Initial Evaluation of a U.S. Army Training Need: Soldier Skills to Develop, Enhance, and Support Local Level Host-Nation Governance

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September 2009

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# Initial Evaluation of a U.S. Army Training Need: Soldier Skills to Develop, Enhance, and Support Local Level Host-Nation Governance

**During recent interviews with U.S. Army commanders, researchers from the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences learned of a critical requirement for training to support missions aimed at developing and supporting legitimate host-nation governance (HNG). Unfortunately, such training is not currently available. Therefore, the primary purposes of this report were to document the Army’s need for governance-related training and provide a tool to aid upcoming efforts to address that need. Through interviews with Soldiers and leaders, we confirmed the training needs initially communicated to us, and learned of the governance activities of Soldiers at squad, platoon, company, and battalion levels. Through a review of recent Army Field Manuals 3-24, 3-07, and 3-24.2, we demonstrated that doctrine has provided an extensive framework upon which governance training can be developed. Through a review of academic and non-governmental literature, we identified commonly used indicators of governance and made note of important considerations for their use. We conclude our report with a preliminary research plan with which we will pursue the development of training that will prepare Soldiers to develop, enhance, and support local level HNG.**

**Subject Matter Expert:** Jeffrey E. Fite

**U.S. Army; Soldiers; Officers; Non-Commissioned Officers; Legitimate Governance; Local Government; Web-Based Training; Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; Job Aids**
Research Report 1912

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INITIAL EVALUATION OF A U.S. ARMY TRAINING NEED: SOLDIER SKILLS TO DEVELOP, ENHANCE, AND SUPPORT LOCAL LEVEL HOST-NATION GOVERNANCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

The research addressed in this report focuses on the need for research and development (R&D) to support missions aimed at developing, enhancing, and supporting legitimate host-nation governance (HNG). During recent interviews with battalion commanders assigned to U.S. Army Forces Command units, researchers from the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) learned of a critical requirement for training to support governance-related missions. Specifically, commanders asked for training that would introduce Soldiers at all levels to the concept and significance of legitimate governance. They also requested training that would allow non-commissioned and junior- (i.e., 2nd lieutenants, 1st lieutenants, captains) and new field-grade (i.e., majors) officers to measure, monitor, and foster good governance at the local level. Therefore, the purposes of this report were to document the Army’s need for governance-related training and provide a tool to aid upcoming efforts by ARI to address that need.

Procedure:

In August 2008, interviews were conducted with battalion commanders (n = 3) as part of an environmental scan to identify the training needs of operational units. Regardless of whether participants had most recently deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq, the need for training to support local level governance missions was a recurring theme during those interviews. Therefore, in June 2009, follow-up interviews were conducted to further develop ARI’s understanding of the problem. Participants included an additional battalion commander (n = 1), a battalion operations and training officer or “S-3” (n = 1), company commanders (n = 3), platoon leaders (n = 8), platoon sergeants (n = 4), and squad leaders (n = 3). After speaking with Army leaders and their Soldiers, we turned our attention to Army Doctrine. We searched recent Army Field Manuals (FMs) – FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (DA, 2006); FM 3-07, Stability Operations (DA, 2008b); and FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (DA, 2009) – for conceptual information on the concept and significance of legitimate governance (LG), and knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) that Soldiers could use to measure, monitor, and foster LG locally. Academic literature and non-governmental reports were also searched for measures of good governance that might prove useful to the Army.

Findings:

Interviews allowed ARI to confirm the training needs initially described to ARI by battalion commanders. They also provided ARI with new insight into the activities required of Soldiers across echelons. The review of Army Doctrine revealed a comprehensive framework for the development of governance-skills training. FM 3-24, FM 3-07, and FM 3-24.2 offered broad guidance on governance-related KSAs that are critical for those Soldiers tasked with
measuring, monitoring, and fostering good governance. However, doctrine did not provide
detailed guidance on the best practice for carrying out those tasks or training them. The review
of academic and non-governmental literature revealed five commonly used indicators of quality
governance. Statistical and methodological issues that often accompany the use of governance
measures were also identified. The report concludes with a preliminary research plan with which
ARI intends to pursue the development of training that will prepare Soldiers to develop, enhance,
and support legitimate HNG.

Utilization and Dissemination of Findings:

The results of the work presented here have been, and will continue to be, used by ARI to
advance its efforts to develop governance training for U.S. Army Soldiers. Interviews with
Soldiers and leaders allowed ARI to confirm the training needs initially described to researchers
by battalion commanders. The results of follow-up interviews provided ARI with new insight
into the activities required of Soldiers across echelons. The review of Army Doctrine revealed a
comprehensive framework which ARI will use for the development of governance-skills
training. The review of academic and non-governmental literature revealed five commonly used
indicators of quality governance that ARI can either use or modify for local-level governance.
Finally, the preliminary research plan presented in this report will be used by ARI to build a
R&D program that will specifically address the Army’s need for governance-skills training.
# INITIAL EVALUATION OF A U.S. ARMY TRAINING NEED: SOLDIER SKILLS TO DEVELOP, ENHANCE, AND SUPPORT LOCAL LEVEL HOST-NATION GOVERNANCE

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INITIAL EVALUATION OF A U.S. ARMY TRAINING NEED: SOLDIER SKILLS TO DEVELOP, ENHANCE, AND SUPPORT LOCAL LEVEL HOST-NATION GOVERNANCE

“Helping others to help themselves is critical to winning the long war.”

Introduction

According to U.S. Army doctrine, a primary objective of counterinsurgency and stability operations is to foster the development of effective governance – the process, systems, institutions, and actors that enable a state to function (Department of the Army [DA\(^1\)], 2008b, p. 2-11) – by a legitimate government (DA 2006, p. 1-21; 2008b, p. 1-7). Legitimate governments rule with the consent of the people and are therefore better able than “illegitimate” governments – governments that rule primarily through coercion – to carry out key functions (DA 2006, p. 1-21). Legitimate governments can more effectively utilize their authority to regulate social relationships, extract resources, and take actions in the public’s name. They are also better able to manage, coordinate, and sustain collective security, as well as economic, political, and social development. For those reasons, legitimate governments are stable governments.

Although doctrinal distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate governments are relatively straightforward, it is important to remember that the legitimacy of any government is determined by the people. In Western liberal tradition, a government that derives its power from the people, responds to their desires, and provides for their welfare is accepted as legitimate (DA, 2006, p. 1-21). In theocratic societies, political figures are accepted as legitimate because the people view those individuals being divinely guided. In other societies, “might makes right.” And, sometimes, the ability of a state to provide security is enough to achieve the legitimacy to govern – especially following a serious breakdown of law and order. Thus, ideals and standards as to what constitutes legitimate governance (LG) can vary from culture to culture, reflecting local customs and practices, and can vary with time and circumstance.

To foster the development of legitimate host-nation governance (HNG), the Army makes use of both military and nonmilitary means. Historically, forces that have learned to effectively enhance and develop HNG have engaged in a number of key local level learning and training tasks that include: developing doctrine and best practices locally; soliciting and evaluating advice from the local people in the conflict zone; learning about the broader world outside of the military and requesting outside assistance in understanding political, cultural, and social situations beyond their experience; and establishing local training centers during operations (DA, 2006, p. x). These are not easy practices for any organization to establish and, for a military actively engaged in conflict, even more challenging to accomplish.

During recent interviews with battalion commanders assigned to U.S. Army Forces Command units, researchers from the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and

\(^{1}\) Appendix A provides a complete list of the acronyms and abbreviations used in this report.
Social Sciences (ARI) learned of a critical need for training to support missions aimed at developing, enhancing, and supporting legitimate HNG. Commanders spoke decisively of their need for training that would equip Soldiers with the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) to carry out and support governance missions. Specifically, commanders asked for training that would introduce Soldiers to the concept and significance of LG. They also requested training that would allow non-commissioned- (NCO), junior- (i.e., 2nd lieutenants, 1st lieutenants, captains), and new field-grade (i.e., majors) officers to measure, monitor, and foster good governance at the area of operations (AO) or local level. Unfortunately, such training is not currently available. To meet that need, and to facilitate the development of training plans and strategies, extensive research is required.

The purposes of this report are twofold. First and foremost, we wanted to document the need for governance-related training, as relayed to us by Army leaders. Second, we wanted to provide a tool that would aid our research team and interested Army leaders in upcoming efforts to address that need. To that end, we describe the results of our first interviews with Soldiers regarding the governance skills required of Soldiers at different echelons. We also review recent Army Doctrine, academic literature, and non-governmental reports for definitions, explanations, and measures of LG, as well as KSAs that Soldiers need to effectively carry out governance missions. We also put forth a preliminary research approach to the development of governance-skills training.

Method

Interviews

In August 2008, we interviewed battalion commanders \( n = 3 \) as part of an environmental scan (Shadrick, Phillips, Bell, & Manning, in preparation) to identify the training needs of operational units. Commanders were assigned to Brigade Combat Teams stationed at Fort Bragg, NC, \( n = 1 \) and Fort Riley, KS \( n = 2 \). All had recently deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq.

Interviews were anonymous (i.e., personally identifiable information was not collected) and approximately 90 min. in length. The format was both structured and unstructured. The structured portion was similar to a job analysis interview. Participants were asked about the tasks and duties that they perform, the skills required to complete those tasks and duties successfully, and the training challenges faced along the way. The unstructured portion was similar to the critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954), in which participants are asked to recount factual stories, both positive and negative, about job behaviors that are crucial for effective performance. Additional details on the interview protocol can be found in Shadrick et al. (in preparation).

Regardless of whether participants had most recently deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq, the need for training to support local level governance missions was a recurring theme during interviews with battalion commanders. Therefore, in June 2009, we conducted follow-up interviews to further develop our understanding of the problem at all levels of unit leadership. Participants included an additional battalion commander \( n = 1 \), a battalion operations and
training officer or “S-3” \((n = 1)\), company commanders \((n = 3)\), platoon leaders \((n = 8)\), platoon sergeants \((n = 4)\), and squad leaders \((n = 3)\). At the time, participants were assigned to a Brigade Combat Team stationed at Fort Hood, TX, and all had recently returned from deployment to Iraq.

Those interviews were also anonymous and approximately 90 min. in length. Governance-related items \((n = 9)\) were integrated into the previously described protocol. Items are presented in Appendix B.

**Review of Literature**

After speaking with Army leaders and their Soldiers, we turned our attention to Army Doctrine. We searched recent Army FMs – FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (DA, 2006); FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (DA, 2008b); and FM 3-24.2 *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (DA, 2009) – for conceptual information on the concept and significance of LG, and KSAs that Soldiers could use to measure, monitor, and foster LG locally. In order to expedite the efforts of our research team and Army leaders to consult doctrine for guidance on governance-related concepts and skills, we provide direct quotes (along with corresponding page and paragraph numbers) from those FMs in the Results section of this report. We also searched academic literature and non-governmental reports for indicators of good governance that might be useful in Army missions.

**Results**

*Interviews with Battalion Commanders*

Battalion commanders spoke decisively of their desire for training that would equip NCOs, junior-, and new field-grade officers with the KSAs to carry out and support governance missions. More specifically, they requested training that would equip their Soldiers with knowledge of the following: the meaning and significance of LG; basic civics; host-nation government policy procedures; culture and history of host-nation people; partnership between coalition and host-nation agencies and organizations; and the role of governance within larger Army missions. Additionally, they requested training that would prepare Soldiers to complete the following tasks: measuring and monitoring the quality of governance; gaining situational awareness of (personal and professional) local-level politics (Figure 1); interacting effectively with local spheres of influence (Figure 2); teaching others about government and how to solve problems through government processes rather than methods to which they are accustomed (Figure 3); lessening or eliminating the influence of shadow governments; and enhancing partnerships between coalition and host-nation agencies and organizations (Figure 4). Thus, the training that battalion commanders requested was both global in nature - that is, general training that would teach the basic concepts and significance of LG - and task-based.

Figure 2. Image of Soldiers interacting with local spheres of influence. A 1st lieutenant speaks with a sheik at a Key Leader meeting in Iraq. Key Leader meetings allow local leaders to gather and discuss issues concerning their community. (Photo Credit: MC2 Robert Whelan). Image retrieved from http://www.defenselink.mil/multimedia/multimedia.aspx.
Figure 3. Image of Soldiers teaching others about government and how to solve problems through government processes. A 1st lieutenant speaks with the representative of a Women's Council outside her home. (Photo Credit: Sergeant Kevin Stabinsky). Image retrieved from http://www.defenselink.mil/multimedia/multimedia.aspx.

Figure 4. Image of Soldiers enhancing partnerships between coalition and host-nation agencies and organizations. A captain explains through an interpreter how local Iraqis are learning job skills and receive paid employment and experience working in carpentry, plumbing, and electrical. (Photo Credit: Staff Sergeant Tim Meyer, 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team Public Affairs, 25th Infantry Division). http://www.defenselink.mil/multimedia/multimedia.aspx.
Background on Local Governance in Baghdad, Iraq. Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in March 2003, one of the key objectives of the U.S. –led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was to restore basic services and establish governmental infrastructure that would function as an interface between Iraqis and the CPA, and lay the foundation for transparent and accountable local governance (Brinkerhoff & Taddesse, 2005). Upon determining that the city’s 88 official neighborhoods and nine larger districts were ethnically and culturally homogenous, the United States Agency for International Development’s Local Governance Program worked with military, CPA, and Baghdad municipal department leaders to design a council system for the Baghdad metropolitan area. The group’s efforts led to a three-tier system of local government: Neighborhood Advisory Councils (NACs), which were composed of 10-15 representatives, depending on the number of people living in a given neighborhood; District Advisory Councils (DACs), which were composed of three representatives from each NAC; and the Baghdad Interim City Council (ICC), which was composed of three representatives from each DAC. Once elections were held for NACs, NAC council members elected a subset of their membership to represent their neighborhood at the district level. Once DACs were formed, those council members elected subsets of their members to represent their district at the ICC. By July of 2003, 88 NACs, nine DACs, and the ICC were formed, and a chain of elected representation connected the citizens of Baghdad to the citywide council for the first time in 30 years.

Governance tasks and challenges. At the battalion level, commanders spent a great deal of time meeting with, providing guidance to, and assisting, important political, religious, and business figures at the district and neighborhood level. They facilitated and mediated DAC meetings and met regularly with DAC council chairpersons, and they “brought weight” to significant NAC meetings when necessary. The commanders that we spoke with were responsible for as many as seven DACs at any given time. Commanders told us that their greatest challenges when working to promote local-level governance had to do with identifying and dealing with corruption, understanding the motivations of local political, religious, and business people, and understanding the structure and function of Iraqi government.

At the company level, commanders facilitated one or more NACs and worked to build lines of communication and cooperation between their NACs and corresponding DACs. Their stated goal was to “get your NAC working and put Iraqis in the lead.” Company commanders were also actively engaged in the activities of Reconciliatory Councils and “Area Support Councils,” which were formed to deal with specific problems with the city, such as sectarian divides. Some company commanders reported that they also facilitated DAC meetings, though to a much lesser degree than NAC meetings. We also learned that commanders were points of contact for local people wishing to file grievances and/or suggest essential services projects, which commanders would then prioritize and work with the people and their NACs to resolve. Challenges relayed to us by company commanders included the following:

- Understanding Iraqi government at neighborhood, district, and city levels,
- Encouraging NAC members to become more responsive to local needs,
• Teaching NACs how to prioritize and initiate essential services projects, in order to reduce their dependency on coalition forces,
• Encouraging cooperation between NAC members,
• Teaching the local populace about local government structure and processes, encouraging them to become involved, and encouraging NACs to take responsibility for this task,
• Identifying local spheres of influence,
• Understanding the political, religious, and (sometimes) selfish motivations of NAC members and local populace,
• Identifying corruption and knowing how to respond,
• “Honesty checks” when dealing with locals and people of political, religious, and economic significance,
• Basic communication with locals, with and without assistance of interpreter, and
• Negotiation and mediations, and teaching those skills to others.

At the platoon level, Soldiers were primarily responsible for providing security at NAC and DAC meetings. However, platoon leaders often accompanied company commanders to NAC and DAC meetings, and platoon leaders and sergeants were sometimes responsible for facilitating NAC meetings, and meeting with local people of political, religious, and economic significance when company commanders were unavailable. Challenges communicated to us by platoon leaders included the following:

• Understanding Iraqi government at neighborhood and district levels,
• Teaching the local populace about local government processes and encouraging them to become involved,
• Identifying local spheres of influence; understanding the political, religious, and (sometimes) selfish motivations of others,
• “Honesty checks,”
• Negotiation, and
• Mediation.

At the squad level, junior Soldiers (privates through specialists) were primarily tasked with conducting patrols, identifying changes in the physical and social environments, and representing the integrity of coalition forces while doing so.

Measuring and monitoring changes in the quality of governance. At the battalion level, commanders measured and monitored changes in the quality of local governance by evaluating the ability of DACs to function without coalition support, prioritize issues and projects, and communicate with NACs and the people of their district. Battalion commanders also considered levels of corruption when making those evaluations. Commanders reported confidence in using those evaluations to measure and monitor changes in governance at the district level, but it was not clear that there was a systematic methodology for monitoring or recording improvements and degradations in the quality of local governance.

At the company level, commanders assessed the quality of local governance by determining whether or not NACs were functioning independently, prioritizing issues and projects, and communicating effectively with their DAC and the people in their neighborhood.
Company commanders also considered how many people in the neighborhood were knowledgeable about local government. For example, could local people identify the chairperson of their NAC? And, did local people know how to engage their NAC? Commanders reported confidence in using those evaluations to measure and monitor changes in the quality of governance at the neighborhood level. But, again, it was not clear that there was a systematic methodology for monitoring or recording improvements and degradations in the quality of local governance.

**Training needs.** The NCOs and officers that we interviewed identified a number of training needs that they felt would have made their last deployment easier and more effective. For all Soldiers, they recommended expanded language training beyond the “key phrases” that are generally taught to Soldiers prior to deployment. We were told that those phrases are useful, but do not help with more subtle interpersonal relations that are key to developing local governance. They also recommended expanded cultural training.

For NCOs and officers, they suggested that the depth and volume of governance training for NCOs and officers should increase with rank and command. Recommended training for NCOs and officers included the following:

- Conceptual and applied perspectives on governance, what it is, and why it is important,
- The history of the host government and how it functions,
- The history and culture of local area,
- Identification of spheres of influence how to work with NACs and DACs, and
- How to know if governance is improving in the AO.

For squad leaders, NCOs and officers recommended training on the “big picture” of the governance mission, what it is, and why it is important, as well as training on how to best capture atmospherics and file patrol reports that best relay that information. For junior Soldiers, privates through specialists, they recommended expanded cultural awareness training. There was disagreement as to whether junior Soldiers require any governance training, but it was unanimously determined that they did not require in-depth governance training.

The NCOs and officers that we interviewed also spoke about how they would like to see any future governance training presented. Suggestions included the following:

- Operation order format,
- Think Like a Commander (Shadrick & Lussier, 2002)-styled training that teaches adaptive thinking in a governance context,
- Role playing,
- Embeds,
- Fact finding missions with local government officials in the U.S., and
- True stories of successful and unsuccessful governance missions, presented in Soldiers own words.

It was also recommended that continuity books be more effectively utilized for training purposes, especially for transferring knowledge between outgoing and incoming units.
Review of Army Doctrine for Guidance on Governance-Related KSAs

Definitions and Explanations of the Significance of LG. Of the Army Doctrine that we reviewed, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency took the strongest position regarding the significance of LG to state stability. According to FM 3-24, the primary goal of any counterinsurgency (COIN) operation is to establish effective governance by a legitimate government. Legitimate governments rule with the consent of the people, which makes them better able to carry out its key functions and manage internal problems, change, and conflict. For those reasons, legitimate governments are more stable over time. FM 3-24 also made the important note that the ideals and standards as to what constitutes legitimate governance vary from culture to culture. They can also vary with time and circumstance.

1-113. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by the balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means. All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Governments described as “legitimate” rule primarily with the consent of the governed; those described as “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. Citizens of the latter obey the state for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than because they voluntarily accept its rule. A government that derives its powers from the governed tends to be accepted by its citizens as legitimate. It still uses coercion—for example, against criminals—but most of its citizens voluntarily accept its governance.

1-114. In Western liberal tradition, a government that derives its just powers from the people and responds to their desires while looking out for their welfare is accepted as legitimate. In contrast, theocratic societies fuse political and religious authority; political figures are accepted as legitimate because the populace views them as implementing the will of God. Medieval monarchies claimed “the divine right of kings.” Imperial China governed with “the mandate of heaven.” Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has operated under the “rule of the jurists [theocratic judges].” In other societies, “might makes right.” And sometimes, the ability of a state to provide security—albeit without freedoms associated with Western democracies—can give it enough legitimacy to govern in the people’s eyes, particularly if they have experienced a serious breakdown of order.

1-115. Legitimacy makes it easier for a state to carry out its key functions. These include the authority to regulate social relationships, extract resources, and take actions in the public’s name. Legitimate governments can develop these capabilities more easily; this situation usually allows them to competently manage, coordinate, and sustain collective security as well as political, economic, and social development. Conversely, illegitimate states (sometimes called “police states”) typically cannot regulate society or can do so only by applying overwhelming coercion. Legitimate governance is inherently stable; the societal support it engenders allows it to adequately manage the internal problems, change, and conflict that affect individual and collective well-being. Conversely, governance that is not legitimate is inherently unstable; as soon as the state’s coercive power is disrupted, the populace ceases to obey it. Thus legitimate governments tend to be resilient and exercise better governance; illegitimate ones tend to be fragile and poorly administered.

- FM 3-24 (p. 1-21)

FM 3-07, Stability Operations also provided an explanation of LG but emphasized the importance of the supremacy of the law and the sources of that authority. Further, FM 3-07 described the many factors that ultimately contribute to legitimacy. Those factors included the following:
• The legitimacy of supporting institutions and societal systems of the host-nation (HN) government,
• The legal framework that governs the state,
• The source of the legal framework and the foundation on which it was built, and
• The perceptions of individuals serving within the host nation’s civil institutions, neighboring states, the international community, and the American public – in addition to those of the local populace.

1-28. Legitimacy is central to building trust and confidence among the people. Legitimacy is a multifaceted principle that impacts every aspect of stability operations from every conceivable perspective. Within national strategy, legitimacy is a central principle for intervention: both the legitimacy of the host nation government and the legitimacy of the mission. The legitimacy of the government has many facets. It generally represents the legitimacy of the supporting institutions and societal systems of the host-nation. Legitimacy derives from the legal framework that governs the state and the source of that authority. It reflects not only the supremacy of the law, but also the foundation upon which the law was developed: the collective will of the people through the consent of the governed. It reflects, or is a measure of, the perceptions of several groups: the local populace, individuals serving within the civil institutions of the host nation, neighboring states, the international community, and the American public.

- FM 3-07 (p. 1-7)

In addition to providing an explanation of governmental legitimacy, FM 3-07 identified several traits of effective, legitimate governments. For example, legitimate governments do not go to war against its own people. They also do not go to war unnecessarily against their neighbors. FM 3-07 also provided four other traits, or dimensions, of effective and legitimate governments from “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (also discussed in FM 3-07, pp. 1-11 – 1-12). Those traits included:

• Honor for basic human rights and freedoms,
• Responsiveness to the will of the people,
• Effective sovereignty, and
• Limited governmental reach.

1-29. Ultimately, a legitimate government does not go to war against its population or instigate unwarranted hostilities with its neighbors. A legitimate government acts in accordance with human rights laws and ensures that citizens have access to state resources in a fair and equitable manner. It respects the rights and freedoms reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and abides by human rights treaties to which it is a party. In addition, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (known as the National Security Strategy) lists four traits that characterize a legitimate, effective state in which the consent of the governed prevails:

• Honors and upholds basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. Respects freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press.
• Responds to their citizens. Submits to the will of the people, especially when people vote to change their government.
• Exercises effective sovereignty. Maintains order within its own borders, protects independent and impartial systems of justice, punishes crime, embraces the rule of law, and resists corruption.
• Limits the reach of government. Protects the institutions of civil society, including the family, religious communities, voluntary associations, private property, independent businesses, and a market economy.

- FM 3-07 (p. 1-7)

FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency provided a figure (Figure 5) showing what we assumed to be key traits of LG, but the figure was not discussed in detail.

![Figure 5. Eight traits of legitimate governance from FM 3-24.2 (page 7-15).](image)

Beyond that figure, FM 3-24.2 did not elaborate on LG. It did, however, address the concept of effective governance, which was previously mentioned in FM 3-24. FM 3-24.2 stated that effective governance meets the needs of the people, and that effective and legitimate governance is key to eliminating insurgency and its root causes. Therefore, LG is the desired end state of COIN operations.

1-90. Real or perceived lack of governmental control can allow insurgents to operate with little or no interference from security forces or other agencies. The greater the control the government has over the situation, the less likely are the chances for insurgent success. The opposite is also true. If the government is not providing what the people believe their government should, insurgents may provide an alternative government, or “shadow” government, or they may merely nullify governance to allow freedom of action and movement, depending on their end state. Host Nation failure to see or admit that there is an issue or outright refusal to change can further strengthen this prerequisite.

- FM 3-24.2 (p. 1-17)

3-2. The end state of counterinsurgency operations is a legitimate Host Nation government that can provide effective governance. This includes providing for their populace, eliminating the root causes of the insurgency and preventing those root causes from returning. Counterinsurgent operations can successfully defeat an insurgency; achieve unity of effort along multiple lines of
effort; isolate the insurgent from the people; and increase the legitimacy of the Host Nation government.

- FM 3-24.2 (p. 3-1)

**Measuring and monitoring governance.** Of the doctrine that we reviewed, FM 3-24 provided the most specific information on measuring and monitoring LG. For example, FM 3-24 provided six broad indicators of LG. Those indicators included:

- The ability of a government to provide security,
- Fair selection of leaders,
- Widespread participation in, or support for, political processes,
- A culturally-acceptable level of corruption,
- A culturally-acceptable level and rate of development, and
- Acceptance of the government by major social institutions.

1-116. Six possible indicators of legitimacy that can be used to analyze threats to stability include the following:

- The ability to provide security for the populace (including protection from internal and external threats).
- Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the populace.
- A high level of popular participation in or support for political processes.
- A culturally acceptable level of corruption.
- A culturally acceptable level and rate of development.
- A high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.

1-117. Governments scoring high in these categories probably have the support of a sufficient majority of the population. Different cultures, however, may see acceptable levels of development, corruption, and participation differently. And for some societies, providing security and some basic services may be enough for citizens to grant a government legitimacy; indeed, the importance of security in situations where violence has escalated cannot be overemphasized. In such cases, establishing security can win the people’s confidence and enable a government to develop legitimacy in other areas.

1-118. In working to understand the problem, commanders and staffs determine what the HN population defines as effective and legitimate governance. This understanding continues to evolve as information is developed. Commanders and staffs must continually diagnose what they understand legitimacy to mean to the HN population. The population’s expectations will influence all ensuing operations. Additionally, planners may also consider perceptions of legitimacy held by outside supporters of the HN government and the insurgents. Differences between U.S., local, and international visions of legitimacy can further complicate operations. But the most important attitude remains that of the HN population. In the end, its members determine the ultimate victor.

- FM 3-24 (pp. 1-21 – 1-22)

FM 3-24 also provided specific and measurable indicators of progress in COIN operations. Although those indicators were not explicitly linked to the quality of governance, most are directly or indirectly related to the six broad indicators of LG described above. For that reason, they may prove useful in measuring and monitoring governmental legitimacy.
Example Progress Indicators


- Dislocated civilians. The number, population, and demographics of dislocated civilian camps or the lack thereof are a resultant indicator of overall security and stability. A drop in the number of people in the camps indicates an increasing return to normalcy. People and families exiled from or fleeing their homes and property and people returning to them are measurable and revealing.

- Human movement and religious attendance. In societies where the culture is dominated by religion, activities related to the predominant faith may indicate the ease of movement and confidence in security, people’s use of free will and volition, and the presence of freedom of religion. Possible indicators include the following:
  - Flow of religious pilgrims or lack thereof.
  - Development and active use of places of worship.
  - Number of temples and churches closed by a government.

- Presence and activity of small- and medium-sized businesses. When danger or insecure conditions exist, these businesses close. Patrols can report on the number of businesses that are open and how many customers they have. Tax collections may indicate the overall amount of sales activity.

- Level of agricultural activity.
  - Is a region or nation self-sustaining, or must life-support type foodstuffs be imported?
  - How many acres are in cultivation? Are the fields well maintained and watered?

- Presence or absence of associations. The formation and presence of multiple political parties indicates more involvement of the people in government. Meetings of independent professional associations demonstrate the viability of the middle class and professions. Trade union activity indicates worker involvement in the economy and politics.

- Participation in elections, especially when insurgents publicly threaten violence against participants.

- Government services available. Examples include the following:
  - Police stations operational and police officers present throughout the area.
  - Clinics and hospitals in full operation, and whether new facilities sponsored by the private sector are open and operational.
  - Schools and universities open and functioning.

- Freedom of movement of people, goods, and communications. This is a classic measure to determine if an insurgency has denied areas in the physical, electronic, or print domains.

- Tax revenue. If people are paying taxes, this can be an indicator of host-nation government influence and subsequent civil stability.

- Industry exports.

- Employment/unemployment rate.

- Availability of electricity.

- Specific attacks on infrastructure.
Dislocated civilian is a broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person (JP 1-02). Dislocated civilians are a product of the deliberate violence associated with insurgencies and their counteraction. (See FM 3-05.40/MCRP 3-33.1A for additional information on dislocated civilians.)

Additionally, FM 3-24 identified governance-related goals and objectives with which Soldiers might be able to measure and monitor progress in their AO. During COIN operations, commanders use lines of effort\(^2\) (LOE) – closely related conceptual categories along which the HN government and COIN force commander intend to attack insurgent strategy – to visualize, describe, and direct operations (DA, 2006, pp. 5-3; but also see DA, 2009, pp. 3-7 – 3-8). As shown in Figure 6, FM 3-24 provided exemplar goals along the governance LOE including: development of the initial concept for governance; identifying and recruiting local leaders and organizational representatives; establishing local, regional, and national policies and ordinances; reestablishing the justice system; and supporting and securing elections. FM 3-24 also provided an example objective, or end state, for the governance LOE. For the example shown in Figure 6, the desired end state was the development of effective government institutions and their presence established or restored. However, FM 3-24 provided little guidance on how to effectively reach the desired end state.

Although doctrinal guidance for measuring and monitoring governance was limited in the FMs we reviewed, FM 3-24 and FM 3-24.2 stressed the use of two assessment tools when evaluating the progress of an operation. Those tools are measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP), the most common types of assessment measures used by the Army (DA, 2009, pp. 4-2 – 4-3; but also see DA, 2006, pp. 5-26 – 5-27). A MOE was defined as “a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.” A MOP was defined as “a criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.” In order to be effective, MOE and MOP should be designed with four key characteristics in mind – they should be measurable, discrete, relevant, and responsive. For further detail on MOE and MOP, see FM 3-24 and FM 3-24.2.

Measure of Performance
4-12. An MOP is criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 1-02). MOPs confirm or deny that the task has been correctly performed. An example of a MOP is “How many people registered to vote at the school this week?”

Measure of Effectiveness
4-13. An MOE is criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). An example of a MOE is "Did the well project provide clean drinking water to the village?"

\(^2\) In 2008, FM 3-0, Operations (DA, 2008a, p. D-5) directed that the term “lines of effort” (LOE) replace “logical lines of operations” (LLO). FM 3-24 was published in 2006 and, therefore, used the term LLO. For that reason, we replaced LLO with LOE in this sentence and throughout this report.
Figure 6. Example goals and objectives along the governance line of effort from FM 3-24 (p. 5-5). The governance LOE is circled.
Purposes
4-14. Measures of effectiveness and of performance help commanders determine when all or part of the mission has been accomplished. The criteria used depend on the situation. Many times the MOP and MOE must be determined and evaluated by the HN government or security forces. They often require readjustment as the situation changes and objectives evolve. If an effect cannot be measured directly, then indicators of achieving the effect are measured. A measure of effectiveness or a measure of performance has four characteristics. They are—

Measurable
4-15. They require quantitative or qualitative standards that can be used to measure them.

Discrete
4-16. Each criterion measures a distinct aspect of the operation. Excessive numbers of MOEs and MOPs become unmanageable. At that point, the cost of collection efforts outweighs the value of assessing.

Relevant
4-17. Each MOE and MOP must be relevant to the result or outcome. The key is visualizing the desired result or outcome and identifying the most accurate and simplest indicator of it.

Responsive
4-18. MOEs and MOPs must detect changes quickly enough for commanders to respond immediately and effectively.

4-19. Commanders and staffs also develop a standard or baseline as a comparison and identify trends. From this information and analysis of why a trend is up or down, staffs can identify trouble spots and plan operations to reverse negative trends. They can also capitalize on positive trends by determining what is causing the positive increases and apply those tactics, techniques, and procedures more broadly.

4-20. Measures of effectiveness and measures of performance are included in the approved plan or order and reevaluated continuously throughout preparation and execution. Higher echelon staffs should ensure that the number of MOEs and MOPs do not overly burden lower echelons—especially battalion and below. Well-devised MOEs and MOPs, supported by effective management of available information, help commanders and staffs understand links between tasks, end state, and lines of effort.

- FM 3-24.2 (pp. 4-2 – 4-3)

Governance-related KSAs. In our review of doctrine for governance-related KSAs, we identified a number of areas that could inform the design of new training products. For example, FM 3-24.2 emphasized the importance of being able to effectively obtain and utilize intelligence about an AO. Nineteen governance-related variables (i.e., “Government and Politics”) critical to the planning and conduct of COIN operations were identified (Figure 7):

- Present and past forms of government,
- Governmental organization and powers,
- Scheduled elections and historical participation in the election process,
- Degree of governmental control over population,
- Relations with U.S. or multinational governments, national governments, and criminal elements,
- Political factions and boundaries,
**Figure 7.** Governance-related variables that are critical to the planning and conduct of COIN operations from FM 3-24.2 (p. A-6). The heading for those variables is circled.
• Grievances,
• Censorship,
• Nepotism and other clan, tribal, or social ties,
• Civil defense and disaster preparedness,
• Legal system,
• Property control,
• Monetary system,
• Domestic and foreign trade,
• Economic aid,
• Perception of relative deprivation,
• Trade unions, and
• Competition with black market and organized crime.

Unfortunately, FM 3-24.2 provided little in the way of guidance on how to effectively obtain, learn, or use that information.

Because good governance is believed to be necessary for the development of LG, activities that foster good governance are highly encouraged in FM 3-24:

• Controlling military and police activities,
• Establishing and enforcing the rule of law,
• Public administration,
• Justice,
• Property records and control,
• Public finance,
• Civil information,
• Historical, cultural, and recreational services,
• An electoral process for representative government, and
• Disaster preparedness and response.

5-45. Sometimes no HN government exists or the government is unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for governance. In those cases, this LOE may involve establishing and maintaining a military government or a civil administration while creating and organizing a HN capability to govern. In the long run, developing better governance will probably affect the lives of the populace more than any other COIN activities. When well executed, these actions may eliminate the root causes of the insurgency. Governance activities are among the most important of all in establishing lasting stability for a region or nation. (Table 5-5 (page 5-16) lists considerations for developing the governance LOE.)

- FM 3-24 (p. 5-15)

FM 3-24 also presented a more specific and actionable list of considerations for developing the governance LOE. Those activities included:

• Encouraging community leaders to participate in local governance,
• Helping the HN government to remove or reduce grievances,
• Making commitments only when they can be fulfilled in foreseeable future,
• Helping the HN develop and empower competent and responsive leaders, and strengthen civil and security forces,
• Being accessible to the populace in order to establish two-way communication,
• Encouraging the HN government to grant local demands and meet acceptable aspirations
• Emphasizing a national perspective in all HN activities; providing liaison officers to HN government ministries or agencies,
• Ensuring that a fair and just legal system has been put in place,
• Creating a system by which people can pursue redress for perceived wrong doings by authorities, and
• Building on existing capabilities.

Although many of those activities are self-explanatory, others (e.g., helping the HN develop and empower competent and responsive leaders) might require further guidance if they are to be completed effectively and efficiently.

• Encourage community leaders to participate in local governance. If no local council exists, encourage the populace to create one. Ask teachers, businesspeople, and others whom the community respects to form a temporary council until a more permanent organization can be formed.

• Help (or encourage) the host-nation government to remove or reduce genuine grievances, expose imaginary ones, and resolve contradictions, immediately where possible. Accomplishing these tasks may be difficult because –
  • Genuine grievances may be hard to separate from unreasonable complaints.
  • Host-nation leaders may be unable or unwilling to give up necessary power to local governments.

• Make only commitments that can be fulfilled in the foreseeable future.

• Help the host nation develop and empower competent and responsive leaders and strengthen their civil service and security forces. Doing this is often difficult; however, backing an incompetent (or worse) host-nation leader can backfire. Do not be afraid to step in and make a bold change where necessary. A corrupt official such as a chief of police who is working for both sides, can be doing more harm than good. You may be forced to replace him. If so, move decisively. Arrange the removal of all officials necessary to solve the problem. The pain of the affair may be acute, but it will be brief and final. Wherever possible, have host-nation authorities conduct the actual removal.

• Be accessible to the populace to facilitate two-way communication. Establish rapport for the host-nation government and counterinsurgents.

• Encourage the host nation to grant local demands and meet acceptable aspirations. Some of these might be driving the insurgency.

• Emphasize the national perspective in all host-nation government activities. Downplay sectarian divides.

• Provide liaison officers to host-nation government ministries or agencies. When possible, use an interagency team approach. Structure teams based on function.
• Once the legal system is functioning, send someone to observe firsthand a person moving through the legal process (arrest by police, trial, and punishment by confinement to a correctional facility). Ask to see the docket of the judges at the provincial courthouse. If there is no one on the docket or if it is full and there are no proceedings, there may be a problem.

• Create a system for citizens to pursue redress for perceived wrongs by authorities. Rule of law includes means for a citizen to petition the government for redress of government wrongs. The ability to petition the counterinsurgency force for redress of wrongs perpetrated by that force (intentionally or otherwise) is also required.

• Build on existing capabilities wherever possible. Host nations often have some capability; counterinsurgents may only need to help develop greater capacity. - FM 3-24 (p. 5-16)

Terrain plays a major role in all military operations. Therefore, FM 3-24.2 offered exemplar actions that could take along the governance LOE when operating on urban, rural, and border terrains. On urban terrain, for example, council meetings might be established to identify and solve the underlying issues of the insurgency. On rural terrain, a village, district, provincial or tribal council might be convened to identify and solve underlying issues. On border terrain, a village or tribal council from both sides of the border might be established or convened to identify and solve issues.

Lines of Effort in Urban Operations
3-48. All urban operations require careful planning and coordination, particularly those operations involving application of force. The most vital requirement is accurate and timely intelligence. Military forces must be able to communicate with police and other agencies involved in the operations. During urban operations, actions must be taken across all the LOEs. Examples of actions along each LOE are—

Support to Governance
3-52. Establish or convene local or tribal council meetings to identify and solve the underlying issues of the insurgency.

Lines of Effort in Rural Operations
3-61. All rural operations must address all LOEs. Examples along each LOE to consider include—

Support to Governance
3-65. Establish or convene a village, district, provincial or tribal council to identify and solve underlying issues.

Lines of Effort in Border Operations
3-76. Border operations must use actions across all LOEs. One or two examples along each LOE are—

Support to Governance
3-80. Establish or convene a village or tribal council from both sides of the border to identify and solve issues.

- FM 3-24.2 (pp. 3-11, 3-12, and 3-14)

Doctrine also provided exemplar actions that could be taken along the governance LOE when conducting various types of operations. For example, FM 3-24.2 provided guidance for
developing the governance LOE in clear-hold-build operations – operations that involve offense, defense, and stability operations (DA, 2009, pp. 3-17 – 3-23). When in the clear phase FM 3-24.2 suggested that key local leaders be identified, along with underlying issues of the population. When in the hold phase, it was suggested that government political apparatus be established. When in the build phase, it was suggested that local government be further developed and enhanced.

Clear Phase Lines of Effort
3-114. Although the clear phase emphasizes establishing civil security, operations across the other LOEs must happen. Examples of complimentary actions across all LOEs include—

Support to Governance
3-118. Identify key government and local leaders that can support the re-establishment of local government that can administer the area. Identifying the underlying issues of the population.

Hold Phase Lines of Effort
3-128. Although the hold phase emphasizes defensive actions, operations across all LOEs must be employed. Examples of complimentary actions along multiple LOEs include—

Support to Governance
3-132. Establish or reestablish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus.

Build Phase Lines of Effort
3-139. Although the build phase continues to secure the population and separate them from the insurgents, the focus will shift to the other LOEs. Examples of complimentary actions along multiple LOEs include—

Support to Governance
3-143. Continue to support and enhance the local government.

-FM 3-24.2 (pp. 3-19 – 3-20, 3-21, and 3-22)

Additionally, FM 3-24.2 provided guidance on offensive and defensive operations, outside of the discussion of clear-hold-build operations.

Offensive operations enable and complement the other lines of effort—support HN security forces, restore essential services, provide support to economic and infrastructure development, provide support to governance, and conduct information tasks. Without the increased security resulting from offensive operations, units may not be able to accomplish any significant tasks in the other LOE.

Support to Governance
5-221. In COIN, tactical units must consider how offensive operations can be used to assist their efforts to strengthen the local government. For instance, a unit might conduct a combined cordon and search based on a tip provided by the local mayor, assist in securing polling sites during local or national elections, or set the conditions for completion of a government project. Units must remember that all offensive operations support one or another group’s political agenda. Eliminating one insurgent group may lead to another group filling the power vacuum.

In a counterinsurgency, defensive operations are conducted to prevent insurgents from attacking security forces, attacking the population, or disrupting actions along the seven COIN lines of effort. This section discusses special defensive operation considerations for the remaining five lines of effort.
Support to Governance

6-120. This line of effort relates to the Host Nation governments’ ability to gather and distribute resources while providing direction and control for society. By disrupting the Host Nation government’s ability to conduct these functions, an insurgency can delegitimize the government. An example is the local security of a key judge who has been instrumental in issuing verdicts against criminal activities of insurgents in order to prevent his assassination. Defensive efforts may need to be applied so that a government can conduct its basic functions which include—

- Controlling military and police activities.
- Establishing and enforcing the rule of law.
- Public administration.
- Justice (a judiciary system, prosecutor/defense representation, and corrections).
- Property records and control.
- Civil information.
- Historical, cultural, and recreational services.
- An electoral process.
- Disaster preparedness and response.

- FM 3-24.2 (pp. 5-38 and 6-31)

FM 3-24 also provided guidance on clear-hold-build operations, by identifying exemplar activities for the build phase – activities that could directly benefit the community and increase support for local government. Specifically, FM 3-24 recommended utilizing special funds to pay wages to local people to do work that benefits the local area. Also recommended are projects to improve economic, social, cultural, and medical needs.

5-70. Tasks that provide an overt and direct benefit for the community are key, initial priorities. Special funds (or other available resources) should be available to pay wages to local people to do such beneficial work. Accomplishing these tasks can begin the process of establishing HN government legitimacy. Sample tasks include—

- Collecting and clearing trash from the streets.
- Removing or painting over insurgent symbols or colors.
- Building and improving roads.
- Digging wells.
- Preparing and building an indigenous local security force.
- Securing, moving, and distributing supplies.
- Providing guides, sentries, and translators.
- Building and improving schools and similar facilities.

5-75. Counterinsurgents should use every opportunity to help the populace and meet its needs and expectations. Projects to improve economic, social, cultural, and medical needs can begin immediately. Actions speak louder than words. Once the insurgent political infrastructure is destroyed and local leaders begin to establish themselves, necessary political reforms can be implemented. Other important tasks include the following:

- Establishing HN government agencies to perform routine administrative functions and begin improvement programs.
- Providing HN government support to those willing to participate in reconstruction. Selection for participation should be based on need and ability to help. People should also be willing to secure what they create.
- Beginning efforts to develop regional and national consciousness and rapport between the population and its government. Efforts may include participating in local elections, making community improvements, forming youth clubs, and executing other projects.
Thus, in both FM 3-24.2 and FM 3-24, there is general guidance on clear-hold-build operations. However, detailed directions on completing those tasks and activities are not provided.

Doctrine has also offered guidance for targeting and strike operations. FM 3-24 provided guidance on targeting operations, which are used to focus actions and the utilization of limited resources. The focus of targeting is people, including combatants and non-combatants, and is carried out through four activities:

- Deciding which targets to engage,
- Detecting targets,
- Delivering or conducting the operation, and
- Assessing the effects of the operation.

5-100. The targeting process focuses operations and the use of limited assets and time. Commanders and staffs use the targeting process to achieve effects that support the LOEs in a COIN campaign plan. It is important to understand that targeting is done for all operations, not just attacks against insurgents. The targeting process can support IO, civil-military operations (CMO), and even meetings between commanders and HN leaders, based on the commander’s desires. The targeting process occurs in the targeting cell of the appropriate command post. (See JP 3-60, FM 3-09.31/MCRP 3-16C, and FM 6-20-10 for joint and Army targeting doctrine. FM 3-13, appendix E, describes how to apply the targeting process to IO-related targets.)

5-101. Targeting in a COIN environment requires creating a targeting board or working group at all echelons. The intelligence cell provides representatives to the targeting board or working group to synchronize targeting with intelligence sharing and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. The goal is to prioritize targets and determine the means of engaging them that best supports the commander’s intent and the operation plan.

5-102. The focus for targeting is on people, both insurgents and noncombatants. There are several different approaches to targeting in COIN. For example, all of the following are potential targets that can link objectives with effects:

- Insurgents (leaders, combatants, political cadre, auxiliaries, and the mass base).
- Insurgent internal support structure (bases of operations, finance base, lines of communications, and population).
- Insurgent external support systems (sanctuaries, media, and lines of communications).
- Legitimate government and functions (essential services, promotion of governance, development of security forces, and institutions).

5-104. The targeting process comprises the following four activities:

- Decide which targets to engage.
- Detect the targets.
- Deliver (conduct the operation).
- Assess the effects of the operation.

5-105. Commanders issue targeting guidance during the “decide” activity. The commander’s guidance drives subsequent targeting-process activities. Actions during the “detect” activity may give commanders the intelligence needed to refine the guidance. It may be difficult to identify targets when a COIN campaign begins. The focus during the “decide” activity should be on decisive points commanders can engage.
Although targeting is not explicitly described as being related to governance missions, knowing which individuals and leaders to target and how to target them should make Soldiers more effective in governance-related activities. For further information on targeting, see FM 3-24 (pp. 5-29 – 5-31).

FM 3-24.2 provided guidance on actions that could be taken along the governance LOE during strike operations – offensive, tactical operations of short duration and conducted in contested or insurgent controlled areas to find, fix, and destroy insurgent forces (DA, 2009, p. 3-23). To support the governance LOE in a strike operation, it was suggested that local or tribal council meetings be established or convened to identify and solve the underlying issues of the insurgency.

3-147. Strike operations are short duration (generally one day to several weeks) offensive, tactical operations conducted in contested or insurgent controlled urban or rural areas to find, fix and destroy insurgent forces. Small, highly mobile combat forces operate in dispersed formations to locate and fix the insurgents. Upon locating the insurgents, commanders direct their forces to attack, pursue, and destroy them. If contact is lost, the units resume aggressive patrolling to reestablish contact and destroy insurgent forces before they can rest, reorganize, and resume operations. Strike operations seek to destroy insurgent forces and base areas, isolate insurgent forces from their support, and interdict insurgent infiltration routes and lines of communications (LOCs). Strike forces are organized as self-sufficient task forces capable of operating in areas remote from logistical bases. Ground or water borne means of entry may be used, as well as air assault or parachute deliveries. Strike operations use offensive tactics such as raids, reconnaissance in force, cordon and attacks, hasty or deliberate attacks, and pursuits. It is often a complementary operation to a clear-hold-build operation.

Lines of Effort
3-151. Along the LOEs in a strike operation, tactical units should examine—

Support to Governance
3-155. Establish or convene local or tribal council meetings to identify and solve the underlying issues of the insurgency.

- FM 3-24.2 (pp. 3-23 and 3-24)

Finally, doctrine has offered guidance on actions that could be taken along the governance LOE in stability operations. Stability operations make use of coercive and constructive capabilities to:

- Establish a safe and secure environment,
- Facilitate reconciliation among adversaries,
- Establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions, and
- Facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority (DA, 2008, p. 2-2).

FM 3-07 identified support to governance as a primary stability task, along with four essential tasks for stability operations. Those tasks included an initial response, in which military forces:

- Establish mechanisms for local-level participation,
- Identify, secure, rehabilitate, and maintain basic facilities for the local government,
- Restore essential local public services,
• Provide resources to maintain essential local public services, and
• Transformation in which military forces advise local legislatures and civil servants during administrative actions.

3-50. When a legitimate and functional host-nation government is present, military forces operating to support the state have a limited role. However, if the host-nation government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions—whatever the reason—some degree of military support to governance may be necessary. A state’s legitimacy among its people is tied in part to its perceived ability to provide these essential services. In extreme cases, where civil government is completely dysfunctional or absent altogether, international law requires the military force to provide the basic civil administration functions of the host-nation government under the auspices of a transitional military authority. (See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of transitional military authority.)

Support Development of Local Governance
3-52. Establishing effective governance at the local level is necessary before developing governance institutions and processes throughout the state. Initially, effective local governance almost depends entirely on the ability to provide essential civil services to the people; restoring these services is also fundamental to humanitarian relief efforts. (See paragraph 2-55 for additional discussion on the primary stability task, restore essential services.) Most stability tasks require an integrated and synchronized effort across all sectors to achieve the desired end state. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces—
• Establish mechanisms for local-level participation.
• Identify, secure, rehabilitate, and maintain basic facilities for the local government.
• Restore essential local public services.
• Provide resources to maintain essential local public services.
• Transformation in which military forces advise local legislatures and civil servants during administrative actions.

- FM 3-07 (pp. 3-13 – 3-14)

FM 3-24.2 also identified support to governance as a primary stability task and identified four typical subtasks including:

• Support to transitional administrations,
• Support for the development of local governance,
• Support for anticorruption initiatives, and
• Support for elections.

All five primary stability tasks are used during counterinsurgency operations, normally as individual lines of effort. However, since each counterinsurgency, each insurgency, and even individual units and leaders are different, how these five stability tasks are applied and managed as individual lines of efforts may vary considerably. The five stability tasks follow:
• Establish civil security.
• Establish civil control.
• Support to governance.
• Restore essential services.
• Support to economic and infrastructure development.

Support to Governance
7-44. This helps build toward effective, legitimate governance. Specifically, it focuses on restoring public administration and resuming public services, while fostering long-term efforts to establish a functional, effective system of political governance. In every case, for the counterinsurgent to develop a long-term solution, unit actions must strengthen the Host Nation
government and reinforce its legitimacy with the people (Figure 7-4). The formation of an effective local government is critical to the success of any counterinsurgency operation because they provide the foundation for legitimate governance at the national level. Additionally, effective local governments promote social stability when people have a say in their own government. They also increase financial transparency, which helps fight corruption. At the local level, the formation of local neighborhood councils serves as an excellent starting point for supporting governance. Units may have to initiate these efforts without an external agency support. Neighborhood and district councils are effective because they empower the population on many levels. They help the populace devise local solutions to local problems and help citizens and community leaders build skills in community decision making. All involved parties learn to resolve conflicts peacefully and in a transparent fashion. Local councils also help leaders at the local level develop skills that can help them serve at higher levels of government.

Subordinate Tasks
7-45. Typical tasks include—
- Support transitional administrations.
- Support development of local governance.
- Support anticorruption initiatives.
- Support elections.

Further, activities that support governance-related subtasks were provided. Activities that support transitional administrations included:
- Vetting HN officials,
- Reconstituting leadership at local levels of government, and
- Establishing interim legislative processes.

Activities that support the development of local governance included:
- Establishing mechanisms for local-level participation,
- Identifying, securing, rehabilitating, and maintaining basic facilities for the local government,
- Restoring essential local public services, and
- Providing resources to maintain essential local public services.

Activities that support anticorruption initiatives included:
- Disseminating ethical standards for civil servants,
- Ensuring transparency in the dispersal of government resources, and
- Implementing reporting procedures for corruption and intimidation.

Activities that support elections included:
- Providing security for polling places, voters, and ballots,
- Determining identification requirements for voter registration, and
- Establishing or verifying voter registry.
Support Transitional Administrations
7-46. When the HN government has collapsed or been deposed, counterinsurgency efforts focus on immediately filling the void in governance. In either situation, the reliability and trustworthiness of local officials is suspect; due care and prudence are necessary to avoid empowering officials whose interests and loyalties are inconsistent with those of the occupying force. For example, a tactical unit may struggle with identifying and emplacing a good neighborhood council leader. Tasks may include—
   • Vet Host Nation officials.
   • Reconstitute leadership at local levels of government.
   • Establish interim legislative processes.

Support Development of Local Governance
7-47. Establishing effective governance at the local level is necessary before developing governance institutions and processes throughout the HN. Initially, effective local governance almost depends entirely on the ability to provide essential civil services to the people. Most stability tasks require an integrated and synchronized effort across all sectors to achieve the desired end state. Tactical Units have often had success when working with a city, district or tribal council, or city manager. Essential tasks may include—
   • Establish mechanisms for local-level participation.
   • Identify, secure, rehabilitate, and maintain basic facilities for the local government.
   • Restore essential local public services.
   • Provide resources to maintain essential local public services.

Support Anticorruption Initiatives
7-48. Corruption of government officials could be a root cause that led to the insurgency. Providing legal guidance and assistance to the transitional government mitigates the near-term effects of corruption. Long-term measures ensure lasting success. Corruption and graft can hinder efforts to establish governance, restore rule of law, or institute economic recovery. While some level of corruption is common to many cultures, its existence can unhinge reform efforts and put the entire mission at risk. Essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces create mechanisms to curtail corruption across government institutions. Units must decide if there is an acceptable level of corruption in the HN society. Essential tasks may include an initial response to—
   • Disseminate ethical standards for civil servants.
   • Ensure transparency in the dispersal of government resources.
   • Implement reporting procedures for corruption and intimidation.

Support Elections
7-49. The ability of the HN government and its local subdivisions to stage fair and secure elections is a significant milestone toward establishing legitimate, effective governance. While civilian agencies that maintain strict transparency guide the elections process, military forces provide the support that enables broad participation by the local populace. Essential tasks may include—
   • Provide security for polling places, voters, and ballots.
   • Determine identification requirements for voter registration.
   • Establish or verify voter registry.

In addition to stability tasks and subtasks, FM 3-24.2 (pp. 7-16 – 7-17) named other governance skills, which it described as critical. Those skills included:
   • Negotiation – discussions between two or more parties, with the desired goal of producing an agreement,
• Mediation – interventions designed to bring about a peaceful settlement or compromise between disputing parties, and

• Leader and meeting security.

7-50. Two critical governance techniques are negotiating and mediating, and leader and meeting security. See FM 3-07 for additional technique considerations.

Negotiations and Mediations
7-51. In a counterinsurgency, situations may arise that require counterinsurgency personnel to negotiate, mediate, and perhaps arbitrate disputes. These usually involve minor points of contention between the belligerents or disagreements about the daily routines of the counterinsurgent force. Unit leaders must remain aware of their limitations. Larger points of contention or issues beyond their ability to resolve should be referred to a higher authority. If possible, arbitration should be referred to the existing legal system. Negotiations are made from a position of strength while mediation is made from a position of impartiality. In the joint, combined, and interagency environment, negotiations and mediations can be complex. Nonetheless, all negotiations and mediations require tact, diplomacy, honesty, patience, fairness, effective communications, cross-cultural sensitivity, and careful planning. For the purposes of this manual, the following definitions are used:

**Negotiation**
7-52. This is a discussion between at least two parties, with the intention to produce an agreement.

**Mediation**
7-53. This is an attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement or compromise between disputants through the objective intervention of a neutral party.

**Arbitration**
7-54. This is the process by which disputants submit their differences to the judgment of an impartial person or group appointed by mutual consent.

Usage in a Counterinsurgency
7-55. Unit leaders must be prepared to conduct negotiations or mediations with the leaders or members of various groups. These groups may be political, ethnic, religious, tribal, military, or even family. Understanding the composition of groups in the AO is vital for effective negotiations and mediations. Analyzing civil considerations using ASCOPE of various groups can be extremely helpful in preparation for these discussions. Furthermore, tensions or hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents. Negotiations and mediations may be broken down into two categories: situational and preplanned.

**Situational negotiations and mediations**
7-56. These both allow immediate discussion and resolution of an issue or problem. For example, members of a ground patrol might encounter two groups arguing at an intersection. To negotiate a resolution to this problem, the patrol must thoroughly understand the ROE and rules of interaction (ROI). Soldiers apply this working knowledge to the process of discussing and, when possible, resolving issues and problems between opposing parties, which might include the unit itself. The leader on the ground must know when he has exhausted his options under the ROE and ROI, and turn over the discussion to a higher authority.

**Preplanned negotiations**
7-57. These allow discussion and resolution of an upcoming, specific issue or problem. For example, a company commander may conduct a work coordination meeting between leaders of the belligerents to determine mine-clearing responsibilities. As with situational negotiations, preplanned negotiations require leaders to know and understand the ROE and ROI. Leaders
must also know as much as possible about every aspect of the dispute or issue. The negotiator’s goal is to reach an agreement that is acceptable to both sides, and that reduces antagonism and the threat of renewed hostilities.

Considerations during Counterinsurgencies
7-58. Commanders should identify powerful groups both inside and outside their AOs, and obtain key information about them to better prepare for negotiating and mediating. Analyzing civil considerations using ASCOPE is a useful tool. This prior preparation can be especially beneficial for the day-to-day situational negotiations and mediations that can easily arise during daily operations. This key information includes—

- Formal relationships such as treaties or alliances between groups.
- Informal relationships such as tolerance or friction between groups.
- Divisions and cleavages between groups.
- Cross-cutting relationships between groups such as religious beliefs, political parties, and business ventures.

- FM 3-24.2 (pp. 7-17 – 7-18)

Guidelines for Negotiations and Mediations
7-59. Credibility is key to success. As a rule, only communicate necessary information and those actions that authorities and commanders intend to do or have the authority to do. Successful negotiating often involves communicating a clear position on all issues. This includes visualizing several possible end states, while maintaining a clear idea of the best end state and conveying a willingness to bargain on negotiable points. Use tact to justify standing firm on nonnegotiable points while still communicating respect for other participants and consider having points that are disposable to use for concessions.

Steps
7-60. Several steps are common to negotiations and mediations, especially preplanned negotiations:

Determine the Purpose
7-61. Before contacting leaders of the belligerent parties to initiate the negotiation or mediation process, participants must know what they are trying to do, as well as the limits of their authority. Ensure that participants can recommend that their superiors ratify the agreement.

Prepare
7-62. Thorough preparation is needed to ensure the success of the negotiation or mediation process. Commanders must familiarize themselves with both the situation and the area in which their unit will operate. They should consider selecting one person who understands conflict dynamics and cross-cultural issues to observe a negotiation or mediation and give advice. This individual can watch for body language and other indicators of how the process is working. In turn, this person may be able to coach more effective techniques to the negotiators or mediators. Leaders should also develop an agenda for the meeting and consider the conduct, customs, and actions expected at the meeting.

Communicate
7-63. Participants must establish an effective means of communicating with all parties. They should not assume that a certain leader or element is opposed to their efforts without careful investigation. Instead, they must ensure that facts are correct before forming any opinions. The commander must earn the trust and confidence of any opposing party. This includes establishing an atmosphere (and a physical setting) that participants will judge to be both fair and safe.

Execute
7-64. Always strive to maintain control of the session; be firm, yet even-handed, in leading the discussion. At the same time, be flexible, with a willingness to accept recommendations from the opposing parties and from assistants and advisors. Settle the easy issues first. Be prepared to
precede issue-by-issue in a predetermined order. Actions can have different connotations to individuals of other cultures. Culture shapes how people reason, what they accept as fact, and what principles they apply to decision making. Also, nonverbal behavior, such as the symbolic rituals or protocols of the arrangement for a meeting, is important. If participants cannot reach agreement, they must keep the dialogue going. At a minimum, they must seek agreement on when the parties will meet again.

- FM 3-24.2 (pp. 7-18 – 7-19)

Specific preparatory steps were provided:

- Determining the purpose,
- Preparation,
- Communication,
- Execution,
- Leader and meeting security,
- Individual Soldier interactions,
- Considerations for leader security, and
- Considerations for meeting security.

Leader and Meeting Security
7-65. Key leaders and important meetings, even in established nonviolent peaceful areas of the world, need security. This security allows leaders to focus on the meeting's purpose without distractions. During a counterinsurgency, security becomes an absolute requirement as all key leaders and important meetings are potential targets for insurgents. Successful counterinsurgency operations require active interaction with the population. This interaction varies from formal meetings and negotiations to informal interactions with local citizens. Formal meetings and negotiations are significant mission events and should be thoroughly planned and properly resourced. Informal interactions happen with little or no planning but must still be prepared for thorough training and SOPs. In most situations, unit leaders, from team leaders up are the individuals who will be involved in regular interactions and meetings. These personnel are often placed in exposed positions as they execute their mission. At the tactical level, a personal security detachment, MP platoon, or squad will typically secure a leader, VIP, or meeting. Leaders and units consider several things when preparing for meetings or negotiations:

Individual Soldier Interactions
7-66. In a counterinsurgency environment, individual Soldiers interact daily with the local population. When doing so, they must maintain situational awareness and be prepared to react immediately to a range of situations. While one Soldier interacts, another should provide security for the other. This is easy if the buddy system is used.

Considerations for Leader Security
7-67. At least one person should be ready to provide close-in, direct physical protection for the leader. However, this should not interfere with the leader’s mission accomplishment, should not irritate other participants, and should not include behavior that could be seen as a threat. Planning must also determine any restrictions on people approaching the protected leader, and should restrict the circulation of people around the leader. If armed at all, the leader should carry a sidearm. This leaves the leader's hands free to react to close-in threats. Security personnel should take positions where they can observe everything and everyone near the leader.

Considerations for Meeting Security
7-68. Before a meeting, crowd-control measures should be planned and prepared, even if crowds are not expected. Evacuation routes and EOF procedures should be planned for key personnel. Planning for outer security should include coverage of inner and outer cordons.
• The inner cordon protects the meeting participants, controls access to the meeting, and controls the immediate crowd.
• The outer cordon isolates and controls access to the meeting. This cordon may be close in and visible or out of sight of the actual meeting, focusing on outside elements trying to gain access.

7-69. If available, use special units or weapons such as snipers and shotguns or nonlethal weapons. Use at least one interpreter (two are preferred). One actively interprets while the other observes body language and listens to side conversations in the audience. All of these steps should be rehearsed before execution.

7-70. A typical technique for conducting a meeting includes reconnoitering the meeting site and also conducting a pre-site clearance before the meeting. Forces also establish outer and inner cordons, secure the meeting, collapse both cordons, and then conduct an orderly movement back to their base or combat outpost. All of these actions should be rehearsed extensively prior to execution.

Review of Academic Literature and Non-Governmental Reports for Guidance on Measuring and Monitoring the Quality of Governance

The need for individuals and institutions to measure and monitor the quality of governance has grown exponentially over the past 20 – 30 years. Increased interest in governance has been due, at least in part, to increased international investment in developing countries, the end of the Cold War, failed development policy reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, and increased awareness of the significance of politics in economic development and policy reform (Arndt & Oman, 2006). As a result, a multitude of governance indicators have become available and are commonly used by academics, development analysts, international investors, journalists, and national and multilateral aid agencies (Arndt & Oman, 2006; Besançon, 2003; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2006). Although those indicators were designed to measure the quality of governance at the national or state level, it may be that they can inform our research team in generating easy to use local-level governance measures.

According to Arndt and Oman (2006), there are five key sources of governance indicators:

• Freedom House,
• International Country Risk Guide (ICRG),
• Transparency International,
• The World Bank, and
• The World Bank Institute.

Freedom House is an important source of governance indicators for academics, analysts, and journalists (Arndt & Oman, 2006). Freedom House is a non-profit advocacy organization founded to serve as an “opponent of dictatorships” and “a clear voice for democracy and freedom around the world.” In its core publication, “Freedom in the World,” it provides ratings of political rights and civil liberties based on its experts’ subjective perceptions of items derived
from the 1984 United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Ratings for political rights include items that assess the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government. Ratings for civil liberties include items that assess freedom of expression, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and individual rights. Countries receive specific ratings for political rights and civil liberties (on a scale of 1 to 7, with “1” being the highest, or best, and “7” being the lowest). The average of those ratings is then used to rate countries as being “free” (a score below 3), “partly free” (a score of 3 – 5), or “not free” (a score above 5). Ratings are available annually for 192 countries and 14 disputed territories. Due to periodic changes in methodology and raters on staff, Freedom House ratings are not fully comparable over time. Like all governance indicators, Freedom House ratings are subject to non-negligible measurement error. However, Freedom House does not provide estimates of that error. For more information on the Freedom House ratings, see http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1.

International Country Risk Guide has been one of the most important sources of governance indicators since its inception in 1980 (Arndt & Oman, 2006). The privately owned International Country Risk Guide rating system was designed to assess financial, economic, and political risks within countries. It was also designed to evaluate the quality of governance for individual countries over time and allow for between-country comparisons. Its financial- and economic-risk assessments rely on objective measurements, such as levels of growth, inflation, and GDP per capita. Its political-risk assessments are determined by its experts’ subjective interpretations. Political-risk factors include variables such as corruption, religious and ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and internal and external political violence and conflict. The International Country Risk Guide rating system provides a composite indicator for each of 140 countries on a monthly basis. International Country Risk Guide does not provide estimates of measurement error. For more information on the International Country Risk Guide rating system, see http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx.

Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index is widely used by academics, analysts, donors, investors, and journalists (Arndt & Oman, 2006). Transparency International is a non-profit organization. The Corruption Perceptions Index is constructed by compiling the results of corruption-perception surveys completed by resident and non-resident business people and other expert assessments. Countries are then ranked on a scale from 0 to 10, with a score of “10” representing the highest levels of corruption. Ratings are published with the number of surveys utilized for each score, along with an estimated “confidence range” that is dependent on the estimated degree of measurement precision. Countries with fewer than three surveys or assessments are excluded. Ratings are published annually and are currently available for 180 countries. Changes in ratings are difficult to interpret because a number of key (and potentially confounding) variables can impact ratings from year to year, including levels of corruption, perceptions of corruption, and methodology. However, it is important to note that Transparency International makes clear to its users that error must be considered when using the Corruption Perceptions Index ratings. For more information on the Corruption Perceptions Index, see http://www.transparency.org/.

The World Bank produces two sets of governance indicators (Arndt & Oman, 2006). One set is produced bi-annually by Daniel Kaufman and his colleagues at the World Bank
Institute. The other, produced annually by World Bank staff, is the Country Policy and Institutions Assessments. The Country Policy and Institutions Assessments have been used since 1977 to guide the allocation of interest-free loans and grants by the World Bank’s International Development Association to some of the world’s poorest countries. Ratings are based on 16 criteria related to four categories: economic management; structural policies; policies for social inclusion and equity; and public-sector management and institutions. Countries are given a score of 1 to 6 for each of the criteria. Each category is then given the same weight to generate an overall score. A “governance factor” is also generated. It is determined largely by data related to public-sector management and institutions, such as property rights and rules-based governance, quality of budgetary and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilization, quality of public administration, and transparency-accountability-corruption in the public sector. The World Bank provides its assessment teams with detailed questions and definitions for its ratings. It also conducts Bank-wide reviews of country ratings and conducts “benchmarking” exercises. The Bank publishes the numerical rating for each criterion annually. For more information on the Country Policy and Institutions Assessments, see http://www.worldbank.org/.

Since 1996, the World Bank Institute has produced the most comprehensively available set of governance indicators – widely known as the “WBI” or “KKZ” indicators for its co-authors, Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, and now Massimo Mastruzzi (Arndt & Oman, 2006). WBI indicators are composite measures of six aspects of governance (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2006):

- **Voice and Accountability** – the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression and association, and a free media,
- **Political Stability and Absence of Violence** – citizens’ perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism,
- **Government Effectiveness** – the quality of public services, civil service, and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies,
- **Regulatory Quality** – the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development,
- **Rule of Law** – the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence, and
- **Control of Corruption** – the extent, to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.

Each of the six indicators are constructed from hundreds of existing perception indicators derived from 37 different data sets, produced by 31 different organizations (Arndt & Oman, 2006). Ratings, which are published annually in “Governance Matters” reports, are currently available for 212 countries and territories. Due to the large number of sources and perception indicators utilized, measurement error is unavoidable. And, because the composition of the
indicators changes over time, it is difficult to compare levels of governance over time. However, the authors do provide estimates of measurement error and make clear to readers that error must be considered when using their indicators. For more information on the WBI indicators, see http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance.

Our review of governance indicators brought to light three important issues regarding the use of governance indicators:

- Measurement error,
- Inconsistent methodology, and
- Limitations associated with the use of subjective measures.

Those concerns were specifically addressed in a report by Kaufmann and Kraay (2007). In that report, they offered seven guiding principles for those seeking to use and produce governance indicators:

- Pay particular attention to the existence, measurement, and implications of margins of error in all efforts to construct governance indicators,
- Fully disclose margins of error, sources, and methodological details (including data collection) in all indicators efforts, and emphasize the key role of public access to the resulting indicators to ensure full transparency and credibility,
- Effectively and intelligently utilize (but with an appropriate abundance of caution) the myriad of indicators already in existence, while continuing to strive to improve upon them and generating new ones,
- Make progress in gathering data on a set of “action-worthy” indicators, which are not simply “actionable” or overly narrow in scope,
- Given the difficulties in linking particular actions with governance results on the ground, continue to utilize and improve upon outcome indicators as a key part of the governance diagnostic process,
- If possible, avoid, to the extent possible, utilizing any one governance indicator alone for any major policy or aid decision-making – without applying checks and balances provided by other indicators, and
- Exploit the complementary nature of different types of indicators, be they aggregate or individual, objective or subjective, action-worthy or outcome.

The issues raised by Kaufmann and Kraay appear to be relevant to the development of local level governance indicators. Specifically, the research team will want to develop multiple actionable and complementary measures, and be cognizant of measurement error, while doing so.

Discussion

Interviews with Soldiers and leaders allowed us to confirm the training needs initially described to us by battalion commanders. They also provided us with new insight into the activities required of Soldiers across echelons. Our review of Army Doctrine revealed a comprehensive framework for the development of governance-skills training. FM 3-24, FM 3-07, and FM 3-24.2 offer broad guidance on governance-related KSAs that are critical for those
Soldiers tasked with measuring, monitoring, and fostering good governance. However, doctrine does not provide specific, detailed guidance on those KSAs. Our review of academic and non-governmental literature revealed five commonly used country-level indicators of quality governance. Of those, the WBI indicators (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2006) seemed to most closely reflect the traits of legitimate governments and indicators of LG presented in Army Doctrine. We were also able to identify statistical and methodological issues that often accompany the use of governance measures – namely, the prevalence of measurement error, inconsistent methodology, and the benefits and limitations of using objective and/or subjective measures. Taken together, the efforts described here provide a foundation upon which we intend to build a research and development program (R&D) to address the Army’s need for governance-skills training.

Because governance is such a complicated concept, the development of governance training for the Army must be realistic and focused. It will not be possible to resolve the long-standing difficulties of defining and measuring governance, or solve all of the Army’s problems related to it. Instead, we feel that the primary goal of such work should be to develop governance training for Soldiers that is relevant to the governance missions that they carry out and support. We also recommend that training development efforts not be strictly limited by culture or geography. The U.S. military has been, and is expected to be, the primary U.S. instrument of nation- and state-building (Chiarelli, 2007). Therefore, we feel that efforts to identify the best practice for training governance development and enhancement skills should provide tools that can be used by, and/or modified for, Soldiers faced with governance-related missions anywhere in the world. With those overarching philosophies in mind, we outline here a preliminary research plan with which we intend to pursue the development of governance-skills training.

Preliminary Research Plan

**Identification of training content.** A first step toward meeting the Army’s need for governance-skills training will be to identify, though various forms of analysis, the information to be trained. Initially we will have to conduct a number of interviews and literature searches. Soldiers, squad and platoon leaders, and company and battalion commanders and staffs, who have recently carried out and/or supported governance-related missions, will be interviewed. During those interviews, we will inquire about the mental, physical, and social tasks and skills required to carry out governance missions. Interviews will also be conducted with governance experts from a variety of perspectives such as anthropology, economics, engineering, political science, and sociology. Once we have completed all of the necessary interviews, we will supplement the data that we have collected with literature searches. We will search Center for Army Lessons Learned to supplement our understanding of Army perspectives on LG. We will also search government and corporate reports, and academic literature, so that other (non-Army) perspectives are included in our analyses.

Making use of the information gleaned from interviews and literature searches, we will then conduct the analyses necessary to:

- Define governance,
• Define LG and identify its dimensions and measures,
• Describe the purpose of LG efforts, and
• Determine how the efforts and actions of individual and squad-level Soldiers are nested within the actions of platoon, company, and battalion-level efforts, and fit into the “bigger LG picture.”

For each of those analyses, care will be taken to generate definitions and explanations that can be readily understood and used by Soldiers.

We will then utilize interview data to conduct job task analyses. The purposes of those analyses will be to:

• Identify the governance-related KSAs required of NCOs, junior-, and new field-grade officers, and demonstrate how those skills are nested within the actions of platoon, company, and battalion-level efforts,
• Identify governance-related “dos and don’ts” for NCOs, junior-, and new field-grade officers,
• Identify the governance-related skills required of squad and platoon leaders, and company and battalion commanders and their staffs, and determine how those skills vary from squad to battalion level, and
• Identify the governance-related skills that Soldiers need to be able to teach individuals belonging to the local populace.

Again, all of the analyses described will be presented in a manner that is ready for use by Soldiers.

Design and Develop Web-Based Training (WBT) Program. A second step toward meeting the Army’s need for governance-skills training will be to design and develop a WBT program that can teach Soldiers at all levels about the general concepts, principles, and significance of governance and LG. The contents of the program will include the results of the previously described analyses:

• A definition of governance,
• A working definition of LG and description of its dimensions and measures,
• A description of the purpose of LG efforts,
• Training vignettes showing how the efforts and actions of individual and squad-level Soldiers are nested within the actions of platoon, company, and battalion-level efforts, and fit into the “bigger LG picture,” and
• Compelling accounts of successful governance-related missions, presented in the words of real Soldiers.

The program will be developed in a manner that is suitable for hosting on Army Knowledge Online (AKO) or similar web-portal, so that it can be accessed from any location with internet access. Content will be presented in a multi-media format, including images, text, and audio, and narrated throughout by an “off-screen” instructor. Demonstration and training vignettes will feature individual Soldiers and leaders as they carry out governance-related
missions. Vignettes will include branching storylines so that students have the opportunity to examine the consequences of individual Soldiers and small group actions, and the results of successful and failed missions.

In order to assess the early efficacy and “Army authenticity” of the WBT program, we will conduct early formative evaluations of the program. Evaluations will be conducted with Soldiers and leaders of operational units with recent experience conducting LG-related missions. We will then revise the WBT program as necessary.

**Design and Develop Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), and Associated Training and Job Aids.** The third step toward meeting the Army’s need for governance-skills training will be to design and develop TTP, and associated training and job aids, which NCOs and junior- and new field-grade officers can use to measure, monitor, and foster LG at the local level. In contrast to the general, concept-based governance training presented in the WBT program, the focus of TTP and training aids will be LG at the local level. The contents of the TTP and training materials will include the results of the previously described analyses.

We will also design and develop training materials and job aids for leaders to use in collective training of TTP. Training materials will include:

- Worksheets and checklists,
- After action review (AAR) discussion points for use after AO evaluations, and
- Training vignettes.

Job aids will include:

- Worksheets and checklists for monitoring and measuring LG in an AO,
- Information cards containing governance concepts,
- Information cards containing governance-related “dos and don’ts” for Soldiers, and
- Informational posters for posting within a unit.

To assess the efficacy of the TTP and related materials, we will conduct early formative evaluations. Evaluations will be conducted with Soldiers and leaders of operational units with recent governance experience. TTP and training materials will be revised as needed.

**Conclusions**

Governance and LG are complicated concepts. Definitions, dimensions, and measures of governance have remained elusive, even to the academicians, economists, and political scientists who have spent decades studying the topic (see reviews in Arndt & Oman, 2006; Besançon, 2003; Landman & Häusermann, 2003; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002; The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2006). For the U.S. Army, the already complex issue of developing legitimate HNG has been made even more difficult by cultural and language barriers, and being actively engaged in conflict. Nonetheless, Army Soldiers and leaders have done a remarkably good job of navigating the complexities of governance in very challenging
physical and socio-cultural environments – even without institutionalized training in place to support those efforts.

The purposes of the effort described here were twofold. First, we wanted to document the Army’s current need for governance-related training as communicated to us by Army commanders. Second, we wanted to provide a tool to aid our research team in upcoming efforts to address that need. In this report, we confirmed the training needs as initially communicated to us by commanders and described the activities of Soldiers at squad, platoon, company, and battalion levels. Further, we demonstrated that Army Doctrine has offered a framework upon which governance-related training can be developed and provided an easy-to-use guide by which relevant doctrinal text can be located. We also identified five commonly used indicators of quality governance and made note of important considerations for their use. Finally, we presented a preliminary research plan. The results of the research described here will influence and guide future R&D efforts to produce training tools and materials that will equip U.S. Army Soldiers with the skills to develop, enhance, and support local level HNG.
References


## Appendix A

### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKO</td>
<td>Army Knowledge Online</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARI</td>
<td>U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>A Memory Aid for the Characteristics of Civil Considerations: Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>District Advisory Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOF</td>
<td>Escalation of Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNG</td>
<td>Host-Nation Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Interim City Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSAs</td>
<td>Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>LG</td>
<td>Legitimate Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Lines of Communications</td>
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<td>LOE</td>
<td>Lines of Effort</td>
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<tr>
<td>LLO</td>
<td>Logical Lines of Operation</td>
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<td>MCRP</td>
<td>Marine Corps reference publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Measure of Effectiveness</td>
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<td>MOP</td>
<td>Measure of Performance</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>Neighborhood Advisory Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
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<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Operation Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROI</td>
<td>Rules of Interaction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIP</td>
<td>Very Important Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>WBT</td>
<td>Web-Based Training</td>
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</table>
Appendix B

Interview Items

1. Were you involved in efforts to promote the development of local governance during your last deployment?

2. If you had to identify 5 or 6 specific governance-related tasks that you and/or your unit were responsible for, what would they be?
   a. What skills were required to successfully perform those tasks?
   b. Can you prioritize those tasks in terms of the amount of time you spent on each?
   b. Can you prioritize those tasks in terms of difficulty?

3. Did you feel that you and/or your unit were adequately trained to perform those tasks?
   a. If so, which training was most useful?
   b. If not, is there pre-deployment training that would have better prepared you for this task? What specific knowledge or skills would you like to have had?

4. Is there any governance-related training that you would modify to better prepare you and/or your unit?