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Working "Through, With, and By" Non-US Actors to Achieve Operational-Level Security Objectives

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Abstract

Title: Working "Through, With, and By" Non-US Actors to Achieve Operational-Level Security Objectives

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Thesis: Working "through, with, and by" non-US actors offers combatant commanders (CCDRs) an indirect method for resolving dynamic, highly complex problems and achieving operational-level objectives—a method that, depending on circumstances, can be politically more palatable and practically feasible than employing a traditional, direct approach.

Discussion: The US, lacking any peer competitors able to challenge it militarily, increasingly views the employment of conventional military power as a viable tool to achieve national security objectives. Paradoxically though, US military superiority and the willingness to employ force to accomplish policy objectives abroad may do more to retard than enable the realization of that objective. As a result, the US must develop an alternative approach to the traditional, direct employment of military force that includes less intrusive, indirect methods and emphasizes nontraditional applications of military power. This indirect method should focus on building mutually beneficial relationships with other agents or actors. Working "through, with, or by" non-US actors offers such an alternative, using relationships to build capacity and will in others to promoting the realization of US national security goals. This paper explores "through, with, and by" as a methodology: defining the terms, discussing the methodology's application at the operational-level, and considering the associated implications at the combatant command-level.

Conclusion: The indirect methodology of "through, with, and by" seeks to use relationships with non-US actors and shared recognition of a common problem to produce mutually beneficial outcomes. This indirect approach supports achieving US operational objectives without promoting perceptions of US hegemony. Consequently, this methodology offers the CCDR a viable alternative to traditional, direct applications of US military power.

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Acknowledgements

"The US is widely perceived as emphasising military power as a tool of foreign policy, at the expense of the complexities of diplomacy and other forms of 'soft' power."

-   Francois Heisburg
"American Hegemony? Perceptions of the US Abroad"

Introduction

The United States of America, as the world's sole superpower, has unparalleled national power and global reach. Logic dictates that such power should facilitate the United States achieving its national objectives. There are, however, real limits to what the direct application of America's national power can achieve.

There are currently no peer competitors able to realistically challenge the United States in a conventional military conflict. As a result, the United States and its military increasingly opt for direct applications of military power to achieve national security objectives.[1] The direct use of military power (or the threat thereof) is one element of the nation's 'hard' power and constitutes a traditional approach to employing military force.[2] The invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 are both examples of America's traditional employment of 'hard' power.

Yet, US military power, applied traditionally in Iraq and Afghanistan, has proven incapable of achieving its intended policy goals. Particularly in the case of Iraq, one can argue that America's decision to directly apply military power—notwithstanding the fact that the US arguably acted unilaterally—has significantly hampered its ability to realize stated policy objectives. This example illuminates a counterintuitive truth upon which this paper is based: the

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1. In this context, the word "direct" connotes the manifest use (or threatened use) of American military power to achieve policy goals. For example, "boots on the ground"—troops committed overseas—in support of American policy objectives falls under the rubric of "direct" applications of military power.

2. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5. Joseph Nye breaks down a nation's power into two broad categories: 'hard' and 'soft' power. Hard power is typically applied directly and "rests on inducements ("carrots") or threats ("sticks")." Typically, a nation's hard power stems from its military, economy or the influence thereof. Soft power, on the other hand, is defined by Nye as "the second face of power." "It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies."

direct application of military power to achieve a policy objective, at the expense of less obtrusive

military alternatives and balanced employment of national power, may retard rather than enable

the realization of that objective.

According to Robert Kagan, America's preeminent military power spawns a proclivity

for direct, unilateral action in pursuit of its policy goals. Kagan maintains that it is precisely

America's vast military power relative to the rest of the world that makes its direct use so

difficult to sanction.[3] Moreover, the direct, unbalanced employment of military power tends to

paint the United States as a hegemon *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. Consequently other nations,

to include potential partners, feel threatened by America's actions and tend to oppose them as a

counterbalance.[4]

If America's preeminent military power makes direct applications of military power

problematic—specifically, traditional applications of military power—the United States must

develop an alternative approach. Such an alternative must include a less intrusive, indirect

method that emphasizes nontraditional applications of military power. Unlike the oft ill-

perceived direct approach, this indirect technique should focus on building mutually beneficial

relationships with other agents or actors: namely, relationships that enhance our partners'

capacity and will to take actions which promote the realization of US national security goals.

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3. Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," Policy Review no. 113 (June and July 2002): 10-15. The majority of Kagan's piece focuses on explaining the nature of divergent American and European world views since the end of the Cold War. Kagan attributes this gulf to two factors. The strength of the United States versus the relative weakness of Europe is one factor. "American military strength has produced a propensity to use that strength. Europe's military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to the exercise of military power." The second factor follows from the first in that a strong United States continues to deal with security challenges using traditional power politics, whereas "Europe has moved beyond the old system of power politics and discovered a new system [which stresses] diplomacy, engagement, [and] inducements over sanctions…"

4. Nye, 26-27, 81. The French-led, anti-US bloc in the run up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq is an example of counterbalancing perceived US hegemony.

It is useful to consider unconventional warfare (UW), a facet of military operations that emphasizes indirect methods, while seeking to define and develop an indirect alternative to the traditional, direct approach. A key component of UW focuses on working "through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source."[5] Working "through, with, and by" non-US actors offers combatant commanders an indirect method for resolving dynamic, highly complex problems and achieving operational-level objectives—a method that, depending on circumstances, can be politically more palatable and practically feasible than employing a traditional, direct approach. This paper will explore "through, with, and by" as a methodology: defining the terms, discussing the methodology's application at the operational-level, and considering the associated implications at the combatant command-level.

What is Really Meant by the Phrase "Through, With, and By?" [6]

The phrase "through, with, and by" can be explained by examining different relationships between two notional actors (i.e., Actor A and Actor B) and relative capacities and will for undertaking action. In broad terms, working "through, with, and by" refers to the idea that Actor A directly or indirectly builds Actor B's capacity and will to take action to address a given problem, the resolution of which benefits both parties. Within this construct, capacity refers to an actor's ability to undertake action in a given situation, while will refers to an actor's freedom

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5. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C.: 12 April 2005 (as amended through 5 January 2007)), 562.

6. Boyatt, Mark, "Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?" Special Warfare (Summer 1998): 37; Crerar, J.H. "Special Forces Core Purpose: A Second Opinion," Special Warfare (Winter 1999): 16. The concept of working "through, by, and with indigenous populations" is viewed by many within the Special Forces community as being a core purpose of Special Forces. However, neither the Joint nor the Special Forces communities have a codified definition for "through, with, and by," nor is the concept linked to tactical tasks in their respective doctrine. As a result, the concept of working "through, with, and by" means different things to different people. Thus, defining "through, with, and by" has value in that it promotes development of a common understanding.

of choice. Will has three components: recognition of the problem, desire to take action, and determination to see that action through to completion. For clarity, the terms "through, with, and by" will be addressed from most to least visible with regard to the overt nature of underlying interactions, rather than defining them in the order in which they appear in the Joint UW definition.

"With" is the most overt association in the methodology, necessitating a physical presence and associated interaction between Actors A and B. "Accompanied by or accompanying," best defines the concept of working "with" another agent. [7] In a relationship defined as working "with," Actor A works alongside Actor B to address a given problem while providing Actor B with the capacity, will, or both capacity and will required to act. In this relationship, Actor A works shoulder-to-shoulder with Actor B, while facilitating the resolution of a mutual problem. Working "with" another actor is an on-the-scene activity where Actor A is physically present with Actor B, sharing ideas, providing advice, and combining resources.

A Special Operations assistance mission whereby Actor A trains and equips (builds capacity) in Actor B and then fights alongside him (provides will) demonstrates working "with" in terms of a military task. An excellent historical example is provided by Special Operations Executive/Office of Strategic Services (SOE/OSS) operatives who equipped and fought alongside Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia during World War II. SOE/OSS operatives built the partisans' capacity for action through aerial-delivered equipment, bolstered their will through their presence as representatives of the Western Allies (at least initially), and fought side by side

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7. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., s.v. "with." The concept of "with" also clearly applies to the relationship present between formal allies or coalition partners. However, in this paper the definition of "with" is confined to its applicability to working indirectly through surrogates and proxies.

to defeat the Germans in the Balkans.[8]

The second of the three relationships in order of observability is working "through" and refers to achieving an objective "by means of."[9] Working "through" implies a relationship in which Actor A works behind-the-scenes to provide Actor B with the capacity, will, or both to take action against a given problem, the resolution of which benefits both actors. The key component to working "through" is Actor A's reduced level of direct involvement in efforts to address the shared problem. In a "through" relationship, Actor A employs Actor B as a surrogate, enabling actions intended to resolve a shared problem by precursor counsel, training, equipping, or combination thereof.

According to this definition of "through," capacity building is not restricted to increasing physical capability, but can also apply to empowering the actions of other actors. If Actor B possesses the physical capability to take action but lacks the freedom to do so, and Actor A can sanction Actor B's right to act, then Actor A is working "through" Actor B by granting Actor B permission to act. Furthermore, in contrast to working "with," working "through" necessitates sharing ideas and providing advice <u>without</u> overtly taking action against the common problem. While "through" demands cooperation between the actors, it has no requirement for combined action.[10]

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8. Franklin Lindsay, <u>Beacons in the Night</u>, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 11-12. Not only does the example of SOE/OSS operations with Tito's Partisans superbly illustrate that mutually beneficial outcomes are integral to working "with" another actor, it also demonstrates that both sides' motives do not necessarily need to be coincident to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome. The OSS operatives were operating alongside the partisans to ensure that the maximum number of German divisions were tied down in the Balkans and unavailable for commitment elsewhere. The Partisans, on the other hand, were fighting both to liberate Yugoslavia from the heel of German occupation and secure political power after the war.

9. <u>Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary</u>, 10th ed., s.v. "through."

10. This is not meant to imply that the relationships developed in working "through" another are fleeting or short-termed in nature. Two actors can conceivably develop a deep, long-term relationship with one another based purely on a relationship characterized as "through." At the strategic-level, the United States' relationship with Egypt provides a good example of just such a relationship.

In terms of military tasks, "through" can best be illustrated by advising and training missions that fall under the aegis of foreign internal defense (FID). Since 2002, the US's Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has performed multiple FID missions, working "through" several countries in the region. Specifically, CJTF-HOA conducted a low-visibility FID mission in Yemen in mid-2003, providing their security forces with an enhanced counterterrorism (CT) capacity.[11] In June of that same year, Yemen used its increased CT capacity to eliminate elements of the Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan (IAA), an Al Qaeda affiliate linked to the bombing of the USS Cole.[12] Thus, by working "through" Yemen to eliminate a terrorist threat, the US enhanced Yemen's internal security while concurrently supporting the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

"By" is the indirect context's third and final relationship, promoting achievement of a desired outcome "through the agency or instrumentality of" another.[13] "By" assumes that an actor, who possesses the capacity and will sufficient to address a given problem, is going to engage that problem. The essence of "by" is that Actor B takes action to achieve an objective desired by Actor A, without Actor A necessarily prompting Actor B to do so. One can reasonably expect Actor B to address the problem, because Actor B recognizes the problem and has both the capacity and will to undertake action toward resolving it.

When the relationship of "by" is operative in a system composed of at least three actors, the system can be considered to be 'self-regulating' because no input is required from Actor A to

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11. This statement is based on the author's experiences while commanding the detachment that conducted the FID mission.

12. "Militants Killed' by Yemeni Forces," BBC News, U.K. Edition, 25 June 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east /3019746.stm> (accessed 6 February 2007); Michael Clark, "In the Spotlight: The Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)," Center for Defense Information, 23 November 2004, <http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=2679&from_page=../index.cfm> (accessed 06 February 2007).

13. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., s.v. "by."

elicit action on the part of Actor B. What is required for "by" to function is that both actors

recognize the problem and perceive that solving the problem will yield a beneficial outcome.

"By" is the least obtrusive of the three relationships because it may not require any initiating

action on the part of Actor A. Actor B simply acts because it is in his interest to do so. In Actor

B's mind, it may be merely coincidental that Actor A also benefits from B's actions. On the

other hand, a relationship characterized as "by" can be the result of having previously worked

"through" and "with" an actor, building the capacity and will required for the future action.

Thus, working "through" and "with" may be viewed as stepping stones to creating a 'self-

regulating' system in which actors take care of problems that affect the entire system without the

prompting or direct involvement of others to do so.

The Iranian role in the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman (1962-1975) is an excellent example of

the US working "by" another actor. Beginning in 1959 and continuing into the late-1970s, the

US worked "through" Iran in an effort to contain the Soviet Union. [14] During this period,

America provided the Pahlavi monarchy with significant military assistance against external,

notably communist, threats.[15] In 1973, Iran used its increased military capacity—without

American prompting—to intervene in the Sultan of Oman's ongoing counterinsurgency

campaign against the communist People's Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). "Iran's

military and economic support made an indispensable contribution toward turning the tide in

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14. Alvin J. Cottrell, "Iran's Armed Forces under the Pahlavi Dynasty," in Iran Under the Pahlavis, edited by George Lenczowski (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 398, 401.

It is also worthwhile to point out that America's decision to work indirectly "through" Iran can be traced directly to the Nixon Doctrine—itself an indirect strategy, albeit at the strategic-level. Jeffrey Kimball, author of "The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding," identifies the doctrine's key tenet as America's reliance on its allies to shoulder the primary burden of defending themselves against Communist encroachment, while America limited its involvement to providing military and economic assistance as well as advice.

15. Cottrell, 418-425.

Oman."[16] This case demonstrates working "by," because the Shah of Iran independently took action against a mutual problem. In fact, America's previous efforts to build Iranian capacity to counteract regional Soviet influence—activities conducted under a "through" relationship—enabled a subsequent "by" relationship in which Iran achieved US objectives, while pursuing its own interests.

What Makes "Through, With, and By" a Compelling Alternative to Direct Action?

The tautology of the argument for "through, with, and by" is that an actor, possessing or provided with sufficient capacity and will to act upon a given problem, can be reasonably expected to address that problem.[17] The actor's motivation for action is the perceived beneficial outcome that will result from solving the problem. Perceived beneficial outcome is also the motivating factor in cases where Actor A supplies capacity or will to Actor B. In the latter case, both parties engage in a relationship that will yield an outcome perceived as being mutually beneficial. In other words, both actors cooperate with one another to achieve a better endstate than that achievable by acting alone.

At a minimum, there are three prerequisites for a mutually beneficial exchange to occur between two actors: each actor must have information about the other, each must believe that the exchange will bring about an advantageous result, and each must be willing to enter into a relationship with the other. More directly stated, Actor A—whether an individual, organization, or nation state—must be aware of Actor B's existence and have some idea of B's capacity for action. Without both actors having information or awareness of the other, there would be no

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16. Cottrell, 407-408. Iran intervened in the Dhofar Rebellion in 1973 at the request of Sultan Qaboos of Oman. According to Calvin H. Allen Jr's Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution 1970-1996, direct Iranian military involvement in Dhofar lasted until 1979. At the height of their involvement the Iranian commitment numbered anywhere from 1,500 to 2,000 men with rotary, fixed-wing, and naval support.

17. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., s.v. "tautology." In this instance, the meaning of tautology as it applies to logic is intended (i.e., a statement "true by virtue of its logical form alone").

basis for a relationship to develop. Information about the other actor becomes particularly important at the international-level or in cross-cultural exchanges. Cultural knowledge facilitates identifying points of commonality between different actors that, when exploited, might yield a mutually beneficial result.

Second, each participant in the exchange must believe, or have reasonable assurance, that the exchange will result in a beneficial outcome (i.e., the actor will be better off in the end.) This implies that each actor is rational and will choose the option which benefits him most from a range of possibilities.[18] Understanding the other actor's rationale, although desirable, is not required to achieve a mutually beneficial exchange. Indeed, many conflicts are the result of difficulties inherent in understanding the rationale of another nation or culture. Each actor must merely acknowledge that the other actor is making the choice that is best for him and is, therefore, acting rationally.[19] What really matters is that the two actors are aware of one another and have recognized that cooperation will result in a mutually beneficial exchange.

In order to cooperate, the two actors must enter into a relationship with one another. Therefore, the building and maintaining of relationships is another key component of generating a mutually beneficial outcome. To function effectively, these relationships must be based upon trust and reciprocity. Trust is a vital component in any relationship. Building trust is a straightforward concept at the interpersonal-level: trust results when each actor's expectation

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18. Scott S. Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 13. Gartner describes the behavior of a rational actor as "not just intelligent behavior, but … behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system."

19. It must again be stressed that rationality, in this case, relates more to beliefs and value systems than it does to logic. As long as the actor believes that he is acting in his best interest according to his belief system, then he is acting rationally. For example, a suicide bomber who chooses to kill himself in the belief that he will become a martyr and gain entry into paradise is acting rationally. He is choosing the best possible outcome, given his beliefs and values, from amongst a range of possibilities. Although the suicide bomber's logic may appear flawed or uninformed from a Western perspective that places a premium on individual life, the individual is striving to obtain a desired outcome and, as a result, acting rationally.

that the other will perform or act as expected is satisfied over time. However, trust is not so easily achieved across nation states and cultures, diverse entities with a myriad of conflicting interests and divergent viewpoints. Pre-existing relationships, interpersonal relationships between the actors' representatives, and recurrent exchanges between actors are mechanisms for creating and maintaining the trust required to cooperate in such cases.

"Through, With, and By" at the Operational-level

How are the principles of "through, with, and by" applied at the operational-level? Could Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) employ "through, with, and by" to achieve operational-level goals? This section will address this question, illustrating the methodology's application with three historical examples.

When applied at the operational-level, "through, with, and by" is an indirect method by which the CCDR can achieve desired endstate conditions or operational objectives that directly contribute to campaign goals. This indirect approach is not a panacea. Instead, it provides CCDRs with an alternative method, diversifying the locus of possible employment options. "Through, with, and by" can serve as the cornerstone method of a campaign's operational design or it can support another method which more directly applies US military power.[20]

Whether employed singly or alongside other methods, working "through, with, and by" applies logical lines of operation to solve complex problems. The indirect nature of "through, with, and by" emphasizes causal relationships (i.e., cause and effect), complimenting the doctrinal idea that logical LOOs link nodes and decisive points to achieve the desired endstate

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20. U.S. Marine Corps, <u>MCDP 1-0: Marine Corps Operations</u>, (Washington, D.C.: 27 September 2001), 6-3. The Marine Corps defines operational design as the "commander's tool for translating the operational requirements of his superiors into the tactical guidance needed by his subordinate commanders and his staff." The most current version of <u>JP 5-0: Joint Operational Planning</u> defines the same term as "the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution."

"when positional reference to the enemy has little relevance."[21] In its most basic form, the methodology is nothing more than a group of actors (i.e., nodes) that recognize a common problem and share a desire to resolve the problem (i.e., links). Under this approach, harnessing surrogate desires and resultant actions is essential to achieving the desired endstate. In fact, the ability to tie "through, with, and by" into a logical LOO will be determined primarily by the surrogate actors' respective capacity and will, as well as the strength and depth of underlying relationships with those actors.

"Through, with, and by" has application not only as a primary or supporting method of a logical LOO, but also within the concept of operational phasing as described in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operational Planning and illustrated in Appendix (1).[22] As depicted in Appendix (1), the level of direct military effort varies across operational phase, rising and falling in accordance with phase-dependent intermediate objectives and the associated logical LOO. Depending upon specific operational requirements (e.g., time horizons, acceptable risk, and asset availability/applicability), working "through, with, and by" other actors can have applicability in multiple operational planning phases and LOOs. For example, a FID mission with a regional partner in Phase 0 could contribute directly to deterrence goals in Phase 1, raising a partner's capacity and will to defend against the actions of a potentially hostile third party. Furthermore, surrogate assets created via "through, with, and by" in Phases I and II to support Dominating

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21. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 17 September 2006), IV-13. The most current joint publication states that logical lines of operations (LOOs) are used to "link multiple actions on nodes and/or decisive points with military objectives using the logic of purpose-cause and effect. Logical LOOs also help commanders visualize how military means can support nonmilitary instruments of national power." Logical lines of operation are "used when positional reference to an enemy has little relevance."

22. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operational Planning, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 26 December 2006), IV-35.

Activities, could be employed in Phases IV and V to support both Stabilizing and Enabling Civil Authority Activities.

"Through, with, and by" can create significant value for operational planning when conducted during Phase 0 or Phase 1 operations. Local and theater shaping activities undertaken indirectly can produce effects that transcend Shaping Activity objectives, contributing directly to Deterrence and/or Dominating Activity goals. Additionally, employing "through, with, and by" approaches during Phase 0 could minimize the direct military effort required in subsequent operational phases, acting as a force multiplier while addressing targeted problems.

Historical Examples of "Through, With, and By"

As previously stated, America's employment of military force is not traditionally associated with an indirect approach. The United States—for a variety of cultural, historical, and economic reasons—typically chooses direct confrontation and relies on technologically advanced conventional forces to wage short, sharp conflicts to defeat opponents. However, in the past, the US military has employed indirect approaches in support of more direct methods. In some instances, success has validated the use of the indirect approach. In other instances, the indirect approach was mistakenly applied and failed to produce the desired outcome.

During World War II, the Western Allies employed an indirect approach while working "with" Tito's Partisans in Yugoslavia. Although the Western Allies successfully employed this approach in the Balkans in support of larger efforts to defeat Germany, indirect methods had the unintended consequence of frustrating their postwar position in Europe. Small OSS/SOE teams parachuted into occupied-Yugoslavia and worked "with" Partisan groups to achieve a dual purpose. Militarily, they tied down the maximum possible number of German units in the Balkans, hindering movements of German troops and assets to other fronts. Politically, these

teams provided the Partisans and local population with tangible evidence of the Western Allies' support for their cause, thereby building Yugoslav will.[23]

Franklin Lindsay, one such OSS operative, parachuted into Slovenia in May of 1944 and operated in Yugoslavia through the end of the war. His specific mission was to "cut German rail lines connecting Austria, Italy, and the Balkans."[24] To accomplish his task, Lindsay worked with a Partisan group in the Stajerska region, building their capacity for offensive action through regular airdrops of Allied weapons and supplies.[25] The fact that the Germans launched a multi-division, anti-Partisan sweep through Stajerska in late 1944 illustrates Lindsay's success in attaining the mission's military purpose—to tie-up German units in the Balkans.[26]

On the surface, the Western Allies' indirect approach in Yugoslavia appears to have been a success. However, the capacity for action provided by the Allies' substantial airdrops produced unintended consequences even before the Germans' defeat. Instead of directing all of his energy against the Germans, Tito used his newly acquired military capacity to eliminate Draža Mihailović's *Chetniks—*the prime threat to a postwar Yugoslavia under communist rule.[27] Likewise, Tito sparked the first Cold War clash in May 1945, when he tried to use his Allied-equipped forces to expand the borders of pre-war Yugoslavia by occupying Trieste and portions of Austria.[28]

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23. Lindsay, 11.

24. Lindsay, 18.

25. It is noteworthy that Lindsay's relationship *vis-à-vis* the Partisans, although best characterized as working "with" them, did not involve building the Partisans' capacity or will through training. From the Partisan perspective, working "with" the OSS/SOE was beneficial only in as much as it built their military capacity.

26. Lindsay, 200-202. For the specific results of Lindsay's mission to cut the rail lines through Stajerska see pages 84-87.

27. Lindsay; 26, 265-267.

28. Lindsay, 291.

This example provides several lessons. First, capacity for action, once supplied, has application beyond the scope of the problem it was furnished to solve. Furthermore, the Western Allies and Tito, despite a shared recognition of the necessity of defeating the Germans, had widely divergent motives for entering into a relationship with the other.[29] Finally, the Western Allies would have done well to fully appreciate Tito's long-term goals and underlying motives prior to equipping the Partisans.

The second historical example illustrates a successful application of working both "through" and "with" indigenous forces to achieve operational-level goals. From 1971 until 1973, the US Army Vietnam Individual Training Group (UITG) undertook "one of the "least known, but most effective FID missions conducted by US Special Forces."[30] The mission's purpose was to build the newly installed Khmer government's military capability against communist insurgency.[31] Operating under its initial mandate to train the *Forces Armee National Khmer* (FANK), US Special Forces trained, equipped, and operated alongside seventy-eight Cambodian battalions at facilities in South Vietnam.[32] In May 1972, UITG's mandate expanded to include re-training elements of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) after its near

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29. Whether or not the Western Allies had a realistic choice to not provide material support to the communist Partisan in Yugoslavia can be argued. Additionally, one could also effectively argue that the Western Allies, the British in particular, were aware of the communists' postwar designs. However, the fact remains that by providing Tito with the capacity to take meaningful action against the Germans in the Balkans, he was also given the capacity to consolidate communist control in Yugoslavia and grab territory in the immediate aftermath of the war. The US and UK worked "with" the Partisans to solve the immediate problem of defeating the Germans but, in doing so, exacerbated a problem for themselves in the postwar world.

30. Kenneth R. Bowra, "An Historical Study: The U.S. Army Vietnam Individual Training Group (UITG) Program, 1971-1973," Individual Study Project, (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1991), 1. Interestingly, the UITG Program provides an example of multiple, developed actors working "with" undeveloped actors, as the program was staffed not only by Americans, but also by Australians and New Zealanders.

31. Bowra, 3. The Khmer government came to power by overthrowing the former regime under Prince Sihanouk who had broken diplomatic relations with the United States in 1963.

32. Bowra, 7. U.S. Special Forces were not permitted to train Cambodian forces in Cambodia due to the Cooper-Church Act of 1970. This act "prohibited the use of funds for the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisors."

collapse during the 1972 Easter Offensive. Employing only 150 Special Forces trainers, the

UITG re-trained 64 ground maneuver battalions—40% of the ARVN's ground force.[33]

"Although both South Vietnam and Cambodia were overrun by their enemies, Special Forces

enabled the end to be significantly delayed."[34]

There are multiple lessons to derive from UITG experiences. The most obvious is that by

working "through" and "with" the Cambodians, the US employed minimal manpower to create a

large, relatively effective force to combat communist insurgency. Moreover, resulting

Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces allowed the US, at least for a time, to retard the

regional spread of communism. The UITG example also highlights the importance of personal

relationships in working "through, with, and by" other actors. The Special Forces trainers

created a strong rapport with their trainees by learning local languages and incorporating other

culturally relevant means.[35] While such grassroots actions may seem unimportant at the

operational-level, they are integral to overcoming cultural differences, building goodwill, and

cementing relationships necessary for future cooperation between organizations, groups, and

countries.

The final historical example deals with maritime security in the Strait of Malacca. This

illustration highlights the negative response attendant to a perceived US direct approach, thereby

reinforcing the need for a viable alternative. One third of the world's shipping and half of the

world's oil transits through the strait each year, making this choke point of vital interest to the

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33. Bowra; 15, 19. The UITG was redesignated as the FANK Field Training Command after the 1972 Easter Offensive.

34. Bowra, 26. Bowra cites Lieutenant General Phan Trong Chinh, Chief of the ARVN Central Training Command, who attested to the effectiveness of the training program and its effect on the ARVN in the wake of the 1972 Easter Offensive. "If it had not been for the FANK Training Command, there would not be an I Corps today."

35. Bowra; 10, 26. One of the rapport building measures undertaken by the UITG was their decision to wear the colors of the Khmer Republic on their beret flashes.

United States and regional nations.[36] Coupled with frequent acts of local piracy—there were 325 attacks in 2004—and the region's known links to radical Islamic fundamentalists, it is no surprise that the US was and remains concerned over the potential for terrorist attacks against commercial shipping in the strait.[37]

In March 2004, US Pacific Command (USPACOM) proposed the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) to address this problem. Admiral Thomas Fargo, the USPACOM Commander, described RMSI as an initiative to work with regional partners against "transnational threats like proliferation, terrorism, trafficking in humans or drugs, and piracy."[38] Unfortunately, when asked how he would resource RMSI, Admiral Fargo chose to emphasize US actions over those of its regional partners. Specifically, during Congressional testimony, he stated that USPACOM was exploring "putting Special Operations Forces on high-speed vessels, putting, potentially, Marines on high-speed vessels… to conduct effective interdiction."[39]

The regional response to Admiral Fargo's comments was both negative and immediate. Both Malaysia and Indonesia responded that "the security of the Malacca strait is for Indonesia and Malaysia to shoulder. Therefore, we will not accept any policies ...that are inconsistent with

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36. Thomas Fargo, Remarks (Military Operations and Law Conference, Victoria, British Columbia, 3 May 2004), <http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040503milops.shtml.> (accessed 13 February 2007).

37. Sumathy Permal, "Piracy and Sovereignty in the Strait of Malacca," Centre for Maritime Security and Diplomacy, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 11 May 2005, <http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/ pdf/sumathy/som-piracy.pdf> (accessed 14 February 2007), 3.

38. House Armed Services Committee, Testimony of Admiral Thomas B. Fargo Regarding U.S. Pacific Command Posture, 31 March 2004, http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040331housearmedsvcscomm.shtml (accessed 13 February 2007), 7.

39. House Armed Services Committee, Testimony of Admiral Thomas B. Fargo Thomas Fargo, Question & Answer Session, 31 March 2004, <http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040331hasc-qa.shtml> (accessed 13 February 2007), 2.

this reality."[40] Although envisioned as an indirect approach to work "with" regional partners,

RMSI was interpreted internationally as yet another instance of direct US unilateral action. This

example reinforces the perception abroad that the US has a "pre-emptive unilateralist approach

to conflict resolution."[41] Furthermore, it illustrates that working indirectly "through, with, and

by" other actors can be a viable method of achieving otherwise unattainable objectives.[42]

Considerations for the Indirect Approach

Cost is a chief consideration in deciding to employ an indirect approach such as "through,

with, and by" in lieu of more traditional, direct approaches. At first glance, cost can be measured

in terms of resources expended, estimated likelihood of success (i.e., expected value of gain),

expenditures of goodwill required to initiate working relationships with other actors, and the

longevity of support from the American public and key decision makers. Currently, the cost of

employing an indirect versus a direct approach is high. Institutionally, the US military has

neither the mindset, nor the organizational structure to effectively work "through, with, or by"

other actors on a large scale.[43] This is not to say that the US military is devoid of leaders who

understand and embrace the efficacy of indirect approaches. Unfortunately, such leaders are the

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40. John Burton and Shawn Donnan, "US Plan to Guard Strait of Malacca Not Welcome," <u>Financial Times</u>, 6 April 2004, <http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=US+Plan+to+Guard+Strait+of+Malacca&aje=true&id=040406001090> (accessed 14 February 2007).

41. Permal, 3.

42. Patrick Goodenough, "Renewal of US-Malaysia Pact a Sign of Improving Ties," CNSNews.com, 9 May 2005, <http://www.cnsnews.com/ForeignBureaus%5Carchive%5C200505%5CFOR20050509c.html> (accessed 14 February 2007). Goodenough's article describes a marked improvement in US-Malaysian relations, despite Malaysia's initial negative response to Admiral Fargo's remarks, and specifically mentions the US desire to work "with" the regional partners within the context of RMSI. Furthermore, the article reports that "Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore have established joint patrols in the Strait," and that US offered Indonesia "expertise in the policing of ships."

43. Brian Harp, "Excluding Unconventional Warfare Solutions: Conventional Thinking in the Military's Educational System," Unpublished Monograph, Naval Postgraduate School, 1. Harp contends that the US military, as a whole, does not understand UW operations and, by default, the indirect approaches such operations employ.

exception, rather than the rule. Consequently, this methodology is not mainstream and is typically accomplished by a small specialized force: namely, regionally-specific Special Forces Groups for whom the indirect approach is their *raison d'être*.[44]

The US military can lower the cost of the indirect approach by improving its ability to operate "through, with, and by" other actors. In practical terms, deployable personnel at all levels will require more cultural and language training to facilitate building relationships. Cultural training should focus less on simple customs and more on how other cultures view situations and interpret underlying issues.[45] Such cultural appreciation is necessary in discerning points of commonality between actors, building effective relationships, and identifying mutually beneficial outcomes. As a corollary, tours of duty should be lengthened for individuals in billets having frequent contact with foreign governments and their militaries. Longer tours facilitate enhanced appreciation for a specific culture and, more importantly, build the personal relationships that underlie the "through, with, and by" concept.

Given the capacity to work "through, with, and by" others, the indirect approach has significant force multiplier implications for the US military. Employing other actors to achieve our aims expands the locus of resources available to resolve a given situation. Moreover, building the capacity and will of other actors reduces tasks the US would otherwise have to undertake with its own finite assets, thereby permitting employment of US-unique capabilities in other applications.

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44. Boyatt, "Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?", 37; Boyatt, Mark, "Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations," Special Warfare (October 1994): 11. Colonel Boyatt identifies the "core purpose of Special Forces [as] ...accomplishing Special Forces missions through, with, or by indigenous populations."

45. It is the author's contention that "understanding" another culture is a misnomer. Unless one comes from that culture, the best that can be hoped for is an appreciation for how the culture makes decisions and views the world.

Working "through, with, and by" others also reduces the likelihood of conflict for the United States. Building the capacity and will of other actors to solve mutual problems during Phase 0 (Shaping) and Phase I (Deterrence) may resolve problems early, reducing ensuing crisis potential and obviating the need for direct US involvement. Ideally, the US would use other actors to address problems before they metastasize. At worst, operating indirectly through relationships will build consensus for follow-on multilateral solutions, disarming Robert Kagan's concern over the unilateral use of direct US military power and its accompanying international opprobrium.

Regardless of results gained via the indirect approach, US leaders must appreciate the primacy of the approach's enabling relationships and the fundamental fact that "empowered" non-US actors achieve desired results. Granting non-US actors ownership of achieved results legitimizes their actions and resource expenditures, demonstrates "buy-in," and strengthens relationships with the US. In so doing, the US validates the actor's decision to enter into a mutually-beneficial relationship, increasing the likelihood of recurrent exchanges. Furthermore, by establishing and maintaining a tradition of reliable partnerships, US leaders increase the value of our country's "brand name," strengthening existing relationships and expanding the locus of actors willing to work on our behalf.[46] Consequently, when working "indirectly" with non-US actors, US leaders should eschew short-term gains that could jeopardize long-term relationships (e.g., misrepresenting the value and difficulty of projects to garner and exploit short-term participation).

As with any method, there are disadvantages with the indirect approach. One disadvantage is that the US will not have direct control over actions, making the assessment of

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[46]. In this case, the economic term "brand name" is synonymous with Joseph Nye's concept of "soft power."

the overall strategy's performance and effectiveness much more difficult. Moreover, the need to depend on the actions of others can retard timely response, especially in flashpoint or crisis situations where requisite relationships do not exist. Additionally, unintended consequences from an actor's increased capacity and will can be a thorny issue, as illustrated by Tito's unforecasted offensive actions in Yugoslavia.[47]

Conclusion

In a world in which America is increasingly perceived as "favoring policies of coercion rather than persuasion [and] ...punitive sanctions over inducements," the US military must overcome its "psychological bias" toward direct rather than indirect solutions.[48] The traditional, direct application of America's military power in today's globalized, international structure increasingly thwarts vice facilitates the realization of operational objectives. The US military must expand its "institutional repertoire" and embrace other solutions.[49] The indirect methodology of "through, with, and by" offers CCDRs another option—an approach that focuses on mutually-beneficial interactions and, as a result, does not promote perceptions of hegemonic intent.

Unlike direct applications of military power, this indirect methodology seeks to use relationships with other actors and shared recognition of a common problem to produce mutually beneficial outcomes. Such relationships provide a context in which CCDRs furnish actors with

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47. The issue of how other actors or agents employ their newly acquired capacity is a perennial problem. It relates directly to UW and the problem of disarming proxy forces in the aftermath of hostilities. At a minimum, there are two parts to solving this problem at the operational-level. First, planners must identify the minimum capacity required to solve a given problem, enabling the development of tailored capabilities vice creating superfluous capacity. Second, planners must appreciate the goals and motivating factors of partner actors. Such an appreciation guards against second or third order effects begetting unintended consequences.

48. Kagan, 1; Gilles Andréani, "The Disarray of US Non-Proliferation," Survival (Winter 1999-2000): 43.

49. Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam, RAND Report R-967-ARPA, RAND Corporation, August 1972, 145.

the capacity and will to resolve mutual problems, directly supporting achievement of US

operational objectives. This method can be the basis for an entire campaign or support a more

direct application of US military power. Hence, "through, with, and by" arms the CCDR with a

non-traditional, indirect alternative for realizing operational objectives in a global environment

where the direct approach is increasingly counterproductive and costly.

Appendix (1)

Figure (1) from JP 5-0: Joint Operational Planning, IV-35

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