference had been the ones directly involved and impacted by the Tsunami Relief effort. The discussions they had demonstrated an increased international interest in the maritime environment and a call for cooperative efforts from international forces. From these talks, Navy leadership pressed forward with hopes to codify a strategy that would shape future operations. In addition to the input from the global community, the Navy realized the importance of collaborating with the mainstream leaders of America. Through a series of “Conversations with the Country”, they met with business, academic, and civic leaders and the shared ideas were instrumental in the strategy. From these “Conversations” it was apparent that the “American people [desired] their maritime services to remain strong, to defend the homeland, and to protect American citizens” as well as to cooperate internationally to secure national interests abroad.25 With these ideas in mind, the next two years were spent debating and discussing the strategy. Finally, at the 2007 International Sea Power Symposium, before a record attendance of 98 nations, including 94 chiefs of Navy and Coast Guards, The Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower was released.26

The Strategy marks the first time in history, that the three U.S. maritime forces - the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard – collaborated on the formulation and implementation of a maritime strategy. This collaboration served as an assurance that an
integrated approach would be taken to protecting the nation's vital interests. It builds on the core capabilities that have been a recent part of the service's maritime approach to operations. Forward presence, deterrence, sea control, and power projection were tenets of the maritime services outlined in numerous strategic whitepapers to include "...From the Sea" (1992), "Forward...From the Sea" (1994), and "Sea Power 21" (2001). The Strategy confirms that the Navy will be forward deployed and will act as a deterrent force capable of controlling the seas. Further it mandates that when access is denied or mission dictates, they are able project power both on the seas and on the shores. These warfare roles have been customarily accepted as what is traditionally expected from the Navy and have been "enduring capabilities...for centuries." While the explicit delineation of these core capabilities is an essential part of the strategy, it is not what makes this strategy a unique and distinctive document. Rather it is the strategy's ability to balance these core "hard power" capabilities with a new emphasis on cooperative "soft power" that makes it so innovative.

In addition to these "enduring capabilities" addressed, the strategy calls for the expanded capabilities of proactive maritime security as well as proactive humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These expanded capabilities support a key precept of the strategy that "preventing wars is as important as winning wars." Maritime security addresses the global economic systems dependence on the sea and the free flow of goods on and above the oceans. Without the freedom of shipping, whether from piracy, smuggling, terrorism, or other illicit activities, the global system is disrupted. The strategy clearly stresses the importance of "[joining] navies and coast guards around the world to police the global commons and suppress common threats." Through this
cooperation and collaboration, a maritime awareness can be developed and programs and initiatives can be developed to protect and preserve both national and international interests abroad. 32

In his testimony before Congress on the Maritime Strategy, current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead stated, “we also intend to pursue proactive humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”33 This second expanded capability, proactive Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR), is perhaps the most distinctive and innovative concept within the Strategy. As stated, the maritime services have traditionally responded to international crises and disasters, however, deploying ships with the sole mission of rendering goodwill and aid had never been done. In delineating this as a core capability, the strategy states “we will continue to mitigate human suffering as the vanguard of interagency and multinational efforts, both in a deliberate, proactive fashion and in response to crises.”34 The expeditionary nature of all three maritime services allows them to render assistance and aid in such a quick and unique manner in response to crises. In making this a proactive endeavor, the services will not only bring direct support and care to the international community, but perhaps more importantly, the global maritime services will develop relationships, procedures, and methods that will benefit future response operations.35 As the strategy states, “trust and cooperation cannot be surged”, and through these expanded capabilities the maritime services are building relationships so that “strategic interests of the participants are continuously considered while mutual understanding and respect are promoted.”36

These capabilities offer a new approach consistent with the National Security Strategy 2006 and National Defense Strategy 2008. These strategies clearly call on the
military to use diplomacy and soft power in coordination with traditional hard power capabilities in order to help shape the behavior and actions of the global community.\textsuperscript{37} They are also in accord with the new Presidential administration’s focus on diplomacy and multilateralism. The top leaders of President Obama’s national security team - Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton - share the same vision of how America will ensure peace both here and abroad. According to Secretary Clinton, “we know our security, our values and our interests cannot be protected and advanced by force alone nor indeed by Americans [alone].”\textsuperscript{38} Secretary Gates, in a November 2007 speech, argued for more funding for the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in an effort to “strengthen our capacity to use soft power and for better integrating it with hard power.”\textsuperscript{39} Perhaps most telling are the words of President Barack Obama when he said, “(I)n order to [assure prosperity] we have to combine military power with strengthened diplomacy and we have to build and force stronger alliances around the world so that we’re not carrying the burdens and these challenges by ourselves.”\textsuperscript{40} It is apparent that a renewed focus on balanced, multilateral approaches will be a prevailing part of the new administration’s approach to global affairs. With the Maritime Strategy’s focus on cooperative security and proactive HA/DR, the Navy is poised to contribute to the overall National Security Strategy for the coming years.
Strategy Implementation

"My guidance to the fleet is to execute our strategy." – Admiral Gary Roughead

A strategy is of no use unless it is put into action and thus the ability of the Naval service to implement the Maritime Strategy is the unique challenge faced by each service. When the Navy is deployed it is implementing the Strategy. Today’s fleet, whether combating piracy off the coast of Africa, flying combat missions over Afghanistan, or patrolling the ocean floors, is consistently engaged in the traditional core capabilities. Yet over the past several years, deploying assets in support of the expanded capabilities of maritime security and HA/DR have been much more prevalent. It comes as no surprise that the Navy has been able to focus on this aspect of the strategy. While the Army and Marine Corps find themselves stretched fighting two ground wars in two theaters, the Navy’s reduced role in these conflicts has afforded them the opportunity to deploy units focused on building partnerships and administering aid.

While the Navy has been able to focus on the soft power missions, they have also elected to deploy to regions whose conditions allow for such missions to take place. Since proactive HA/DR deployments began in 2006, the Navy has deployed ships to three primary Areas of Operations: South America, the west coast of Africa, and the Pacific. Because these regions are absent of intense combat operations, the Combatant Commanders have been able to focus on these type missions to improve social conditions and cooperative engagements.

In both U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and U.S. Southern Command (USSouthCOM), the value the interagency plays in their missions have garnered so much attention that their commands now incorporate representatives from various
interagency and NGOs. In fact, both commands have placed a senior State Department official to act as the deputy to the Commander. With this type of thinking and focus from the combatant commands, the Navy has received significant support in execution of its Maritime Strategy.

Though the Maritime Strategy was released in 2007, the Navy did not wait for its release to start implementing the expanded core capabilities. As noted, the genesis of the ideas surrounding cooperative engagement and proactive HA/DR, took place soon after the Indonesian Tsunami of 2004/2005 (See Table 1). As early as 2006, the Navy deployed one of its two hospital ships, USNS MERCY, on a proactive HA/DR mission as part of Pacific Partnership 2006. On its five month deployment, it revisited Indonesia, where it had deployed in response to the Tsunami in a continuing effort to “restore hope and spread goodwill to the region.” In spring of 2007, just prior to the release of the strategy, the catamaran HSV SWIFT deployed to the Caribbean and South American in the first deployment in support of cooperative engagement. These two deployments marked the beginning of the efforts of the Navy to execute the two soft aspects of the Maritime Strategy, HA/DR and Maritime Security Operations.

*Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief*

The U.S. Navy’s unique capability in rendering HA/DR is made possible by its 2 dedicated hospital ships, USNS COMFORT and USNS MERCY as well as its fleet of large deck amphibious ships. The hospital ship has been an intermittent part of the Navy’s inventory since 1918 and have predominantly been activated during times of war. The current ships, COMFORT and MERCY, were commissioned in 1986 and 1987 respectively. The ships are equipped with operating rooms, intensive care units, dental
services, optometry, and laboratory facilities. Through 2004, their deployments mainly consisted of supporting military operations, and disaster and refugee relief.\textsuperscript{46}

While the hospital ships are designed for HA/DR type missions, the Navy has begun to use their large deck amphibious ships in diverse ways to support its overall strategy. Large deck amphibious ships, typically used to carry elements of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) in preparation for combat operations, have played an integral part in executing the Maritime Strategy. As Marine units have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, the frequency of their deployments aboard naval vessels has diminished. With the reduced deployment on board amphibious ships, the Navy has elected to deploy the ships without the Marines and their usual complement of weapons and equipment and instead have deployed with medical equipment, construction vehicles, and medicine. Instead of Marines, the ships are deploying with doctors, nurses, and a “medical assault force.” While it is undetermined if these types of deployments will be part of the long term future of naval HA/DR missions aboard amphibious ships, they currently are filling the role quite effectively.\textsuperscript{47}

Since the first deployment of MERCY in 2006 and the release of the Maritime Strategy in 2007, the Navy has significantly increased the frequency of proactive HA/DR deployments (See Table 1). In 2007 and 2008 there were a total of four deployments conducted to South America and the Pacific and the Navy has committed to annual deployments to each region. Under the initiative Continuing Promise 2007, the COMFORT deployed to South America while Continuing Promise 2008 saw USS KEARSARGE and USS BOXER continue the mission. Currently, COMFORT is scheduled to redeploy to the region in 2009. The Pacific Partnership initiative has seen
two MERCY deployments and one deployment by USS PELILIU. In 2009, the USS DUBUQUE is scheduled to deploy to the region.\textsuperscript{48}

While the deployments have become a part of the naval rotation, it is important to understand exactly what these missions accomplish. The Continuing Promise 08 mission is to "conduct civil-military operations including humanitarian and civic assistance as well as veterinary, medical, dental and civil engineering support to six partner nations and to send a strong message of U.S. compassion, support and commitment to Central and South America and the Caribbean."\textsuperscript{49} In its five month deployment, KEARSARGE conducted missions in five nations: Nicaragua, Columbia, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. The crew included 150 military and Public Health Service medical professionals as well as host nation medical teams and NGOs. Overall, the team treated 47,000 patients, conducted 221 surgeries, treated 5,600 animals with veterinary care, dispensed 81,300 prescriptions, and conducted 198,600 medical, dental, and optometric services. In addition to these services, a team of military engineers built three schools and conducted 25 renovation and infrastructure projects.\textsuperscript{50} These numbers were just a continuation of the goodwill COMFORT delivered in summer of 2007 where 400,000 patients were treated and over 1,100 surgeries were performed.\textsuperscript{51} It is evident that the operations were particularly successful in helping to improve impoverished countries where leadership is often hesitant and distrustful of American intervention.\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{Maritime Security: Theater Security Cooperation and Global Maritime Partnerships}

When Admiral Mullen called on an increase in existing alliances and cooperative engagements with his "1,000 Ship Navy" concept, it marked a renewed emphasis on
collaborative maritime partnerships. This concept was soon codified in the Maritime Strategy. Later referred to as Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), it called for an increased emphasis in maritime security and was the impetus behind the major initiative that became known as the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) Concept.

In February 2008, the Navy released a GMP concept paper. This paper not only defined the concept, but also defined why it is needed, and helped identify how the concepts would be conducted. Its definition is as follows:

Global Maritime Partnerships is a new approach to cooperation among maritime nations with a shared stake in international commerce, safety, security, and freedom of the seas. GMP serves as a basis for building a global consensus on policy principles and for undertaking common activities to address maritime challenges by improving collective capabilities. Global Maritime Partners will seek opportunities to assist one another in using the sea for lawful purposes and legitimate commerce, while limiting use by those who threaten national, regional, or global security.

The GMP is not an official organization led by any particular country, but rather a voluntary organization amongst nations committed to supporting maritime security. In essence, it is an informal partnership focused on collaboration and exchanging best practices to foster maritime security. The Navy began to “operationalize” the concept when it began deploying units as part of Global Fleet Stations (GFS).

GFS came about in the Navy’s effort to support the GMP concept. A GFS is a small, adaptive force package that is deployed to facilitate partnerships in a region. Its size can range from one ship to a small flotilla consisting of four to five ships primarily focusing on shaping operations. By using the Navy’s sea basing capability, a GFS deploys to specific regions for an extended period of time and works to meet the needs of partner nations. Through training and working with these partners, the GFS aims to
bolster the effectiveness of maritime operations through the exchange of ideas and skills. However, perhaps the greatest benefit of the GFS is that it is able to do all of this while imposing a negligible presence ashore.56

The GFS is still in its infancy stages. There was one GFS deployment to the west coast of Africa in 2008 while another one is slated for early 2009 (See Table 1). In South America, there have been a total of four deployments since 2007.57 With the newness of such deployments, the Navy is still developing procedures on how to execute such missions. However, thus far, there has been very positive feedback in the effectiveness of these deployments.

SOUTHCOM has two initiatives which support the GFS concept, Partnership of Americas (POA) and Southern Partnership Stations (SPS). An annual operation, there have been three POA deployments since its initial deployment in 2006. These deployments focus on exercises and other training evolutions in an effort to improve coordination and interoperability amongst participating countries. The exercises, which focus on combating unconventional threats such as narco-terrorism and illicit trafficking, are carried out by traditional combatant ships to include destroyers and aircraft carriers.58

Where POA has emphasized exercises and other at sea events to work and train with other navies, SPS has taken a slightly different approach. SPS is a much smaller scaled operation whose primary mission is information sharing. It has used the HSV-SWIFT (High Speed Vessel), a 300 ft., wave penetrating catamaran as its primary vessel. A leased vessel with a crew of 45, the SWIFT deploys with embarked engagement teams from the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard as well as Naval Criminal Investigative Service and Information System technicians. Focusing on classroom training and hands-
on instructions, these teams train and mentor partner nation's defense forces, police departments and Coast Guards. Engagement teams instruct on a wide spectrum of topics including small boat operations, boarding techniques, search and rescue, marksmanship, martial arts, and port security. HSV SWIFT is currently conducting its second SPS mission as it is in the midst of a five month, seven country deployment throughout the Caribbean, and Central and South America. 59

Perhaps more significant and potentially under more scrutiny, is the Africa Partnership Station (APS) conducted off the west coast of Africa. APS is the Navy’s GFS initiative which, according to its mission statement, is designed to “build maritime safety and security capabilities in the Gulf of Guinea with partner nations using an at-sea training platform that provides persistent regional presence with a minimal footprint.” 60 Similar to its counterpart initiatives in South America, the Navy is using a combination of large deck amphibious ships, destroyers, submarines, and HSV SWIFT to accomplish its mission. 61

The first APS deployment took place in November 2007 through April 2008 where the goals, objectives, and outcomes were the similar to SPS and POA. The African maritime environment is extremely unstable. One quarter of the cocaine sold in Europe goes through West Africa and approximately 60% of the world’s human trafficking takes place in sub-Sahara Africa. The maritime capabilities of West African nations are extremely limited, making it very difficult for local navies to combat the illicit activities that take place on their waters. 62

Africa’s dangerous waters and insufficient protection provide a model environment for the Navy to make a difference with APS and by Navy standards the most
recent deployment was extremely successful. Seven countries were visited. 1,770 courses were given to over 1,500 students from 15 nations ranging from small boat operations to port security to maritime law. Eleven nations were represented on the APS staff to include six European and five African nations. Training took place aboard ships as well as host nation facilities. Finally NGOs, including USAID, Project HOPE, and the Wildlife Conservation Society assisted in community outreach programs delivering aid, training and hospital equipment. On an operational level, APS was able to improve maritime security and promote goodwill while establishing partnerships in an unstable region of the world.

However, there are still some reservations about a growing military presence in Africa. Currently, African governments are apprehensive about the establishment of AFRICOM. There is a fear of an increased U.S. military presence, particularly land forces, on the continent. Likewise, most of the littoral African nations are years away from developing a credible and competent naval force. Some may think this would discourage future APS endeavors. However, the Navy’s unique characteristics make it an ideal platform for the region. Due to its small footprint, APS is able to work with host countries without burdening them with a sizeable ground force. It also is able to assuage concerns of AFRICOM’s presence with the assistance and training it is offering. Finally, while many countries may be decades off from developing strong maritime forces, the APS costs are low and as long as the Navy is committed to this concept, in the long run it should prove to be an effective investment.
The Way Ahead

"For far too long and in far too many ways, it has been about big-ship battles and high-tech weapons. Life is just not that simple anymore." - Admiral Mike Mullen

The Maritime Strategy has laid the foundation of how the Navy will operate in the coming years. As seen, the Navy has and will continue to maintain a balanced approach between the hard power it is customarily known for and the soft power that is called for and required in today's irregular and complex global environment. As this new Strategy is implemented, it is important to evaluate its effectiveness. It is important not only to evaluate the Strategy from a strategic and operational level, but it is equally as important to assess if HA/DR and TSC are effective means of reaching the nation's objectives.

Strategic Analysis

Much of the press and discussion surrounding the Maritime Strategy has tended to focus on the expanded core capabilities of HA/DR and maritime security. The new focus on these capabilities, in conjunction with the aforementioned proactive deployments, is an innovative and new undertaking for the Navy. Highlighting these missions is an important development as they will be more essential over the coming years while the U.S. continues to battle terrorism, instability on the high seas, and political volatility. From a strategic perspective, it is important to realize the necessity to balance the soft power with hard power. With this strategy the Navy has done so. 67

It is essential the Navy not reduce the hard power capabilities that are so clearly outlined in the strategy. These capabilities are the backbone of the U.S. Navy and the emphasis on soft power elements does not preclude the necessity for hard power. 68 As
Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Donald C. Winter, stated at the release of the Maritime Strategy, “Let there be no mistake: we are not walking away from, diminishing, or retreating in any way from those elements of hard power that win wars...our increased emphasis on maritime partnerships and the “1000 ship Navy concept” is not a repudiation of the Mahanian insistence on U.S. Navy maritime dominance.” The balance of these capabilities have ensured the Navy is postured to prevent, as well as combat conflicts it may face in the future.

The Navy must also determine if its HA/DR and TSC deployments are focused in the appropriate regions. Annual deployments are already taking place in South America, West Africa, and the Pacific. The Maritime Strategy has stated that its areas of focus will be the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific. However, it also recognizes the importance of increased peacetime operations in Africa and the Western Hemisphere. This can be interpreted to mean that the hard power focus will remain in the Middle East and Pacific in response to threats such as Iran and China where soft power concentration will remain the more unstable areas where deployments are currently underway. While this current force distribution makes sense, the Navy must assess if there are other regions, such as East Africa and the Arabian Gulf, where proactive HA/DR and TSC could be effective.

Finally, it is important to address the strategic shortfalls that are inherent in the implementation of any new plan. Initial responses to the GFS and HA/DR deployments have for the most part been extremely positive yet there have still been some negative, unintended consequences. In some cases the good works done by Navy and NGOs have revealed the incompetency of the host government or military. It is imperative that the
Navy continue to work in conjunction with host nations in order to build confidence in the governments and militaries. In doing so, they must remain sensitive to the perceptions, both good and bad, that may come about from their works.

Next, the Navy must be mindful that their stops in each country are only temporary. They cannot train every sailor, treat every village, or build enough schools to immediately change many of the conditions that inflict these nations. Therefore, it is essential to develop a comprehensive and logical deployment plan that best meets the strategic objectives for each region. Is it better to revisit a select group of countries or villages at the cost of working with other nations? While consistent revisits are the core of creating partnerships, is there a benefit to “spreading the wealth” and deploying to more countries at a less frequent interval?

These questions are so challenging because currently there are no means of evaluating the measures of effectiveness of these deployments. It could be years if not decades before one knows if the overall strategic objective has been achieved. According to a November 2008 study on HA/DR missions, conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis, “accepted measures of effectiveness have not been established but are being developed along with operational doctrine. In particular, there is not yet any framework that relates the achievement of operational objectives to the achievement of strategic objectives.” The Navy must develop a framework quickly because until hard numbers can be evaluated, it will be difficult to determine the strategic effectiveness of such missions.
Operational Analysis

The biggest operational challenge for the Navy concerns resources and force structure. First, the Navy does not have the resources or capacity to execute the strategy. Second, it is still debating future structure of the force in determining if it should be built for small scale and maritime security operations or large scale, conventional war.\textsuperscript{73}

The Navy currently has 280 ships in its inventory which is too small of a number to execute the Strategy. It has a goal of building the size of the fleet to 313 ships yet this number, according to Admiral Roughead, is the minimum number of ships that is acceptable to execute the Strategy.\textsuperscript{74} Given the current financial crisis the country finds itself in, along with the necessity to fund the Army and Marine Corps, the pressure on DOD budgets will likely lead to a loss of Navy budget supplementations.\textsuperscript{75} With this reality, the Navy must find a creative way to attain necessary funding or must figure out a creative way to purchase the number of ships it needs for the Strategy. The latter option is more likely and will require the Navy to sacrifice some technologies and capability in order to attain capacity.

When evaluating the decision of what type of force to build, the Navy will have to make the difficult decision of either building a force to combat an unconventional or conventional opponent. The fiscal realities of today will make it difficult to achieve the ideal, a well balanced force able to combat both high and low end opponents. The Navy has already cut the DDG-1000 program designed for high end warfare and likewise has halted the Littoral Combat Ship production designed for low end warfare. If a high end force designed for conventional warfare is desired, there will likely not be the numbers to support the Maritime Strategy.\textsuperscript{76} Likewise, if a low end force focused on unconventional
and TSC operations is built, the capability will likely be absent to meet the Strategy’s demands in the conventional realm. The Navy is at a crossroad. It must make difficult decisions in sacrificing its ideal force if the future fleet is going to be capable of executing all aspects of the Strategy.

Conclusion

The Maritime Strategy has set a course for the Navy in the 21st century. While challenges and uncertainty still exist in some of the specifics of its implementation, the men and women of the Navy have deployed and conducted all facets of the Strategy. In doing so, they have laid the foundation for future deployments and execution. The world is more complex and more dynamic than ever. By maintaining a focus on the core capabilities that have been tenets of naval strategy for years while codifying the new areas of proactive HA/DR and TSC, the Strategy has not only found itself relevant for the coming years, but as the world has shifted to a more cooperative environment, the Navy has positioned itself to lead and influence future world affairs.
TABLE 1

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