How the Army Resists Change

A Monograph
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### 14. ABSTRACT
Many authors in recent years have written about the Army’s reaction to change. They have explored the topic from various perspectives; some look at bureaucracy, others at culture, and still others look at the increasing speed with which the Army’s strategic environment is evolving. However, few researchers have assessed the concurrent interaction of these factors. Even fewer have identified a common thread that might help to explain the Army’s resistance to change beyond the factors themselves. In this paper, the author attempts to explain the Army’s resistance to change from a new perspective – one that identifies ‘organizational hypocrisy’ as an anti-catalyst to change in the Army. This monograph recommends that the Army’s strategic leaders adopt a more critical, measured posture on change in the Army. This is not necessarily a call for slowing the pace of change. Rather, it requires Army leaders to approach change from a perspective of healthy skepticism. This skepticism begs to question one’s efficacy in directing strategic change (transformation), the authenticity in one’s change messages, and whether or not practicable changes – those that strategic leaders can directly affect – are occurring to facilitate real transformation. It realizes the transactional expense in posing transformational change, measuring rhetoric as one form of currency, and asks leaders to spend that currency wisely. Most importantly it recognizes that perceptions of hypocrisy, be it a disconnect between words and actions or a negative assessment of sincerity in change utility or necessity, undermines whatever change is currently associated with it and builds institutional cynicism to further change in the future.

### 15. SUBJECT TERMS
Organizational Change, Transformation, Army, Culture, Bureaucracy, Strategic Environment
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Many authors in recent years have written about the Army’s reaction to change. They have explored the topic from various perspectives; some look at bureaucracy, others at culture, and still others look at the increasing speed with which the Army’s strategic environment is evolving. However, few researchers have assessed the concurrent interaction of these factors. Even fewer have identified a common thread that might help to explain the Army’s resistance to change beyond the factors themselves. In this paper, the author attempts to explain the Army’s resistance to change from a new perspective – one that identifies ‘organizational hypocrisy’ as an anti-catalyst to change in the Army.

While this monograph references several established theories of organizational change, the author did not set out to study the Army with any one theory in mind. Instead, he traced many years of discourse regarding change in the Army to try and identify a fresh, grounded view of the subject. This research uncovered something beyond bureaucratic structure, culture, and environment that helps to explain the Army’s difficulty with change in recent years. It is a sense of hypocrisy in the rhetoric surrounding change that exacerbates tensions and increases resistance to change within the Army. While one can certainly trace this rhetoric back to any and all of the common factors of change for its sources, a critical view of the rhetoric itself elucidates a significant source of additional anti-change sentiment throughout the Army.

This monograph recommends that the Army’s strategic leaders adopt a more critical, measured posture on change in the Army. This is not necessarily a call for slowing the pace of change. Rather, it requires Army leaders to approach change from a perspective of healthy skepticism. This skepticism begs to question one’s efficacy in directing strategic change (transformation), the authenticity of one’s change messages, and whether or not practicable changes – those that strategic leaders can directly affect – are occurring to facilitate real transformation. It realizes the transactional expense in proposing transformational change, measuring rhetoric as one form of currency, and asks leaders to spend that currency wisely. Most importantly it recognizes that perceptions of hypocrisy, be it a disconnect between words and actions or a negative assessment of sincerity in change utility or necessity, undermines whatever change is currently associated with it and builds institutional cynicism to further change in the future.
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INTRODUCTION

With 2,000 years of examples behind us we have no excuse when fighting, for not fighting well.

T.E. LAWRENCE, letter, in Liddell Hart, Memoirs

The United States Army, despite its preeminence as a military ground force, continues to struggle with efforts to improve its doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) in order to meet current and future national security requirements. Discussions of force structure, manning, equipment, priorities for training, and necessary capabilities – questions unabated by existing Army resolutions to transform – indicate serious doubts about the Army’s potential resilience. ‘How is it,’ one might ask, ‘that an army with so many resources at its disposal, such an enormous budget, so much operational experience, and such a long tradition of success attracts so much debate about its future viability?’

Despite all of the attention paid to the Army’s status and its future needs – the Chief of Staff admits the Army is “stretched”¹ and American Enterprise Institute fellow Thomas Donnelly proposes a much larger expansion than current plans suggest² – few people have taken their discussion past quantifiable factors. Arguments usually revolve around ‘how much more,’ ‘how many more will we need’ or ‘how should we restructure?’ Rarely will you hear someone question the Army’s organic institutional ability to meet its future security requirements. In fact, all the rhetoric about revolutionary change and transformation portrays an Army that is not only adapting to be successful in ongoing conflicts, but also to poise its forces for the future.

There is no doubt that the United States’ Army is the finest in the world. Its future efficacy, however, begs to question much more than DOTMLPF resourcing. The real question is:

can the Army adapt to meet future security requirements given its current institutional and organizational paradigms? In order to properly answer such a question one must assess not only the factors of DOTMLPF, but also the strategic context that frames the Army’s operating environment. Furthermore, one must consider the organizational culture of the Army itself. Because so many others have written about the Army’s future viability from a perspective of DOTMLPF, this monograph concentrates more on the interrelationship of the Army’s culture, its traditional organizational characteristics, and its contemporary strategic context. Specifically, this monograph explains how tensions between these domains and perceptions of hypocrisy in the Army create hidden impediments to change.

In his research, the monograph author sought not to disparage the Army as a defunct organization, but rather to expose some of the underlying explanations for the Army’s recent difficulties in adapting to its environment. These difficulties are not unique to the Army, nor should we consider them entirely the Army’s ‘fault.’ This monograph demonstrates that there are legitimate and practical reasons why the Army should find transformation easier said than done. By critically reflecting upon the interrelationship of the Army’s structure, its culture, the strategic environment, and the messages that reconcile (or fail to reconcile) tensions between these domains, Army leaders can provide better assessments of the organization’s ability to reform and improve efforts to effectively implement change. These insights should inform other like-organizations within the nation’s security apparatus about the importance of understanding the complexity of these relationships in assessing institutional capacity and capability, as well as managing change.

The monograph contains eight major sections: research methodology, an examination of change messages in the Army, a review of the DOTMLPF paradigm’s relevance to change, the impact of the Army’s culture and its strategic context, a critical view of change efficacy in the Army, conclusions regarding tensions between these elements, and recommendations for overcoming the associated impediments to change.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This paper reflects a journey that began with a simple question: why does the Army have difficulty with change? Given all the literature on organizational change, the many directives for transformation from outside the Army, and the seemingly concurrent proposals for reformation from within, the author sought to determine what unrecognized conditions might exist that impede the change that everyone seems to agree the Army needs.

The author pursued a research methodology that most would characterize as grounded theory. This methodology encouraged exploration in a multitude of directions at first, looking for possible explanations of the Army’s struggle with change that differ from prevailing thought. In addition, the approach provided an interesting parallel to the School of Advanced Military Studies “Art of Design” in which one reverse engineers a hypothesis through the categorization of concepts that emerge during open-minded examination and coding of data. The data included official statements from political and military leaders, professional discourse, doctrine, academic literature outside the Army, and mainstream media commentary on military and political affairs. In addition to contemporary materials, the author delved into American military history to assess the influence of the Army’s evolution on its embedded culture and, thus, its natural propensities and disposition to change in general.

CHANGE, TRANSFORMATION, AND MORE CHANGE

“When you're finished changing, you're finished.”

Benjamin Franklin

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4 Booz Allen Hamilton, Art of Design: Student Text v1.0 (Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC - School of Advanced Military Studies, 2008), 3.
The following excerpt from the current edition of the Army War College’s *How the Army Runs* demonstrates just how pervasive the idea of change is within the Army today (bold added to emphasize change messages):

Fulfilling the intent of Congress and the requirements of Section 3062 of Title 10, United States Code (USC), is a formidable task. The Army is a dynamic organization that must constantly **change** to **adapt** to **changing** threats to the Nation's security and to the assignment of new missions that promote our country's interests at home and abroad…. This requires continual modernization and development across the Army's Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. The military is at a historic moment; it is a time when a confluence of factors are relentlessly driving **change**. Foremost among these factors is the advent of the Information Age that has empowered rapid, and focused **adaptation** through the creation of learning organizations penetrating heretofore rigid hierarchies with almost limitless multi-echelon access and connectivity. This rapidly developing network centric mode of operation is bypassing layered bureaucratic systems and processes and allowing concurrent vertical and horizontal informal communications and access to near real-time task related information.

Simultaneously, the accelerating development of revolutionary technologies with broad military applicability is continually improving precision, detection, range, lethality, navigation, situational awareness, and many more aspects of system and organizational performance. Finally, the strategic environment is providing the context for driving major **changes** in our armed forces. This context includes: the emergence of a more complex national security environment with diminishing protection afforded by geographic distances; a deteriorating international security environment caused by weak and failing states; the emergence and diffusion of power to non-state actors; and a global war against terrorism. These trends and others have caused the nature and location of conflicts to be unpredictable and created a broad spectrum of new threats within dynamic strategic and operational environments. The combination of these influences is forcing a **transformation**, not only in our new weapons systems and platforms, but also in the organizations, systems and processes used to develop and manage the Army. Consequently, the very systems that this book describes and explains are undergoing profound **changes** responding to both external and internal factors. Many of these organizations, systems and processes were undergoing dramatic **changes** as this text was being written.5

‘The Army needs to change!’ Many in the Army today associate these words with contemporary conflicts – namely Iraq and Afghanistan, the larger fight against religious extremist networks, or with situations spurred by globalization along with increasing regional competition.

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The assumption permeates everything those in the Army do and say; it goes unchallenged that the Army today faces a more complex and ambiguous environment than ever before. A brief review of recent history, however, provides some perspective on this matter.

When did change become so important in the Army? Many attribute the exigency to the events that transpired on September 11th 2001. In a December 2006 speech to the Commission on National Guard and Reserves, Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker stated “Following 9/11, our Army began its most significant reorganization since World War II.” In February 2009, Army Secretary Pete Geren echoed the same message when he addressed the Army Management Staff College. But in a speech at the Citadel in December of 2001, President Bush stated “The need for military transformation was clear before the conflict in Afghanistan and before September the 11th.” He went on to explain,

Here at The Citadel in 1999 I spoke of keeping the peace by redefining war on our terms. The same recommendation was made in the strategic review that Secretary Rumsfeld briefed me on last August, a review that I fully endorse. What's different today is our sense of urgency, the need to build this future force while fighting a present war. It's like overhauling a car engine while you're going at 80 miles an hour. Yet we have no other choice.

What happened to prompt President Bush to make such a declaration in 1999? After a bit of reflection, most people familiar with the Army will remember talk of pre-9/11 change and even realize that it had already been dubbed ‘Transformation’. Army Chief of Staff General Erik Shinseki introduced his vision for Army Transformation at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Eisenhower Luncheon in October of 1999. Many agree that his was a reaction to

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the Army’s embarrassment at how long it took to deploy units to Albania during the Kosovo War earlier that year,\textsuperscript{10} not to a global Islamic-extremist insurgency.

Was Shinseki the first to recognize a change in strategic context? Not at all. His predecessor, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer proposed the Strike Force in early-1999: “Operation Desert Storm showed us we had to change. And we have changed. In Operation Desert Storm, it took us 18 days to deploy a heavy brigade. Today we can do it in 96 hours. All that insight gave birth to the Strike Force concept. We have been working this concept since 1996.”\textsuperscript{11} 1996? Were there others who saw a need for change before this? Army Chief of Staff General Edward Meyer proposed the High Technology Light Division in the early 80s.\textsuperscript{12} General Donn Starry developed AirLand Battle before that.\textsuperscript{12} So it seems the Army has always been in a state of significant change.

In a monograph for the Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute Dr. Zhivan Alach, a capabilities analyst within the New Zealand Army General Staff, argues that when one looks at the U.S. Army and in a broader sense the U.S. military over the last century, the period following the Cold War have actually been a time of “relative military stasis”.\textsuperscript{13} He explains that the contemporary period may be seen as a return to military normalcy after the lengthy anomaly of the Cold War. It is a shift away from state-on-state conflict, away from large scale war, away from a view that sees armies as forces designed solely for decisive, Clausewitzian battles. Yes, there has been change since the end of the Cold War, but it should not be exaggerated; rather than innovation, it might be taken as reaction, and the Cold War should be examined from a new perspective as a period of radical innovation in strategic terms, which would further be reinforced by the rapid technological development that characterized it.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} Zhivan Alach, Slowing Military Change (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), viii.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., viii-ix.
If one were to return to General Schoomaker’s claim, echoed by many in recent years, that the Army is in the midst of it “most significant reorganization since World War II,” the following table would seem quite ironic:

**Excerpt from Force Design Initiatives, 1917-1995:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pentomic Army (1956)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Mobile Army (1959-60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (1961-65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Assault Division (1962-65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple Capabilities Division (1971-74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army 86 (1978-83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Technology Light Division (1980-84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of Excellence (1983-84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force XXI (1994)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the table describing force design initiatives above, the Army appears to have undergone multiple periods of significant change since World War II. One would find the same indications looking at personnel strength, equipment fielding, or doctrine. In retrospect, Dr. Alach’s assertions that recent changes represent a relative stasis actually seem to hold up.

In March of 2006, the Commander of Forces Command General Dan McNeil announced:

As good as the Army is today, we will need a better one tomorrow. We will need it because the strategic landscape in which we operate is changing; it is becoming considerably more complex. We have to change to maintain this great Army as a relevant force tomorrow. To remain the preeminent land power on Earth, it is clear to all of us who have leadership responsibilities that we have to change.

If one were to read General McNeil’s statement at any time, in any context, would it be any less valid? ‘The Army needs to change!’ There has never been any question about this.

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15 General Peter Schoomaker, 1.
17 Zhivan Alach, viii-ix.
In his book *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, published in 1984, Barry Posen asserts that large organizations (e.g. the Army) inherently resist innovation and seek stability. This is largely a result of the increased bureaucracy that normally accompanies organizational growth. Many who profess about the Army’s resistance to innovation, learning, and change today maintain Posen’s assertion as an implicit assumption in their arguments.

When conceptualizing, planning, directing, and assessing change in the Army from a bureaucratic perspective, the most familiar paradigm is DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities). These domains essentially represent the levers with which the Army’s leaders steer the organization. A good example of this paradigm’s application is the 2007 Transformation Report to Congress, which states that the following DOTMLPF goals represent “complementary and fully integrated major objectives associated with transformation”:

**Doctrine:** Develop concepts and doctrine to guide force development, which include The Army in Joint Operations: The Army’s Future Force Capstone Concept (2015–2024), FM 3–0 Full-Spectrum Operations, FM 3–24 Counterinsurgency, and the doctrine to employ the Army Modular Force.

**Organization:** Implement the Army Modular Force to reorganize the Operational Army into modular theater armies, theater support structure, corps and division headquarters, brigade combat teams, and multi-functional and functional support brigades based on common organizational designs for AC and RC units.

**Training:** Implement Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), a cyclic training and readiness process that generates modular expeditionary forces tailored to joint force requirements. ARFORGEN supports the Army’s goal to synchronize strategic planning, resourcing and execution to meet rotational and contingency requirements more effectively and efficiently. ARFORGEN requires the Generating Force to adapt its processes to resource and sustain the Operating Force on a cyclic basis.

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20 How the Army Runs, 5.
**Materiel:** Reset the Force to ensure readiness for current and future operations. Sustain the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) and Rapid Equipping Force (REF) to equip Soldiers properly for combat operations. Implement Network Enabled Battle Command solutions to support current joint operations. Develop the Integrated Network Architecture and resource plan for LandWarNet, the Army’s contribution to the Global Information Grid (GIG). Develop FCS and field FCS BCTs. Spin-out mature FCS capabilities directly into the current force.

**Leadership and Education:** Instill the Warrior Ethos in every Soldier. Develop pentathletes—innovative, adaptive leaders who are full-spectrum warriors, confident and competent in the complex, uncertain operating environment. Leverage lessons learned in combat, counter-insurgency, stability and reconstruction operations. Expand cultural awareness in military education and enhance foreign language training.

**Personnel:** Implement unit focused stability (lifecycle manning) to improve training, cohesion and combat effectiveness in units. Implement force stabilization to improve predictability for Soldiers and their families. Apply better business practices to free resources for pressing operational needs and to develop leaders who practice the principles of continuous improvement.

**Facilities:** Implement the Global Defense Posture Realignment (GDPR) and Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) directed unit moves.\(^2^1\)

Unfortunately, the Army’s bureaucracy does not directly reflect the DOTMLPF activities that it supposedly promulgates. There is an inherent set of tensions between how the Army has evolved in the past, how to manage its significant size and commitments in the present, and how to bring about changes in the future. *How the Army Runs* describes the Army as an “open organizational system with three distinct components: the production, combat, and integrating subsystems.”\(^2^2\) The description continues with an explanation:

Each of these components has tasks to accomplish, each operates in a given environment, and each requires and acquires resources. Because of the size and complexity of the Army and its tasks, its corresponding organizational structure must provide as much flexibility as possible (given resources and mission requirements) while also maintaining the command and control necessary to develop forces and marshal, deploy, employ those forces and sustain operations in support of our national strategy.\(^2^3\)

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\(^2^1\)Ibid., 5-6.

\(^2^2\)How the Army Runs, 19.

\(^2^3\)Ibid., 19.
The description above uncovers several underlying conditions that explain the Army’s unyielding bureaucratic nature. First, there is a tension between flexibility and reliability. While the Army needs to be flexible enough to carry out its tasks in a complex environment, it must be reliable in its subordination to civilian control and its ability to follow orders through an internal command structure. Second, this particular description of environment and resources reflects a classical view of organizations as systems – one of inputs and outputs between subsystems within their environments.24 This traditional view of the organization reinforces bureaucracy and encourages improvements through additional structures and reporting mechanisms, rather than consideration of a more flexible, open system of operation. Progress, in this model, is usually accompanied by increases in structure and reporting requirements rather than streamlining.

Viewing the Army as a complex adaptive system would explicate many sources of resistance to change within the Army and without. While each of the Army’s subsystems and components described above are presumably designed to work together in a cooperative manner, they inevitably develop their own self-maintaining properties to justify their continued existence and relevance. Additionally, ‘the environments’ they operate in become a complex set of milieus as well, characterized by relationships that extend outside the Army’s formal organization, associated with interests and influences that are not subject to the Army leaders’ control.

A systemic exploration of the Army’s bureaucracy is beyond the scope of this paper. However, several authors have undertaken the task recently.25, 26 The preceding section simply highlights how something as ‘organized’ as the Army does not manifest change in a predictable

manner, particularly when its bureaucracy does not reflect the controls necessary to manage such change (DOTMLPF).

In many ways, the Army’s bureaucracy has become so massive and so entrenched in the larger national administration that it seems unmoving. When people have difficulty fully explaining the Army’s resistance to change with such a view, they often look for something apart from the tensions within the bureaucracy that must be slowing down the system’s processes. Instead of pursuing a better systemic view of the Army as an organization, they often cite its culture as the culprit for change resistance.

**ARMY CULTURE**

“Armies are conservative organizations; they adapt themselves slowly to new environments, and especially to new mental surroundings. Today a new epoch of war is dawning, and we are surrounded by a veritable fog of new ideas”


The preceding section demonstrates that managing change in the Army involves understanding relationships between several domains internal and external to the organization. The War College’s *How the Army Runs* expounds on the complexity of managing change in the Army with the following:

Changing large organizations with well-developed cultures embedded in established hierarchical bureaucracies is incredibly difficult. The mere existence of functioning complex organizational systems and embedded processes tends to resist change. The Army’s systems and processes outlined herein are no exception. Within the current unprecedented organizational context, these processes can be more likely to impede than to facilitate change as the Army struggles to incorporate flexible and adaptive processes that will reduce the bureaucracy, inspire creativity and rapidly incorporate technological, cognitive, and organizational innovations.27

27 Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, 1.
Often, instead of looking at the impediments inherent in the bureaucracy itself, people assume there must be something common throughout the system that explains its resistance to change. After all, the task is daunting – to conceptualize and fully assess the interrelationships between so many sub-organizations, interests, and processes. It would be much easier if one were to assume there is a common element, one that permeates the entire Army, which can help explain its conservative nature. That element is culture. And while culture is indeed a critically important consideration in understanding the Army’s response to change, it may not be the most significant impediment.

One of the most prominent writers on culture in organizations, Edgar Schein describes organizational culture as a “pattern of shared basic assumptions that a group has learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”  

Schein’s description is powerful because it captures the amorphous nature of culture, the systemic nature of coping methods in organizations, and the idea that culture persists.

Unfortunately, the Army is ambiguous about its own definition of organizational culture. FM 6-22 Army Leadership defines culture as “the set of long-held values, beliefs, expectations, and practices shared by a group that signifies what is important and influences how an organization operates.”  

But the field manual’s main text refers to culture as “the environment of the Army as an institution” and goes on to describe that culture “consists of the shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterize the larger institution over time. It is deeply rooted in

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long-held beliefs, customs, and practices." The way the manual explains culture represents a circular logic between what it is and where it is rooted. Furthermore, FM 6-22 states “strategic leaders maintain the Army’s institutional culture,” but does not adequately explain how they do this.

This ambiguity is not lost on the Army at large. As just one example of how many in the Army view culture, consider the following description: “a common set of values and goals described as missions, [and] practices that we accept as routine.” Values and goals described as missions? In the same article, the author repeatedly defines Army culture as “beliefs and practices,” an interesting simplification. Herein lies the problem; many in the Army see practices as a direct path to culture. Such a view represents the same untenable idea that many share regarding the efficacy of controlling Army culture: “we must take charge of our Army culture – set our own path vice yielding to external pressures.”

The cognitive distinction between beliefs and practices is an important one in understanding culture change. This difference is similar to the contrast between attitudes and behaviors that has occupied so much thought in the field of psychology over the years. While one could look at it as a discussion of ‘which comes first, the chicken (attitudes) or the egg (behaviors),’ a critical view of what you can actually observe, assess, and influence begins to hint at what leaders who want to affect changes in culture should be talking about. It also begs to

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30 Ibid., 8-1.
31 Ibid., 8-1.
33 Ibid., 10.
34 Ibid., 11.
question, what does it mean when leaders call for a change in culture but there are no apparent changes in practice?

The Army War College has seen many papers recently responding to a call for change in Army culture. In a 2003 paper, LTC Driessnack describes why changing culture is easier said than done.

The maturity of the Army’s current beliefs and values creates the first obstacle to changing the culture. The Army’s beliefs and values are deeply embedded, encompassing: the customs and traditions, norms of conduct, ideals, and values that have evolved over 226 years of campaigns and battles, of shared hardship and triumph. 36

Like Schein, Driessnack recognizes that the Army’s culture is a product of centuries of evolution, not something that turns on a dime. Driessnack also understands how embedded culture is within an organization and how persistent culture is when many people are already invested in it.

The size and complexity of the Army creates a second obstacle to culture change. The large number of personnel and the multiple levels within the Army organization can potentially translate into a large number of personnel resisting change from numerous levels within the organization. T.O. Jacob observes: the Army and DOD are massively complex, and resist change massively. 37

Driessnack further describes how personal culture is. Especially when people join an organization and voluntarily adopt its culture as their own, changing culture presents a dilemma about belonging altogether.

The third difficulty in Army cultural change addresses the emotional aspect of belief change. Changing what people have come to believe, changing what people understand is true and right is both an intellectual and an emotional event. Significant effort must be focused on getting people to see and feel that the new way is right and reduce their natural emotions that could undermine the change effort. The larger the change, the more likely the response will create emotions that undermine change. 38

36 LTC (P) Charles H Driessnack, Responding to the Call to Transform the Army Culture (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2003), 2.
37 Ibid., 3.
38 Ibid., 3.
Driessnack explains how ironic it is for the Army’s strategic leaders to propose culture change because they are a product of the Army’s culture and often perpetuate it unknowingly.

A fourth challenge in the Army’s cultural change effort will be obtaining examples and models of the desired behaviors. Unlike many civilian companies that recruit externally for leadership that possess the desired values, the leadership in the Army is internally grown. Current Army leadership must first internalize the more enlightened values and beliefs and become examples before the rest of the Army can change. Any approach to changing the Army culture must first effectively change the embedded beliefs of the current and future leaders. ³⁹

Finally, Driessnack acknowledges how difficult it might be to propose culture change in the face of success or preeminence.

A fifth obstacle to Army cultural change is created by the current status the Army enjoys. The Army is currently rated the most powerful Army in the World. The Army is also teamed with the most powerful Air force and Navy in the World. America’s Armed Forces have helped establish the United States as the world’s single super power. A culture normally needs to experience situations that force a reevaluation of their beliefs before they will consider changing. Without a compelling reason or crisis to alert the Army culture for the need to change, the Army culture will most likely resist change. With all these potential obstacles to changing the Army culture, the Army’s Leadership Field Manual (FM 22-100) adds to the problems by providing no guidance on how to overcome these obstacles and effect cultural change. The FM simply states that the strategic leader is responsible for changing and shaping culture and that shaping culture is critical to supporting the organization’s vision and objectives. ⁴⁰

In order to better understand the role of culture in organizational change, one should return to Edgar Schein’s definition above. He describes culture as something you can not directly observe or affect. In fact, Schein goes on to describe three levels of organizational culture, only one of which is visible or accessible: artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and underlying assumptions. ⁴¹ In Army culture, practices represent artifacts – the observable part of our culture. When people call for culture change in the Army, be it a culture of innovation or a culture that embraces counterinsurgency, they should understand that what they are proposing is insufficient

³⁹ Ibid., 3.
⁴⁰ Ibid., 3.
⁴¹ Edgar Schein, 25-37.
without a comprehensive assessment and recommendation for changes in practices as well. Furthermore, they should consider any relationships they assess between practices and culture to be uncertain, realizing the complex nature of interaction between attitude (culture), behavior (practice), and the environment. BG Fastabend and Robert Simpson understood this in writing their article “Adapt or Die,” one of the most influential pieces on General Schoomaker’s Transformation plan, but the Army’s implementation of this guidance does not indicate the same level of understanding. Until the Army’s leaders make fundamental changes in its practices, implementing measures like a new officer evaluation report or multi-rater feedback practices, they cannot rightly expect a change in culture. Like the rhetoric surrounding ‘change’ itself, much of the attention to changing Army culture has been just as ambivalent.

Perhaps understanding Army culture is more important than understanding how to change culture, as changing culture is a difficult process that takes a long time. Major Michael Siegl wrote in Joint Forces Quarterly, “Every organization has a culture. It is ‘a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization. Culture is to an organization what personality is to an individual.” This analogy captures the essence of the quandary. Imagine changing culture is like changing personality. A more fruitful endeavor would be to understand how culture (personality) affects the way the Army responds to change. Siegl further notes, “Culture will dictate how an organization responds to different situational challenges. It also consistently shapes how the military views the environment and adapts to meet current and future challenges.”

45 Michael Siegl, 103.
When he was the 3rd Infantry Division’s Assistant Division Commander for Support in 2007, BG Edward Cardon seemed to understand the difference: “The Army's transformation, multiple combat deployments over five years of war and a changing American society have had a significant impact on our culture.”\(^\text{46}\)

This excerpt reflects an understanding that our culture, while somewhat a barrier, is open to and influenced by the larger environment. Furthermore, it captures the idea that our activities have shaped our culture, a reverse perspective from many who propose we change our culture in order to be better at the activities we anticipate doing in the future. BG Cardon continues: “The leaders making the decisions on the direction of the Army need to embrace our changing culture.…. More than not understanding the changing culture, leaders who focus on the former tend to frustrate our junior leaders. On the other hand, leaders who can harness our changing Army culture will continue to ensure that our Army remains the most respected land force in the world.”\(^\text{47}\)

BG Cardon, who is now the Deputy Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, presents a view of culture that is even more resilient to change and less responsive to directives than the Army’s bureaucracy.

Returning to a systemic view of the Army, if the bureaucracy is so unmovable and culture is so intangible, perhaps the environment helps to better explain the Army’s quandary. This environment represents more than simply the Army’s position in relationship to other organizations. It represents an exchange of influence, reinforcing (positive) forces and opposing (negative) forces created by convergent and divergent interests. Environment includes potential adversaries and likely allies, current operations and future outlooks. It also includes expectations from the larger community, obligations the Army might be required to fulfill, as well as the resources available to operate. These many things are but part of the Army’s environment – its strategic context.

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\(^\text{47}\) Ibid., 3.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT

To succeed, leaders must be at harmony with their context.

LTG (Retired) Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., 1997,
Inside View: A Leader’s Observations on Leadership.

Any assessment of the Army’s institutional responsibilities must include an understanding of its strategic context. The 2008 Army Posture Statement proposes the following strategic environment:

Persistent conflict and change characterize the strategic environment. We have looked at the future and expect a future of protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors who will use violence to achieve political, religious, and other ideological ends. We will confront highly adaptive and intelligent adversaries who will exploit technology, information, and cultural differences to threaten U.S. interests. Operations in the future will be executed in complex environments and will range from peace engagement, to counterinsurgency, to major combat operations. This era of persistent conflict will result in high demand for Army forces and capabilities.48

Many authors have written about the Army’s predilection for conventional war.49 Today there are a growing number writing about its unpreparedness for conventional conflict, precisely because the Army has chosen to focus so much effort on current counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.50 The Army is caught in a paradox, largely because it faces such an ambiguous strategic context. Or does it?

Besides potential enemies the Army might face and the locations in which it might fight, part of the Army’s strategic context is defined by its joint, interagency and allied partners. Despite all the talk about improved joint capability and cooperation, as well as interagency and


multinational, these factors are virtually absent from the Army’s official explanations of transformational change. Apart from promising to bring additional capability to the joint force, the Army – and the other services for that matter – continues to treat change as a unilateral top-down process. A discussion from a working group between the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College demonstrates the superficial consideration given to such concerns thus far:

The participants identified several factors that should be considered in the context of a joint operational environment, including: (1) emphasizing interagency cooperation and the interdependence of the armed forces; (2) placing military action within a political context; and (3) de-emphasizing the notion of a homogeneous force, (i.e. Future Combat System), in favor of a mixed force. The participants questioned whether it is necessary or wise for the joint operational concept to rely on the tenet of U.S. strategy that the United States must be superior across the entire spectrum of military missions. What is meant by superiority? Did the United States even use its superiority in Somalia? In Iraq, the United States is superior, but it is not decisive.

There is also some concern about the heavy emphasis on technology, in terms of the threats and responses thereto, because it is not necessarily consistent with the real threat from the low-tech opponents of the last 15 years: for example, the use of IEDs, and the use of RPGs against helicopters. The focus on high tech leads to exceedingly high costs which prevent allies from operating with the US military easily. The forces, by default, conducted a strategy of rapid in/out expeditionary warfare which leads to destruction. Although such an approach might be the most rational choice (i.e. regime change and withdrawal), it is politically unacceptable. Moreover, the existence of sophisticated weapons technology inclines a state to think in terms of resolving a conflict by military means even if it undermines other elements of National Security Strategy.\textsuperscript{51}

The preceding text alludes to the idea that what is best for the Army is not best for other interested parties, or rather – what is best for the Army must incorporate the interests and perspectives of other parties. After all, the Army no longer fights alone.

‘The Army needs to change!’ takes on different meanings when one considers the many other parties who share a place in the Army’s operational environment. To some, like defense contractors and members of Congress whose constituents value defense contracts, these words

\textsuperscript{51} Summary of Discussions, “Divergent Perspectives on Military Transformation” 2\textsuperscript{nd} Colloquium, Carlisle, PA, April 15-16, 2005, 5-6.
represent opportunity. To others, like the Marines, they represent a threat; after all, why does the Army need to be *more* expeditionary? To still others, like the Air Force and Navy, they represent competition – competition for funding. And to others, like interagency and allied partners, they represent concerns about capability, cooperation, interoperability, and often simply consideration. One might ask why the Army is placing so much emphasis on future technology when it has identified ongoing low-intensity conflicts as its primary concern for some time to come. This question gets to the central issue of change in the Army – efficacy. It is how people understand change to occur, either something that they affect or something that happens to them, that underlies the way they proceed about changing.

**TRANSFORMATION, OR SIMPLY EVOLUTION & ADAPTATION?**

"Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur."

Giulio Douhet

The real question is not whether the Army needs to change, as this is a constant, but whether the Army can transform itself, of its own volition. Change. Adapt. Evolve. Transform. Writers use the words interchangeably, but a critical inquiry into the meaning of each helps to clarify one’s examination of the Army’s predicament. For example, change is generic; it can be either passive or active. One can change or be changed. Adapt and evolve can both take on either active or passive meanings but, given their etymology, they usually imply passive change. Adaptation usually occurs in response to something. Evolution is a matter of natural selection, not willful change. Transform is generally active change. One transforms something by one’s own volition. But the English language leaves room for passive: allowing that something could be transformed. Ultimately, none of these terms are exclusively active or passive. However, the western preference for active voice, particularly in the government and military, generally implies
all of these terms in the active voice. So when the Army’s leaders say ‘the Army must change’ or explain their plans for Transformation, their wording implies ‘we (the Army) must change ourselves’. Is this really how change works?

A central question is whether the Army is adapting, changing as a reaction to its context, or transforming in anticipation of what lies ahead. While this might seem like an irrelevant matter of semantics, the distinction is worth exploring as it exposes a great deal about assumptions regarding efficacy in large organizations and complex environments.

When proposing change in the Army, leaders usually speak of future implications. After all, selling change is hard based on historical contexts. People are always complaining about an Army that prepares to fight the last war. Ironically, however, when one examines most contemporary change proposals in context, their arguments often indicate concerns from the recent past. For General Shinseki, the impetus behind Army Transformation was arguably the amount of time it took forces to deploy to Kosovo in 1999.52 His stated vision was more comprehensive than simply making the Army lighter and faster; he said it would be “more responsive, agile, versatile, deployable, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.”53 But despite the promise of a more capable Army, General Shinseki’s vision apparently betrayed his bias, to some at least:

Transformation was supposed to fix what was wrong with the Army. But what was wrong with the Army? For some looking outward, the lack of jointness was at the heart of what was wrong. For those who were looking inward, it was the deployability and survivability of Army units that needed to be corrected. While both perspectives are essential for real transformation, the current transformation of the Army is more inward-looking than outward-looking. Its major focus is on deployability and survivability. It does not emphasize the deficiencies in jointness that have become apparent over the last decade.54


54 Ibid., 147.
There were obviously tensions surrounding the concept: “Transformation means different things to different people. All planning and all changes in the Army have come to be called transformation. The term has permeated beyond the Army to encompass the entire defense program of the Bush administration.”

Ironically, as the buzz-word left the Army’s sole jurisdiction, the Army became its first victim. One account describes, “even those systems the army leadership…considered transformations, such as the Stryker wheeled combat vehicle and Future Combat System, were questioned by the civilian leadership.”

An even bigger question looms: to what degree can the Army anticipate its future context and furthermore, to what degree can the Army transform itself towards that future context given all the external interests involved. This is a matter of efficacy. In considering the Army’s organizational structure and bureaucracy, its organizational culture, as well as its strategic environment, the issue of efficacy is central to understanding Army transformation. A realistic view of change efficacy impacts not just what the Army’s leaders try to change, but also how they try to affect such change.

In addition to understanding what to change and how to change it, the issue of efficacy informs what Army leaders say about change. Appreciating efficacy should help to avoid a sense of hypocrisy that usually develops as a response to contradictions in what the Army says and what the Army does.

**HYPOSCRISY**

The Army needs to change. The Army has always been changing. Army culture must change. Army culture has changed, but not deliberately or by anyone’s decree. The Army is reorganizing to degrees unseen in the past six decades. The Army’s divisions and brigades may be

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55 Ibid., 148.

organized differently, but the larger organization appears very much the same. We are in an era
persistent conflict characterized by asymmetric warfare. We are transforming to a capabilities-
based force of unparalleled symmetric capabilities, ignoring concerns from coalition and joint
force partners that they have not been part of our consideration. These sentences serve only as an
element of tensions that might best be described as hypocrisy regarding recent change messages
in the Army.

In his testimony before the House Armed Service Committee on July 15, 2004, retired
Colonel Douglas Macgregor made the following critique of Transformation:

Current Army transformation programs are not informed by the realities of
modern combat or rigorous testing and experimentation…. Perfect situational
awareness, the key underlying assumption of the Army's future combat system is
an illusion, or perhaps a delusion. Situational awareness promotes that
information about the enemy and his intentions will always be available when it
is needed. It also assumes that everyone inside the battlespace will create and
exploit information in exactly the same way. As a result, situational awareness
demands a greater level of technological capability than is attainable today or in
the decades ahead. Most important, there is no evidence that plentiful networked
information can replace killing power and inherent survivability, especially in
close combat. Timely and useful information is critical, but it cannot substitute
for firepower, mobility and armored protection.57

Dr. Macgregor's analysis begs to question several underlying assumptions in the Army's
transformation proposals. Fundamentally, he proposes that the Army's likely operational
environment contradicts many of its leaders’ proposed capabilities tradeoff arguments.
Furthermore, he exposes and questions the supposition that relatively minor improvements in the
Army's deployment speed necessitate or justify sacrificing things like protection and firepower.
More important to Dr. Macgregor than the speed with which the Army moves is how capable it is
to support joint operations when it arrives.58 He is rightfully concerned about the flawed view of

57 U.S. Congress, *Statement of Colonel (Retired) Douglas Macgregor before the House Armed
58 Ibid., 2.
joint considerations that is so pervasive in the Army’s recent plans to change – one that sees joint partner capabilities as constraints first, enablers second. A better view would have Army leaders acknowledge that the Army does not move itself, strategically or even operationally really; rather the Army is moved by joint partners. Instead of proposing future Army forces that are more easily moved, justifying the Army’s quest for nimbleness with other potential capabilities, Army leaders might admit that the ground force actually requires the joint community to pursue new capabilities and adopt new practices in the way they move ground forces to realize effectual changes in the nation’s overall strategic agility.

Dr. Macgregor goes on to question the modular brigade concept, another central component in the Army’s Transformation plan. Implicit in his argument is the question, ‘are modular brigades truly more capable than their predecessors were when task-organized?’ This becomes an even more interesting question when one compares them to pre-Force XXI brigades and divisions, when the Army also justified decreases in brigade capacity with more technological capability. More importantly, Dr. Macgregor wonders how the merits of modularity translate to the larger fighting force as an amalgamation of modular brigades that might be required in future conflicts. Again, he uncovers a duplicity: “(t)he concept looks like an attempt to equate a near-term requirement to rotate smaller formations through occupation duty in Iraq or Afghanistan with the transformation of the Army into a new war-fighting structure, but the two missions are not the same at all.”

Dr. Macgregor further questions the utility of instigating major shifts in Army organization at the brigade level that equate to relatively minor changes in capabilities, all the while hiding the fact that the Army has not changed much at higher echelons or in its bureaucracy.

59 Ibid., 4-5.
60 Ibid., 8.
Dr. Macgregor’s concern is ultimately that the Army is changing significantly, which inherently causes turbulence and tension, but not in ways that justify the effort and cost of change with real increases in capability. “(T)oday’s senior leaders, dealing as they do with life and death should be as utterly realistic and ruthless in discarding the old for the new…. The Army must provide the joint force with a diversity of capabilities from theater missile defense to rapidly deployable armored fighting forces. One size does not fit all.”

The preceding testimony from Dr. Macgregor is just one example of the kind of critical inquiry that surrounds the Army’s Transformation plans. His inquiry is not better or worse than the Army’s proposals for change. Dr. Macgregor simply highlights the abundance of hidden assumptions that have recently imbued change proposals throughout the Army and potentially created room for perceptions of hypocrisy.

Hypocrisy in this case does not refer to the psychological phenomena of projection or fundamental attribution error. Nor does hypocrisy imply the negative connotation of deliberate contradiction often associated with the word. Hypocrisy, in this sense, simply refers to the tension created in people or organizations by inconsistencies between actions and statements or gaps between credible information and assertions.

In the preceding research of strategic change messages in the Army, as well as its organizational bureaucracy, culture, and strategic environment, a pattern of hypocrisy emerged that is not generally mentioned in studies of these facets themselves. While the Army’s size, structure, culture, and the complexity of its environment all certainly help to explain difficulties with change, there seems to be a theme of hypocrisy shared amongst these facets that serves to make matters worse. By not recognizing and addressing the tensions created by contradictions in

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61 Ibid., 9-10.
statement and action, or worse – by amplifying contradiction through more numerous and even stronger statements, the Army’s leaders exacerbate organic tensions surrounding change within the Army as a system.

Few people have written about such a condition until recently. Most recent materials refer specifically to the Army’s aversion to low-intensity conflict. Despite its focus on contemporary Army operations in Iraq, a draft paper by Dr. Sergio Catignani serves well to introduce some relatively new ideas of organizational hypocrisy to the Army. Ironically, Dr. Catignani’s research led him in a very similar direction as the research described thus far.

Catignani first discusses the internal facets of Army change that most researchers study, things like doctrine and culture, a similar path to this paper’s initial course. He notes the role that doctrine plays in shaping the Army’s course towards countering anticipated security threats. At the same time, he admits how much resistance informal aspects of the organization such as culture can manifest towards change communicated through formalities such as doctrine. He extends his argument to the bureaucracy of organizations like the Army, highlighting the huge discrepancies between organizational structure and actual function, to demonstrate the inherent ambivalence within organizations such as the Army.63

Catignani goes on to explain how the Army can resist change through its interaction with the larger system of national government and society, showing the importance of considering competing interests and interrelated forms of influence beyond the organization’s formal boundaries – even when looking at an institution as hierarchical and disciplined as the Army.64 This argument applies not only to the Army, but to all parties whose interests intersect in the

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63 Sergio Catignani, "Organizational Culture and Hypocrisy: Explaining the U.S. Army's Resistance to Adaptation to the Low-Intensity Conflict in Iraq" (paper presented at annual meeting of ISA's 49th Annual Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, San Francisco, CA, March 26, 2008) 7-8.

64 Ibid., 8-9.
national security arena, and helps to explain how formal structures and systems can be circumvented by informal relationships.

To explain why the Army might resort to such measures, Catignani explains how a sense of hypocrisy emerges “when identities within them are actually not shared, when norms and routines are varied and perhaps at odds with each other (Fiol, 1994), and when such organizations are subject to often contradictory demands for reform and adaptation both from within and from without their organizational setting.” He provides the following explanation:

Nils Brunsson’s theory of ‘organizational hypocrisy’ (2002), which has been used in organizational studies concerning business firms and political institutions, can provide a very useful conceptualization of such heterogeneity within military organizations, which although highly institutionalized and hierarchical, still fall short of being a homogeneous organization (Rosen, 1991). Within organizations that operate within heterogeneous political-institutional frameworks, members may possess a multiplicity of notions about what the organization is, what are its goals, what are seen to be as positive organizational outcomes and how such outcomes should be achieved. Brunsson contends that such organizations display the attributes of ‘hypocrisy’ in that a multiplicity of values results in the necessity for organizational incongruity between what is said, what is decided and what is acted upon. Such inconsistency is particularly due to the fact that ‘modern organizations are confronted not only by consistent demands but also by others that are inconsistent, conflicting or contradictory (Brunsson, 2002: xii). Such ‘conflicting demands are ultimately reflected in organizational structures, processes and ideologies’ [and these] incorporated inconsistencies define “the organization of hypocrisy”’ (Brunsson, 2002: xiii). The refutation of shared cultural values has attested to how difficult it has been to reconcile the idea that culture ‘exert[s] some regular influence on behavior of group members’ (Stromberg, 1981: 545).

Most interestingly, Catignani’s research does not propose a solution to the conditions inherent to the Army which create resistance to change – its bureaucracy, culture, or ambiguous strategic environment. Instead he proposes “the concept of organizational hypocrisy to explain the gap between statement and practice that an organization finds itself in when trying to satisfy a myriad of demands from various institutional actors.” Instead of looking to the problems

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65 Ibid., 10.
66 Ibid., 10-11.
67 Ibid., 11.
themselves, many of which are difficult to fully appreciate or influence, he looked to the larger problem of what leaders say about such things. He recognized that, in an organization as large and complex as the Army, how people address change can be as important in understanding an organization’s reaction to it as the change is itself. For example, Catignani notes “it is important to observe the explanatory/justificatory linguistic practices that organizations and other institutional actors carry out in relation to the multiple normative demands they are subject to in the ‘communicative domain’ of domestic and international politics. Such practices often produce a vocabulary of legitimate action that limits the strategies that individuals and organizations can adopt.”

This distinction provides a different perspective than established models like the Competing Values Framework (CVF) used to study organizational change through a lens of paradoxes. Models like the CFV provide a means to assess organizations and illustrate the tensions that commonly exist in organizations which must respond to competing demands. Even Brunsson’s original work on organizational hypocrisy delineates between action organizations and political organizations, another expression of divergent organizational requirements.

Dr. Catignani’s paper does two things. It provides support to a grounded theory regarding the role of hypocrisy in helping to explain the Army’s resistance to change. Without such, arguing that hypocrisy is a factor in the Army’s organizational change paradigm might seem like pure conjecture. Furthermore, his writing provides access to a body of literature regarding organizational hypocrisy that could complement existing organizational change concepts for the Army – literature that might not be associated with the Army otherwise. This perspective could

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68 Ibid., 11.
have profound impacts on the way Army leaders approach change necessity, change
implementation, and change messaging in the future. Along with a more comprehensive view of
the Army as a system, Catignani’s perspective could assist leaders in an improved
conceptualization of Army change altogether.

RECOMMENDATIONS

"People don't resist change. They resist being changed!"

Peter Senge

This paper presents a highly contestable and insufficiently researched set of conclusions
about tensions within the Army, caused primarily by an apparent sense of hypocrisy, that increase
resistance to change beyond what can be explained by Army bureaucracy, organizational culture
or an uncertain strategic outlook. These three elements present impediments to innovation in and
of themselves; they are already the focus of many studies and assessments. But these are difficult
things for the Army’s leadership to actually affect, despite the rhetoric regarding efforts to do so.
The Army’s leadership can however control their communications regarding these facets of
organizational change, providing clarity over certainty, crafting consistent messages that
harmonize action with purpose across all three.

In order to do this, the Army’s leaders must be critical of messages presented to them,
asking first and foremost ‘does this ring true?’ rather than ‘does this say what we want to say?’
Those who craft the Army’s strategic messages must have, as a foundation to their efforts, a truly
systemic view of the Army. They must acknowledge the interdependence of its history, current
context, and future prospects, as well as the Army’s personality (culture), its organs
(bureaucracy), and the external forces (environment) acting upon it. Most efforts to implement
change within the Army look at the facets themselves, and this is worthwhile, but effective
change requires an understanding of the tensions between these things. Furthermore, effective change requires a humble appreciation for efficacy – knowing what things the Army’s leaders can change directly, what things they can influence towards change by describing a context that will inspire reformation from within, and what things are beyond their influence. If Army leaders can reconcile these things in their messages, as well as show action that avoids hypocrisy in their assertions, they could alleviate much of the potential resistance to change.

People in the Army resist being changed when they are not convinced that the proposed change is necessary, appropriate, or adequate – a reasonable response really. They resist change messages when those messages present hypocrisy between espoused values and beliefs and actual practices. These contradictions are most noticeable as tensions between the Army as a profession and the Army as a bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{71}

As with any complex adaptive (human) system, the Army does not always respond in a predictable manner. This is especially true when any one aspect of the ‘Army as a system’ changes apart from other significant parts, or when a force attempts to instigate change in one aspect that is not reflected in others. The ‘Army as a system’ tends to counter such perturbations in an attempt to maintain its own equilibrium. In order to affect real change within the Army, its leaders must do three things. First, avoid change messages that are hypocritical. Second, reinforce messages with significant changes in the DOTMLPF. Third, paint a picture of a future operating environment that matches these messages and actions. In all three, the emphasis must be on inspiring change rather than controlling or directing it. This subtle distinction requires the Army’s leaders to acknowledge that they cannot control transformation, but can only control small parts of the organization, and that transformation will occur only in response to significant shifts within the system or a dramatic change in the environment – not change messages alone.

ADDENDUM

This monograph reflects an incomplete journey in research. By its very nature, a study of
the Army’s response to change is a continuous endeavor. This paper mentioned only some of the
factors involved in understanding change in the Army and in mentioning those, the author only
scratched the surface. There remains a great deal of room for further research into the complexity
and particularly the interrelationship of the factors that affect change in the Army.

While tangential to the point of the paper, the author’s research method is worth noting as
an aside. The author’s research began with a simple question: ‘why does the Army have difficulty
with change?’ The author chose a research method based on the vagueness of the question and a
willingness to pursue research in any direction, even if it concluded with ‘the Army does not have
difficulty with change’ and thus required a new question. That method was grounded theory,72 at
least in spirit. While the author was not very familiar with grounded theory’s academic
application, it served as a guide in the questions the author asked of the data, what meaning the
author assigned to the data, and subsequently where the data took the author’s continued research.
For example, instead of taking statements at face value, the author asked what those statements
meant to the speaker or institution issuing them, as well as to their audience. One of the
fundamental questions that ended up guiding this research was ‘does this statement ring true?’
This question led to several contradictions, perhaps not intentional, but certainly possible in
perceptions.

The author would not have begun his research with a question about hypocrisy in the
Army. However, with open-ended research into a myriad of other issues, issues that many
researchers before have identified as the problem that impedes Army change, a veiled problem
emerged.

72 Kathy Charmaz, 1-12.
Coincidently, the course that this research followed, its preliminary findings, and its fundamental lack of closure ended up reflecting the School of Advanced Military Studies’ *Art of Design* in many ways.\(^7\) This is significant because the findings represent an opportunity to explore parallels between Design and an established academic research methodology. Academics and practitioners alike have been building upon Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss’ concepts since 1967.\(^7\) While grounded theory is typically associated with interviews as a method of data collection, the process can also be applied to actions, written documents and public statements.

While the grounded theory approach is not directly applicable to Design, many of its concepts seem to inform how one might conduct research as part of a Design team, particularly with respect to questions regarding human relationships and perceptions. This complements the concepts derived from complex adaptive systems research to integrate the human element of understanding problems.

\(^7\) Booze Allen Hamilton, *Art of Design: Student Text v1.0* (Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC – School of Advanced Military Studies, 2008), 58.


Press, Associated. "Casey: Army needs 3 to 4 years to recover from war." *USA Today,* June 20, 2008.


